Brief Amicus Curiae — United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
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FILED =
No. 84-701 JUN 27 ne,
| — i. 8 |
IN THE —
Supreme Court of the United State
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner
V.
RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
CITIZENS OF CHINCOTEAGUE
FOR A REASONABLE WETLANDS POLICY
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
RICHARD R. NAGEOTTE
NAGEOTTE, BORINSKY & ZELNICK
14908 Jefferson David Highway
Woodbridge, Virginia 22191
(703) 491-4136
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Amici Curiae
— ᷑ᷣ̊—̊—̊—ů ES
WILGON - Eres PrinTiING Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTION PRESENTED
To what extent are wetlands “waters of the United
States” within the meaning of § 502(7) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), and therefore subject
to federal regulatory jurisdiction.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. e ene
r ..
pe es gy ——————jß5ð
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
EE ......
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. eee. ”
EEE EEE
I. WHEN CONGRESS PASSED THE FED-
II.
ERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS IN 1972, ITS EXPRESS PUR-
POSE WAS TO CONTROL POLLUTION OF
THE NATION’S WATERS AT THE POINT
SOURCE AND NOT TO ESTABLISH A FED-
ERAL LAND USE PROGRAM TO PRE-
EERE crccensccrcessconessnccsenecessecsesstosees
A. The Corps’ extension of its Section 404 juris-
diction to all wetlands “saturated by surface
or ground water“ resulted from the un-
constitutional delegation of Congress’ legis-
lative function to the executive and judicial
branches of Government
B. The 1977 regulations extended federal regu-
latory power beyond the permissible limits
of the Commerce Clause
THE CORPS’ REGULATIONS RESULT IN A
TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH-
OUT COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
e E
10
13
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
A. Regulation which denies a property owner of
viable, beneficial use of his land constitutes
a taking under the Fifth Amendment 16
B. Application of the Corps’ regulations results
in an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment tak-
ing Of PEIVALS PTOPETTY ............cccccceseceesenceseeeeee 19
III. THE FEAR THAT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE POTEN-
TIAL FOR TAKING BY INTERJECTION OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION INTO THE BACK-
YARDS OF EVERY CITIZENS IS WELL
— ——ꝛ—— 22
IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORT-
ING AMICI PAINT THE ENVIRONMENTAL
VALUE OF WETLANDS WITH TOO BROAD
2 —— 27
89 30
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980) 18, 19
1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F.Supp. 1381
Ans I lee 26, 27
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
D . 12
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S.
r 7, 17
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) 15
Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States,
D a in 15
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 16
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, No.
266-82L (Cl. Ct. May 6, 198800))))):· 17, 18
Froehlke v. Leslie Salt Co., 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.
EERIE SEL SR A I ee es OE I a 10
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 400
a a a Se aa ek 10
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
i lls 14
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
BOTH, GE Ute BO COD cccccececcocecccsverecessecocscceess: 13, 14
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 154
„ delish tiie etiilaciniasiiat 18
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (19688) 14
The Montello, 87 U.S. (21 Wall.) 430 (1874) 15
National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v.
SOEs GD Cee Ge CID cicecescenecsmctestecsenssescons 12
NRDC v. Calleway, 392 F.Supp. 385 (D.D.C.
TID. scintdeisicansshegmeaadiaaendia F 7, 13
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atcheson Co.,
I x 15
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
r 18
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
1 „
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
ah a ae aia ee 11
Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102
%%% ̃ AA ̃ ͤ l! 2 hal ita 12
6 — .
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196 (June 26,
1 AA . f —— 18
San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) ...............................---- 18
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
11 ̃6—— 10
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) 12
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) 12
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Commission and City of Los Angeles, No. 82-708
ü ͤ•ö! 2 2
United States v. Applachian Electric Power Co.,
e eseneninenabenaiibente 15
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357
r x x x 18
United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429 (11th Cir.
1 TP 10
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) 16
Wie ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (194-5 14
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS:
Art. J. § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) ........................ 13
Amend. V (Just Compensation Claus) 18, 19
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
r i abunenneontonnabelians 6
33 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (1) n 6
,, e ehcale 6
r 6
r Tc eens sree 6
Zr passim
33 U.S.C. 1344 (b) 8 n 20
D 1 11
e,, seiclaaceeubeiednaes 6
D . 7, 10, 15
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401 et seq......... 6,7
Water Bank Act, 16 U.S.C. 131! 17
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
33 C. F. R.:
Pt. 209:
Section 209.120 (d) (1) (197 7
Section 209.120 (d) (2) (197557 8
33 C. F. R.:
Pt. 320:
e Ret 16, 20
r SD 20
Section $30.4 (b) (4)..................................... 21
Pt. 323:
D RR A ot eat 9
, ̃ Sere NR cna 15
Section 328.2 (b) (2) cece eee 16
r . 3, 4, 8, 9
r AINE CN 9
40 C. F. R.:
Pt. 230:
Section 200. 10 (a) (8) .................................. 21, 26
. ET 10
MISCELLANEOUS:
118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (197 2ù777)ʒ 13
A. Ash et al., Natural and Modified Pocosins: Lit-
erature Synthesis and Management Options
RE secinchitebiitacdnchbbbenitae ieee 28, 29
Communicable Disease Control, U.S. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare; Mosquitoes
of Public Health Importance and Their Control
J ̃ ꝗ— EE eae rea ne See 29
W. King, A Handbook of the Mosquitoes of the
Southeastern United States (1960) 29
Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the
United States, OTA-0-206, Wetlands: Their Use
and Regulation (1984) 7 27, 28
C. Richardson, Pocosin Wetlands (1981)
IN THA
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
No. 84-701
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
. Petitioner
RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
CITIZENS OF CHINCOTEAGUE
FOR A REASONABLE WETLANDS POLICY
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 36.2, the Citizens of
Chincoteague for a Reasonable Wetlands Policy file this
brief as amici curiae in support of the respondent, River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc. Letters of consent from counsel
for the parties have been filed with the Clerk.
No area of the United States is more directly affected
by the issue of federal regulation of the discharge of fill
material onto wetlands under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, et seg., than the Island
of Chincoteague, Virginia. Chincoteaque is the beneficiary
of a substantial seafood industry which is dependent upon
clean water and productive wetlands. Chincoteague is
also dependent upon its tourist industry which requires
reasonable utilization of its limited land mass. As a
barrier island, Chincoteague is composed of a continuous
series of upland ridges and lowland swales oriented north
— A ²̊¾•
to south. The lowland swales collect rain water run off
which, combined with a high seasonal water table, results
in ground water at or near the surface. These conditions,
which change from year to year and from season to sea-
son, combined with a generally flat topography, make
drainage difficult and result in vegetation commonly asso-
ciated with fresh water wetlands. The topography of
Chincoteague makes the upland ridges useless for reason-
able economic development unless the low lying swales can
also be filled. Without a reasonably balanced wetland pol-
icy which protects the waters for the fishing industry and
at the same time permits development of the island land
mass for its tourist industry, serious economic damage
will result to the citizens of Chincoteague.
