Appendix — Anthony Grandison v. Maryland

Supreme Court brief1986

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so. 85-7165

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ANTHONY GRANDISON, SR.

Petitioner

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

APPENDIX

Ow” 4¥

RECEIVED AM 1986 \ ,)

POLICE DEPARTMENT 8/9118 11) 12) 1,2, 4 He

14/2)§

JU 6

am ae 1986 Nancy L. Cook

A

78,9) 10) 11) 12)1)2 34 i Appellate Advocacy Clinic

S Ui, 3 Washington College of Law

Vall wel NWLP The American University

4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20016

(262) 885-1500

Counsel for Petitioner

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial j

of the State and district wherein the crime shall ha

been committed, which district shall have been

previously ascertained by iaw, and to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted

with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to

have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

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United States Constitution, Amendment VIII:

essive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

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United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:

‘ (N)or shall any state deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,

nor deny to any perscr within the jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, Sec. 412:

§ 412. Punishment for murder.

(a) Designation of degree for court or jury

-- If a person is found guilty of murder, the court of

ury that determined the person's guilt shall state in

he verdict whether the person is guilty of murder in

he first degree or murder in the second degree.

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(b) Penalty for

found guilty of murder

first degree murder.

in the first deg: >

A person

shall be

sentenced either

to death or

to imprisonment for life.

The sentence shall be

imprisonment for

life unless (1)

the State notified the person

days prior to trial that it

of death, and advised the per

in writing at least 30

intended to seek a sentence

son of each aggravating

circumstance upon which it intended to rely, and (2) a

sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413.

(c) Penalty for second degree murder. -- A

person found guilty of murder in the second degree sal}

be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, Sec. 413>

§ 413. Sentencing procedure upon finding of guilty of |

firsc degree murder.

. o e Ain au a oo

Separate sentencing proceeding required

If a person is found guilty of murder in the first

degree, and if the State had given the notice required

under Sec. 412(b), a separate sentencing proceeding

shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the

trial has been completed to determine whether he shall

be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life.

(b) Before whom proceeding conducted. -- This

proceeding shall be conducted:

(1) Before the jury that determined the

defendant's guilt; or

2 Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the

proceeding if

(i) The defendant was convicted upon a plea of

guiity;

(ii) The defendant was convicted after a trial

before the court sitting without a jury;

(1) The following type of evidence

in this proceeding:

is admissible

;

(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating

circumstance listed in subsection \g) of this section;

(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating

circumstance listed in subsection (d) of this section

which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to

Section 412(b);

(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions,

pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of

such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent

admissible in other sentencing procedures;

i Any presentence investigation report.

However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in

the report is not admissible; and

(v Any other evidence that the court deems of

probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the

defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any

Statements.

(2 The State and the defendant or his counsel ma

present argument for or against the sentence of death

(3) After presentation of the evidence in a

proceeding before a jury, in addition to any other

appropriate instructions permitted by law, the court

shall instruct the jury as to the findings it must make

in order to determine whether the sentence shall be

death or imprisonment for life and the burden of proof

applicable to these findings in accordance with

subsection (f) or subsection (h) of this section.

(a) Consideration of aggravating circumstances

-- In determining the sentence, the court or jury, as

the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a

reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating

circumstances exist:

(1 The victim was a law enforcement officer whc

was murdered while in the performance of his duties

(2) The defendant committed the murder at a time

when he was confined in any correctional institution

(3) The defendant committed the murder in

furtherance of an escape or an attempt to escape from

evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or 5

an officer or guard of a correctional institution or »

a law enforcement officer

‘

(4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken

in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt

to kidnap or abduct.

(5) The victim was a child abducted in violation

of § 2 of this article.

(6) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to

an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise

of remuneration to commit the murder.

person to commit the murder and

pursuant to an agreement or cont:

the promise of remuneration.

(7) he defendant engaged or emp]

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(8) At the time of the murder

under sentence of death or imprisonment f:

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(9) The defend

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(e) Definition. -- su

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(2) The term “correctional institut

any institution for the detention or confinement

persons charged with or convicted of a

Patuxent Institution, any institution f

Or confinement of juveniles charged wit!

as being delinquent, and any hospital in

person was confined pursuant to an order of ac

exercising criminal jurisdiction.

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(3) The term "law enforcement officer” has the

meaning given in § 727 of Article 27. However, as used

the term also includes (i) an officer

lonary status, (ii) a parole and

d (iii) a law enforcement officer

tside of Maryland.

-4-

exist. -- If the court or jury does not find, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating

circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in

writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for

life.

(g) Consideration of mitigating circumstances.

-- If the court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that one or more of these aggravating

circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether,

based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the

following mitigating circumstances exist:

1) The defendant has not previously (i) found

ty of a crime of violence, (ii) entered a plea of

ty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of

ence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay

ntry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of

ce. As used in this paragraph, “crime of

" means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping,

manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem,

murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first

or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these

offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a

felony or another crime of violence.

2) The victim was a participant in the

| ndant's conduct or consented to the act which caused

the victim's death.

(3) The defendant acted under substantial dur

domination or provocation of another person, Dut no

substantial as to constitute a complete defense to

pr

(4) The murder was committed while the capacity of

the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

law was substantially impaired as a result of mental

incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance, or

intoxication.

(5S) The youthful age of the defendant at the time

of the crime.

(6 The act of the defendant was not the sole

prox 0 cause of the victim's death.

It is unlikel t

7) ] at the defendant wi

ther criminal act

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ity that would constitute a

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in fur ivi

continuing threat to society.

(8) Any other facts which the jury or the court

specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as

Mitigating circumst@nces in the case.

(h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating

Circumstances. -- (1) If the court or jury finds

one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist

shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the

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evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the

aggravating circumstances.

(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumst

do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the

sentence shall be death.

(3) If it finds that the mit

outweigh the aggravating circumstan

shall be imprisonment for life.

ances

(i) Determination to be written and unanimou

The determination of the court or jury shall be in

writing, and, if a jury, shall be unanimous and sh

Signed by the foreman.

(3) t qui in determination. -

determination of the court or Jury shall state,

specifically:

(1) Which, if any, aggravating circumstances

finds to exist;

(2) Which, if any, mitigating circumstances

finds to exist;

3 Whether any mitigating circumstances fou

under subsection (g) Outweigh the aggravating

circumstances found under subsection (4d);

(4) Whether the aggravating circumstances fo

under subsection (d) are not Outweighed by mitigat

circumstances found under subsection (9g); and

(5) The sentence, determined in accordance w

subsection (f) or (h).

(k) Imposition of sentence. -- (l The

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Shall impose the sentence determined by the jury u

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Subsection (f£) or (h)

(2) If the jury, within a reasonable time is

able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dism

the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for

(3) If the sentencing proceeding is conducte

before a court without a jury, the court shall imp

the ntence determined under subsection (f) or (h

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(1) Rules of procedure. -- The Court of Appeals

may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a

sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this

section, including any forms to be used by the court or

jury in making its written findings and determinations

of sentence.

(m) Alternate jurors. -- (1) A judge shall

appoint at least 2 alternate jurors when impaneling a

jury for any proceeding:

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i) In which the defendant is being tri

crime for which the death penalty may be impo

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(ii) Which is held under the provisions of this

(2) The alternate jurors shall be retained during

the length of the proceedings under such restrictions

and regulations as the judge may impose.

(3) (1) If any juror dies, becomes incapacitated,

or disqualified, or is discharged for any other reason

before the jury begins its deliberations on sentencing,

an alternate juror becomes a juror in the order in which

selected, and serves in all respects as those selected

on the regular trial panel.

(ii) An alternate juror may not replace a juro. whe

is discharged during the actual deliberations of the

; ilt mnocence of the defendant, or on

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ury on the guilt

he issue of sente

Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 414:

§ 414. Automatic review of death sentences.

(a) Review by Court of Appeals required. --

Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and the judgment

becomes final, the court of Appeals shall review the

sentence on the record.

(b) Transmission of papers to Court of Appeals. --

The clerk of the trial court shall transmit to the Clerk

of the Court of Appeals the entire record and transcript

of the sentencing proceeding within ten days after

receipt of the transcript by the trial court. The clerk

also shall transmit the written findings and

determination of the court or jury and a report prepared

by the trial court. The report shall be in the form of

a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the

Court of Appeals of Maryland and shall include a

recommendation by the trial court as to whether or not

imposition of the sentence of death is justified in the

case.

(c.) Briefs and oral argument. <-- Both the State

and the defendant may submit briefs and present oral

argument within the time provided by the Court.

(d.) Consolidation of appeals. -- Any appeal from

the verdict shall be consolidated in the Court of

Appeals with the review of sentence.

(e.) Consideration by Court of Appeals. -- In

addition to the consideration of any errors properly

before the Court on appeal, the Court of Appeals shall

consider the imposition of the death sentence. With

regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine:

(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed

under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other

arbitrary factor;

(2 Whether the evidence supports the jury's or

court's findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance

under § 413 (d);

(3) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or

court's finding that the aggravating circumstances are

not outweighed by mitigating circumstances; and

(4) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar

cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

(€) Decision of Court of Appeals. <-- (1 In

addition to its review pursuant to any direct appeal,

with regard to the death sentence, the Court shall

(i) Affirm the sentence;

(ii) Set aside the sentence and remand the case for

he conduct of a new sentencing proceeding under § 413;

(iii) Set aside the sentence and remand for

modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life.

(2) The court shall include in its decision a

reference to the similar cases which it considered.

(g) Rules of procedure. -- The Court may adopt

rules of procedure to provide for the expedited review

of all death sentences pursuant to this section.

RULES INVOLVED

Maryland Rule 4-343:

Rule 4-343. SENTENCING -- PROCEDURE IN CAPITAL CASES

(a) Applicability. -- This Rule applies whenever

sentence is imposed under Colle, Article 27, Sec. 413.

(b) Statutory Sentencing Procedure. -- When a

defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first

degree and the State has given the notice required under

Code, Article 27, Sec. 412(b), a separate sentencing

proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable

after the trial pursuant to the provisions of the Code,

Article 27, § 413.

(c) Judge. -- Except as provided in Rule 4-361,

the judge who presides at trial shall preside at the

sentencing proceeding.

(d Allocution. -- Before sentence is

determined, the court shall afford the defendant the

opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a

statement.

(e) Written Pindings and Determinations. -- The

findings and determinations shall be made in writing in

the following form:

Section I

Based upon the evidence, we unanimously find that

each of the following aggravating circumstances that is

marked “yes” has been proven BEYOND A REASONABLE

DOUBT. Each of the aggravating circumstances that h

not been so proven is marked “no.”

Re The victim was a law enforcement officer who

was murdered while in the performance of the officer's

duties.

Yes Wi

2 The defendant committed the murder at a time

when confined in a correctional institution

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3 The defendant committed the murder in

furtherance of an escape from or an attempt to escape

from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention

cer or guard of a correctional

of or by an offi

institution or by law enforcement officer.

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4. The victim was taken or attempted ¢t be taken

in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt

t Kiagnap or abduct

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6. The defendant comm tted the murder pursuant +

an agreement or contract for remunerat mn or the prom é

r remuneration t commit tne murder

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7 The defendant engacaced r employed ther

De > Siakedied t t he murder and he murder = maker +

7 renan? ‘ an sreement , eontract for remiunera?> r

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> r ra ho ~ cé¢ . remunerati -

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8. At the time of the murder, the defendant wa

under the sentence of death or imprisonment for lif

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y y

- The defendant committed more t} ne ffense

of murder mn the first degree arising t of the same

neiden

incid Be

Yes y

Ge The defendant committed the murder while

~ 7s ttine attempt na t ale tasks. - a bbery, ars ™ ra ‘

in the first degree or sexual offense in the first

degree.

