Reply Brief — NC Dept. of Transp. v. Crest St. Council
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‘ Supreme reme Court U.S.
e FILED
| | | SEP 30 1986
No. 85-767 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
In The 7
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1986
ft
Vv
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL,
Petitioners,
vs.
CREST STREET COMMUNITY
COUNCIL, INC., ET AL
Respondents.
.f>.
Vw
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
ra’
Ww
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
t>..
Ww
Lacy H. THornsurc*
Attorney General for the
State of North Carolina
James B. Ricumonp, Special
Deputy Attorney General for
the State of North Carolina
Post Office Box 25201
Raleigh, North Carolina, 27611
Telephone: (919) 733-4185
*Counsel for Petitioners
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831
os out
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ww. casas il
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Pages
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99
S.Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed.2d 560 (1979) . a se
Citizens t Preserve Overton Park v. . Volpe 401
U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) 0... 2
ECOS, Ine. et al v. Brinegar, et al C-352-D-72
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 1973) ................... 65
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Comm.
N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d
866 (1983) LS ESE Se 4,10
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S.
54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.24 723 (1980) oo 1,14
Parker v. Matthew, 411 F.Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976) .... 2,3
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council
for Clean Air, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3088, —
L.Ed.2d — (1986) x 1
STATUTES
ES 2
EE 2
42 U.S.C. Section 1988 ee
42 U.S.C. Section 2000d et.seq. . (Title VI) Ditinisned im passim
a ee 4
LEGISLATIVE History
EE 5
122 Cong. Ree. 35116 (1964) 2 Se
H. Rep. 1558, 94th Cong.2dSess., 7 (1964) 2 2
REPLY ARGUMENT
I. Respondents first argue (Resp. Br. 15-27) that the
reference to “proceeding” in “action or proceeding” in
Section 1988 suggests congressional intent to allow an
award of attorney’s fees for administrative proceedings.
A. We do not disagree with the general proposition that
the term ‘‘proceeding’’ may include an administrative
proceeding. Plainly, that is the case. New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) How-
ever, the mere inclusion of the term “proceeding” in
Section 1988 does not prove conclusive congressional
intent to provide attorney’s fees for time spent in
all administrative proceedings anymore than the ez-
clusion of that term would conclusively establish con-
gressional intent to disallow such awards. See Penn-
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council for Clean
Air, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3095, — L.Ed.2d —
(1986). If that were so, Carey could have been decided
without resort to examination of its enforcement
scheme and legislative history. Respondents’ entit!e-
ment to attorney’s fees under Section 1988 does not
turn on the broad inquiry whether attorney’s fees are
ever available under Section 1988 for time spent in an
administrative proceedings. The correct and neces-
sary inquiry in this case is whether the nature of the
activities engaged in by respondents’ counse]—par-
ticipating in meetings and informal negotiations and
communicating with NCDOT et al, to resolve alleged
violations of Title VI'—is an activity which Congress
‘See FEIS pp. 18-21 for a brief description of these activities.
The respondents’ statement of Hours and Expenses characterizes
(Continued on following page)
1
2
considered to be appropriate for an award of attor-
ney’s fees. The language of Section 1988, particularly
the mere inclusion of the term “proceeding,” is in-
sufficient to establish congressional intent to man-
date such an award.
B. Respondents’ contention (Resp. Br. 18-23) that the
legislative history supports their reading of Section
1988 fails.
1. First, congressional rejection of the Senator
Helm’s amendment to delete “proceeding” from
Section 1988 sheds no light on the meaning of
the term, including its relevance to Title VI ad-
ministrative enforcement. In particular, there is
no suggestion that members of Congress intended,
by their action, to extend the scope of Section 1988
to include participation in Title VI voluntary con-
ciliation efforts such as those requested by the
federal agency in this case.
2. Second, the House Report’s reference to Parker
v. Matthew, 411 F.Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976),
relied upon by respondents (see Resp. Br. 18-
19), was limited to the Report’s assertion, not
at ‘ssue in this case, that “if the litigation ter-
minates by consent decree, it would be proper to
(Continued from previous page)
ee
the activities as ‘‘meetings,” “monitoring,” ‘conferences,’ not
trials or hearings. Appendix, infra, pages 10-52. The activities
are comparable to the public involvement Action Plan process
under 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) and although less formal, to the public
hearings under 23 U.S.C. § 128. See Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
3
award counsel fees” (H. Rep. 1558, 94th Cong.
