Respondents Brief — Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

Supreme Court brief1987

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 85-920

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

WILLIAM E. Brock, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al.,

Respondents.

Ca Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

GARY GREEN

EUGENE B. GKANOF*

Arr LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

*(Counsel of Record)

Of Counsel

GEORGE B. DRIES=EN

1000 Potomac Street, N.W.

(Suite 204)

Washington, D.C. 20007

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

-—<-—— -— —

~ ‘BEST AVAILABLE copy bi

HY

ey

e

ae

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,

49 U.S.C. app. § 1552, contains labor protective pro-

visions, which, inter alia, grant a hiring preference

to certain furloughed or terminated airline employees.

Section 43 also authorizes the Secretary of Labor to

issue regulations to implement the preference, sub-

ject, however, to a legislative veto. Did the Court ol!

Appeals correctly conclude that the concededly un-

constitutional legislative veto provision was severable

from the remainder of § 43 where it found ‘ample

evidence that the employee protection program was

deemed to be an important aspect’’ of the Airline

Deregulation Act, but ‘“‘not a shred of evidence that

the veto provision was deemed to be a vital feature

of the protection plan’’?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED cccccuccocecisincenscsvieuee

AUTHORITIES CUT occcccsscecsentesssoseusnsnneenee

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE. ........cccsccccceeeeessees

E. Tine Bemete TA cccccssssssscsccssnseneeeeeee

A. The Senate’s Deregulation Provisions .....

B. The Senate’s Labor Protective

PPOUUGUID ccccccocessccnssiunenanieneee

1. The Disagreements Over Concept ......

2. The Particulars of the Senate’s Labor

Protection Provision ................sseceeeeeees

BT. Thee Blows BER ccncsccccscssinscnnnensiaiennnaneane

A. The House’s Deregulation Provisions ......

B. The House’s Labor Protective

i

III. The Conference Committee and Subsequent

Ns ETN

PARGUBGERINE occccovessecccntssececcocesecensbuncusiieannnnnnnnE

I. THERE IS NO PERSUASIVE BASIS FOR

CONCLUDING THAT THE LEGISLA IVE

VETO PROVISION WAS CRUCIAL IN ANY

MATERIAL RESPECT TO THE ENACT-

BENT OF 6 66 ncccoxccscsssensensiiseniisesnnaaanane

A. The Evidence to Support a Determination

_ Inseverability is Completely Lacking

TO ...<+ccncesessessssinnsbiieeieaniiiaialainnnnnnnnE

B. Petitioners Are Mistaken in Asserting that

the Veto Provision Resulted rom

Congressional Concern that Administration

of §43 Might Conflict With Airline Dere-

gulation Objectives ..............cccccsssssssccseseeee

rs

23

ili

C. Petitioners Do Not Otherwise Show that

the Veto Provision Was Crucial to Enact-

ment of First Right of Hire ....................

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED A

PROPER TEST FOR DETERMINING SEV-

ERABLITY

CONCLUSION

MSTSVDSSPSHSSSSSSSSSOSSSHSHS LES OO SOS SOCECOOOESOEECOOEOOOOSSESSS

wo

rw A |

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES: Page

Alaska Airlines, Inc., v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550

Re: SRR IID wrccsmcnsnrcescrecssncovessinscorensescoensens passim

American Federation of Government Employees v.

Pierce, 697 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.

TTT chehieaibebuiiantncsennasescenasieeemisanmmaserenicnees 24,26,34,43

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) o..ccccccecccecee. 23,41,43

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n

BD Ue BOD (RGBR) nvenccscocosccacnsacscreccessscareecoys 23, 41

City of New Haven v. United States, __ F.Supp. —_

(No. 86-0455) (D.C. D.C. May 16, 1986) ......... 26, 34

Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC.

673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd mem. sub

nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer

Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216

GR sabeiaa ete nr ree ents 24, 26, 33

EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984) ......... 25, 34

EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc.. 724 F.2d 1188

eh A ee: i

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp.

Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 173

GRIPE semccasateatintasis adem aereence tee. 34, 37, 41

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,

GOS UB. O19 (1GGB) oon... ccc cecenccccsccccccocccsees 23, 36, 41

McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th

Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011

I eiciatincecrerwin nage ere Eee Sa fe: 26, 33

McDonald v. Piedmont Aviation, 625 F.Supp. 762

Ge. 6 ee Ae 29

Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir.

DRRPEE: § Ssdacotensgthiact ta telnet ne en enone ee Ss 25

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1

SRD “Cescnscreitch cue tc Loak ee ceaeameaecamageie 44

Regan v. Time, Inc., —_ U.S. __, 104 S.Ct.

TE COE Sect eke ee ee 24, 41

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) .................... 36

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) — ........... 44

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.

95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in various

sections of 49 U.S.C. app. (1982)) .............. passim

iD ee Ge SE, | ceicedieincs es -aiedaalercaneenneas 38

2h fF MS: | | Sener enero ee” 39

ye Sts PIE ca vecckccuascekvcksedecagaasiseusearenoann 39

ee I IIE — senevacissesnnedintionsaciesanaimieavacieies 37

Dy Ge BR PME cindaccseceviociecevecssaarkcsasinans 38, 39

§ 43 (92 Stat. 1750 (49 U.S.C. app. § 1552)) . passim

Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2

Sens. RE. spacannipeceedipaaltaneiatncibcdabldnustataielanies 26

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 49 U.S.C.

SS Na 0 sd cielicscaeascasiensteslaceenicanus moebasialeadaseasnaarse 37

Interstate Commerce Act, § 5(2\f), 49 U.S.C.

it PEE cethcta ineienadepeudbeitnnacdahbutacacinnveniousimeciterees 14, 30

Rail Passenger Act, § 405, 45 U.S.C. § 565 .......... 14, 30

Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act

of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31) ow... 14

Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.

Sy MPU socal chenicchsbducenatactiasisceavaneesstonecteciebdcuts 20, 41

I ne a eae 41

Se Mia: ED ©, hast cusncck cn ocheonasdnardoebaumememaniecat 4]

Pes te ORI desis dieshuaceustodeaacesdinansxtieunedautdertors 4]

Be UT. BD hos cak crscwnscencrunsbcnsesenensccbusewvcenees 4]

Be ess I Il iasosacdcccdsctococchetcivettnesenesseceee 41

We PR Us ME senacesachotsececcersecciseveevacesiensesss 4]

29 C.F.R. Part 220, 50 Fed. Reg. 53094-105 (Dec.

27, 1985) 29

vl

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

§ 220.21, 50 Fed. Reg. 53103 oovceeeeccccccccceseeee 28

00 Fed. Reg. 58094-95 ooov cee cecccsccsscccceseseee 29

ee 29

D0 Fed. Reg. 58096 oou....cccccccsesscesssssseccsscesee, 29

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS

H.R. 12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ....ccccc0.-. passim

H.R. Rep. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

RPI sacsseaicenesbennpesscesenics esciesouounnneencacansacckccicisasss passim

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d esd

SITE Gtistih doncteaemeseccrtoesudinunuscaselonccenditsscn co: passim

S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ....cccccccceccceee. passim

S. Rep. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

SEE sesuntinhiheintsteeits cured oe aly passim

124 Cong. Rec. 10674-75 (1978) o......eeeccccccseccoceseee. 10

124 Cong. Rec. 10674-83 (1978) ooecceeceeccececccecceeees 7

124 Cong. Rec. 10675 (1978) coecccccccccccccccccccccccceeee.. 7

124 Cong. Rec. 10679 (1978) .........cccceceeeee eee 7

124 Cong. Rec. 10680-81 (1978) oooceeececcccccccesceeeee. 11

124 Cong. Rec. 10682 (1978) oo... eeeecccccceccseseseeees 7

124 Cong. Rec. 10683 (1978) .............0.000.. eae 1]

124 Cong. Rec. 10698 (1978) ooveeecccccccccccccceececeeseee. 2

124 Cong. Rec. 10701 (1978) oo..eeeeeccccsccccececsceceee. 37

124 Cong. Rec. 30703 (1978) oooccccccccccccccccccceecceeeees. 15

124 Cong. Rec. 10710 (1978) ..occcccccccccceccccccceeeeeeeen. 4

124 Cong. Rec. 30661-718 (1978) ooeeeeeeccececccceceeeee, 15

124 Cong. Rec. 30703 (1978) ooeccceccccececcececceceeceececes 14

124 Cong. Rec. 30718 (1978) ..........ccccccccssccoscoeeceeese 14

124 Cong. Rec. 37416-21 (1978) ooococococccocccceeeececeee. 7

124 Cong. Rec. 38521-25 (1978) o...eeeeceeeeececcececeeee, 7

Vil

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

BBG Comm, Tec. SEGRE CIGTE) cvccccncesssicenecisnevesssccress 17

E36 Comet. Het. BEGETS CIGTE) oivccccesssoscsssdssesccssnccesce 17

BBG Comeee, Tee. BG CERT sisiscccscrsccsccccccessescesecs: 19

124 Cong. Rec. 38524-25 (1978) .........2....0000...0.0000s 18

124 Cong. Rec. 38526-27 (1978) ........ccccccsscssssseseees 17

MISCELLANEOUS

Levitas & Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response:

A Call to Congressional Arms, 12 Hofstra L.

NN ny SUID <acccoenndct,ciscaroncrunbintdeakapmancciets 32

1 Mezines, Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law

EES ie MM air ALR R ERT OR AE ORL MeN I DHE 33

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-920

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

We

WILLIAM E. Brock, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT AIR LINE PILOTS

ASSOCIATION

The Air Line Pilots Associaticn, International (“‘ALPA’’)

is a labor organization which is the bargaining agent for

approximately 39,000 commercial airline pilots employed

by 47 U.S. carriers. Because of the obvious interest of its

members in the employee protection provision which was

enacted for their benefit and which is at issue in this

litigation, ALPA intervened as a defendant in the district

court and was one of the appellants in the court of appeals.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

ALPA accepts Petitioners’ procedural history of this lit-

igation. However, in their Statement of the Case,

Petitioners give only cursory treatinent to the legislative

history of § 43, which has enabled them to characterize it

misleadingly. (Pet. Br., pp. 2-5). Accordingly, we set forth

below the pertinent facts concerning the passage of the

Airline Deregulation Act in general, and of § 43 in par-

ticular. These facts show with unusual clarity that Con-

gress placed great importance on the labor protective

provisions of the ADA, that it paid scant heed to the veto

provision, and that it evinced no concern that implemen-

tation of § 43 could in any way undermine the objectives

of airline deregulation.

