Petitioners Brief — Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh

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(5) | Supreme Court, U.S.

$ FILED

JUN

No. 88-1640 30 1989

—_— ——

| CLERK

NIOL, JR.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

MICHIGAN CITIZENS

FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRESS, et al,

Petitioners,

V.

DICK THORNBURGH,

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

William B. Schultz

_ (Counsel of Record)

David C. Vladeck

Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation4Group

2000 P Strect, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-3704

Attorneys for Petitioners

June 30, 1989

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. In determining whether two competitively equal newspa-

pers qualify for an antitrust exemption under the Newspaper

Preservation Act, which requires that one of them be in “prob-

able danger of financial failure,” may the Attorney General

approve the application on the basis of a construction of the Act

that only requires (a) a showing that both papers have lost money

for several years and (b) a statement by representatives of the

“non-failing” paper that it will not raise its prices even if the

exemption is denied?

2. Does this Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), require a

reviewing court to defer to an administrative agency’s expansive

interpretation of an exemption from the antitrust laws where the

agency's construction is at odds with the established rule that

exemptions from the antitrust laws must be narrowly construed?

PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING

Petitioners Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press, Public

Citizen, Senator John F. Kelly, W. Edward Wendover, David A.

Kersh, William B. Cowan, Matthew Beer, and Murray Green-

halge, Jr., appeared as plaintiffs-appellants below.

Respondents United States Attorney General Dick Thorn-

burgh, Detroit Free Press (owned by Knight-Ridder, Inc.) and

The Detroit News (owned by Gannett Co.) appeared as defen-

dants-appellees below.

In addition, the American Newspaper Publishers Association

and Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. appeared as amici curiae in the

court of appeals.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

BAABEs CP AUTIBORITIES. ..0....ccccccccccccssscccccssscsssessscssscsveces Vv

Ee 1

se, cncrccncivecesonsccesncevonecooescoosenes l

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .............cccccccccesseceseceeseees 2

Neen ee os cncusnsnsnsscnncensocsorescononoone 4

NS 0 hs 13

EEE 15

I. APPROVAL OF THE DETROIT JOINT

OPERATING ARRANGEMENT (“JOA”)

IS CONTRARY TO THE NEWSPAPER

Ee 15

A. The NPA May Not Be Interpreted

to Encourage Profitable Newspapers

to Engage in Behavior Leading

Neen ccscesscccncsesesvesresecons 15

B. The Attorney General Violated the

NPA Because His Decision Significantly

Increases the Likelihood That

- Otherwise Profitable Newspapers

Nee snc csccscercnesencssesceresees 21

ill

1. The Record Establishes That the TABLE Or AUTHORITIES

News and the Free Press Are Com-

petitive Equals in a Market That Cases: Page:

Can Support Two Newspapers and

That the Free Press Has Not Lost Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell,

Ey Sg SL), Ea ene ee na 3]

Bowen v. American Hospital Association,

2. The Attorney General’s Decision

476 U.S. ET ssldbatnbactasesdunaciiibbtaamibieaes

Improperly Turns the NPA Into a Se II ici cindiaaddeniciachenia aa ceaieaea 31, 38

Statute That Encourages Conduct Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

That Will Inevitably Lead to Fe hs ee Ie CIID titi seccnsencssststiannsinntnesunnnsiicbensaieniessinsiieinnies 31

: SIN tesscnaeioastiinidsliahssetlapmadeanioniaiiad ee

Reduced COMpetitsOn. ..ce.eeeseseeonens Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

C By SF Why PE COD cisccsancrsserccenesccosarereccecess i

I. CHEVRON DOES NOT PROVIDE A ounci U.S. 837 (1984) ...Passim

BASIS FOR UPHOLDING THE Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DECISION. ................... 29 re cee SUIT scussdanestdlicahsestshasesasctansicidiadsowsniaviusavadaubaade 14

Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst,

A. Chevron Did Not Alter the Applicability 704 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.). cert. denied

od Js rT. denied,

of the Rule That Exemptions From

Re is Cee CIID cccdtdiedecececdncinsedsecekecensadesoncasless 20, 28, 26

the Antitrust Laws Must Be Narrowly ; ?

SI aciccniicediadetaihiharisltesiitamionee ndliiiaainitgliaraiel 30 DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building

and Construction Trade Council,

B. The Court Should Not Defer to the i | ne, LTE *

Attorney General’s Construction of the NPA. ........34 7 ee

7 , Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain,

nA RE he + se Oa Te ean 14, 33, 35

RULE AE PUNE ccvcucsesasacensheibtinnicsachsamsnaniealeinabiainanatalaibieetiidikdd ated eee 39 II, J.

Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana

Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) voce, 35

Group Life and Health Insurance v. Royal

Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) wo ccccccecceecceeeee, 14, 29, 31

Immigration and Naturalization Service

v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 20.00... 32

International Shoe Co. v. FTC,

I, i aetiamniapeiontensnaaiiad 16

Lieberman v. FTC,

sigh oe & fo Rh Reeser een 37

Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,

i, MT oo. resarnninosentonnnebeanenniectons 31

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) .......ccccccccceeeeeees 14, 26-27

NLRB vy. Hearst Publications,

, 3 BE | nn eT Eee 34

Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. v.

United States, 826 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1987) .........cceeeee 32

Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury,

I casinniesenanbiebintesionl 3]

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff

Bureaus, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) ............ccccccesecssrseceessrceeesseres ID

- United States v. First City National Bank,

I a a caeasseieisiainieeiovaniomnsian 34

United States v. Third National Bank,

. 4 & Rie, Der 13, 19, 20, 36

vi

Statutes and Regulations:

Bank Merger Act,

a te II sc scrcnsecsenedcsesusneesesusekanseobamouiiies 19

Clayton Act,

OI sa aeacladeegedessdiendacidetsniiabiaieendalbaesmbedpiannih 15-16

Export Trading Company Act,

Sr eh I cepted aliusiselenmecacueuaninle 35

Federal Trade Commission Act,

See AT IIT bocshssisinhnsiabioscecauietoiasecscicieaabidstssealiddaihainiisasbicubsiaiaeiae 35

Fishers’ Coop Marketing Act,

co pk Not ky | See aN NeC NI:

Interstate Commerce Act,

FP res Te FIG BAO crtncncesncssnssececescrinn mrissnsneternesoanes 35

Newspaper Preservation Act,

I I accede aicsaciielnabcadinipsteiesadnsealabibiatlaie 4, 18, 38

Be IIT siiiiinijnsiistpisinsnindesinendivntiintcadansiasboes 4,6, 17

aN: UI tdcniccacustsadeaclacusihendseutntmceasiebbersenee 4,17, 37

Be eat i MII vxcnnhcosicecenidncdnshcagieaiadbedsasaumbelesan passim

a sh i UII ao lia ddcidncisebenuvsisuctensiincanidanichslsaialiununieahdaen 27

Sherman Antitrust Act,

Sor TE Tis UIE ne cca las aeadiiecileseiaceldnbepenissandcnissntonineceomecdebanesinl 16

Shipping Act of 1916,

et I cia seeithscaesacedesceidiacesdtateshdhisinbenoisinadiasiiassbadeaaniinaahda 33

Be es A EO ocetessecidihcccaslinasctaniuesiaisDleiiininndesdisaebanmbanenaeal 2

nee AN I I cricaseaschstpciicansisioisdancinscticicidnididcnsnusscundmaseiobiaon 5

rp Lee oF EF Le |_| Sa een r INTe 8, 20

Vil

Legislative Authorities:

H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ........... 16, 17

The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings

on H.R. 279 Before the Antitrust Subcommittee

of the House Committee on the Judiciary,

Piast Cong., Lat Seas. (1DGR) .....cccseorecveceseevversesveseeeeenes 16, 37

The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings

on S. 1312 Before the Subcommittee on

Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee

on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) .............00+ 16

The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings

on S. 1520 Before the Subcommittee on

Antitrust and Monopoly Senate Committee

on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ..............0+ 37

S. Rep. No. 535, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)........... 17, 19, 36

S. 1520, Dist Cons... 868 Foes (IFS) ....resccrceserecccscvsesssssee 17, 37

116 Cong. Rec. 2,006 (1970) ae anneal 37

$216 Come, Rac. ZOIUT (IGT) ...0.00.ccvssescesecesosscccesesversversseveees 17

116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) .......cccecerervessseserseresees 17, 19, 36

116 Cong. Rec. 23,148 (1970) .........cesrscrcrsscoserceeernssereneensooes 18

116 Cong, Rec. 23,154 (1970) ........c.0rccsersccosseosesrcrserenssnscooes 17

116 Come. Rec. 25,179 (IFT) ......crcossescosccssesvescenvesenevsesenssees 17

Vill

Other Authorities:

Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and

Related Practices Under Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975) .o....ccccccccccccceees 26

Bork, R., The Antitrust Paradox (1978) ........ccccccccccccceccceeceeee 26

McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited,

23 TL. & Boom. ZED (IDG) .......ceceececcecsecsesesscsescecsvsscseceees 26

Report of the Assistant Attorney General,

Public File No. 44-03-24-4 (January 6, 1978)

SI ee a 19

Report of the Assistant Attorney General,

Public File No. 44-03-25-5 (May 19, 1980)

I 29

Report of the Assistant Attorney General,

Public File No. 44-03-26-6 (May 29, 1981)

I eer ec el i 20

Supplemental Report of the Assistant Attorney

General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5

(June 2, 1980) (Chattanooga) .............cccccccccceeeceeeeeeeeeees 19-20

45 Fed. Reg. 58, 733 (September 4, 1980) ......ccccccecceeecceeeeee. 29

47 Fed. Reg. 26, 472 (June 18, 1982) w.o..cccccceccceeceseeeeseeee, 29

1X

No. 88-1640

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

MICHIGAN CITIZENS

FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRESS, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

DICK THORNBURGH,

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the court of appeals’ panel (Pet. App. 166a -

90a) are reported at 868 F.2d 1285. The opinions regarding the

court of appeals’ order denying rehearing en banc (Pet. App.

191-97a) are reported at 868 F.2d 1300. The opinion of the

district court (Pet. App. 149a-63a) is reported at 695 F. Supp.

1216.’

‘Pet. App. __” refers to the separately bound appendix to the petition for

a writ of certiorari. “J.A.__” refers to the joint appendix submitted with this

brief.

tl

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on January

27, 1989, and the order denying rehearing en banc was entered

on February 24, 1989 (Pet. App. 164a, 199a). The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked undei 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat.

466, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04, provides in pertinent part:

Section 1801. Congressional declaration of policy.

In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper pr’ ss

editorially and reportorially independent and competitive

in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be

the public policy of the United States to preserve the

publication of newspapers in any city, community, or

metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement has

been heretofore entered into because of economic distress

or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of

this chapter.

Section 1802. Definitions.

* * *

(5) The term “failing newspaper” means a newspaper

publication which, regardless of its ownership or affili-

ations, is in probable danger of financial failure.

Section 1803. Antitrust Exemptions.

(a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for

any person to perform, enforce, renew, or amend any joint

newspaper operating arrangement entered into prior to July

24, 1970, if at the time at which such arrangement was first

entered into, regardless of ownership or affiliations, not

more than one of the newspaper publications involved in

the performance of such arrangement was likely to remain

or become a financially sound publication . . .

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into,

perform, or enforce a joint operating arrangement, not

already in effect, except with the prior written consent of the

Attorney General of the United States. Prior to granting

such approval, the Attorney General shall determine that

not more than one of the newspaper publications involved

in the arrangement is a publication other than a failing

newspaper, and that approval of such arrangement would

effectuaie the policy and purpose of this chapter.

(c) Nothing contained in the chapter shall be construed

to exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing, any

predatory practice, or any other conduct in the otherwise

lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrange-

ment which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if

engaged in by a single entity. Except as provided in this

chapter, no joint newspaper operating arrangement or any

party thereto shall be exempt from any antitrust law.

The Department of Justice’s regulations pertaining to the News-

paper Preservation Act, 28 C.F.R. § 48-1988), provide in perti-

nent part:

Section 48.10. Hearings.

(a) Upon the issuance by the Attorney General of an

order for a hearing, the Assistant Attorney General for

Administration shall appoint an administrative law judge in

accordance with section 11 of the Administrative Proce-

dure Act, 5 U.S.C. 3105. The administrative law judge

shall:

~ * «

(4) Conducta hearing in accordance with section 7 of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 556. At such

hearing, the burden of proving that the proposed arrange-

ment meets the requirements of the Newspaper Preserva-

tion Act will be on the proponents of the arrangement.

STATEMENT

1. On May 9, 1986, respondents Detroit Free Press (the “Free

Press’’) and The Detroit News (the “News”) filed an application

with the respondent Attorney General for approval of a joint

operating arrangement (“JOA”) pursuant to the Newspaper

Preservation Act (the “NPA” or the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801

et seq.

As will be explained more fully below, the Newspaper Pres-

ervation Act of 1970 is Congress’s response to this Court’s

decision in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394U.S. 131

(1969), which held that a pre-existing JOA violated the antitrust

laws. Recognizing that this Court’s stringent standard might

impose a hardship on newspapers that had been operating under

a JOA for many years, Congress retroactively approved JOAs

where, at the time of the agreement, at least one of the newspa-

pers was not “likely to remain or become a financially sound

publication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1803(a). However, Congress adopted

a more exacting standard for future JOAs, which are permitted

only if one of the papers is a“‘failing newspaper,” a term that the

Act defines as a “newspaper publication which, regardless of its

ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial

failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5). Congress also provided that, in

order to obtain an antitrust exemption, post-1970JOAs must first

be approved by the Attorney General. 15 U.S.C. § 1803(b).

Detroit is the nation’s fifth largest newspaper market. The

News, the nation’s seventh largest newspaper, is Detroit’s only

afternoon newspaper, and the Free Press, the nation’s eighth

largest newspaper, is the dominant, daily morning newspaper.

Pet. App. 7a, 14a, 15a. The Free Press has been owned by

Knight-Ridder, Inc. (“Knight-Ridder’’) or its corporate prede-

cessor since 1940. The News was owned by the Evening News

Association until 1986, when it was purchased by Gannett Co.,

Inc. (“Gannett”). Gannett and Knight-Ridder are the two largest

newspaper chains in the United States.

The application identified the Free Press as the “failing

newspaper.” Pet. App. 137a. The JOA provides that the Detroit

market would be divided between the two newspapers for the

next 100 years. Under the agreement, the News would eliminate

its morning, weekday edition. It would publish only an afternoon

daily newspaper, and the Free Press would publish only a

morning newspaper. The JOA also provides that the newspapers

would publish a joint edition on Saturdays and Sundays and that

the news and editorial staffs of the two newspapers would remain

independent. Pet. App. 114a-16a.

The newspapers would form a partnership known as “The

Detroit Newspaper Agency,” which would make all commercial

decisions for both papers, including setting their sales prices and

advertising rates. The News would receive 55% of the profits

during the first year, but thatpercentage would decrease until the

beginning of the sixth year, after which the profits would be

divided evenly. Pet. App. 173a.

In accordance with the Department of Justice’s regulations,

28 C.F.R. § 48.7 (1988), the application was referred to then-

Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Douglas H. Ginsburg,

who concluded in a 70-page report that the applicants had not

carried their burden of establishing that the Free Press was a

failing newspaper. He pointed out that there is a serious question

as to why the News is “willing to share 50% of the profits of the

JOA with the Free Press (after the first five years) if, as the parties

assert, ‘the inescapable conclusion [is] that the financial losses

of the Free Press will continue indefinitely [absent a JOA].’” J.A.

89-90 (brackets in original). However, to give the applicants

another opportunity to prove their case, Assistant Attorney

General Ginsburg recommended that Attorney General Edwin

Meese III appoint an administrative law judge to hear evidence.

Id. at 93.

2. Attorney General Meese referred the application to Admin-

istrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Morton Needelman, who presided

over a three-week evidentiary hearing, at which 16 witnesses

testified, and at which the Justice Department’s Antitrust Divi-

sion opposed the application. Pet. App. 1a, 5a-6a. On December

29, 1987, Judge Needelman issued a 129-page Recommended

Decision, in which he made numerous findings of fact and

concluded that the JOA should be denied. /d. Although Attorney

General Meese ultimately approved the JOA, he expressly

“accept[ed] as accurate the fact findings of the Administrative

Law Judge.” Pet. App. 147a. Therefore, the findings of the ALJ

must be considered in reviewing the Attorney General’s deci-

sion.

The principal issue before Judge Needelman was whether the

Free Press was in “probable danger of financial failure.” 15

U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1803(b). In order to resolve this question, the

ALJ had to determine why the Free Press had been losing money

and whether it would continue to do so if the JOA were denied.

Based on the evidence in the record, Judge Needelman made a

number of critical factual findings.

First, Judge Needelman found that Detroit could support two

profitable newspapers. Thus, he concluded that the Free Press’s

financial troubles were not due to any inherent weakness in the

relevant market or to competition from suburban newspapers,

radio, or television. Pet. App. 95a-98a, 122a.

