Reply Brief — NC Dept. of Transp. v. Crest St. Council

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a

‘ Supreme reme Court U.S.

e FILED

| | | SEP 30 1986

No. 85-767 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

In The 7

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1986

ft

Vv

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION, ET AL,

Petitioners,

vs.

CREST STREET COMMUNITY

COUNCIL, INC., ET AL

Respondents.

.f>.

Vw

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ra’

Ww

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

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Ww

Lacy H. THornsurc*

Attorney General for the

State of North Carolina

James B. Ricumonp, Special

Deputy Attorney General for

the State of North Carolina

Post Office Box 25201

Raleigh, North Carolina, 27611

Telephone: (919) 733-4185

*Counsel for Petitioners

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

or call collect (402) 342-2831

os out

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pages

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99

S.Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed.2d 560 (1979) . a se

Citizens t Preserve Overton Park v. . Volpe 401

U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) 0... 2

ECOS, Ine. et al v. Brinegar, et al C-352-D-72

(M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 1973) ................... 65

Guardians Association v. Civil Service Comm.

N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d

866 (1983) LS ESE Se 4,10

New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S.

54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.24 723 (1980) oo 1,14

Parker v. Matthew, 411 F.Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976) .... 2,3

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council

for Clean Air, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3088, —

L.Ed.2d — (1986) x 1

STATUTES

ES 2

EE 2

42 U.S.C. Section 1988 ee

42 U.S.C. Section 2000d et.seq. . (Title VI) Ditinisned im passim

a ee 4

LEGISLATIVE History

EE 5

122 Cong. Ree. 35116 (1964) 2 Se

H. Rep. 1558, 94th Cong.2dSess., 7 (1964) 2 2

REPLY ARGUMENT

I. Respondents first argue (Resp. Br. 15-27) that the

reference to “proceeding” in “action or proceeding” in

Section 1988 suggests congressional intent to allow an

award of attorney’s fees for administrative proceedings.

A. We do not disagree with the general proposition that

the term ‘‘proceeding’’ may include an administrative

proceeding. Plainly, that is the case. New York

Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) How-

ever, the mere inclusion of the term “proceeding” in

Section 1988 does not prove conclusive congressional

intent to provide attorney’s fees for time spent in

all administrative proceedings anymore than the ez-

clusion of that term would conclusively establish con-

gressional intent to disallow such awards. See Penn-

sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council for Clean

Air, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3095, — L.Ed.2d —

(1986). If that were so, Carey could have been decided

without resort to examination of its enforcement

scheme and legislative history. Respondents’ entit!e-

ment to attorney’s fees under Section 1988 does not

turn on the broad inquiry whether attorney’s fees are

ever available under Section 1988 for time spent in an

administrative proceedings. The correct and neces-

sary inquiry in this case is whether the nature of the

activities engaged in by respondents’ counse]—par-

ticipating in meetings and informal negotiations and

communicating with NCDOT et al, to resolve alleged

violations of Title VI'—is an activity which Congress

‘See FEIS pp. 18-21 for a brief description of these activities.

The respondents’ statement of Hours and Expenses characterizes

(Continued on following page)

1

2

considered to be appropriate for an award of attor-

ney’s fees. The language of Section 1988, particularly

the mere inclusion of the term “proceeding,” is in-

sufficient to establish congressional intent to man-

date such an award.

B. Respondents’ contention (Resp. Br. 18-23) that the

legislative history supports their reading of Section

1988 fails.

1. First, congressional rejection of the Senator

Helm’s amendment to delete “proceeding” from

Section 1988 sheds no light on the meaning of

the term, including its relevance to Title VI ad-

ministrative enforcement. In particular, there is

no suggestion that members of Congress intended,

by their action, to extend the scope of Section 1988

to include participation in Title VI voluntary con-

ciliation efforts such as those requested by the

federal agency in this case.

2. Second, the House Report’s reference to Parker

v. Matthew, 411 F.Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976),

relied upon by respondents (see Resp. Br. 18-

19), was limited to the Report’s assertion, not

at ‘ssue in this case, that “if the litigation ter-

minates by consent decree, it would be proper to

(Continued from previous page)

ee

the activities as ‘‘meetings,” “monitoring,” ‘conferences,’ not

trials or hearings. Appendix, infra, pages 10-52. The activities

are comparable to the public involvement Action Plan process

under 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) and although less formal, to the public

hearings under 23 U.S.C. § 128. See Citizens to Preserve Over-

ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).

