Respondents Brief — Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

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No. 8-920 ~ ur :

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

In the Supreme Court of the United Stafee™

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

WILLIAM E. BROcK, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

RICHARD K. WILLARD

Assistant Attorney General

Louis R. COHEN

Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES M. SPEARS

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

LAWRENCE §S. ROBBINS

Assistant to the Solicitor General

DOUGLAS LETTER

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the legislative veto provision in subsection

(f) (8) of Section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act

of 1978, 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f)(3), is severable

from the remainder of Section 43, which imposes on

air carriers a duty to hire airline employees who have

been displaced from their jobs following deregulation.

(I)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

a seenmusomnenes 1

Jurisdiction ........ EE 1

Statement:

A. The Airline Deregulation Act —.........0000000000..... 2

B. The employee protection program ........................ 4

C. The proceedings below ..................-.........--.-..00.-..--+- 7

ET 12

Argu

(i) The court of appeals correctly decided that the

legislative veto provision of Section 43(f) should

be severed from the duty-to-hire provisions of

ES 16

A. The court of appeals applied the proper rule

EEE TR 16

B. The structure, language, and legislative his-

tory of the statute show plainly that Con-

gress would not wish to abandon the remain-

Tee ee eremsencs 21

1. The structure and language of the statute.. 21

2. The legislative history of the statute........ 27

a. Initiation of the bill in the Senate........ 28

b. The Senate debate on the bill ............. 32

Cee ecsenecenenes 34

d. The House debates ................................ 85

e. The bill reported by the conference... 36

Ne ssumstecousnesovewerenmees 42

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Aaron V. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 ........------------e---eeee---ee000+ 21

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 178... 11

Bowsher v. Synar, No. 85-1377 (July 7, 1986) ........ 26

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 -....------------------0-00000+ 12, 16, 18

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 ............-..--.-- 19

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of

Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 .........---------------+- 9, 12, 16, 17, 18

Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,

aff’'d sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group V.

Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 ............ 32, 42

Consumer Product Safety Comm’n. v. GTE Syl- '

vania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 .......--------.----ee-eecee-eeseeeeees 21 :

EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 1232........ 15 :

El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87........ 17, 19

Greyhound Corp. Vv. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. |

— Cena 21

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, cert. denied,

No. 84-20 (Oct. 1, 1984) .......-..-.-.-..2------cceereesecceeees 10

Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 ..............-...-------- 15

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9199 ............-----------ee-eeeee2++" passim

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187 ......... 12,18

People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. V.

Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 129 N.E. 202 .................------- 43

Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 ................ 12, 17, 19, 23

Tilton Vv. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 .............----------- 10, 13, 18

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570........ 12, 18, 19, 23

Statutes and regulation:

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

504, 92 Stat. 1705 ef seq. ...............-----0----ccee-eeeeeeees

GUT. Baie, TITEL GE) -nncsncnnnnnecvencce cco evescesseseenss

rok Se |! eee

4D ULC. Asp. TETL GE) C7) _ ..-~~-22-~--220nnccccerer ses

GD UG, Bam, TUT aneencnccce nc ccrnccctenesenccsvsncenncnscne

49 U.S.C. App. 1482(d) ......... Bet aera) eee rere

Ge BI TI. siitvicotevcctrerceccinnnvsevcseescncewnenen

49 U.S.C. App. 1551(a) (1) (A) .......-----------------

4 U.S.C. Amp. TEB1 CG) (B) .-....---2-<200-cncce2cee2-

49 U.S.C. App. 1551 (a) (8) -........--...--<cc-cc---+-220

orwr wr RWW WH

Vv

Statutes and regulation—Continued: Page

49 U.S.C. App. 1552 (§ 43) 00. passim

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c) (§ 43(a)-(c))...... 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(a) (1) (§ 48(a) (1))........ 5

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b) (1) (§ 43(b) (1))......5, 21, 22

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) ($ 43(d)) 0. 5, 18, 22

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (1) (§ 43(d) (1))..5, 6, 22, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (2) (§ 43(d) (2))_...... 6, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (3) (§ 43(d) (3))....... 6, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(e) (§ 43(e)) 0. 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (§ 43(f)) 00... 24

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (1) (§ 48(f) (1))........ 6

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (2) (§ 43(f) (2))......6, 14, 24,

25

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3) (§ 43(f) (3))........ 6, 7, 25

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(g) (§$ 43(g)) 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (§ 48(h)) —.............. 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (1) (§ 43(h) (1))........ 5, 22

4 SRR ee A oo ee PRS ON 9,15

SESE eee San” ee eee 15

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et

Gunn: “meibiessadasinanicbbiinminineadbadsimecicdaenamia sitet ati 2

Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 565 ( Se 39

Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 et seq... 39

Ie res I ci ke 11,12

Miscellaneous:

124 Cong. Rec. (1978)

SEES SE Sb anes OMA RNR a ae 32

RS RESET RSS avn LCR ie SOO ee aD 32

EER DCRR ye RI teed 33

I 33

Ba i A 33

pp. 10677-10678 _.... hapiguaanscialiiiaienmbaieniaiiainiaa Mais 33

See hs J ee 33

“5 es RECN Se ea 33

gk Saha Ie ee OC 83

ge RET ER SIN Seo epee aL an 34

SPRUE FOES Ene are aE 34

GES TERE ESC pe as oe NO 38

VI

Miscellaneous—Continued : Page

DP. 2OGZE ..........---..------2nceecenoreceeneensecnrsneenasonsenseenee 35

PP. 29529-29530 ..........-.-------c-nc-ncenseneeesnenenssnensenses 35-36

DP. BOGT71 ............-.-..-.-0-c-ecece-ssaneessnecessereeesenensensenseses 36

DB. BOTOG .........-...-2--2----ncer-nernrenenecnsnesnacnecescsorscssneess 36

De BT41G ......----..00-00-0--0-nc-ncencenernnscnenesncsseccscornessnscees 36

Wp, TIN nanan enna nn no nnecncnscrnnscnsnecsscnsnscnecencoonecnonss 36

Bo, BODE ....2n.ncnnnnnonna-nannnncenssnsecreresnssnsscecnscsscosenscses 36

OE —_—-—« DTN ENNE NE Oe 87, 41, 42

Oe, I acesicsccnscccoserseonscanaccssosoonenesenonscnesensesiniad 27, 36, 41

BD, SOBRE nccecencnncensco-na-acencecsenscceecesnsevenssesenscnonsoeseee 37

- DP. 38524-B8525 ...............----c-c--cceeeeceeeeceenensense 27, 36, 41

130 Cong. Rec. :

p. H2520 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984) ....................-. 38

p. H10516 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) ....................... a8

Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemak-

ing: Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and a8

Related Bills, Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-

trative Law and Governmental Relations of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st

I © ininccesatinniensiocctsensconntecssscmncnmnasesueinneeies 38

44 Fed. Reg. 19146 (1979) .......-.......-.------- -1---eeeeeeeee 7

47 Fed. Reg. 41804 (1982) ~..............--------------eeeeeeeee 7

48 Fed. Reg. (1983) :

ARIE ncoanerchinsecesenncesniosueniibisocnnsmvesnosten s¢ecnconamtens 7

i, TI secreenecsscvnncoennnsevacocsonsennvenvncnannsnecsenensnbons 11

H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

| eee 3

H.R. Rep. 95- 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ....4, 34, 35

House Comm. on Public Works, 96th Cong., Ist :

Sess., Legislative History of the Airline Deregu-

lation Act of 1978 (Comm. Print 96-5, 1979) ......passim

Legislative Veto Proposals: Hearings on S. 890

and S. 864, Before the Subcomm. on Agency Ad- :

ministration of the Senate Comm. on the Judici- ;

ary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) .. saa . 87-38

Levitas & Brand, The Post Legislative “Veto Re-

sponse: A Call to Congressional Arms, 12 Hof- ;

* oS f §. FREE 38

S. Rep. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) -........... passim

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 85-920

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

WILLIAM E. BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-

29a) is reported at 766 F.2d 1550, and the opinion of

the district court (Pet. App. 30a-37a) is reported at

594 F. Supp. 92.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on July 16, 1985, and a petition for rehearing was

denied on September 11, 1985. The petition for a

(1)

2

writ of certiorari was filed on November 27, 1985;

the Court granted the petition on March 3, 1986.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

A. The Airline Deregulation Act

Beginning in 1938 and for the next forty years,

the federal government, acting through the Civil

Aeronautics Board (“CAB”), extensively regulated

the commercial airline industry. Pursuant to the

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its successor, the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301 et

seq.), the CAB “provided for comprehensive regula-

tion of prices and entry in domestic air transporta-

tion” (S. Rep. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as S. Rep. 95-631]; Leg. Hist.

168).1 Over time, however, Congress came to believe

that price and entry regulation was producing unde-

sirable results. “Broad regulation of fares and rates

ha[d] discouraged price competition at every turn

[and] [n]Jew entrants ha[d] been singularly unsuc-

cessful in gaining new route authority” (S. Rep. 95-

631, at 2; Leg. Hist. 168). “In short,” the Congress

concluded, “a careful analysis of the regulatory sys-

tem indicated that it was imposing costs upon the

industry and raising prices to consumers without

producing any offsetting benefits” (Leg. Hist. v-vi)

(Introduction by Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson, Chair-

1 Much of the legislative background of the Deregulation

Act has been compiled in a single volume entitled House

Comm. on Public Works, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative

History of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Comm.