I. The Senate Bill |

A. The Senate’s Deregulation Provisions

The Senate passed its version of the ADA—S. 2493—

on April 19, 1978, about a month before the House Com-

mittee on Public Works and Transportation reported out

its deregulation bill, H.R. 12611. 124 Cong. Rec. 10,698

(1978); H.R. Rep. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)

(hereinafter ‘House Report’’). The Report of the Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

which accompanied S. 2493 succinctly stated the bill’s pri-

mary objective: “to provide the domestic air transportation

industry with the same competitive incentives which face

most other American industries.”” S. Rep. No. 631, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) (hereinafter ‘Senate Report’’).

These competitive incentives did not exist in the airline

industry, according to the Report, because the Civil Aero-

nautics Board (“CAB”), which was statutorily charged with

issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity

‘The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), Pub. L. No. 95-

504, 92 Stat. 1705 et seqg., is codified in various sections of 49 U.S.C.

app. Section 43 of the ADA appears as 49 '' S.C. app. 1552.

without which an interstate air carrier could not operate,

had developed and applied its certification policy in a man-

ner which was “both substantively restrictive and admin-

istratively burdensome to new competitors.’’ Senate

Report, p. 3. Moreover, the “Board has pursued fare pol-

icies which restrict price competition at the public’s ex-

pense.” Ibid.

In legislating a response to tne perceived problems, the

Senate rejected a “broad discretionary approach” whereby

Congress would simply “indicate its preference for in-

creased competition in a general way, leaving the partic-

ular details of reform to the [Civil Aeronautics] Board.”

Senate Report, p. 4. Instead, it opted to “deprive the

Board of some of its discretion’’ by changing existing law

“in a variety of ways.” Id. at pp. 4-5. A major objective

of these specific changes was to “substantially increase

... the ability of new carriers to enter the industry, and

the ability of existing carriers to expand into new mar-

kets.” Id. at p. 5.?

* As summarized in the Senate Report, among the specific changes

were the following:

First, the public interest standard which the Board applies in route

cases is rewritten to impose on the Board a duty to allow prices,

route structures, and the nature and variety of air services to be

set by the independent forces of the free market and airline man-

agement decisions, rater than the Board itself. Second, a new

section provides specific procedural deadlines to which the Board

must adhere. This provision will ensure that every route application

receives expedited consideration. .. Third, there are two provisions

which allow new entry without Board interference. The first is the

Dormant Authority provision, which allows qualified new entrants

/ to begin service in markets which have been abandoned bf incum-

bent carriers. The second provision is Automatic Market Entry,

which guarantees that every carrier will be granted at least one

route each per year without seeking CAB approval of manage-

ments’ market selection.

[Senate Report, p. 5]

Another major objective was to ‘“‘ensure price compe-

tition will be a permanent reality in domestic air trans-

portation” by establishing a ‘‘zone of reasonableness.”

Senate Report, p. 5. Within that zone, the Board would

be without power to suspend or reject fares; outside the

zone, the Board could regulate fares, but had to evaluate

them under the new pro-competition public interest stand-

ard. Ibid. The Board retained authority “to prevent anti-

competitive fare strategies and prevent unjust

discrimination.” [bid.

A stated concern regarding the proposed reforms was

“that the movement to a more competitive airline system

should be made without major disruptions to the industry

or the traveling public.”” Accordingly, the Senate bill pro-

vided for “‘a gradual phase-in of the more competitive pro-

visions over periods that var{ied] from one to ten years.”’

Senate Report, p. 5.

B. The Senate’s. Labor Protective Provisions

1. The Disagreements Over Concept

As reported out of Committee and as approved largely

unchanged by the full Senate, S. 2493 contained an airline

employee protection program which was set forth in Sec-

tion 22 of the bill. Two types of relief were to be available

to eligible individuals: (1) monetary compensation for lost

wages and benefits and for relocation expenses; and (2) a

hiring preference within the industry, referred to as “‘first

right of hire.’”’ Senate Report, pp. 46-49, 113-117; 124

Cong. Rec. 10,710 (1978).

The rationale for the protection program stated in the

Committee report (Senate Report, pp. 113-114) was basic-

ally as follows:

¢ Although “regulatory reform ... will increase the to-

tal number of jobs in the airline industry,” it is none-

theless “‘a possibility ... that one or more airlines will

encounter such difficulties in adjusting that they will

lose enough traffic to cause a major reduction in their

total labor force.’”’

¢ Airline employees entered the industry and shaped

their careers in reliance on a regulatory system which

gave them a measure of job security.

e Whereas the carriers are given a transition period to

adjust and should be able to adapt to phased-in dereg-

ulation, individual employees are not as versatile:

...[AJn individual employee will be able to do

little to adjust to the new structure. Many airline

employees have given most of their working lives

to the air transportation industry and have too

much invested to leave it now. In many cases, a

job shift, even within the industry would be costly

because of lost seniority. Older employees looking

for a new job might encounter difficulties because

of their age. Since employees will not be able to

adjust in the sense their employers can, the Com-

mittee believes that a reasonable program of

transition assistance should be provided.

... The Committee believes that the Congress,

on behalf of the American people, must insure

that the benefits to the public which result from |

its decision to alter substantially the regulation

of air transportation are not paid for by a minor-

ity—the airline employees and their families who

have relied on the present system.

[Senate Report, p. 114]

The Committee report took note of arguments of critics

of the employee protection program that airline employees

are no more deserving of special protection than others

in private industry adversely affected by government ac-

tion, and that the program would set a bad precedent for

the future. Senate Report, pp. 114-115. The Committee

responded, however, that in the airline industry there had

been “justifiable reliance on the stability of the regulatory

mm

structure” over a long period, that Congress was in part

to blame for leaving an outdated framework in place for

so long, and that, accordingly, “very special circum-

stances’ existed which merited an attempt to minimize

the dislocations caused by deregulation. As the Committee

put it, “the particular features of the airline industry and

the regulated environment in which it has existed since

1938 make a temporary transitional assistance program

appropriate,” but “(t]he appropriateness of such programs

for future regulatory reform legislation must be examined

on a case by case basis.”” Senate Report, p. 115.

During Committee deliberations, a member of the Com-

mittee, Senator Zorinsky, had sought to limit employee

protection to first right of hire. However, the limiting

amendment he offered was defeated by a vote of 8-6.

Senate Report, p. 206. Accordingly, at the conclusion of

the Senate Report, Senator Zorinsky submitted his ‘Ad-

ditional Views”’ explaining his position. Senate Report, pp.

206-11. He supported giving furloughed or terminated air-

line employees a priority in the hiring process of other

carriers in order “to take advantage of the ebb and flow

of the free enterprise system.” Jd. at 206-7. Moreover, he

stated that “there is precedent for protective provisions”

which he found “analogous” to first right of hire. Ibid.

However, he strongly objected to what he deemed the

unprecedented monetary compensation to “also provide

funds from the federal treasury, which could conceivably

cost $1 billion...” Jd. at 206. In this regard, he noted

that ‘airline employees are some of the highest paid in

the nation,” and he “wonderfed] if the general public is

willing to support from its tax dollars a senior pilot at

$100,000 a year, not to mention fringe benefits.” bid.

When S. 2493 reached the Senate floor, disagreement

over the concept of labor protection—whether there should

be any protection program for airline employees, and, if

so, the basic form it should take—surfaced again in the

debate on the bill. Senator Hatch offered an amendment

to delete Section 22 (the labor protection section) in its

entirety from the bill and substitute instead a declaration

that “It“is the policy of the United States not to approve

employee protection programs.”’ 124 Cong. Rec. 10,679,

10,682 (1978). Although Senator Hatch complained partic-

ularly about the financial assistance portion of Section 22,

his basic objection was that “there should be no special

or favored treatment accorded to workers in a special and

privileged industry,” and that “the employee protection

provisions . . . set a bad example and precedent for a trend

which is not right for anybody.” Ibid. Senator Kennedy

responded that the bill contains protections for ‘‘small com-

munities ... for the airlines and their shareholders ...

for just about every aspect of the airline industry. . .,”’

and, hence, it would be “unfair and unwarranted” to elim-

inate “the limited provisions for the protection of em-

ployees” contained in the bill. 124 Cong. Rec. 10,682 (1978).

Senator Hatch’s amendment was resoundingly defeated,

85-7. Ibid.

_ Senator Zorinsky renewed his effort to delete the fi-

nancial assistance component of the bill, stating that his

substitute first right of hire amendment “is far more lib-

eral in application than is the present bill’s provision.”’ 124

Cong. Rec. 10,675 (1978). The floor debate reflected es-

sentially the same arguments as were made in the Com-

mittee over the wisdom of providing federal financial

assistance to airline employees adversely affected by de-

regulation. And, as in Committee, Senator Zorinsky lost

on the issue before the full Senate by a close vote: 48-43. _

124 Cong, Rec. 10,674-83 (1978).

2. The Particulars Of The Senate’s Labor Protection

Provision

With respect to monetary compensation, S. 2493 au-

thorized the Secretary of Labor to make monthly assist-

ance payments or reimbursement payments to “eligible

protected employee{s].” (§ 22(a)) However, the bill set forth

in considerable detail the manner in which the Secretary

was to exercise that authority:

e A “protected employee” was defined as ‘‘a person

who, on the date of enactment of this section, has

been employed for at least 4 years by an air carrier

holding a certificate issued under section 401 of the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958.” (§ 22(h\1))

e An “eligible employee” was defined as a “‘pro-

tected employee’”’ who either “has been deprived of

employment, or ... has been adversely affected with

respect to his compensation, on account of a qualifying

dislocation.”’ (§ 22(a))

eA “qualifying dislocation” was defined as ‘‘a bank-

ruptcy or major contraction” of a certificated air car-

rier occurring within ten years after the date of the

Act and resulting from the change in regulatory struc-

ture as determined by the CAB. (§ 22(h\2))

eA “major contraction” was, in turn, defined as a

reduction of at least 15 percent of a carrier’s full-

time employees (excluding strikers) which either had

occurred, or was likely to occur, within a 12-month

period (§ 22(h\4))

e Although the Secretary of Labor was given dis-

cretion to determine the amount of monthly assistance

payments, including ‘what percentage of salary such

payment shall constitute for each applicable class or

craft of employees,” he was required to consult in

this regard with the Secretary of Transportation, to

deduct unemployment compensation, and to make fur-

ther specified reductions if an individual refused to

accept reasonably comparable employment even if that

meant relocating. (§ 22(b))

e There was a limit of 36 on the number of monthly

payments an employee could receive. (§ 22(g\2))

e “Eligible protected’’ employees were entitled to

receive “relocation assistance,’ defined as “‘reason-

able moving expenses (as determined by the Secretary

[of Labor])’’ incurred in obtaining new employment,

as well as “reimbursement payments for any loss re-

sulting from selling . . . [the employee’s] principal place

of residence at a price below its fair market value (as

determined by the Secretary) or any loss incurred in

cancelling such employee’s lease agreement or con-

tract of purchase relating to his principal place of

‘aoa ” (§ 22(c))

S. 24983 was even more precise in spelling out first right

of hire.

e A “protected’’ employee who is furloughed or

otherwise terminated by a carrier regulated by the

CAB “shall have first right of hire, in order of sen-

iority and regardless of age, in his occupational spe-

cialty, by any other air carrier which held a certificate

issued under section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act

of 1958 prior to the effective date of this section.”