The Citizens of Chincoteague for a Reasonable Wet-
lands Policy is an unincorporated, non-profit organization
of Chincoteague residents who have become concerned
with the effect of the Section 404 program on the Island
of Chincoteague. This brief is paid for by contributions
from the citizens of Chincoteague because of their fear
that the financial and legal resouress of the Petitioner,
United States of America (hereinat er Government“,
and amici curiae National Wildlife ederation, et al.
(hereinafter “NWF), could result in . decision which
does not consider the interests of affected * ul property
owners.
The Government and the NWF claim that t. Sixth
Circuit’s decision threatens the future ability of th ~™-
eral government to “protect ecologically important v
lands” (Pet. Brief at 14). They do not acknowledge tha.
the wetlands which are the subject of this case, and which
they “seek to preserve”, are owned by individual citizens
who under the Constitution have a protected and, there-
fore, vital interest in the proper resolution of this case.'
1 See, Summa Corporation v. California er rel. State Lands Com-
mission and City of Los Angeles, No. 82-708, 80 L.Ed. 2d 237 ( April
17, 1984), where the Court recognized limits to intrusive govern-
mental interference with private property rights.
STATEMENT
Riverside’s land is comprised of one sixty acre parcel
and a partially adjoining twenty acre parcel. The sixty
acre parcel adjacent to Jefferson Avenue had been ac-
tively farmed through the early 1900’s. (Pet. App. 22a).
In 1916, it was platted as a subdivision, storm drains and
fire hydrants were installed. (Pet. App. 22a). The ad-
jacent twenty acre parcel has not been platted. In 1973,
because of unprecedented high water levels in Lake Saint
Clair, a dike was installed across the property, ditches
were filled, and water was pumped onto Riverside’s prop-
erty, disrupting the normal drainage patterns. ( Pet. App.
3a). As a result, a cattail swamp developed on that por-
tion of the property which no longer had proper drainage.
(Pet. App. 29a).
Expert witnesses testifying at trial stated that the soil
type and lack of proper drainage caused the wetland con-
ditions found at the property. (Pet. App. 24a, 25a).
Hydrologic studies conducted on the property yielded con-
flicting results: one expert being of the opinion that
there was a hydrologic connection between Lake Saint
Clair and the property, while another expert testified that
there was no hydrologic connection. (Pet. App. 24a).
The District Court found as a matter of fact that there
was no hydrologic connection between the property and
Lake Saint Clair. Pet. App. 25a, 37a
The District Court had great difficulty applying the
Section 404 regulations to the facts in Riverside’s case.
Judge Kennedy, recognizing that her decision was of
necessity “somewhat arbitrary“, held that under the
The Government, after failing in the District Court to raise the
issue of “saturation”, as defined in the Corps regulations at 33
C.F.R. 323.2(c) asks this Court for the first time on appeal to
address this issue. (Pet. Brief at 44-45) Such a request by the
Government comes too late and this Court is not in a position to
make a finding of fact not made by the District Court.
The District Court was immediately confronted with a central
issue presented to this Court by the Government and NWF, i.e,
when science and constitutional limitations are in conflict, should
C W ůu-ͥ W W
4
1975 regulations Riverside’s property above elevation
575.5 was uplands and that portion of the property below
qualified as wetlands. (Pet. App. 3la). Judge Kennedy
further held that areas of Riverside’s property landward
of the 575.5 elevation line could be filled despite the ex-
istence of wetlands vegetation and other wetlands charac-
teristics. (Pet. App. 31a
While the case was on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the
Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter the Corps“
revised its Section 404 regulations. The Corps’ new
wetlands definition eliminated the requirement of peri-
odie inundation and required only saturation by surface
waters, which can be tide, flood or rainwater and ground
water. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a fac-
tual determination applying the Corps’ 1977 wetlands
definition. (Pet. App. 42a). On remand, Judge Gilmore,
without hearing additional evidence, determined that “as
redefined by 33 C. F. R. 323.2 e, the Army Corp of Engi-
neers definition of ‘waters of the United States’ is
broader than its predecessor”. (Pet. App. 43a). Judge
Gilmore reaffirmed Judge Kennedy’s ruling that all lands
below elevation 575.5 were subject to jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, and the Corps’
1977 regulations. Pet. App. 43a).
On appeal the Sixth Circuit held that “neither inundation
nor aquatic vegetation would be sufficient, standing alone,
to bring a piece of land within the definition. Both must
be present, and the latter must be caused by the former.”
(Pet. App. 10a). The Sixth Circuit held that the proper
interpretation of the words “inundated at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances (does) support wetlands vegetation” re-
quires frequent flooding by waters flowing from “navi-
gable waters” as defined in the Act. (Pet. App. 10a,
the requirements of the constitution bend to accommodate science
or must science bend to accommodate constitutional limitations.
(Pet. Brief at 37-39; NWF Brief at 18-21). As further discussed
below, Congress cannot extend its regulatory authority beyond the
authority granted it under the Constitution.
5
l5a). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the defi-
nition applies to marsh, swamps and bogs directly cre-
ated by such waters, but not inland low lying areas such
as the one in question in this case, which sometimes be-
come saturated with water. (Pet. App. 15a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Citizens of Chincoteague believe that the decision
of the Sixth Circuit is correct and should be affirmed as
it recognizes the distinction between inundated wetlands
formed by waters of the United States, a prerequisite if
jurisdiction is to exist under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, and non-inundated wetlands formed by
ground or surface water in association with poor drain-
age which are beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.