(If one or more of the above are marked “yes,” complete

section II If all of the above are marked "no," do not

complete Sections II and III.)

Based upon the evidence, we unanimously find that

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each of the following mitigating circumstances that

marked “yes” has been proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE

a> Gan ry - a6 as ‘ x

F THE EVIDENCE. Each mitigating circumstance that

not been so proved is marked "no." -

: e ney

l. As used in this paragraph, “crime f vy lence

means abcuctions, arson, escape, kidnapping, mayhem,

murder, robbery, rape in the first or second decree,

sexual offense in the first or second decree,

ca } \- 2 ; un?) ry r a’ r

mansiaughter other than involuntary mansla ter, a

attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use :

nandgun in the commission of a felony or another rime

of violence.

The defendant previously (i) has not been four

guilty of a crime of violence; and (ii has not entere

a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of

crime of violence; and (iii has not been granted

nr ha + nm On - ryt nreru af _ Aan n+ - a ; n+ >

probatio Stay fe y of judgme . vant ¢t

sharge f Crime f vy lence.

Yes N

5 Th ,ir ac nar ;einar in he

oe rne victim was a participant in the

Je fendant' condu > . C nsented t the act wh =" Ca

the y —“ftimte dea

Yes y

3. The defendant acted under substantial duress,

ry provocation of another person, but not s

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constitute a complete defense to the

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Vec \)

é The mu rde wa mmitted while the capac ‘

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conduct or to conform his c nduct to the requirements of

law was substantitally impaired as a result of mental

incapacity, mental disorder, or emotional disturbance.

Yes Nc

c sae . ? +h eC ’ b

5 The defendant was of a youthful age at the

time of the crime.

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6. The act of the defendant was not the sole«

proximate cause of the victim's death

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uP It is unlikel that the defendant will engags

n further crimina activit that wou constitute a

ntinuing threat t societ

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8 Other facts specificall et fort elow

~ tute loa t Jat - circum tar ec

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C pi te Section III

Section III

evidence, we un at it has

PREPONDERANCE t the

mstances marked I utweigh

sumstances marked I

DETERMINATION OF SENTENCE

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‘ Jetermination of sentence either €¢

= me -* r "Death" acc rding t the f wir

were

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"Life Impri

2. If Sect

"Life Impri

3 If Sect

marked “no”

4. If Sect

"Death."

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-APTION

leted and all of the answers

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pleted and was marked "no"

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oe At +he time ~ = mr -

the defendant of the rig

or the exercise of this

ise a defendant who receive

sentence only will be

urt of Appeals, and (2) t?

a review of the sentence ¢

eal which the defendant ma

After sentence is imposec,

and send to the partie 3

and was marked

I are marked

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yes

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. Reputation in Community

ly Situation and Background

1. Situation at time of offense (describe

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defendant's living situation including marital

status and number and age of children

2 Family history (describe family history

including pertinent data about parents and

siblings

H Education

I Work Record

J Prior Criminal Record and Institutional Hist

( st any privsr convictions, Jisy t n, an period f

ncarcerati

k Military Histor

L. Pertinent Physical or Mental Characteristics t

4 st r :

M. Other Significant Data At t Defendant

I! Data Concerning Offense

ry Briefly describe facts of offense (include time,

place, and manner of death; weapon, if any; ther

participants anc nature of participation

B. Was there any evidence that the defendant wa inde:

the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of t

f fense If so, describe.

, Did the defendant know the victim pr _ the

€ffoence”

ye N

If so, describe relationshiy

2 Did the pr r relations! W pre tat

the offense? If so, explair

c Did the victim's behavi r na - pr ke ¢t

ffense If so, explain.

E Data Concerning Victim

l. Name

2. Date of Birtt

3 Sex

4. Race

5S. Lenath of time in communit

6. Reputation in communit

F Any Other Significant Data About Of f« é

Ezz. & Plea Entered By Defendant

Not guilty ; guilty ; not g t t ea :

insanity ;

m Mode of Trial

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If there was a jury trial, did defendant eng

the ur select n or my t Tf ,» e©xX

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Name

Address

Appointed or retained (If more than

attorney represented defendant,

and include stage of proceeding at

representation was furnished.)

Pre-Trial Publicity -- Did defendant reques

mistrial or a change of venue on the basis

publicity? If so, explain. Attach copies

motion made and exhibits filed.

Was defendant charged with other offenses

|

of the same incident? If sc

ate whether they were tried at same pr

give disposition.

erning Sentencing Proceeding

aggravating circumstance(s upon w

ed in the pretrial notice.

the proceeding conducted before sam

] before same jury

sentencing proceeding was conducted ¢t

han the trial jury, did the defendant

ection or composition of the jury I

ounsel -- If counsel at sentencing was

trial counsel, give information re

C above

h aggravating and mitigating circum

ed by the evidence?

hich aggravating and mitigating cir

the jur instructed?

tence mposé Lite img nm t

. De **

ation of intention to seek penalt f

ilt/innocence) -- began and ended

rial Motions Disposed Of

cing Proceeding -- began and ended

imposed

endation of Trial Court as to Whether

tence of Death is Justified

py of the Findings and Sentencing C

is case 1 attached t an made a

provide

CERTIFI

7 ce ,€ > ne +h a ‘ | 7 -

I certify that the day of » a9 I sent

at at ae Ttt.t } rc _ ¥ om @ e oe cr en oo nn

copies of this report to counsel for the parties for comment a

have attached any mment made by them to this report.

a “ | eisaaszeaaaaaaaaaaa

JUDGE

Within five days after receipt f the report, the parti¢

may submit to the judge written comment concerning the factual!

accuracy of the report. The udge promptly shall file with tne

lerk f the trial court, and in the cas¢ f a life sentence wit

tho C6 .Y € +b o + ‘ rr » 7 he rer r+ — fina? farm

‘ € € ” I € IT Appeai t l ] al I I P

noting ar changes made, together wit ar somments f the

580 Md $06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

in county where murder Bas comr .

Anthony GRANDISON , though alleged acy of const Ts sob

place in other count)

v=

,

STATE of Maryland 2. Criminal Law © 14 |

Nos. 65 & 108, Sept. Term. 1984 Defendant, who wa argec *

Court of Appeals of Maryland

jection & venur of murder count Dy fa

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Aon } ) Qe 7 at tris

3. Conapiracs &4

Defendant was convitec f firsid

Conspirator »

gree murder, conspiracy & mr murocr P .

¢ ‘ ar nature 4

and use of handgun in commission of cmme 2 . P .

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f violence by We Ur Court. Somer:

ie - , a

Lounty J L vad Simpkin and he a

a? yh P ever r 7 r "

peaiec The Court f Appea A r

are cone pursua be

held that. (1) conspiracy charge Was pr

purpose ra

erly venued in county where murders were

ommitted (2 murder and hancgur 4. Criminal Las & 59

~harges were propery yrenuec r “ a

where murders were comr ugh ce as rl

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fendant was guilty urde sole f~ t . " n

virtue of having entered inl conspira act. a

ther county. (3) dema! of defendants re nals

juest for further removal, Dasec On exter

a

sive publicity surrounding case. was ©

. i‘irimina | * «

abuse of discret mn where case ha pre ’ ns

Mur “

yusly been removed fron u wher :

or r ¢ “

murders were mmittec 4) refusal wu , .

defendar reque ndividua . ve .

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he re Py

a: xing

eff«

"

w a

2: (onspirac’ > 46

ar er a

e WwW sé ; - ar

au na prux .

®& Criminal Law ¢

/* 4

“ ‘

r as

3ERIES

here murder was committed

zed acta of conspiracy Urn

r count)

Lae @145

nt

t who was charged with cor

urder and murder, waived ob

we of murder count by fail

iv

ra

y &i!

lor iS responsiblt for logica

ronsequences of acts comn

conspirators even tor hor

4 outside of b presence @

er contemplatec wher @

irsuance of common desig .

mspiracy

Las 595

er ura’ 4 .

ralor m con

y ulpable with perpetra

Dability exle

and Wwica e

ae 110

r agains def -

5 mn o where -

sgh Getendgar “a a

f

. ,

pr

ae 6? j

exer

r Gefenda

_ grat Z y >

>| ‘ nag ’

Jelenda aga

‘ ar eff

io

t consp rawr ‘ r

re eariyv relevant af al

< pirac

ay —) walle

re allege

; € ha a

ry ste severance * .

ale atur

GRANDISON +. STATE Md

Crus 00 906 A.2d 500 (hid 1988)

9. Criminal Law 12)

Tra! court's order transfernng entre

prosecuuon w other county based on fatt

that some of counts were pun hable by

death, was not abus yf discretion Ma

Rule 744

10. Criminal Law 26

+

Time withir which dt fendant could eT

ter if nit t n r f +}

ul J pia @ alv re “a

extended “wher will bod er pr

ceding defends attempted entr ‘

‘ I F "

tria ourt rule ” , j and for

parucular , her pat- ° ring

a c ’ r — as i

a piea Mat «

11. Criminal Las on6. 1249

7 0 |

ria . rina ’

cr“ “ e

‘ ‘4 r |

m ) erur at

: j re wher

r . “ sad ra . 4

ngt Md Rul 2

12. Criminal Law ¢ 64)

ere " na rig

-

4 }t ’

13. Criminal! La» 44

é

‘

14. Criminal Las @&-™

T ‘ > r >

VDetenca “ : ec

2 rn mor ¢ acre ' { ,

\a ; ul hereatter re ¢

‘ nr i “a y e@xar J + a a

ne - be preser “a ¥ ive

relu c A suodrr w exar a

hat ne r ater ooje hat ne wa

r give sul t opportur d€

rau go au neevde for

erur pit Vid Rules *

1s Criminal Las o5-+.10"

\" ‘ ,

581

tris! within 180 days after earlher of afr

pearance of defense counsel or first ap

pearance of defendant, only addre ascd

ation where case was set and ultima

tned in single circuit court and did

apply when case wa removed or def

ant's request other county

16. Criminal Las © 577.9

al case. © a mot re

4, 4 4 requ shar

7 - oO for tr with ™ |

me a s receive r ‘

Va f ~ 4 Cod Py art

iT Criminal Law @&> »

r 3 a “i as t* r

wa re uu her

, with wi) ac { ‘

° P rece r

wa}

’ - =

, ’ requimng th3 2 "|

. . 4 f -

“ afte ¢

4 - v's jete .