(§ 22(dX1))

e The hiring preference was available only if the

termination or furlough was the result of ‘‘a qualifying

dislocation.”’ Ibid.

e The hiring carrier was entitled to hire its own

furloughed employees before extending the preference

to others. Ibid.

e An individual who obtained a job at another car-

rier through first right of hire retained seniority and

recall > oval at the carrier which furloughed or ter-

SI iaiteat ak Leh coun instereted to-gnepere

and publish a list of jobs available with certificated

carriers, and to “make every effort to assist an eli-

gible protected employee in finding other employ-

10

ment.’ The Secretary was also authorized to require

carriers to submit relevant reports, data, and other

information. (§ 22(d\2))

In addition to the mandatory duties imposed on the

Secretary of Labor—primarily determining monetary com-

pensation levels and establishing a job list—Section 22 pro-

vided that “(t]he Secretary may issue, amend, and repeal

such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the

administration of this section.’’ (§ 22(f1)) Subsection

22(f(2) then provided that the rules and regulations pro-

posed by the Secretary had to be submitted to Congress

60 legislative days before they were to take effect, during

which period they could be disapproved by a resolution of

either House.

On the Senate floor, there were several attempts to

amend Section 22. The Hatch and Zorinsky amendments

which dealt with the basic concept and form of labor pro-

tection have previously been described. Supra, pp. 6-7. The

Zorinsky amendment, aside from its primary objective of

seeking to delete the financial assistance component of

Section 22, sought as well to change some of the partic-

ulars of first right of hire so as to make it more favorable

to employees. Thus, the amendment would have defined

a “protected” employee as a person with only one year

of airline employment, instead of four years, and would

have defined ‘‘a qualifying dislocation” as any reduction

in a carrier’s workforce instead of a minimum 15% re-.

duction. Senator Zorinsky’s stated purpose was to further

strengthen the hiring preference as a better alternative to

“affording the relief of compensation from the pockets of

the Nation’s taxpayers.” 124 Cong. Rec. 10,674-75 (1978).

Senator Danforth, on the other hand, offered an amend-

ment that would have enhanced the financial assistance

component by extending the three year limit on monthly

payments to up to five years and by eliminating the “15%

trigger’ for both monetary compensation and first right

11

of hire. As with the Zorinsky amendment, the Danforth

amendment did not pass; the vote was 54-37 against. 124

Cong Rec. 10,680-81 (1978).

Senator Cannon, one of the primary sponsors of S. 2493,

offered an amendment which did pass: deleting language

which would have required the Secretary of Labor ‘to

insure that the protected employee will not, during the

period in which he is entitled to protection, be placed in

a substantially worse financial position with respect to

wages and fringe benefits.” 124 Cong. Rec. 10,683 (1978).

The stated purpose of this amendment was to make certain

that the Secretary would not be legally bound to guarantee

the full salary and benefits of very highly paid employees,

but rather would have “discretion concerning the level of

payments” in view of his “expertise and experience in

providing adjustment assistance to workers.” [bid.

There was no discussion on the floor of the Senate con-

cerning the legislative veto, nor was it even mentioned.

The Committee report refers to the veto once, as follows:

Eligible employees who lost their jobs would

be entitled to monthly payments for a maximum

of 3 years or until they were reemployed, which-

ever occurred first. The amount of such payment

would be equal to a percentage of former wages,

as determined by regulations promulgated by the

Department of Labor. These regulations will be

subject to congressional review. The committee

considered setting statutory percentage figures

and maximum dollar amounts, but concluded that

the Secretary of Labor, after consultation with

the Secretary of Transportation, will be in a bet-

ter position to determine the appropriate

amounts. The committee intends that the per-

centages chosen will result in compensation pay-

ments that are less than the employees’ after-tax

12

income in order to preserve maximum incentives

for employees to secure comparable work.

[Senate Report, pp. 116-117 (emphasis added)]

II. The House Bill

A. The House’s Deregulation Provisions

The House bill, H.R. 12611, was reported out by the

House Committee on Public Works and Transportation on

May 19, 1978. The Committee pointed out that there was

considerable dissatisfaction with the existing airline reg-

ulatory system, which had been established in 1938 and

had not been substantially changed since. House Report,

p. ‘1. The sources of that dissatisfaction, in the Commit-

tee’s view, were largely the same as those identified in

the report of its Senate counterpart (supra, p. 3): the CAB,

particularly prior to 1975, tended to discourage competi-

tion in the industry “by denying or dismissing most ap-

plications for new routes, by refusing to allow new carriers

to enter the trunkline industry,... by discouraging ex-

periments with reduced fares ... [,]’’ and by utilizing hear-

ing procedures which “‘led to extensive inaction, delay, and

red tape.”” House Report, p. 2.

The legislation recommended by the House Committee

was conceptuaily similar to that passed by the Senate in

that it, too, opted for targeted reform in specific ways—

a “release of some regulatory fetters’”—as opposed to giv-

ing the CAB discretionary authority to implement “‘total

deregulation.”” House Report, p. 4. As the Committee re-

port described the proposed legislation, “H.R. 12611 is a

moderate reform bill which introduces more competition

and less regulation of the airline industry on a gradual,

controlled basis.”” Ibid. Like the Senate bill, the House bill

... includes a revised policy statement requiring

the Board to stress competition and to encourage

low fare service and new entry into the industry.

The bill also includes a fare flexibility provision

13

permitting airlines to raise and lower fares by

specified percentages without CAB approval. The

bill also imposes procedural deadlines for CAB

decisions and allows CAB to develop simplified

procedures for less controversial cases.

[House Report, p. 5]

Also like the Senate bill, the House bill contained provi-

sions allowing easy access by other carriers into markets

in which carriers certified to provide services were not

doing so (“dormant authority”) aud establishing an “‘ex-

perimental automatic entry program under which all CAB

certificated carriers will be permitted automatic entry into

one market of their choice in the first calendar year after

enactment.” Thereafter, the CAB would report on the pro-

gram, and Congress would decide whether to continue it

on a more permanent basis. House Report, p. 5.

B. The House’s Labor Protective Provision

Section 32 of H.R. 12611 protected airline employees

from the potential effects of deregulation in a way which

was far more encompassing than the more specific pro-

tection afforded by the Senate bill. For, under the House

bill, no new carrier authority could be exercised at all if

affected employees were thereby placed in a substantially

worse position. The Secretary of Labor was charged in

this regard with adhering to a minimum protection stand-

ard, but no statutory maximum was set. Thus, Section 32

provided that:

No authority granted by this Act, or by any

amendment made by this Act, shall be exercised

by any carrier unless prior to each such exercise,

the Secretary of Labor has certified to the Civil

Aeronautics Board that the interests of the em-

ployees who may be affected thereby have been

adequately protected by fair and equitable ar-

rangements providing levels of protection no less

beneficial to and protective of such interests than

14

those established pursuant to section 5(2\f) of the

Interstate Commerce Act and section 405 of the

Rail Passenger Act, as such sections are in ex-

istence on the date of enactment of this section

or are hereafter amended, except that the car-

rier-employer of the affected employees shall be

responsible for the application of the protective

arrangements to such employees and sha! be

reimbursed by the Secretary of the Treasury for

the cost of such application. There is hereby es-

tablished in the Treasury of the United States a

separate account to be known as the “Airlines.

Employees’ Protective Account’”’ ... to make

reimbursements pursuant to this section.

[124 Cong. Rec. 30,703, 30,718 (1978); House Re-

port, p. 22]

Section 5(2Xf) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was

then codified as 49 U.S.C. § 5(2\f) and subsequently re-

codified as 49 U.S.C. § 11347, provided inter alia that

affected employees of the carriers involved will not be in

a worse position with respect to their employment for at

least four years, and that the protective arrangements be

at least as favorable to the employees as were ordinarily

required prior to February 5, 1976.* Section 405 of the

Rail Passenger Act, 45 U.S.C. § 565, mandated “fair and

equitable arrangements to protect the interests of em-

ployees,”’ which

... Shall include, without being limited to, such

provisions as may be necessary for (1) the pre-

servation of rights, privileges, and benefits (in-

* February 5, 1976 was the date of enactment of the Railroad Re-

vitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-210, 90

Stat. 31. Section 402 of that Act, 90 Stat. 62, amended Section 5(2\f)

of the Interstate Commerce Act to require the ICC to impose arrange-

ments no less protective of the interests of employees “than those

heretofore imposed pursuant to this subdivision. . .”’

15

cluding continuation of pension rights and

benefits) to such employees under existing col-

lective-bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2)

the continuation. of collective-bargaining rights;

(3) the protection of such individual employees

against a worsening of their positions with re-

spect to their employment; (4) assurances of

priority of reemployment of employees termi-

nated or laid off; and (5) paid training or re-

training programs.

The House Committee report briefly summarized the

gist of the House bill’s employee protection provision, but

otherwise did not discuss it. House Report, p. 22. The

report did, however, list the employee protection program

as among the “important provisions of H.R. 12611.” Jd.

at p. 5.

H.R. 12611 was considered and passed by the full House

on September 21, 1978. 124 Cong. Rec. 30,661-718 (1978).