Print 96-5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.j.

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man, Committee on Public Works and Transporta-

tion).

In 1978, Congress decided that “[t]he time ha[d]

come for a major change and fundamental redirec-

tion as to the manner of regulation of interstate and

overseas air transportation so as to place primary

emphasis on competition” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 52;

Leg. Hist. 218). Enacting the Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978 (the Deregulation Act), Pub. L. No.

95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 et seg., Congress took “historic”

measures “to return the air transportation industry

to [the] free enterprise economy” (S. Rep. 95-631, at

4; Leg. Hist. 170). It jettisoned the industry-wide

fare structure previously enforced by the CAB and

substantially altered the procedures by which airlines

could enter new markets (49 U.S.C. App. 1371(c)

and (d) and 1482(d)). It also abolished the licensing

power of the CAB as of 1981, and, effective in 1984,

eliminated the CAB altogether (49 U.S.C. App.

1551(a) (1) (A) and (a) (3)).

In making what it termed “a major change and

fundamental redirection * * * [in the] regulation of

* * * air transportation” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 52;

Leg. Hist. 218), Congress felt “strongly that the

movement to a more competitive airline system should

be made without major disruptions to the industry

or the traveling public” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 5; Leg.

Hist. 171). For that reason, Congress made clear

that the Deregulation Act was intended to effec-

tuate a “gradual and phased transition to a deregu-

lated system” (H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong.,

2d Sess. 56 (1978); Leg. Hist. 898). During the

first three years under the new act, for example, each

previously certificated air carrier could enter only one

new market without prior CAB approval (49 U.S.C.

4

App. 1371(d)(7)). And not until 1982 could car-

riers enter new markets and withdraw from unprof-

itable old ones, free from government regulation (49

U.S.C. App. 1551). Similarly, while Congress re-

duced the authority of the CAB over airline rates

during the first three years of deregulation, it did not

terminate that authority entirely until 1983 (49

U.S.C. App. 1373, 1551(a) (2)).

B. The Employee Protection Program

Just as it sought to minimize disruption to the in-

dustry and the traveling public, Congress in 1978

expressed its determination to “insure that the bene-

fits to the public which result fro:a its decision to

alter substantially the regulation of air transporta-

tion * * * not [be] paid for by a minority—the air-

line employees and their families who have relied on

the present system” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 114; Leg.

Hist. 280). The Senate Committee recognized that

airline employees had relied upon the system of regu-

lation both in “their decision to enter the industry”

and in their decision to remain (ibid.). Over time,

the Senate reported, the regulatory structure had

prevented the operation of “the normal free market”

in employment; as a result, “[i]n order for Congress

responsibly to change its policy now and require the

industry to move toward a much more competitive

market oriented environment, Congress should at-

tempt to minimize the [employee] disclocations caused

by the change” (ibid.). The House Committee ex-

pressed the same concern (see H.R. Rep. 95-1211,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978); Leg. Hist. 530).

Congress therefore provided a statutory Employee

Protection Program (“EPP”), enacted as Section 43

5

of the Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C. App. 1552), to

assist dislocated employees. The EPP as enacted had

two parts. The first provided for monthly payments

and relocation assistance to persons who had been

employed by airlines for at least four years (“pro-

tected employees”) and who lost their jobs or much

of their income because of deregulation (Section

43(a)-(c), (e), and (h) of the Deregulation Act, 49

U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c), (e), and (h)). The Sec-

retary of Labor was directed to promulgate “guide-

lines to be used by him in determining the amount

of each monthly assistance payment to be made” (49

U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). The financial assistance

part of the EPP, however, was expressly made “sub-

ject to such amounts as are provided in appropriation

Acts” (49 U.S.C. App. 1552(2)(1)); Congress never

appropriated any funds, and the financia) assistance

program has not become operative and cannot become

operative without future legislation. It is not in-

volved in this case except as it bears on the intent of

Congress in providing a legislative veto.

The second part of the EPP imposes on airlines

certificated under the prior regulatory system a “duty

to hire protected employees.” Section 43(d), 49

U.S.C. App. 1552(d), provides that “fe]ach such air

carrier hiring additional employees shall have a duty

to hire [protected employees] before they hire any

other person * * *” (§48(d)(1)). Protected em-

ployees are those who had been employed by a certif-

icated carrier for at least four years as of the date

that the Deregulation Act went into effect (49 U.S.C.

App. 1552(d) and (h)(1). If any such employee is

“furloughed or otherwise terminated” other than for

cause within the ten years after October 24, 1978, a

carrier covered by the section is obligated to hire him,

6

“in his occupational specialty,” before it may hire any

other job applicant to fill the position (except that the

hiring carrier may first rehire any of its own pre-

viously furloughed employees) (49 U.S.C. App.

1552(d)(1)).

The duty to hire is imposed directly on the affected

carriers by Section 43(d)(1). A separate provision

directs the Secretary of Labor to “establish, maintain,

and periodically publish a comprehensive list of jobs

available with air carriers” and to “make every ef-

fort to assist an eligible protected employee in finding

other employment” (§ 43(d)(2)). Section 43(d) (2)

further provides that “[i]n order to carry out his

responsibilities under this subsection, the Secretary

may require each such air carrier to file with the Sec-

retary the reports, data, and other information nec-

essary to fulfill his duties under this subsection”’.’

A separate subsection of Section 43 provides that

the Secretary of Labor “may issue, amend, and repeal

such rules and regulations as may be necessary for

the administration” of the EPP (49 U.S.C. App.

1552(f)(1)). It states that the “rule containing the

guidelines which is required to be promulgated pur-

suant to subsection (b) of this section [relating to

- monthly assistance payments] and any other rules or

regulations which the Secretary deems necessary to

earry out this section shall be promulgated within six

months after October 24, 1978” (49 U.S.C. App.

1552(f)(2)). It also states that the Secretary may

not issue any final rule until 30 legislative days after

it has been submitted to the two transportation com-

mittees of Congress (49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3)).

* The Secretary is also directed to encourage negotiations

between air carriers and eligible protected employees “with

respect to rehiring practices and seniority” (49 U.S.C. App.

1552 (d) (3)).

7

Finally, it contains a legislative veto provision, de-

claring that any such final rule shall be submitted

to Congress and shall become effective after 60 legis-

lative days, unless during that 60-day period either

House of Congress adopts a resolution disapproving

the rule. Ibid.*

The Deregulation Act took effect on October 24,

1978. In March 1979, the Secretary published pro-

posed regulations covering both the financial assist-

ance and duty-to-hire portions of the EPP (44 Fed.

Reg. 19146). Thereafter, in September 1982, the

Secretary issued revised proposed regulations relating

only to the duty to hire (47 Fed. Reg. 41304). Fol-

lowing receipt of public comments, the Secretary pro-

mulgated final regulations in November 1983 (48

Fed. Reg. 52854), and simultaneously submitted them

to Congress. But for this litigation the regulations

would have become effective on May 17, 1984.

C. The Proceedings Below

Petitioners are 14 airlines subject to the duty-

to-hire provisions of the Deregulation Act. They

brought this action in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia against the re-

spondent Secretary; thereafter, several airline em-

ployee unions intervened as defendants. Among a

variety of constitutional and statutory claims, peti-

tioners contended that the legislative veto provision

in Section 43 is unconstitutional under this Court’s

decision in INS vy. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ; that

the veto provision is not severable from the balance

* If both Houses adopted an approval resolution during the

60-day period, the rule would become effective immediately

(49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3)).

8

of Section 43; and that the entire EPP must there-

fore be invalidated.

The Secretary agreed that under Chadha the legis-

lative veto provision is unconstitutional. The Secre-

tary argued, however, that the veto clause is severable

from the remainder of Section 43, and that the Secre-

tary’s regulations relating to the duty-to-hire provi-

sions of the EPP should therefore be sustained. The

Secretary also defended his regulations against the

other legal challenges raised by petitioners.

In May 1984, just before the Secretary’s regulations

were to have become effective, the district court

granted summary judgment to petitioners (Pet. App.

30a-37a). The court struck down the entire EPP,

holding that the legislative veto clause could not be

severed from the remainder of Section 43 (Pet. App.

34a-37a). The court did not reach any of the other

issues raised by the petitioners.

The district court first considered the test for sev-

erability of unconstitutional provisions. The court

stated that “[t]he question is not * * * whether Con-

gress would have enacted some type of employee pro-

tection plan in the absence of a legislative veto provi-

sion; rather, the issue is whether Congress would

have enacted the same statute. If not, the Court can-

not enforce the remainder of the statute merely be-

cause it might be an approximation of what Congress

would have enacted” (Pet. App. 33a n.8 (emphasis in

original) ). Examining the text and history of the

Deregulation Act, the court concluded that “Congress

considered the legislative veto provision to be integral

to the EPP and that Congress would not have enacted

§ 43 in its present form without such a provision”

(id. at 34a). The court found “most significant” the

fact that Section 43 was the only portion of the De-

weeny

9

regulation Act to contain a legislative veto (Pet. App.

34a). The court also found in the legislative history

of Section 43 evidence that Congress wanted to “sub-

ject to a legislative veto” what the district judge felt

was a “grant of * * * broad authority to the Secre-

tary” (Pet. App. 35a). The court discounted the fact

that there was “relatively little discussion of the veto

provision in the legislative history of the Act” (ibid.).