Reversal by this Court would effectively remove any
barriers to federal regulation under the Commerce Cause
and leave it a legal concept in name only. The Sixth
Cireuit's decision recognizes and reasonably balances the
competing environmental concerns while preserving the
integrity of the Commerce Clause. /nundated wetlands
directly formed by waters of the United States constitute
the major significant wetlands having characteristics
generally accepted as most valuable to the environment
as a whole, while non-inundated, isolated wetlands of the
type located upon Riverside’s property have the least.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit’s decision, while not so holding,
recognized the real danger of unconstitutional takings
resulting when authority under the Commerce Clause is
exceeded and the regulations and permitting process de-
veloped under the Clean Water Act are used as a vehicle
to ensure preservation of wetlands located upon private
property, rather than to promote Congress’ water quality
goals.
sateen meee
6
I. WHEN CONGRESS PASSED THE FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS IN 1972, THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF
THE ACT WAS TO CONTROL POLLUTION OF THE
NATION’S WATERS AT THE POINT SOURCE AND
NOT TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL LAND USE
PROGRAM TO PRESERVE WETLANDS.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (hereinafter FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq., were enacted to “. . . restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 33 U.S.C. 125l(a). As the statutory goals in
the FWPCA expressly demonstrate, Congress was con-
cerned with water quality. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1251/a)
(1) (“That the discharge of pollutants into the navi-
gable waters be eliminated by 1985.”) To achieve these
goals, the FWPCA provided for federal regulatory super-
vision over water polluting activities from point sources:
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, established the national
pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) to
apply effluent standards for particular discharges; Sec-
tion 403, 33 U.S.C. 1343, established a program to regu-
late ocean dumping; Section 404, 33 U.S.C. 1344, estab-
lished a permitting process to regulate the discharge
of dredge and fill material into navigable waters. It is
this latter program, Section 404, which is at issue in
the instant case.
Section 30l(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 131l(a),
makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant into the
waters of the United States without a Section 402 ( Riv-
ers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401-413) or Section
404 (FWPCA dredge and fill) permit. Pollutant is de-
fined in Section 502(6) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1362
(6), when it is “. . . discharged into waters.” Section
404 provides that “the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers, may issues permits, after
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the dis-
7
charge of dredged of fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites.“ 33 U.S.C. 1344.
Section 502(7) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7),
defined “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.” The Corps, pur-
suant to its authority under the FWPCA, published regu-
lations defining its jurisdiction over “navigable waters”
as extending to “those waters of the United States which
are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are
presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the
future, susceptible for use for purpose of interstate or
foreign commerce.” 33 C. F. R. 209-120(d)(1) (1974).
In 1975, in ruling on a suit brought by the National
Resources Defense Council and the National Wildlife Fed-
eration against the Secretary of the Army, the District
Court for the District of Columbia issued a short opinion
granting partial summary judgment. In its brief dis-
cussion of the scope of the Corps’ regulations under Sec-
tion 404, the court stated:
Congress, by defining “navigable waters” in Section
502(7) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et. seq. (the “Water Act“ to mean “the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas“,
asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters
to the maximum extent permissible under the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as
used in the Water Act, the term is not limited to the
traditional tests of navigability. [NRDC v. Call-
away, 392 F.Supp. 385, 386 (D. D.C. 1975
While explicitly acknowledging that the regulatory au-
thority of Congress was limited by the Commerce Clause
and making no reference to wetlands, the Court ordered
* The Corps administered the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.
401-413, while the Environmental! Protection Agency (hereinafter
EPA“ was given general responsibility for administering the
FWPCA. To eliminate the potential jurisdictional overlap and
maintain the Corps’ traditional jurisdiction, the Corps was given
authority to issue Section 404 permits. 118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (1972).
the Corps to publish new regulations “clearly recognizing
the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act.” Id. at
386. The Corps did not appeal this order and the Dis-
trict Court did not rule upon the constitutionality of the
resulting regulations.
The Corps responded by publishing interim regulations
in July of 1975 to “phase-in” expansion of its Section
404 jurisdiction. In administratively defining “navigable
waters“, the 1975 regulations, for the first time, included
certain wetlands as “waters of the United States” and,
therefore, subject to Section 404 jurisdiction. As ex-
plained in the regulations, “waters of the United States”
included :
b All coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and
similar areas that are contiguous or adjacent to
other navigable waters. “Coastal wetlands” includes
marshes and shallows and means those areas peri-
odically inundated by saline or brackish waters and
that are normally characterized by the prevalence of
salt or brackish water vegetation capable of growth
or reproduction.
h Freshwater wetlands including marshes, shal-
lows, swamps, and similar areas that are contiguous
or adjacent to other navigable waters and that sup-
port vegetation. “Freshwater wetlands” means those
areas that are inundated and that are normally
characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that
requires saturated soil conditions for growth and
reproduction. 33 C. F. R. 209. 120d (2) (1975
On July 19, 1977 the Corps promulgated new regula-
tions that again expanded the Section 404 permit juris-
diction over wetlands not previously defined as falling
within the term “waters of the United States They
While the Government contends that the Corps simply “revised
the 1976 interim final regulations to clarify many of the definitional
terms” (Govt’s Brief at 6), it is clear that the 1977 regulations
greatly expanded the Corps jurisdictional authority. On remand
from the Sixth Circuit, the District Court explicitly concluded that
“as redefined by 33 C.F.R. 323.2(c), the Army Corps of Engineers’
9
defined “navigable waters of the United States“, at
33 C. F. R. 323.2(a), as encompassing (1) traditionally
navigable waters, (2) the tributaries of all such naviga-
ble waters, (3) interstate waters, whether or not navi-
gable, (4) the tributaries of all such waters, and (5)
“all other waters of the United States not identified in
paragraphs (1)-(4) above . . . the degradation or de-
struction of which could affect interstate commerce“, 33
C. F. R. 323.2(a) (1-5) (1977). Further, all “adjacent
wetlands” to the waters defined in paragraphs (1)-(4)
were included as “waters of the United States”. These
terms were defined in the regulations as:
(e) The term “wetlands” means those areas that
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency or duration sufficient to sup-
! port, and that under normal circumstances does sup-
) port, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted
) for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands gen-
erally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar
areas.
(d) The term “adjacent” means bordering, contingu-
: ous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other
waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the
like are “adjacent wetlands”. [33 C. F. R. 323.2(c)
and (d) (1977)]
Amicus curiae contend, that Congress’ failure to clearly
define the term “waters of the United States“, and the
subsequent incorporation by federal agencies of an over-
broad definition of “wetlands” into that term, renders
enforcement of the FWPCA unconstitutional. Because
Congress failed to establish jurisdictional limits to the
Section 404 program, leaving the executive branch of
government to do so by regulation, this Court must not
permit federal agencies to overstep their Constitutional
authority and extend federal regulatory jurisdiction be-
yond permissible bounds.
definition of ‘waters of the United States’ is broader than its
predecessor’. (Pet. App. 43a)
ee
10
A. The Corps’ extension of its Section 404 jurisdiction
to all wetlands “saturated by surface or ground
water” resulted from the unconstitutional delega-
tion of Congress’ legislative function to the execu-
tive and judicial branches of Government.
As mentioned previously, Congress intended that the
FWPCA* be enforced to the “maximum constitutional
limit“, but it left the Corps to define its own jurisdiction.
Amicus curiae contend that the failure of Congress to
prescribe jurisdictional limits constitutes a fatal consti-
tutional flaw.