The labor protective provision, as reported out by the Com-

mittee, was acopted without apparent controversy or dis-

cussion. /2. at 30,703. The provision contained no

legislative veto language, and none was proposed or even

mentioned on the House floor.

III. The Conference Committee And Subsequent Enact-

ment

As stated in the Conference Report, the employee pro-

tection provision that emerged from the House-Senate

Conference Committee and was ultimately enacted as § 43

of the ADA “‘ijs basically the same as the Senate bill.”

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1978)

(hereinafter ‘‘Conf. Rep.””). However, under pressure from

the House conferees, the protection provision was liber-

alized in several respects. Perhaps most important, the

“qualifying dislocation” requirement was dropped for first

right of hire, though it remained as a condition for finan-

cial assistance. Conf. Rep., pp. 48-51, 105-106. Thus, in

16

order to obtain the hiring preference granted by § 43, a

“‘protected”” employee would not have to meet the heavy

burden of showing that his termination or furlough was

the result of a “bankruptcy or major contraction ... the

major cause of which is the change in regulatory structure

provided by the Airline Deregulation Act ... as deter-

mined by the Civil Aeronautics Board.”’ § 43(hX2) (defini-

tion of “qualifying dislocation”). On the other hand,

language was added making clear that employees fur-

loughed or terminated ‘‘for cause” were ineligible for the

hiring preference. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(d1). The re-

quirement that employees entitled to the preference be

hired in order of seniority was deleted, but the “regardless

of age” language was retained. Jbid.

Financial assistance was made somewhat easier to ob-

tain because a “‘major contraction’’—one of the elements

of a “qualifying dislocation” —was redefined as a work

force reduction of at least 7'/, percent, rather than 15

percent. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(hX4). Also, the limit on

the number of monthly assistance payments was increased

from 36 to 72. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(eX1). However, the

words “subject to such amounts as are provided in ap-

propriation Acts’’ were insertec in subsections (bX1) and

(c) of § 43, thus removing any possible doubt that all mon-

etary compensation authorized by the provision was con-

tingent on future a»propriations.

With regard to both the guidelines for financial assist-

ance which the Secretary of Labor was directed to issue

and such other rules and regulations “as may be neces-

sary’ for the program, the Secretary was placed under a

time constraint: they were to “be promulgated within six

months after the date of enactment of this section.”’

§ 43(f(2); Conf. Rep., p. 105. Moreover, a. ‘report and

wait’”’ requirement was added to the one-house legislative

veto provision: %.¢., thirty days prior to issuance, the Sec-

retary was obligated to submit any final rule or regulation

to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Com-

17

mittee and to the House Public Works and Transportation

Committee. § 43(f(3); Conf. Rep., p. 106.

The Conference Report on the ADA was agreed to by

the Senate by a vote of 82 to 4 without any significant

debate on the employee protection provision. 124 Cong.

Rec. 37,416-21 (1978). Senator Cannon described the pro-

vision as “important” (Jd. at 37,416), and Senator Pearson

called it “‘an acceptable compromise ‘hat all sides can live

with” (Id. at 37,417-18).

The House, by a vote of 356 to.6, likewise agreed to

the Conference Report. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,526-27 (1978).

Congressmen Andersen, Snyder, Johnson, Harsha, and

Minetta all commented on the importance of the employee

protection provision. Jd. at 38,521-25. Representative An-

derson, who presented the Conference Report, specifically

pointed out that the ‘House provisions on employee pro-

tection ... were stronger than those in the conference

bill,” but that the House conferees had succeeded in mak-

ing the Conference bill “considerably stronger’ than the

Senate bill. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,522 (1978). Representative

Harsha, a member of the conference committee, com-

plained that he was not. “totally satisfied’ with the con-

ference agreement because

... benefits are not to be paid an employee who

loses his job . . . until there is at least 7'/, percent

employee reduction in the airline. It makes no

sense ... to defer these benefits until this per-

centage trigger is reached, causing employees

who have not found a job to suffer needlessly.

However, in the spirit of compromise we man-

aged to reduce by one-half the percentage trigger

in the Senate bill.

{124 Cong. Rec. 38,523 (1978)]

Congressman Minetta, who had been deeply involved in

drafting the House’s labor protection provisions, elaborated

further:

18

The Committee on Public Works and Trans-

portation struggled with the problem of employee

protection for quite some time before it came

around to support almost unanimously the em-

ployee protection provision I offered. . .

The labor protective provisions in the House-

passed bill were reasonable, responsible legisla-

tion. These provisions were to be based on levels

of protection established pursuant to section

5(2\f) of the Interstate Commerce Act and sec-

tion 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act. The

levels of protection would have assured that an

affected employee would not be in a worse po-

sition with respect to his employment as a result

of passage of the act. An employee who suffered

reduction in salary or who was deprived of em-

ployment would have been eligible for 100 per-

cent of his average monthly salary for up to 6

years, with moving expenses if necessary and a

12-month lump sum separation payment op-

tion. . .

By comparison with the House-passed provi-

sion, the conference agreement—which was based

on the Senate language—is not much protection

at all.

[124 Cong. Rec. 38,524-25 (1978)]

Concerning the legislative veto provision, Congressman

Levitas, in the course of commenting on several other

provisions of the bill, stated:

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I cannot let this moment

go by without making this observation. While

there have been several bills sent to the Presi-

dent this year and signed by him which contained

a provision for a congressional veto, I am happy

to say that this piece of legislation contains a

19

one-House veto over the regulations which may

be issued by the Secretary of Labor on the !abor

protection provisions, so that the Congress and

not an unelected bureaucrat will have the final

word on the regulations that will have the effect

of law.

[124 Cong. Rec. 38,524 (1978)]

Representative Levitas’ “observation”’ is the sole reference

to the veto in either the House or Senate debate on the

ADA.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals concluded that the veto provision

is severable from the remainder of § 43 because the leg-

islative history provides overwhelming evidence that Con-

gress considered the protections afforded emovloyees by

that section to be important, but there is no evidence that

Congress regarded the veto as significant. As the court

pointed out, the legislative history. is barren ‘‘of any direct

statement evidencing a Congressional intent of insevera-

bility;’”’ hence, the case against severability is entirely cir-

cumstantial. 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a-25a). The record

fully supports the court’s determination that the circum-

stances fall ‘‘far short” of establishing the requisite intent;

if anything, they “‘positively” buttress the holding in favor

of severability. 766 F.2d at 1561, 1565 (Pet. 19a,. 28a).

First, there were only a handful of votes in the Senate

opposed to § 43; the House wanted an even stronger em-

. ployee protection provision; and the committee reports and

comments made in debate confirm that labor protection

was deemed to be a vital part of the ADA. Notwithstand-

ing uncertainty over the economic consequences of dere-

gulation on airline employees generally, Congress was not

uncertain about the need to assist individual employees

who had made a career commitment to the industry when

it was regulated and relatively stable and who might be

20

furloughed or terminated through no fault of their own in

the new competitive environment.

Second, the authority delegated in § 43 which is subject

to the legislative veto is not the sort of authority which

Congress has historically been reluctant to part with out

of fear that an unchecked delegation would undermine tra-

ditional legislative prerogatives. There was no concern that

§ 43 might permit an unwarranted expansion of executive

branch power at the expense of the legislative branch.

Third, the veto provision was not the result of any com-

promise between the House and the Senate. The provision

was in the Senate bill from the outset, and it played no

role in the House’s eventual acceptance of the Senate’s

labor protection concept. In fact, the House was willing

to delegate far greater authority to the Secretary of Labor

to formulate protective arrangements for airline employees

without subjecting that authority to a legislative veto.

Fourth, there is no support in the record for Petitioners’

argument that Congress was afraid that the Secretary of

Labor’s administration of § 43 would defeat the objectives

of airline deregulation, and, accordingly, inserted the veto

provision to allow Congress to check the Secretary’s au-

thority. No concern of that nature appears in the com-

mittee reports or in floor debate. Moreover, neither of the

two components of § 43 present any potential for inter-

fering with deregulation. Financial assistance payments

from federal revenues to terminated or furloughed em-

ployees would obviously have no bearing on airline oper-

ations. Nor would first right of hire impair a carrier’s

competitive position. The carrier’s ability to enter new

markets and to price its services remains unaffected be-

cause first right of hire does not increase a carrier’s labor

costs, but merely requires a carrier who is otherwise hiring

to give a preference to eligible individuals who meet that

carrier’s~ qualifications and are willing to work for the

wages and under the working conditions established by

21

the carrier. If anything, by hiring individuals with consid-

erable experience in the industry, a carrier is likely to

improve its ability to compete.

Fifth, especially with regard to first right of hire, § 43

sets forth the nature of the benefits provided in consid-

erable detail. The authority delegated to the Secretary of

Labor is circumscribed and quite routine. There is nothing

in such a delegation which suggests that the Senate, in

enacting a labor protective provision with a veto, and the

House, in acquiescing in the Senate’s version, regarded

the legislative veto as an indispensable rein on the Sec-

retary’s authority.

Sixth, had the House’s labor protection provision been

enacted, the Secretary would have been given extremely

broad authority to impose labor protective provisions. The

Secretary's decision-making could significantly affect the

nature and pace of deregulation under the House bill be-

cause “{njo authority granted by ... [the Airline Dere-

gulation] Act” could be exercised without a certification

from the Secretary that the employees had been ade-

quately protected (supra, p. 13). That. the House was will-

ing to give the Secretary this authority without attaching

a legislative veto to it, and only reluctantly acceded to the

Senate’s far more modest labor protective provision, com-

pellingly demonstrates that the veto was irrelevant to

House action.

Seventh, the legislative history of § 43 indicates that the

most likely explanation for the veto provision is that the

Senate wanted to retain a check on the financial assistance

payment levels established by the Secretary. Since the pay-

ments were to be based on wages, these levels could prove

to be politically sensitive in view of the high earnings of

many airline employees. Nonetheless, although the veto

was useful and desirable, it was not essential: financial

assistance payments depended on future appropriations,

and thus the appropriations process gave Congress the

22

requisite means to keep a rein on the Secretary if for any

reason the veto could not be utilized.

Eighth, in any event, all that is at issue in this case is

first right of hire, and there is nothing in the legislative

history which ties the veto to that component of § 43. First

right of hire can and should be implemented without re-

gard to whether the financial assistance component of § 43

is also implemented. Congress preferred that displaced air-

line employees obtain jobs, and only if they could not was

financial assistance to be made available.

