Petitioners Brief — Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh
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(5) | Supreme Court, U.S.
$ FILED
JUN
No. 88-1640 30 1989
—_— ——
| CLERK
NIOL, JR.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
MICHIGAN CITIZENS
FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRESS, et al,
Petitioners,
V.
DICK THORNBURGH,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
William B. Schultz
_ (Counsel of Record)
David C. Vladeck
Alan B. Morrison
Public Citizen Litigation4Group
2000 P Strect, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-3704
Attorneys for Petitioners
June 30, 1989
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. In determining whether two competitively equal newspa-
pers qualify for an antitrust exemption under the Newspaper
Preservation Act, which requires that one of them be in “prob-
able danger of financial failure,” may the Attorney General
approve the application on the basis of a construction of the Act
that only requires (a) a showing that both papers have lost money
for several years and (b) a statement by representatives of the
“non-failing” paper that it will not raise its prices even if the
exemption is denied?
2. Does this Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), require a
reviewing court to defer to an administrative agency’s expansive
interpretation of an exemption from the antitrust laws where the
agency's construction is at odds with the established rule that
exemptions from the antitrust laws must be narrowly construed?
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
Petitioners Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press, Public
Citizen, Senator John F. Kelly, W. Edward Wendover, David A.
Kersh, William B. Cowan, Matthew Beer, and Murray Green-
halge, Jr., appeared as plaintiffs-appellants below.
Respondents United States Attorney General Dick Thorn-
burgh, Detroit Free Press (owned by Knight-Ridder, Inc.) and
The Detroit News (owned by Gannett Co.) appeared as defen-
dants-appellees below.
In addition, the American Newspaper Publishers Association
and Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. appeared as amici curiae in the
court of appeals.
ll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
BAABEs CP AUTIBORITIES. ..0....ccccccccccccssscccccssscsssessscssscsveces Vv
Ee 1
se, cncrccncivecesonsccesncevonecooescoosenes l
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .............cccccccccesseceseceeseees 2
Neen ee os cncusnsnsnsscnncensocsorescononoone 4
NS 0 hs 13
EEE 15
I. APPROVAL OF THE DETROIT JOINT
OPERATING ARRANGEMENT (“JOA”)
IS CONTRARY TO THE NEWSPAPER
Ee 15
A. The NPA May Not Be Interpreted
to Encourage Profitable Newspapers
to Engage in Behavior Leading
Neen ccscesscccncsesesvesresecons 15
B. The Attorney General Violated the
NPA Because His Decision Significantly
Increases the Likelihood That
- Otherwise Profitable Newspapers
Nee snc csccscercnesencssesceresees 21
ill
1. The Record Establishes That the TABLE Or AUTHORITIES
News and the Free Press Are Com-
petitive Equals in a Market That Cases: Page:
Can Support Two Newspapers and
That the Free Press Has Not Lost Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell,
Ey Sg SL), Ea ene ee na 3]
Bowen v. American Hospital Association,
2. The Attorney General’s Decision
476 U.S. ET ssldbatnbactasesdunaciiibbtaamibieaes
Improperly Turns the NPA Into a Se II ici cindiaaddeniciachenia aa ceaieaea 31, 38
Statute That Encourages Conduct Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
That Will Inevitably Lead to Fe hs ee Ie CIID titi seccnsencssststiannsinntnesunnnsiicbensaieniessinsiieinnies 31
: SIN tesscnaeioastiinidsliahssetlapmadeanioniaiiad ee
Reduced COMpetitsOn. ..ce.eeeseseeonens Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
C By SF Why PE COD cisccsancrsserccenesccosarereccecess i
I. CHEVRON DOES NOT PROVIDE A ounci U.S. 837 (1984) ...Passim
BASIS FOR UPHOLDING THE Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DECISION. ................... 29 re cee SUIT scussdanestdlicahsestshasesasctansicidiadsowsniaviusavadaubaade 14
Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst,
A. Chevron Did Not Alter the Applicability 704 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.). cert. denied
od Js rT. denied,
of the Rule That Exemptions From
Re is Cee CIID cccdtdiedecececdncinsedsecekecensadesoncasless 20, 28, 26
the Antitrust Laws Must Be Narrowly ; ?
SI aciccniicediadetaihiharisltesiitamionee ndliiiaainitgliaraiel 30 DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building
and Construction Trade Council,
B. The Court Should Not Defer to the i | ne, LTE *
Attorney General’s Construction of the NPA. ........34 7 ee
7 , Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain,
nA RE he + se Oa Te ean 14, 33, 35
RULE AE PUNE ccvcucsesasacensheibtinnicsachsamsnaniealeinabiainanatalaibieetiidikdd ated eee 39 II, J.
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) voce, 35
Group Life and Health Insurance v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) wo ccccccecceecceeeee, 14, 29, 31
Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 20.00... 32
International Shoe Co. v. FTC,
I, i aetiamniapeiontensnaaiiad 16
Lieberman v. FTC,
sigh oe & fo Rh Reeser een 37
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,
i, MT oo. resarnninosentonnnebeanenniectons 31
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) .......ccccccccceeeeeees 14, 26-27
NLRB vy. Hearst Publications,
, 3 BE | nn eT Eee 34
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. v.
United States, 826 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1987) .........cceeeee 32
Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury,
I casinniesenanbiebintesionl 3]
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureaus, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) ............ccccccesecssrseceessrceeesseres ID
- United States v. First City National Bank,
I a a caeasseieisiainieeiovaniomnsian 34
United States v. Third National Bank,
. 4 & Rie, Der 13, 19, 20, 36
vi
Statutes and Regulations:
Bank Merger Act,
a te II sc scrcnsecsenedcsesusneesesusekanseobamouiiies 19
Clayton Act,
OI sa aeacladeegedessdiendacidetsniiabiaieendalbaesmbedpiannih 15-16
Export Trading Company Act,
Sr eh I cepted aliusiselenmecacueuaninle 35
Federal Trade Commission Act,
See AT IIT bocshssisinhnsiabioscecauietoiasecscicieaabidstssealiddaihainiisasbicubsiaiaeiae 35
Fishers’ Coop Marketing Act,
co pk Not ky | See aN NeC NI:
Interstate Commerce Act,
FP res Te FIG BAO crtncncesncssnssececescrinn mrissnsneternesoanes 35
Newspaper Preservation Act,
I I accede aicsaciielnabcadinipsteiesadnsealabibiatlaie 4, 18, 38
Be IIT siiiiinijnsiistpisinsnindesinendivntiintcadansiasboes 4,6, 17
aN: UI tdcniccacustsadeaclacusihendseutntmceasiebbersenee 4,17, 37
Be eat i MII vxcnnhcosicecenidncdnshcagieaiadbedsasaumbelesan passim
a sh i UII ao lia ddcidncisebenuvsisuctensiincanidanichslsaialiununieahdaen 27
Sherman Antitrust Act,
Sor TE Tis UIE ne cca las aeadiiecileseiaceldnbepenissandcnissntonineceomecdebanesinl 16
Shipping Act of 1916,
et I cia seeithscaesacedesceidiacesdtateshdhisinbenoisinadiasiiassbadeaaniinaahda 33
Be es A EO ocetessecidihcccaslinasctaniuesiaisDleiiininndesdisaebanmbanenaeal 2
nee AN I I cricaseaschstpciicansisioisdancinscticicidnididcnsnusscundmaseiobiaon 5
rp Lee oF EF Le |_| Sa een r INTe 8, 20
Vil
Legislative Authorities:
H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ........... 16, 17
The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings
on H.R. 279 Before the Antitrust Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Piast Cong., Lat Seas. (1DGR) .....cccseorecveceseevversesveseeeeenes 16, 37
The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings
on S. 1312 Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) .............00+ 16
The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings
on S. 1520 Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ..............0+ 37
S. Rep. No. 535, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)........... 17, 19, 36
S. 1520, Dist Cons... 868 Foes (IFS) ....resccrceserecccscvsesssssee 17, 37
116 Cong. Rec. 2,006 (1970) ae anneal 37
$216 Come, Rac. ZOIUT (IGT) ...0.00.ccvssescesecesosscccesesversversseveees 17
116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) .......cccecerervessseserseresees 17, 19, 36
116 Cong. Rec. 23,148 (1970) .........cesrscrcrsscoserceeernssereneensooes 18
116 Cong, Rec. 23,154 (1970) ........c.0rccsersccosseosesrcrserenssnscooes 17
116 Come. Rec. 25,179 (IFT) ......crcossescosccssesvescenvesenevsesenssees 17
Vill
Other Authorities:
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975) .o....ccccccccccccceees 26
Bork, R., The Antitrust Paradox (1978) ........ccccccccccccceccceeceeee 26
McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited,
23 TL. & Boom. ZED (IDG) .......ceceececcecsecsesesscsescecsvsscseceees 26
Report of the Assistant Attorney General,
Public File No. 44-03-24-4 (January 6, 1978)
SI ee a 19
Report of the Assistant Attorney General,
Public File No. 44-03-25-5 (May 19, 1980)
I 29
Report of the Assistant Attorney General,
Public File No. 44-03-26-6 (May 29, 1981)
I eer ec el i 20
Supplemental Report of the Assistant Attorney
General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5
(June 2, 1980) (Chattanooga) .............cccccccccceeeceeeeeeeeeees 19-20
45 Fed. Reg. 58, 733 (September 4, 1980) ......ccccccecceeecceeeeee. 29
47 Fed. Reg. 26, 472 (June 18, 1982) w.o..cccccceccceeceseeeeseeee, 29
1X
No. 88-1640
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
MICHIGAN CITIZENS
FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRESS, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
DICK THORNBURGH,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the court of appeals’ panel (Pet. App. 166a -
90a) are reported at 868 F.2d 1285. The opinions regarding the
court of appeals’ order denying rehearing en banc (Pet. App.