- 2 4.fenda

in Criminal Law &!--

é r a ase allege x le

7 y mur pr

- ° -

6 Crmina La‘ ee

- , he gt nal t

aiece Priv et r curr

edce NPOSe was f al

- wher jefenda had r —

r relU e af wher corm rece

a aamor r agai’ ext ire

Vd R € $ e 4

ode ouru and Judicia Procet

» ]

0. Criminal Law & eo

4 { defenda re é r

< ¢ of new ry. Das allies

ae ror “ 3

4 asa & t I ’

enc

582 Md

cured by tna! court's mdividua) questuoning

of jurors

21. Jury € 131113)

Denial of defendant's request two ind:

viduaily jurors, aboul potenua

prejudice fron ity verdict

against coconspirator in neighbonng coun

tv. was not abuse of discretior

vou dire

resulung

where tna

ror fh

court had previously instructed jw

us expose Ulemselves to media pul

and where tna! court questioned jurors er

masse as & whether they had heard any

th ng alw ut utcorn of coc Nepira ,

ca

Appellate court shou De Siow to In

pule & me a diregarc { their d ¢

anc w tna rus @ War f dilige ' r

perspicacity im appraising jur ndu

23. Jury 104

Juror: were proper excluded for

cause where eacl expressed some he

lation abou mposing Geath penalty wu

murder prosec . and where after

painslaxing anc thorougniy examining

r r ria uri r ude 5 Wa ur rn

>

er r sut Lanta mpair perf rma ‘ f

their dutie

’

24. Jury & lf .

Kef - - | ‘

Fet a - r r

b } -

) ry ~ , iene

cau a U r ave lu if

and as fendarnt sed ir ner

anc 0 Getenda S alege nv eme \

drug trafficking. was not abuse of discre

tion, thoug?t bewng

cuted for murder and not drug traffickir

defendant was prose

R

where jurors indicated that they »

make Gecisior. based on evidence and law

25. Homicide €°334(1

In murder prosecution. allowing v

ums wife to tecufy about her relavionshir

with husband war at harmle error

gover. overwheiming e ence defer

. gvilt

4 gv

26. Criminal Law ©4381), 1153) 1

Adr ™ 7 oP . .

806 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

court, whose determination wil! not be d

turbed unless plainly arbitrary

77. Criminal Law € 4385) 4

In murder prosecution. tna! court

cision w admit photographs of victirr *u

not abuse of discretion. where phowyra)

were mere graphic representations of ur

+ vid

disputed fa \ alread evicer

2%. Criminal Law C10123

for ubyect party objecting will be b

those grour 2 - rdinar

dons eae, te yr

fied

29. Criminal Law ©1043

Defendar failed preserve ¢

Ww reicvancy | erla ri T -

r ‘ raise 4 r ¥u

hearta nature f ll

30. Conspiracy 4

In prosecution for pit

Ger. @stuumony of weun wile tha 7

spiralor acted in manner suppor

fendar wo fr ghte nerse 2

from testifying at pnor pr

fenda va re evar “

31. Criminal Law 404: 2

k “wat adr ~~ “

re £ _ { na a . -

ga nice

ahere Weal- exter

“a * * * .

where BW LNe suf nal sr na

32. Criminal Law 43

Display of enlarged letter u —

not have prejudicial effect of overer

ing single piece of evidence. where enlar;

ment was exact copy of omgina!l. and w!

eniargement Was emmy ec Ww Gemor r

33. Cominal Law 1

_RIES GRANDISON +. STATE Md 583

Cite as 506 ADd SOD (Md 1986)

determination will not be dis of coconspirator are admissible as excep 40. Criminal Law €=666'/;

}

plainly arbitrary ion Ww hearsay rule, as long as conspiracy Tral court's decision, refusing w allow

Law @4305) is established at some time during tna! defendant's request for direct. pretna! ex

amination of coconspirator. was not abu

of discretion, where both defendant ar

coconspirator were in custody and cor

calls with conspirators provided ample indé sidered extremely dangerous, where dé

pendent evidence of existence of conspir

prosecution. tna! court's ds 34. Criminal Laws @ 4727/5)

photographs of victuums wa

Defendant's letter, visit. and phone

mscretion. where pholoyray)!

aphic representations of ur

fendant had ample opportunity, pnor to b

already m eviden | Pr 5

4 that in proseculor for conspira request, & ascertain tenor of coconsp:r

ae C1019 ind murder. declaratior f defendant , tor lestimor and wher tma! cour

fw grounds are delines rator were adn t as except io while not allowing defendant to participa

ePly Objectling w ta Pe euros rule mn mlerview. did allow interview Ww be c

and w ordinariis ducted through defendar wand

4 , 45. Homicide 166: 4

t Waived gr ! r . ‘

Ev ide het defends had bes

} 1. Cnminal « 1036.2

hary: with other cnmes was adr : 4 n al La 1

- ~~ = P . ; » . " .

A 104313 mn ppenetunion tee Gane of titnemnes wt Defendant failed Ww preserve e*

f a } ‘ ’ ne tk .

tae \&) preserve - i have testified at poor enmina! pr Oo tna ourt s ru Nn 4 ra

7 ,

rt ‘ er fae a , te

Corts “ “ ‘ R how th Jefendant had nr were called as w e é jet ‘

raised at ur * — 4 sla “ 1 te a “Me t r #3

, ‘

le r . hirr r 4ifurd plea. where defe

e 16 Criminal Law i192 made no proffer of wha f rs

c&j5 ,

for r r l mur r pr A e “ r e

' , a a r

f ‘ fficer that vicun would hare ide

etim 's , ; 3 —

wieu wile tha - $2. Criminal Law 539: 1

: tified defendant as party t nrelated of

mar Fr sun ‘ 34 Da | 4

anne Upportive T be adn ble a ster roceeding

: . P " ’ nadmuissible hearsa wher

gn herself ano \ - former te mor mu Nave ¢ give

’ ex.(\fa >| aleme wer

a: prior prose “ ¢ inger oath. al proces £ ‘

" " ‘ boi emmatt? >

P nt n 7 ‘ ‘ ‘ u F ; ma

‘se Ww Snow OS la a ne sSarme 4 a J

how th Jefe ant } _——

ase @ 4042 . proceeding tnere mu na as res

= .

dey " ; a

3 t a ¥ alm r =

hat alleged } (Criminal! Law 116¢.2'] :

> defe , . -

ar le Te “ " .

“eam | r i ; as - .

f . 7 = a a .

£ Tie tha she ha fend “wacr reversible error

give similar weap 43. Criminal Law @=544. 54

. . eu}

38 Criminal Law ©666'A. 1153/1 - P ,

na r ré “ t adr + r

C cpeumctar nder which defenda: ; ‘ :

a 133 4 =i € ) 4 4 sa gra’ um te rr . 2

r Ju pretr nuernie. I pr = roinct tat not fa ret

arged letter u urors d 7 , = . , aga Olav Wa I abuse Gis e

“ e witne are matters Dest ieIt Wl Wia . — . . 4 7 ear

al effect of overempha . as lest y wa Hlained dumng 4

r ; retior nd t —

J Giscretio ano Una: court § deci 7 . =~ f ie@atineg he

f evidence. where er arge ¢ exploratory phase oF invesuga “

> A } f P thar

“ be reversed only for abuse of tha ¢ ate not ¢f nared

“Op of ongina and where federa’ attorneys were prepared

3 re r 4 '

*| t . . - “onst tor ; -

emploved to demonstrat« i cross<@xamine Cox spiral a a Ld ‘es

; f —T, - °

‘ne< 7 ob was me party to ledera! gra U

ne cr is 3 . P p

39. Criminal Laws €666'4

@ authored. draft ar a ceeding

ima! judge may place limitations anc

ar ©

restr r Nn party's access to potentia 44. Criminal Law 54!

es Si 47713 wine 4 urt s discretion such resur Mid Rule 4 subdc Nf. par ) re.a

my r are reasonat necessary for prote ng w adr t and substar J

- re . ¥witnes r for ecur purpose Je ix at wna >| n apt 4

584 Md 606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

not serve ax basis for admission of tran

script of declarant’s federal grand jury te:

tuumon)

45. Criminal! Law @°594(3)

Tria! court's decision, not & allow cor

tunuance so thai defendant could attempt lo

secure presence of rebuttal witness, was

net abuse of discrevior where witness

presence coulic nol be guaranteed Dy Ge

fendant. and where 2s was Otherw

ready for tna

46. Criminal Law @700

In murder prosecution, defendant wa

not entitled, pmor wu being sentler

death. to stauistics as & frequer “

which state sought death penalty for de

fendants charged with murder

47. Homicide 354

Fact that defendant ha red

individual to commit Murder Was agrress

ing circumstance wi r mn murder pr

uor just fied im positior if deat pena

Code 1957, Art. 27. § 4

48. Homicide 354

Death pena!t which was imposec a!

ter defendant was convicted of ntracting

for murder of state witne

vestif aga r é r

croceed:ng. 7 ‘

Du 4 .

nour? defe 4 4 re

conviction for rime f ence. @

thoug? he Was Tf 1s ' pr ximale cause

killing

49. Criminal Law 641.415

Sentencing was not separate proceed

ing from crimina] tnal. such thal defend

ant. who had knowingly and wmteligent

waived right w counse! at tna yu

thereafter insist that attorney handle fh

sentencing US.C.A. ConstAmenc ¢

56. Criminal Lae 641.711

Md Rule 723. which mandates that tna

court readvise defendant of mgt

sel at every separate proceecing a r

reouire reacvisement “here jete na

affirmauvely waived nght wo counse

5}. Constitutional Law 295

Homicide 351

Amendment to Code 1957, Am 4

§ 124, allownng court to consider evider

of impact of murder on victim's family and

not just on vicum as part of sentencing

decision. did not change quantum of pur

ishment attaching to crime of murdcr

that it did not constitute ea post facto law

LSC A Cor An Lh

uon of Rights. Am 14

52. Homicide 354

r rr -

nvicle ra . 5

“ou have to fu r '

n a hough r ece r a

r Tr gating r nm a s

Art Zz & 4 ra

F 4 s* defe 3 ”

£ p ner ar a

r Ging e e e the lance “

found mow! fF a ated &

fendar Cc r fia

anc Geta ¢ reiau r

suct a “ be near ‘ dé

pena 4 ahere n harge aga

ele wes ase » ‘ “

“A a a r ‘

4 »

54. Conspiracy 2s

(< ra f mur re re

parties agree to con n 3

IT urder = su . f :

55. Homicide &7

Murder, regardies f whethe

convictec as accessor r on

quires completed hor

56. Criminal Law 729

mmes f murder anc nspura

mfr murcer w e separav

< that dJefenda - . “ -

s i abe is r

4-6 ase ‘ + 2

sory be re fa

RIES

nal Law 207

351

t t& Code 1957. An 41

court & consider evidencs

arder on vicurm's family and

‘um as part of sentencing

change quantum of pur

ng to cmme of murder. s

mstitule @r paost fact a

Ar &% Canst [he ir

Ar

34

‘ oa « death um

le ‘ ra i ‘

+ t f rr [

ugh n r r la

CciIrcumSLa A ;

"

>166: 4

4 jefenda Na bee

F her ar

e Wa substance “ue

room associated with de

co ule nflammator

ence .of unrelated cnme

Oe aan . r deat

ased on k ng fw ‘

4 nave { als ,

( ae

r ré r

urce ar 4

J é

f ahether é

r r pa r

79

a ra A

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 585

Cie as 988 4.34 908 (hd = 1OR8)

when hired killer mistakingly killed wrong

pan

57. Criminal Law ©1035)

Defendant. who never requested that

juror be removed for miaconduct, could nf

argue on appeal that tna! judge should

have removed juror sua sponte

58. Criminal Law 10359)

Defendant, who at no time objected &

trial court's statement, as part of evidentia

ry ruling, that there was evidence to su;

port conspiracy could not raise coun

comment as ground for reversa! of con

uon where tna! judge had already advise

jury Uvat his lega) ruisr shouic fr

taken W indcicay

59. Criminal Law 113711

Defendar wh acquiesce n tna

uri Ge f wa “ fur D rele

hmer rece r

r r urge de n as a grou

reversa

69. Homicide 354

ra Wie defendar nad murdere

re War € party cor ule ig yra\a

rcum<ctar hich sified in

z u =“ a! U €

{ death penalty for b rder

61. Homicide @ 234

efenda f mur

> a | ‘ re é r r

‘a4 u ore aah

rator def. bir .