In enacting the 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water
Act, Congress failed to “lay down .. . an intelligible
principle to which [an executive agency] is directed to
conform,” thereby unconstitutionally delegating its legis-
lative power. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 275
U.S. 400, 409 (1928). By simply redefining “navigable
waters” as “waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas“, 33 U.S.C. 1362 (7), Congress failed to
provide such an intelligible principle. Courts have recog-
nized the lack of guidance and expressed their frus-
tration with Congress’ overbroad delegation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431 (11th Cir.
1983) (“It may be that the extravagant reach of the
regulations would raise serious problems under some
situations.“; Froehlke v. Leslie Salt Co., 578 F.2d 742,
756 (9th Cir. 1978) (“We express no opinion on the
outer limits to which the Corps’ jurisdiction under the
FWPCA might extend“
Throughout its brief, the Government fails to appre-
ciate that Congress may not “abdicate or transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it
it vested.” Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 529 (1939). Congress has never included wet-
lands within the definition of waters to be regulated
under the Clean Water Act. The first efforts by the Corps
The 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA changed the popular
name of the FWPCA to the Clean Water Act, which will be used
henceforth.
11
to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material onto
wetlands came not from a specific legislative directive
from Congress, the body elected by the citizens and
charged by the Constitution with that responsibility, but
from a federal regulatory agency itself. See, 40 Fed.
Reg. 31320 (1975).
The Government makes much of the fact that Congress
passed Amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977. The
Government asserts that Congress thereby ratified the
Corps’ regulations of July 19, 1977 extending Section
404 jurisdiction over land characterized by “saturated
soil“ conditions, contending that Congress retroactively
expressed its intent that the Corps exercise jurisdiction
over all “wetlands”. (Pet. Brief at 25). In support of
this proposition, the Government cites Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), in which this Court upheld the FCC’s
regulations concerning fairness in broadcasting require-
ments. This case is readily distinguishable, however, as
the Court’s opinion stressed that “Congress has not just
kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative
construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation“.
395 U.S. at 381-382. (Emphasis added) The Court went
on to state:
When the Congress ratified the FCC’s implication of
a fairness doctrine in 1959, it did not, of course,
approve every past decision or pronouncement by the
Commission on this subject, or give it a completely
free hand for the future. The statutory authority
does not go that far. 395 U.S. at 385 (Emphasis
added )
The 1977 Amendments did not mention in any way the
Clean Water Act’s definition of “navigable waters”. The
only mention of wetlands came in an administrative pro-
vision allowing for state assumption of the Section 404
program, 33 U.S.C. 1333(g). Nowhere in the Clean
Water Act has Congress implied that land with no con-
nection to “navigable waters” be encompassed by the
Section 404 program. Unlike the Red Lion case, Congress
12
has never positively addressed the Corps’ Section 404
jurisdiction, let alone through legislative act ratified the
Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction. There are, how-
ever, interesting parallels between the issues before the
Court in Red Lion, and the instant case. If this Court
is to uphold the Corps’ extension of its Section 404 jur-
isdiction to all private property characterized by satu-
rated soil, from whatever cause, the private property of
all landowners will be turned into a public trust just
as surely as were the airwaves in Red Lion.
The Government also cites Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in support of its
proposition that Congress retroactively expressed its
intent to extend Section 404 permit jurisdiction to land
characterized by “saturated soil.“ The cited portion of
Bob Jones, however, stands only for the unremarkable
proposition that the general words of a statute cannot be
construed to defeat the intent of Congress and that the
interpretation of the regulatory agency charged with
administering a program is due proper deference from
a reviewing court. 461 U.S. at 595-602. The Govern-
ment’s reliance upon the Hob Jones decision is misplaced,
as the Government fails to acknowledge that the principle
of deference to an agency’s interpretation is inappro-
priate where that interpretation has not been consistent.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944),
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978). As the Corps’
regulations clearly demonstrate, the Corps has been far
from consistent in its interpretation of its en 404
jurisdiction over wetlands.
It is a settled principle that Congress cannot manifest
its intent through silence. Regional Rail Reorganization
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); National Woodwork
Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
Had Congress intended Section 404 jurisdiction to ex-
tend to “wetlands” not connected to “navigable waters“
it would have so provided. At no time, however, has Con-
gress done so. Congress has never expressed an intention
that the Clean Water Act be used to assert federal juris-
13
diction over non-inundated land unconnected to “naviga-
ble waters“.
Congress’ failure to provide “an intelligible principle”
to guide the federal regulatory agencies charged with
administering the Clean Water Act has resulted in the
“abdication” of its “essential legislative function”, ren-
dering the application of the Section 404 program uncon-
stitutional. Congress, not the Corps, must make the pol-
icy choices required in national legislation.
B. The 1977 regulations extended federal regulatory
power beyond the permissible limits of the Com-
merce Clause.
The Government’s position before this Court represents
an attempted assertion of federal regulatory authority
that exceeds the permissible limits of the Commerce
Clause. The July 19, 1977 Corps regulations have com-
pletely forsaken the requirement of a nexus between in-
terstate commerce and legislative purpose required by
the Constitution.
The Commerce Clause states that Congress may
“{rjegulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. To say that Congress intended
that “navigable waters be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation”, 118 Cong. Rec. 33699
(1972) and that the Clean Water Act be enforced to the
“maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause,” Callaway, supra, at 856, is to definitionally ac-
knowledge that there are constitutional limits upon Con-
gress’ Commerce Clause powers.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), this Court deliniated
the function of judicial review of Commerce Clause legis-
lation as a determination of whether Congress has a ra-
tional basis for “finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce” and whether the means Congress
has chosen are “reasonably adapted to the end permitted
by the Constitution”. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, citing
14
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258, 262 (1964). In articulating this test the Court
noted that mere invocation of the Commerce Clause will
not trigger federal jurisdiction. Instead, “Congress must
show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce“. 452 U.S. at 313
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Emphasis added).
The Hodel Court respected long standing precedent in
holding that:
In light of the evidence available to Congress and
the detailed consideration that the legislation re-
ceived, we cannot say that Congress did not have a
rational basis for concluding that surface coal min-
ing has substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, at 280 (1981) (Emphasis
added
Congress cannot regulate an activity without a demon-
stration that the activity “affects” commerce in some
meaningful way. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197
n.27 (1968) (Congress may not “use a relatively trivia:
impact on commerce as an excuse for a broad general
regulation of state or private activity”); Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 258 local
activities which have “a substantial and harmful effect
upon that commerce” may be federally regulated) ; Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 1944 local activity
may be regulated if “it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce
This Court cannot sustain the Corps’ overbroad wet-
land regulations, subjecting to Section 404 permit juris-
diction all private land “saturated by surface or ground
water”, as a proper exercise of Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers. While the Corps’ regulations ostensibly
demonstrate concern to preserve wetlands for their “eco-
logical” and “habitat” value, Congress has never deter-
mined that the discharge of dredge or fill material onto
lands “inundated or saturated by surface or ground wa-
ter is an activity that “affects” interstate commerce,
15
substantially or otherwise, or has any effect upon water
quality, its stated legislative goal.