191-97a) are reported at 868 F.2d 1300. The opinion of the
district court (Pet. App. 149a-63a) is reported at 695 F. Supp.
1216.’
‘Pet. App. __” refers to the separately bound appendix to the petition for
a writ of certiorari. “J.A.__” refers to the joint appendix submitted with this
brief.
tl
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on January
27, 1989, and the order denying rehearing en banc was entered
on February 24, 1989 (Pet. App. 164a, 199a). The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked undei 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat.
466, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04, provides in pertinent part:
Section 1801. Congressional declaration of policy.
In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper pr’ ss
editorially and reportorially independent and competitive
in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be
the public policy of the United States to preserve the
publication of newspapers in any city, community, or
metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement has
been heretofore entered into because of economic distress
or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter.
Section 1802. Definitions.
* * *
(5) The term “failing newspaper” means a newspaper
publication which, regardless of its ownership or affili-
ations, is in probable danger of financial failure.
Section 1803. Antitrust Exemptions.
(a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for
any person to perform, enforce, renew, or amend any joint
newspaper operating arrangement entered into prior to July
24, 1970, if at the time at which such arrangement was first
entered into, regardless of ownership or affiliations, not
more than one of the newspaper publications involved in
the performance of such arrangement was likely to remain
or become a financially sound publication . . .
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into,
perform, or enforce a joint operating arrangement, not
already in effect, except with the prior written consent of the
Attorney General of the United States. Prior to granting
such approval, the Attorney General shall determine that
not more than one of the newspaper publications involved
in the arrangement is a publication other than a failing
newspaper, and that approval of such arrangement would
effectuaie the policy and purpose of this chapter.
(c) Nothing contained in the chapter shall be construed
to exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing, any
predatory practice, or any other conduct in the otherwise
lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrange-
ment which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if
engaged in by a single entity. Except as provided in this
chapter, no joint newspaper operating arrangement or any
party thereto shall be exempt from any antitrust law.
The Department of Justice’s regulations pertaining to the News-
paper Preservation Act, 28 C.F.R. § 48-1988), provide in perti-
nent part:
Section 48.10. Hearings.
(a) Upon the issuance by the Attorney General of an
order for a hearing, the Assistant Attorney General for
Administration shall appoint an administrative law judge in
accordance with section 11 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. 3105. The administrative law judge
shall:
~ * «
(4) Conducta hearing in accordance with section 7 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 556. At such
hearing, the burden of proving that the proposed arrange-
ment meets the requirements of the Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act will be on the proponents of the arrangement.
STATEMENT
1. On May 9, 1986, respondents Detroit Free Press (the “Free
Press’’) and The Detroit News (the “News”) filed an application
with the respondent Attorney General for approval of a joint
operating arrangement (“JOA”) pursuant to the Newspaper
Preservation Act (the “NPA” or the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801
et seq.
As will be explained more fully below, the Newspaper Pres-
ervation Act of 1970 is Congress’s response to this Court’s
decision in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394U.S. 131
(1969), which held that a pre-existing JOA violated the antitrust
laws. Recognizing that this Court’s stringent standard might
impose a hardship on newspapers that had been operating under
a JOA for many years, Congress retroactively approved JOAs
where, at the time of the agreement, at least one of the newspa-
pers was not “likely to remain or become a financially sound
publication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1803(a). However, Congress adopted
a more exacting standard for future JOAs, which are permitted
only if one of the papers is a“‘failing newspaper,” a term that the
Act defines as a “newspaper publication which, regardless of its
ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial
failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5). Congress also provided that, in
order to obtain an antitrust exemption, post-1970JOAs must first
be approved by the Attorney General. 15 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
Detroit is the nation’s fifth largest newspaper market. The
News, the nation’s seventh largest newspaper, is Detroit’s only
afternoon newspaper, and the Free Press, the nation’s eighth
largest newspaper, is the dominant, daily morning newspaper.
Pet. App. 7a, 14a, 15a. The Free Press has been owned by
Knight-Ridder, Inc. (“Knight-Ridder’’) or its corporate prede-
cessor since 1940. The News was owned by the Evening News
Association until 1986, when it was purchased by Gannett Co.,
Inc. (“Gannett”). Gannett and Knight-Ridder are the two largest
newspaper chains in the United States.
The application identified the Free Press as the “failing
newspaper.” Pet. App. 137a. The JOA provides that the Detroit
market would be divided between the two newspapers for the
next 100 years. Under the agreement, the News would eliminate
its morning, weekday edition. It would publish only an afternoon
daily newspaper, and the Free Press would publish only a
morning newspaper. The JOA also provides that the newspapers
would publish a joint edition on Saturdays and Sundays and that
the news and editorial staffs of the two newspapers would remain
independent. Pet. App. 114a-16a.
The newspapers would form a partnership known as “The
Detroit Newspaper Agency,” which would make all commercial
decisions for both papers, including setting their sales prices and
advertising rates. The News would receive 55% of the profits
during the first year, but thatpercentage would decrease until the
beginning of the sixth year, after which the profits would be
divided evenly. Pet. App. 173a.
In accordance with the Department of Justice’s regulations,
28 C.F.R. § 48.7 (1988), the application was referred to then-
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Douglas H. Ginsburg,
who concluded in a 70-page report that the applicants had not
carried their burden of establishing that the Free Press was a
failing newspaper. He pointed out that there is a serious question
as to why the News is “willing to share 50% of the profits of the
JOA with the Free Press (after the first five years) if, as the parties
assert, ‘the inescapable conclusion [is] that the financial losses
of the Free Press will continue indefinitely [absent a JOA].’” J.A.
89-90 (brackets in original). However, to give the applicants
another opportunity to prove their case, Assistant Attorney
General Ginsburg recommended that Attorney General Edwin
Meese III appoint an administrative law judge to hear evidence.
Id. at 93.
2. Attorney General Meese referred the application to Admin-
istrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Morton Needelman, who presided
over a three-week evidentiary hearing, at which 16 witnesses
testified, and at which the Justice Department’s Antitrust Divi-
sion opposed the application. Pet. App. 1a, 5a-6a. On December
29, 1987, Judge Needelman issued a 129-page Recommended
Decision, in which he made numerous findings of fact and
concluded that the JOA should be denied. /d. Although Attorney
General Meese ultimately approved the JOA, he expressly
“accept[ed] as accurate the fact findings of the Administrative
Law Judge.” Pet. App. 147a. Therefore, the findings of the ALJ
must be considered in reviewing the Attorney General’s deci-
sion.
The principal issue before Judge Needelman was whether the
Free Press was in “probable danger of financial failure.” 15
U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1803(b). In order to resolve this question, the
ALJ had to determine why the Free Press had been losing money
and whether it would continue to do so if the JOA were denied.
Based on the evidence in the record, Judge Needelman made a
number of critical factual findings.
First, Judge Needelman found that Detroit could support two
profitable newspapers. Thus, he concluded that the Free Press’s
financial troubles were not due to any inherent weakness in the
relevant market or to competition from suburban newspapers,
radio, or television. Pet. App. 95a-98a, 122a.