Second, he agreed with the Antitrust Division that the two

papers are competitive equals. Pet. App. 31a, 32a-85a. Thus,

although in 1960 the News had a “substantial lead (183,751) over

the Free Press in daily circulation,” by 1976 “the daily circula-

tion battle ha[d] been fought to a virtual tie,” and since then “the

Free Press’s share of total daily circulation [had] never [fallen]

below 49%.” Pet. App. 40a. While the News led in advertising,

the Free Press was dominant in the critical morning market and

had other clear advantages over the News. Pet. App. 31a-39a,

106a-108a. And the division of profits, which the ALJ concluded

would be “essentially . .. 50/50” (Pet. App. 122a), was powerful

evidence, as the Antitrust Division had argued (J.A. 116), that

the papers themselves believed they were at competitive parity.

Third, the ALJ found that the Free Press had lost approxi-

mately $10 million per year since 1980, that the News had lost

almost as much, and that the reason for these losses was that both

newspapers’ circulation and advertising prices were probably

the lowest in the country for major daily newspapers. Pet. App.

70a, 76a, 82a, 84a; see also Panel Opinion at Pet. App. 172a. For

example, the daily price of the News is fifteen cents, and the Free

Press charges twenty cents. Pet. App. 172a. According to Judge

Needelman, “[nJeither paper can achieve profitability (or sur-

vive indefinitely if viewed on a stand-alone [basis]) so long as its

parent-chain persists in its present strategy of sacrificing current

profits for dominance and future profitability or a JOA.” Pet.

App. 122a. In other words, “Detroit cannot sustain two profitable

papers when both are practically being given away.” /d.

Fourth, Judge Needelman discussed the motivation for the

low prices. He found that in 1981, after both papers had suffered

their first year of losses in many years, the chief executive

officers of Knight-Ridder, which owned the Free Press, and the

Evening News Association, which then owned the News, had

met and “emphasized that one or both newspapers needed to

continue to show losses in order to qualify for a JOA, and that

with a few more years of such losses the prospects of a JOA

would be ‘ironclad.’” Pet. App. 19a. The ALJ also found that the

Free Press subsequently adopted a marketing strategy with the

objective of “achiev[ing] profitability through total market

dominance... ., and if that should fail, to force the News to accept

a JOA on the Free Press’s terms.” Pet. App. 21a. Moreover,

before purchasing the News in 1986, Gannett contacted Knight-

Ridder “to determine if [it] was still interested in forming a

JOA.” Pet. App. 29a. The two newspaper chains then consum-

mated the JOA only two months after Gannett purchased the

News. Pet. App. 8a, 31a.

Fifth, Judge Needelman addressed the issue of whether the

News was likely to raise its prices if the JOA were denied, which

the News would have to do to return to profitability. This issue

was critical because the ALJ found, and the Attorney General

agreed, that a price rise by the News would enable the Free Press

to become immediately profitable since it could then follow suit,

eliminating any justification for a JOA. Pet. App. 95a-100a,

122a, 143a n.3. On this issue, the ALJ found that the applicants

had not met their burden of proving that the News was likely to

continue to keep its prices low (and thereby to lose money

indefinitely). Pet. App. 92a, 132a; see also 28 C.F.R. § 48.10(a)(4)

(1988) (burden of proving ali pertinent issues on the proponents

of the JOA). Instead, the ALJ concluded that the papers might

raise their prices if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 92a.

Summarizing the discussion portion of his opinion, Judge

Needelman concluded that “[i]t remains to be seen whether

without a JOA these interdependent firms will modify their

competitive strategies in the face of the equally strong certainty

that should present tactics persist the result will be continued

losses for both.” Pet. App. 132a. Having found that the appli-

cants had not carried their burden of proving that the Free Press

was in “probable danger of financial failure,” Judge Needelman

recommended that the Attorney General deny the application.

Pet. App. 133a.

3.On August 8, 1988, four days prior to leaving office,

Attorney General Meese rejected the recommendations of the

ALJ and the Antitrust Division and approved the application. He

made no independent fact findings, but instead expressly ac-

cepted those of the ALJ. Pet. App. 147a. Indeed, the Attorney

General did not cite any record evidence, but instead relied only

on the findings of the ALJ. Pet. App. 136a-48a.

In his opinion, the Attorney General pointed out that the Free

Press had sustained substantial losses since 1980 and that the

News was ahead in terms of circulation and advertising revenue.

Pet. App. 140a. However, he also recognized that the News had

“suffered sizeable operating losses,” and also had not “mov{ed]

toward a position of market dominance.” Pet. App. at 139a-40a.

Like the Free Press, “the pricing and discount strategies adopted

and maintained by the News so as to retain its market position

defeated all prospects for its achieving profitability as well.” Pet.

App. at 140a.

Attorney General Meese found that both papers could become

profitable if circulation and advertising prices were increased,

but he concluded that the Free Press could not increase its prices

unless the News did the same. Pet. App. 143a. Relying on

testimony of Gannett officials that the News would not raise

prices if the JOA were denied, he ruled that it was “probable” that

the Free Press was in “danger of financial failure.” Pet. App.

144a.

Attorney General Meese also concluded that the “prediction”

of Knight-Ridder’s chief executive officer (“CEO”), “who prom-

ised to recommend a closing of the Free Press if the JOA

application is disapproved,” could not be “wholly disregarded.”

Pet. App. 144a. However, he cautioned that this testimony could

not be given “undue weight,” citing a finding by Judge Needel-

man that: (1) the record “contains no convincing evidence that

ithe CEO] seriously considered closing the Free Press prior to his

10

witness stand bolt out of the blue”; (2) there was no evidence that

the Knight-Ridder Board had considered this recommendation,

but, “ori the contrary, the record shows that the Knight-Ridder

Board has approved costly Free Press expansions and the news-

paper’s executives have been proceeding on the assumption that

the Free Press would not be closed even if the JOA were to be

denied”; and (3) “Knight-Ridder has never shut down a single

paper, and [the CEO] did not rule out finding a buyer interested

in operating the Free Press should it ever reach the point when

Knight-Ridder would no longer wish to challenge Gannett for

the rich Detroit market.” /d.; Pet. App. 104a-0S5a.

Finally, the Attorney General addressed the argument that

“the prospect of a JOA, not competition for market domination,

was responsible most recently for the papers’ reluctance to

increase prices and eliminate discounting.” Pet. App. 145a-46a.

Recognizing that the desire to obtain a JOA was a factor in its

below-cost pricing strategy, he concluded that Knight-Ridder

was “principally” pursuing the goal of market domination and

accordingly approved the JOA. Pet. App. 146a-47a.?

4. Petitioners filed this case in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia on August 16, 1988. Petitioners are

Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press (“Michigan Citi-

zens”), Public Citizen, and six individuals. Michigan Citizens

has over 500 members, including approximately 200 employees

of either the News or the Free Press, more than 300 readers, and

13 advertisers of one or both papers.

"In a footnote, the Attorney General noted that after the ALJ’s decision,

Knight-Ridder made certain “maneuvers” in order “to underscore its corpo-

rate intention to close the Free Press if there is no approval of the JOA.” J.A.

150 n.4. Since these efforts occurred after the hearing record had been closed,

the Attorney General stated that he had not considered them. /d. For the same

reason, this Court should not give weight to Knight-Ridder’s restatement of

this threat. See Detroit Free Press Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari, pp. i, 3, 7, 9, 22.

1]

The individual petitioners represent the same range of inter-

ests as Michigan Citizens. Public Citizen is a national consumer

organization which brought this action on behalf of its members

in the Detroit area, as well as its members nationwide who might

be adversely affected by the precedent that would be established

if the JOA in this case were approved. The defendants below and

respondents here are the Attorney General of the United States,

the Free Press, and the News.

On August 17, 1988, District Judge Joyce Hens Green stayed

the Attorney General’s order. J.A. 169. Thereafter, District

Judge George H. Revercomb ruled against petitioners on the

merits. Pet. App. 149a. Relying on Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Judge Rever-

comb concluded that the courts were required to “grant consid-

erable deference” to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the

_NPA. Pet. App. 155a. Although he described as “disconcerting”

the Attorney General’s response to the argument that the news-

papers would not have engaged in reckless, destructive compe-

tition without the cushion of a JOA (Pet. App. 160a), Judge

Revercomb held that the Attorney General’s decision was not

arbitrary or capricious. Pet. App. 162a.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. After reviewing the

statutory language and its legislative history, Judge Laurence

Silberman, joined by Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, held

that the “exact meaning” of the term “probable danger of

financial failure” was “not apparent” and that, under Chevron,

the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute was permis-

sible and must be upheld. Pet. App. 178a. The panel then held

that the Attorney General had the discretion to find that the

Detroit JOA applicants had met the requirements of the NPA.

The panel implied that the result would have been different if

it had applied the rule of statutory construction that exemptions

from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. Pet. App.

12

180a. It declined to apply the rule in interpreting the Newspaper

Preservation Act, however, finding the statutory language

ambiguous. The Court, therefore, held that the Attorney General

was free to ignore the rule in the exercise of his discretion. Pet.