3

award counsel fees” (H. Rep. 1558, 94th Cong.

2d Sess., 7 (1964) ; there is no need for ‘‘a full evi-

dentiary hearing before a judge or jury”’ (ibid.).

The Report is no manner refers with ‘‘approval’’

(Resp. Br. 19) to that distinct portion of the

opinion concerned with an award of fees for time

spent in administrative proceedings. Further-

more, the administrative proceedings at issue in

Parker were Title VII proceedings, not Title VI

informal conciliation efforts and all agree that

fee awards are appropriate under Title VII’s

distinct administrative enforcement scheme.

Third, respondents erroneously rely (Resp. Br.

19-20) on the fact that when Section 1988 was

enacted, some courts had held that private rights

of action under Title VI required prior exhaus-

tion of administrative remedies. As the legis-

lative history of Section 1988 makes plain, in

enacting Section 1988 Congress deliberately chose

not to address the issue whether a private right

of action even existed at all under Title VI. See,

e.g., 122 Cong. Ree. 35116 (1964) (remarks of

Rep. Railsback). Having refused to address that

fundamental threshold issue, one can hardly at-

tribute to that same Congress a view concerning

the secondary question of the need for exhaustion

of Title VI administrative remedies.

Indeed, as pointed out by the brief of the

United States as amicus curiae (Br. 18-19), con-

gressional debate concerning the significance of

Section 1988 to Title VI reveals that Congress

assumed that Section 1988 would apply to Title

4

VI only in the event that the courts ultimately

concluded that an implied private right of action

to sxe in court existed under Title VI’. This leg-

islative assumption is flatly inconsistent with

respondents’ position, which if adopted would

require congressional intent to apply Section 1988

to Title VI administrative proceedings, regard-

less of the outcome in the courts of the implied

private right of action controversy.

Respondents make an attempt to dispute

(Resp. Br. 20-22) the plain import of the legis-

lative history by arguing that Congress could

not have made the assumption suggested by the

United States because regardless of the availa-

bility of implied private right of actions, com-

plainants would have been entitled to fees through

judicial review of agency action under Section

603 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-2. Res»nondents’

premise is fundamentally flawed, however, be-

cause the availability of private complainant chal-

lenges under Section 603 to federal agency action

is far from clear. The literal language of the

provision contemplates challenges brought only

by those persons aggrieved by decisions “termi-

nating or refusing to grant or to continue finan-

cial assistance’’ (42 U.S.C. 2C00d-2) and not ae-

tions brought by persons aggrieved by agency de-

cisions not to make such funding cut-off determi-

5)

nations. Indeed, as this Court has noted, it

was in order to provide victims of discrimination

with a remedy that certain legislators supported

the creation of a private right of action. See

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,

716 n.52 (1979), quoting 110 Cong. Ree. 5256 (re-

marks of Sen. Keating) (“Under section 603, a

state * * * which is denied funds because dis-

crimination is taking place, is given the right

of action in court. But there is no correlative

right of action in the citizen. If funds are

granted to discriminatory projects by public of-

ficials, the citizen who is denied the benefits of

the project has no correlative right to bring a

suit in court, and he should have.”). And, as

this Court further stressed in Cannon, congres-

sional rejection of an express private right of

action in Title VI was designed not to deny the

possibility of an implied private right of action

against the federal recipient but as a legislative

“compromise aimed at protecting individual rights

without subjecting the [Federal] Government to

suits’’ (442 U.S. at 715 (footnote omitted) ).°

II. Respondents’ argument (Resp. Br. 27-32) that the ac-

tivities they engaged in constituted “proceedings” within

3Respondents’ sole support for the contrary view is an iso-

lated statement in an appendix to a House Report that was

signed only by two legislators who, in making it, were offering

arguments why the legislation should not be enacted (See Resp.

Br. 40 n.40)—such a slender and unreliable indicator of con-

2It’s assumption turned out to be correct. Cannon Uni-

versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Guardians Association

v. Civil Serv. Commission, N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 (1983).

gressional intent is entitled to no weight particularly when, as

here, the plain meaning of the statute and remarks by the bill’s

supporters refute its content.