Second, he agreed with the Antitrust Division that the two
papers are competitive equals. Pet. App. 31a, 32a-85a. Thus,
although in 1960 the News had a “substantial lead (183,751) over
the Free Press in daily circulation,” by 1976 “the daily circula-
tion battle ha[d] been fought to a virtual tie,” and since then “the
Free Press’s share of total daily circulation [had] never [fallen]
below 49%.” Pet. App. 40a. While the News led in advertising,
the Free Press was dominant in the critical morning market and
had other clear advantages over the News. Pet. App. 31a-39a,
106a-108a. And the division of profits, which the ALJ concluded
would be “essentially . .. 50/50” (Pet. App. 122a), was powerful
evidence, as the Antitrust Division had argued (J.A. 116), that
the papers themselves believed they were at competitive parity.
Third, the ALJ found that the Free Press had lost approxi-
mately $10 million per year since 1980, that the News had lost
almost as much, and that the reason for these losses was that both
newspapers’ circulation and advertising prices were probably
the lowest in the country for major daily newspapers. Pet. App.
70a, 76a, 82a, 84a; see also Panel Opinion at Pet. App. 172a. For
example, the daily price of the News is fifteen cents, and the Free
Press charges twenty cents. Pet. App. 172a. According to Judge
Needelman, “[nJeither paper can achieve profitability (or sur-
vive indefinitely if viewed on a stand-alone [basis]) so long as its
parent-chain persists in its present strategy of sacrificing current
profits for dominance and future profitability or a JOA.” Pet.
App. 122a. In other words, “Detroit cannot sustain two profitable
papers when both are practically being given away.” /d.
Fourth, Judge Needelman discussed the motivation for the
low prices. He found that in 1981, after both papers had suffered
their first year of losses in many years, the chief executive
officers of Knight-Ridder, which owned the Free Press, and the
Evening News Association, which then owned the News, had
met and “emphasized that one or both newspapers needed to
continue to show losses in order to qualify for a JOA, and that
with a few more years of such losses the prospects of a JOA
would be ‘ironclad.’” Pet. App. 19a. The ALJ also found that the
Free Press subsequently adopted a marketing strategy with the
objective of “achiev[ing] profitability through total market
dominance... ., and if that should fail, to force the News to accept
a JOA on the Free Press’s terms.” Pet. App. 21a. Moreover,
before purchasing the News in 1986, Gannett contacted Knight-
Ridder “to determine if [it] was still interested in forming a
JOA.” Pet. App. 29a. The two newspaper chains then consum-
mated the JOA only two months after Gannett purchased the
News. Pet. App. 8a, 31a.
Fifth, Judge Needelman addressed the issue of whether the
News was likely to raise its prices if the JOA were denied, which
the News would have to do to return to profitability. This issue
was critical because the ALJ found, and the Attorney General
agreed, that a price rise by the News would enable the Free Press
to become immediately profitable since it could then follow suit,
eliminating any justification for a JOA. Pet. App. 95a-100a,
122a, 143a n.3. On this issue, the ALJ found that the applicants
had not met their burden of proving that the News was likely to
continue to keep its prices low (and thereby to lose money
indefinitely). Pet. App. 92a, 132a; see also 28 C.F.R. § 48.10(a)(4)
(1988) (burden of proving ali pertinent issues on the proponents
of the JOA). Instead, the ALJ concluded that the papers might
raise their prices if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 92a.
Summarizing the discussion portion of his opinion, Judge
Needelman concluded that “[i]t remains to be seen whether
without a JOA these interdependent firms will modify their
competitive strategies in the face of the equally strong certainty
that should present tactics persist the result will be continued
losses for both.” Pet. App. 132a. Having found that the appli-
cants had not carried their burden of proving that the Free Press
was in “probable danger of financial failure,” Judge Needelman
recommended that the Attorney General deny the application.
Pet. App. 133a.
3.On August 8, 1988, four days prior to leaving office,
Attorney General Meese rejected the recommendations of the
ALJ and the Antitrust Division and approved the application. He
made no independent fact findings, but instead expressly ac-
cepted those of the ALJ. Pet. App. 147a. Indeed, the Attorney
General did not cite any record evidence, but instead relied only
on the findings of the ALJ. Pet. App. 136a-48a.
In his opinion, the Attorney General pointed out that the Free
Press had sustained substantial losses since 1980 and that the
News was ahead in terms of circulation and advertising revenue.
Pet. App. 140a. However, he also recognized that the News had
“suffered sizeable operating losses,” and also had not “mov{ed]
toward a position of market dominance.” Pet. App. at 139a-40a.
Like the Free Press, “the pricing and discount strategies adopted
and maintained by the News so as to retain its market position
defeated all prospects for its achieving profitability as well.” Pet.
App. at 140a.
Attorney General Meese found that both papers could become
profitable if circulation and advertising prices were increased,
but he concluded that the Free Press could not increase its prices
unless the News did the same. Pet. App. 143a. Relying on
testimony of Gannett officials that the News would not raise
prices if the JOA were denied, he ruled that it was “probable” that
the Free Press was in “danger of financial failure.” Pet. App.
144a.
Attorney General Meese also concluded that the “prediction”
of Knight-Ridder’s chief executive officer (“CEO”), “who prom-
ised to recommend a closing of the Free Press if the JOA
application is disapproved,” could not be “wholly disregarded.”
Pet. App. 144a. However, he cautioned that this testimony could
not be given “undue weight,” citing a finding by Judge Needel-
man that: (1) the record “contains no convincing evidence that
ithe CEO] seriously considered closing the Free Press prior to his
10
witness stand bolt out of the blue”; (2) there was no evidence that
the Knight-Ridder Board had considered this recommendation,
but, “ori the contrary, the record shows that the Knight-Ridder
Board has approved costly Free Press expansions and the news-
paper’s executives have been proceeding on the assumption that
the Free Press would not be closed even if the JOA were to be
denied”; and (3) “Knight-Ridder has never shut down a single
paper, and [the CEO] did not rule out finding a buyer interested
in operating the Free Press should it ever reach the point when
Knight-Ridder would no longer wish to challenge Gannett for
the rich Detroit market.” /d.; Pet. App. 104a-0S5a.
Finally, the Attorney General addressed the argument that
“the prospect of a JOA, not competition for market domination,
was responsible most recently for the papers’ reluctance to
increase prices and eliminate discounting.” Pet. App. 145a-46a.
Recognizing that the desire to obtain a JOA was a factor in its
below-cost pricing strategy, he concluded that Knight-Ridder
was “principally” pursuing the goal of market domination and
accordingly approved the JOA. Pet. App. 146a-47a.?
4. Petitioners filed this case in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia on August 16, 1988. Petitioners are
Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press (“Michigan Citi-
zens”), Public Citizen, and six individuals. Michigan Citizens
has over 500 members, including approximately 200 employees
of either the News or the Free Press, more than 300 readers, and
13 advertisers of one or both papers.
"In a footnote, the Attorney General noted that after the ALJ’s decision,
Knight-Ridder made certain “maneuvers” in order “to underscore its corpo-
rate intention to close the Free Press if there is no approval of the JOA.” J.A.
150 n.4. Since these efforts occurred after the hearing record had been closed,
the Attorney General stated that he had not considered them. /d. For the same
reason, this Court should not give weight to Knight-Ridder’s restatement of
this threat. See Detroit Free Press Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, pp. i, 3, 7, 9, 22.
1]
The individual petitioners represent the same range of inter-
ests as Michigan Citizens. Public Citizen is a national consumer
organization which brought this action on behalf of its members
in the Detroit area, as well as its members nationwide who might
be adversely affected by the precedent that would be established
if the JOA in this case were approved. The defendants below and
respondents here are the Attorney General of the United States,
the Free Press, and the News.
On August 17, 1988, District Judge Joyce Hens Green stayed
the Attorney General’s order. J.A. 169. Thereafter, District
Judge George H. Revercomb ruled against petitioners on the
merits. Pet. App. 149a. Relying on Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Judge Rever-
comb concluded that the courts were required to “grant consid-
erable deference” to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the
_NPA. Pet. App. 155a. Although he described as “disconcerting”
the Attorney General’s response to the argument that the news-
papers would not have engaged in reckless, destructive compe-
tition without the cushion of a JOA (Pet. App. 160a), Judge
Revercomb held that the Attorney General’s decision was not
arbitrary or capricious. Pet. App. 162a.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. After reviewing the
statutory language and its legislative history, Judge Laurence
Silberman, joined by Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, held
that the “exact meaning” of the term “probable danger of
financial failure” was “not apparent” and that, under Chevron,
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute was permis-
sible and must be upheld. Pet. App. 178a. The panel then held
that the Attorney General had the discretion to find that the
Detroit JOA applicants had met the requirements of the NPA.
The panel implied that the result would have been different if
it had applied the rule of statutory construction that exemptions
from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. Pet. App.