App. 180a-8 1a.

Judge Ruth B. Ginsburg dissented and would have remanded

the case to the Attorney General for further consideration. Pet.

App. 191a-97a. In her view, the structure of the statute, its

legislative history, the antitrust rule, and the burden of proof

which JOA applicants bear all demonstrated that the Attorney

General had not correctly interpreted the legal standard that

Congress had adopted in the NPA. Pet. App. 194a-96a. She also

was concerned that “[m]Jaking the JOA an option now, in the

situation artificially.created and maintained by the Free Press

and the News, moves boldly away from the ‘frame of reference

[Congress] essentially embraced’” in the NPA. Pet. App. 197a,

quoting Attorney General’s Decision and Order at Pet. App.

146a.

The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc by

a vote of 5-4. Chief Judge Wald, in an opinion joined by Judges

Mikva and Edwards, dissented on the ground that the predicate

for the Attorney General’s decision — that if the JOA were

denied, the News would not raise its prices, causing the Free

Press to continue to lose money — made “no economic sense”

because such a course of action would mean that the News would

also continue to suffer deep losses. Pet. App. 205a. She pointed

out that the News’s strategy amounted to predatory pricing,

behavior which is inconsistent with the purposes of the antitrust

laws and which the NPA does not authorize. Pet. App. 208a-09a.

In response, the panel majority emphasized that its decision was

required by “Chevron’s restraining leash.” Pet. App. 200a.’

Judges Starr and D.H. Ginsburg did not participate. Judge Ruth B.

Ginsburg voted to grant rehearing en banc, but did not join Chicf Judge

Wald’s opinion.

13

On March 20, 1989, this Court vacated the stay of the JOA that

had previously been issued, removing the only legal obstacle to

implementation of the JOA. Nevertheless, the newspapers have

not consummated the joint operating arrangement. The Court

granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on May 1, 1989.

SUMMARY OF ARGUME.wT

J. The Newspaper Preservation Act did not authorize the

Attorney General to approve the Detroit JOA application. Con-

gress preferred competition to joint operation, and therefore it

intended the “probable danger of financial failure” standard to be

narrowly construed. The antitrust exemption is available only

where it is likely that one of the newspapers would otherwise be

eliminated by normal market forces.

Evidence of Congress’s intent is found in the Act’s language,

its statement of policy, its structure, and its legislative history. In

the past, the Justice Department has consistently followed the

direction in the legislative history that the NPA incorporates the

standard in the Bank Merger Act, as interpeted by this Court in

United States v. Third National Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). Third

National Bank requires an exploration of alternatives to a merger

and denies an analogous antitrust exemption to banks whose fi-

nancial failure is attributable to mismanagement or other im-

proper practices.

The Attorney General’s decision upsets the balance that

Congress struck. Under his interpretation of the NPA, profitable

newspapers in competitive markets would have an incentive to

engage in price wars with the goal of achieving dominance and

monopoly profits or, alternatively, approval of a lucrative JOA.

One newspaper would only have to lower prices to the point

where both it and its competitor were losing substantial sums of

money. If the competitor survives, then the papers would qualify

14

for an antitrust exemption, as long as officials from the paper not

designated as “failing” testify that they will not raise their prices

regardless of whether the JOA is denied.

This interpretation of the Act must be evaluated in light of

settled antitrust doctrine which holds tha: in healthy, competitive

markets, predatory pricing strategies ‘ are rarely tried, and even

more rarely successful.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). As the ALJ found,

the reason that the newspapers in Detroit were willing to bear

substantial losses for a sustained period of time was that they

believed that they could qualify for a JOA if one of the papers did

not prevail. Even the Attorney General and the panel majority

below concluded that the prospect of a JOA was a factor in the

reckless competition that had occurred in Detroit. Matsushita

teaches that newspapers are unlikely to adopt such a scheme if an

antitrust exemption is not available as a consolation prize.

If the strategy employed here is rewarded with an exemption

from the antitrust laws, then it is likely that newspapers in other,

competitive markets will follow the Detriot example. This inter-

pretation of NPA would subvert one of its basic goals, which was

to preserve competition in the newspaper industry. Therefore,

the Attorney General’s approval of the antitrust exemption must

be set aside.

II. Nothing in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), required the court of appeais to

defer to the Attorney General’s expansive construction of the

NPA. To the contrary, this Court’s established precedents re-

quire that the Newspaper Preservation Act, like all other exemp-

tions from the antitrust laws, be construed narrowly. See, e.g.,

Group Life and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.

205, 231 (1979). Although Chevron was decided after Royal

Drug, it explicitly directs courts to use “traditional tools of

statutory construction” to determine whether “Congress had an

15

intention on the precise question at issue” (id. at 843 n.9), which

includes use of the antitrust rule. This rule must also be used in

determining whether the Attorney General’s interpretation of

the Newspaper Preservation Act is reasonable and supportable.

Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain, 411 U.S. 726, 731

(1973).

Other factors counsel against giving any special deference to

the Attorney General’s construction of the NPA. The most

important consideration is the lead role that the courts have

historically taken in interpreting the antitrust laws. Indeed, the

NPA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress assumed

that the task of resolving legal issues arising under the Act would

remain the province of the courts. Moreover, the Attorney

General has no expertise in the antitrust field, and he rejected the

recommendation of the expert Antitrust Division. Finally, the

NPA does not require the resolution of competing policy issues

since Congress made the important choices in the Act.

ARGUMENT

I. APPROVAL OF THE DETROIT JOINT OPERATING

ARRANGEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE NEWSPA-

PER PRESERVATION ACT.

A. The NPA May Not Be Interpreted to Encourage Prof-

itable Newspapers to Engage in Behavior Leading to

Approval of a JOA.

The Newspaper Preservation Act was Congress’s response to

Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). In

that case, this Court affirmed a decision against two newspapers

in Tucson, Arizona, that had been operating jointly since 1940

under an agreement that provided for price fixing, profit sharing,

16

and market control. It held that their agreement violated sections

1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as section 7 of the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 18, unless the papers could meet

the traditional failing company test spelled out in /nternational

Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). The Court then ruled

against the newspapers since they had been unable to demon-

strate that, at the time they entered into the agreement, one of

them was “on the verge of going out of business.” 394 U.S. at

137.

At that time, 59 newspapers in 22 cities were published pur-

suant to joint operating agreements. H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 91st

Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1970). Some of these agreements were

more than 30 years old (id. at 5), and a significant number had

received approval from the Department of Justice. The Newspa-

per Preservation Act: Hearing on H.R.279 Before the Antitrust

Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 22-25 (1969) (hereinafter “]969 House

Hearings’) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga). Even before this

Court’s decision in Citizen Publishing, the Senate had held

hearings to consider the potential impact of the Justice Depart-

ment’s decision to initiate antitrust lawsuits against newspapers

that were parties to JOAs. The Newspaper Preservation Act:

Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and

Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,

Ist Sess. (1967).

The issue was extremely controversial. More than 40 bills

were introduced; 28 days of hearings were held; and the debates

consume 100 pages of the Congressional Record. As enacted,

the NPA adopted two distinct standards for JOAs, depending on

whether the agreement was executed before or after July 24,

1970, the Act’s effective date. Recognizing that a demanding

standard might pose a hardship for the newspapers that had been

operating under a JOA for many years, Congress provided that

pre-enactment JOAs would be exempt if, at the time of the initial

17

agreement, ore of the parties to the agreement was not “likely to

remain or become a financially sound publication.” 15 U.S.C. §

1803(a). This provision has had the effect of grandfathering the

pre-1970 JOAs.

Initially, the Senate sponsors proposed that this same standard

govern post-enactment JOAs. S. 1520, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. §

_ 3(5) (1969). However, the Senate Judiciary Committee modified

the bill to include papers either “unlikely to remain or become a

financially sound publication” or in “probable danger of fail-

ure,” and the Senate enacted the bill in that form. S. Rep. No. 535,

91st Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 1-2 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 2 017-18

(1970). The House rejected the Senate’s definition of failing

newspaper for future JOAs and passed a bill which limited a

“failing newspaper” to one in “probable danger of financial

failure.” 116 Cong. Rec. 23,179-80 (1970). This narrow stan-

dard was enacted into law. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5).

The legislative history underscores the statutory language; it

demonstrates that the House approach contained a “tougher” and

“much more stringent” standard than the “not likely to remain or

become financially sound” standard which applied to pre-1970

JOAs. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,154-55 (1970) (remarks of Rep.