a (

mr murder. as well a ale

f other witnesses showing that defendar

hac talked with conspirators on var

ycasions Code 1957, Art 27, § 413id®"

62. Criminal Law 795

No mstrucuion on effect of deadio

was required where jury. in prosecutor

murder which extended over many da

reached verdict Ww one anc one quar

b

63. Homicide © 17

Defendant. who contractec »

party for murder of state witne

wraile ¢ mur

reialec prosecu was FV

cur f Ta ferre ‘

64. Homicide 354

Imposition of death penalty was aul!

nzed, though defendant was guilty of mur

der only ax accessory and not as pmncipa

in first degree, where defendant had en

ploved another person to commit murder

Code 1957. Art 27. § 4)3idW7), tex

Ne L Cook. A gne Py Ly

er Washing [ for appella

leterah K Chasanow A 4

ul e mh Sach A r

Balu re. fur appe''t

rgued before MURPH ,

MITH ELDRIDGE = =}

H and McA rre

( CH, Judge

T apjt ie 4 r

was cl.arged in Baltimore ( -

spirac. tw murcer > a ner r

r { .~< degre am urd a ~*~ >

now 3 “usan -& ‘ a

handzun in the comr acr

, rand ha F > ,

£ ar he sut 7 é

- 4 -

4 a

gr | ‘re r 4 a

r P gr ° -

error we shal) affurn

With respect to the under g fa §

“@s w We narge aga Uranc

we recently recited ther in Eren <

104 Ma 487, 494-95, 499 A 2d 126 2t

65 (1985), and therefore shal! borrow fr

thal recitavon as follows

According lo Whe Sule evrde

defendant Evans and Anu Te

eniered into an agreeme where E

ans would kill David Scott Piechow

a wife. Cher ywecau U

were scheduled ‘ aga rs

ry ar , . "

z *vVa . r 2

686 Md

trict of Maryland) Evans was to receive

$9,000.00 from Grandson for performing

the murders

David Scott Piechowiez and Chery! Pie

chowiz were employed at the Warren

House Mote! in Baltimore County. On

April 2%, 1983, Susan Kennedy, the sister

of Chery! Piechowiez

place of Chery! at the

Mot The

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, or

2kth

was working uv

Hous

sufficent &

Warrer

evicence was

Apn Evans went to the mote! and

not knowing the Prechowrezs. shot I

Scott Piechowiez and Susan Kenne

with a MAC-11 machine pisu Nine

teen bullets were fired at the weur

who died from multiple gunshot wound

A ww count indictment was file

against Evans and Grandison w

ed States Court

charged with wolating the

i ci

Ure

They

Prechowxz

District were

mghts by interfenng with ther ng!

to be witmesses in & judicia! proceeding

in violauvon of 18 US<

witness

usC

§ 241, and mu

tampenng. i

§ 1512

Subsequently the present case bega

with a four count indictment in the

cuit Court for Balumore County charg

na

+ Ura

nas

ing Evar

counts of first degree mu

a handgun in the comr

felony or cmme of nolence

defendants’ requests for remova!, Gray

dison's trial was the Cur

cuit Court for Somerset County and Ey

Upon the

transferred &

ans 6 tra’ was transferred to the Circu

Court for Worcester County

Prior to the tral im the imstant case

Grandison and Evans were convicted on the

federa) charges and sentenced to life

ten years They

pretna

impmsonment then file

mouons W disrmuss We charges

thew respechbve state cases on double jeoy

ardy grounds The motor

Lhe

wa! jucges

06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

US

(1985)

Thereafter, the trial proceeded m Sorne

set County and Grandison was found gu

of all charges. SubsequenUy, a sentencing

proceeding was held pursuant tw Maryland

Code, Art 27, § 413, wherein the jury in

105 S.Ct 1411, & LEd 2d 79

posed death penalties for the two mu

convicuons he Ura! judge Biso senu

Urandis nw hfe IMpms« nmer for t

spiracy conviclion and twer vears f

handg violauon consecutive u

sentence These senu we mi.

lo run conse we o th

years Sse s e pre T) Ix

federa! ca:

We shall now addre he! a

me urn) & rt ‘

Fa:lure nguire im Mer ’

Siete Witness Sparro.

prandis complains Wat hus cor

Dona’ mgr f witness confrontabon a

cross<2aminabon Was impairec by We Ura

court's refusa) to permit appropnate stu

_

wo be taken W dGelermine Wie mental cane

ty ar vera \ f Slave § Wilwes Nar

“parros vert Evar ransec UV

u ra u r Our

¥ orcest . "

v 4° ye 499 A 2 2 ri n

slavec peruner pe

*] 2

med examnad should be gracv

nowever = trial jucge shouic care

aia he Gemrmonstratec nece f

compevec eXaminavon agains! We ex

ence unportant countlervaiuLs

erabons. In affirming We dena

mobon for a psychiatne examunad

government w

our Appeals for the Distic

umDu rcu . he wv 4c » 4 e 5

476 F 2d 4) 3 T r 1% 2 ‘

some f the factors w be «x ~~

RIES

S.Cu. 1411, 8 LEd 2d 795

he trial proceeded nn Somer

Grandison was found guilt)

Subsequently, ® sentencing

held pursuant to Maryland

§ 413, wherein the jury in

nalues for the two murder

c tial judge also sentence

e impmsonment for the cor

yn and twenty years for

on consecutive to Une

e sentences were ims

tively to the life

4 A

aire tnto Mental Capacity

e Witness Sparrow

mplains that hus consu

witness confrontavon ar

ym was impaired by the tna

w permit approprate step:

etermine the menta! capa

f State’s witness Charlene

n Evans raised the same

in the Circuit Court f

In Evans v. State, 304

A 2d 1261, 1272 11950) *

pot part

g whether @ requt for a

nation should be grante

wal judge shoule carefi

monstrated necess:t) for 4

minavon against the ex:

tant countervauing

affirming the dema

sychuatre exampavor

uness, the United Stale

als for the Disurxct of Co

in United States t. Bent

1131 (D.C.Cw.1972), lste

factors to be considerec

unc exarminabon may ser

ze on & witness men

that ad

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 587

Cows os 908 424 Se (ed -_

role of complamant is sharply

creased by the indignity of 8 peychial

ne examination, the examinavon itself

could serve as & wool of harassment

and the impact of al) these considera

uons may well deter the vicum of a

crime from lodging any complaint at

all Since there is no exact measure

for weighing these- kinds of danger

against the need for an examine

the de mn must be entrust

sound yscrelior if the we udég

g? of the particular facts

Accord. United State Butle 4°

F2 DC Cw 197 Sec Ra

State 7 Md App $64. 571-572. 206 AS

543 (1969), cert denied, 40 S & 9

SC. 70. 27 L.Ed.2d 67 (197

an ws disposilve f the ws ’ Hence he

tra! court 4 r eomir reversible error

"1

Venu?

Grands nex argue that We nc

ments handed down Ww La lumore Ou

srandison was indicted oF gune o 19s.

Balumore Counts he war ullmave

tned and convictec WF Somerset \&

rsua w DP uggee for re a vu

r former Mar Rule 74 T a

wlan! argue a’ since he @ com

ted constituting Whe cmme of acce r

before the fact to murder, conspirec) and

unlawful use of a handgun in commussior

of a crime of violence indisputad!) occurred

in Baluumore City, he was wrongtu ur

dicted and prosecuted Balumore Cou

Pror to tna!l, Grandson moved to dis

11) of the

miss the conspiracy count (Count Nl) «

indictment on the ground that the Grand

Jury for Balumore County lacked jums

1 Former Md Rule 744 provieece

4 CLapruie Case

hen a defencan' '5 hargee with ar Hens

whch the maurpum pena’ death anc

Dp cs a suggestion ul der oath tba: 0 a

wie aca anc impale “ "

tion. At the February 77 1984 hearing. he

amended his movon dismiss & alieg

improper venue Judge Simpkine dene

the motion. relying oF Luevers v Slate

MdApp 597. 241 A 2d 147 (196) ar

. - _ .

Greenwald v State, 2¢! Md 245.15 Ae

119. appeal dismissed 362 US 721. *

Sc a4 4 LEd.2d 1521 09% Wer

tha vc Sor xrns romrr tLec nr error

Ger [ rand mot 1 5 T

, 7v Pol ha

= enter a ega! apreeme

Py gc r ey

uu arr r r ‘ Dia a

ther — ' r formher P

{rere a € a J ey

hey agreemer eact f the ralor

may be uned in e e

a expre renee heir agree™

nee n be esa © prose A

conspirators Wf t he y wher ‘

act wa mmittec Green 221 M

- 4 ‘ l-

at 24 Alicea 24 ,) ¢

p Wether (N.Y.), 4 Wendall <5. @. -

Amer De Ze 4

The underlying ravona for pr

ple lies un what has be er

unulng na ure of Cc st ra er -

The las c sicerm a.* re J

spirator a ere re .

. ) ‘ agree? . act

vr ° n .

whe a - .

. , o ob

“Ts e i‘

wold. 221 Md. at co a

. ?

in Luerers the (our (« - <a

recognize the rule a

be prosecuted “where egs. acre

arose ahere |U |

ance of the agreeme curt

Md Ag at & <4 4208

Chef Judge Mor ar :

Lour >pecia Appes Bo

n wt he as “

c ha he came & ans e

an ° nm having i 4 PY,

¢ a defencar we ai

2 & sugee

. e oat? e

“nr —-

588 Md

State, 6 Md.App. 623, 262 A.2d 290 (1969)

applied the holding of Laevers. In Boddu

the appellants were @ the State of Mary

land when the overt act in furtherance of

the conspiracy to rob occurred. However

the illega! agreement mm that case seeming

ty took place outside of the territona! Lmits

of the state. Nonetheless, the court held if

the evidence could sustain a finding that a

conspiracy existed, the conspirators could

be punished in Maryland Boddie. 6 Md

App at 529. 252 A2d at 293. The rule uw

m sceord with. and indeed follows from

decisions rendered by the Supreme Court

In Hyde v. United States, 25 US Mi. 32

SC. 793, 56 LEd 1114 (1912), the Coun

was considering whether venue wm a cor

spiracy case under § 5440 Rev Stat (190)

properly hes in the state or distrnct where

Uhe conspiracy was entered inw or ar

State or district where an overt act in fur

therance of the conspiracy was performed

In its analysis, the Court stated “thal a

conspiracy iS not necessanly the concepuor

and purpose of the moment, but may h&

conunuing Id. at 363, 32 S.Ct at 800, &

LEd at 1124

conspirators act there they “renes. or per

haps. to speak more properly, Wey conor

ue, they agreement. and Us agreement u

Moreover. wherever Ue

'

renewed or continued as to al) whenever

any one of them does an act wm furtherar

of they common desig ld at & .