2d Sess., 7 (1964) ; there is no need for ‘‘a full evi-
dentiary hearing before a judge or jury”’ (ibid.).
The Report is no manner refers with ‘‘approval’’
(Resp. Br. 19) to that distinct portion of the
opinion concerned with an award of fees for time
spent in administrative proceedings. Further-
more, the administrative proceedings at issue in
Parker were Title VII proceedings, not Title VI
informal conciliation efforts and all agree that
fee awards are appropriate under Title VII’s
distinct administrative enforcement scheme.
Third, respondents erroneously rely (Resp. Br.
19-20) on the fact that when Section 1988 was
enacted, some courts had held that private rights
of action under Title VI required prior exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. As the legis-
lative history of Section 1988 makes plain, in
enacting Section 1988 Congress deliberately chose
not to address the issue whether a private right
of action even existed at all under Title VI. See,
e.g., 122 Cong. Ree. 35116 (1964) (remarks of
Rep. Railsback). Having refused to address that
fundamental threshold issue, one can hardly at-
tribute to that same Congress a view concerning
the secondary question of the need for exhaustion
of Title VI administrative remedies.
Indeed, as pointed out by the brief of the
United States as amicus curiae (Br. 18-19), con-
gressional debate concerning the significance of
Section 1988 to Title VI reveals that Congress
assumed that Section 1988 would apply to Title
4
VI only in the event that the courts ultimately
concluded that an implied private right of action
to sxe in court existed under Title VI’. This leg-
islative assumption is flatly inconsistent with
respondents’ position, which if adopted would
require congressional intent to apply Section 1988
to Title VI administrative proceedings, regard-
less of the outcome in the courts of the implied
private right of action controversy.
Respondents make an attempt to dispute
(Resp. Br. 20-22) the plain import of the legis-
lative history by arguing that Congress could
not have made the assumption suggested by the
United States because regardless of the availa-
bility of implied private right of actions, com-
plainants would have been entitled to fees through
judicial review of agency action under Section
603 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-2. Res»nondents’
premise is fundamentally flawed, however, be-
cause the availability of private complainant chal-
lenges under Section 603 to federal agency action
is far from clear. The literal language of the
provision contemplates challenges brought only
by those persons aggrieved by decisions “termi-
nating or refusing to grant or to continue finan-
cial assistance’’ (42 U.S.C. 2C00d-2) and not ae-
tions brought by persons aggrieved by agency de-
cisions not to make such funding cut-off determi-
5)
nations. Indeed, as this Court has noted, it
was in order to provide victims of discrimination
with a remedy that certain legislators supported
the creation of a private right of action. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
716 n.52 (1979), quoting 110 Cong. Ree. 5256 (re-
marks of Sen. Keating) (“Under section 603, a
state * * * which is denied funds because dis-
crimination is taking place, is given the right
of action in court. But there is no correlative
right of action in the citizen. If funds are
granted to discriminatory projects by public of-
ficials, the citizen who is denied the benefits of
the project has no correlative right to bring a
suit in court, and he should have.”). And, as
this Court further stressed in Cannon, congres-
sional rejection of an express private right of
action in Title VI was designed not to deny the
possibility of an implied private right of action
against the federal recipient but as a legislative
“compromise aimed at protecting individual rights
without subjecting the [Federal] Government to
suits’’ (442 U.S. at 715 (footnote omitted) ).°
II. Respondents’ argument (Resp. Br. 27-32) that the ac-
tivities they engaged in constituted “proceedings” within
3Respondents’ sole support for the contrary view is an iso-
lated statement in an appendix to a House Report that was
signed only by two legislators who, in making it, were offering
arguments why the legislation should not be enacted (See Resp.
Br. 40 n.40)—such a slender and unreliable indicator of con-
2It’s assumption turned out to be correct. Cannon Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Guardians Association
v. Civil Serv. Commission, N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
gressional intent is entitled to no weight particularly when, as
here, the plain meaning of the statute and remarks by the bill’s
supporters refute its content.
