Brief Amicus Curiae — United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.

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FILED =

No. 84-701 JUN 27 ne,

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IN THE —

Supreme Court of the United State

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner

V.

RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

CITIZENS OF CHINCOTEAGUE

FOR A REASONABLE WETLANDS POLICY

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

RICHARD R. NAGEOTTE

NAGEOTTE, BORINSKY & ZELNICK

14908 Jefferson David Highway

Woodbridge, Virginia 22191

(703) 491-4136

Counsel of Record and

Attorney for Amici Curiae

— ᷑ᷣ̊—̊—̊—ů ES

WILGON - Eres PrinTiING Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

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QUESTION PRESENTED

To what extent are wetlands “waters of the United

States” within the meaning of § 502(7) of the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), and therefore subject

to federal regulatory jurisdiction.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. e ene

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pe es gy ——————jß5ð

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

EE ......

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. eee. ”

EEE EEE

I. WHEN CONGRESS PASSED THE FED-

II.

ERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

AMENDMENTS IN 1972, ITS EXPRESS PUR-

POSE WAS TO CONTROL POLLUTION OF

THE NATION’S WATERS AT THE POINT

SOURCE AND NOT TO ESTABLISH A FED-

ERAL LAND USE PROGRAM TO PRE-

EERE crccensccrcessconessnccsenecessecsesstosees

A. The Corps’ extension of its Section 404 juris-

diction to all wetlands “saturated by surface

or ground water“ resulted from the un-

constitutional delegation of Congress’ legis-

lative function to the executive and judicial

branches of Government

B. The 1977 regulations extended federal regu-

latory power beyond the permissible limits

of the Commerce Clause

THE CORPS’ REGULATIONS RESULT IN A

TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH-

OUT COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

e E

10

13

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

A. Regulation which denies a property owner of

viable, beneficial use of his land constitutes

a taking under the Fifth Amendment 16

B. Application of the Corps’ regulations results

in an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment tak-

ing Of PEIVALS PTOPETTY ............cccccceseceesenceseeeeee 19

III. THE FEAR THAT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE POTEN-

TIAL FOR TAKING BY INTERJECTION OF

FEDERAL JURISDICTION INTO THE BACK-

YARDS OF EVERY CITIZENS IS WELL

— ——ꝛ—— 22

IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORT-

ING AMICI PAINT THE ENVIRONMENTAL

VALUE OF WETLANDS WITH TOO BROAD

2 —— 27

89 30

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980) 18, 19

1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F.Supp. 1381

Ans I lee 26, 27

Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.

D . 12

Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S.

r 7, 17

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) 15

Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States,

D a in 15

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 16

Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, No.

266-82L (Cl. Ct. May 6, 198800))))):· 17, 18

Froehlke v. Leslie Salt Co., 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.

EERIE SEL SR A I ee es OE I a 10

Hampton & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 400

a a a Se aa ek 10

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379

i lls 14

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

BOTH, GE Ute BO COD cccccececcocecccsverecessecocscceess: 13, 14

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 154

„ delish tiie etiilaciniasiiat 18

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (19688) 14

The Montello, 87 U.S. (21 Wall.) 430 (1874) 15

National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v.

SOEs GD Cee Ge CID cicecescenecsmctestecsenssescons 12

NRDC v. Calleway, 392 F.Supp. 385 (D.D.C.

TID. scintdeisicansshegmeaadiaaendia F 7, 13

Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atcheson Co.,

I x 15

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York

r 18

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

1 „

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367

ah a ae aia ee 11

Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102

%%% ̃ AA ̃ ͤ l! 2 hal ita 12

6 — .

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196 (June 26,

1 AA . f —— 18

San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San

Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) ...............................---- 18

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.

11 ̃6—— 10

SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) 12

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) 12

Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands

Commission and City of Los Angeles, No. 82-708

ü ͤ•ö! 2 2

United States v. Applachian Electric Power Co.,

e eseneninenabenaiibente 15

United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357

r x x x 18

United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429 (11th Cir.

1 TP 10

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) 16

Wie ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (194-5 14

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS:

Art. J. § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) ........................ 13

Amend. V (Just Compensation Claus) 18, 19

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.

r i abunenneontonnabelians 6

33 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (1) n 6

,, e ehcale 6

r 6

r Tc eens sree 6

Zr passim

33 U.S.C. 1344 (b) 8 n 20

D 1 11

e,, seiclaaceeubeiednaes 6

D . 7, 10, 15

Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401 et seq......... 6,7

Water Bank Act, 16 U.S.C. 131! 17

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

33 C. F. R.:

Pt. 209:

Section 209.120 (d) (1) (197 7

Section 209.120 (d) (2) (197557 8

33 C. F. R.:

Pt. 320:

e Ret 16, 20

r SD 20

Section $30.4 (b) (4)..................................... 21

Pt. 323:

D RR A ot eat 9

, ̃ Sere NR cna 15

Section 328.2 (b) (2) cece eee 16

r . 3, 4, 8, 9

r AINE CN 9

40 C. F. R.:

Pt. 230:

Section 200. 10 (a) (8) .................................. 21, 26

. ET 10

MISCELLANEOUS:

118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (197 2ù777)ʒ 13

A. Ash et al., Natural and Modified Pocosins: Lit-

erature Synthesis and Management Options

RE secinchitebiitacdnchbbbenitae ieee 28, 29

Communicable Disease Control, U.S. Department

of Health, Education and Welfare; Mosquitoes

of Public Health Importance and Their Control

J ̃ ꝗ— EE eae rea ne See 29

W. King, A Handbook of the Mosquitoes of the

Southeastern United States (1960) 29

Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the

United States, OTA-0-206, Wetlands: Their Use

and Regulation (1984) 7 27, 28

C. Richardson, Pocosin Wetlands (1981)

IN THA

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-701

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

. Petitioner

RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

CITIZENS OF CHINCOTEAGUE

FOR A REASONABLE WETLANDS POLICY

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 36.2, the Citizens of

Chincoteague for a Reasonable Wetlands Policy file this

brief as amici curiae in support of the respondent, River-

side Bayview Homes, Inc. Letters of consent from counsel

for the parties have been filed with the Clerk.

No area of the United States is more directly affected

by the issue of federal regulation of the discharge of fill

material onto wetlands under the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, et seg., than the Island

of Chincoteague, Virginia. Chincoteaque is the beneficiary

of a substantial seafood industry which is dependent upon

clean water and productive wetlands. Chincoteague is

also dependent upon its tourist industry which requires

reasonable utilization of its limited land mass. As a

barrier island, Chincoteague is composed of a continuous

series of upland ridges and lowland swales oriented north

— A ²̊¾•

to south. The lowland swales collect rain water run off

which, combined with a high seasonal water table, results

in ground water at or near the surface. These conditions,

which change from year to year and from season to sea-

son, combined with a generally flat topography, make

drainage difficult and result in vegetation commonly asso-

ciated with fresh water wetlands. The topography of

Chincoteague makes the upland ridges useless for reason-

able economic development unless the low lying swales can

also be filled. Without a reasonably balanced wetland pol-

icy which protects the waters for the fishing industry and

at the same time permits development of the island land

mass for its tourist industry, serious economic damage

will result to the citizens of Chincoteague.