Applying its view of the governing legal standard, the

district court was unable to find that Congress “would

* * * have enacted the remainder of § 43 in its pres-

ent form without [the legislative veto]” (id. at 36a).

It therefore invalidated the entire EPP (id. at 37a).

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit reversed, holding that the legislative veto pro-

vision was severable from the rest of Section 43.‘

The court of appeals first reviewed the severability

principles articulated by this Court in Chadha and

other cases. Following Chadha and earlier cases dat-

ing back to Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation

Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), the court

held that the legislative veto provision must be sev-

ered “‘[uJjnless it is evident that the Legislature

would not have enacted those provisions which are

within its power, independently of that which is not’ ”

(Pet. App. 16a (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-

* Before reaching the merits of petitioners’ claims, the court

first held that appellate jurisdiction properly lay in the court

of appeals, notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1252

(Pet. App. 6a-92). The court then determined that the sever-

ability issue was ripe, despite the fact that Congress had never

exercised the legislative veto contained in Section 43 (Pet.

App. 9a-10a). The court also concluded that the district

court had correctly decided that this Court’s decision in

Chadha applies retroactively to earlier enacted veto provi-

sions (id. at 1la-l5a).

10

932)). The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ con-

struction of that language, according to which the

entire statute must be invalidated whenever “Con-

gress would have passed some alternative version of

the statute if it knew that it could not lawfully have

included the offending provision” (id. at 18a). That

approach, the court of appeals determined, would vio-

late “ ‘[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construc-

tion [which] is to save and not to destroy’” (id. at

18a n.9 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,

684 (1971)). Limiting its consideration to the two

available choices, the court of appeals held that “ ‘the

question is * * * whether Congress would have pre-

ferred th[is] statute[], after severance of the legis-

lative veto provision[], to no statute[] at all’” (Pet.

App. 18a, quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d

797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, No.

84-20 (Oct. 1, 1984)).° In making that determination

in this ease, the court of appeals further noted, peti-

tioners must overcome a presumption of severability

because the duty-to-hire provision “is fully operative

as a law” without the legislative veto provision (Pet.

App. 16a-17a (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934)).

The D.C. Circuit reviewed the text and legislative

history of the Deregulation Act in light of these

standards (Pet. App. 20a-24a, 27a-28a). In the leg-

islative history the court found that Congress had

expressed “a strong, humanitarian desire to provide

for airline employee protection” and, by contrast, had

evinced “relatively little concern about the veto pro-

5 The court of appeals did not state, as petitioners imply

(Br. 7), that the test is whether Congress would have pre-

ferred any protection statute to none at all. It simply com-

pared the statute it had with the only available alternative—

striking it down.

ll

vision” (id. at 19a). The court rejected petitioners’

argument that the structure of the oversight provi-

sions “evidenc[ed] a Congressional intent of insever-

ability” (id. at 24a-27a). After examining the rec-

ord in considerable detail the court concluded that

“fajmple evidence persuades us that the employee

protection program, whatever its merit, was deemed

by Congress to be an important aspect of the Act. In

contrast, there is not a shred of evidence that the

veto provision was deemed to be a vital feature of

the protection plan.” Jd. at 28a.° The court of ap-

peals therefore upheld the balance of Section 43 and

remanded the case to the district court to consider

petitioners’ remaining challenges (Pet. App. 28a).’

* Judge Ginsburg concurred in the judgment. Like the

majority, she concluded that “[d]eletion of the veto preserves

Section 43 and thereby gives effect to the dominant intent of

Congress,” while a declaration of inseverability ‘“‘would be

far more destructive of the legislature’s will” (Pet. App. 29a).

™On remand, the district court sustained all but one of the

Secretary’s regulations against petitioners’ contention that

they were inconsistent with the Deregulation Act (Alaska

Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 178 (D.D.C. 1986) ). The

sole exception was Section 220.21(a) (1) (29 C.F.R.) of the

regulations (Pet. App. 52a; 48 Fed. Reg. 52863 (1983) ), which

deals with the initial hiring age of designated employees. The

district court remanded to the Secretary that part of the rule

that affected flight officers and pilots. After the district court

and court of appeals declined to stay the effective date of the

remainder of the regulations, the Chief Justice, by order dated

January 27, 1986, denied petitioners’ application for a stay

pending the Court’s disposition of petitioners’ certiorari peti-

tion. No. A-571. The Secretary’s regulations accordingly

went into effect on January 27, 1986. After this Court granted

certiorari approximately one month later, the D.C. Circuit

recalled its mandate, as it automatically does in such instances.

On May 9, 1986, pursuant to the Secretary’s motion, the court

of appeals reissued its mandate, thereby allowing the Secre-

pb

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The court of appeals faithfully applied the rule

prescribed by this Court for determining whether an

‘ unconstitutional provision is severable: the uncon-

stitutional provision should be severed and the bal-

ance of the statute sustained “‘[u]nless it is evident

that the Legislature would not have enacted those pro-

visions which are within its power, independently of

that which is not’” (Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-932,

quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976),

and Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n

of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). Applied

to this case, as the court of appeals held (Pet. App.

18a-19a), this rule dictates sustaining the duty-to-

hire provisions “unless it is evident” that the enact-

ing Congress would have preferred to abandon the

duty-to-hire provisions if it had known that it could

not have the legislative veto provision.

The phrase “unless it is evident” reflects a strong

presumption in favor of severability. The Court has

held that a further presumption arises when what

remains is “ ‘fully operative as a law’ ” (Chadha, 462

U.S. at 934, quoting Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234; see

also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984)

(plurality opinion); United States v. Jackson, 390

U.S. 570, 585-591 (1968) ). Courts have no authority

to invalidate federal statutes except the command of

the Constitution, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 176-180 (1803), or the expressed or

“evident” intent of Congress that an otherwise valid

tary’s program to go back into effect. On May 20, 1986, the

Chief Justice denied petitioners’ request that the mandate be

recalled and stayed. The regulations are now in operation,

with the exception of Section 220.21(a) (1), insofar as it re

lates to flight officers and pilots.

ee

13

provision is to fall with an unconstitutional provision.

Absent such instructions, the duty of the court is “ ‘to

save and not to destroy’” (Tilton v. Richardson, 403

U.S. 672, 684 (1971) ), permitting Congress, and not

the courts, to reconsider otherwise valid provisions

after a portion of the statute has been found uncon-

stitutional.

Petitioners’ contention that the court of appeals

“formulated * * * a completely new standard” that

“violates the * * * separation of powers” (Br. 9-10),

is groundless. The court of appeals, expressly follow-

ing this Court’s instructions, made a meticulous ex-

amination of the only issue a court does have the

power to decide: whether it is evident (from the text,

structure, or legislative history) that Congress would

not have wanted the courts to enforce the constitu-

tional remainder of a statute, after the unconstitu-

tional part was stricken. It is petitioners, who insist

that courts speculate about whether Congress would

have preferred some third possibility—perhaps a stat-

ute “with different form, content or language” (Br.

15)—who would have the courts intrude on the leg-

islative domain and strike down otherwise valid leg-

islation without instructions from Congress to do so.

II. As the court of appeals concluded, the struc-

ture and language of the EPP show plainly that Con-

gress would have wanted the duty-to-hire provisions

in Section 43(d) to survive. The statute itself im-

poses the duty to hire directly on the air carriers;

the Secretary is given only the routine functions of

gathering and providing information and otherwise

assisting. The statutory requirements imposed on

the air carriers do not depend on any regulatory ac-

tion by the Secretary and would not have been sub-

ject to any veto. There is not the slightest reason to

suppose, as petitioners do, that Congress would prefer

14

to abandon the detailed structure that it created sim-

ply because it lost the power to veto regulations of

the Secretary that, in respect of this part of the EPP,

were entirely routine.

The legislative history also confirms the court of

appeals’ conclusion “that the employee protection pro-

gram, whatever its merit, was deemed by Congress to

be an important aspect of the Act. In contrast, there

is not a shred of evidence that the veto provision was

deemed to be a vital feature of the protection plan”

(Pet. App. 28a). The EPP was described, again and

again in the legislative debates, as an important “in-

surance” feature of deregulation; the veto provision,

on the other hand, appears to have been a reflexive

addition to the bill, added almost without comment.

In particular, there is not the slightest suggestion

that any member of Congress anticipated the possi-

bility of vetoing any regulation relating to the duty-

to-hire provisions. The only mention of the legislative

veto in the committee reports relates it to the finan-

cial assistance program (which is now inoperative),

not the duty-to-hire provisions that are before the

Court. (The statute itself, in fact, suggests in Sub-

section (f) (2) that the desire for congressional over-

sight related principally to the financial assistance

program.) Moreover, the only comment on the veto

clause in the debates in either House came from one

House member, long a champion of the legislative

veto, who noted his routine approval of the inclusion

of such a clause in the Conference Bill—without sug-

gesting any particular concern about duty-to-hire reg-

ulations or any others; in fact, the House Bill, which

he had actively supported, did not contain a veto

clause. A fair reading of the legislative record thus

richly confirms what the court of appeals concluded:

there is no reason to believe that, if Congress had

ee .

ee ee eee

ern ee

15

anticipated the demise of the legislative veto, it would

have wanted the courts to invalidate the duty-to-hire

provisions of the EPP.*

® Petitioners contend, as they did below, that the court of

appeals lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s decision

held “an Act of Congress unconstitutional” and therefore, pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. 1252, could only be appealed directly to this

Court. As the court of appeals concluded in rejecting this

argument (Pet. App. 6a-9a), this Court’s jurisdictional ruling

in EEOC vy. Allstate Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 1232 (1984),

resolves this question against petitioners. There, the EEOC

took a protective appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1252 from a district court decision holding the legislative veto

provision in the Reorganization Act of 1977 inseverable from

the remainder of the enactment. At the same time, however,

the EEOC contended that the severability holding of the dis-

trict court presented simply a question of legislative intent—

not one of the constitutionality of the remaining provisions.