12
180a. It declined to apply the rule in interpreting the Newspaper
Preservation Act, however, finding the statutory language
ambiguous. The Court, therefore, held that the Attorney General
was free to ignore the rule in the exercise of his discretion. Pet.
App. 180a-8 1a.
Judge Ruth B. Ginsburg dissented and would have remanded
the case to the Attorney General for further consideration. Pet.
App. 191a-97a. In her view, the structure of the statute, its
legislative history, the antitrust rule, and the burden of proof
which JOA applicants bear all demonstrated that the Attorney
General had not correctly interpreted the legal standard that
Congress had adopted in the NPA. Pet. App. 194a-96a. She also
was concerned that “[m]Jaking the JOA an option now, in the
situation artificially.created and maintained by the Free Press
and the News, moves boldly away from the ‘frame of reference
[Congress] essentially embraced’” in the NPA. Pet. App. 197a,
quoting Attorney General’s Decision and Order at Pet. App.
146a.
The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc by
a vote of 5-4. Chief Judge Wald, in an opinion joined by Judges
Mikva and Edwards, dissented on the ground that the predicate
for the Attorney General’s decision — that if the JOA were
denied, the News would not raise its prices, causing the Free
Press to continue to lose money — made “no economic sense”
because such a course of action would mean that the News would
also continue to suffer deep losses. Pet. App. 205a. She pointed
out that the News’s strategy amounted to predatory pricing,
behavior which is inconsistent with the purposes of the antitrust
laws and which the NPA does not authorize. Pet. App. 208a-09a.
In response, the panel majority emphasized that its decision was
required by “Chevron’s restraining leash.” Pet. App. 200a.’
Judges Starr and D.H. Ginsburg did not participate. Judge Ruth B.
Ginsburg voted to grant rehearing en banc, but did not join Chicf Judge
Wald’s opinion.
13
On March 20, 1989, this Court vacated the stay of the JOA that
had previously been issued, removing the only legal obstacle to
implementation of the JOA. Nevertheless, the newspapers have
not consummated the joint operating arrangement. The Court
granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on May 1, 1989.
SUMMARY OF ARGUME.wT
J. The Newspaper Preservation Act did not authorize the
Attorney General to approve the Detroit JOA application. Con-
gress preferred competition to joint operation, and therefore it
intended the “probable danger of financial failure” standard to be
narrowly construed. The antitrust exemption is available only
where it is likely that one of the newspapers would otherwise be
eliminated by normal market forces.
Evidence of Congress’s intent is found in the Act’s language,
its statement of policy, its structure, and its legislative history. In
the past, the Justice Department has consistently followed the
direction in the legislative history that the NPA incorporates the
standard in the Bank Merger Act, as interpeted by this Court in
United States v. Third National Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). Third
National Bank requires an exploration of alternatives to a merger
and denies an analogous antitrust exemption to banks whose fi-
nancial failure is attributable to mismanagement or other im-
proper practices.
The Attorney General’s decision upsets the balance that
Congress struck. Under his interpretation of the NPA, profitable
newspapers in competitive markets would have an incentive to
engage in price wars with the goal of achieving dominance and
monopoly profits or, alternatively, approval of a lucrative JOA.
One newspaper would only have to lower prices to the point
where both it and its competitor were losing substantial sums of
money. If the competitor survives, then the papers would qualify
14
for an antitrust exemption, as long as officials from the paper not
designated as “failing” testify that they will not raise their prices
regardless of whether the JOA is denied.
This interpretation of the Act must be evaluated in light of
settled antitrust doctrine which holds tha: in healthy, competitive
markets, predatory pricing strategies ‘ are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). As the ALJ found,
the reason that the newspapers in Detroit were willing to bear
substantial losses for a sustained period of time was that they
believed that they could qualify for a JOA if one of the papers did
not prevail. Even the Attorney General and the panel majority
below concluded that the prospect of a JOA was a factor in the
reckless competition that had occurred in Detroit. Matsushita
teaches that newspapers are unlikely to adopt such a scheme if an
antitrust exemption is not available as a consolation prize.
If the strategy employed here is rewarded with an exemption
from the antitrust laws, then it is likely that newspapers in other,
competitive markets will follow the Detriot example. This inter-
pretation of NPA would subvert one of its basic goals, which was
to preserve competition in the newspaper industry. Therefore,
the Attorney General’s approval of the antitrust exemption must
be set aside.
II. Nothing in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), required the court of appeais to
defer to the Attorney General’s expansive construction of the
NPA. To the contrary, this Court’s established precedents re-
quire that the Newspaper Preservation Act, like all other exemp-
tions from the antitrust laws, be construed narrowly. See, e.g.,
Group Life and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 231 (1979). Although Chevron was decided after Royal
Drug, it explicitly directs courts to use “traditional tools of
statutory construction” to determine whether “Congress had an
15
intention on the precise question at issue” (id. at 843 n.9), which
includes use of the antitrust rule. This rule must also be used in
determining whether the Attorney General’s interpretation of
the Newspaper Preservation Act is reasonable and supportable.
Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain, 411 U.S. 726, 731
(1973).
Other factors counsel against giving any special deference to
the Attorney General’s construction of the NPA. The most
important consideration is the lead role that the courts have
historically taken in interpreting the antitrust laws. Indeed, the
NPA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress assumed
that the task of resolving legal issues arising under the Act would
remain the province of the courts. Moreover, the Attorney
General has no expertise in the antitrust field, and he rejected the
recommendation of the expert Antitrust Division. Finally, the
NPA does not require the resolution of competing policy issues
since Congress made the important choices in the Act.
ARGUMENT
I. APPROVAL OF THE DETROIT JOINT OPERATING
ARRANGEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE NEWSPA-
PER PRESERVATION ACT.
A. The NPA May Not Be Interpreted to Encourage Prof-
itable Newspapers to Engage in Behavior Leading to
Approval of a JOA.
The Newspaper Preservation Act was Congress’s response to
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). In
that case, this Court affirmed a decision against two newspapers
in Tucson, Arizona, that had been operating jointly since 1940
under an agreement that provided for price fixing, profit sharing,
16
and market control. It held that their agreement violated sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 18, unless the papers could meet
the traditional failing company test spelled out in /nternational
Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). The Court then ruled
against the newspapers since they had been unable to demon-
strate that, at the time they entered into the agreement, one of
them was “on the verge of going out of business.” 394 U.S. at
137.
At that time, 59 newspapers in 22 cities were published pur-
suant to joint operating agreements. H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1970). Some of these agreements were
more than 30 years old (id. at 5), and a significant number had
received approval from the Department of Justice. The Newspa-
per Preservation Act: Hearing on H.R.279 Before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 22-25 (1969) (hereinafter “]969 House
Hearings’) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga). Even before this
Court’s decision in Citizen Publishing, the Senate had held
hearings to consider the potential impact of the Justice Depart-
ment’s decision to initiate antitrust lawsuits against newspapers
that were parties to JOAs. The Newspaper Preservation Act:
Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1967).
The issue was extremely controversial. More than 40 bills
were introduced; 28 days of hearings were held; and the debates
consume 100 pages of the Congressional Record. As enacted,
the NPA adopted two distinct standards for JOAs, depending on
whether the agreement was executed before or after July 24,
1970, the Act’s effective date. Recognizing that a demanding
standard might pose a hardship for the newspapers that had been
operating under a JOA for many years, Congress provided that
pre-enactment JOAs would be exempt if, at the time of the initial
17
agreement, ore of the parties to the agreement was not “likely to
remain or become a financially sound publication.” 15 U.S.C. §
1803(a). This provision has had the effect of grandfathering the
pre-1970 JOAs.
Initially, the Senate sponsors proposed that this same standard
govern post-enactment JOAs. S. 1520, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. §
_ 3(5) (1969). However, the Senate Judiciary Committee modified
the bill to include papers either “unlikely to remain or become a
financially sound publication” or in “probable danger of fail-
ure,” and the Senate enacted the bill in that form. S. Rep. No. 535,
91st Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 1-2 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 2 017-18
(1970). The House rejected the Senate’s definition of failing
newspaper for future JOAs and passed a bill which limited a
“failing newspaper” to one in “probable danger of financial
failure.” 116 Cong. Rec. 23,179-80 (1970). This narrow stan-
dard was enacted into law. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5).