Railsback).* In his introductory remarks as floor manager of the

bill, Representative Kastenmeier explained that the bill had gone

through three generations, with the exemption being narrowed

each time. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970). In the third stage of

consideration, Representative Railsback had “further limited the

bill to provide a far more stringent test for any future joint

operating agreements.” /d. In contrast to the “relatively more

liberal standard” applicable to existing arrangements, Represen-

tative Railsback later assured the House of Representatives that

*See also H.R. Rep. No. 1193, supra, p. 10 (standard applicable to pre-

1970 JOAs “less strict” than standard applicable to post-1970 JOAs).

18

the “prospective availability of the exemption has been sharply

restricted.” Jd. at 23,154. Thus, in the end, Congress adopted a

standard which would promote competition and would require

that the antitrust laws continue to apply to newspapers, unless a

JOA was “demonstrably essential” to prevent one newspaper

from closing. 116 Cong. Rec. 23,418 (1970) (remarks of Rep.

McCulloch). In that situation, the Act authorizes the Attorney

General to grant an exemption from the antitrust laws because

Congress preferred two newspapers operating under a JOA toa

single, monopoly paper.

The debate over the scope of the exemption demonstrates that

Congress was concerned that healthy newspapers might be

tempted to take advantage of the Act. The reason for this concern

is obvious: newspapers can make far greater profits in a shared

monopoly market than in a competitive one. For example, while

neither Detroit paper has earned more than $14 million during

any year since 1963, Gannett projects that after four years the

Detroit JOA would earn $100 million in yearly profits. Pet App.

76a-77a, 84a-85a; J.A. 25.

The NPA and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress

intended to ensure that the Act would not encourage newspapers

to alter their behavior in order to obtain a JOA. The Act defines

“failing newspaper” as newspapers that are in “probable danger

of financial failure.” This definition excludes newspapers that

might fail for other reasons, including the desire to obtain an

exemption from the antitrust laws. This prohibition is reinforced

in the statement of policy, which emphasizes “the public interest

of maintaining a newspaper press [that is] competitive in all parts

of the United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1801. Congress also explicitly

directed the Attorney General to insure that approval of a JOA

would “effectuate the policy and purpose” of the Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1803(b), which even Attorney General Meese recognized

would preclude him from approving a JOA for a failing paper

that had lost money solely in order to obtain the exemption. Pet.

19

App. 114a, 145a-46a.°

The legislative history of the NPA also demonstrates that

Congress intended that the exemption would not be available to

newspapers that could technically qualify as “failing,” but for

which conferring an antitrust exemption would be inappropriate

in light of the purposes of the NPA. For example, the Senate

Judiciary Committee’s report stated that the “probable danger of

financial failure” standard should be read in light of United

States v. Third National Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968), where this

Court narrowly interpreted the antitrust exemption in the Bank

Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B). S. Rep. No. 535, supra,

p. 2; accord, 116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) (remarks of Rep.

Kastenmeier). This reference to Third National Bank is signifi-

cant because that case held that an analogous antitrust exemption

required banks to “reliably establish the unavailability of alter-

native solutions to the woes” of the bank in order to obtain the

exemption. 390 U.S. at 190.

The Justice Department has historically used the Third Na-

tional Bank standard as a benchmark in considering JOA appli-

cations. The case was discussed at length in the Antitrust

Division’s Report when newspapers in Cincinnati, Chattanooga

and Seattle applied for JOAs in 1977, 1980 and 1981.° The Ninth

*The district court recognized that the Attorney General’s formulation of

this issue — whether “the prospect of a JOA, not competition for market

domination, was responsible most recently for the papers’ reluctance to

increase prices and eliminate [advertising] discounting” (Pet. App. 146a) —

was a “strawman.” As the court correctly pointed out, a “key concem of both

the ALJ and the chief of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division” was that

“both newspapers felt free to adopt bold strategies of price-cutting in an effort

to gain Market domination because they were secure in the belief that ‘failure

too had its reward in the form of JOA approval.”” Pet. App. 160a, citing ALJ

Recommended Decision at Pet. App. 121a, 132a-33a.

*Report of the Assistant Attorney General, Public File No. 44-03-24-4, pp.

18-22 (January 6, 1978) (Cincinnati); Supplemental Report of the Assistant

(footnote continued)

20

Circuit relied on this standard in Committee for an Independent

P-I v. Hearst, 704 F.2d 467, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.

892 (1983). Both the Antitrust Division and the Administrative

Law Judge adopted the standard in this case as well. J.A. 101-02;

Pet. App. 125a-26a.

The Third National Bank standard required Attorney General

Meese to look behind the losses that the Free Press had suffered

and to consider both whether the losses were caused by misman-

agement and whether there were reasonable alternatives to the

JOA that could avoid the necessity of joint operation. As Judge

Silberman observed in his opinion for the panel majority, under

Third National Bank, and thus under the NPA, “strong evidence

of probable failure was required.” Pet. App. 178a.

The final hurdle imposed by the Act, recognized by the

Department of Justice, is that “the burden of proving that the

proposed arrangement meets the requirements of the Newspaper

Preservation Act [is] on the proponents of the arrangement.” 28

C.F.R. § 48.10(a)(4) (1988). Only by imposing a rigorous

standard on JOA applicants can Congress’s interest in reserving

the exemption for newspapers that otherwise would likely have

ceased publication be protected.

At various times in the proceedings concerning the Detroit

JOA, the parties, including petitioners, have suggested compre-

hensive definitions of “probable danger of financial failure.” For

example, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that “there

must at least be convincing evidence of an irreversible economic

condition that would produce domination and a downward

spiral,” where declining circulation and advertising revenues

feed each other until the newspaper is forced to close. Pet. App.

Attorney General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5, pp. 17-19 (June 2, 1980)

(Chattanooga);Report of the Assistant Attorney General, Public File No.44-

03-26-6, pp. 7-9 (May 29, 1981) (Seattle). Copies of these reports have been

lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

21

126a. However, in this case, the Court need not formulate an all-

inclusive test, but can overturn the approval of the application

because the prospect of a JOA was an essential factor in the Free

Press’s losses and because approval of the Detroit application

would jeopardize healthy newspapers in other cities.

B. The Attorney General Violated the NPA Because His

Decision Significantly Increases the Likelihood That

Otherwise Profitable Newspapers Will Obtain JOAs.

As the Attorney General indicated in his decision, in enacting

the NPA, Congress’s “frame of reference essentially embraced

the scenario of a strong newspaper poised to drive from the

market a weaker competitor experiencing the ‘downward spiral’

phenomenon due to external market forces,” and this is how the

NPA has “[t]raditionally” been applied. Pet. App. 141a, 146a. It

is undisputed, however, that “(n]o such description fits either

ne spaper here.”’ Attorney General Decision and Order at Pet.

App. 141a. In addition, the Attorney General found that the

newspapers’ losses were not due to any inherent weakness in the

Detroit market, and that in fact “the Detroit market could sustain

two profitable newspapers” if prices were in line with the prices

charged in other cities. Pet. App. 143a (emphasis in original).

In section 1 below, we discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s

findings, which were all adopted by the Attorney General. Pet.

App. 147a. In section 2, we demonstrate that the Attorney

General’s interpretation of the Act is contrary to Congress’s

intent and that it would significantly increase the likelihood of

additional JOAs in markets that would remain competitive under

a proper interpretation of the Act.

22

1. The Record Establishes That the News and the Free

Press Are Competitive Equals in a Market That Can

Support Two Newspapers and That the Free Press

Has Not Lost Ground in Recent Years.

In their public announcement of the JOA, Knight-Ridder and

Gannett declared that “[o]ver a period of more than a quarter

century since this became a two-newspaper city, the Free Press

and The News have fought to a virtual draw.” Pet. App. 31a. The

Administrative Law Judge concluded that this statement accu-

rately described the relative positions of the two newspapers

(Pet. App. 31a-85a), a finding that Attorney General Meese did

not disturb and implicitly accepted. Judge Needelman based this

finding on a number of critical, undisputed facts.

First, as the Antitrust Division had emphasized, prior to

applying for the JOA, the Free Press had not been losing ground

to the News. J.A. 101-06. Between 1976 and 1986, when the

JOA application was filed, the Free Press’s share of daily

circulation never fell below 49%. Pet. App. 41a. As the Antitrust

Division also pointed out, competition today “is as close, or

closer, than it was a decade ago.” J.A. 97.

Judge Needelman further found that as recently as 1985 — a

year before the papers negotiated the JOA — Knight-Ridder

executives believed that the Free Press was in a position to

become the dominant newspaper in Detroit. Pet. App. 24a-25a.

One key factor was the Free Press’s commanding lead in the

critical morning market, which was thought to give it a substan-

tial long-term strategic advantage over the News. In fact, in

1985, Knight-Ridder concluded that its campaign to gain circu-

lation for the Free Press was working so well that it justified a

$22.3 million capital investment for an expansion of one of the

paper’s printing plants. Pet. App. 25a-26a.