As such, the EEOC maintained, an appeal was properly

brought to a court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.

See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984). This Court

dismissed the appeal] in Allstate, making it clear that an appeal

under these circumstances must be taken to the court of

appeals.

Petitioners’ effort to distinguish Allstate (Br. 13 n.13) is

unavailing. They contend that in Allstate the appellants chal-

lenged only the remedy ordered by the district judge, after he

had found the veto provision unconstitutional. By contrest,

petitioners maintain, here the United States has challenged

the district court’s finding of inseverability. But this is just a

semantic quibble: the “remedy” challenged in Allstate was the

same as that which the Secretary appealed from here—the

declaration that a legislative veto provision is, by virtue of

legislative intent, inseverable from the balance of the statute.

Under this Court’s unanimous holding in Heckler v. Edwards,

465 U.S. at 885, an appeal only from that judgment—which

does not challenge the underlying decision that the veto is

unconstitutional—does not vest jurisdiction in this Court

under 28 U.S.C. 1252.

16

ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED

THAT THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISION OF

SECTION 43(f) SHOULD BE SEVERED FROM THE

DUTY-TO-HIRE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 43(d)

A. The Court of Appeals Applied The Proper Rule Of

Severability

Both courts below, and all parties in this Court,

have agreed that this cas2 is governed by the sever-

ability rule repeatedly stated by this Court (Chadha,

462 U.S. at 931-932, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at

108, and Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234) :

[T]he valid portions of a statute are to be

severed “ ‘unless it is evident that the Legisla-

ture would not have enacted those provisions

which are within its power, independently of that

which is not.’ ”

Petitioners have misinterpreted this Champlin rule in

two respects.

First, petitioners make the remarkable assertion

that under the Champlin rule an entire statute must

be invalidated whenever it appears that Congress—

had it known that one portion would be declared in-

valid—would have modified the remainder in any

respect (Br. 15, 18).° To make that formulation

seem more plausible, petitioners repeatedly (and in-

correctly) attribute to the Secretary, and to the court

of appeals, a formulation that would sustain the re-

® Even if petitioners’ formulation were correct, it would not

change the result in this case: as we show below, there is no

evidence that Congress would have modified the duty-to-hire

provisions in any respect if it had known that it could not

have a legislative veto.

17

mainder of a statute whenever it appears that Con-

gress would have enacted any statute with the same

general purpose (7.e., Br. 9-10).

Both of petitioners’ formulations—the one that

they endorse and the one that they erroneously ascribe

to the court of appeals—are wrong. A court’s proper

task, when deciding severability, is to choose between

the two available alternatives, saving the balance of

what Congress in fact enacted, unless it is evident

that Congress would not have wanted the remainder

enforced in the absence of the unconstitutional provi-

sion. That is the plain meaning of the Champlin rule,

and that is the only formulation that avoids intru-

sion upon Congress’ prerogatives. Both of petition-

ers’ formulations would lead to inappropriate, and

inevitably fruitless, speculation about legislation nei-

ther adopted nor actually considered by Congress.

And both would rest the fate of provisions Congress

actually enacted on the hypothetical fate of imaginary

alternative legislation.

Second, petitioners ignore the strong presump-

tion, reflected in the Champlin rule, in favor of sev-

erance. The words “unless it is evident * * *” ob-

viously imply such a presumpton. Explaining the

reason for the presumption, the plurality in Regan

v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984). said, “A rul-

ing of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of

the elected representatives of the people. Therefore, a

court should refrain from invalidating more of the

statute than is necessary” (id. at 652; accord id. at

661, 677 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring) ;

cf. El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87,

96 (1909)). The Court has alse repeatedly stated

that where the valid remainder of a statute “ ‘is fully

operative as a law,’” the invalid provision “is fur-

18

ther presumed severable” (Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934,

quoting Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234). These pre-

sumptions reflect the fact that courts have no author-

ity to invalidate federal statutes except the command

of the Constitution, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 137, 176-180 (1803), or the expressed or

“evident” intent of Congress. The duty of the courts

is to sustain constitutionally valid parts of a statute

unless either there is a clear indication in the statute

or its legislative history that Congress would have

wanted them to fall, in the absence of the unconstitu-

tional part, or the valid parts cannot operate without

the unconstitutional part.

The decision of the court of appeals in this case

was entirely faithful to the severability rule articu-

lated by this Court. Following Chadha, the court of

appeals held that the veto provisions should be sev-

ered “‘fu]nless it is evident that the Legislature

would not have enacted those provisions which are

within its power, independently of that which is not’ ”

(Pet. App. 16a, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108).

Noting, further, the presumption in favor of sever-

ability where, as here, the valid portion “ ‘is fully

operative as a law’” (Pet. App. 16a, quoting Chadha,

462 U.S. at 934), the court of appeals held, con-

sistent with this Court’s decisions, that “[o]nly if

we conclude that Congress would not have included

[the balance of Section 43] absent the constitution-

ally flawed portion [are those] provision[s] to fall”

(Pet. App. 18a). The court reviewed the language

10 In Chadha, the Court also found a presumption based on

the existence of a severability clause. It is clear that, while

the presence of a severability clause certainly strengthens the

case for severance, the absence of such a clause does not raise

a presumption against severability. See Tilton v. Richardson,

403 U.S. at 684; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n.27.

19

and structure of Section 43, together with its legisla-

tive history, and concluded that had Congress known

that the veto would be found unconstitutional, it

would not have preferred “no employee protection

program over the program passed by Congress shorn

of its veto provision” (Pet. App. 28a).

The court of appeals asked precisely the right ques-

tion. The district court had only two choices when it

found the legislative veto portion of the EPP invalid:

save the duty-to-hire provisions or strike the duty-to-

hire provisions. Since that choice depended on legis-

lative intent (Regan, 468 U.S. at 653; Jackson, 390

~ 3. at 585-591; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.

2.38, 313 (1936), the relevant question, in this case,

is just as the colrt of appeals put it: would Congress

have preferred “no employee protection program

over the program passed by Congress shorn of its

veto provision” (Pet. App. 28a).

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals’ ap-

proach “rais[es] serious separation-of-powers con-

cerns” (Br. 19) and “improperly allows the judiciary

to reformulate statutes to create laws which are not

at all what Congress contemplated” (Br. 17). But

this is simply not a case in which a court has changed

the meaning of a statute in order to save its consti-

tutionality. The court of appeals here sought “‘to save

as much of the statute as [it] can” (Pet. App. 18a;

see Regan, 468 U.S. at 652; El Paso & N.E. Ry.,

215 U.S. at 96), by sustaining otherwise valid provi-

sions that operate independently and that Congress

clearly considered important. It did so without in

any way “reformulating” the duty-to-hire provisions

or departing in any way from what Congress con-

templated. And it left to Congress the task of revis-

ing the EPP, should it choose to, in light of the demise

of the legislative veto.

20

Under petitioners’ theory, on the other hand, if a

court finds anything in the otherwise valid balance

of a statute that it guesses Congress might have writ-

ten differently were it not for the invalid provision,

the court must strike the whole enactment—even if

it is clear that Congress would have preferred to keep

the balance of the statute rather than lose it. It could

not be plainer that the court of appeals honored (as

far as possible) what Congress wrote and intended,

while petitioners’ approach would force the courts

into speculation about legislation Congress did not

enact.

Finally, this case illustrates perfectly still another

problem with petitioners’ approach to severability:

there is no stopping place. Petitioners apparently

believe—and the district court, accepting petitioners’

legal premise, expressly held (Pet. App. 37a n.5)—

that the EPP was severable from the balance of the

Deregulation Act. Thus, the district court concluded,

the invalidation of the EPP did not require the entire

deregulation statute to be struck down. The court so

held because, in its view, “[n]othing in the statute or

legislative history even remotely suggests that Con-

gress would not have passed the Act without the EPP

or that in the absence of an EPP it would have taken

a different approach to deregulation” (ibid.). In fact,

there is a good deal of evidence that at least some

members of Congress would have taken a much dim-

mer view of the rest of the Deregulation Act had the

draftsmen not included the EPP. See, e.g., S. Rep.

95-631, at 221; Leg. Hist. 387 (Sen. Inouye) ; id. at

216; Leg. Hist. 382 (Sen. Danforth). Indeed, the evi-

dence unmistakably shows that the EPP was more

essential to the passage of the entire Deregulation

Act than the legislative veto was to the passage of

the EPP. See pages 28-39, infra. Under petitioners’

<----—

21

proposed standard it is hard to see why the balance of

the Deregulation Act should not be invalidated along

with the EPP. Certainly, petitioners do not say.