As previously discussed the Clean Water Act, as
amended by Congress in 1972, regulates the discharge of
pollutants from point sources into the navigable waters.
As Congress’ concern was water quality “navigable wa-
ters” was statutorily defined as “waters of the United
States“, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), in order to extend the reach
of the Clean Water Act further than the traditional def-
inition of navigable waters.’ At no time, however, did
Congress express its intention that all wetlands, let alone
land “saturated by surface or ground water”, be sub-
jected to the Section 404 permitting process.
The Corps’ 1977 redefinition of wetlands to include
areas of vegetation resulting from “surface or ground
water’, including isolated weilands such as those in the
instant case, represents a substantia! increase in alleged
federal jurisdiction to include much of the land mass of
the United States. This regulation constitutes a clear and
distinct break of the Commerce Clause nexus and places
under federal regulatory jurisdiction all wetlands re-
gardless of their connection to the navigable waters of
the United States. By administrative regulation, not
legislation, these wetlands are now included within the
term “waters of the United States”.
Amicus curiae believe that the Sixth Cireuit's deci-
sion holding that those areas subject to federal regula-
The Corp's traditional jurisdiction over navigable waters,
codified at 33 C.F.R. 323.2(b), was developed from this Court's
decisions in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (waters
navigable in fact and used, or susceptible of use, in their ordinary
condition, for commerce); The Montello, 87 U.S. (21 Wall.) 430
(1874) (extended to waters capable of use, though not actually
used, in commerce) ; Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States,
256 U.S. 113 (1921) (non-navigable portions of navigable water-
bodies; United States v. Aj palachain Electric Power Co., 311 U.S.
377 (1940) (waters that, through reasonable improvement, could
be made navigable); and, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atcheson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (non-navigable tributaries of
navigable waters).
5 WWW W- W r
16
tory jurisdiction must be limited to areas so frequently
inundated by waters of the United States as to make
them also a part of waters of the United States is cor-
rect. To rule otherwise would ignore the fact that Con-
gress has never determined that land “inundated or sat-
urated by surface or ground water” has any connection
to interstate commerce and effectively render the Com-
merce Clause meaningless.
II. THE CORPS’ REGULATIONS RESULT IN A TAK-
ING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT COM-
PENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES.
A. Regulation which denies a property owner of viable,
beneficial use of his land constitutes a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.
The Clean Water Act has been moulded by the execu-
tive branch into regulations containing a permitting
process typical of zoning and land use regulation avail-
able only to the states under their general police power
jurisdiction. See, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraus, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US.
365 (1926). The permitting policies of the Corps have
evolved into an extensive public interest review process,
considering such factors as:
“ . conservation, economics, aesthetics, general en-
vironmental concerns, historic values, flood damage
protection, land use, navigation, recreation, water
supply, water quality, energy needs, safety, food
production, and in general, the needs and welfare
of the people”. 33 C. F. R. 320.4(a) (1)]
When these regulations are coupled with the Corps’ ex-
panded definition of wetlands as land “inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water”, 33 C. F. R. 323.2
(b (2), the Corps’ implementation of its Section 404
program results in a policy of extensive federal land use
regulation that does not consider as significant the pro-
tected interest of the property owner.
This pervasive regulatory structure, purportedly au-
thorized under the Commerce Clause, raises serious “tak-
17
ing” concerns under the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. As the Sixth Circuit ob-
served, “A very real taking problem [is raised] with the
exercise of such apparently unbounded jurisdiction by
the Corps” (Pet. App. 15a). This observation was un-
derscored by the United States Claims Court in its recent
decision in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,
No. 266-82L (U.S. Claims Court, filed May 6, 1985).
In that case, the Claims Court held that denial of a Sec-
tion 404 permit to a company wishing to mine phosphate
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking for which com-
pensation was due. After noting that the federal govern-
ment has a program to preserve wetlands deemed ecologi-
cally important by compensating the property owner,” to
conserve wetlands, the Claims Court evaluated the Fifth
Amendment “taking” issue by noting:
The difficulty arises because the property in ques-
tion does not belong to the public but to the plain-
tiff. It may be perfectly appropriate to consider only
the public interest factors when determining the use
of public land. However, when government treats
private land as if it were its own, ignoring the in-
terests of the property owner and rendering the
property economically useless, it has worked a tak-
ing and, under our constitution, compensation is
due.” [Florida Rock, slip op. at 24.]
The Claims Court’s analysis in Florida Rock, is fuily
compatible with this Court’s decision in Chicago RJ. &
P. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 (1931), in which
this Court ruled that “confiscation may result from a
taking of the use of property without compensation quite
as well as from the taking of title.” 284 U.S. at 96.
This Court has long held to the principle that “if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”.
Most interestingly though, is the Water Bank Act. Under this
Act, Congress recognized that it is in the public interest to pre-
serve, restore and improve the wetlands of the Nation, and thereby
to conserve surface waters, to preserve and improve habitat for
migratory waterfowl and other wildlife resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1301
(1982) [Florida Rock, slip op. at 22).
.
18
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Accord, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Central Eureka Min-
ing Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). In Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 154 (1979) this Court reiterated this
principle in holding that the exercise of federal regula-
tory authority to require the owners of a private marina
to allow free public access would have amounted to a tak-
ing for which compensation would be due. 444 U.S. at
345.
Riverside finds itself in precisely the same situation
as the plaintiff in Florida Rock, supra, as the Corps’ as-
sertion of Section 404 jurisdiction over its property and
denial of a Section 404 permit effectively forces it to
preserve its property in a natural state. The Claims
Court specifically noted that any construction connected
with alternative uses of the land at issue would require
a Section 404 permit and made a finding of fact that
“it is unthinkable that the Corps would issue such a per-
mit in light of its denial of plaintiff’s application.” Flor-
ida Rock, slip op. at 4 (footnote omitted). It specifically
held that “denial of the [Section 404] permit therefore
has deprived plaintiff of all economically viable use of it
land.” Id., slip op. at 5.