6

~l

the meaning of Section 1988 reveals the boundlessness of “proceeding” would, therefore, be deprived of any

their claim for fees in this case. meaningful legal significance. One should not ascribe

Ley to Congress such an expansive and boundless view of

A. To be sure, an individual claimant who ultimately

settles his Title VI claim may still be entitled to an

attorney’s fee award, but only if the settlement

was pursuant to the claimants’ status as a formal

party to an action or proceeding to enforce Title VI

in which the claimant has prevailed. Hence, there

can be no doubt that if respondents had maintained

a lawsuit in court under their implied private right

of action to enforce Title VI against petitioners and

favorably settled their discrimination claims prior

to a full evidentiary hearing, Section 1988 might en-

title them to an award of attorney’s fees for their

efforts. On the other hand, if, as what actually oe-

curred, they had favorably settled their implied right

of action under Title VI without resort to maintain-

ing an action or proceedings against petitioners, they

would not.

Respondents, however, ignore the essential threshold

requirement that they must be a “party” to a “pro-

ceeding” to enforce Title VI and, as a consequence,

offer a view of Title VI under which, i: effect, any

investigations or discussions conducted by a person

who claims to be a victim of discrimination by a re-

cipient of federal funas would constitute a “proceed-

ing” to enforce Title VI within the meaning of Sec-

tion 1988. Responcents would, in effect, equate the

the propriety of attorney’s fee awards under Section

1988, at least as applied to Title VI.

Instead, as suggested by the United States in its

amicus submission (U.S. Br. 14-18, 21-22, se also id.

at 24-26) the better view of Title VI udministrative

enforcement is that it is exclusively the province of

the federal agency as enforcer. The private citizen

may, as in this case, become involved by bringing a

potential violation to the attention of a federal agency

and by participating in informal settlement discus-

sions instigated by the federal agency pursuant to

Title VI’s explicit demand for voluntary conciliation

efforts, but those negotiations do not amount to “pro-

ceedings” to which the complainant may be cenomi-

nated a prevailing party and cons ‘quently recover

attorney fees from the recipient.‘

Indeed, as respondents have ther Ives stressed in

their brief (Resp. Br. 1, 34), the mal role of the

federal agency, even in those negotia ions it requests

may seem fairly minimal. The abseun of substan-

tial formal federal agency involvement do.. >t how.

ever, suggest that the ensuing negotiations consucute

private enforcement proceedings or that the federal

agency or the federal recipient have accorded the

‘Query: if the recipient had “prevailed,” what would the

term “proceeding” with any effort taken by a victim

of discrimination, as long as there was assistance of respondents say as to their liability for the attorney fees of the

4 Mat ee ee recipient under Section 1988?, not “parties?” not “an action or

counsel, to assert the victim’s civil rights. The term proceeding?”

8

complainant party status. To the contrary, it under-

scores that the negotiations are not a federal proceed-

ing to which there are any formal parties at all, any-

more than if respondents had initiated the negotia-

tions themselves. Instead the negotiations simply

represent one product of the federal agency’s effort

to harmonize the purposes of the legislative enact-

ment funding the recipient’s activities with the non-

discrimination mandate of Title VI.

III. Respondents claim (Resp. Br. 35) that this Court

should not consider whether respondents were parties to

the administrative proceeding because the issue was

neither raised nor ruled on by the parties below. This

claim is 1efuted by the record and, in addition, misappre-

hends the import of this Court’s practice of not enter-

taining, as a prudential matter, issues raised in the Court

in the first instance.°

A. First, the district court decision leaves no doubt that

the significance of respondents’ lack of status as par-

ties to the administrative proceeding was raised and

ruled on by the courts below. See Pet. App. 37. The

trial court specifically based its decision that respond-

ents were not entitled to fees, in part, on their limited

role in the administrative enforcement setting.

B. Second, the argument that respondents are not a

party, within the meaning of Section 1988, is not, in

‘Petitioners do not dispute that respondents were “parties”

to the Final Mitigation Plan agreement or that they were par-

ticipants in the informal resolution process which resulted in

the agreement. Petitioners dispute that respondents were par-

ties in an action or proceeding to enforce Title VI within the

meaning of Section 1988 which resulted in the agreement.

9

any event, the type of ‘‘new’’ issue that this Court

has typically chosen not to entertain. The ‘‘party’’

issue is merely the other side of the same coin as the

issue whether respondents participated in a ‘‘pro-

ceeding’’ to enforce Title VI, within the meaning of

that provision. Hence, the alternative characteriza-

tion of the issue serves only to highlight existing is-

sues and not to inject wholly new legal questions into

the dispute.