The Citizens of Chincoteague for a Reasonable Wet-

lands Policy is an unincorporated, non-profit organization

of Chincoteague residents who have become concerned

with the effect of the Section 404 program on the Island

of Chincoteague. This brief is paid for by contributions

from the citizens of Chincoteague because of their fear

that the financial and legal resouress of the Petitioner,

United States of America (hereinat er Government“,

and amici curiae National Wildlife ederation, et al.

(hereinafter “NWF), could result in . decision which

does not consider the interests of affected * ul property

owners.

The Government and the NWF claim that t. Sixth

Circuit’s decision threatens the future ability of th ~™-

eral government to “protect ecologically important v

lands” (Pet. Brief at 14). They do not acknowledge tha.

the wetlands which are the subject of this case, and which

they “seek to preserve”, are owned by individual citizens

who under the Constitution have a protected and, there-

fore, vital interest in the proper resolution of this case.'

1 See, Summa Corporation v. California er rel. State Lands Com-

mission and City of Los Angeles, No. 82-708, 80 L.Ed. 2d 237 ( April

17, 1984), where the Court recognized limits to intrusive govern-

mental interference with private property rights.

STATEMENT

Riverside’s land is comprised of one sixty acre parcel

and a partially adjoining twenty acre parcel. The sixty

acre parcel adjacent to Jefferson Avenue had been ac-

tively farmed through the early 1900’s. (Pet. App. 22a).

In 1916, it was platted as a subdivision, storm drains and

fire hydrants were installed. (Pet. App. 22a). The ad-

jacent twenty acre parcel has not been platted. In 1973,

because of unprecedented high water levels in Lake Saint

Clair, a dike was installed across the property, ditches

were filled, and water was pumped onto Riverside’s prop-

erty, disrupting the normal drainage patterns. ( Pet. App.

3a). As a result, a cattail swamp developed on that por-

tion of the property which no longer had proper drainage.

(Pet. App. 29a).

Expert witnesses testifying at trial stated that the soil

type and lack of proper drainage caused the wetland con-

ditions found at the property. (Pet. App. 24a, 25a).

Hydrologic studies conducted on the property yielded con-

flicting results: one expert being of the opinion that

there was a hydrologic connection between Lake Saint

Clair and the property, while another expert testified that

there was no hydrologic connection. (Pet. App. 24a).

The District Court found as a matter of fact that there

was no hydrologic connection between the property and

Lake Saint Clair. Pet. App. 25a, 37a

The District Court had great difficulty applying the

Section 404 regulations to the facts in Riverside’s case.

Judge Kennedy, recognizing that her decision was of

necessity “somewhat arbitrary“, held that under the

The Government, after failing in the District Court to raise the

issue of “saturation”, as defined in the Corps regulations at 33

C.F.R. 323.2(c) asks this Court for the first time on appeal to

address this issue. (Pet. Brief at 44-45) Such a request by the

Government comes too late and this Court is not in a position to

make a finding of fact not made by the District Court.

The District Court was immediately confronted with a central

issue presented to this Court by the Government and NWF, i.e,

when science and constitutional limitations are in conflict, should

C W ůu-ͥ W W

4

1975 regulations Riverside’s property above elevation

575.5 was uplands and that portion of the property below

qualified as wetlands. (Pet. App. 3la). Judge Kennedy

further held that areas of Riverside’s property landward

of the 575.5 elevation line could be filled despite the ex-

istence of wetlands vegetation and other wetlands charac-

teristics. (Pet. App. 31a

While the case was on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the

Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter the Corps“

revised its Section 404 regulations. The Corps’ new

wetlands definition eliminated the requirement of peri-

odie inundation and required only saturation by surface

waters, which can be tide, flood or rainwater and ground

water. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a fac-

tual determination applying the Corps’ 1977 wetlands

definition. (Pet. App. 42a). On remand, Judge Gilmore,

without hearing additional evidence, determined that “as

redefined by 33 C. F. R. 323.2 e, the Army Corp of Engi-

neers definition of ‘waters of the United States’ is

broader than its predecessor”. (Pet. App. 43a). Judge

Gilmore reaffirmed Judge Kennedy’s ruling that all lands

below elevation 575.5 were subject to jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, and the Corps’

1977 regulations. Pet. App. 43a).

On appeal the Sixth Circuit held that “neither inundation

nor aquatic vegetation would be sufficient, standing alone,

to bring a piece of land within the definition. Both must

be present, and the latter must be caused by the former.”

(Pet. App. 10a). The Sixth Circuit held that the proper

interpretation of the words “inundated at a frequency

and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal

circumstances (does) support wetlands vegetation” re-

quires frequent flooding by waters flowing from “navi-

gable waters” as defined in the Act. (Pet. App. 10a,

the requirements of the constitution bend to accommodate science

or must science bend to accommodate constitutional limitations.

(Pet. Brief at 37-39; NWF Brief at 18-21). As further discussed

below, Congress cannot extend its regulatory authority beyond the

authority granted it under the Constitution.

5

l5a). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the defi-

nition applies to marsh, swamps and bogs directly cre-

ated by such waters, but not inland low lying areas such

as the one in question in this case, which sometimes be-

come saturated with water. (Pet. App. 15a).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Citizens of Chincoteague believe that the decision

of the Sixth Circuit is correct and should be affirmed as

it recognizes the distinction between inundated wetlands

formed by waters of the United States, a prerequisite if

jurisdiction is to exist under the Commerce Clause of the

Constitution, and non-inundated wetlands formed by

ground or surface water in association with poor drain-

age which are beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.

Reversal by this Court would effectively remove any

barriers to federal regulation under the Commerce Cause

and leave it a legal concept in name only. The Sixth

Cireuit's decision recognizes and reasonably balances the

competing environmental concerns while preserving the

integrity of the Commerce Clause. /nundated wetlands

directly formed by waters of the United States constitute

the major significant wetlands having characteristics

generally accepted as most valuable to the environment

as a whole, while non-inundated, isolated wetlands of the

type located upon Riverside’s property have the least.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit’s decision, while not so holding,

recognized the real danger of unconstitutional takings

resulting when authority under the Commerce Clause is

exceeded and the regulations and permitting process de-

veloped under the Clean Water Act are used as a vehicle

to ensure preservation of wetlands located upon private

property, rather than to promote Congress’ water quality

goals.

sateen meee

6

I. WHEN CONGRESS PASSED THE FEDERAL

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-

MENTS IN 1972, THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF

THE ACT WAS TO CONTROL POLLUTION OF THE

NATION’S WATERS AT THE POINT SOURCE AND

NOT TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL LAND USE

PROGRAM TO PRESERVE WETLANDS.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972 (hereinafter FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq., were enacted to “. . . restore and maintain the

chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s

waters.” 33 U.S.C. 125l(a). As the statutory goals in

the FWPCA expressly demonstrate, Congress was con-

cerned with water quality. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1251/a)

(1) (“That the discharge of pollutants into the navi-

gable waters be eliminated by 1985.”) To achieve these

goals, the FWPCA provided for federal regulatory super-

vision over water polluting activities from point sources:

Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, established the national

pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) to

apply effluent standards for particular discharges; Sec-

tion 403, 33 U.S.C. 1343, established a program to regu-

late ocean dumping; Section 404, 33 U.S.C. 1344, estab-

lished a permitting process to regulate the discharge

of dredge and fill material into navigable waters. It is

this latter program, Section 404, which is at issue in

the instant case.