The Sixth Circuit’s recognition of a “very real tak-
ing problem with the exercise of such apparently un-
bounded jurisdiction by the Corps” was well founded and
fully consistent with settled Fifth Amendment analysis.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196, 81 L.Ed. 2d
815, 833-834 (June 26, 1984) (Government action short
of acquisition of title or occupancy can work a taking if
its effect is to deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the subject matter); San Diego Gas v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981) (Dissenting opin-
ion by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell)
(“taking” may occur without a formal condemnation
proceeding or transfer of fee simple) ; Agins, 447 U.S. at
262 (1980) (Fifth Amendment taking occurs when gov-
19
ernmental regulation “denies an owner economically
viable use of his lands“
Amicus curiae contend that the federal regulatory
agencies have utilized the Section 404 program as a
federal land use mechanism in violation of the Fifth
Amendment requirement of just compensation for gov-
ernmental taking of private property.
B. Application of the Corps’ regulations results in an
unconstitutional Fifth Amendment taking of pri-
vate property.
The Sixth Circuit addressed a major concern of the
Citizens of Chincoteague in recognizing that the inter-
jection of federal jurisdiction into the backyards of every
citizen may result in an unconstitutional “taking” of
property. Nowhere is this concern better appreciated
and understood than on the Island of Chincoteague which
includes many low-lying damp areas that might be con-
sidered “wetlands” under the Corps’ far reaching defini-
tion.
The Government and the NWF state that wetlands of
the United States and wetlands of the States will be lost
if this Court does not reverse the decision in this case.
(Pet. Brief at 40 and NWF Brief at 19) They assert
that reversal will permit the preservation of these vast
wetlands areas. If the permitting process is, as they as-
sert, merely a permitting process and not a regulatory
) taking, how will their objective of preservation of these
wetlands result? The answer is found in the regulations
of the Corps where, once jurisdiction is established, a
property owner is no longer free to put his property to
any economically viable or beneficial use that he may
choose. At that point, all choice of use is transferred to
the Corps and as will be discussed, the Corps is predis-
| posed under the regulations towards not allowing any
reasonable use of property that it determines is a wet-
lands.
The Government argues that a taking of private prop-
erty does not arise from the mere assertion of regulatory
—
20
authority to require an application for a permit. Pet.
Brief at 30-32). In this case, however, the Corps’ per-
mitting system is designed to preclude alternative, bene-
ficial uses to property owners of land “administratively
defined” as wetlands. Instead, the permitting process of
the Corps is designed to deny permit requests or to grant
permits only under very limited circumstances, thereby
making the total use restrictions imposed at the onset
of the Corps’ jurisdiction permanent.
The Government has asserted in its brief that a Corps
permit will be issued if the proposed activity complies
with the guidelines issued under 404(b) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. 1344(b), and is otherwise not contrary to the
public interest. Pet. Brief at 40). The problem with the
Government's proposition is that the Corps’ regulations
predetermine that the filling of wetlands is not in the
public interest. The Corps’ regulations direct that no
permit will be granted unless its issuance is found to be
in the public interest.” 33 C. F. R. 320.4(a). The section
immediately following states in turn, that “|w]etlands
are vital areas that constitute a productive and valuable
public resource, the unnecessary alteration or destruction
of which should be discouraged as contrary to the public
interest.“ 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b) (Emphasis added). This
regulatory predetermination that the filling of wetlands
is not in the public interest raises an insurmountable
barrier for a property owner to overcome in attempting
to obtain a fill permit. If it is not in the public interest
to fill wetlands and a citizen files a permit application to
fill wetlands, then the permit must be denied because it
is not in the public interest.
In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, the Government
argues that it is only fill proposals requiring an un-
necessary alteration of wetlands that the permitting pro-
gram is designed to prohibit. Pet. Brief at 11, 42) The
fallacy of the Government’s argument lies in the Corps’
regulations, which set forth criteria to be used in de-
termining what projects constitute a necessary filling.
Under this criteria no realistic proposals can qualify for
;
21
a permit. The relevant Corps’ regulations, 33 C. F. R.
320.4(b) (4), and those of the EPA, 40 C.F.R. 230.10
(a) (3) address what the Corps considers to be a neces-
sary alteration.’ These sections provide that no permit
will be granted unless two requirements are met: the
proposed use must be water dependent; and there can be
no other practicable alternative sites available.
The requirement of water dependency may be reason-
able in the case of a project proposal for a frequently
inundated wetland, as a frequently inurdated wetland is
connected to a waterbody. However, this requirement is
totally unreasonable when applied to a non-inundated wet-
land like Riverside’s property because the non-inundated
wetland is not connected to a waterbody. Logic dictates
that a water dependent project would not be located on a
site that is not connected to a waterbody. The only
realistic project proposal for a non-inundated wetland
would be one that was not water dependent which, in ac-
cordance with the Corps’ and EPA's regulations, has al-
ready been predetermined to be an unnecessary alteration
of a wetland and therefore, not in the public interest.
The second requirement under 33 C.F.R. 320(b) (4)
and 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a) that there be no alternative site
33 C.F.R. 320(b) (4) states:
No permit will be granted to work in wetlands identified as
important by subparagraph (2), above, unless the District
Engineer concludes, on the basis of the analysis required in
paragraph (a) above. that the benefits of the proposed altera-
tion outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource and the
proposed alteration is necessary to realize those benefits. /n
evaluating whether a particular alteration is necessary, the
District Engineer shall consider whether the proposed activity
is primarily dependent on being located in, or in close proximity
to the aquatic environment and whether feasible alternative
sites are available. (Emphasis added).
EPA's regulation 40 C. F. R. 230.10(a) (3) has a similar requirement:
no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if
there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem.
The current regulations of both agencies are substantially un-
changed versions of the 1977 regulations.
22
available for the proposed use is equally unreasonable.
The Government acknowledges that the regulations pre-
sume that there are alternative sites for all proposed
uses, with the property owner having the burden of over-
coming this presumption. (Pet. Brief at 41). Amicus
curiae submits that there are very few, if any, non-water
dependent projects where there are no practicable alter-
native sites available for the proposed use. As such, the
presumption imposed by the Corps and EPA regulations
is impossible to overcome. This impossibility, coupled
with the unreasonable requirement of water dependency,
has the effect of preventing any realistic economic or
beneficial use of property such as Riverside’s.
the right of the property owner to put his land to some
economically viable or beneficial use.
process, being heavily biased against granting a permit
for any realistic economic or beneficial use, does nothing
to cure the regulatory taking that results from total
at the
Ii. THE FEAR THAT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Ex-
PRESSED CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL
TAKING BY INTERJECTION OF THE CORPS’
JURISDICTION INTO THE BACKYARDS OF
EVERY CITIZEN IS WELL FOUNDED.
There are an infinite number of sites throughout this
country, including many on Chincoteague, that have low
lying damp areas which could qualify as “wetlands”
under the Corps’ extremely broad definition. The follow-
ing are just a few examples of the types of “takings”
effectuated by the Corps under the Section 404 permit
requirements upon some of our citizens.