B. The Structure, Language, And Legislative History Of

The Statute Show Plainly That Congress Would Not

Wish To Abandon The Remainder Of Section 43

1. The Structure And Language Of The Statute

“(T]he starting point for interpreting a statute,”

this Court has noted, “is the language of the statute

itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative inten-

tion to the contrary, that language must ordinarily

be regarded as conclusive” (Consumer Product Safety

Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108

(1980)). Accord Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695

(1980) ; Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.,

437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978). Here, the language and

structure of Section 43 leave no doubt that Congress

would have wanted the duty to hire it imposed on

petitioners to be sustained, notwithstanding the in-

validity of the legislative veto.

Section 43 established two different kinds of pro-

tection for employees displaced from their jobs as a

result of airline deregulation. The first program, em-

bodied in Section 43(a)-(c), (e), (g), and (h), 49

U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c), (e), (g), and (h), was in-

tended to provide “monthly assistance” and other fi-

nancial support to eligible employees. Under this pro-

gram, eligible employees were entitled to receive,

“subject to such amounts as are provided in appropri-

ation Acts,” a “monthly assistance payment * * * in

an amount computed by the Secretary” (§ 43(b) (1),

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). In discharging his:

considerable discretion under this provision, the Sec-

retary of Labor, “after consultation with the Secre-

tary of Transportation,” was to “promulgate guide-

22

lines to be used by him in determining the amount

of each monthly assistance payment to be made”

(§$ 43(b) (1), 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). This

program, however, was never funded by Congress

and, thus, never went into effect.

The other program provided by Section 43, em-

bodied in Section 48(d), 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d),

imposed on air carriers a “duty to hire protected

employees” who were “furloughed or otherwise ter-

minated” by an air carrier during the 10-year period

beginning with the effective date of the Deregulation

Act. In contrast to the assistance provisions, Con-

gress imposed this obligation, unconditionally, in the

statute itself and spelled out the “duty to hire” in

some detail. Paragraph 438{d)(1) gives “[e]Jach

person who is a protected employee of an air car-

rier’—defined by Congress in Section 43(h) (1),

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (1)—“‘who is furloughed or

otherwise terminated by * * * an air carrier (other

than for cause)” a “first right of hire” for a specific

period of time. This right of hire, Congress stated,

extends only to the employee’s “occupational spe-

cialty” but may be enjoyed “regardless of age.’’ Each

affected air carrier—defined by Congress in Subsec-

tion (d) (1)—*“shall have a duty to hire” protected

employees “before they [sic] hire any other person,

except that such air carrier may recall any of its own

furloughed eraployees before hiring such a person.”

Further, each employee rehired pursuant to this sub-

section “shall retain his rights of seniority and right

of recall with the air carrier that furloughed or ter-

minated him.”

Whereas the now inoperative assistance program

could not have functioned without a substantial exer-

cise of discretion by the Secretary (who was to fix

the guidelines for benefits), the statute does not make

WY ES PS ee

23

the airlines’ duty to hire dependent on regulation at

all. The Secretary’s role is an auxiliary one, and

the scope of his assigned duties is routine; there is

no reason whatever to think Congress might have

wanted to veto his exercise of those functions. The

Secretary is mentioned only in an entirely separate

provision (§ 43(d)(2)), which directs him to “pub-

lish a comprehensive list of jobs available with air

carriers’, which list “shall include * * * information

and detail * * * such as job descriptions and required

skills.” The same provision directs him to “make

every effort to assist an eligible protected employee

in finding other employment.” To carry out these

functions “the Secretary may require each * * * air

carrier to file with the Secretary * * * reports, data,

and other information.” »

Congress did not make the airlines’ duty to hire,

which is set forth in Section 43(d) (1), conditional in

any way on regulations and did not subject it to any

legislative veto. That fact provides the clearest pos-

sible evidence that Congress would not have wanted

the duty to hire invalidated merely because the legis-

lative veto was invalidated. And the responsibilities

that Congress did give the Secretary with respect to

the duty to hire (in contrast to his responsibilities

11 The Court need not decide in this case whether, if the

assistance provisions had not been rendered inoperative by

Congress’ failure to fund them, they would have been invali-

dated as inseverable from the legislative veto. The fate of the

duty-to-hire provisions does not depend in any way on that

question. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 653; Jackson, 390 U.S. at

585-591.

12 A separate provision provides that, in addition to these

duties, “the Secretary shall encourage negotiations between

air carriers and representatives of eligible protected employees

with respect to rehiring practices and seniority” (§ 43(d) (3)).

24

under the assistance program) were auxiliary activ-

ities in connection with a program whose basic obli-

gations were defined and imposed on the carriers by

Congress itself. There is no reason to believe that

Congress contemplated the possibility of vetoing any

of the Secretary’s actions in connection with the duty-

to-hire program.”

The language of Section 43(f), which contains the

legislative veto, also confirms that to the extent that

Congress wanted to oversee anything, it was the

anticipated assistance regulations, not the Secretary’s

activities in connection with the duty to hire. Sec-

tion 43(f)(2) provides that within six months the

Secretary shall promulgate “[t]he rule containing the

guidelines which is required to be promulgated pur-

suant to subsection (b) [establishing the “monthly

assistance” program] and any other rules or regula-

tions which the Secretary deems necessary to carry

out this section.” Congress’ principal concern—the

only set of regulations that it identified specifically

in Subsection (f)—was the regulations under the

48 Petitioners’ assertion that “Section 43 required the De-

partment of Labor * * * to establish a novel, untested type of

labor protection” (Br. 3) (emphasis added) is incorrect. It

was Congress, not the Secretary, which imposed the duty to

hire from which petitioners now seek to escape, and it is to

Congress that they should address their objections. Petitioners’

suggestion that because of purported “uncertainty about the

need for labor protection * * * Congress did not fully develop

the EPP” (Br. 4) is similarly mistaken. The EPP was, as peti-

tioners acknowledge (Br. 3), an “insurance” program, and it

was of course hoped that few employees would need to call on

it; but Congress exhibited no uncertainty whatever about

whether the duty-to-hire part of the insurance should go into

effect. To the contrary, Congress unambiguously declared its

intent to impose on air carriers a duty to hire displaced

workers.

25

“monthly assistance” program. And it is not hard to

see why: with respect to the financial assistance pro-

gram, Congress delegated the hard, and expensive,

choices to the Secretary, subject to appropriation by

Congress.**

The case for severability of the legislative veto is

strengthened by the fact that Subsection 43(f) (3)

also provides for a so-called “report and wait” rule,

under which the Secretary may not “issue any rule

or regulation as a final rule or regulation * * * until

30 legislative days after it has been submitted” to

the congressional transportation committees. As a

result of this provision, the demise of the veto did

not deprive Congress of all power to review the Sec-

retary’s regulations. Congress retains the authority

to review proposed regulations and, if it wishes, to

disapprove them through constitutionally permissible

legislation.”

14 Petitioners find fault with the court of appeals’ determi-

nation that the legislative veto was primarily directed at the

payment regulations—not the duty to hire (Br. 40 n.49). They

argue that Congress intended both parts of the EPP to “oper-

ate in tandem” (ibid.). Whatever that may mean (and, of

course, it has not proven to be the case in practice), it does

not contradict the considerable evidence that the only source

of controversy in the EPP was the assistance provisions.

Those provisions were, potentially, the costliest and, under the

statutory framework, involved the greatest measure of dele-

gated authority to the Secretary. Not surprisingly, the only

part of the EPP to which the oversight provisions make spe-

cific reference is the portion giving the Secretary authority

to promulgate guidelines for monthly payments (49 U.S.C.

App. 1552(f) (2)).

15 The Court made a similar point in Chadha, finding the

legislative veto severable in part because a “report and wait”

type of oversight remained available to Congress. The Court

noted that, without the legislative veto, ‘Congress’ oversight

26

Petitioners contend that Congress viewed the EPP

as an “unprecedented” proposal, which was “funda-

mentally inconsistent with the overall deregulatory

purpose manifest throughout the Act” (Br. 29, 33-

34). They imply (id. at 32-33) that Congress in-

serted a veto provision “directly into subsection 43(f),

the same provision granting the DOL delegation”

(id. at 30), and combined the veto power with a “‘re-

port and wait” requirement (id. at 32 & n.39), be-

cause Congress wanted a second look before the duty

to hire was implemented. But, first, petitioners mis-

characterize the record. Congress assuredly did not

regard the duty to hire as a “novel, untested type of

labor protection” (Br. 3); in fact, the Senate Report

described the EPP as a program similar to ones that

had been approved “in certain cases in the past” (S.

Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg. Hist. 279).*° Moreover,

of the exercise of * * * delegated authority is preserved since

all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it” (462

U.S. at 935). “‘Without the one-House veto,” the Court ob-

served, the remaining statute “resembles the ‘report and wait’

provision approved by the Court” in prior case law (id. at

935 n.9). See also Bowsher v. Synar, No. 85-1377 (July 7,

1986), slip op. 19 (inclusion of fallback provision indicative of

legislative intent with respect to consequences of invalidation

of statutory provision).