Section 30l(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 131l(a),

makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant into the

waters of the United States without a Section 402 ( Riv-

ers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401-413) or Section

404 (FWPCA dredge and fill) permit. Pollutant is de-

fined in Section 502(6) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1362

(6), when it is “. . . discharged into waters.” Section

404 provides that “the Secretary of the Army, acting

through the Chief of Engineers, may issues permits, after

notice and opportunity for public hearings for the dis-

7

charge of dredged of fill material into the navigable

waters at specified disposal sites.“ 33 U.S.C. 1344.

Section 502(7) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7),

defined “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas.” The Corps, pur-

suant to its authority under the FWPCA, published regu-

lations defining its jurisdiction over “navigable waters”

as extending to “those waters of the United States which

are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are

presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the

future, susceptible for use for purpose of interstate or

foreign commerce.” 33 C. F. R. 209-120(d)(1) (1974).

In 1975, in ruling on a suit brought by the National

Resources Defense Council and the National Wildlife Fed-

eration against the Secretary of the Army, the District

Court for the District of Columbia issued a short opinion

granting partial summary judgment. In its brief dis-

cussion of the scope of the Corps’ regulations under Sec-

tion 404, the court stated:

Congress, by defining “navigable waters” in Section

502(7) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251

et. seq. (the “Water Act“ to mean “the waters of

the United States, including the territorial seas“,

asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters

to the maximum extent permissible under the Com-

merce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as

used in the Water Act, the term is not limited to the

traditional tests of navigability. [NRDC v. Call-

away, 392 F.Supp. 385, 386 (D. D.C. 1975

While explicitly acknowledging that the regulatory au-

thority of Congress was limited by the Commerce Clause

and making no reference to wetlands, the Court ordered

* The Corps administered the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.

401-413, while the Environmental! Protection Agency (hereinafter

EPA“ was given general responsibility for administering the

FWPCA. To eliminate the potential jurisdictional overlap and

maintain the Corps’ traditional jurisdiction, the Corps was given

authority to issue Section 404 permits. 118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (1972).

the Corps to publish new regulations “clearly recognizing

the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act.” Id. at

386. The Corps did not appeal this order and the Dis-

trict Court did not rule upon the constitutionality of the

resulting regulations.

The Corps responded by publishing interim regulations

in July of 1975 to “phase-in” expansion of its Section

404 jurisdiction. In administratively defining “navigable

waters“, the 1975 regulations, for the first time, included

certain wetlands as “waters of the United States” and,

therefore, subject to Section 404 jurisdiction. As ex-

plained in the regulations, “waters of the United States”

included :

b All coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and

similar areas that are contiguous or adjacent to

other navigable waters. “Coastal wetlands” includes

marshes and shallows and means those areas peri-

odically inundated by saline or brackish waters and

that are normally characterized by the prevalence of

salt or brackish water vegetation capable of growth

or reproduction.

h Freshwater wetlands including marshes, shal-

lows, swamps, and similar areas that are contiguous

or adjacent to other navigable waters and that sup-

port vegetation. “Freshwater wetlands” means those

areas that are inundated and that are normally

characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that

requires saturated soil conditions for growth and

reproduction. 33 C. F. R. 209. 120d (2) (1975

On July 19, 1977 the Corps promulgated new regula-

tions that again expanded the Section 404 permit juris-

diction over wetlands not previously defined as falling

within the term “waters of the United States They

While the Government contends that the Corps simply “revised

the 1976 interim final regulations to clarify many of the definitional

terms” (Govt’s Brief at 6), it is clear that the 1977 regulations

greatly expanded the Corps jurisdictional authority. On remand

from the Sixth Circuit, the District Court explicitly concluded that

“as redefined by 33 C.F.R. 323.2(c), the Army Corps of Engineers’

9

defined “navigable waters of the United States“, at

33 C. F. R. 323.2(a), as encompassing (1) traditionally

navigable waters, (2) the tributaries of all such naviga-

ble waters, (3) interstate waters, whether or not navi-

gable, (4) the tributaries of all such waters, and (5)

“all other waters of the United States not identified in

paragraphs (1)-(4) above . . . the degradation or de-

struction of which could affect interstate commerce“, 33

C. F. R. 323.2(a) (1-5) (1977). Further, all “adjacent

wetlands” to the waters defined in paragraphs (1)-(4)

were included as “waters of the United States”. These

terms were defined in the regulations as:

(e) The term “wetlands” means those areas that

are inundated or saturated by surface or ground

water at a frequency or duration sufficient to sup-

! port, and that under normal circumstances does sup-

) port, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted

) for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands gen-

erally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar

areas.

(d) The term “adjacent” means bordering, contingu-

: ous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other

waters of the United States by man-made dikes or

barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the

like are “adjacent wetlands”. [33 C. F. R. 323.2(c)

and (d) (1977)]

Amicus curiae contend, that Congress’ failure to clearly

define the term “waters of the United States“, and the

subsequent incorporation by federal agencies of an over-

broad definition of “wetlands” into that term, renders

enforcement of the FWPCA unconstitutional. Because

Congress failed to establish jurisdictional limits to the

Section 404 program, leaving the executive branch of

government to do so by regulation, this Court must not

permit federal agencies to overstep their Constitutional

authority and extend federal regulatory jurisdiction be-

yond permissible bounds.

definition of ‘waters of the United States’ is broader than its

predecessor’. (Pet. App. 43a)

ee

10

A. The Corps’ extension of its Section 404 jurisdiction

to all wetlands “saturated by surface or ground

water” resulted from the unconstitutional delega-

tion of Congress’ legislative function to the execu-

tive and judicial branches of Government.

As mentioned previously, Congress intended that the

FWPCA* be enforced to the “maximum constitutional

limit“, but it left the Corps to define its own jurisdiction.

Amicus curiae contend that the failure of Congress to

prescribe jurisdictional limits constitutes a fatal consti-

tutional flaw.