Although this additional capacity was designed to benefit the

Free Press in its battle with the News, it was not scheduled to be

23

available until six months after the JOA application was filed.

Pet. App. 27a. In fact, Judge Needelman concluded that “as late

as June 1986 [a month after the JOA application had been filed],

Lawrence, the Free Press’s publisher, was planning for an

expansion ‘regardless of the outcome of the JOA.”” Pet. App.

104a n.242. As Judge Needelman found, the decision to expand

the printing plant “indicated confidence in the [1985] predictions

of Free Press executives that the investment would eventually

bring dominance .. ..”” Pet. App. 25a.

Second, the ALJ endorsed the Antitrust Division’s argument

that the 50/50 profit split between the News and the Free Press

was persuasive evidence that the papers themselves did not

believe that the Free Press was in “probable danger of financial

failure.” Pet. App. 113a-14a; 122a; J.A. 115-17. According to

the testimony of the Antitrust Division’s expert witness, which

was adopted by Judge Needelman, “the JOA profit split repre-

sents a recognition by Gannett that the Free Press would remain

in existence for at least seven to ten years; otherwise, Gannett

would have found it more profitable to wait for the Free Press to

fail.” Pet. App. 113a. The profit split alone is telling evidence

that neither newspaper had a significant edge when they submit-

ted their JOA application. Moreover, the ALJ found that, during

the JOA negotiations, it was an open question which paper would

be designated as “failing,” a finding that further buttresses the

conclusion that the newspapers were essentially competitive

equals. Pet. App. 30a.

Third, the ALJ concluded that the Free Press was a healthy

paper and had a number of competitive advantages over the

News. The most important evidence on this issue is a January 20,

1986 memorandum from Knight-Ridder’s CEO, on behalf of the

Free Press, to Gannett’s CEO, which the ALJ reprinted in full in

his Recommended Decision (Pet. App. 32a-38a). This memo-

randum was written about the time Gannett acquired the News.

less than two months before the papers signed the JOA. Accord-

ing to the memorandum:

the Free Press has “clear leadership in the critically impor-

tant morning field” (Pet. App. 32a);

“the Free Press has greater overall readership” than the

News (Pet. App. 34a; see also Pet. App. 55a);

“the Free Press is the dominant daily paper among adults in

virtually all upscale demographic categories” (Pet. App.

35a);

over the five previous years, the Free Press’s circulation

figures had improved in every area, and it had outgained the

News in a number of important areas (Pet. App. 33a-34a);

“[t]he Free Press has improved [its] advertising share of

field over time” (Pet. App. 33a, 36a);

the Free Press has won far more journalistic prizes than the

News (Pet. App. 37a);

according to the Free Press’s CEO, “we think the figures

reflect the Free Press’ increasingly strong competitive

position” (Pet. App. 34a).

Although Judge Needelman credited the applicants’ testimony

that this memorandum was written to argue the Free Press’s case

during the JOA negotiations, he concluded that it “was a reason-

able summary of the data available at that time.” Pet. App. 39a.

Furthermore, just two months prior to signing the JOA, John

W. Morton, one of the expert witnesses for the applicants and a

nationally recognized newspaper analyst, “was of the view that

if the Detroit newspaper war was to continue, the News was ‘at

greater risk’ than the Free Press.” Pet. App. 112a. According to

Judge Needelman, “Morton saw a ten-year trend favoring the

Free Press and he emphasized that because of its strong morning

25

franchise it was positioned to avoid the downward spiral and

overtake the News.” /d. As the Antitrust Division summarized

the facts in its Post-Hearing Brief, “[a]lthough the record shows

that the Free Press has not achieved its stated goal of dominance

in the Detroit market, it also shows that until the very moment the

JOA was announced, Free Press executives believed that sub-

stantial progress was being made.” J.A. 113.

2. The Attorney General’s Decision Improperly Turns

the NPA Intoa Statute That Encourages Conduct That

Will Lead to Reduced Competition.

During the five years prior to applying for the JOA, the News

and the Free Press lost an average of nine and eleven million

dollars per year, respectively. Pet. App. 77a, 85a. According to

the Attorney General and the ALJ, the reason for these losses was

below-market pricing of both circulatio. and advertising. Pet.

App. 143a n.3. Yet the Attorney General concluded that the

papers were entitled to a JOA because the Free Press had no

unilateral way out of its loss position: as long as the News was

willing to continue to incur heavy losses, the Free Press could not

raise its prices without losing circulation and advertising. Pet.

App. 143a. To support his conclusion that the Free Press would

not raise its prices, the Attorney General relied on testimony

from the News’s chief executive officer that it would continue to

sustain large losses in an effort to gain dominance over the Free

Press, even if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 143a-44a.

This interpretation of the Act gives profitable newspapers in

competitive markets a roadmap for obtaining a lucrative antitrust

exemption. The first step would be for one paper to set its

advertising rates and circulation prices significantly below the

level necessary to make a profit. The second paper would then

have to lower its prices in order to maintain its competitive

position. Soon both papers would be losing money, and neither

26

would have a unilateral way to become profitable. Relying on the

Attorney General’s interpretation of the Act, after several years

of losses, either paper could then be designated as “failing” so

long as its competitor testified that it would not raise prices even

if the JOA were denied. Pet. App. 141a, 142a-44a; see also Panel

Opinion at Pet. App. 176a, 177a>184a-86a.’

The problem with this interpretation of the NPA is that it

provides an incentive for newspapers in healthy markets to

engage in conduct that will lead to losses and eventually an

exemption from the antitrust laws. Thus, absent the fall-back of

a lucrative JOA, there would be no reason for any newspaper to

assume the enormous risk of losing money for years in the hope

of driving a competitor from the market. As Chief Judge Wald

pointed out, “[c]lassic economic principles and basic antitrust

law run counter to any prediction that sophisticated firms will

pursue below-cost pricing strategies over the long haul.’ This is

because “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even

more rarely successful.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). Thus, intention-

’The possibility of one newspaper driving an unwilling competitor into a

JOA is not idle speculation. As described in the amicus curiae brief of Little

Rock Newspapers, Inc. (publisher of the Arkansas Democrat), Gannctt, the

owner of The Detroit News, has cut prices and thereby transformed the

Arkansas Gazette, which it also owns and which competes with the Arkansas

Democrat, from a profitable newspaper into one that is losing several million

dollars per year. On August 14, 1988, six days after the Attorney Gencral

approved the Detroit JOA, but before this case had been filed, Gannett

increased the pressure on the Arkansas Democrat by further cutting the

Gazette's circulation price to all subscribers, this time by 57.5%. Amicus

Curiae Brief, p. 2.

*Pet. App. 207a (emphasis in original), citing McGee, Predatory Pricing

Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 291-300 (1980); R. Bork, The Antitrust

Paradox, 144-59 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related

Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 697-704

(1975).

27

ally incurring substantial losses would be rational and likely if,

and only if, a government bailout, in the form of a JOA, would

be available if the predatory pricing scheme should fail. If

Congress’s basic policies are to be preserved, the NPA may not

be interpreted to reward or encourage such behavior.’

The fact that the NPA expressly prohibits predatory pricing by

newspapers operating under a lawful JOA further bolsters the

proposition that the Act should not be interpreted to reward such

schemes. 15 U.S.C. § 1803<c) (Act not to “be construed to

exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing’’). Even the

panel majority recognized the legitimate concern tl at, after the

Attorney General’s interpretation of the NPA, “[n]ewspapers in

two newspaper towns will compete recklessly because of a

recognition that the loser will be assured a soft landing.” Pet.

App. 189a (emphasis added). The panel majority, however, held

that the Attorney General had discretion to adopt this interpreta-

tion of the Act, without regard to its impact on competition.

The seriousness of the deviation of the Attorney Genecal’s

interpretation is highlighted by the evidence that the prospect of

obtaining a JOA in Detroit was an important factor in che

decision of both papers to cut prices in the first place. As the

Administrative Law Judge conciuded,

[t]he losses incurred by the Free Press and the News are at-

tributable to their strategies of seeking market dominance

and future profitability at any cost along with the expecta-

*The ALJ’s finding, that the applicants had not demonstrated that the News

is likely to maintain its low prices even if the JOA is denied, reinforces this

point. Pet. App. 92a. Although the Attomey Gencral found that the News was

likely to maintain its low prices (Pet. App. 143a), his only support for this

finding was the ALJ’s Finding of Fact No. 107 (Pet App. 143a), where Judge

Needelman reached a directly contrary conclusion, namely that the applicants

had not carried their burden of proof on this issue. Pet. App. 92a.

28

tion that failure to achieve these goals would result in

favorable consideration of a JOA application.