Ninth, the addition of a “report and wait” requirement

to the veto provision does not show that the veto was

crucial to the enactment of § 43. If anything, “report and

wait” diminishes the importance of the veto because it

ensures that Congress will receive sufficient advance no-

tification of proposed regulations to overrule them through

the normal legislative process should it be dissatisfied. The

significance of the veto provision in § 43 further recedes

in light of the far more elaborate veto provisions Congress

inserted in other statutes. The comparison shows that Con-

gress attached a much higher priority to legislative review

in those situations than it did here.

Finally, the court of appeals’ severability analysis is not

invalid because the court considered whether Congress

would have preferred § 43 without the veto to an ADA

without a labor protective provision. The court’s opinion

reflects a thorough canvass of the legislative history in an

effort to ascertain legislative intent. The court, in fact,

found ‘“‘not a shred of evidence that the veto provision

was deemed to bea vital feature of the protection plan.”

(766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 28a)). Moreover, there is “not a

shred of evidence” either that, but for the legislative veto

in § 43, Congress would have enacted a different labor

protective provision than it did. Accordingly, it is clearly

not “evident” that Congress chose § 43 over other alter-

natives because of the veto provision, and that, absent the

23

veto, § 43 would have failed of passage. In this context,

and in light of the practical realities, it was entirely ap-

propriate for the court to search for the dominant legis-

lative intent as between preserving § 43 without a veto

and tearing down the section in its entirety.

ARGUMENT

I. There Is No Persuasive Basis For Concluding That

The Legislative Veto Provision Was Crucial In Any

Material Respect To The Enactment Of § 43

A. The Evidence To Support A Determination of Insev-

erability Is Completely Lacking Here

In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462

U.S. 919, 931-932 (1983), this Court, reaffirming and quot-

ing from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) and

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n., 286 U.S.

210, 234, (1932), stated “that the invalid portions of a

statute are to be severed ‘[ujnless it is evident that the

Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which

are within its power, independently of that which is not.’ ”’

Petitioners assert no disagreement with this standard. (Pet.

Br., p. 14) They argue, however, that it means that “a

statutory section containing an invalid provision must fall

in its entirety if it appears that absent the invalid part,

Congress would have enacted either no provision at all or

one with different form, content or language.” (Pet. Br.,

pp. 14-15) But even with the gloss that Petitioners place

on the Chadha/Buckley/Champlin Refining standard, the

fundamental inquiry is the same: it still must be ‘‘evident”’

that the invalid portion was crucial to passage of the sta-

tutory section in question; and, with respect to an uncon-

stitutional legislative veto provision, it still must appear

that Congress would have been unwilling to delegate the

authority it did unless it could retain a check on that

authority by way of the veto. American Federation of Gov-

ernment Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 307 (D.C. Cir.

24

1982); Consumer Energy Counsel of America v. FERC, 673

F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process

Gas Consumers Group v. Cunsumer Energy Council of

America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). That showing simply has

not been, and cannot be, made here. For, as the court of

appeals found, the evidence is “{ajmple... that the em-

ployee protection program... was deemed by Congress to

be an important aspect of the [Airline Deregulation] Act,”’

whereas, “‘{iJn contrast, there is not a shred of evidence

that the veto. provision was deemed to be a vital feature

of the protection plan.” 766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a).) If,

as we now demonstrate, the court was correct in con-

cluding that the veto provision was not ‘deemed to be a

vital feature” of § 43 by Congress, it follows that affirm-

ance would be appropriate even under Petitioners’ for-

mulation. In other words, as the legislative record confirms,

it is far from evident that Congress would have chosen

to enact no program at all, or a substantially modified

§ 43, rather than enact the section as it now stands with-

out the veto.‘

Although Petitioners do not directly attack the court of

appeals’ finding that Congress regarded the employee pro-

tection program as important, they do so inferentially by

referring to what they term the ‘“‘congressional uncertainty

about the need for labor protection” in the ADA. (Pet.

Br., pp. 4, 37) Presumably, Congress would be more in-

clined to insist on retaining a legislative veto over regu-

lations implementing a program the necessity of which was

‘In Regan v. Time, Inc., ___ U.S. —__, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 3269, (1984),

Justice White’s plurality opinion stated: ““Whether an unconstitutional

provision is severable from the remainder of the statute in which it

appears is largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption

is in favor of severability.” Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, was

of the view that “severability is exclusively a question of legislative

intent.” 104 S.Ct. at 3275. Under either view, the finding of the court

of appeals that the veto provision was not considered by Congress to

be ‘vital’ to § 43—if that finding is borne out by the record—should

be dispositive of the severability issue.

25

in doubt than a program it definitely wanted. However,

as Petitioners concede (Pet. Br., pp. 9-10), § 43 was viewed

by Congress as a form of insurance. The impact of the

deregulatory provisions of the ADA on employees in the

airline industry could not be accurately predicted. On the

one hand, the proponents of deregulation anticipated that

air travel would increase, which, in turn, would bring in-

creased employment opportunities. On the other hand, it

was fully recognized that individual employees might well

be adversely affected by deregulation as some airlines con-

tracted or went out of business while other airlines pros-

pered and expanded. Supra, pp. 4-5; 766 F.2d at 1562

(Pet. 22a). Section 43 was no different than most common

forms of insurance: there was uncertainty. over the extent

to which the contingencies on which the benefits were

predicated would materalize; but there was no serious

doubt as to the need for protection if they did. In the

Senate, an amendment to eliminate § 43 in its entirety

was overwhelmingly defeated 85-7. Supra, p. 7. And in

the House, a labor protective provision which was per-

ceived as far more expansive was passed without contro-

versy. Supra, p. 15.

There is no persuasive evidence that Congress would

have failed to enact §43 were it not for the legislative

veto. To begin with, § 43 does not delegate authority which

has traditionally been jealously guarded by Congress. For

instance, there is nothing in § 43 remotely comparable to

the authority to restructure the Executive Branch con-

tained in the Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

17, 91 Stat. 29, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seg., which

was at issue in EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d

1188 (5th Cir. 1984) (legislative veto provision found sev-

erable), in EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984)

(severability rejected), and in Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC,

743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (severability question not ripe

for decision in absence of actual use of veto by Congress).

We do not have here delegated authority analogous to the

26

authority to establish pay schedules for federal employees

contained in the salary adjustment statutes at issue in

McCorkle v. U.S., 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). (veto proviso held insevera-

ble). No danger exists that the delegation in § 43 might

work an unintended shift of govenmental powers as be-

tween the separate branches. See Consumer Energy Coun-

cil v. FERC, supra, 673 F.2d at 445, n. 70. Section 43

does not constitute ‘definitive legislation’’ which was care-

fully “‘designed ... to mark the limits of Congressional

and Presidential power” over appropriated funds. City of

New Haven v. United States, __. F.Supp. ___,____ (No. 86-

0455) (D.C. D.C. May 16, 1986), slip. op., p. 7 (legislative

veto in Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2

U.S.C. § 681 et seg., held inseverable).

Moreover, the circumstances with respect to § 43 are

not at all like those in American Federation of Government

Employees v. Pierce, supra, in which one house of Con-

gress acceded to the other house’s legislation in lieu of its

own, but only reluctantly and after insisting on the in-

sertion of a veto restriction as the price of its acquies-

cence. True, the House was reluctant to agree to the

Senate’s labor protective provision. But that was only be-

cause the Senate bill was viewed as insufficiently protec-

tive of employee interests. Supra, pp. 17-18. Furthermore,

the veto provision was in the Senate bill from the outset;

the record is devoid of any indication that it was inserted

in either the initial or the final version of § 43 as the price

of House agreement. Of far greater significance is that

the House first passed a deregulation bill; H.R. 12611,

which gave the Secretary of Labor broad latitude—indeed,

far broader than that in the Senate bill—to fashion labor

protection arrangements for airline employees, and yet the

House attached no legislative veto leash to the Secretary’s

authority. Supra, pp. 13-15. If the House was willing to

enact the expansive and non-specific labor protective pro-

vision of H.R. 12611 without any veto language, it is log-

27

ical to assume that it likewise would have been willing to

enact § 43 without the veto restriction. As the court of

appeals put it, “(ijt seems ... unlikely that a program

offering less protection would have occasioned a call for

even greater legislative control over the bureaucracy.’’ 766

F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a).

B. Petitioners Are Mistaken In Asserting That The Veto

Provision Resulted From Congressional Concern That

Administration Of § 43 Might Conflict With Airline De-

regulation Objectives

Petitioners argue, however, that a legislative veto was

“critical’’ to enactment of Section 43, but not to the labor

protective provision of H.R. 12611, because § 43 “created

a program fundamentally inconsistent with the overall de-

regulatory purpose manifest throughout the Act” (Pet. Br.,

p. 29). They particularly assert that Congress was espe-

cially fearful of first right of hire “regulations that would

displace marketplace hiring decisions and ... thwart the

Deregulation Act’s overall purpose by overburdening cov-

ered carriers” (Jd. at 30). Petitioners are demonstrably

wrong in their contentions.

As shown supra, pp. 2-4, 12-13 the type of deregulation

that Congress sought to accomplish through the ADA was

to substantially increase the ability of new carriers to enter

the industry and of existing carriers to expand into new

markets, as well as to ensure greater non-predatory fare

competition among carriers. First right of hire does not

contravene those stated objectives. It clearly does not pre-

vent new entrants from coming into the industry or limit

the ability of existing carriers to expand into new markets.

And it does not undercut the competitive position of any

carrier because it does not require a carrier to do any

hiring that it does not plan to do, and does not preclude

the carrier from recalling its own furloughed employees

before hiring others. Nor does § 43 compel a carrier to

pay any higher wages or grant any more favorable work-

28

ing conditions to an individual entitled to the preference

than it would if it hired someone not so entitled. Except

for age, a carrier need only hire those who meet its own

qualifications, notwithstanding that those qualifications are

more stringent than the minimum Federal Aviation Admin-

istration qualifications or the qualifications of other air-

lines. To the extent that compliance with the preferential

hiring requirement presents any administrative burden to

a carrier, that burden is so slight and its cost so small as

to be inconsequential with respect to the carrier’s ability

to compete. Surely, if there had been any concern in Con-

gress about the impact of first right of hire on the ability

of existing carriers to compete in a deregulated environ-

ment, that concern would have surfaced in the various

committee reports or in floor debate. However, there is

nothing in the legislative history which so much as sug-

gests that Congress thought this to be a potential problem

or otherwise saw any burden to carriers in first right of

hire. For all that appears, it is more likely that Congress

accepted the commonsense notion that carriers would ben-

efit by hiring experienced individuals.*

There is another equally persuasive reason why Con-

gress manifested no misgivings regarding the authority it

delegated to the Secretary of Labor to issue such regu-

lations as ‘“‘may” be necessary to administer first right of

hire: the statutory language defining those entitled to the

hiring preference—‘‘protected’’ employees—was suffi-

ciently elaborate as to leave little in the way of substantive

discretion to the Secretary. Thus, the statute was fairly

* Department of Labor regulations implementing first right of hire,

which are currently in effect, confirm that carriers are entitled to

impose their own qualifications. 29 C.F.R. § 220.21, 50 Fed. Reg. 53103

(Dec. 27, 1985).