In enacting the 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water

Act, Congress failed to “lay down .. . an intelligible

principle to which [an executive agency] is directed to

conform,” thereby unconstitutionally delegating its legis-

lative power. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 275

U.S. 400, 409 (1928). By simply redefining “navigable

waters” as “waters of the United States, including the

territorial seas“, 33 U.S.C. 1362 (7), Congress failed to

provide such an intelligible principle. Courts have recog-

nized the lack of guidance and expressed their frus-

tration with Congress’ overbroad delegation. See, e.g.,

United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431 (11th Cir.

1983) (“It may be that the extravagant reach of the

regulations would raise serious problems under some

situations.“; Froehlke v. Leslie Salt Co., 578 F.2d 742,

756 (9th Cir. 1978) (“We express no opinion on the

outer limits to which the Corps’ jurisdiction under the

FWPCA might extend“

Throughout its brief, the Government fails to appre-

ciate that Congress may not “abdicate or transfer to

others the essential legislative functions with which it

it vested.” Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

U.S. 495, 529 (1939). Congress has never included wet-

lands within the definition of waters to be regulated

under the Clean Water Act. The first efforts by the Corps

The 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA changed the popular

name of the FWPCA to the Clean Water Act, which will be used

henceforth.

11

to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material onto

wetlands came not from a specific legislative directive

from Congress, the body elected by the citizens and

charged by the Constitution with that responsibility, but

from a federal regulatory agency itself. See, 40 Fed.

Reg. 31320 (1975).

The Government makes much of the fact that Congress

passed Amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977. The

Government asserts that Congress thereby ratified the

Corps’ regulations of July 19, 1977 extending Section

404 jurisdiction over land characterized by “saturated

soil“ conditions, contending that Congress retroactively

expressed its intent that the Corps exercise jurisdiction

over all “wetlands”. (Pet. Brief at 25). In support of

this proposition, the Government cites Red Lion Broad-

casting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395

U.S. 367 (1969), in which this Court upheld the FCC’s

regulations concerning fairness in broadcasting require-

ments. This case is readily distinguishable, however, as

the Court’s opinion stressed that “Congress has not just

kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative

construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation“.

395 U.S. at 381-382. (Emphasis added) The Court went

on to state:

When the Congress ratified the FCC’s implication of

a fairness doctrine in 1959, it did not, of course,

approve every past decision or pronouncement by the

Commission on this subject, or give it a completely

free hand for the future. The statutory authority

does not go that far. 395 U.S. at 385 (Emphasis

added )

The 1977 Amendments did not mention in any way the

Clean Water Act’s definition of “navigable waters”. The

only mention of wetlands came in an administrative pro-

vision allowing for state assumption of the Section 404

program, 33 U.S.C. 1333(g). Nowhere in the Clean

Water Act has Congress implied that land with no con-

nection to “navigable waters” be encompassed by the

Section 404 program. Unlike the Red Lion case, Congress

12

has never positively addressed the Corps’ Section 404

jurisdiction, let alone through legislative act ratified the

Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction. There are, how-

ever, interesting parallels between the issues before the

Court in Red Lion, and the instant case. If this Court

is to uphold the Corps’ extension of its Section 404 jur-

isdiction to all private property characterized by satu-

rated soil, from whatever cause, the private property of

all landowners will be turned into a public trust just

as surely as were the airwaves in Red Lion.

The Government also cites Bob Jones University v.

United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in support of its

proposition that Congress retroactively expressed its

intent to extend Section 404 permit jurisdiction to land

characterized by “saturated soil.“ The cited portion of

Bob Jones, however, stands only for the unremarkable

proposition that the general words of a statute cannot be

construed to defeat the intent of Congress and that the

interpretation of the regulatory agency charged with

administering a program is due proper deference from

a reviewing court. 461 U.S. at 595-602. The Govern-

ment’s reliance upon the Hob Jones decision is misplaced,

as the Government fails to acknowledge that the principle

of deference to an agency’s interpretation is inappro-

priate where that interpretation has not been consistent.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944),

SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978). As the Corps’

regulations clearly demonstrate, the Corps has been far

from consistent in its interpretation of its en 404

jurisdiction over wetlands.

It is a settled principle that Congress cannot manifest

its intent through silence. Regional Rail Reorganization

Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); National Woodwork

Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).

Had Congress intended Section 404 jurisdiction to ex-

tend to “wetlands” not connected to “navigable waters“

it would have so provided. At no time, however, has Con-

gress done so. Congress has never expressed an intention

that the Clean Water Act be used to assert federal juris-

13

diction over non-inundated land unconnected to “naviga-

ble waters“.

Congress’ failure to provide “an intelligible principle”

to guide the federal regulatory agencies charged with

administering the Clean Water Act has resulted in the

“abdication” of its “essential legislative function”, ren-

dering the application of the Section 404 program uncon-

stitutional. Congress, not the Corps, must make the pol-

icy choices required in national legislation.

B. The 1977 regulations extended federal regulatory

power beyond the permissible limits of the Com-

merce Clause.

The Government’s position before this Court represents

an attempted assertion of federal regulatory authority

that exceeds the permissible limits of the Commerce

Clause. The July 19, 1977 Corps regulations have com-

pletely forsaken the requirement of a nexus between in-

terstate commerce and legislative purpose required by

the Constitution.

The Commerce Clause states that Congress may

“{rjegulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among

the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. To say that Congress intended

that “navigable waters be given the broadest possible

constitutional interpretation”, 118 Cong. Rec. 33699

(1972) and that the Clean Water Act be enforced to the

“maximum extent permissible under the Commerce

Clause,” Callaway, supra, at 856, is to definitionally ac-

knowledge that there are constitutional limits upon Con-

gress’ Commerce Clause powers.

In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), this Court deliniated

the function of judicial review of Commerce Clause legis-

lation as a determination of whether Congress has a ra-

tional basis for “finding that a regulated activity affects

interstate commerce” and whether the means Congress

has chosen are “reasonably adapted to the end permitted

by the Constitution”. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, citing

14

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.

241, 258, 262 (1964). In articulating this test the Court

noted that mere invocation of the Commerce Clause will

not trigger federal jurisdiction. Instead, “Congress must

show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substan-

tial effect on interstate commerce“. 452 U.S. at 313

(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Emphasis added).

The Hodel Court respected long standing precedent in

holding that:

In light of the evidence available to Congress and

the detailed consideration that the legislation re-

ceived, we cannot say that Congress did not have a

rational basis for concluding that surface coal min-

ing has substantial effects on interstate commerce.