Pet. App. 132a-33a. Judge Needelman supported this conclusion

by finding that the Free Press had rejected several opportunities

to escape the competitive struggle because it believed that it

could win dominance in the Detroit market, with the JOA as a

cushion to fall back on if it failed. Pet. App. 17a-19a. It is also

significant that Gannett purchased the News only after confirm-

ing that Knight-Ridder was willing to consider a JOA, and the

two newspapers signed the joint operating agreement just two

months after Gannett had formally acquired the News. Pet. App.

29a; J.A. 85. As described by Assistant Attorney General

Ginsburg, “Gannett and Knight-Ridder demonstrated an almost

unseemly haste in considering the possibility of a JOA even

before Gannett had successfully bid for the Evening News

Association.” J.A. 89.

In Hearst, supra, 704 F.2d at 478, the Ninth Circuit upheld

Attorney General Smith’s interpretation of the NPA, which was

designed “to prevent newspapers from allowing or encouraging

financial difficulties in the hope of reaping long-term financial

gains through a JOA.” Yet, as Chief Judge Wald lamented, the

Attorney General’s decision in this case “will, ironically, make

iteven more probable that newspapers will disappear than if the

Act had never been passed in the first place.” Pet. App. 2i0a

(emphasis in original). For all of these reasons, the Attorney

General’s decision approving the Detroit JOA is contrary to the

Newspaper Preservation Act.

29

Il. CHEVRON DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR

UPHOLDING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S

DECISION.

Until the decision of the panel below, it had been universally

accepted that the Justice Department and the courts < re required

to construe the Newspaper Preservation Act narrowly because it

is an exemption from the antitrust laws. In the only other case

where a court construed the exemption, the Ninth Circuit ex-

pressly held that this rule of statutory construction applies to the

NPA. Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., supra,

704 F.2d at 478. In Hearst, the court was restating the position

of then- Attorney General William French Smith, who had noted,

in the decision under review there, that “exemptions from the

antitrust laws,” such as the NPA, “must be narrowly construed.”

See 47 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 26,473 (June 18, 1982). Similarly, the

Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust had issued the same

declaration in his report evaluating the application for a JOA in

Chattanooga, which Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti incor-

porated into his decision. Report of the Assistant Attorney

General, Public File No. 44-03-25-5, p. 8 n.1 (May 19, 1980); 45

Fed. Reg. 58,733 (September 4, 1980) (Attorney General Civ-

iletti’s order).

During the consideration of the Free Press and News’s appli-

cation for a JOA, there was never any indication that the Justice

Department intended to disavow this rule of construction. In his

initial report on the application, Assistant Attorney General

Ginsburg stated, as if the issue were beyond dispute, that “[a]s

with all exemptions to the antitrust laws, exemptions for joint

arrangements under the Act must be narrowly construed.” J.A.

38, citing “Croup Life and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co.,

supra, and Hearst, supra. In its Post-Hearing Brief to the

Attorney General, the Antitrust Division reiterated the impor-

tance of the rule. J.A. 100. Although Attorney General Meese did

30

not mention the rule in his Decision and Order (Pet. App. 136a-

48a), he never indicated that he intended to reject it, or that he

believed he would have had the authority to do so. Similarly, in

the briefs in the court of appeals, the Justice Department and the

newspapers never argued that the Attorney General had any such

authority.

Nevertheless, the panel majority found that the Attorney

General was excused from applying the rule. It held that Chev-

ron, U.S A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837

(1984), “implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among

various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable

agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.” Pet. App. 180a

(emphasis in original’. As applied to the NPA, the panel major-

ity’s decision is wrong.

A. Chevron Did Not Alter the Applicability of the Rule

That Exemptions From the Antitrust Laws Must Be

Narrowly Construed.

In Chevron, this Court provided guidance to lower courts

reviewing the interpretation and implementation of regulatory

statutes by administrative agencies. Chevron involved a chal-

lenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation

defining the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. The

regulation permitted the states to adopt a plant-wide definition of

stationary source rather than restricting the definition to each

device that emitted pollution within a plant.

Both this Court and the lower court held that neither the Clear

Air Act nor its legislative history clearly defined the statutory

term at issue. Finding that Congress had assigned to EPA the

function of implementing this technical statute and that the

ultimate decision depended on how one balanced the Act’s

competing policies (“progress in reducing air pollution [and]

economic growth”), the Court held that the Congress had dele-

—

31

gated that task to the agency. 467 U.S. at 866. In these circum-

stances, this Court ruled that any reasonable construction of the

statute must be upheld.

Chevron does not give agencies the latitude to ignore estab-

lished rules of statutory construction, as the panel majority

concluded. To the contrary, Chevron explicitly held that “[iJf a

court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,

ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question

at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”

Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis supplied). More-

over, since Chevron, this Court has frequently used rules of

statutory construction in reviewing agencies’ interpretations of

statutes. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

109 S. Ct. 468 (1988) (statutes to be construed as not conferring

implied authority to issue retroactive regulations). Insofar as we

have been able to determine, the Court has never suggested that

Chevron modifies these traditional rules of statutory construc-

tion.'°

The panel majority never came to grips with the importance of

the application of the antitrust rule. That application is firmly

embedded in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Group Life & Health

In addition to Bowen, see also Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480

U.S. 531,555 (1987) (reference to “familiar rule of statutory construction that

doubtful expressions must be resolved in favor of Indians,” although rule not

applicable in that case); /mmigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-

Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (reference to “longstanding principle of

construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the

alien,” although it was unnecessary to rely on the rule in reversing the

agency); Bowen y. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610, 644 n.33

(1986) (reference to the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of

sovereignty); Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,

370 (1986) (“where possible, provisions of a statute should be read so as not

to create a conflict”); Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860

(1986) (“identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended

to have the same meaning”).

32

Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979), as

this Court has confirmed since Chevron. Square D Co. v.

Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 421 (1986)

(“exemptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed and

strongly disfavored”). No court had previously suggested that an

administrative agency or a court has the authority to ignore it

under Chevron or any other rationale.'!

The Court faced an analogous issue in DeBartolo Corp. v.

Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trade Council,

108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988), where the National Labor Relations

Board sought enforcement of an order prohibiting a union from

distributing handbills urging consumers to boycott a shopping

mall. In response to the NLRB’s argument that its interpretation

of the statute was entitled to deference under Chevron, this Court

held that any Chevron deference was overridden by “[a]nother

rule of statutory construction” — the rule that “where an other-

wise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious

constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to

avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary

to the intent of Congress.” /d. at 1397. While the antitrust rule at

issue in this case may not have the stature of the rule invoked in

DeBartolo, it too is solidly entrenched in this Court’s jurispru-

dence, and it should also override any deference that would

otherwise be required by Chevron.

The court of appeals did leave some room for the use of canons

of statutory construction. It held that canons could be employed

to demonstrate that Congress had a “specific intent on the issue

in question.” Pet. App. 180a (emphasis in original). Forexample,

according to the panel, the canon of expresgio unius est exclusio

"See also, e.g., Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 826

F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (2d Cir. 1987) (court’s review of agency action guided by

both the rule requiring strict construction of antitrust exempuons and Chev-

ron).

33

alterius might be used to demonstrate that in a statute banning the

importation of apples, oranges, and bananas, Congress did not

intend to ban the import of grapefruits. Pet. App. 180a-81a.

However, the panel claimed that Chevron_prohibited the courts

from applying the canon here, even if such an application would

have led to the conclusion that the Attorney General had con-

strued the antitrust exemption too broadly and thereby had

violated the Newspaper Preservation Act. Nothing in Chevron or

its progeny supports this result, particularly since Congress

intended that the NPA be narrowly construed. See pp. 17-20,

supra.

Even if the NPA did not directly address the issue raised in this

case, this Court made it clear in Federal Maritime Commission

v. Seatrain, 411 U.S.726 (1973), that the rule should still be used

in determining whether the agency’s interpretation of an anti-

trust exemption is reasonable and supportable. In Seatrain, the

Court reviewed a decision of the Federal Maritime Commission,

that a contract involving the purchase of one shipping company

by another was an “agreement” within the meaning of section 15

of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814, and thus subject

to the FMC’s approval and grant of antitrust immunity. This

Court rejected the Commission’s interpretation, even though

“the statutory language neither clearly embraces nor ciearly

excludes discrete merger or acquisition-of-assets agreements.”

Id. at 731. According to the Court, a ruling sustaining the

Commission’s “broad reading of [the statute] would conflict

with our frequently expressed view that exemptions from an‘.-

trust laws are strictly construed.” /d. at 733.

The panel’s analysis is flatly inconsistent with Seatrain.

Indeed, applying the panel’s method of statutory construction

would have led to the opposite result there since this Court relied

on the rule to reverse the Commission’s expansive construction

of the Shipping Act. The panel’s error is underscored by this

Court’s citation to the Seatrain decision in Chevron. 467 U.S. at

843 n.9.