SCr. at 801, 56 LEd@ at 1125 tquoung

Rotinson v. United States, 172 Fed. 10

(8th Cir.1909)); accord United States 1

Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 3) S.Cu 124, 126

54 L.Ed. 1168 (U.S.N.Y. 1910); see United

States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084. 1080 (Vu

2 ht is clear from the wanuript of February 2°

1984 that Grandison soughi only to dismins

Count Il] (conspiracy) of the wdiciment o0 Ue

basis Uval venue was umprope:

5. Marviand Rule 885 prowdes

“Rule 685 Scope 6f Rewew—Limiiad 0 Ques

mons Decdaed by Circ! Court

Thus Court wil) aot ordinarily decide any

pon! or question wtuch does oo! plainly ap

pear by ue record to have been wed and

decided by the carcuit coum but when a pou

or question of law had been presenied Une

606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, t¢ SERIES

Cir.1983), see generally 1 F Wharton

Criminal Lew § 14 (14th ed. 1978)

We note that, though the Count m Hyd

was analyzing @ statute which required a!

legation and proof of an overt act. it st!

accepted the charactenzation of a conspir

acy as “continuing” and “ongoing” See

Mayo, 721 F.2d at 1090. Such s character

wabon convinces us that the rule expressed

in Lievers and applied in Boddic & sound

Accordingly, appellant's argument m

fail. Since the murders occurred in Ba

more County and were a contemplated re

sult of an ongoing, continuing scheme

which appellant was coauthor, venue for

the conspiracy count was proper in Ba

more County

(B

Grandson next attempts Ww specifica

challenge venue for the murder and har

gun counts as being improperly set ir. Ba

more County He argues that since he wa

indicted and prosecuted outside the count

in which the acts he committed occurred

Balumors t the indictment charming

him as an accessory before the fact

murder a f a handgun volation should

have been dismissed

12) The short answer & apre!ar

venuor | hat venue for e W.lrde’ &

handgur counts Was never Ccha.«nge

the tna! court.*? Thus. wt argument 4a

waived Md Rule 885.? McBurney

State, 20 Md. 21, 32-33. 371 A.2d 129

135-36 (1977)

However, considering the nature of —«

proceedings before us, we entertain app

court and a decision of thal poi! or quest

of law by thus Court is necessary oF Gewradic

for the guidance of the ciurcwi court. oF

avord the expense and delay of anouner appes

to this Court, the point or quesion of law ma

be decnded by this Court even though it was

not decided by the circwt court Wher

dicvion cannot be conferred on Uys Court b

waiver or consent of the parties 4 question a

to the pumadiction of the circun cour may

raned and decided in us Cour ehethe

not ransed and decided in the cir oun

¢ generally 1 F. Wharton,

w § 14 (4th ed. 1978)

at, though the Court in Mydr

+ @ statute which required a)

proof of an overt act, it stl!

charactenzation of a conspir

nuing” and “ongoing.” See

‘d at 1090. Such a character

ces us that the rule expressed

i applied in Boddic w sound

appellant's argument mu*'

e murders occurred in Balt

and were a contemplated re

going, conUnuing scheme of

was coauthor venue fur

count was proper in Balt

(B)

ext attempu: w specifica

ye for the murder and har

being improperly set in Ba!

He argues that since he ¥a

rosecuted outside the count

acts he’ committed occurred

y. the indictment charpne

cessory before the fact u

a handgun violation shou'c

nissed

wl answer Wo appellant sc

venue for the murder ar

us was never challengec

Thus. this argumer.

Rule 885.2 McBurney

21. 32-33. 37) A.2ad

eG i«

nsidering the nature of Ux

fore us, we entertain appt

jecision of thal point or ques!

s Court is necessary or desrabic

ance of the circuit court, or \

ense and delay of another appes

the point or question of law may

y this Court even though it was

w the carcwit coun When jurs

t be conferred on this Cour >

vem of the partes. @ question a)

cuen of the crrcuit court may be

ecided on this Court. whether or

i decided in the circull coun

GRANDIBON +. STATE Md 589

Cire we 808 Ad 8 (ea ee

lant's argument but are compelled to sum

marily dismiss & as being without ment

{3) It wa generally recognized principle

that where the exittence of a conspiracy &+

established, the law imposes upon & con

spirator full responsibility for the logical!

and natural consequences of acta commit

ted by bis fellow conspirators if such acts

are done in pursuance of the common de

cign or purpose of the conspiracy See

is Wenzel. 31) F 2d 164 (4th Cir 1962)

l ‘rerio State 272 Md 607, 63) 32°

A 2d Kin, RY2 (1474) tembezziement) Ac

cord Comm nucalth Thomas, 410 Pa

160. #4 Add 255 258. cert denied. 31

c ate ag Ct 12%. 1) L.Ed.2d 83 (1960

Such responsi! - yttaches even thoug!

the conspirator Was not physically present

when the acts were committed by his fel

ow conspiralrs and would extend even U

» homicide whic a contingency of a

natufe! execution of the conspiracy, ever

though such homicide 15 not specifically

contemplated by the parties See Ureolo

7712 Md

Thomas, 189 A.2d at 258. See ge nerally, }

F. Wharton, supra: 2) AmJur.2d §§ 386

gy (196°

at 633, 325 A.2d at R92 accord

(4) This rule rests on Un underlying

principie that one who encourages. aids

abet, or assists Ure active perpetrator ir

he comin of wv fer is a FV I

r " a ? eve f the law

jus 2 “ ut re wl dm ,

3 Ss. ec. Ureiolo, 272 Md 60°. Je

4 24 878%. accord Bloomer | State, 48 Md

59) (1878: see Ex Parte Williams, 383

So 2d 564. 565 (Ala). cert denied. 449 US

99s, 10] S Ct. 334. 66 LEd.2d 293 (1980)

And this enminal accountability extends to

the proximate. natura! and logical! conse

quences of the conspiracy Williams, 383

So.2d at 565. It follows that the law looks

upon such a conspirator as an actual partuc

ipant im the contemplated offense In

short. the act of the co-conspirators in the

case at bar was the act of Grandison

{5] The determination of venue in the

instant case must rely Upon this theory of

viearoes cnmina! respoosibilty which

arises out of the exstence of the conspir

acy The conspiracy which Grandisor

took part had as its gos! and sole objective

the homeides of two vicume As & co-con

apirator, Grandison became criminally re

sponsible for the acl of his fellow conepir

ators, acta which were committed in Balt

more County. Since the record reveal:

that in this conspiracy Grandison played #

principal role he is subject to venue at u

situs of the enmmeé According!

view had the issue been proper’) al

would be without meri

Hl

Seperate Trals as & Count

Grandson also asserts that the charg

of conspuracy and handgun violatwn wert

improperly uned in Somerset Counts i

yuncucr with the murder charge

Appellant was charged in a four coun’

indicument with the murders of Scott Px

chowicz and Susan Kenned). conspire

murder Seott and Chery! Prechowicz. af

use of a handgun in the commussior of a

enme of violence. He sought remove

the case for una! without reference

count: Subsequently, he moved to seps

rate the tral of the conspiracy count fror

the tra! of all other count Appelar

argued that he intendec & tare the witre

stanc ©. his Owe defer s¢ WH Pes}«

the corspirac’ charge Ov wuhed U fete

silent with respect & the murocr charge

After the proceedings were ren vec

Somerset County, the movor for separa

trials was denied. We perceive no error u

the denial of appellant s mowvor

{6} It is uncontroverted that the de

sion as to whether to grant @ severance is

within the sound discrevon of the tna

cour. Stevenson v State 43 Md. Apr

120. 190, 403 A.2d 812, 81 (1979), affad

ORT Md 304, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980). State:

Jones. BA Md 232. Be 395 A.2d l)t-

1185 (1979). The tna! court, # exercising

its discrebon, & required balance Ue

likely preyudice to the accused against Ue

590 Me

possible effects on economy and efficiency

in judicial) administreuon. McKnight &

State, 230 Md. 604, 609-10, 375 A2d 55)

555 (1977)

{7} Moreover, we note that in considdr

ing a charge of conspiracy. the overt acts

of the conspirators in the commission of

the crime are clearly relevant and matena

to the proof of the conspiracy. See Jones

vr. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 379-80, 259 A.20

807. 813 (1969), Aall + State. 23) Md 45%

461. 190 A 2d 795, 79 }964 It follows

that in the case at bar. evidence of Une

homicides and surrounding circumstances

is relevant and matena! Ww the conspiracy)

which in the first instance contemplated

and directed their commission The hor

cides at wsue here are Clear!

‘

reiatec Ww Un

conspiracy

(8) Additionally, abser

contrary. it would bh

t authority Ww the

foolhardy and pur

ul

poseless to require as of nght two tnals

one for a crime committed and one for

commit the

conspiracy w same crime

Green v. State. 25 Md. App. 679, 686, 337

A.24 729. 733 (1975) At tnal. appellant

offered no authority or compelling jusuf

cation for a finding that a severance was

warranted. Only the following wok piace

at the February 27, 19M heanng. in pert

nent part

“THE COURT Thre Mouon for

Separate Trials under Count 1. 2 and 4

] guess what vou re Saying. you re as)

ing that Counts 2 ard 4 be tned and

that Count 3 be tned separate

Counts 1 and 2 are murder, first de

gree murder, and 4 is a handgun viola

tion, and 3 is conspiracy. What you're

saying is that the charges be severed and

that we have two separate trails

AJl right. I'm ready w hear from you

on that. You want w be heard on that

sir’

MR. GRANDISON: Yes, sir. Yes

Your Honor

Appellant does not argue that the conspiracy

under which he ws charged is unrelated to the

homicides committed in furtherance of the con

@27-

$06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

THE COURT. Al! nght. sr

MR. GRANDISON The position or

this motion w Uthat count should be ses

ered because | inund W take the stand

as to Count 3. but not as Count | and

2. which the Stale w seeking Ure deat!

penalty. My position » that if cases are

uned jointly, if | take the stand. then |

would be subject Ww being cross «xamined ’

as © any prnor convicuior that | ma

have 1 fee! that U might be ver

prejudicial to Me as Us those tw

which the Stal b b we

alty

THE COURT Are you saying tha

reason (thuse count r aa Hafele

becuuse—did | understand you & sa

Counts 1] and J vou @ i wa Ww Lake

the stand. but on Count 4 you a

MR GRANI ISON (

spiracy offense J] mtend wu ane

‘ ffor

stand and

THE COURT I see

MR GRANDISON Euta

and 2,1 dor wis! vestif

THE COURT. All ngt And becau

of tha you thin? re ast

Lest

separated that tr

aratec is that r re

VR GR ANI l

oniy reasor } Pie a a fea

MR. GRANDISON. The conspire

fense in this case a distinct offer

from the substantse offense wt

first degree murder charges. | dor

believe it to be true thal evidence hat

would be admissible in the conspira

count would be adrmussibie as wel) in the

first degree murder case

spiracy. Ci. McKmghi +. State, 280 Ma 604. 5

Ald 551 (1977

ERIES

URT. All right, sir

ANDISON The position on

& Unat counts should be sey

« I intend to take the stand

$, but not as to Counts | and

¢ Stale w seeking the death

y position wm that if cases are

if 1 take the stand, then |

byect lo being cross-examined

pror conviction that I may

e! that this might be ver

m™ as W those two count

ate is seeking the death per

RT. Are vou Saving that th:

counts should be separat

1 | understand vou wo sav ir

a 2 you don't want to tak

it on Count 4 vou d

SDISON Count 3» th

nse l intend wo Wake the

stuify, offer testimony

RT 1 see

*DISON: But as w Count

Ol wish Ww testify

tT: All nght. And becaus«

thinh he Case Shouid be

it the counts should be sep

at the only reasor

NDISON That's nv tt

i heave additiona! rea

DHISON Dn -” ‘

nO a0ditiona! reason other

lated

DOISON The conspiracy of

case i a distunct offense

Stantive offense which is

murder charges. 1 don't

« true that evidence that

ussible in the conspiracy

admissible as wel) ir the

urder case

might + State 280 Vd 604 37°

GRANDIBSON +. STATE

Mé 591

(Cave ow Me ADs SaD (had 1088)

| have oo authority righUy before me

t© support that position I think the

w—the law i clear on Uhat as wel! as Unc

rules, that evidence may be admissible in“

& conspiracy. but not be admissible to

substanuve offense

I think that I am entitled to a separate

tral on these two counts. especially in

light of the fact that | have presented to

the Court that | wish to take the stand as

to the conspiracy and not ax wo the firs:

degree murder counts

This is not no ordinary runof-them

case. The State « seeking the deatt

penalty on first count of the indictment

the first two counts of the indictment ]

think the situation would be different

from any other case and | think chat I'm

entitied © &@ Separate tma! on thes«

counts, and | subn

MR GRANDISON Your Honor. of

fer one additional thing To force me

mto a tna! of Count 3 along with the

first two counts in the indictment would

be a—pul me in Une position where |

would have to offer defense for my a

leged codefendant as well, where |

wouldnt be in that position if 1 wa

being tmed separate for both count

But being as the conspiracy count. the

State would allege different things as a

or allegedly commitied by thres

fendants which would force me in &

von to have & deferd the act allegedis

committed by them which | think would

be very prejudicial and no way could |

receive a fair tria! being tried in al! these

counts together

We are unable to find any authonty for

the proposition that a tna! court is required

to grant @ motion for separate trals as a

matter of nght to a criminal defendant

upon an allegation by that defendant that

he wishes to testify on less than al! counts

charged against him. In this case, Grand

son has done little more than express a

generalized desire to testify as to some

S. See supre noice | and accompanying tev

counts but not others He has not md)

cated what he would or would not have

tesufied & and whether such testumon,

would have been of any particular impor

tance We are thus unable w concluds

that appellant has demonstrated compelling

prejudice resulting from denial of the mu

uon for separate tnais when we have leer

given no wdication that tesumonys & &

offered or withheld by ajpeliant had «

value See McAnight, 2h) Md at 60

ho Ald Sol

Therefore. we conclude that Grand

bare allegation proffered in support

motor wit? nothing more under

record before us is no basis for manda’: ;

a severance of tria Sec. e¢. United

States + Corbin. 734 F.2d 643. 644%

Lith Cor 19m4) It follows. then. that there

war no abuse of discretion on the par

the tna! court in denying appeliants rr

von for separate trals

{9} Considering the allegatior that

conspiracy) and handgun counts were ir

properly removed along with the murcer

counts from Baltuumore County in the

mstance, we conclude this argument to

without ment

As Age Simok r “Orrect.\ nol °

ucge . ,

tna You remove the whole cass

part of More particu'ar’s former M

Rule 744° speaks in tern f wransferre

Ne Ca r r f

Fur! n Steven : ‘

App 152. 263 A.2d 36 119TH. the Cour

Special Appeals held that “[Ejven thoug!

[an] indoctment contains other counts wt

charge offenses which are not punisha!

by death. those offenses are carned alors

with the removal of the offense that is or

may be punishable by death. and are a

removed for tna! /d at 162 263 A2c a:

4)

Finally. we note that appellant's ini

movon did not express the intent lo ren

only the murder counts from Balur

County. Indeed. appellant's “Motor. ar

Affidavit for Removal! of Tma!” f t>

ec v

a

> —

692 Md

case Gemanded « removal of appellant's

trai As we have stated herew. 4 was

proper for appellant's enure (rel encom

passing a!) coun which were enumerated

in the Balumore County Grand Jury Indict

ment t© be removed pursuant tw former

Md Rule 744

Therefore, in light of the plain langvage

enunciated in former Md Rule 744 and Si¢

venson, 9 Md App 152 263 A2d 36. we

hold Unat the tna! court did not er

transferring Ube enure pro ceding to Son

erset County

We turn now w the sue of whether th

tia! court erred in refusing u grant app

mants request to file a plea of insar

The request was made on Apmi 25, 1964

the day before tra! was scheduled tu begir

The procedures governing the assert

of the insanity defense at the time of the

Grandison tna! were dictated by sector

12-108 of the 1982 Health—Genera! Aruck

of the Maryland Code and former Maryland

Rule 731.6 The rule and the statute n

be read in conjuncuor Their combined

provisions require the defense of insar

© De interposed uv wrung at the ume the

Ua! Picea mac a pies J »

mad withir sae 424 after ; earlier

of the appearance ‘ eounse r the for

appearance f the defendar before the

court pursuant to former Md Rule 723

This period is automatically extended if a

motion, demand for particulars. or other

aper requiring @ ruling by the court or

' t

6 The provisions § 12-106 of the 196)

Health—General Arucie of the Marviand Code

can mow Ge found wm § |)-iOhax and (2

that article § Marviand Code (1982 1985 Cum

Supp ). Health—Genera’ Ariicle § 12-109 we

1984 Md Laws & The provisions of forme

Mid Rule 73! « are now onuined in Marland

Rule 4 242ia) while forme: Rule 7 b&b ) uw now

Rule 4-242(bK}

The docke: refle > n the fiheen 4

~ Cea

perved trom Ap vue Ar . wae he

UJ “ing \u c were ma t

AD ‘

$06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 4 SERIES

compliance by # party before enternng «

plea w filed Former Md Rule 73) b 2

Such « filing delays the deadline for enter

ing 8 ples anti! fifteen days after the cour

has ruled on the motion /d

Both the statute and the rule provide {

an excepuon t© Ubese Ume constrainu

The court may sccept an insanity plea a

any ume before commencement

fthe wu

upon a showing of “good caus

Appellant posits two theomes ur

which he contends the tna! court si

have accepted hit insanity plea Fir:

asserts Uial i plea War Litre under f

mer Rule 73] b 2 and the court was ther:

fore without discretion u reject it inv

alternative. appellant argues that he mad

an adequate showing of “good cause” a

required by § 10® and former Ruk

Db, hence he was entit'-4 to plead insar

prnor w the commencement of una

110) Appellant's first areument fa

since f motion, Gemand for part ar

or olher paper requinng ruling dy U

court or compliance by a pa ., before er

tering &@ plea Was ruled upon by the cour

in the fifteen day penod preceding his a

tempted entry of the insanity plea* Cons

quentiy. the automatic extension of forn

Rule 731 b 2 does r coms

* ? the aL fe Sar fv Te r fir k

appeara wlor vr r J

19% the fifte Gu\ per junnc «

he had a net © file v : 4

expired long before Apn) 25. 19&4

{11} Thus, Grandison was entitled w e

ler a late plea of insanit yr upon a

showing of “good cause Marviand Co

Re-removal dened Apri! 13. 1984—Defendar

Motion to Withdraw Voluntar w to Othe

wise Disqualify Judge demed Apr! 16 1964

Order to usue subpoens duces tecum Apr é

1984—Order to transier inmate issued Apr ’

1984 Order t© msue subpoena duces tecur

Apr 19 1984—Defendani s M f Cor

ance Gemed Apri 25 1964—rdecr f menia

examination of defendant msued Apr! 24 |) 984

Defendants Renews! of Motion for Cor

ance dened Apr 2¢ 1984—Delendar vi

' ndividusa! \ Dire granie Pe

UES

e party before entering «

ormer Md

uve Ue deadline for enter

fifvween days after Une cour

ld

ie and Ue rule provide for

Uvese

movor

Rule 73)

d2

Ure cons\BiInu

accept an Mmeaennty pies &

commencement of Ue ins

f good caus

tw Uneor v

is the tna! court s

nsanity plea 7.

piea war Uri under |

2 ene the rea re

reuon reje

lant argues Wat he mac

wing of “good cause a

108 and former Rule 7

entitled lo plea ’

mencemer f ww

s fwst argumer :

demand for par P

requiring @ ruling ¢

nee by a party before «

as ruled upon t ne

¥Y pernwd preceding r 2

Ure insanity piea .

matic extension of forn

loew* r come

int made - fr k ‘

re the a

Ga perv jur rr ©€

file the insar . "

re Apr é 19a4

andison was enttied Ww e

of insanity only upon sa

} Cause Maryland Cod

Apr 3. 1984—Defendar

raw Voluntanis or to Uthe

sage Gemeed. April 16. 1984

»poena duces tecum. Apr .

ansier mmmate iasved Apri! 19

“ue subpoena duces tecurr

efendant's Motion for Con

1984—Order for menia

ssued Apri! 26

of Motion for Con

>

fendant

wwe

26. 1984

a) % Dire

Defendar

granied

n

}9R-s

“M

pe

GRANDIBON +. STATE Me 65593

(1982). Health—General Arucle. § 12-108

former Md Rule 73152 Aldinoug? sot &

the content of the maanity plea. we heave

previously hele Ut 6 Statulory require

mer ' good couse ves Wer Uw’ cov

with ewe Guwcrevor Ser Slate Prerer

298 Md 422. 470 A.2d 1269 (194) (ducus

ing “good cause m conler of postpone

ment of tra! date) State r Jones. 770 Me

ne 2 A2d 2) (1973) (analyse of “go

a ; req remer w per ar ’

whores fens sec r ra ta

er We now holt Wie > c-_ a

re remer fs ‘ ar forme r

keer ences r 4 r .

_ a - 7? Tv, a | 5

sete rm™mins - oF : he wutl

- ar «=? we en "ee ,

here wat & ear ar . at ca re

‘v) LX mor wry ;¥v 4

‘ 4 ‘ A? 4 > 4

Beca we fee! tha 6 mph

- “a > re at

re ~ re 7

e - e proflere re de fe ‘

r hearnng de err wm hethe

ea good ca arr g the acce

ance fs iav - a ea s

a . u anuave . ‘ee Na

> eer mfr - * -- 4 2

«> * * . .

atin

r pr de f avr era P

“? » wonca hac ber r ate pur

A aope ar Apr : see TOG

‘ nr arrs proy- f nia 7

ar at 4 ne Apr pw ear

ice Sompkins gave 3 fue: hand a

he even precipitatec Ural

request for a menta’ eva-ve r

; war filed t he defendar

ny r be fore our “a slam Ir

Oer W bare me af ‘ Ty *

w ge hom the etarm ne m UWrat fe

quested in We pies ar give ‘Tr

hear ‘ tra Ne re . . a

contacted «4 peycheve' who w employec

by the Department of Health and Menu

Hygiene. and asted him if he woul’ s

range for s peychwUrx exam

ear kind enoug? & arreng® ha’ @te

na n afer he g ‘ work le nig

He went to the Wicom« Ou

> t io me

wnuon Uenur af be . .

with Mr Grandson He met oh *¥

a a i rar »| _

a —

a ane y ,

Ma “a ” - +

>. ’ “e

4 as } ha re ecte

fuse a o the a e ha

2 a o stance

. hecause ? . ’

te 5 4 7 : .

. . “a _ e*

s ‘\e _ *

s se * . =

ot . ‘ rv

" ge

Ss - have 4

. *a

ta . apre a

‘

exar }

‘ Z " . “

4 ‘ re

* ave Wise ts r ’

es , .