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, at 280 (1981) (Emphasis

added

Congress cannot regulate an activity without a demon-

stration that the activity “affects” commerce in some

meaningful way. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197

n.27 (1968) (Congress may not “use a relatively trivia:

impact on commerce as an excuse for a broad general

regulation of state or private activity”); Heart of At-

lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 258 local

activities which have “a substantial and harmful effect

upon that commerce” may be federally regulated) ; Wick-

ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 1944 local activity

may be regulated if “it exerts a substantial economic

effect on interstate commerce

This Court cannot sustain the Corps’ overbroad wet-

land regulations, subjecting to Section 404 permit juris-

diction all private land “saturated by surface or ground

water”, as a proper exercise of Congress’ Commerce

Clause powers. While the Corps’ regulations ostensibly

demonstrate concern to preserve wetlands for their “eco-

logical” and “habitat” value, Congress has never deter-

mined that the discharge of dredge or fill material onto

lands “inundated or saturated by surface or ground wa-

ter is an activity that “affects” interstate commerce,

15

substantially or otherwise, or has any effect upon water

quality, its stated legislative goal.

As previously discussed the Clean Water Act, as

amended by Congress in 1972, regulates the discharge of

pollutants from point sources into the navigable waters.

As Congress’ concern was water quality “navigable wa-

ters” was statutorily defined as “waters of the United

States“, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), in order to extend the reach

of the Clean Water Act further than the traditional def-

inition of navigable waters.’ At no time, however, did

Congress express its intention that all wetlands, let alone

land “saturated by surface or ground water”, be sub-

jected to the Section 404 permitting process.

The Corps’ 1977 redefinition of wetlands to include

areas of vegetation resulting from “surface or ground

water’, including isolated weilands such as those in the

instant case, represents a substantia! increase in alleged

federal jurisdiction to include much of the land mass of

the United States. This regulation constitutes a clear and

distinct break of the Commerce Clause nexus and places

under federal regulatory jurisdiction all wetlands re-

gardless of their connection to the navigable waters of

the United States. By administrative regulation, not

legislation, these wetlands are now included within the

term “waters of the United States”.

Amicus curiae believe that the Sixth Cireuit's deci-

sion holding that those areas subject to federal regula-

The Corp's traditional jurisdiction over navigable waters,

codified at 33 C.F.R. 323.2(b), was developed from this Court's

decisions in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (waters

navigable in fact and used, or susceptible of use, in their ordinary

condition, for commerce); The Montello, 87 U.S. (21 Wall.) 430

(1874) (extended to waters capable of use, though not actually

used, in commerce) ; Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States,

256 U.S. 113 (1921) (non-navigable portions of navigable water-

bodies; United States v. Aj palachain Electric Power Co., 311 U.S.

377 (1940) (waters that, through reasonable improvement, could

be made navigable); and, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.

Atcheson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (non-navigable tributaries of

navigable waters).

5 WWW W- W r

16

tory jurisdiction must be limited to areas so frequently

inundated by waters of the United States as to make

them also a part of waters of the United States is cor-

rect. To rule otherwise would ignore the fact that Con-

gress has never determined that land “inundated or sat-

urated by surface or ground water” has any connection

to interstate commerce and effectively render the Com-

merce Clause meaningless.

II. THE CORPS’ REGULATIONS RESULT IN A TAK-

ING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT COM-

PENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-

TION OF THE UNITED STATES.

A. Regulation which denies a property owner of viable,

beneficial use of his land constitutes a taking under

the Fifth Amendment.

The Clean Water Act has been moulded by the execu-

tive branch into regulations containing a permitting

process typical of zoning and land use regulation avail-

able only to the states under their general police power

jurisdiction. See, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraus, 416

U.S. 1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US.

365 (1926). The permitting policies of the Corps have

evolved into an extensive public interest review process,

considering such factors as:

“ . conservation, economics, aesthetics, general en-

vironmental concerns, historic values, flood damage

protection, land use, navigation, recreation, water

supply, water quality, energy needs, safety, food

production, and in general, the needs and welfare

of the people”. 33 C. F. R. 320.4(a) (1)]

When these regulations are coupled with the Corps’ ex-

panded definition of wetlands as land “inundated or

saturated by surface or ground water”, 33 C. F. R. 323.2

(b (2), the Corps’ implementation of its Section 404

program results in a policy of extensive federal land use

regulation that does not consider as significant the pro-

tected interest of the property owner.

This pervasive regulatory structure, purportedly au-

thorized under the Commerce Clause, raises serious “tak-

17

ing” concerns under the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-

tution of the United States. As the Sixth Circuit ob-

served, “A very real taking problem [is raised] with the

exercise of such apparently unbounded jurisdiction by

the Corps” (Pet. App. 15a). This observation was un-

derscored by the United States Claims Court in its recent

decision in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,

No. 266-82L (U.S. Claims Court, filed May 6, 1985).

In that case, the Claims Court held that denial of a Sec-

tion 404 permit to a company wishing to mine phosphate

constituted a Fifth Amendment taking for which com-

pensation was due. After noting that the federal govern-

ment has a program to preserve wetlands deemed ecologi-

cally important by compensating the property owner,” to

conserve wetlands, the Claims Court evaluated the Fifth

Amendment “taking” issue by noting:

The difficulty arises because the property in ques-

tion does not belong to the public but to the plain-

tiff. It may be perfectly appropriate to consider only

the public interest factors when determining the use

of public land. However, when government treats

private land as if it were its own, ignoring the in-

terests of the property owner and rendering the

property economically useless, it has worked a tak-

ing and, under our constitution, compensation is

due.” [Florida Rock, slip op. at 24.]

The Claims Court’s analysis in Florida Rock, is fuily

compatible with this Court’s decision in Chicago RJ. &

P. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 (1931), in which

this Court ruled that “confiscation may result from a

taking of the use of property without compensation quite

as well as from the taking of title.” 284 U.S. at 96.

This Court has long held to the principle that “if regula-

tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”.

Most interestingly though, is the Water Bank Act. Under this

Act, Congress recognized that it is in the public interest to pre-

serve, restore and improve the wetlands of the Nation, and thereby

to conserve surface waters, to preserve and improve habitat for

migratory waterfowl and other wildlife resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1301

(1982) [Florida Rock, slip op. at 22).

.

18

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

Accord, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980);

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438

U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Central Eureka Min-

ing Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). In Kaiser Aetna v. United

States, 444 U.S. 154 (1979) this Court reiterated this

principle in holding that the exercise of federal regula-

tory authority to require the owners of a private marina

to allow free public access would have amounted to a tak-

ing for which compensation would be due. 444 U.S. at

345.

Riverside finds itself in precisely the same situation

as the plaintiff in Florida Rock, supra, as the Corps’ as-

sertion of Section 404 jurisdiction over its property and

denial of a Section 404 permit effectively forces it to

preserve its property in a natural state. The Claims

Court specifically noted that any construction connected

with alternative uses of the land at issue would require

a Section 404 permit and made a finding of fact that

“it is unthinkable that the Corps would issue such a per-

mit in light of its denial of plaintiff’s application.” Flor-

ida Rock, slip op. at 4 (footnote omitted). It specifically

held that “denial of the [Section 404] permit therefore

has deprived plaintiff of all economically viable use of it

land.” Id., slip op. at 5.