23
31 lots and is bounded by Ridge Road and Division
Street. Lot 23 is also bounded by Pinedale Drive
and Rosedale Drive. Mr. and Mrs. Ransley’s inland
property is located in an upland area of Chincoteague not
in the vicinity of any waters of the United States. It
includes a low area 30 feet wide by 100 feet long
which, because of poor drainage supports cattails and
other wetland vegetation. In order to build their home,
it was necessary for the Ransleys to fill this area.
They were advised by the Corps that a permit was
required. They applied to all state and local wetlands
agencies and were advised that a permit was not nec-
essary. The Corps processed their application and on Jan-
uary 24, 1985, denied their permit request claiming it
was necessary “based on a public interest review, to deny
the project as proposed due to the lack of a justifiable
néed to destroy valuable wetlands.” As a result, Mr. and
Mrs. Ransley have been barred from building their house
on Lot 23.
2. In 1969, three years before the FWPCA was en-
acted, Richard and Carolyn Conklin purchased upland
property located in a developed residential area near the
center of Chincoteague. They began constructing a row
of townhouses on the property in early 1982. On Sep-
tember 9, 1983 they received a Formal Cease and Desist
Order from the Corps advising them that they had filled
wetlands within their regulatory jurisdiction. The order
gave them fifteen days to remove the fill. The cease and
desist order pertained to an approximately 100 x 100
foot area which can be described as a sink hole with a
lower topography that contained trash and other debris.
The Corps described the area as a wetland relatively
small in size, isolated by surrounding upland and cut off
from any inundation. The Corps admitted that even
without any filling by the Conklins, the wetland vegeta-
| tion probably would have decreased in time due to its
isolation.
Upon receiving the cease and desist order, the Conklins
agreed to submit an After-the-Fact Application for au-
Z
24
thorization to fill and also agreed to the Corps’ demands
for mitigation. Mitigation as practiced by the Corps and
its consulting environmental agencies requires that a
property owner requesting a permit bulldoze uplands
and make them into wetlands as the price for receiving
a permit.
Mitigation in this case required the purchase of two
parcels of property totalling more than 10,000 square
feet, clearing off all trees and other upland vegetation,
lowering the elevation of the land to a point which
would allow tidal waters to flood the land and then plant-
ing and fertilizing 8,999 spartina alternaflora sprigs and
361 Iva frutescens plants, thereby creating two man-made
bogs out of what was before high and dry land.
3. Terry and Debra Combs, Jay and Barbara Mason,
Teri and Dana Gorner, George and Linda Hall, James
and Nancy Adams, William and Patricia Jones, Richard
and Rosemary Merrill, David and Elaine Fioriglio, Kruno
Flipic, James Jester, Earl Ross and Charles Snear all
owned property in a residential subdivision known as the
Ridge Road Development located in Chincoteague. More
than a year after these lots were purchased and after
four homes had been constructed, the Corps and the
EPA brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia against each of these
individuals, along with the developer of the Ridge Road
Development, alleging that the property to which they
held title was once a wetland under the Corps’ jurisdic-
tion and that the developer had filled this property with-
out a Corps permit. The government sought a Court
order to restore the development to its former condition
notwithstanding that the property had been purchased
more than a year earlier and homes had been con-
structed on four of the twelve lots.
After a year of costly legal proceedings the suit was
dismissed due to lack of evidence. The cumulative legal
expenses of the property owners exceeded $30,000.00 and
during the year of litigation they were unable to sell,
develop or make any improvements on their land.
25
4. Mr. Delmas Mears owns a lot located on Chinco-
teague on which he operates an auto repair business
On November 18, 1983 he received a notice from the
Corps advising him that aerial photographs revealed that
a wetland which was once located in his backyard in
1977 had been filled without a permit and that he had
thirty days to either remove the fill or apply for an
After-the-Fact Permit. This area contained approxi-
mately .65 acres covered with grass. The Corps claimed
that it was at one time a cattail patch. The Corps also
gave the same notice of violation to Mr. Mears’ next door
neighbors, Mr. Williams and Mr. Hall.
Mr. Mears freely admitted that he had added sand over
the years since 1968 to a low area in his backyard which
previously was a breeding ground for rats and mosquitoes.
But, he denied that this property was ever a “wetland”.
Mr. Williams and Mr. Hall were not required to re-
move the fill from their properties after agreeing to pay
$500.00 and signing a Consent Order. Mr. Mears, not
wanting to pay $500.00, applied for an After-the-Fact
Permit.
On reviewing Mr. Mears’ application, the Corps noted
that most of his property was uplands and that there
had been considerable “legal filling“ done all around his
property. Nevertheless, on May 24, 1985, the Corps de-
nied Mr. Mears’ permit, finding:
(T]he completed project to be contrary to the public
interest because of the unnecessary loss of fresh-
water wetlands and because of the potential for
cumulative environmental degradation.
The Corps, acknowledging that it would be of little
or no benefit to the environment in the area to require
Mr. Mears to remove the fill, instead put him on notice of
their intent to refer the matter to the Justice Department
for an appropriate civil penalty. As of this date, Mr.
Mears is awaiting further Government action.
5. The following case occurred in nearby Chesapeake,
Virginia. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. applied for a permit on
26
April 22, 1981 to fill a man-made borrow pit upon which
it planned te build an industrial complex. The borrow
pit was created by three man-made enbankments with
a small ditch cutting across the center that allowed tide
water into the pit. The Corps denied the permit stating
that the proposed project was not “water dependent” as
required by 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a) (3). 1902 brought suit
claiming that the denial of the permit was arbitrary and
capricious and that the Corps’ action was an unconstitu-
tional regulatory taking. The Court agreed, stating that
the Corps’ actions not only resulted in a diminution in
value of the property, but also denied 1902 all viable
economic use of their property. The Court also held the
permit denial was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion and the Corps was ordered to reconsider the
permit without imposing the unlawful requirements which
exist. 1902 Atlantic Limited v. Hudson, 574 F.Supp.
1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).