*Nor is there any suggestion in the legislative history that the fi-

nancial assistance component of § 43 could frustrate the deregulation

objectives of the ADA. Payments which would come from federal rev-

enues could only help disadvantaged employees, not harm the airlines.

29

detailed in spelling out eligibility requirements and man-

dating the class of carriers who are obliged to grant the

preference; in specifying the manner in which age, sen-

iority, and discharge for cause could or could not be taken

into account; in limiting the preference to an individual’s

occupational specialty; and in permitting a carrier to hire

its own furloughed employees before being required to hire

others entitled to the preference. Supra, pp. 7-10, * , 15-

16. As the court stated in McDonald v. Piedmon' Aviation,

625 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), a private action

brought by an individual pilot claiming the defendant car-

rier wrongfully denied him first right of hire under § 43,

“the statute delineates unambiguously the rights and du-

ties of the parties and identifies specifically to whom they

should apply,’”’ so much so that “the adoption of regula-

tions is hardly necessary to the enforcement of Section 43

of the Act.”

And, indeed, the Labor Department’s implementing reg-

ulations tend to confirm that appraisal. Except insofar as

they reiterate the statutory requirements or reflect what

§ 43 clearly seems to require (¢.g., that a ‘qualifying dis-

location” is not a prerequisite for first right of hire, 50

Fed. Reg. at 53094-95), their focus is on the sort of me-

chanical details—notices to be sent, information to be sub-

mitted and published, and procedures to be followed—which

could scarcely be considered of much interest to Congress.

29 C.F.R. Part 220, 50 Fed. Reg. 53094-53105 (Dec. 27,

1985). Arguably, the Secretary made “policy” decisions in

requiring carriers to wait 30 days after notifying the Labor

Department of a vacancy before hiring an applicant not

entitled to first right of hire (50 Fed. Reg. at 53095), and

in allowing a carrier having a specific equal employment

opportunity requirement to place that requirement ahead

of its first right of hire obligation (50 Fed. Reg. 53096).

But these are ordinary pragmatic administrative deter-

minations which merely serve to highlight the routine na-

ture of the authority delegated to the Secretary.

30

By contrast, the authority that would have been dele-

gated to the Secretary of Labor in the House bill is of a

different level entirely. Had the House bill become law,

the Secretary was not merely authorized, but virtually in-

structed, to play a major role in regulating the pace of

deregulation because no authority granted by the ADA

could be exercised until the Secretary certified that af-

fected employees were protected. Supra, p. 13. And the

Secretary was not only directed to ensure that the affected

employees were not put in a worse position, but also given

extremely broad powers to achieve that result. Supra, pp.

13-14. The guidelines set by reference to Section 5(2\f) of

the Interstate Commerce Act and Section 405 of the Rail

Passenger Act are general ones, and, by the very terms

of those provisions, are only a floor, not a ceiling. Supra,

pp. 13-15.

To be sure, as Petitioners point out (Pet. Br. p. 33),

the arrangements imposed by the Secretary would likely

deal ‘‘with specific companies, workers, route terminations

and employment dislocations that were a direct result of ~

some private transaction or government approval.’”’ But

that would provide small comfort to any carrier seeking

to utilize the new authority contained in the ADA. No

such carrier could do so without contemplating the eco-

nomic consequences that would flow from the labor pro-

tective arrangements likely to be imposed by the Secretary.

‘ The cost of those arrangements would inevitably be cal-

culated by airlines in deciding whether, under the aegis

of the ADA, to consolidate or terminate routes, to expand

into new markets, to merge with another carrier, or to

establish a lower fare structure. Obviously, the Secretary’s

authority to require such arrangements would become a

significant factor in this kind of airline decision-making.

Nonetheless, the House was willing to give the Secretary

this authority without proposing or even discussing any

restraint on the Secretary by way of a legislative veto

limitation.

31

In short, analysis of the legislative history reveals that

it was not the impact of Section 43 on deregulation that

evoked Congressional concern, but rather the potential im-

pact of deregulation on airline employees that caused a

concerned Congress to ameliorate the effects of that im-

pact without changing the deregulation process itself.

Moreover, unlike the speculative and implausible expla-

nation advanced by Petitioners in an effort to demonstrate

that § 43 would not have been enacted without a legislative

veto, there is a perfectly straightforward explanation which

fits logically with the legislative history as to why the

Senate inserted a non-essential veto provision in § 43 and

the House went along with it. Thus, the aspect of § 43

that provoked significant controversy in the Senate was

the financial assistance component. Senator Zorinsky’s ef-

fort to defeat it in Committee lost by a narrow margin

as did his renewed attempt on the Senate floor. Supra,

pp. 6-7. Both the Committee Report and floor debate re-

flected Congressional anxiety about the overall cost to the

Treasury and the political sensitivity of salary protection

for individuals with high earnings. Supra, pp. 6-7, 10-12.

In fact, § 43 was successfully amended by Senator Cannon

on the Senate floor ‘o ensure that the Secretary of Labor

was authorized to establish payment levels which were

below that of full salary and benefits. Supra, p. 11. By

contrast, there was no specific controversy over first right

of hire. Senator Hatch, who opposed any employee pro-

tection provision on principle, garnered only seven votes

in support of his amendment to eliminate § 43 in its en-

tirety (supra, p. 7), and other Senators commented on the

importance of the provision. Supra, pp. 7, 17. Senator

Zorinsky, notwithstanding his opposition to financial as-

sistance, had no difficulty in accepting first right of hire

and even introduced an amendment to strengthen the hir-

ing preference. Supra, pp. 6, 10. Significantly, the only

mention of the veto provision in the Senate was not made

in connection with first right of hire, but rather was in

32

regard to financial assistance: the Senate Report explained

that, although the Committee had considered setting wage

percentage figures and maximum dollar amounts, it had

decided to let the Secretary of Labor do that by regulation,

and that such “regulations will be subject to congressional

review.” Supra, p. 11. The Senate Report thus unmistak-

ably ties the veto provision to the Congressional interest

in reviewing the Secretary’s performance of his assigned

task of determining payment levels. All of these circum-

stances persuasively support an inference that the moti-

vating factor for the veto provision in the Senate, where

it originated, was a desire to retain a Congressional check

on the substantive details of the financial assistance pro-

The House, which acceded to the Senate version of § 43

after changes favorable to employees were made in Con-

ference, had no reason not to accept the legislative veto

restriction contained therein. For all that appears—with

one exception—the veto restriction made no difference one

way or another in the House. The exception is the lone

comment of Congressman Levitas (supra, pp. 18-19) ex-

pressing approval of the presence of a legislative veto in

§ 43. However, as the court of appeals pointed out, ‘‘[bly

his own description, Rep. Levitas was ‘making [an] obser-

vation,’ ... not setting forth what he was maintaining to

be an indispensable legislative ingredient of an acceptable

bill.”” 766 F.2d at 1563, n.12 (Pet. 23a). Moreover, ‘Rep.

Levitas was a vigorous advocate generally for the prop-

osition, eviscerated by Chadha, that Congress must retain

control over administrative agencies via the legislative veto

device.” 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a), citing Levitas &

Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to

Congressional Arms, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 598, 611-12 (1984).

However, “there is not a shred of evidence that Rep.

Levitas’ statement represented the view of Congress as a

whole (or even his full Committee) fhe was a member of

both the House and Conference committees which consid-

33

ered the ADAj, nor is there any indication that Congress-

man Levitas himself attached especial significance to this

particular veto provision, as opposed to his keen interest

generally in seeing the incorporation of such devices in

legislation enacted by the Congress.” 766 F.2d at 1563

(Pet. 25a). In short, the evidence is lacking that Repre-

sentative Levitas himself, much less any other represent-

ative, would have voted against the conference substitute

had the legislative veto not been a part of § 43. See, Con-

sumer Energy v. FERC, supra, 673 F.2d at 443-444

(“‘Nothing in these dozens of remarks remotely indicates

that these proconsumer arguments would have changed

into opposing arguments had Phase II not been made sub-

ject to legislative review.’’).

Even though the Senate may have preferred that Con-

gress retain a veto over the Secretary of Labor’s admin-

istration of financial assistance authorized by § 43, it is by

no means apparent that the Senate would have been un-

willing to enact the same authorization absent a veto once

the Conference Committee inserted qualifying language

making certain that all monetary compensation authorized

was contingent on subsequent appropriations. Supra, p.

16. The appropriations would then provide an absolute

Congressional check on the financial assistance program.’

Furthermore, there is absent from the legislative history

here the type of strong, positive indications which courts

have relied on in other cases to find that the substantive

provisions of a bill would not have been enacted in the

absence of a veto provision.*®

’ 1 Mezines, Stein and Gruff, Administrative Law § 3.02 at 3-61 and

authorities cited therein at n. 1 (“The denial or reduction of appro-

priations because of administrative or executive action of which Con-

gress disapproves” is “one of the most commonplace methods of

Congressional control. . .’’).

*In McCorkle v. U.S., supra, 559 F.2d at 1262, the Fourth Circuit

emphasized that, when some members of Congress protested during

34

In any event, it is academic whether the financial as-

sistance portion of § 43 would have been enacted without

the veto reservation. Because Congress has never appro-

priated any funds to provide such assistance and may never

do so, it is immaterial whether or not the veto provision

was crucial to passage of that portion of § 43. All that is

presently operative is first right of hire, and there is every

reason to go forward with that part of the program even

if a legitimate question could be raised concerning the

other part. Although, as Petitioners assert (Pet. Br., p.