The Sixth Circuit’s recognition of a “very real tak-

ing problem with the exercise of such apparently un-

bounded jurisdiction by the Corps” was well founded and

fully consistent with settled Fifth Amendment analysis.

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196, 81 L.Ed. 2d

815, 833-834 (June 26, 1984) (Government action short

of acquisition of title or occupancy can work a taking if

its effect is to deprive the owner of all or most of his

interest in the subject matter); San Diego Gas v. City

of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981) (Dissenting opin-

ion by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell)

(“taking” may occur without a formal condemnation

proceeding or transfer of fee simple) ; Agins, 447 U.S. at

262 (1980) (Fifth Amendment taking occurs when gov-

19

ernmental regulation “denies an owner economically

viable use of his lands“

Amicus curiae contend that the federal regulatory

agencies have utilized the Section 404 program as a

federal land use mechanism in violation of the Fifth

Amendment requirement of just compensation for gov-

ernmental taking of private property.

B. Application of the Corps’ regulations results in an

unconstitutional Fifth Amendment taking of pri-

vate property.

The Sixth Circuit addressed a major concern of the

Citizens of Chincoteague in recognizing that the inter-

jection of federal jurisdiction into the backyards of every

citizen may result in an unconstitutional “taking” of

property. Nowhere is this concern better appreciated

and understood than on the Island of Chincoteague which

includes many low-lying damp areas that might be con-

sidered “wetlands” under the Corps’ far reaching defini-

tion.

The Government and the NWF state that wetlands of

the United States and wetlands of the States will be lost

if this Court does not reverse the decision in this case.

(Pet. Brief at 40 and NWF Brief at 19) They assert

that reversal will permit the preservation of these vast

wetlands areas. If the permitting process is, as they as-

sert, merely a permitting process and not a regulatory

) taking, how will their objective of preservation of these

wetlands result? The answer is found in the regulations

of the Corps where, once jurisdiction is established, a

property owner is no longer free to put his property to

any economically viable or beneficial use that he may

choose. At that point, all choice of use is transferred to

the Corps and as will be discussed, the Corps is predis-

| posed under the regulations towards not allowing any

reasonable use of property that it determines is a wet-

lands.

The Government argues that a taking of private prop-

erty does not arise from the mere assertion of regulatory

—

20

authority to require an application for a permit. Pet.

Brief at 30-32). In this case, however, the Corps’ per-

mitting system is designed to preclude alternative, bene-

ficial uses to property owners of land “administratively

defined” as wetlands. Instead, the permitting process of

the Corps is designed to deny permit requests or to grant

permits only under very limited circumstances, thereby

making the total use restrictions imposed at the onset

of the Corps’ jurisdiction permanent.

The Government has asserted in its brief that a Corps

permit will be issued if the proposed activity complies

with the guidelines issued under 404(b) of the Act, 33

U.S.C. 1344(b), and is otherwise not contrary to the

public interest. Pet. Brief at 40). The problem with the

Government's proposition is that the Corps’ regulations

predetermine that the filling of wetlands is not in the

public interest. The Corps’ regulations direct that no

permit will be granted unless its issuance is found to be

in the public interest.” 33 C. F. R. 320.4(a). The section

immediately following states in turn, that “|w]etlands

are vital areas that constitute a productive and valuable

public resource, the unnecessary alteration or destruction

of which should be discouraged as contrary to the public

interest.“ 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b) (Emphasis added). This

regulatory predetermination that the filling of wetlands

is not in the public interest raises an insurmountable

barrier for a property owner to overcome in attempting

to obtain a fill permit. If it is not in the public interest

to fill wetlands and a citizen files a permit application to

fill wetlands, then the permit must be denied because it

is not in the public interest.

In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, the Government

argues that it is only fill proposals requiring an un-

necessary alteration of wetlands that the permitting pro-

gram is designed to prohibit. Pet. Brief at 11, 42) The

fallacy of the Government’s argument lies in the Corps’

regulations, which set forth criteria to be used in de-

termining what projects constitute a necessary filling.

Under this criteria no realistic proposals can qualify for

;

21

a permit. The relevant Corps’ regulations, 33 C. F. R.

320.4(b) (4), and those of the EPA, 40 C.F.R. 230.10

(a) (3) address what the Corps considers to be a neces-

sary alteration.’ These sections provide that no permit

will be granted unless two requirements are met: the

proposed use must be water dependent; and there can be

no other practicable alternative sites available.

The requirement of water dependency may be reason-

able in the case of a project proposal for a frequently

inundated wetland, as a frequently inurdated wetland is

connected to a waterbody. However, this requirement is

totally unreasonable when applied to a non-inundated wet-

land like Riverside’s property because the non-inundated

wetland is not connected to a waterbody. Logic dictates

that a water dependent project would not be located on a

site that is not connected to a waterbody. The only

realistic project proposal for a non-inundated wetland

would be one that was not water dependent which, in ac-

cordance with the Corps’ and EPA's regulations, has al-

ready been predetermined to be an unnecessary alteration

of a wetland and therefore, not in the public interest.

The second requirement under 33 C.F.R. 320(b) (4)

and 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a) that there be no alternative site

33 C.F.R. 320(b) (4) states:

No permit will be granted to work in wetlands identified as

important by subparagraph (2), above, unless the District

Engineer concludes, on the basis of the analysis required in

paragraph (a) above. that the benefits of the proposed altera-

tion outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource and the

proposed alteration is necessary to realize those benefits. /n

evaluating whether a particular alteration is necessary, the

District Engineer shall consider whether the proposed activity

is primarily dependent on being located in, or in close proximity

to the aquatic environment and whether feasible alternative

sites are available. (Emphasis added).

EPA's regulation 40 C. F. R. 230.10(a) (3) has a similar requirement:

no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if

there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge

which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem.

The current regulations of both agencies are substantially un-

changed versions of the 1977 regulations.

22

available for the proposed use is equally unreasonable.

The Government acknowledges that the regulations pre-

sume that there are alternative sites for all proposed

uses, with the property owner having the burden of over-

coming this presumption. (Pet. Brief at 41). Amicus

curiae submits that there are very few, if any, non-water

dependent projects where there are no practicable alter-

native sites available for the proposed use. As such, the

presumption imposed by the Corps and EPA regulations

is impossible to overcome. This impossibility, coupled

with the unreasonable requirement of water dependency,

has the effect of preventing any realistic economic or

beneficial use of property such as Riverside’s.

the right of the property owner to put his land to some

economically viable or beneficial use.

process, being heavily biased against granting a permit

for any realistic economic or beneficial use, does nothing

to cure the regulatory taking that results from total

at the

Ii. THE FEAR THAT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Ex-

PRESSED CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL

TAKING BY INTERJECTION OF THE CORPS’

JURISDICTION INTO THE BACKYARDS OF

EVERY CITIZEN IS WELL FOUNDED.