16 Only Senator Zorinsky described the EPP as “without

precedent”, but he limited his characterization to the monthiy

payment program (S. Rep. 95-631, at 208; Leg. Hist. 374)

(additional views of Sen. Zorinsky). That program, we have

noted, was never funded and never became operational. The

Senator did, however, find ample precedent for the duty-to-

hire program, which he thought “mesh[ed] perfectly with this

expanding competitive environment” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 206;

Leg. Hist. 372). The Senator, in fact, proposed amending the

EPP in a way which would have retained the duty-to-hire

provisions in their present form. Jd. at 208-209; Leg. Hist.

374-375.

27

Congress did not regard the EPP as “fundamentally

inconsistent” with the deregulation bill. As petition-

ers are constrained to admit (Br. 43 n.53), some

members of the House even favored a protection pro-

gram stronger than the final bill. See 124 Cong. Rec.

38523 (1978); Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.

Harsha) ; 124 Cong. Rec. 38524-38525 (1978); Leg.

Hist. 986 (statement of Rep. Mineta). All of the

evidence affirms Congress’ belief that the EPP was

entirely consistent with the desire that “movement

to a more competitive airline system * * * be made

without major disruptions” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 5;

Leg. Hist. 171), and without causing the benefits of

the deregulation to be “paid for by a minority—

the airline employees and their families” (id. at

114; Leg. Hist. 280). While Congress clearly re-

tained the right to decline to fund the assistance

program, there is not the slightest evidence to support

petitioners’ suggestion that Congress wanted the duty

to hire to be less than an unconditional statutory

obligation.”

2. The Legislative History Of The Statute

The court of appeals “emerge[d] from [its] trek

through the legislative history of the Airline Deregu-

17 Petitioners point to the fact that out of the entire Dereg-

ulation Act only Section 43 contained a legislative veto (Br.

28-29) as demonstrating that Congress would not have wanted

the duty-to-hire provisions to be sustained in the absence of

the legislative veto. But the uncommented-on absence of a

veto clause in other provisions of the Act says nothing what-

ever about (i) whether Congress considered the veto clause

in Section 43 more important, or less important, than other

veto clauses it has adopted or (ii) whether Congress would not

have enacted the duty-to-hire provisions of Section 43 with-

out it.

28

lation Act” persuaded “that the employee protection

program, whatever its merit, was deemed by Congress

to be an important aspect of the Act” (Pet. App.

28a). “[W]hat evidence there is,” the court declared,

“indicates that Congress had a strong, humanitarian

desire to provide for airline employee protection”

during the deregulation process (id. at 19a, 22a).

“In contrast,” the court noted, “there is not a shred

of evidence that the veto provision was deemed to be

a vital feature of the protection plan” (id. at 28a).

In short, the court concluded, given the only two

choices that a court has when it strikes a portion of

a statute (id. at 19a)

the evidence * * * positively indicates that Con-

gress would have preferred the employee protec-

tion plan with the veto provision severed out to

a deregulatory statute stripped of any employee

protection plan.

As we show below, the court of appeals read the

legislative history correctly. There is strong support

for employee protection, but, in the entire history of

Section 43, the legislative veto is mentioned only

twice—once in a sentence in the Senate Report, which

ties it to the assistance provisions and not the duty-

to-hire provisions, and once in a routine comment by

one Representative.

a. Initiation Of The Bill In The Senate

The airline regulatory system established in 1938

“subjected airlines to extensive economic regulation

by the Civil Aeronautics Board” (Leg. Hist. v) (In-

troduction by Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson, Chairman,

Committee on Public Works and Transportation).

If an airline wished to change the cities it served

or the prices it charged, it was required to seek

ee we a a amenen al

29

permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The Board could refuse to allow the airline to

take actions which would benefit consumers and

which the airline believed to be in its best inter-

est. Even if the Board ultimately granted an

airline’s request, there could be years of delay

before the airline could implement its proposal

[ (Leg. Hist. v) (same) }.

After forty years of an airline regulatory struc-

ture that had “outlived its usefulness” (Leg. Hist.

v) (same), Congress enacted the Airline Deregula-

tion Act of 1978, a “landmark” and “historic” reform

which “free[d] the airline industry from excessive

economic regulation” (Leg. Hist. v-vi) (same).” Be-

cause of the dramatic changes contemplated by this

legislation, however, Congress determined that the

“movement to a more competitive airline system

should be made without major disruptions to the in-

dustry or the traveling public” (S. Rep. 95-631, at

5; Leg. Hist. 171). Accordingly, among other provi-

sions, the Senate Bill contained an employee protection

plan substantially identical to the version that was

eventually enacted as Section 43 (S. Rep. 95-631, at

46-48; Leg. Hist. 212-214).

In the report that accompanied the bill when it

reached the Senate floor, the legislators made clear

that employee protection was a central concern. Some

airlines, the Senate Report noted, may well “en-

counter such difficulties in adjusting that they will

lose enough traffic to cause a major reduction in

their total labor force” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg.

18 The Senate Report described the new legislation as “a

major change and fundamental redirection as to the manner

of regulation of interstate and overseas air transportation”

(S. Rep. 95-631, at 52; Leg. Hist. 218).

30

Hist. 279). This prospect, the Senate observed, while

uncertain, “should not be ignored” (ibid.). Over the

years, the Report continued, “[r]egulation has * * *

had the effect of reducing the potential for major

employment reductions in individual airlines” (ibid.) ;

as a result, once the burdens of regulation are lifted

“a major reduction might occur in the labor force of

one or more airlines” (ibid.). The Senate felt

strongly that “[a]irline employees have relied on the

present regulatory system” both in “their decision to

enter the industry” and in their decision to continue

in the field “within the context of the regulatory sys-

tem” (id. at 114; Leg. Hist. 280). The Senate put

its concerns squarely (ibid.) :

Because it is the public who will benefit from

the regulatory reform provided for in this bill,

the public should be willing to assume reasonably

close to the full cost of such reform, including

the cost of transition for any dislocated employ-

ees. The Committee believes that the Congress,

on behalf of the American people, must insure

that the benefits to the public which result from

its decision to alter substantially the regulation

of air transportation are not paid for by a minor-

ity—the airline employees and their families who

have relied on the present system.

The Senate therefore proposed “a statutory em-

ployee protection program, as has been done in cer-

tain cases in the past” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg.

Hist. 279). Its report sheds considerable light on the

intent of the legislators. First, if, as petitioners urge

at length, the Senate evinced any “uncertainty” about

the EPP (Br. 10), that uncertainty concerned solely

31

the financial assistance program, not the airlines’

duty to hire dislocated employees. Thus, while the

report reflected some passing concern about “the po-

tential expenditure of Government funds” (S. Rep.

95-631, at 115; Leg. Hist. 281), it expressed no com-

parable concern over the duty-to-hire provisions. In-

deed, the only reference in the Senate Report to con-

gressional oversight of the Secretary’s regulations

stated that the “amount of [each monthly] payment

would be * * * determined by regulations promulgated

by the Department of Labor. These regulations will

be subject to congressional review” (id. at 116; Leg.

Hist. 282). The report gave no indication of any de-

sire to oversee the Secretary’s regulations relating to

the duty to hire.

The Senate Report, then, corroborates the court

of appeals’ conclusion: Congress expressed substan-

tial concern for employee welfare; and it paid little

attention to legislative oversight. Moreover, what

little interest the Senate expressed in exercising a

reviewing power related solely to the assistance pro-

gram, which has never become effective. The Senate

said nothing indicating an interest in overseeing, let

alone vetoing, regulations relating to the duty to

hire.”

19 The strong support for the duty to hire, and the lack of

concern to oversee related regulations, are both illustrated by

the views of the Senators who refused to vote for the Senate

Bill in committee. Senator Zorinsky objected to the bill be-

cause its employee protection program was not limited to a

duty to hire. His alternative proposal would have retained

virtually the identical duty-to-hire plan (S. Rep. 95-631, at

208-209; Leg. Hist. 374-375) (additional views of Sen.

Zorinsky), for which, the Senator acknowledged, there was

“precedent” (id. at 206; Leg. Hist. 372) (same). Senator

Zorinsky would simply have excised the funding program,

b. The Senate Debate On The Bill

Senator Cannon sponsored the Deregulation Act on

the Senate floor on April 19, 1978 (124 Cong. Rec.

10647 (1978); Leg. Hist. 396). While he discussed

the employee protection program (id. at 10649; Leg.

Hist. 399), he said nothing about a legislative veto

power—or, for that matter, congressional oversight

generally. Indeed, when Senator Cannon caused a

summary of the EPP to be printed in the Record, the

summary did not even indicate that the legisiation

contained a legislative veto (ibid.). See Consumer En-

ergy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir.

1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group

v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).

Thereafter, during the debates on the bill, various

Senators reaffirmed their support for the EPP, and

no Senator ever said anything at all about the legisla-

tive veto. For example, Senator Zorinsky, consistent

with the views he had expressed when the bill emerged

which he believed might cost as much as $1 billion (id. at 207;

Leg. Hist. 373) (same). From the opposite perspective, Sena-

tor Inouye objected to the bill because it did no go far enough

in protecting employees from “the risks” of “large-scale em-

ployee cutbacks and other disruptions” (id. at 221; Leg. Hist.

387) (minority views of Sen. Inouye). The other two dissent-

ing committee members were Senators Melcher and Goldwater.

See id. at 222-224; Leg. Hist. 388-390 (minority views of Sen.