IV. Respondents’ reliance (Resp. Br. 35-40) on certain

similarities between Title VI and Title VII administrative

enforcement to support their view that attorney’s fees

awards for participation in administrative enforcement

is mistaken. Although the two administrative enforce-

ment schemes share certain features, they nonetheless

remain fundamentally different in both nature and design.

Their differences, moreover, support the application of

varying legal standards for the awarding of attorney’s

fees.

A. The federal administrative enforcement scheme under

Title VII may have as a competing purpose the

promotion of the public interest generally, but the

administrative framework is, by congressional de-

sign, a fundamental, indeed mandatory, aspect of

private enforcement as well. Not only is the fed-

eral agency specifically empowered to safeguard

the interests of the individual, but the individual must

himself exhaust the administrative remedy and seek

administrative relief for his discrimination claim,

prior to bringing lawsuit. The individual complain-

ant is, therefore, a party to the administrative enforce-

ment proceeding under federal law from the moment

10

that the administrative complaint is filed. Hence,

all the activities subsequently undertaken by the com-

plainant subsequent to the filing, including any re-

quired deferral to state administrative proceedings

(regardless of how the specific state law may de-

nominate the complainants’ role (see Resp. Br. 38-39) )

or informal conciliation efforts, are activities the

complainant takes in his capacity as a party under

federal law to the federally-mandated proceedings.

Under Title VI, in contrast, filing an administrative

complaint does not render the individual complainant

a party to the administrative proceeding because,

notwithstanding some common features, the nature

and purpose of that proceeding is fundamentally dif-

ferent vis a vis the rights of the individual.

1. While the administrative process is a fundamental

aspect of the federal agency’s enforcement scheme,

it is deliberately not, as it is in Title VII, simul-

taneously an integral part of the private ‘enforce-

ment scheme; for this reason, it is not even a

prerequisite to filing suit for an implied private

Title VI claim like it is for Title VII.

2. The reason for this distinction between Titles VI

and VII stem from the special ‘‘consensual’’ na-

ture of Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate

which, unlike that of Title VII, is rooted in the

congressional spending power and depends for

its accomplishment on the acceptance of federal

funds by certain public and private entities.

Guardians Association v. Civil Serv. Commis-

sion of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 (1983).

11

Because of its consensual, indeed contractural

nature, the federal agency enforcing Title VI is,

in certain respects, acting in privity with the re-

cipient of federal funds and, consequently, must

be concerned both with Title VI’s nondiserimina-

tion mandate and with those legislative purposes

dependent upon the activities of the federal recipi-

ent. Title VI administrative enforcement, unlike

Title VII enforcement, often depends for its sue-

cessful accomplishment, therefore, on a federal

agency striking that delicate balance needed to

further both the purposes of the federal legisla-

tion funding the federal recipient’s activities and

Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate.

The main thrust of agency enforcement of Title

VI provided by Congress is obtaining from the

recipient compliance with the Title VI standards

prescribed by the agency, and as to which it has

expertise in relationship to the assistance pro-

gram it is charged to administer. Providing in-

dividual complainants with party status for their

participation in federal efforts to promote in-

formal conciliation and voluntary settlement is

fundamentally incompatible with the nature of

that federal enforcement function and would,

contrary to congressional design, have the effect

of converting the federal agency enforcement

scheme into (as al! agree it is for Title VII) a

basic component of private enforcement.

a. Entitlement to attorney’s fees for the com-

plainant would inevitably establish a differ-

ent relationship between the complainant and

12

federal re >ient, by, for instance, enhancing

the advers ial nature of their dealings,

Application ot Section 1988 would also tend

to displace the federal agency as the pre-

13

congressional goal to assist victims of discrimination,

and that any problems in disruption of agency en-

forcement can be adjusted in determining the appro-

priate amount of fees.