There are an infinite number of sites throughout this

country, including many on Chincoteague, that have low

lying damp areas which could qualify as “wetlands”

under the Corps’ extremely broad definition. The follow-

ing are just a few examples of the types of “takings”

effectuated by the Corps under the Section 404 permit

requirements upon some of our citizens.

23

31 lots and is bounded by Ridge Road and Division

Street. Lot 23 is also bounded by Pinedale Drive

and Rosedale Drive. Mr. and Mrs. Ransley’s inland

property is located in an upland area of Chincoteague not

in the vicinity of any waters of the United States. It

includes a low area 30 feet wide by 100 feet long

which, because of poor drainage supports cattails and

other wetland vegetation. In order to build their home,

it was necessary for the Ransleys to fill this area.

They were advised by the Corps that a permit was

required. They applied to all state and local wetlands

agencies and were advised that a permit was not nec-

essary. The Corps processed their application and on Jan-

uary 24, 1985, denied their permit request claiming it

was necessary “based on a public interest review, to deny

the project as proposed due to the lack of a justifiable

néed to destroy valuable wetlands.” As a result, Mr. and

Mrs. Ransley have been barred from building their house

on Lot 23.

2. In 1969, three years before the FWPCA was en-

acted, Richard and Carolyn Conklin purchased upland

property located in a developed residential area near the

center of Chincoteague. They began constructing a row

of townhouses on the property in early 1982. On Sep-

tember 9, 1983 they received a Formal Cease and Desist

Order from the Corps advising them that they had filled

wetlands within their regulatory jurisdiction. The order

gave them fifteen days to remove the fill. The cease and

desist order pertained to an approximately 100 x 100

foot area which can be described as a sink hole with a

lower topography that contained trash and other debris.

The Corps described the area as a wetland relatively

small in size, isolated by surrounding upland and cut off

from any inundation. The Corps admitted that even

without any filling by the Conklins, the wetland vegeta-

| tion probably would have decreased in time due to its

isolation.

Upon receiving the cease and desist order, the Conklins

agreed to submit an After-the-Fact Application for au-

Z

24

thorization to fill and also agreed to the Corps’ demands

for mitigation. Mitigation as practiced by the Corps and

its consulting environmental agencies requires that a

property owner requesting a permit bulldoze uplands

and make them into wetlands as the price for receiving

a permit.

Mitigation in this case required the purchase of two

parcels of property totalling more than 10,000 square

feet, clearing off all trees and other upland vegetation,

lowering the elevation of the land to a point which

would allow tidal waters to flood the land and then plant-

ing and fertilizing 8,999 spartina alternaflora sprigs and

361 Iva frutescens plants, thereby creating two man-made

bogs out of what was before high and dry land.

3. Terry and Debra Combs, Jay and Barbara Mason,

Teri and Dana Gorner, George and Linda Hall, James

and Nancy Adams, William and Patricia Jones, Richard

and Rosemary Merrill, David and Elaine Fioriglio, Kruno

Flipic, James Jester, Earl Ross and Charles Snear all

owned property in a residential subdivision known as the

Ridge Road Development located in Chincoteague. More

than a year after these lots were purchased and after

four homes had been constructed, the Corps and the

EPA brought suit in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia against each of these

individuals, along with the developer of the Ridge Road

Development, alleging that the property to which they

held title was once a wetland under the Corps’ jurisdic-

tion and that the developer had filled this property with-

out a Corps permit. The government sought a Court

order to restore the development to its former condition

notwithstanding that the property had been purchased

more than a year earlier and homes had been con-

structed on four of the twelve lots.

After a year of costly legal proceedings the suit was

dismissed due to lack of evidence. The cumulative legal

expenses of the property owners exceeded $30,000.00 and

during the year of litigation they were unable to sell,

develop or make any improvements on their land.

25

4. Mr. Delmas Mears owns a lot located on Chinco-

teague on which he operates an auto repair business

On November 18, 1983 he received a notice from the

Corps advising him that aerial photographs revealed that

a wetland which was once located in his backyard in

1977 had been filled without a permit and that he had

thirty days to either remove the fill or apply for an

After-the-Fact Permit. This area contained approxi-

mately .65 acres covered with grass. The Corps claimed

that it was at one time a cattail patch. The Corps also

gave the same notice of violation to Mr. Mears’ next door

neighbors, Mr. Williams and Mr. Hall.

Mr. Mears freely admitted that he had added sand over

the years since 1968 to a low area in his backyard which

previously was a breeding ground for rats and mosquitoes.

But, he denied that this property was ever a “wetland”.

Mr. Williams and Mr. Hall were not required to re-

move the fill from their properties after agreeing to pay

$500.00 and signing a Consent Order. Mr. Mears, not

wanting to pay $500.00, applied for an After-the-Fact

Permit.

On reviewing Mr. Mears’ application, the Corps noted

that most of his property was uplands and that there

had been considerable “legal filling“ done all around his

property. Nevertheless, on May 24, 1985, the Corps de-

nied Mr. Mears’ permit, finding:

(T]he completed project to be contrary to the public

interest because of the unnecessary loss of fresh-

water wetlands and because of the potential for

cumulative environmental degradation.

The Corps, acknowledging that it would be of little

or no benefit to the environment in the area to require

Mr. Mears to remove the fill, instead put him on notice of

their intent to refer the matter to the Justice Department

for an appropriate civil penalty. As of this date, Mr.

Mears is awaiting further Government action.

5. The following case occurred in nearby Chesapeake,

Virginia. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. applied for a permit on

26

April 22, 1981 to fill a man-made borrow pit upon which

it planned te build an industrial complex. The borrow

pit was created by three man-made enbankments with

a small ditch cutting across the center that allowed tide

water into the pit. The Corps denied the permit stating

that the proposed project was not “water dependent” as

required by 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a) (3). 1902 brought suit

claiming that the denial of the permit was arbitrary and

capricious and that the Corps’ action was an unconstitu-

tional regulatory taking. The Court agreed, stating that

the Corps’ actions not only resulted in a diminution in

value of the property, but also denied 1902 all viable

economic use of their property. The Court also held the

permit denial was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of

discretion and the Corps was ordered to reconsider the

permit without imposing the unlawful requirements which

exist. 1902 Atlantic Limited v. Hudson, 574 F.Supp.

1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).