3), first right of hire and financial assistance are ‘“‘closely

linked components,”’ the linkage is one in which the hiring

preference is the remedy of choice for cushioning the im-

pact of deregulation on airline employees, and monetary

compensation is a secondary or fallback remedy. To the

vigorous debate that a federal pay bill would delegate excessive au-

thority to the President, the bill’s defenders repeatedly responded ‘‘that

Congress could veto the President’s suggestions.”” In EEOC v. CBS,

supra, 743 F.2d at 972-973, the Second Circuit emphasized that the

Reorganization Act was viewed as a compromise in which the veto

provision played such a central role that Congress, warned of possible

constitutional problems, nevertheless decided ‘‘the risk [was] worth tak-

ing’ and, accordingly, rejected efforts to delete the provision or add

a severability clause. In American Federation of Government Employees

v. Pierce, supra, 697 F.2d at 306-307, the District of Columbia Circuit

emphasized that the legislative veto language was the result of a com-

promise, and that severance would produce a result—a complete ban

on reorganizing the Department of Housing and Urban Development—

which Congress plainly did not intend. And in City of New Haven v.

United States, supra, slip op., pp. 7, 9, the district court emphasized

that “Congress was intent upon recovering its primacy in matters of

money and spending for all time,” and the ‘‘one-House veto was spe- .

cifically extolled as an integral component of the control machinery

being considered."’ Compare, EEOC v. Hernando Bank, supra, 724 F.2d

at 1192 (“‘Mere uncertainty about the legislature’s intent is insufficient

to satisfy the test announced in Buckley v. Valeo.’’); Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105

S.Ct. 173 (1984) (fragility of a compromise is insufficient to establish

non-severability in the absence of “‘a clear indication” that the statutes

would not have been passed without legislative veto provisions).

35

extent employees entitled to first right of hire are suc-

cessful in obtaining new jobs, their need for and entitle-

ment to financial assistance will be reduced or eliminated.

Even if Congress had appropriated funds to implement the

financial assistance component of § 43, the objectives of

the statute would be fully satisfied if not a penny had to

be spent because all eligible employees obtained new jobs

as a result of first right of hire. Accordingly, whatever

the status of the financial assistance component of § 43—

that is, whether it is dormant because of a lack of ap-

propriations or rendered inoperative because of its rela-

tionship to the invalid legislative veto—Congress obviously

intended first right of hire to continue.’

C. Petitioners Do Not Otherwise Show That The Veto Pro-

vision Was Crucial To Enactment Of First Right Of

Hire

In this Court, as in the court of appeals, Petitioners,

{flailing to find any direct statement evidencing a

Congressional intent of inseverability, ... advance various

items of circumstantial evidence of what they perceive to

be such an intent.” 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a-25a).

Thus, Petitioners argue that “{[bly strengthening the

Section 43 veto in Conference and at the same time re-

moving a veto provision from a section that was at least

as controversial as Section 43, Congress unmistakably

demonstrated its serious reservations about the regulatory

authority delegated to DOL” (Pet. Br., p. 44). The

“strengthening” to which Petitioners refer is the addition

of a “report and wait” requirement that, thirty days prior

to issuing rules and regulations implementing § 43, the

Secretary of Labor must submit them to the House and

Senate committees primarily responsible for the ADA. As

*The Senate Report anticipated that, as a result of first right of

hire, “few ... employees would be without work for a long period of

time” and that cash payments under the financial assistance program

would thereby be decreased. Senate Report, p. 116.

36

the court of appeals recognized, ‘[t}his mechanism may

reasonably be viewed as the assertion of interest by com-

mittees not normally charged with the review of the labor

regulations. ..” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a). However,

there is nothing in the record which indicates precisely

why the committees had such an interest. Yet, given the

controversy over the financial assistance program, the un-

certainty about its cost, and especially the political sen-

sitivity of the payment levels, almost surely the monetary

compensation component of § 43 was the source of that

interest, rather than the hiring preference which is at issue

in this litigation. In any event, whatever the basis of the

committees’ interest as manifested by the addition of the

“report and wait” provision, interest alone “does not in-

dicate that the veto is inseverable, particularly since the

‘report and wait’ clause remains inviolate notwithstanding

Chadha.”’ 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a)."° Moreover, as to

both the financial assistance and first right of hire com-

ponents of § 43, the addition of the “report and wait’

requirement makes it more likely, not less, that Congress

would have enacted § 43 as it now stands—that is, without

an operative veto provision. For, although “report and

wait” does not give Congress as much control as the veto,

it does give the relevant committees advance notice of

proposed regulations, and, hence, the opportunity to make

their views known before the regulations are actually is-

sued and during a period when they could easily be mod-

ified. If the Secretary of Labor was nevertheless

determined to issue the regulations in disregard of the

committees’ views, Congress could make use of the con-

stitutional legislative process to achieve a different result.

Accordingly, “report and wait” is a workable procedure

‘© This Court made clear in Chadha that its ruling declaring legislative

veto provisions unconstitutional was not meant to express disapproval

of “report and wait” provisions, the validity of which has previously

been upheld. Chadha, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2776, n. 9, citing Sibbach v.

Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

37

=

which preserves a measure of legislative review and

thereby diminishes the importance of the veto; in other

words, a veto is less necessary with “report and wait’

than without it. Cf Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, supra, 734

F.2d at 804, n. 26.

As for the removal of legislative veto language from a

section other than § 43, the Senate bill provided that either

house could disapprove CAB rules issued on an emergency

basis modifying the automatic entry program established

as part of the deregulation effort. 124 Cong. Rec. 10,701

(1978) (§ 5, S. 2498, amending § 401 of the Federal Avia-

tion Act by, inter alia, adding new subsection k(11) (B));

Senate Report, p. 16. This legislative veto provision was

dropped in Conference, although the Conference report is

silent as to why. Conf. Report, pp: 66-67. However, the

automatic entry program extended only through 1981, and

emergency modification of the program during the three

years it was in effect was an unlikely contingency. Fur-

thermore, the conditions for exercise of the emergency

authority were rather precisely spelled out, and use of the

authority would be subject to judicial review. See § 12,

ADA, 92 Stat. 1718, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) inter

alia adding subpar. 7(D). In these circumstances, the Con-

ference Committee could well have deemed a legislative

veto superfluous in the automatic entry section, but still

have preferred to retain the veto in § 43 in light of the

authority given to the Secretary of Labor with respect to

monetary compensation. In any event, absent any legis-

lative history showing a connection between the two, it is

at best a tenuous inference that because Congress deleted

the veto from the automatic entry section, it would not

have enacted -the entirely unrelated § 43 unless a veto

provision was included.

It is equally tenuous to argue, as Petitioners do (Pet.

Br., pp. 28-29), that the veto provision was crucial to pas-

sage of § 43 because “‘only DOL’s delegation to implement

the EPP was made subject to a legislative veto.’’ As the

38

court of appeals aptly responded, it is “‘hardly surprising”’

that §43 was “the most likely candidate for inclusion, of

a legislative veto device” in what otherwise is a deregu-

latory statute. 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 25a-25a). Thus, the

basic thrust of the ADA is to limit rather than to expand

the CAB’s regulatory authority. Supra, pp. 3-4, 12-13.

Congress could have decided to “indicate its preference

for increased competition in a general way, leaving the

particular details of reform to the Board...” Senate Re-

port, p. 4. Instead, it chose to “deprive the Board of some

of its discretion so that anticompetitive policies cannot

reemérge in the future. . .” Ibid. Inasmuch as a legislative

yeto normally operates as a check on the manner in which

an agency affirmatively uses its delegated authority, it

would have made little sense to insert legislative veto pro-

visions in the numerous sections of the ADA which operate

to reduce agency discretion—that is, which require the

CAB to regulate less and to allow market conditions

greater play in determining routes and fares. By contrast,

§ 43 established a new program, and Congress could ra-

tionally desire a veto provision as a check on the newly

delegated authority it conferred on the Secretary of Labor

to administer that program, and especially to set payment

levels. But that says nothing about whether Congress con-

sidered the veto so essential that it would not have granted

the Secretary the authority it did without retaining a veto."

Petitioners assert that the ADA contains “‘at least 25 distinct del-

egations of regulatory authority” (Pet. Br., p. 28). To the extent that

various sections of the ADA (other than § 43) do provide for issuance

of rules and regulations which could have been subjected to a veto

restriction, the nature either of the authority granted or of the subject

matter tends to be self-explanatory as to why there is no such restric-

tion. Petitioners specifically mention only four such “distinct delega-

tions” (Pet. Br., p. 29, n. 35). As just discussed, one of these, the

exceedingly narrow authority to modify by rule “on an emergency

basis” the automatic entry program, is readily differentiated from the

§ 43 type of authority. Another, the FAA’s duty to establish safety

standards (§5, 92 Stat. 1709, and §33, 92 Stat. 1738), concerns a

39

Petitioners also contend that the requirement that final

regulations of the Secretary of Labor implementing § 43

be promulgated within six months (supra, p. 16) enhanced

the importance of the veto provision because it ‘“‘guaran-

teed that the regulations would be reviewed by essentially

the same members of Congress who, through their posi-

Png on the aviation committees, shaped the Deregulation

” (Pet. Br., pp. 32-33). Here again, Petitioners’ con-

omer is nothing more than speculation, unsupported by

legislative history. Moreover, as the court of appeals

pointed out, there is an opposing inference which is at

least as persuasive: the six months requirement “‘could just

as readily be seen as an indication of the high importance

Congress attached to the employee protection plan, which

Congress mandated be implemented as quickly as possi-

ble.” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 26a). The latter inference

surely is more consistent with the committee reports and

comments made in floor debate. Supra, pp. 4-6, 7, 15, 17-

18. Furthermore, contrary to Petitioners (Pet. Br., pp. 32-

33), the six months requirement could not assure that

“essentially the same members of Congress’”’ would review

the Secretary’s regulations, inasmuch as the 1978 Congres-

sional elections would have intervened between the Oc-

tober 23, 1978 date of enactment of the ADA and issuance

of the Secretary’s regulations. There obviously could be

technical subject in which the regulatory details are more suitable for

evaluation by experts than particularized oversight by Congress. The

third—the CAB’s duty to establish, by rule, objective criteria for des-

ignating “eligible points” for purposes of providing essential air service

to small communities, and also to promulgate guidelines for ‘“‘computing

the fair and reasonable amount of compensation required to insure the

continuation of service to any eligible point” (§ 33, 92 Stat. 1732, 1736,

1739)—merely requires elaboration of factors which the statute already

sets forth in detail; hence, Congress had scant reason to fear that the

criteria and guidelines would not reflect ‘its wishes. The fourth—the

CAB’s obligation, under revised procedures, to consider applications for

route certifications (§ 7, 92 Stat. 1711, and § 8, 92 Stat. 1712)—leaves

no room for a legislative veto of anything other than the Board’s

processing and determination of ind’-idual cases.