The legislative history underscores the statutory language; it
demonstrates that the House approach contained a “tougher” and
“much more stringent” standard than the “not likely to remain or
become financially sound” standard which applied to pre-1970
JOAs. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,154-55 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Railsback).* In his introductory remarks as floor manager of the
bill, Representative Kastenmeier explained that the bill had gone
through three generations, with the exemption being narrowed
each time. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970). In the third stage of
consideration, Representative Railsback had “further limited the
bill to provide a far more stringent test for any future joint
operating agreements.” /d. In contrast to the “relatively more
liberal standard” applicable to existing arrangements, Represen-
tative Railsback later assured the House of Representatives that
*See also H.R. Rep. No. 1193, supra, p. 10 (standard applicable to pre-
1970 JOAs “less strict” than standard applicable to post-1970 JOAs).
18
the “prospective availability of the exemption has been sharply
restricted.” Jd. at 23,154. Thus, in the end, Congress adopted a
standard which would promote competition and would require
that the antitrust laws continue to apply to newspapers, unless a
JOA was “demonstrably essential” to prevent one newspaper
from closing. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,418 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch). In that situation, the Act authorizes the Attorney
General to grant an exemption from the antitrust laws because
Congress preferred two newspapers operating under a JOA toa
single, monopoly paper.
The debate over the scope of the exemption demonstrates that
Congress was concerned that healthy newspapers might be
tempted to take advantage of the Act. The reason for this concern
is obvious: newspapers can make far greater profits in a shared
monopoly market than in a competitive one. For example, while
neither Detroit paper has earned more than $14 million during
any year since 1963, Gannett projects that after four years the
Detroit JOA would earn $100 million in yearly profits. Pet App.
76a-77a, 84a-85a; J.A. 25.
The NPA and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress
intended to ensure that the Act would not encourage newspapers
to alter their behavior in order to obtain a JOA. The Act defines
“failing newspaper” as newspapers that are in “probable danger
of financial failure.” This definition excludes newspapers that
might fail for other reasons, including the desire to obtain an
exemption from the antitrust laws. This prohibition is reinforced
in the statement of policy, which emphasizes “the public interest
of maintaining a newspaper press [that is] competitive in all parts
of the United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1801. Congress also explicitly
directed the Attorney General to insure that approval of a JOA
would “effectuate the policy and purpose” of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1803(b), which even Attorney General Meese recognized
would preclude him from approving a JOA for a failing paper
that had lost money solely in order to obtain the exemption. Pet.
19
App. 114a, 145a-46a.°
The legislative history of the NPA also demonstrates that
Congress intended that the exemption would not be available to
newspapers that could technically qualify as “failing,” but for
which conferring an antitrust exemption would be inappropriate
in light of the purposes of the NPA. For example, the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s report stated that the “probable danger of
financial failure” standard should be read in light of United
States v. Third National Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968), where this
Court narrowly interpreted the antitrust exemption in the Bank
Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B). S. Rep. No. 535, supra,
p. 2; accord, 116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier). This reference to Third National Bank is signifi-
cant because that case held that an analogous antitrust exemption
required banks to “reliably establish the unavailability of alter-
native solutions to the woes” of the bank in order to obtain the
exemption. 390 U.S. at 190.
The Justice Department has historically used the Third Na-
tional Bank standard as a benchmark in considering JOA appli-
cations. The case was discussed at length in the Antitrust
Division’s Report when newspapers in Cincinnati, Chattanooga
and Seattle applied for JOAs in 1977, 1980 and 1981.° The Ninth
*The district court recognized that the Attorney General’s formulation of
this issue — whether “the prospect of a JOA, not competition for market
domination, was responsible most recently for the papers’ reluctance to
increase prices and eliminate [advertising] discounting” (Pet. App. 146a) —
was a “strawman.” As the court correctly pointed out, a “key concem of both
the ALJ and the chief of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division” was that
“both newspapers felt free to adopt bold strategies of price-cutting in an effort
to gain Market domination because they were secure in the belief that ‘failure
too had its reward in the form of JOA approval.”” Pet. App. 160a, citing ALJ
Recommended Decision at Pet. App. 121a, 132a-33a.
*Report of the Assistant Attorney General, Public File No. 44-03-24-4, pp.
18-22 (January 6, 1978) (Cincinnati); Supplemental Report of the Assistant
(footnote continued)
20
Circuit relied on this standard in Committee for an Independent
P-I v. Hearst, 704 F.2d 467, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
892 (1983). Both the Antitrust Division and the Administrative
Law Judge adopted the standard in this case as well. J.A. 101-02;
Pet. App. 125a-26a.
The Third National Bank standard required Attorney General
Meese to look behind the losses that the Free Press had suffered
and to consider both whether the losses were caused by misman-
agement and whether there were reasonable alternatives to the
JOA that could avoid the necessity of joint operation. As Judge
Silberman observed in his opinion for the panel majority, under
Third National Bank, and thus under the NPA, “strong evidence
of probable failure was required.” Pet. App. 178a.
The final hurdle imposed by the Act, recognized by the
Department of Justice, is that “the burden of proving that the
proposed arrangement meets the requirements of the Newspaper
Preservation Act [is] on the proponents of the arrangement.” 28
C.F.R. § 48.10(a)(4) (1988). Only by imposing a rigorous
standard on JOA applicants can Congress’s interest in reserving
the exemption for newspapers that otherwise would likely have
ceased publication be protected.
At various times in the proceedings concerning the Detroit
JOA, the parties, including petitioners, have suggested compre-
hensive definitions of “probable danger of financial failure.” For
example, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that “there
must at least be convincing evidence of an irreversible economic
condition that would produce domination and a downward
spiral,” where declining circulation and advertising revenues
feed each other until the newspaper is forced to close. Pet. App.
Attorney General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5, pp. 17-19 (June 2, 1980)
(Chattanooga);Report of the Assistant Attorney General, Public File No.44-
03-26-6, pp. 7-9 (May 29, 1981) (Seattle). Copies of these reports have been
lodged with the Clerk of the Court.
21
126a. However, in this case, the Court need not formulate an all-
inclusive test, but can overturn the approval of the application
because the prospect of a JOA was an essential factor in the Free
Press’s losses and because approval of the Detroit application
would jeopardize healthy newspapers in other cities.
B. The Attorney General Violated the NPA Because His
Decision Significantly Increases the Likelihood That
Otherwise Profitable Newspapers Will Obtain JOAs.
As the Attorney General indicated in his decision, in enacting
the NPA, Congress’s “frame of reference essentially embraced
the scenario of a strong newspaper poised to drive from the
market a weaker competitor experiencing the ‘downward spiral’
phenomenon due to external market forces,” and this is how the
NPA has “[t]raditionally” been applied. Pet. App. 141a, 146a. It
is undisputed, however, that “(n]o such description fits either
ne spaper here.”’ Attorney General Decision and Order at Pet.
App. 141a. In addition, the Attorney General found that the
newspapers’ losses were not due to any inherent weakness in the
Detroit market, and that in fact “the Detroit market could sustain
two profitable newspapers” if prices were in line with the prices
charged in other cities. Pet. App. 143a (emphasis in original).
In section 1 below, we discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s
findings, which were all adopted by the Attorney General. Pet.
App. 147a. In section 2, we demonstrate that the Attorney
General’s interpretation of the Act is contrary to Congress’s
intent and that it would significantly increase the likelihood of
additional JOAs in markets that would remain competitive under
a proper interpretation of the Act.
22
1. The Record Establishes That the News and the Free
Press Are Competitive Equals in a Market That Can
Support Two Newspapers and That the Free Press
Has Not Lost Ground in Recent Years.
In their public announcement of the JOA, Knight-Ridder and
Gannett declared that “[o]ver a period of more than a quarter
century since this became a two-newspaper city, the Free Press
and The News have fought to a virtual draw.” Pet. App. 31a. The
Administrative Law Judge concluded that this statement accu-
rately described the relative positions of the two newspapers
(Pet. App. 31a-85a), a finding that Attorney General Meese did
not disturb and implicitly accepted. Judge Needelman based this
finding on a number of critical, undisputed facts.
First, as the Antitrust Division had emphasized, prior to
applying for the JOA, the Free Press had not been losing ground
to the News. J.A. 101-06. Between 1976 and 1986, when the
JOA application was filed, the Free Press’s share of daily
circulation never fell below 49%. Pet. App. 41a. As the Antitrust
Division also pointed out, competition today “is as close, or
closer, than it was a decade ago.” J.A. 97.
Judge Needelman further found that as recently as 1985 — a
year before the papers negotiated the JOA — Knight-Ridder
executives believed that the Free Press was in a position to
become the dominant newspaper in Detroit. Pet. App. 24a-25a.
One key factor was the Free Press’s commanding lead in the
critical morning market, which was thought to give it a substan-
tial long-term strategic advantage over the News. In fact, in
1985, Knight-Ridder concluded that its campaign to gain circu-
lation for the Free Press was working so well that it justified a
$22.3 million capital investment for an expansion of one of the
paper’s printing plants. Pet. App. 25a-26a.