As of this date, 1902 still does not have a permit, and

it appears that the Corps has no intention of complying

with the District Court’s original Order. In the District

Court’s most recent Order, Judge Doumar stated:

On September 28, 1983 this Court ordered the Corps

to either reconsider the plaintiff’s permit application

in accordance with the views expressed in its opin-

ion or to commence condemnation proceedings. The

Corps chose to do neither. Instead, the Corps effec-

tively considered the application de novo and paid

no attention whatsoever to the Court’s findings of

the fact and conclusions of law. Except for refer-

ring to the subsequent administrative proceeding as

a rehearing, the Corps completely ignored this

Court’s order. The Corps obviously believes that it

can totally ignore its prior hearings and

The Court specifically finds that the Corps’ Report

woas designed to justify a predeternined result—to

deny plaintiff's permit application. Accordingly, this

Court has no choice but to order the current District

Engineer, Charles D. Boyd, III, to comply with this

Court’s order of September 28, 1983 and to recon-

27

sider its decision in the light of that hearing, not as

an adversary but as a fair and impartial determina-

tion. [1902 Atlantic Ltd. „. Boyd, No. 82-533-N,

slip. op. at 15, filed Feb. 8, 1985 (Emphasis added)

Judge Doumar’s statement sums up the experiences

on the Citizens of Chincoteague with the Corps’ imple-

mentation of the Clean Water Act. Where it is already

predetermined by the Corps’ regulations that any alter-

ations to private property are not in the public interest,

and where the permitting process in effect allows no

permits for the filling of non-inundated wetland areas,

any professed fair decision making on the part of the

Corps can only be viewed as a sham, heavily biased

against the property owner. As such, the total restric-

tions that the Section 404 permitting process imposes

effect an unconstitutional regulatory taking.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTING

AMICI PAINT THE ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

OF WETLANDS WITH TOO BROAD A BRUSH.

All areas, wetlands and non-wetlands alike, contribute

in one way or another to the overall environment. How-

ever, the substantia! wetlands values claimed by the Gov-

ernment (Pet. Brief at 14, 39), and NWF (NWF Brief

at 11, 18, 19) do not exist in all wetlands. To infer

to this Court that all wetlands have the same high pro-

ductivity as alleged in the Petitioner’s briefs is mislead-

ing. As noted in a Congressional report, “the intrinsic

values and ecological service provided by wetlands can

vary significantly from one wetland to another and from

one region of the country to another“, Office of Tech-

nology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulations

37 (1984) (hereinafter “Wetlands” ).

Wetlands periodically inundated contribute to some de-

gree in the maintenance of the chemical, physical and

biological integrity of the nations waters as alleged. Some

of these wetlands act as a filtering system which prevent

sediment from runoffs and tributaries from directly en-

tering, polluting and clogging the water bodies which

they border. The vegetation in these periodically in-

undated wetlands can act as a breeding ground for fish

and wildlife, and because these wetlands are periodically

flushed with the waters that they border, detrital export

(the transport of decaying organic matter) can occur.

However, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling has no impact on

the regulation of periodically inundated wetlands in the

United States. To the contrary, the Sixth Circuit’s opin-

ion held that periodically inundated wetlands were sub-

ject to regulation under the Clean Water Act. Signifi-

cantly, the developmental pressures upon these types of

wetlands are considerably less because of their location

and characteristics. These wetlands exhibit poor soils

which are not suitable for foundations and lack perco-

lation necessary for septic tanks and drain fields. In

order to raise the elevation sufficiently to avoid the dan-

gers of flooding requires extensive earth moving, which

cannot usually be accomplished with conventional machin-

ery. The resulting cost of development of these wetlands

can be expected to exceed the economic value of the

ground after development, thereby eliminating develop-

ment pressures. Accordingly, nature has built in a cer-

tain degree of protection for its most productive wetlands.

Contrary to the Government’s statement that all “wet-

lands perform the same important function” (Pet. Brief

14), not all wetlands perform important functions and

in fact some may constitute a nuisance and a threat to

public health. Wetlands 37-38. For example, one func-

tion which non-inundated wetlands do not perform is

detrital export. In a wetland not subject to periodic

inundation from adjoining waterbodies, such as those on

Riverside’s land, detrital export does not take place be-

cause of the land barriers which surround the wetland.

Also, not all wetlands purify water through hydraulic

conductivity. Some forms of wetlands have saprie sub-

soils which are sticky, plastic and impervious to water.

A. Ash et al, Natural and Modified Pocosins: Literature

Syntheses and Management Options, 10 (1983) (here-

inafter “Natural Pocosins”). Wetlands with saprie soils

tend to retain water instead of permitting percolation

A A A a el

29

into the soil. The only way water can leave this type ot

wetland is overland. C. Richardson, Pocosin Wetlands

(1981). One result is that chemicals, insecticides and

other pollutants which wash into these pools tend to col-

lect and become concentrated until a heavy rain washes

them into nearby waterbodies causing environme- tal dam-

age. Natural Pocosins 52. Water in wetlands with sticky

soil conditions can also become stagnant or in some cases

highly acidic, precluding the presence of fish and wild-

life Id. at 16.

One life form which thrives under such conditions is

the mosquito. W. King, A Handbook of the Mosquitoes

of the Southeastern United States (1960). Wetlands

which are not periodically inundated by adjacnt water-

bodies provide a natural breeding ground for the mos-

quito. Ibid. Where there is frequent inundation from

adjacent waterbodies, fish that feed on the larvae can

enter and survive. Also, the frequent inundation tends

to flush the larvae out into open waters where they pro-

vide food for non-wetland life forms. Jbid. Non-

frequently inundated wetlands are not subject to the

flushing process and many will not support fish. There-

fore, the larvae has a much better chance of surviving.

Mosquitoes take a costly toll on the surrounding pop-

ulations. They spread disease such as malaria and en-

cephalitis, to name a few, along with causing discom-

fort and lowered productivity to both man and beast.

They effect local economies by discouraging the settle-

ment of new homes and business. They also discourage

tourism, the industry upon which Chincoteague depends.

The most effective method of controlling mosquitoes in

the past has been by draining and filling these stil] water

wetlands where they breed. Communicable Disease Con-

trol, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare:

Mosquitoes of Public Health Importance and Their Con-

trol (1982. If the Sixth Cireuit's holding is not af-

firmed, mosquito control which is now under state and

local control will become increasingly more difficult and

costly. New ditching and land filling will be eliminated

30

and it will be necessary to obtain a Section 404 permit

to maintain ditches that were dug at substantial expense

under prior Federal and State programs. Considering

that thousands of localities must expend tax revenue upon

mosquito control, the cost of the economy as a whole is

substantial.

Accordingly, while it may be conceded that the inun-

dated wetlands, such as the wetlands that the Sixth Cir-

cuit’s decision would protect, do perform some of the

beneficial functions that the Government alleges, the

same cannot be said for all non-inundated wetlands that

the Government now seeks to expand its jurisdiction over.

In fact, some of these wetlands possess negative qualities

which out weigh any contributions which they might make

to the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the

nation’s waters.

CONCLUSION

For these reasens and those stated in the Brief of Re-

spondent Bayview Homes, the judgment of the Sixth

Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD R. NAGEOTTE

NAGBEOTTE, BoRiNsKY & ZELNICK

14908 Jefferson David Highway

Woodbridge, Virginia 22191

(703) 491-4136

Counsel of Record and

Attorney for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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