6
~l
the meaning of Section 1988 reveals the boundlessness of “proceeding” would, therefore, be deprived of any
their claim for fees in this case. meaningful legal significance. One should not ascribe
Ley to Congress such an expansive and boundless view of
A. To be sure, an individual claimant who ultimately
settles his Title VI claim may still be entitled to an
attorney’s fee award, but only if the settlement
was pursuant to the claimants’ status as a formal
party to an action or proceeding to enforce Title VI
in which the claimant has prevailed. Hence, there
can be no doubt that if respondents had maintained
a lawsuit in court under their implied private right
of action to enforce Title VI against petitioners and
favorably settled their discrimination claims prior
to a full evidentiary hearing, Section 1988 might en-
title them to an award of attorney’s fees for their
efforts. On the other hand, if, as what actually oe-
curred, they had favorably settled their implied right
of action under Title VI without resort to maintain-
ing an action or proceedings against petitioners, they
would not.
Respondents, however, ignore the essential threshold
requirement that they must be a “party” to a “pro-
ceeding” to enforce Title VI and, as a consequence,
offer a view of Title VI under which, i: effect, any
investigations or discussions conducted by a person
who claims to be a victim of discrimination by a re-
cipient of federal funas would constitute a “proceed-
ing” to enforce Title VI within the meaning of Sec-
tion 1988. Responcents would, in effect, equate the
the propriety of attorney’s fee awards under Section
1988, at least as applied to Title VI.
Instead, as suggested by the United States in its
amicus submission (U.S. Br. 14-18, 21-22, se also id.
at 24-26) the better view of Title VI udministrative
enforcement is that it is exclusively the province of
the federal agency as enforcer. The private citizen
may, as in this case, become involved by bringing a
potential violation to the attention of a federal agency
and by participating in informal settlement discus-
sions instigated by the federal agency pursuant to
Title VI’s explicit demand for voluntary conciliation
efforts, but those negotiations do not amount to “pro-
ceedings” to which the complainant may be cenomi-
nated a prevailing party and cons ‘quently recover
attorney fees from the recipient.‘
Indeed, as respondents have ther Ives stressed in
their brief (Resp. Br. 1, 34), the mal role of the
federal agency, even in those negotia ions it requests
may seem fairly minimal. The abseun of substan-
tial formal federal agency involvement do.. >t how.
ever, suggest that the ensuing negotiations consucute
private enforcement proceedings or that the federal
agency or the federal recipient have accorded the
‘Query: if the recipient had “prevailed,” what would the
term “proceeding” with any effort taken by a victim
of discrimination, as long as there was assistance of respondents say as to their liability for the attorney fees of the
4 Mat ee ee recipient under Section 1988?, not “parties?” not “an action or
counsel, to assert the victim’s civil rights. The term proceeding?”
8
complainant party status. To the contrary, it under-
scores that the negotiations are not a federal proceed-
ing to which there are any formal parties at all, any-
more than if respondents had initiated the negotia-
tions themselves. Instead the negotiations simply
represent one product of the federal agency’s effort
to harmonize the purposes of the legislative enact-
ment funding the recipient’s activities with the non-
discrimination mandate of Title VI.
III. Respondents claim (Resp. Br. 35) that this Court
should not consider whether respondents were parties to
the administrative proceeding because the issue was
neither raised nor ruled on by the parties below. This
claim is 1efuted by the record and, in addition, misappre-
hends the import of this Court’s practice of not enter-
taining, as a prudential matter, issues raised in the Court
in the first instance.°
A. First, the district court decision leaves no doubt that
the significance of respondents’ lack of status as par-
ties to the administrative proceeding was raised and
ruled on by the courts below. See Pet. App. 37. The
trial court specifically based its decision that respond-
ents were not entitled to fees, in part, on their limited
role in the administrative enforcement setting.
B. Second, the argument that respondents are not a
party, within the meaning of Section 1988, is not, in
‘Petitioners do not dispute that respondents were “parties”
to the Final Mitigation Plan agreement or that they were par-
ticipants in the informal resolution process which resulted in
the agreement. Petitioners dispute that respondents were par-
ties in an action or proceeding to enforce Title VI within the
meaning of Section 1988 which resulted in the agreement.
9
any event, the type of ‘‘new’’ issue that this Court
has typically chosen not to entertain. The ‘‘party’’
issue is merely the other side of the same coin as the
issue whether respondents participated in a ‘‘pro-
ceeding’’ to enforce Title VI, within the meaning of
that provision. Hence, the alternative characteriza-
tion of the issue serves only to highlight existing is-
sues and not to inject wholly new legal questions into
the dispute.