Although this additional capacity was designed to benefit the
Free Press in its battle with the News, it was not scheduled to be
23
available until six months after the JOA application was filed.
Pet. App. 27a. In fact, Judge Needelman concluded that “as late
as June 1986 [a month after the JOA application had been filed],
Lawrence, the Free Press’s publisher, was planning for an
expansion ‘regardless of the outcome of the JOA.”” Pet. App.
104a n.242. As Judge Needelman found, the decision to expand
the printing plant “indicated confidence in the [1985] predictions
of Free Press executives that the investment would eventually
bring dominance .. ..”” Pet. App. 25a.
Second, the ALJ endorsed the Antitrust Division’s argument
that the 50/50 profit split between the News and the Free Press
was persuasive evidence that the papers themselves did not
believe that the Free Press was in “probable danger of financial
failure.” Pet. App. 113a-14a; 122a; J.A. 115-17. According to
the testimony of the Antitrust Division’s expert witness, which
was adopted by Judge Needelman, “the JOA profit split repre-
sents a recognition by Gannett that the Free Press would remain
in existence for at least seven to ten years; otherwise, Gannett
would have found it more profitable to wait for the Free Press to
fail.” Pet. App. 113a. The profit split alone is telling evidence
that neither newspaper had a significant edge when they submit-
ted their JOA application. Moreover, the ALJ found that, during
the JOA negotiations, it was an open question which paper would
be designated as “failing,” a finding that further buttresses the
conclusion that the newspapers were essentially competitive
equals. Pet. App. 30a.
Third, the ALJ concluded that the Free Press was a healthy
paper and had a number of competitive advantages over the
News. The most important evidence on this issue is a January 20,
1986 memorandum from Knight-Ridder’s CEO, on behalf of the
Free Press, to Gannett’s CEO, which the ALJ reprinted in full in
his Recommended Decision (Pet. App. 32a-38a). This memo-
randum was written about the time Gannett acquired the News.
less than two months before the papers signed the JOA. Accord-
ing to the memorandum:
the Free Press has “clear leadership in the critically impor-
tant morning field” (Pet. App. 32a);
“the Free Press has greater overall readership” than the
News (Pet. App. 34a; see also Pet. App. 55a);
“the Free Press is the dominant daily paper among adults in
virtually all upscale demographic categories” (Pet. App.
35a);
over the five previous years, the Free Press’s circulation
figures had improved in every area, and it had outgained the
News in a number of important areas (Pet. App. 33a-34a);
“[t]he Free Press has improved [its] advertising share of
field over time” (Pet. App. 33a, 36a);
the Free Press has won far more journalistic prizes than the
News (Pet. App. 37a);
according to the Free Press’s CEO, “we think the figures
reflect the Free Press’ increasingly strong competitive
position” (Pet. App. 34a).
Although Judge Needelman credited the applicants’ testimony
that this memorandum was written to argue the Free Press’s case
during the JOA negotiations, he concluded that it “was a reason-
able summary of the data available at that time.” Pet. App. 39a.
Furthermore, just two months prior to signing the JOA, John
W. Morton, one of the expert witnesses for the applicants and a
nationally recognized newspaper analyst, “was of the view that
if the Detroit newspaper war was to continue, the News was ‘at
greater risk’ than the Free Press.” Pet. App. 112a. According to
Judge Needelman, “Morton saw a ten-year trend favoring the
Free Press and he emphasized that because of its strong morning
25
franchise it was positioned to avoid the downward spiral and
overtake the News.” /d. As the Antitrust Division summarized
the facts in its Post-Hearing Brief, “[a]lthough the record shows
that the Free Press has not achieved its stated goal of dominance
in the Detroit market, it also shows that until the very moment the
JOA was announced, Free Press executives believed that sub-
stantial progress was being made.” J.A. 113.
2. The Attorney General’s Decision Improperly Turns
the NPA Intoa Statute That Encourages Conduct That
Will Lead to Reduced Competition.
During the five years prior to applying for the JOA, the News
and the Free Press lost an average of nine and eleven million
dollars per year, respectively. Pet. App. 77a, 85a. According to
the Attorney General and the ALJ, the reason for these losses was
below-market pricing of both circulatio. and advertising. Pet.
App. 143a n.3. Yet the Attorney General concluded that the
papers were entitled to a JOA because the Free Press had no
unilateral way out of its loss position: as long as the News was
willing to continue to incur heavy losses, the Free Press could not
raise its prices without losing circulation and advertising. Pet.
App. 143a. To support his conclusion that the Free Press would
not raise its prices, the Attorney General relied on testimony
from the News’s chief executive officer that it would continue to
sustain large losses in an effort to gain dominance over the Free
Press, even if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 143a-44a.
This interpretation of the Act gives profitable newspapers in
competitive markets a roadmap for obtaining a lucrative antitrust
exemption. The first step would be for one paper to set its
advertising rates and circulation prices significantly below the
level necessary to make a profit. The second paper would then
have to lower its prices in order to maintain its competitive
position. Soon both papers would be losing money, and neither
26
would have a unilateral way to become profitable. Relying on the
Attorney General’s interpretation of the Act, after several years
of losses, either paper could then be designated as “failing” so
long as its competitor testified that it would not raise prices even
if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 141a, 142a-44a; see also Panel
Opinion at Pet. App. 176a, 177a>184a-86a.’
The problem with this interpretation of the NPA is that it
provides an incentive for newspapers in healthy markets to
engage in conduct that will lead to losses and eventually an
exemption from the antitrust laws. Thus, absent the fall-back of
a lucrative JOA, there would be no reason for any newspaper to
assume the enormous risk of losing money for years in the hope
of driving a competitor from the market. As Chief Judge Wald
pointed out, “[c]lassic economic principles and basic antitrust
law run counter to any prediction that sophisticated firms will
pursue below-cost pricing strategies over the long haul.’ This is
because “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). Thus, intention-
’The possibility of one newspaper driving an unwilling competitor into a
JOA is not idle speculation. As described in the amicus curiae brief of Little
Rock Newspapers, Inc. (publisher of the Arkansas Democrat), Gannctt, the
owner of The Detroit News, has cut prices and thereby transformed the
Arkansas Gazette, which it also owns and which competes with the Arkansas
Democrat, from a profitable newspaper into one that is losing several million
dollars per year. On August 14, 1988, six days after the Attorney Gencral
approved the Detroit JOA, but before this case had been filed, Gannett
increased the pressure on the Arkansas Democrat by further cutting the
Gazette's circulation price to all subscribers, this time by 57.5%. Amicus
Curiae Brief, p. 2.
*Pet. App. 207a (emphasis in original), citing McGee, Predatory Pricing
Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 291-300 (1980); R. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox, 144-59 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 697-704
(1975).
27
ally incurring substantial losses would be rational and likely if,
and only if, a government bailout, in the form of a JOA, would
be available if the predatory pricing scheme should fail. If
Congress’s basic policies are to be preserved, the NPA may not
be interpreted to reward or encourage such behavior.’
The fact that the NPA expressly prohibits predatory pricing by
newspapers operating under a lawful JOA further bolsters the
proposition that the Act should not be interpreted to reward such
schemes. 15 U.S.C. § 1803<c) (Act not to “be construed to
exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing’’). Even the
panel majority recognized the legitimate concern tl at, after the
Attorney General’s interpretation of the NPA, “[n]ewspapers in
two newspaper towns will compete recklessly because of a
recognition that the loser will be assured a soft landing.” Pet.
App. 189a (emphasis added). The panel majority, however, held
that the Attorney General had discretion to adopt this interpreta-
tion of the Act, without regard to its impact on competition.
The seriousness of the deviation of the Attorney Genecal’s
interpretation is highlighted by the evidence that the prospect of
obtaining a JOA in Detroit was an important factor in che
decision of both papers to cut prices in the first place. As the
Administrative Law Judge conciuded,
[t]he losses incurred by the Free Press and the News are at-
tributable to their strategies of seeking market dominance
and future profitability at any cost along with the expecta-
*The ALJ’s finding, that the applicants had not demonstrated that the News
is likely to maintain its low prices even if the JOA is denied, reinforces this
point. Pet. App. 92a. Although the Attomey Gencral found that the News was
likely to maintain its low prices (Pet. App. 143a), his only support for this
finding was the ALJ’s Finding of Fact No. 107 (Pet App. 143a), where Judge
Needelman reached a directly contrary conclusion, namely that the applicants
had not carried their burden of proof on this issue. Pet. App. 92a.