é ; 1. Most fundamentally, respondents’ argument sim-

eminent enforcement authority, replacing an

ply proves too much. All agree, as they must,

exclusive sphere of federal agency enforce- . : ,

ment with an additional mechanism for pri- oo rename 6 —— on _

awards to prevailing victims of discrimination.

vate cureresmnent, The only issue in this case is whether Congress

Indeed, respondents suggest just such a dis- intended to place some limitations on either the

placement of the federal agency enforcement capacity or the forum in which the victim must

function in claiming (see Resp. Br. 41) that it he asserting its rights. Under respondents’ view,

is the individual complainants, not the fed- the prevailing victim must be entitled to fees in

eral agency, who can best enforce Title VI. all circumstances because a contrary view would

What respondents ignore is that this Court fail to promote completely the bringing of civil

found an implied private right of action to rights claims. Whatever the wisdom of that

enforce Title VI in court not just in recogni- approach as a matter of policy, we do not believe

tion of the special abilities and needs of that the statutory language of Section 1988 es-

private enforcers, but also in response to the tablished that Congress adopted such a open-

substantial need to maintain the independent ended approach. Instead, in our view, the mere

administrative enforcement function of ad- possibility that providing complainants with ad-

ministrative agencies. The practical effect ditional fees might provide additional incentive

of respondents’ expansive reading of private for private enforcement does not provide a suf-

administrative enforcement of Title VI would ficient basis for ignoring the congressional de-

be, however, to convert the federal agency termination to maintain an independent federal

enforcement mechanism into the very ave- agency administrative enforcement scheme. Cer-

nue for private enforcement that this Court tainly nothing in Section 1988 suggests such a

assumed Title VI to lack. drastic reworking of Title VI.

C. Respondents are mistaken in their assertion (Resp. 2. In addition, it is the characterization of the com-

plainant’s formal role in the Title VI administra-

tive enforcement setting, not the precise amount

of fees awarded in a given case, that is at odds

with the congressional design for Title VI ad-

ministrative enforcement.

Br. 40-45) that petitioners’ view will deny respondents

the right to secure attorneys, in contravention of the

14

V. Attorney’s fees are not recoverable in an independent

court action. In Carey, the plaintiff, while her mandatory

state proceedings to enforce Title VII were ongoing, filed

an action in federal court to enforce her Title VII rights

and to recover attorney fees under the attorney fees pro-

visions of Title VII. She obtained complete Title VII

relief in the state proceedings on the merits, rendering

her claim on the merits in federal court moot, but she did

not recover attorney fees in the state proceedings. There-

fore, in order to obtain the complete relief for a Title VII

violation envisioned by Congress in the enforcement

scheme provided, she was entitled to recover attorney fees,

either in federal court or in the mandated state proceed-

ings. Clearly if the state procedure did not provide com-

plete Title VII relief, she was entitled to obtain the deficit

in federal court. Such is not the enforcement scheme for

Title VI. Participation by private parties in assisting in-

formal activities to help a federal assistance agency obtain

from a recipient voluntary compliaxee with Title VI re-

quirements (the opportunity for which is required by the

Title VI enforcement proceedings) is not an integral part

of the private enforcement remedy for Title VI envisioned

by Congress, so that when the private citizen fails to re-

cover attorney fees for such participation he has not failed

to obtain the complete relief envisioned by Congress in

the enforcement scheme for Title VI. The language of

Section 1988 itself, when read in the light of the Title VI

enforcement provisions, and th: legislative history of both

acts negates establishment of any such separate private

right of action.

VI. Respondents wrongly suggest that petitioners vio-

lated an agreement and committed a breach of trust when

it filed a motion in the ECOS case to dissolve the exist-

15

ing injunction. (Resp. Br. Footnote 8 and Resp. Br. Ap-

pendix). There was an agreement that the ECOS injune-

tion would not be dissolved until final agreement on the

mitigation plan was reached. The motion was filed merely

for lead time to provide for service upon the scattered

plaintiffs and to put the case in a position to be calen-

dared and heard, if respondents were unable to persuade

the ECOS plaintiffs not to oppose the motion. Respon-

dents did not object at the time the motion was filed or

ask that it be withdrawn. Regardless, the suggestion is

irrelevant because the district court found that the re-

spondents’ representation as applicants for intervention

in the ECOS action had no causal connection or acted even

as a catalyst to the Finai Mitigation Plan agreement.

Ly

Vv

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in their

original brief, petitioners respectfully request that this

Coui' reverse the decision of the Fourth Cireuit Court

of Appeals in this case and affirm the decision of the

District Court.

Respectfully submitted, this the 29 day of September,

1986.

Lacy H. THornpure

Attorney General for the

State of North Carolina

James B. RichMonpD

Special Deputy Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice

P. O. Box 25201

Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

Telephone: (919) 738-4185

Attorneys for the Petitioners

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