IV. Respondents’ reliance (Resp. Br. 35-40) on certain
similarities between Title VI and Title VII administrative
enforcement to support their view that attorney’s fees
awards for participation in administrative enforcement
is mistaken. Although the two administrative enforce-
ment schemes share certain features, they nonetheless
remain fundamentally different in both nature and design.
Their differences, moreover, support the application of
varying legal standards for the awarding of attorney’s
fees.
A. The federal administrative enforcement scheme under
Title VII may have as a competing purpose the
promotion of the public interest generally, but the
administrative framework is, by congressional de-
sign, a fundamental, indeed mandatory, aspect of
private enforcement as well. Not only is the fed-
eral agency specifically empowered to safeguard
the interests of the individual, but the individual must
himself exhaust the administrative remedy and seek
administrative relief for his discrimination claim,
prior to bringing lawsuit. The individual complain-
ant is, therefore, a party to the administrative enforce-
ment proceeding under federal law from the moment
10
that the administrative complaint is filed. Hence,
all the activities subsequently undertaken by the com-
plainant subsequent to the filing, including any re-
quired deferral to state administrative proceedings
(regardless of how the specific state law may de-
nominate the complainants’ role (see Resp. Br. 38-39) )
or informal conciliation efforts, are activities the
complainant takes in his capacity as a party under
federal law to the federally-mandated proceedings.
Under Title VI, in contrast, filing an administrative
complaint does not render the individual complainant
a party to the administrative proceeding because,
notwithstanding some common features, the nature
and purpose of that proceeding is fundamentally dif-
ferent vis a vis the rights of the individual.
1. While the administrative process is a fundamental
aspect of the federal agency’s enforcement scheme,
it is deliberately not, as it is in Title VII, simul-
taneously an integral part of the private ‘enforce-
ment scheme; for this reason, it is not even a
prerequisite to filing suit for an implied private
Title VI claim like it is for Title VII.
2. The reason for this distinction between Titles VI
and VII stem from the special ‘‘consensual’’ na-
ture of Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate
which, unlike that of Title VII, is rooted in the
congressional spending power and depends for
its accomplishment on the acceptance of federal
funds by certain public and private entities.
Guardians Association v. Civil Serv. Commis-
sion of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
11
Because of its consensual, indeed contractural
nature, the federal agency enforcing Title VI is,
in certain respects, acting in privity with the re-
cipient of federal funds and, consequently, must
be concerned both with Title VI’s nondiserimina-
tion mandate and with those legislative purposes
dependent upon the activities of the federal recipi-
ent. Title VI administrative enforcement, unlike
Title VII enforcement, often depends for its sue-
cessful accomplishment, therefore, on a federal
agency striking that delicate balance needed to
further both the purposes of the federal legisla-
tion funding the federal recipient’s activities and
Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate.
The main thrust of agency enforcement of Title
VI provided by Congress is obtaining from the
recipient compliance with the Title VI standards
prescribed by the agency, and as to which it has
expertise in relationship to the assistance pro-
gram it is charged to administer. Providing in-
dividual complainants with party status for their
participation in federal efforts to promote in-
formal conciliation and voluntary settlement is
fundamentally incompatible with the nature of
that federal enforcement function and would,
contrary to congressional design, have the effect
of converting the federal agency enforcement
scheme into (as al! agree it is for Title VII) a
basic component of private enforcement.
a. Entitlement to attorney’s fees for the com-
plainant would inevitably establish a differ-
ent relationship between the complainant and
12
federal re >ient, by, for instance, enhancing
the advers ial nature of their dealings,
Application ot Section 1988 would also tend
to displace the federal agency as the pre-
13
congressional goal to assist victims of discrimination,
and that any problems in disruption of agency en-
forcement can be adjusted in determining the appro-
priate amount of fees.