“a ? re :

r omMrTav * r . “

i nave y ‘ rese 2

era a Gever ‘ :

States + Byrrs 740 F2

he ;

a ’ ‘ ‘

45. 4> cer! deni ‘

4 45 wi kA oO 5

‘ 4 6

. Bone 44 F2 :

) , s ‘ f 4)4

"“~ 7 r )969 eer 4

: . w & P t

(1970; United States « Albright, 888 F 2d

719, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1968)

113,14) A defendant s, however, env

ted to the assistance of counse! in deter

mining whether to submit to 8 peychiatric

examination. Fatelle » Smith, 451 US

454, 471, 101 S.Cu 1866, 1877, 68 L.Ed 2d

359, 374 (1981). Since Grandson was act

ing as his own counsel, the only possible

complaint he might have @ that he was

demed assistance of standby counsel! in de

termuning whether to undergo mental eva!

uation. However, the April 25, 198

“Plea” itaelf reflects that thu was not 50

It requests that the court “arrange proper

psychistree examination of Defendant” and

is signed by both the defendant and his

standby counsel. Also, at the April 26u

hearing, standby counsel, acting at the re

quest of the defendant, stated that pror to

the filing of this plea “Mr. Grandison and I

had s considerable discussion about the

fine distinction between competency

stand trial and insanity at the time the

crime was commitied” Thus, it is clear

that the decision to undergo psychiatric

evaluation was made after consultavon

with standby counse! Therefore, there

was po excuse for appellant's subsequent

refusal to proceed with the examunavon

He cannot now complain that he was not

given an opportunity to demonstrate “good

cause” or that the trial court's refusa! of

the insanity plea was m error. The defense

did not demonstrate “good cause” for entry

of the late plea Thus, the trial judge

& Now Md Rule 4271, wtuch provides

Rule 4271. Trial dau

(s) Trial Dare @ Ciraus Court —The date

for wrial ww the carcwt court shall be set withuo

30 days afver the carber of the appearance of

counse! or the first appearance of the defend

Art 27. § 39) prowdes

§ 59). Semng dau fo mal postpon

pen:

(a) Within two weeks after the arrmgoamen!

of @ person accused of » crumnal offense or

$44 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 34 SERIES

property exercued hs decreton @ re

fusing to accept the maanity plea

v

Violation of Former Md Rule 746

Grandson claims that the charges

against him should have been dismussed

because he was not tried within 180 days of

his arraignment and there was no post

ponement for good cause by an adminstra

tive judge pursuant © Maryland Code

(1957, 1982 Rep! Vol, 1985 Cum.Sup;

Art 2, § 591 and former Md Rule 746 *

The record reveals that Grandson was furs!

arraigned in the Circuit Court for Balt

more County on July 19, 1983, thus the 15

days requirement of Rule 746 started &

rup malang January 15, 1984 the expiratior

date before which the case was W be tried

in the Circuit Court for Balumore County

Tria! was initially set for November 1)

1983. but was subsequently postponed unt

January 3. 1984. The case was removed

from the Circuit Court for Baltumore Cour

ty to the Circuit Court for Somerset Cour

ty on December 16, 1985, on Grandson 's

motion. The record is silent as to what, if

anything occurred on January 3 1984. It

is clear, however, that on January 20, 1984

the Circuit Court for Somerset County set

the tria! date for Apri) 26. 19™

moved w dismiss based on two ground

first, he argued to the tra! judge that once

the 180 days had elapsed January 15, 1954

Grandsor

within two weeks afier the filing of an appear

ance of counse! or the appowunen! of counse

for ap accused in any crumuna! matter, whuch

ever shall ccow firm, 2 judge or other desig

ested official of the carew! court in whuch tbe

matic: ws pending shal) set 2 date for the tna

of the case, which date shal) be not later ar

180 davs from the date of the erraigament of

the person accused of Uw ay

appowunes! of count for the accused

whichever cocurs fra The date established

for the wal of the matic: chal! oot be pos

pooed except for good caus shown by the

moving party and only wnb the permussoo of

the admunimrative padge of the court where

the mater w peoding

arance of the

wmer Md Rule 746

s that the charges

have been dismissed

tuned within 180 days of

d there was no post

‘ause by an sdmunisus

tt to Maryland Code

Jol. 1985 Cum.Supp)

former Md Rule 746°

nat Grandison was first

yweuit Court for Balu

19, 1983; thus the 15

{ Rule 746 started u

15, 1984 the expiratior

ve case was wo be ted

for Baltumore County

vet for November 1)

juently postponed unt

he case was removed

rt for Baltimore Cour

rt for Somerset Cour

1983, on Grandison s

is silent as to what, if

n January 3, 198

st on January 20, 19™

Somerset County 5

i} 26, 1984 Grands

ued on two grounc

e tria) judge that once

sed (January 15, 198)

er the filing of an appear

x appointment of counse

y cruminal matter which

1, a judge or other desig

arcu court which une

sall set a date for the wna

sie shall be oot later than

ate of the arraignment of

od cause shown by the

jy with the permussion of

sdge of the court where

|

GRANDISON *. STATE

Md. 595

Cone as 908 A2d 500 (Bd 1988)

the trial court 00 longer had any jurisdic

tion. Secondly, he claimed that the admin

intrative judge did not grant the postpone

ment as required by the rule

Both Art 27. § 59! and former Rule 746

provide that tra! shall be set within 180

days after the earlier of the appearance of

counse! or the first appearance of the de

fendant before the circurt court The stat

ute and rule als: provide that for good

cause shown the County Admuinistratiy'

Judge may grant 4 change of a circuit

court tna! dau

{15} In our we the rule & SIM ly mal

plicable here where a! Grandison § reque

the case was removed ww the Circuit Court

for Somerset County '€s* than a month

before the Januar) 2 1984 tna) date set if

the Circuit Cour for Baltimore Count

This is reac) understandable since the

statute anc rue only address the situatior

where a case & Se" and ultimately tned in 4

single circul court. and not where @ We

date has been set im one circuit court but

the case has been rem wed to a different

circuit court for tna Indeed, to conclude

that Art. 2. § 54) and former Rule 74¢

similarly cover remove situauons would be

to render useless and uneffecuve the pn

pa! requirement contemplated by the stat

ute and rule Judge Eldndee speaking for

the Court in State Franer. 2 Ma 4--

453, 470 A.2d 126% 19n4), stated

“The major safeguard contemplatec D)

the statute and rule for assuming that

criminal tals are not needlessly post

poned beyond the \goday period, is the

requirement that the administrative

judge or hus designee. rather than an)

judge, order the postponement This is a

logical safeguarc. * it us the adminisus

tive judge who has ap overall view of the

court's business. Who & responsible ‘for

the admuustravon of the court,” who as

signs tna! judges, who supervises the

assignment of acuons for tral, who su

pervises the court personne! involved In

the assignment of cases and who re

@ The record joes 1" reflec: tha: Grandiser

ceives reports from such personnel”

(footnotes omitted)

* Clearly then former Rule 746 was not

designed to cover the removal situation

In such a situation the administravve

judge of the cirevit court from which the

case Was removed would be unable to fu!

fill those functions contemplated by the

statute and rule /d Similarly, to expec’

and require that the receiving court adhere

to the tna schedule set forth in the former

circuit court wuld be to bestow upon the

administrative judge of the receiving cour

an unreasonatie burden whict oftentime

could result m ar ympossibie task Under

standably. this was recognized by the tna

judge Somerset County who. iM deny'ng

Grandison s motion to dismiss. statec If

part

Obwousiy. when you ask for remova

like that. you automatica!!) extend tn

trial date. There is no 8) in this cour

ty we could have tried it on the 3rd

January. No. 1, we only had 12 days

because of the Christmas holiday and

weekends and New Year's holiday and

we have the problem of cancelling ov

four or five months of cases that hac

already been scheduled to be uied We

onix have one judge anc one courtroon

in U ynty. so it becarme necessary

ntinue the trial Gate & the reques:

the defendant »

116} We hold therefore that when 4

emmina! case & removed on 4 defendan:

request. the una! date assigned in the for

warding circuit court pursuant to An 2

§ 591 and present Rule 4-27] is sitnou'

effect. We further hold that under suc!

condivions the 180-day penod begins © rur

anew in the receiving circuit court from the

time the case & received therein A de

fendant also remains protected by his

speedy wna! rights under the federa! 3m

state consutuvons

{17} We also point out that this holding

is equal!) applicable where the State ob

tains the remo¥ al. but with some jymitauor

ever asacc for a continuance

596 Med

If it appears tat such removal was for the

purpose of or had the necessary effect of

circumvenung the requiremens of the sta!

ute and the ruk the ongina! tna! date will

hold. See Curiey * State, 299 Md. 449

474 A.24 2 94 icharges refiled follow

ing nolle prosequ Sto vt Glenn we

Md 464.474 46 cus () 984), and compare

State Ph ; ooo Ma 40 vw

512 (19

according!> * ment wo Great

s Z

orn

¢ a Des sa

nod © “

uw Mary 4 aac Marys

( on ir ‘ a

a aye ™

Granc I *- if

the Cir Balur

era ume [ matwn o e .

u as anpearm We >

“a federe . New k a

up —" he hearing 7

anc ther mater eas re urnesc New

York ¢t ra @ r A r

‘ o 4 ary

n m eng w

i . . . er

* “A ‘ “ eve “a nece

cars w have Grands attendance 3

court f r mat? nnectec U this case +

wnt of habeas corpus ad prosequendu”

was obtained 3! -erved Thereupor fed

era marst.a escorvec Grancson ri

and stayec * th him until the court DU

ness was com) eted. Grandson was Wen

10. Thai < siaiecs

tenon of reque ~The approprs*«

get ATLANTIC REPORTER. 24 SERIES

New York by te {edera

being held in 8

It also appear’

eacorted back

* marshal. where he was

pretna! detenuon facility

that dumng this penod Grandison was no

serving 3 pend of incarceravion

The wi!

only pre

tna! detenvon judge concluded

that he was not satisfied that Grands

eS serving ® sentence tm Federe

Court,” that mo detainer ¥@ filed, and ths

f

f the custoc)

ri. § 6l6hia

wrt

Grandapor

federe

never «

mars" Artickt

contains n wunggenne events

as argue® Siu, were f met her

a detainer wt

there is Gout

ympane ling fa

una! juce* jemec @ yf these

Granaiseo’ now complains

IES

New York by the federal

he was being held ma

n faciiity It also appears

penod Grandiwon was not

of incarceration, only pre

The tna! judge concluded

sausfied that Grandson

sentence in the Federa

elainer was filed, and that

ft the custody of the

Article 27. § 616Eta)"

uiggenng events whuicl

Stats, were not met here

a clear a@ Ww What Wa

ge found that it fell shor

r Secor d there isd

ment & 616Ela that

rving a term. of incarcera

tma! judge a4 not think

6Eia) requires that cust

the Slate t Was not

the tria! judge Ved

a! judge errea. he hearc

Saw what Was presented

'

r mer th th .

\

f

©C afm ac sf a

niecac Ja ‘ ar

either he rv ed w ha

‘ He a soug

= ‘ . 7

A 3 uf

a | Pr re .