Melcher) (expressing concern over “assuredly * * * wide

spread unemployment and dislocation among the labor forces

of the carriers”) ; id. at 225-228; Leg. Hist. 391-394 (minority

views of Sen. Goldwater). Finally, one Senator who voted for

the bill did so in part because the final bill, unlike the original

version, included a “program to assist employees who might

be dislocated” (id. at 216; Leg. Hist. 382) (additional views of

Sen. Danforth).

me te 5 et ee

33

from committee (see page 31 n.19, supra), proposed

deleting the assistance program altogether, leaving

only a duty to hire (124 Cong. Rec. 10674-10676

(1978); Leg. Hist. 443-446). Significantly, however,

while Senator Zorinsky’s proposal would have elimi-

nated the assistance plan, it would, quite deliberately,

have “liberal[ized]” the duty to hire, by expanding

the definitions of “protected employee” and “qualify-

ing dislocation” (id. at 10674-10675; Leg. Hist. 443-

444). Senator Cannon, the floor manager of the bill,

endorsed the duty-to-hire aspect of the amendment as

a “good” “concept * * * [which] wouid insure

that people have the opportunity to work, even though

it is with another carrier” (id. at 10677; Leg. Hist.

448). After vigorous debate, in which one chief sup-

porter of the Committee Bill opposed Senator Zorin-

sky’s modification (see id. at 10677-10678; Leg. Hist.

448-450) (remarks of Sen. Danforth), the Senate re-

jected Senator Zorinsky’s effort to scale down the

EPP (id. at 10683; Leg. Hist. 458). It bears repeat-

ing that nowhere in this debate about whether to

strengthen the duty to hire is there any mention of

a role for regulations or the legislative veto.

The Senate lopsidedly rejected an amendment pro-

posed by Senator Hatch that would have entirely

eliminated the EPP (124 Cong. Rec. 10679, 10682

(1978); Leg. Hist. 451, 457).% After a strong de-

fense of the EPP by two of its proponents (id. at

10682; Leg. Hist. 456-457) (remarks of Sens. Ken-

nedy and Cannon), the Hatch amendment was de-

22 Although the Hatch amendment would have eliminated

even the duty-to-hire provision, here, too, the only objection

to the EPP expressed by Senator Hatch was to the costliness

of the financial assistance provision (id. at 10679, 10682; Leg.

Hist. 451, 457).

34

feated 85-7. Following renewed expressions of sup-

port for the deregulation bill—including, in particu-

lar, support for the EPP (see id. at 10695; Leg. Hist.

479 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) )—the Senate over-

whelmingly passed 8.2493, providing for airline de-

regulation (id. at 10698; Leg. Hist. 485-486). In all

of the debate, no one—neither a supporter, nor an

opponent of the bill—said one word about the legisla-

tive veto.

c. The House Bill

The history of the Deregulation Act in the House

confirms the same conclusions: Congress was very

concerned about employee protection, and was not

concerned about a legislative veto. The employee pro-

tection sections of the House Bill differed substan-

tially from the Senate Bill, which eventually became

law. The House Bill provided that the “authority

granted [to airlines] by the [deregulation] bill may

not be exercised until the Secretary of Labor certifies

that employees affected by new authority are pro-

tected by arrangements no less favorable than those

in * * * [certain sections of] the Interstate Commerce

Act and * * * the Rail Passenger Service Act.” These

arrangements included benefits to be paid by employ-

ers, but “reimbursed from a separate account in the

U.S. Treasury” (H.R. Rep. 95-1211, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. 22 (1978) ; Leg. Hist. 530). The House Bill had

no legislative veto or other oversight provision.

The House Bill would have delegated substantia]

authority to the Secretary of Labor, who had to “cer-

tify” that employees were “protected” by arrange-

ments “no less favorable” than those under two other

transportation statutes before any of the authority

granted by the deregulation bill could be exercised.

te tt Don 4

35

Yet, as noted, it provided no legislative oversight of

the Secretary’s determinations. The willingness of

the House Committee on Public Works and Trans-

portation to pass favorably on a bill with these fea-

tures demonstrates both strong House support for

employee protection and, even more significantly, a

willingness to delegate substantial decision-making

authority to the Secretary without legislative over-

sight.”

d. The House Debates

Employee protection provoked no controversy at

all when the House debated the Deregulation Act.

Congressman Anderson, who managed the bill on the

floor, stated that one feature of the legislation “in-

sure[d] that the costs of the transition to a more

competitive system will not weigh too heavily * * * on

airline employees” (124 Cong. Rec. 29526 (1978);

Leg. Hist. 731) (statement of Rep. Anderson). Con-

gressman Anderson made clear the House’s concern

that “regulatory reform * * * not have an undue

impact on airline employees” (ibid.; Leg. Hist. 732)

(same). Otherwise, the provision emerged from the

House debates without comment; and, despite its

broad delegation of power to the Secretary, it was

adopted without any mention of legislative oversight.”

21 Congressman Levitas, the one Member of Congress who

eventually commented on the legislative veto, supported the

House Bill; and although he noted some disagreement with

what he thought was the “precipitous[ness]” of the House

Bill, he said nothing at this point about any need to insert a

legislative veto (H.R. Rep. 95-1211, at 73; Leg. Hist. 581)

(additional views of Rep. Levitas).

22 Again, Congressman Levitas, as he had when the bill

emerged from committee, spoke enthusiastically about the

bill. Again, he did not mention the veto power (124 Cong.

36

The bill passed the House by a vote of 363 to 8 (124

Cong. Rec. 30708 (1978); Leg. Hist. 824-825).

e. The Bill Reported By The Conference

The final version of the EPP, as it emerged from

conference, was “basically the same as the Senate

bill” (H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

105 (1978); Leg. Hist. 947) (listing the differences).

The Conference Report gives no indication that there

was any consideration in conference of eliminating

the EPP; and, except in the text and summary of the

bill itself, the report makes no mention of a legisla-

tive veto. Thereafter, when the two chambers con-

sidered the final bill, the legislators again stressed

their support for the EPP. See 124 Cong. Rec. 37416

(1978); Leg. Hist. 968 (statement of Sen. Cannon)

(characterizing the EPP as an “important protec-

tion[]” in the bill); id. at 37421; Leg. Hist. 975

(statement of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 38522; Leg.

Hist. 981 (statement of Rep. Snyder); id. at 38523;

Leg. Hist. 984 (statement of Rep. Johnson). Indeed,

two members of the House expressed their regrets

that the EPP had not been made even stronger. See

id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.

Harsha) ; id. at 38524-38525; Leg. Hist. 986 (state-

ment of Rep. Mineta). But Congressman Anderson,

who had managed the Conference Bill on the floor

(id. at 38521; Leg. Hist. 980), assured the other

Rec. 29529-29530, 30671 (1978); Leg. Hist. 737-738, 760)

(statement of Rep. Levitas). Indeed, the Congressman ex-

pressed his view that the House Bill—which did not contain a

veto clause—was ‘“‘far superior to the bill of the other body

in every respect” (id. at 30671; Leg. Hist. 760) (statement of

Rep. Levitas). The Senate Bill, of course, did contain a leg-

islative veto provision.

87

members of the House that the “conference provi-

sions represent substantial progress for the airline

employees” (id. at 38522; Leg. Hist. 981).

During this debate on the Conference Bili—indeed,

during Congress’ entire deliberation on the EPP—

only one comment, by Congressman Levitas, was made

about the legislative veto provision (id. at 38524;

Leg. Hist. 985-986).** Plainly, however, even in Con-

gressman Levitas’ own consideration of the legisla-

tion, the veto provision played an insubstantial role.

As noted above, he was a supporter of the House

Bill, which would have delegated substantial author-

ity to the Secretary and would have required that

authority to be exercised before deregulation could

even become operational, but he made no attempt to

add a legislative veto provision, or any other oversight

provision (see page 35 nn.21, 22, supra). The Con-

gressman’s remarks in the post-conference debate, as

their tone reflects, are best understood as support for

legislative vetoes in general—not as a belief that the

veto had some specia! significance in the EPP.™

28 Representative Levitas stated: “Finally, Mr. Speaker, I

cannot let this moment go by without making this observation.

While there have been several! bills sent to the President this

year and signed by him which contained a provision for a

congressional veto, I am happy to say that this piece of legis-

lation cor*ains a one-House veto over the regulations which

may be issued by the Secretary of Labor on the labor protec-

tion provisions, so that the Congress and not an unelected

bureaucrat will have the final word on the regulations that

will have the effect of law.”