é ; 1. Most fundamentally, respondents’ argument sim-
eminent enforcement authority, replacing an
ply proves too much. All agree, as they must,
exclusive sphere of federal agency enforce- . : ,
ment with an additional mechanism for pri- oo rename 6 —— on _
awards to prevailing victims of discrimination.
vate cureresmnent, The only issue in this case is whether Congress
Indeed, respondents suggest just such a dis- intended to place some limitations on either the
placement of the federal agency enforcement capacity or the forum in which the victim must
function in claiming (see Resp. Br. 41) that it he asserting its rights. Under respondents’ view,
is the individual complainants, not the fed- the prevailing victim must be entitled to fees in
eral agency, who can best enforce Title VI. all circumstances because a contrary view would
What respondents ignore is that this Court fail to promote completely the bringing of civil
found an implied private right of action to rights claims. Whatever the wisdom of that
enforce Title VI in court not just in recogni- approach as a matter of policy, we do not believe
tion of the special abilities and needs of that the statutory language of Section 1988 es-
private enforcers, but also in response to the tablished that Congress adopted such a open-
substantial need to maintain the independent ended approach. Instead, in our view, the mere
administrative enforcement function of ad- possibility that providing complainants with ad-
ministrative agencies. The practical effect ditional fees might provide additional incentive
of respondents’ expansive reading of private for private enforcement does not provide a suf-
administrative enforcement of Title VI would ficient basis for ignoring the congressional de-
be, however, to convert the federal agency termination to maintain an independent federal
enforcement mechanism into the very ave- agency administrative enforcement scheme. Cer-
nue for private enforcement that this Court tainly nothing in Section 1988 suggests such a
assumed Title VI to lack. drastic reworking of Title VI.
C. Respondents are mistaken in their assertion (Resp. 2. In addition, it is the characterization of the com-
plainant’s formal role in the Title VI administra-
tive enforcement setting, not the precise amount
of fees awarded in a given case, that is at odds
with the congressional design for Title VI ad-
ministrative enforcement.
Br. 40-45) that petitioners’ view will deny respondents
the right to secure attorneys, in contravention of the
14
V. Attorney’s fees are not recoverable in an independent
court action. In Carey, the plaintiff, while her mandatory
state proceedings to enforce Title VII were ongoing, filed
an action in federal court to enforce her Title VII rights
and to recover attorney fees under the attorney fees pro-
visions of Title VII. She obtained complete Title VII
relief in the state proceedings on the merits, rendering
her claim on the merits in federal court moot, but she did
not recover attorney fees in the state proceedings. There-
fore, in order to obtain the complete relief for a Title VII
violation envisioned by Congress in the enforcement
scheme provided, she was entitled to recover attorney fees,
either in federal court or in the mandated state proceed-
ings. Clearly if the state procedure did not provide com-
plete Title VII relief, she was entitled to obtain the deficit
in federal court. Such is not the enforcement scheme for
Title VI. Participation by private parties in assisting in-
formal activities to help a federal assistance agency obtain
from a recipient voluntary compliaxee with Title VI re-
quirements (the opportunity for which is required by the
Title VI enforcement proceedings) is not an integral part
of the private enforcement remedy for Title VI envisioned
by Congress, so that when the private citizen fails to re-
cover attorney fees for such participation he has not failed
to obtain the complete relief envisioned by Congress in
the enforcement scheme for Title VI. The language of
Section 1988 itself, when read in the light of the Title VI
enforcement provisions, and th: legislative history of both
acts negates establishment of any such separate private
right of action.
VI. Respondents wrongly suggest that petitioners vio-
lated an agreement and committed a breach of trust when
it filed a motion in the ECOS case to dissolve the exist-
15
ing injunction. (Resp. Br. Footnote 8 and Resp. Br. Ap-
pendix). There was an agreement that the ECOS injune-
tion would not be dissolved until final agreement on the
mitigation plan was reached. The motion was filed merely
for lead time to provide for service upon the scattered
plaintiffs and to put the case in a position to be calen-
dared and heard, if respondents were unable to persuade
the ECOS plaintiffs not to oppose the motion. Respon-
dents did not object at the time the motion was filed or
ask that it be withdrawn. Regardless, the suggestion is
irrelevant because the district court found that the re-
spondents’ representation as applicants for intervention
in the ECOS action had no causal connection or acted even
as a catalyst to the Finai Mitigation Plan agreement.
Ly
Vv
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in their
original brief, petitioners respectfully request that this
Coui' reverse the decision of the Fourth Cireuit Court
of Appeals in this case and affirm the decision of the
District Court.
Respectfully submitted, this the 29 day of September,
1986.
Lacy H. THornpure
Attorney General for the
State of North Carolina
James B. RichMonpD
Special Deputy Attorney General
N. C. Department of Justice
P. O. Box 25201
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611
Telephone: (919) 738-4185
Attorneys for the Petitioners
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