As of this date, 1902 still does not have a permit, and
it appears that the Corps has no intention of complying
with the District Court’s original Order. In the District
Court’s most recent Order, Judge Doumar stated:
On September 28, 1983 this Court ordered the Corps
to either reconsider the plaintiff’s permit application
in accordance with the views expressed in its opin-
ion or to commence condemnation proceedings. The
Corps chose to do neither. Instead, the Corps effec-
tively considered the application de novo and paid
no attention whatsoever to the Court’s findings of
the fact and conclusions of law. Except for refer-
ring to the subsequent administrative proceeding as
a rehearing, the Corps completely ignored this
Court’s order. The Corps obviously believes that it
can totally ignore its prior hearings and
The Court specifically finds that the Corps’ Report
woas designed to justify a predeternined result—to
deny plaintiff's permit application. Accordingly, this
Court has no choice but to order the current District
Engineer, Charles D. Boyd, III, to comply with this
Court’s order of September 28, 1983 and to recon-
27
sider its decision in the light of that hearing, not as
an adversary but as a fair and impartial determina-
tion. [1902 Atlantic Ltd. „. Boyd, No. 82-533-N,
slip. op. at 15, filed Feb. 8, 1985 (Emphasis added)
Judge Doumar’s statement sums up the experiences
on the Citizens of Chincoteague with the Corps’ imple-
mentation of the Clean Water Act. Where it is already
predetermined by the Corps’ regulations that any alter-
ations to private property are not in the public interest,
and where the permitting process in effect allows no
permits for the filling of non-inundated wetland areas,
any professed fair decision making on the part of the
Corps can only be viewed as a sham, heavily biased
against the property owner. As such, the total restric-
tions that the Section 404 permitting process imposes
effect an unconstitutional regulatory taking.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTING
AMICI PAINT THE ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
OF WETLANDS WITH TOO BROAD A BRUSH.
All areas, wetlands and non-wetlands alike, contribute
in one way or another to the overall environment. How-
ever, the substantia! wetlands values claimed by the Gov-
ernment (Pet. Brief at 14, 39), and NWF (NWF Brief
at 11, 18, 19) do not exist in all wetlands. To infer
to this Court that all wetlands have the same high pro-
ductivity as alleged in the Petitioner’s briefs is mislead-
ing. As noted in a Congressional report, “the intrinsic
values and ecological service provided by wetlands can
vary significantly from one wetland to another and from
one region of the country to another“, Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulations
37 (1984) (hereinafter “Wetlands” ).
Wetlands periodically inundated contribute to some de-
gree in the maintenance of the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the nations waters as alleged. Some
of these wetlands act as a filtering system which prevent
sediment from runoffs and tributaries from directly en-
tering, polluting and clogging the water bodies which
they border. The vegetation in these periodically in-
undated wetlands can act as a breeding ground for fish
and wildlife, and because these wetlands are periodically
flushed with the waters that they border, detrital export
(the transport of decaying organic matter) can occur.
However, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling has no impact on
the regulation of periodically inundated wetlands in the
United States. To the contrary, the Sixth Circuit’s opin-
ion held that periodically inundated wetlands were sub-
ject to regulation under the Clean Water Act. Signifi-
cantly, the developmental pressures upon these types of
wetlands are considerably less because of their location
and characteristics. These wetlands exhibit poor soils
which are not suitable for foundations and lack perco-
lation necessary for septic tanks and drain fields. In
order to raise the elevation sufficiently to avoid the dan-
gers of flooding requires extensive earth moving, which
cannot usually be accomplished with conventional machin-
ery. The resulting cost of development of these wetlands
can be expected to exceed the economic value of the
ground after development, thereby eliminating develop-
ment pressures. Accordingly, nature has built in a cer-
tain degree of protection for its most productive wetlands.
Contrary to the Government’s statement that all “wet-
lands perform the same important function” (Pet. Brief
14), not all wetlands perform important functions and
in fact some may constitute a nuisance and a threat to
public health. Wetlands 37-38. For example, one func-
tion which non-inundated wetlands do not perform is
detrital export. In a wetland not subject to periodic
inundation from adjoining waterbodies, such as those on
Riverside’s land, detrital export does not take place be-
cause of the land barriers which surround the wetland.
Also, not all wetlands purify water through hydraulic
conductivity. Some forms of wetlands have saprie sub-
soils which are sticky, plastic and impervious to water.
A. Ash et al, Natural and Modified Pocosins: Literature
Syntheses and Management Options, 10 (1983) (here-
inafter “Natural Pocosins”). Wetlands with saprie soils
tend to retain water instead of permitting percolation
A A A a el
29
into the soil. The only way water can leave this type ot
wetland is overland. C. Richardson, Pocosin Wetlands
(1981). One result is that chemicals, insecticides and
other pollutants which wash into these pools tend to col-
lect and become concentrated until a heavy rain washes
them into nearby waterbodies causing environme- tal dam-
age. Natural Pocosins 52. Water in wetlands with sticky
soil conditions can also become stagnant or in some cases
highly acidic, precluding the presence of fish and wild-
life Id. at 16.
One life form which thrives under such conditions is
the mosquito. W. King, A Handbook of the Mosquitoes
of the Southeastern United States (1960). Wetlands
which are not periodically inundated by adjacnt water-
bodies provide a natural breeding ground for the mos-
quito. Ibid. Where there is frequent inundation from
adjacent waterbodies, fish that feed on the larvae can
enter and survive. Also, the frequent inundation tends
to flush the larvae out into open waters where they pro-
vide food for non-wetland life forms. Jbid. Non-
frequently inundated wetlands are not subject to the
flushing process and many will not support fish. There-
fore, the larvae has a much better chance of surviving.
Mosquitoes take a costly toll on the surrounding pop-
ulations. They spread disease such as malaria and en-
cephalitis, to name a few, along with causing discom-
fort and lowered productivity to both man and beast.
They effect local economies by discouraging the settle-
ment of new homes and business. They also discourage
tourism, the industry upon which Chincoteague depends.
The most effective method of controlling mosquitoes in
the past has been by draining and filling these stil] water
wetlands where they breed. Communicable Disease Con-
trol, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare:
Mosquitoes of Public Health Importance and Their Con-
trol (1982. If the Sixth Cireuit's holding is not af-
firmed, mosquito control which is now under state and
local control will become increasingly more difficult and
costly. New ditching and land filling will be eliminated
30
and it will be necessary to obtain a Section 404 permit
to maintain ditches that were dug at substantial expense
under prior Federal and State programs. Considering
that thousands of localities must expend tax revenue upon
mosquito control, the cost of the economy as a whole is
substantial.
Accordingly, while it may be conceded that the inun-
dated wetlands, such as the wetlands that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision would protect, do perform some of the
beneficial functions that the Government alleges, the
same cannot be said for all non-inundated wetlands that
the Government now seeks to expand its jurisdiction over.
In fact, some of these wetlands possess negative qualities
which out weigh any contributions which they might make
to the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
nation’s waters.
CONCLUSION
For these reasens and those stated in the Brief of Re-
spondent Bayview Homes, the judgment of the Sixth
Circuit should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD R. NAGEOTTE
NAGBEOTTE, BoRiNsKY & ZELNICK
14908 Jefferson David Highway
Woodbridge, Virginia 22191
(703) 491-4136
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Amici Curiae
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