*4 Representative Levitas has been an ardent partisan of

the legislative veto device and has supported its inclusion in a

wide variety of statutes to cover all agency regulations. See,

e.g., Legislative Veto Proposals: Hearings on S. 890 and

S. 684, Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administration of

38

if sum, the legislative history amply supports the

urt of appeals’ conelusion. Committees and leaders

f Congress repeatedly expressed strong support for

the E P P, insisting that displaced employees not bear

an unfair portion of the costs of deregulation. By

contrast, there is only one committee report reference

to the legislative veto (and it relates the veto to the

assistance program), and one Congressman on one

occasion mentioned the legislative veto (and his com-

ment was routine praise for a device he vigorously

supported). On that record, there is simply no basis

to conclude that Congress—had it known that the

veto would one day be invalidated—would have

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 97

(1981) ; Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking:

Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and Related Bills, Before

the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Re-

lations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st

Sess. 142 (1975). Indeed, Congressman Levitas’ unusual de-

votion to the legislative veto was recognized by his colleagues

in the House. In 1978, during the same period of time that the

Deregulation Act was being considered in Congress, one Con-

gressman paid tribute to Congressman Levitas’ “leadership

in the fight to establish a congressional veto over executive

agency rules and regulations” (124 Cong. Rec. 19 7 (1978)

(statement of Rep. Alexander)). Congressman Alexander

described his colleague as “[u!lndaunted by an administration

that opposes the concept of a legislative veto” and noted that

Congressman Levitas had “time and again brought our atten-

tion to the need for such a veto through introduction of

amendments to authorizing legislation for the various Fed-

eral agencies” (ibid.). Representative Levitas has continved

his support of the legislative veto device, strongly expressing

his view that this Court was mistaken in ruling as it did in

Chadha. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. H2520 (daily ed. Apr. 10,

1984); id. at H10516 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984): Levitas &

Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to Con-

gressional Arms, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 593, 613 (1984).

39

wished this Court to invalidate the balance of the

EPP as well.

Petitioners’ picture of “uncertainty” and “doubts”

in Congress that labor protection was even necessary

(Br. 34-37), their suggestion of congressional “con-

cern” that the Department of Labor might not be

“knowledgeable or even sympathetic to the objectives

of the Deregulation Act” (Br. 38), and their asser-

tion that “Congress left open many fundamental is-

sues for subsequent resolution through administra-

tive action subject to congressional review” (Br. 37)

are all belied or totally unsupported by the legislative

history. What petitioners describe as “uncertainty”

about the need for labor protection was, as the court

of appeals noted (Pet. App. 21la-22a), simply “the

sincerely held belief in various legislative quarters

that loss of employment in a deregulated industry was

unlikely,” not opposition to insurance in case it oc-

curred. No one in Congress, not even those most

optimistic about the future of deregulation, denied at

least the possibility of employee dislocation; and no

one spoke in opposition to establishing a duty-to-hire

provision as insurance. See, e.g., S. Rep. 95-631, at

206-211; Leg. Hist. 372-377 (additional views of Sen.

Zorinsky). Nor is there a whisper in the legislative

record that Congress doubted either the ability or

willingness of DOL to administer the program; cer-

tainly petitioners point to no evidence of this.” Fi-

nally, at least in the duty-to-hire provisions, Con-

25 Indeed, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion (Br. 38), the

Department of Labor had had significant regulatory responsi-

bilities for other employee protection programs. See, e.g.,

Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 565(b) ; Redwood Na-

tional Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92

Stat. 163 et seq.

40

gress did not leave open “many fundamental issues’’

(Pet. Br. 37) for regulatory resolution.

Petitioners’ suggestion that the legislative veto was

part of a compromise at conference is also without

foundation. Petitioners note that in conference the

Congress deleted a “qualifying dislocation” require-

ment applicable to the duty-to-hire provisions, with

the effect, they say, of “provid[ing] less guidance to

DOL regarding the duty-to-hire authority” (Br. 41).

At the same time, petitioners contend, Congress

strengthened the oversight requirements of the EPP

—by adding the six-month rule and the report-

and-wait provision—while simultaneously deleting a

veto provision elsewhere in the bill (Br. 41-42). “By

strengthening the Section 43 veto in conference, and

at the same time removing a veto provision from a

section that was at least as controversial as Section

43, Congress unmistakably demonstrated its serious

reservations about the regulatory authority delegated

to DOL” (Br. 44).

Petitioners’ claims were correctly rejected by the

court of appeals (Pet. App. 26a-28a). The removal

of the “qualifying dislocation” requirement did poten-

tially expand the class of protected employees (and

thus is further evidence of congressional enthusiasm

for the duty to hire), but it had no stated, or logical,

relationship either to the Secretary’s regulations or

to the power to veto them. If Congress believed that

by removing this requirement it was investing DOL

with some new and less fettered authority, or if it

perceived any tie between this step and the matter

of legislative oversight, it never said so. The decision

to remove the veto provision in a wholly unrelated

part of the Act says nothing at all about the failure

to delete a legislative veto in the EPP; again, Con-

II fic cana rein ee

41

gress gave no expression to the motivations petition-

ers ascribe to it. Finally, the addition in conference

of the six-month deadline and the report-and-wait

rule are, at best, equivocal evidence: the former sug-

gests a desire to proceed promptly with implementa-

tion, while the latter, as the Court recognized in

Chadha (see page 25 n.15, supra), reduced the im-

portance of the veto provision; in any event, no one in

Congress suggested that these steps were part of any

compromise. Indeed, apart from the lone reference

to the legislative veto by Congressman Levitas,” the

only discussion of the EPP after conference, in either

House, consisted of either wholesale approval (see,

e.g., id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.

(statement of Sen. Cannon) ; id. at 38522; Leg. Hist.

981 (statement of Rep. Snyder) ), or regrets that the

protections had not been made even stronger (see,

e.g., id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.

Harsha) ; id. at 38524-38525; Leg. Hist. 986 (state-

ment of Rep. Mineta). In fact, the only real evidence

26 Petitioners maintain that Congressman Levitas tried to

“persuade” a “skeptical House” to “‘acquiesce” in the Senate’s

approach to the EPP, by “emphasizing the importance of the

legislative veto” (Br. 43). As our previous discussion indi-

cates, Congressman Levitas was not trying to “persuade”

anyone, nor were his colleagues “skeptical” about the bill. The

Congressman was simply extolling the presence of a legisla-

tive veto in this bill—a theme, we have noted, he returned to

on numerous occasions in a variety of contexts. Moreover,

as the court of appeals correctly observed (Pet. App. 27a-28a),

those few members of the House who were, indeed, “skeptical”

felt that the employee protections did not go far enough. As

the court of appeals put it, “{i]t seems * * * unlikely that a

program offering less protection would have occasioned a call

for even greater legislative control over the bureaucracy”

(Pet. App. 28a).

42

of what Congress thought had been done to the EPP

in conference was expressed by the House floor man-

ager, Congressman Anderson; he assured his col-

leagues that the Conference Bill on employee protec-

tions had been made “considerably stronger than the

Senate bill” (id. at 38522; Leg. Hist. 981).

Thus, the debate’ on the EPP ended in conference

just as it had begun in the Senate: Congress main-

tained its support for a strong EPP, and paid virtu-

ally no attention—let alone “emphatic” attention (Br.

45 )—to the presence of a legislative veto.”

CONCLUSION

Congress spoke plainly when it enacted the EPP.

It sought deliberately to protect airline employees in

order that “the benefits to the public which result

from its decision to alter substantially the regulation

of air transportation * * * not [be] paid for by a

minority—the airline employees and their families

*7 Based on this legislative record, the case for severability

is far stronger here than it was in Chadha. In Chadha the

Court found in the history of related immigration legislation

that “Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over

cancellation of deportations” (462 U.S. at 932), and thus that,

at least to some extent, “Congress[] desire[d] to retain a

veto in this area” (id. at 934). Similarly, in Consumer

Energy Council, 673 F.2d 425, which this Court affirmed

without opinion, 463 U.S. 1216, the court of appeals, while

finding severable a legislative veto attached to a portion of

the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, conceded that there were

“contradictory comments about the importance of [the legis-

lative veto]” (673 F.2d at 442), including statements on the

floor that a key portion of the legislation “could be rejected by

legislative veto” (id. at 442-443). By contrast, there is no

evidence on this record that anyone in Congress was concerned

about the power to veto regulations connected with the duty

to hire.

—*

Ln te

43

who have relied on the present system” (S. Rep. 95-

631, at 114; Leg. Hist. 280). The duty-to-hire pro-

visions of Section 43—the only provisions ever to be-

come operational—impose a direct obligation on air

carriers, an obligation that was not made dependent

on regulations or subject to veto. The EPP was over-

whelmingly approved by both Houses of Congress;

and not once in either House—not in committee, not

on the floor, and not in conference—did anyone in

Congress suggest, even obliquely, that legislative

oversight of the EPP regulations was important. The

veto was simply of no visible concern to anyone.

Given the only two choices that were available to

the court of appeals once the legislative veto was in-

validated, that court made the right selection. Peti-

tioner’s alternative approach—requiring courts to

search the record for any evidence that Congress

might have passed a different statute if it had known

that there would be no veto provision—is truly a rule

of judicial nullification. But statutes, as Judge (later

Mr. Justice) Cardozo once said, “are not to be sacri-

ficed by courts on the assumption that legislation is

the play of whim and fancy * * * Our right to de-

stroy is bounded by the limits of necessity. Our duty

is to save unless in saving we pervert” (People ex

vel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y.

48, 62-63, 129 N.E. 202, 207-208 (1920). The court

of appeals saved the balance of Section 43 and left to

Congress the choice of how, if at all, to amend it, in

light of the veto’s demise. That was exactly what

the law requires.

44

For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of

the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

RICHARD K. WILLARD

Assistant Attorney General

LouIs R. COHEN

Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES M. SPEARS

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

LAWRENCE §S. ROBBINS

Assistant to the Solicitor General

DOUGLAS LETTER

Attorney

JULY 1986

W ©. 5S. GOVERNMENT Palatine Orrice, 1986 491507 20273

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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