40

no “guarantee” that the members of the Congress who

were the primary sponsors of the ADA in general, and of

§ 43 in particular, would be reelected, or, if reelected,

would have the same committee assignments.

Finally, Petitioners urge that the “unique combination

of features’’-+the six months requirement coupled with the

“review and wait’’ and legislztive veto provisions— “create

a review procedure that ensured intimate congressional

involvement in the development of the EPP”’ (Pet. Br.,

pp. 31-32). For a number of reasons, this argument is

. farfetched. First, aside from the monetary compensation

levels, Congress was sufficiently specific in § 43 as to leave

little room for administrative development (especially when

compared to the labor protective program proposed by the

House). Supra, pp. 28-31. Second,:the six months require-

ment can readily be explained as evincing Congressional

interest in getting the labor protection program moving

quickly rather than in legislative review of that program.

* Third, if continued intimate involvement in the labor pro-

tection program was a Congressional objective, it is odd,

indeed, that such a seemingly significant purpose is no-

where mentioned in the committee reports or in floor de-

bate. Instead, the Senate Report refers only to the far

more modest goal of ensuring Congressional review of the

“statutory percentage figures [of former wages] and max-

imum dollar amounts” to be set by the Secretary in con-

nection with the financial assistance aspect of the program.

Fourth, as Petitioners acknowledge (Pet. Br., p. 31), there

is nothing unique about statutory deadlines for issuing reg-

ulations or “report and wait’ and legislative veto provi-

sions. Each has separately been incorporated in numerous

statutes. However, as the court of appeals concluded, their

combination here does not point to “anything of decisional

import.” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a). Of greater signifi-

cance, we suggest, is that Section 43’s veto provision is

by no means the strongest rein on delegated authority that

Congress could devise. In matters which Congress attached

41

a high priority to preserving legislative review, such as

reorganization of the Executive Branch, the veto provision

is considerably more elaborate and more compelling.’ That

Congress chose a weaker veto provision in § 43, when

there was precedent for a stronger one, further undercuts

Petitioners’ argument that inclusion of the legislative veto

was crucial to the section’s passage.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED A PROPER

TEST FOR DETERMINING SEVERABILITY

Petitioners concede (Pet. Br., pp. 14, 15), as they must,

that the court of appeals correctly began its severability

analysis with the question of whether it is ‘“‘evident’”’ that

Congress would have failed to enact § 43 in the absence

of a legislative veto provision. 766 F.2d 1559-60 (Pet. 16a-

18a), citing Regan v. Time, supra; Chadha v. INS, supra;

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n., supra; Buckley

v. Valeo, supra. However, Petitioners fault the court (Pet.

Br., pp. 14-26) for asking the additional question of whether

Congress would have preferred § 43, after severance of

the veto provision, to “no statute at all.’’ 766 F.2d at 1560

(Pet. 19a), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797,

804 (T.E.C.A.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 173 (1974).

Had the court of appeals not posed the second question

and analysed the severability issue in light of the first

The Reorganization Act provides that the President is required to

submit each proposed reorganization plan to Congress; immediately after

such submission, resolutions of disapproval are automatically introduced

in both the Senate and the House and referred to designated commit-

tees; after 45 days, the resolutions are automatically placed on the

appropriate calendars in the Senate and the House even if they were

not reported out of committee; any member of Congress could at this

point move for consideration of the disapproval resolution; and a ma-

jority “‘yes’’ vote in either the House or the Senate would veto the

plan. 5 U.S.C. §§ 909-912. Other statutes contain veto provisions along

the same lines: ¢.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3417; 29 U.S.C. § 1306; 42 U.S.C.

§ 2159; 42 U.S.C. §§ 8724, 8725; 43 U.S.C. § 1337(aX4); and 50 App.

U.S.C. § 2097.

42

question only, the result would have been exactly the same

and, indeed, so would the court’s analysis. For, although

Petitioners contend otherwise, there is no ‘“‘strong evidence

that Congress would have preferred to enact something

different” than the current § 43 if the legislative veto pro-

vision could not be included. (Pet. Br., p.26). Instead, as

we have shown (supra, pp. 23-27), what is striking about

this case is the complete lack of any such evidence in the

pertinent legislative history, especially the committee re-

ports and floor debate. As the court held, there is ‘ample

evidence ... that the employee protection program ...

was deemec by Congress to be an important aspect of the

[Airline Deregulation] Act,” but “not a shred of evidence

that the veto provision was deemed to be a vital feature

of the protection plan” (766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a)). This

conclusion, the product of a careful search of legislative

records, is dispositive of the severability issue under any

plausible test.*

Petitioners criticize the court of appeals for failing to

take into account that there are alternatives besides, on

the one hand, the current version of § 43 stripped of the

veto, and, on the other, no labor protective provision what-

ever. They argue. that, had Congress known the veto pro-

vision would be struck down as unconstitutional, it might

have enacted an altogether different type of protection

program for airline employees or a substantially modified

§ 43. (Pet. Br., p. 18). If it were evident here that, but

for the inclusion of the legislative veto in § 43, Congress

would have chosen a different option—for instance, the

‘8 Petitioners imply that the court of appeals arrived at its conclusion

by mechanical application of an erroneous standard as opposed to “a

painstaking inquiry into legislative intent.’’ (Pet. Br., p. 20). The im-

plication does not withstand scrutiny. A substantial portion of the court’s

opinion was devoted to just that “painstaking inquiry into legislative

intent’’—as well as a thorough discussion of Petitioners’ arguments—

which Petitioners now accuse the court of avoiding. 766 F.2d at 1560-

65 (Pet. 19a-28a).

43

House provision in lieu of § 43—there would be some force

to the argument that the court of appeals ignored a rel-

evant consideration. But this is not a case where a showing

of that nature has been, or can be, made. There was

accordingly no reason for the court of appeals to accept

the unfounded speculations advanced by Petitioners as to

what Congress might have done had it been prescient

enough to anticipate Chadha.

Nor was.it in any way impermissible for the court to

add by way of elaboration that the ‘evidence . ~ positively

indicates that Congress would have preferred the employee

protection plan with the veto provision severed out to a

deregulatory statute stripped. of any employee protection

plan.” 766 F.2d at 1561 (Pet. 19a). Surely, a key consid-

eration in any severability analysis is whether the end

result will be an outcome Congress plainly never intended.

For instance, as the court of appeals pointed out (766 F.2d

at 1564-65 (Pet. 27a-28a)), in American Federation of Gov-

ernment Employees v. Pierce, supra, severance of a leg-

islative veto provision would have left in place a complete

ban on reorganizing the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, a consequence which “it was abundantly

clear” would have been unacceptable to Congress. Ac-

cordingly, the court in Pierce decided against severance.

So, in the instant case, the court quite properly focused

on which result—‘“‘excision of the veto provision” or “‘dem-

olition of the airline employee protective prescriptions’’

(766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 29a) (concurring opinion of Gins-

burg, J.)—Congress would have found least acceptable. The

court had little difficulty in making that choice: as con-

curring Judge Ginsburg succinctly put it, whereas

{deletion of the veto preserves section 43 and thereby

gives effect to the dominant intent of Congress,” by con-

trast “{a] declaration of inseverability, tearing down the

section in its entirety, would be far more destructive of

the legislature’s will. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, -108-

09...” Ibid.

44

The court could not very well ignore the foregoing and

still be faithful to the “cardinal principle of statutory con-

struction” which “is to save and not to destroy.’”’ Tilton

v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (plurality opinion)

(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.

1 (1937)). Petitioners respond that “[t]o save statutes in

a form inconsistent with congressional intent threatens,

not preserves, the role of the legislative branch.’’ (Pet.

Br., p. 22, n. 23). Here, however, the court explicitly ac-

knowledged that its “charge ... to save as much of the

statute as we can’ must be carried out “consistent of

course with the underlying legislative intent.” 766 F.2d at

1560 (Pet. 18a). The search for probative legislative intent ~

is precisely the point of the court’s inquiry as to whether

Congress “would have preferred no employee protection

program over the program passed by Congress shorn of

its veto provision.” 766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a). Such an

inquiry appropriately recognizes and takes into account the

practical reality that a determination of inseverability

would, indeed, leave the ADA with no employee protection

program. And that is a result which the legislative history

clearly shows to be at odds with the importance Congress

attached to the program (supra, pp. 4-6, 7, 15, 17-18),

whereas there is nothing in the committee reports or floor

debate which indicates that Congress would have failed to

enact § 43 in the absence of the veto provision.

Petitioners urge that “the responsibility for remedial

action should be left ... with the legislature.” (Pet. Br.,

p. 18). But even Petitioners concede that as a necessary

predicate it must “appear ... that congressional prefer-

ence would have been for a law other than that which

would remain after severance...’ Ibid. Here, the predi-

cate has not even come close to being established.

In this context, then, the court of appeals was right to

ask whether Congress would have wanted an ADA entirely

without a labor protective provision or an ADA with the

labor protective provision that had been enacted minus the

45

legislative veto. In responding that Congress clearly would

have preferred the latter, the court adequately addressed

and rejected any contention that, but for the veto provi-

sion, Congress would have withheld the delegation of au-

thority to the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations

implementing § 43. In short, it was simply not “evident”

to the court that loss of the veto provision would have

doomed § 43. We submit that Petitioners have failed to

demonstrate either that the court did not make the ap-

praisal required by the Chadha—Buckley—Champlin Refin-

ing standard, of that, in making that appraisal, the court’s

assessment of legislative intent was incorrect.

ay

For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent Air Line

Pilots Association urges that the decision of the court of

appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

GARY GREEN

EUGENE B. GRANOF* :

AiR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,

INTERNATIONAL

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

Counsel for Air Line Pilots Ass’n.,

Int’l.

Counsel of Record

Of Counsel

GEORGE B. DRIESEN

1000 Potomac Street, N.W.

Suite 204

Washington, D.C. 20007

July 18, 1986

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.