34

B. The Court Should Not Defer tothe Attorney General’s

Construction of the NPA.

Even prior to Chevron, the principle that agencies’ interpreta-

tions and applications of statutes were entitled to deference was

well-established. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322

U.S. 111 (1944); see also Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

However, the lower courts have interpreted Chevron as requir-

ing them to give extremely broad latitude to administrative

agencies’ interpretations of statutes. This is what the panel

majority referred to as “Chevron’s restraining leash.” Pet. App.

200a. |

We have argued above that this Court’s precedents, including

Chevron, required the court of appeals to apply the antitrust rule

to the NPA and that the NPA directly addresses the issue before

the Court. However, even if the Court finds that the NPA does not

answer the specific issue before the Court, there are four reasons

why deference to the Attorney General is not appropriate here.

First, in contrast to the Clean Air Act and other complex

regulatory statutes administered by agencies, the antitrust laws

have historically been interpreted and enforced by the courts. As

this Court stated in United States v. First City National Bank, 386

U.S. 361, 367 (1967),

Traditionally in antitrust actions involving regulated indus-

tries, the courts have never given presumptive weight to a

prior agency decision, for the simple reason that Congress

put such suits on a different axis than was familiar in

administrative procedure.

Although the Bank Merger Act required de novo review of the

Comprtroller’s decisions, the Court indicated that Congress had

codified the standard of judicial review that had previously been

applicable. /d. (“We have found no indication that Congress

35

designed judicial review differently under the 1966 Actthan had

earlier obtained.”’). Addressing the argument that Congress had

intended it to apply a more relaxed standard of review, this Court

concluded that it would have had “to assume that Congress made

a revolutionary innovation” to shift the standard of review to the

test that is traditionally used in reviewing administrative actions.

Id. at 368. Finally, in its post-Chevron construction of section 5

of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which

does not provide for de novo review, this Court adopted a similar

approach, holding that, although the FTC is entitled to “some

deference,” “identification of governing legal standards and

their application tothe facts found [are] for the courts toresolve.”

Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,

476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).

The implications of the deference question go far beyond the

Newspaper Preservation Act since there are numerous other

exemptions from the antitrust laws that administrative agencies

are charged with interpreting and enforcing.” To interpret Chev-

ron as giving agencies an almost unreviewable ability to expand

those exemptions would upset the settled expectations of Con-

gress when it enacted those laws.

Second, the NPA and its legislative history demonstrate that

Congress expected the courts to construe the Act. Since Chevron

"See, e.g., Fishers’ Coop Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (Secretary

of Commerce may order associations to “cease and desist” if he finds that the

“associauion monopolizes or restrains trade . . . to such an extent that the price

of any aquatic product is unduly enhanced”); Export Trading Company Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et sed. (Secretary of Commerce may exempt persons in

export trade from antitrust laws upon showing that there will be no “substan-

tial lessening of competition” and no “unfair methods of compeution”);

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11343, 11344 (ICC may approve

certain acquisitions and mergers taking into account the “effect . . . on the

adequacy of transportation” and whether it would have an “adverse effect on

compctition”).

36

is founded on the general assumption that Congress intended to

grant regulatory agencies broad latitude to fill in gaps in their

statutes, an identifiable congressional expectation that the courts

would take the lead in interpreting the NPA precludes giving the

Attorney General deference otherwise accorded administrative

agencies under Chevron.

The Senate Committee Report, as well as the debates and

Statements made at the hearings on the NPA, establish that

Congress assumed that the courts would play the principal role

in interpreting the definition of “failing newspaper” and in

particular the provision requiring proof of “probable danger of

financial failure.” As we have discussed above, the definition of

“failing newspaper” was taken from the Bank Merger Acct. In its

Report, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the phrase

had “been the subject of a Supreme Court opinion in U.S. v. Third

National Bank.” S. Rep. No. 91-535, supra, p. 2. As Repre. :n-

tative Kastenmeier, the House floor leader, described the term:

It comes out of the Bank Merger Act. /t is understood by the

courts in the field, and happens to be a term that is well

known.

116 Cong. Rec. 23,146 (1970) (emphasis added). Numerous

other statements made during the course of legislative considera-

tion of the bill also demonstrate that Congress assumed that the

courts, rather than the Attorney General, would have the princi-

pal responsibility to interpret the NPA."?

'8§. Rep. No. 535, supra, p. 4 (“In applying this definition the Court should

consider the impact of competition on newspapers as it determines whether

a paper is likely to disappear as a competitive factor.”) (emphasis added); id.

at 5 (“The language of section 3(5) is similar to other general standards

which the courts apply in other areas of antitrust law.”) (emphasis added);

- 1969 House Hearings, supra, p. 97 (statement of Rep. Railsback that “I take

(footnote continued)

37

A comparison of the NPA with the version of the bill initially

introduced in the Senate also indicates that Congress assumed

that the courts would interpret the Act. Since the NPA does not

provide for review by the Attorney General of pre-1970 JOAs,

the courts have the sole responsibility for resolving any legal

issue pertaining to such agreements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1803(a).

The bill approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee contained

an identical standard for pre-1970 and post-1970 JOAs, but

newspapers seeking to operate under a JOA after 1970 would

have been required to obtain approval from the Attorney Gen-

eral. S. 1520, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3(5), 4(a), 4(b) (1969). If

that bill had been enacted into law, the Act would not have been

interpreted to mean that the Justice Department could adopt one

interpretation of that standard for post-1970 JOAs, while the

courts could adopt another interpretation for pre- 1970 agreements.

Cf. Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (Chevron

deference not applicable where Congress has entrusted Federal

Trade Commission and Justice Department with responsibility

under section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act because of possibility of

conflicting interpretations). Although Congress ultimately

adopted two distinct standards, it did not alter the respective roles

of the Attorney General and the courts. Therefore, the sequence

it that the courts have defined what constitutes a failing newspaper?”)

(emphasis added); id. at 110 (statement of Morris J. Levin, Counsel for

Tucson Newspapers, Inc. that “[t]o argue that the proposed language of the

definition is too broad or generally fails to take into consideration the fact that

the courts have had little difficulty in interpreting similar language in the

antitrust laws”) (emphasis added); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 2006 (1970)

(statement of Sen. Hruska indicating that the failing newspaper standard

would be interpreted by “a reviewing court”); The Newspaper Preservation

Act: Hearings on S. 1520 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and

Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 9\stCong., Ist Sess., p.

302 (1979) (statement of Senator Hart that “we don’t know how a court will

interpret any picce of legislation”) (emphasis added).

38

of bills that Congress considered supports the argument that it

did not intend the courts to defer to the Justice Department in

construing the NPA.

Third, to the extent that the deference required by Chevron

depends on the complexity of the statute or the expertise of the

agency, it has little or no applicability here. See Bowen v.

American Hospital Association, supra, 476 U.S. at 642 n.30. The

NPA is not complex, and in contrast to the Clean Air Act and

many of the other statutes to which Chevron has been applied,

the Attorney General has no technical expertise in interpreting it.

The basic antitrust laws, such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts,

are typically applied and interpreted in the first instance by the

courts. Moreover, the expertise in this area resides in the Anti-

trust Division of the Department of Justice, which disagreed with

the Attorney General as to whether the application at issue in this

case qualified under the NPA. Thus, the consideration of exper-

tise does not support granting extra deference to the Attorney

General’s decision in this case.

Fourth, to the extent that Chevron depends on the principle

that Congress intended executive branch agencies to resolve the

competing policies underlying regulatory statutes, it has less

applicability here because Congress largely resolved those poli-

cies in the statute itself. In the NPA’s declaration of policy,

Congress identified the two relevant policy considerations: the

“public interest of maintaining anewspaper press editorially and

reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the

United States”; and the interest in “preserv[ing] the publication

of newspapers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1801. This statement of policy dem-

onstrates that Congress preferred competing newspapers and

that joint operation was to be permitted where the alternative was

likely to be the loss of one newspaper. Therefore, the Act

prohibits the Attorney General from granting the exemption

unless one of the newspapers is in “probable danger of financial

failure.”

39

In summary, the Attorney General’s decision must be judged

against the statute, its structure, its legislative history, and the

rule that exceptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly

construed. Whatever deference may be appropriate, the Attor-

ney General is not entitled to adopt a broad construction of the

Act that is inconsistent with both the rule of construction and the

underlying purposes of the Act itself.

CONCLUSION rd

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals

should be reversed, and the Decision and Order of the Attorne,

General approving the JOA should be set aside.

Respectfully submitted,

William B. Schultz

(Counsel of Record)

David C. Vladeck

Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation Group

2000 P Street, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-3704

Attorneys for Petitioners

June 30, 1989

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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