28
tion that failure to achieve these goals would result in
favorable consideration of a JOA application.
Pet. App. 132a-33a. Judge Needelman supported this conclusion
by finding that the Free Press had rejected several opportunities
to escape the competitive struggle because it believed that it
could win dominance in the Detroit market, with the JOA as a
cushion to fall back on if it failed. Pet. App. 17a-19a. It is also
significant that Gannett purchased the News only after confirm-
ing that Knight-Ridder was willing to consider a JOA, and the
two newspapers signed the joint operating agreement just two
months after Gannett had formally acquired the News. Pet. App.
29a; J.A. 85. As described by Assistant Attorney General
Ginsburg, “Gannett and Knight-Ridder demonstrated an almost
unseemly haste in considering the possibility of a JOA even
before Gannett had successfully bid for the Evening News
Association.” J.A. 89.
In Hearst, supra, 704 F.2d at 478, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Attorney General Smith’s interpretation of the NPA, which was
designed “to prevent newspapers from allowing or encouraging
financial difficulties in the hope of reaping long-term financial
gains through a JOA.” Yet, as Chief Judge Wald lamented, the
Attorney General’s decision in this case “will, ironically, make
iteven more probable that newspapers will disappear than if the
Act had never been passed in the first place.” Pet. App. 2i0a
(emphasis in original). For all of these reasons, the Attorney
General’s decision approving the Detroit JOA is contrary to the
Newspaper Preservation Act.
29
Il. CHEVRON DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
UPHOLDING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
DECISION.
Until the decision of the panel below, it had been universally
accepted that the Justice Department and the courts < re required
to construe the Newspaper Preservation Act narrowly because it
is an exemption from the antitrust laws. In the only other case
where a court construed the exemption, the Ninth Circuit ex-
pressly held that this rule of statutory construction applies to the
NPA. Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., supra,
704 F.2d at 478. In Hearst, the court was restating the position
of then- Attorney General William French Smith, who had noted,
in the decision under review there, that “exemptions from the
antitrust laws,” such as the NPA, “must be narrowly construed.”
See 47 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 26,473 (June 18, 1982). Similarly, the
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust had issued the same
declaration in his report evaluating the application for a JOA in
Chattanooga, which Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti incor-
porated into his decision. Report of the Assistant Attorney
General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5, p. 8 n.1 (May 19, 1980); 45
Fed. Reg. 58,733 (September 4, 1980) (Attorney General Civ-
iletti’s order).
During the consideration of the Free Press and News’s appli-
cation for a JOA, there was never any indication that the Justice
Department intended to disavow this rule of construction. In his
initial report on the application, Assistant Attorney General
Ginsburg stated, as if the issue were beyond dispute, that “[a]s
with all exemptions to the antitrust laws, exemptions for joint
arrangements under the Act must be narrowly construed.” J.A.
38, citing “Croup Life and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co.,
supra, and Hearst, supra. In its Post-Hearing Brief to the
Attorney General, the Antitrust Division reiterated the impor-
tance of the rule. J.A. 100. Although Attorney General Meese did
30
not mention the rule in his Decision and Order (Pet. App. 136a-
48a), he never indicated that he intended to reject it, or that he
believed he would have had the authority to do so. Similarly, in
the briefs in the court of appeals, the Justice Department and the
newspapers never argued that the Attorney General had any such
authority.
Nevertheless, the panel majority found that the Attorney
General was excused from applying the rule. It held that Chev-
ron, U.S A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), “implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among
various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.” Pet. App. 180a
(emphasis in original’. As applied to the NPA, the panel major-
ity’s decision is wrong.
A. Chevron Did Not Alter the Applicability of the Rule
That Exemptions From the Antitrust Laws Must Be
Narrowly Construed.
In Chevron, this Court provided guidance to lower courts
reviewing the interpretation and implementation of regulatory
statutes by administrative agencies. Chevron involved a chal-
lenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation
defining the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. The
regulation permitted the states to adopt a plant-wide definition of
stationary source rather than restricting the definition to each
device that emitted pollution within a plant.
Both this Court and the lower court held that neither the Clear
Air Act nor its legislative history clearly defined the statutory
term at issue. Finding that Congress had assigned to EPA the
function of implementing this technical statute and that the
ultimate decision depended on how one balanced the Act’s
competing policies (“progress in reducing air pollution [and]
economic growth”), the Court held that the Congress had dele-
—
31
gated that task to the agency. 467 U.S. at 866. In these circum-
stances, this Court ruled that any reasonable construction of the
statute must be upheld.
Chevron does not give agencies the latitude to ignore estab-
lished rules of statutory construction, as the panel majority
concluded. To the contrary, Chevron explicitly held that “[iJf a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”
Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis supplied). More-
over, since Chevron, this Court has frequently used rules of
statutory construction in reviewing agencies’ interpretations of
statutes. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
109 S. Ct. 468 (1988) (statutes to be construed as not conferring
implied authority to issue retroactive regulations). Insofar as we
have been able to determine, the Court has never suggested that
Chevron modifies these traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion.'°
The panel majority never came to grips with the importance of
the application of the antitrust rule. That application is firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Group Life & Health
In addition to Bowen, see also Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480
U.S. 531,555 (1987) (reference to “familiar rule of statutory construction that
doubtful expressions must be resolved in favor of Indians,” although rule not
applicable in that case); /mmigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (reference to “longstanding principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien,” although it was unnecessary to rely on the rule in reversing the
agency); Bowen y. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610, 644 n.33
(1986) (reference to the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of
sovereignty); Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,
370 (1986) (“where possible, provisions of a statute should be read so as not
to create a conflict”); Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860
(1986) (“identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning”).
32
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979), as
this Court has confirmed since Chevron. Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 421 (1986)
(“exemptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed and
strongly disfavored”). No court had previously suggested that an
administrative agency or a court has the authority to ignore it
under Chevron or any other rationale.'!
The Court faced an analogous issue in DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trade Council,
108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988), where the National Labor Relations
Board sought enforcement of an order prohibiting a union from
distributing handbills urging consumers to boycott a shopping
mall. In response to the NLRB’s argument that its interpretation
of the statute was entitled to deference under Chevron, this Court
held that any Chevron deference was overridden by “[a]nother
rule of statutory construction” — the rule that “where an other-
wise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.” /d. at 1397. While the antitrust rule at
issue in this case may not have the stature of the rule invoked in
DeBartolo, it too is solidly entrenched in this Court’s jurispru-
dence, and it should also override any deference that would
otherwise be required by Chevron.
The court of appeals did leave some room for the use of canons
of statutory construction. It held that canons could be employed
to demonstrate that Congress had a “specific intent on the issue
in question.” Pet. App. 180a (emphasis in original). Forexample,
according to the panel, the canon of expresgio unius est exclusio
"See also, e.g., Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 826
F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (2d Cir. 1987) (court’s review of agency action guided by
both the rule requiring strict construction of antitrust exempuons and Chev-
ron).
33
alterius might be used to demonstrate that in a statute banning the
importation of apples, oranges, and bananas, Congress did not
intend to ban the import of grapefruits. Pet. App. 180a-81a.
However, the panel claimed that Chevron_prohibited the courts
from applying the canon here, even if such an application would
have led to the conclusion that the Attorney General had con-
strued the antitrust exemption too broadly and thereby had
violated the Newspaper Preservation Act. Nothing in Chevron or
its progeny supports this result, particularly since Congress
intended that the NPA be narrowly construed. See pp. 17-20,
supra.
Even if the NPA did not directly address the issue raised in this
case, this Court made it clear in Federal Maritime Commission
v. Seatrain, 411 U.S.726 (1973), that the rule should still be used
in determining whether the agency’s interpretation of an anti-
trust exemption is reasonable and supportable. In Seatrain, the
Court reviewed a decision of the Federal Maritime Commission,
that a contract involving the purchase of one shipping company
by another was an “agreement” within the meaning of section 15
of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814, and thus subject
to the FMC’s approval and grant of antitrust immunity. This
Court rejected the Commission’s interpretation, even though
“the statutory language neither clearly embraces nor ciearly
excludes discrete merger or acquisition-of-assets agreements.”
Id. at 731. According to the Court, a ruling sustaining the
Commission’s “broad reading of [the statute] would conflict
with our frequently expressed view that exemptions from an‘.-
trust laws are strictly construed.” /d. at 733.
The panel’s analysis is flatly inconsistent with Seatrain.
Indeed, applying the panel’s method of statutory construction
would have led to the opposite result there since this Court relied
on the rule to reverse the Commission’s expansive construction
of the Shipping Act. The panel’s error is underscored by this
Court’s citation to the Seatrain decision in Chevron. 467 U.S. at
843 n.9.
34
B. The Court Should Not Defer tothe Attorney General’s
Construction of the NPA.
Even prior to Chevron, the principle that agencies’ interpreta-
tions and applications of statutes were entitled to deference was
well-established. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322
U.S. 111 (1944); see also Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
However, the lower courts have interpreted Chevron as requir-
ing them to give extremely broad latitude to administrative
agencies’ interpretations of statutes. This is what the panel
majority referred to as “Chevron’s restraining leash.” Pet. App.
200a. |
We have argued above that this Court’s precedents, including
Chevron, required the court of appeals to apply the antitrust rule
to the NPA and that the NPA directly addresses the issue before
the Court. However, even if the Court finds that the NPA does not
answer the specific issue before the Court, there are four reasons
why deference to the Attorney General is not appropriate here.
First, in contrast to the Clean Air Act and other complex
regulatory statutes administered by agencies, the antitrust laws
have historically been interpreted and enforced by the courts. As
this Court stated in United States v. First City National Bank, 386
U.S. 361, 367 (1967),
Traditionally in antitrust actions involving regulated indus-
tries, the courts have never given presumptive weight to a
prior agency decision, for the simple reason that Congress
put such suits on a different axis than was familiar in
administrative procedure.
Although the Bank Merger Act required de novo review of the
Comprtroller’s decisions, the Court indicated that Congress had
codified the standard of judicial review that had previously been
applicable. /d. (“We have found no indication that Congress
35
designed judicial review differently under the 1966 Actthan had
earlier obtained.”’). Addressing the argument that Congress had
intended it to apply a more relaxed standard of review, this Court
concluded that it would have had “to assume that Congress made
a revolutionary innovation” to shift the standard of review to the
test that is traditionally used in reviewing administrative actions.
Id. at 368. Finally, in its post-Chevron construction of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which
does not provide for de novo review, this Court adopted a similar
approach, holding that, although the FTC is entitled to “some
deference,” “identification of governing legal standards and
their application tothe facts found [are] for the courts toresolve.”
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
The implications of the deference question go far beyond the
Newspaper Preservation Act since there are numerous other
exemptions from the antitrust laws that administrative agencies
are charged with interpreting and enforcing.” To interpret Chev-
ron as giving agencies an almost unreviewable ability to expand
those exemptions would upset the settled expectations of Con-
gress when it enacted those laws.
Second, the NPA and its legislative history demonstrate that
Congress expected the courts to construe the Act. Since Chevron
"See, e.g., Fishers’ Coop Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (Secretary
of Commerce may order associations to “cease and desist” if he finds that the
“associauion monopolizes or restrains trade . . . to such an extent that the price
of any aquatic product is unduly enhanced”); Export Trading Company Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et sed. (Secretary of Commerce may exempt persons in
export trade from antitrust laws upon showing that there will be no “substan-
tial lessening of competition” and no “unfair methods of compeution”);
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11343, 11344 (ICC may approve
certain acquisitions and mergers taking into account the “effect . . . on the
adequacy of transportation” and whether it would have an “adverse effect on
compctition”).
36
is founded on the general assumption that Congress intended to
grant regulatory agencies broad latitude to fill in gaps in their
statutes, an identifiable congressional expectation that the courts
would take the lead in interpreting the NPA precludes giving the
Attorney General deference otherwise accorded administrative
agencies under Chevron.
The Senate Committee Report, as well as the debates and
Statements made at the hearings on the NPA, establish that
Congress assumed that the courts would play the principal role
in interpreting the definition of “failing newspaper” and in
particular the provision requiring proof of “probable danger of
financial failure.” As we have discussed above, the definition of
“failing newspaper” was taken from the Bank Merger Acct. In its
Report, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the phrase
had “been the subject of a Supreme Court opinion in U.S. v. Third
National Bank.” S. Rep. No. 91-535, supra, p. 2. As Repre. :n-
tative Kastenmeier, the House floor leader, described the term:
It comes out of the Bank Merger Act. /t is understood by the
courts in the field, and happens to be a term that is well
known.
116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) (emphasis added). Numerous
other statements made during the course of legislative considera-
tion of the bill also demonstrate that Congress assumed that the
courts, rather than the Attorney General, would have the princi-
pal responsibility to interpret the NPA."?
'8§. Rep. No. 535, supra, p. 4 (“In applying this definition the Court should
consider the impact of competition on newspapers as it determines whether
a paper is likely to disappear as a competitive factor.”) (emphasis added); id.
at 5 (“The language of section 3(5) is similar to other general standards
which the courts apply in other areas of antitrust law.”) (emphasis added);
- 1969 House Hearings, supra, p. 97 (statement of Rep. Railsback that “I take
(footnote continued)
37
A comparison of the NPA with the version of the bill initially
introduced in the Senate also indicates that Congress assumed
that the courts would interpret the Act. Since the NPA does not
provide for review by the Attorney General of pre-1970 JOAs,
the courts have the sole responsibility for resolving any legal
issue pertaining to such agreements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1803(a).
The bill approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee contained
an identical standard for pre-1970 and post-1970 JOAs, but
newspapers seeking to operate under a JOA after 1970 would
have been required to obtain approval from the Attorney Gen-
eral. S. 1520, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3(5), 4(a), 4(b) (1969). If
that bill had been enacted into law, the Act would not have been
interpreted to mean that the Justice Department could adopt one
interpretation of that standard for post-1970 JOAs, while the
courts could adopt another interpretation for pre- 1970 agreements.
Cf. Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (Chevron
deference not applicable where Congress has entrusted Federal
Trade Commission and Justice Department with responsibility
under section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act because of possibility of
conflicting interpretations). Although Congress ultimately
adopted two distinct standards, it did not alter the respective roles
of the Attorney General and the courts. Therefore, the sequence
it that the courts have defined what constitutes a failing newspaper?”)
(emphasis added); id. at 110 (statement of Morris J. Levin, Counsel for
Tucson Newspapers, Inc. that “[t]o argue that the proposed language of the
definition is too broad or generally fails to take into consideration the fact that
the courts have had little difficulty in interpreting similar language in the
antitrust laws”) (emphasis added); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 2006 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Hruska indicating that the failing newspaper standard
would be interpreted by “a reviewing court”); The Newspaper Preservation
Act: Hearings on S. 1520 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 9\stCong., Ist Sess., p.
302 (1979) (statement of Senator Hart that “we don’t know how a court will
interpret any picce of legislation”) (emphasis added).
38
of bills that Congress considered supports the argument that it
did not intend the courts to defer to the Justice Department in
construing the NPA.
Third, to the extent that the deference required by Chevron
depends on the complexity of the statute or the expertise of the
agency, it has little or no applicability here. See Bowen v.
American Hospital Association, supra, 476 U.S. at 642 n.30. The
NPA is not complex, and in contrast to the Clean Air Act and
many of the other statutes to which Chevron has been applied,
the Attorney General has no technical expertise in interpreting it.
The basic antitrust laws, such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
are typically applied and interpreted in the first instance by the
courts. Moreover, the expertise in this area resides in the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice, which disagreed with
the Attorney General as to whether the application at issue in this
case qualified under the NPA. Thus, the consideration of exper-
tise does not support granting extra deference to the Attorney
General’s decision in this case.
Fourth, to the extent that Chevron depends on the principle
that Congress intended executive branch agencies to resolve the
competing policies underlying regulatory statutes, it has less
applicability here because Congress largely resolved those poli-
cies in the statute itself. In the NPA’s declaration of policy,
Congress identified the two relevant policy considerations: the
“public interest of maintaining anewspaper press editorially and
reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the
United States”; and the interest in “preserv[ing] the publication
of newspapers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1801. This statement of policy dem-
onstrates that Congress preferred competing newspapers and
that joint operation was to be permitted where the alternative was
likely to be the loss of one newspaper. Therefore, the Act
prohibits the Attorney General from granting the exemption
unless one of the newspapers is in “probable danger of financial
failure.”
39
In summary, the Attorney General’s decision must be judged
against the statute, its structure, its legislative history, and the
rule that exceptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly
construed. Whatever deference may be appropriate, the Attor-
ney General is not entitled to adopt a broad construction of the
Act that is inconsistent with both the rule of construction and the
underlying purposes of the Act itself.
CONCLUSION rd
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals
should be reversed, and the Decision and Order of the Attorne,
General approving the JOA should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
William B. Schultz
(Counsel of Record)
David C. Vladeck
Alan B. Morrison
Public Citizen Litigation Group
2000 P Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-3704
Attorneys for Petitioners
June 30, 1989
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.