Npiair tha ©« “a

arceraicd pr de ha

tu n¢é ‘Tv

TMpiain! sha have Ou 2

a ‘v c ‘ Gut

2 c ma & 2 per

e " . .

reques! & * c “

govern send

reque -

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 597

Cite as 588 A2d S00 (Md 1980)

nied a fair ual. We disagree. In Erans

v. State, 4 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 126) (1985)

we had occasion to address this wentica!

issue when Evans rained it in the Circuit

Court for Worcester County where he was

being tried. The reasons cited by Evans

are the same, basically, as those cited by

Grandison What Judge Eldndge wrot

for the Court there is equally applicable u

Grandison’s argument here and is disy

tive of his contention Judge Eldndge stat

ed in part

We hold that the record support th:

decision of the tna! judge W der +

request for further remova We have

consistently taken the position that tf

question is one which rests within the

una! court s discretion. reviewable on aj

peal oni U determine whether there ha

heen an abuse of discretuor

Id a 2 499 4 2d at 12 4 ls

le

According!\. we herein ce ude that tne

, = .

denia! of the reques f surtne re =

did not amount tw an abuse of discret

under Maryland law

The same can be said of the tra un

denial of a continuance It ws t r d

Pule that the determinatior f whether

gre ac va t ¢ wit! the s

3 re Ne (ria ur i ;

\ 4 ~ He: * M4

4 if thatad re

{19} Similarly. the determinat

have the jury sequestered throughout tne

trial is discretionary. Former Md Rule °:

e inow Md Rule 4-3liten. Marviana Code

1974. 1984 Repl. Courts and Jud

Proceedings Aru § & 304. sec Evons

304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 11985) Here

too. Grandison has failed to provide us wott

anv indication that there was an abuse of

discretion There is no proof of juror pre

udice To the contrary. the jurors received

da admonitions against exposure to pul

'

1 Former Mid Ruic ~ ? G

7 mo perm he par

{20} Finally, Grandison's contenvor

that a new jury should have been impar

elled due to alleged discussions connecting

him to the Mafia is completely wit!

ment and foundation in the record Ar

possibility of prejudice resulting from thus

rumors was adequately cured by the tna

court's individual questioning of the fr

spective juror Consequent! there ‘eo

no abuse of the trial courts d re’

VI

, | )

{21} ; ey . » 4) 4 ‘

nat U ria jucye r re Xe

oi U urs cn md “a a Ja

prote hom fr prota

de “ be pr

srfuy ce Le E ey r a

with the recog ¢ ,

abs a sta r rr

nirar a } @

faiwr re 4 fair -

jur ne 4

a r dire re " r

‘ . er -

Md 4 4. 499 AZ J

< mu ¥ .

3u : .

"7 "

4 r ‘

al ‘ r 4

f RN °

na y r dire n r t r

pane a to potentia’ prejugice resvU

from the gut vercict rendre’

Evans tra! which was fe fea?

Worcester Count

Appellant has offered ne auth«r

has our research uncovered an) © Jasin

that a tna! court conduct ind\idua! sor

dire of each member of the jury after tr

nas ommenced nM 3 Catv Ase “rer

there ar alegator f wr : 3 :

Suiting fron put 1 1a fe

arate. tris

7 » Y

Md

Nonetheless. severa! related principles of

law exist which in our analysis force us to

conclude that appellant's argument must

fail

To support his contention, appellant re

hes im part on Silverthorne vr. United

States. 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.196%), cert

demed. 400 US 1022. 91 SCt SHS. 277

L.F.d.2d 633 (1971). for the proposiven that

m some mslance

where a siagmificant po

tenual for prejudice ha» been found. ind

vidual voir dire of the

jurors w required

We decline analyze the ment of uch a

contention as we find the case sub judi

factually disunguishable to Silverthorne

In Silverthorne the appellant

that the tra! court committed reversible

error in failing w ascertain durnng voir dire

ano al

arguec

certain specific points in the tra

whether. in light of the massire news me

dia publicity which antedated and

Was contemporaneous with the tna! the

prejudice toward appellant

In analyzing the parucu

whict

jurors bore ar

400 F.2d at 630

lar situation. the United States Cour of

Appeals noted that during the tna! some

jurors. while situng in the jury room. reac

the newspaper accounts of appellant's tna

indeed, one parucular juror maintained «

comprehensive collection of newspapgr an

cles pertaining Ww appellants tna da

til. Though these facts were broug

the attention of the une! judge dumng the

tna!l, he nonetheless failed w ir Quire @ A

the possible infiuence of the article: or

further attempt w remedy the situation

In holding that the trial] court erred. the

Circuit Court of Appeals stated. “[Wk

have no recourse. in light of this inodent

but to attmbute little if any weight u

the court's repetitive admonivons thal the

jurors should read or hear nothing about

the case Id. at 641. Relying w part or

Coppedge v. United States. 106 US Ap;

D.C. 275. 22 F.2d Wa, We 11959). cert

denied, 36% U.S. &55, 82 S.Cr 92, 7 L Ed 2d

52 (1961). the court noted. “It ws Une

affirmative duty of the tna! court t

606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

posilse acuuon to ascertain the exustence of

, Mprojer influences on the jurors’ delilera

uve qualifications and t© take whatever

steps are necessary to diminish or eradicals

such impropnmeties Silverthorne, 4

F.2d at 643

We find the significant fact existing

Silverthorne. knowledge on the part of th

tris ? f blatant vs utions t memoer

ft . f the tria ourt s edmor

not WO te reser mn the case at bar Fur

ther ase ult bar. there no eviorr

on re . ‘wn cpu \ surr

appr , ru ’ r a legat f

ex u U surround c tr re

latec t e rate LVans (Mma

In ¢ rag he United Stats our

Appe r e | r uMbis

Cull rever he nv f « cnmina

defence ne va Mat the tria r

failed t ascertain the possible effe

Wis! [fv members of the ur

the tna) court was found t

have a “wec the jury Ww twice separa

overnig’?.: withou! admomshing the juror

agains’ reading newspaper arucles atx

the pe g tmal Further. the tna! cour

failed nquire inw the potentua’ prejuc

harbor those jwror he tma! cour

knew f rte wspaper accou f

proce T ‘a r cor

— r he tria’ court}

Ca>t 2 ri Si

ac juror €apose Une

selves Tmedia publicity further, there

in the record that suggests th:

ima! cou™ hac knowledge that an) member

¢

or mer.ter the jur hac violate

See also Adimi i nite

States. 3° F.2d 654 (Sth Cir.1965

Turnir¢ w the instant appeal. it must be

borne uw. und thal the recorc suggests tne

trai jucce *as extreme sensiuve W ar

concer? o he polenua probien

raise media publicity and was quit

av are 7 necessity of pecifica \ c

certain the existence of

on the jurors’ delibera

and wo take whatever

to diminish or eradicate

Silverthorne, 400

ficant fact existing in

edge on the part of the

violations by members

a! court s admonitions

the case at bar. Fur

ar. there is no evidence

publicity surrounding

only allegations of the

surrounding the re

vans (ma

United States Court of

unct of Columbw Cir

nvicuon of a cmmuina

sis that the trai court

the possible effect of

nembers of the jury

i! court was found wo

iry to twice separate

dmonishing the jurors

sspaper arucles about

urther, the tna! court

the potentia! prejudice

jurors the tna! court

paper accounts of the

was heic to constituls

the tria! court. In the

una: court specifically

r> not to eapuse ther

icity; further, there is

cord that suggests the

edge that any member

jury had violated its

so Adjmi v. United

‘Sth Cir.1965)

cant appeal, it must be

ve record suggests the

emely sensitive to and

potential problems

cbucity and was quite

ty of specifically call

f the jurors the impor

—s proposed bs the par

Emphasis added

GRANDISON v. STATE Md §99

Cre we Se 2d SOD (hd 19S)

tance of avoiding it. On the evening of

May 2. 1984. the tna! judge warned the

newly selected jurors

“Now, the admonishment | am going

lo give you now will be lve Urroughout

these proceedings Please don't discuss

this matter with anyone at all Don't

discuss it amongst yourselves and dont

discuss it with your fmends or your

neighbors or your wives or husbands. a

the case May be. or vour chileren. oF

with the pres>

As 1 said a couple times befor | know

when you are playing ar important part

in a proceeding Nxt vr wows difficult

sometimes avoid reading a newspaper

account of it or watching 2 Uelevisior

account of it or something the that |

know it is hard not to de tha’ But | ar

going to ask you. you are going w have

w refrain from doing 1 in ihe Case {

vou are going to be fair Ww both parve

You are under oath to fair w bot

parties Don't watch any television a

f

count or listen W an) radi account 0

these proceedings until this case Is tert

nated Dont read anything if the news

paper about i, please, UNt wn cast

terminatec

The next morning the tna! judge rev

erated the admor wor H. age” rem raoec

rie vrors during ; ur the tra

44 the mor ‘wy 2

f, "err . } r

+} morning «efter co“ ; Eva

“a convicied VUorcester ( our’ yor

request of the appellant-Grandisor the tr

a! judge posed the following quesuon

the jury en masse

Have any of you hearc anything

about the outcome of a case that war

concluded in Worcester County ‘ast

night” If you have please stand

There was no response by any member of

the jury

{22} Based on our review of the record

we are not persuaded that the tna! judge

erred in questioning the jury em masse as

12. Each case musi resi on its “snecia!l facts

Marshall v insted States YF LS 310. 79 SCt

to the alleged publicity aurrounding th

Evans tral"? Appellate court should t»

alow wo impute Jurmes 8 disregard of their

duties and w tral courts a want of 4

igence OF perspicacity appraising the

jury's conduct Fairmount Glass Worth

» Cub Fork Coal Co. BLS 474. 58

S.Ct. 252, 77 L.Ed 439 (1934 It ws mere

speculation unsupp rudd by the record. t

conclud: tat there wer jurors #7 i»

carn ,ermm PoIming niivences C |

ty surrounding a different tris! s ver d

not Choose w acknowledge these feeling

be f 77 they f¢ “ uror Ma ‘*

Granc hu r rate +}

ha "rt afford 3 r ‘

and impartia ur

Ll nd ; circumstal r nts )

the insta 4 we af r

he Ur sare err R °

quested r dire concermire put

roundiny (ry Eva! e w

1\

;

Erc usion for (au Jury Por

Vember ve Evryre f ‘

Otrections to the Death Pe u

{23} Grand r nex e t?

the (we ‘ pr - al ©) “a!

jes - HN .

for ¢ ial r

} - mor . - -

because their Oe etfs were f SU 2

prevent them from rendering an Imps

verdict The State. on the ol vand

tends there was no error ©) he tra: juce

We have areful , revrewec * re rs ar

agree with the States pos

The Court has recentl; beer confrontec

with two death penalty cases if which tne

same basic argument “a> made as is “

presented by Grandison. im both cases ¥°

rejected tha! argumen! and dv so ner

See Foster vr. State. 304 Md 439. 499 Ac

1171. 3 LEd 2d 1280 199

600 Md

1236 (1985) and Evans v State. 34 Md

4®7, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985) The only vana

tion in Grandwson's argument stems from,

Vainwnght r Wilt, 469 US 10°

S.Ct S44, 53 L.Ed.2d 84) (1985), whereir

the Supreme Court modified the standard

for determining when a prospective juror

may be excluded for cause because of his

or her views on capital punishment.” The

Court stated, “That standard © whether

Un ‘urors views would prevent or sul

stantially umpair the performance of hi

dutw's a # juror m accordance with he

matructions and his oath Id. — Us

a — 10 s at 52. 63 LEd2d a

81-52 iquot ™ Teras, 446 |S

3m. 100 65 LEd.2d +1

After reviewing the rece

that

(190

L &ti

rd we are Satisfied

where the trial puodge excused a pro

spective juror for cause he followed the

Standard set out in Witt In reaching this

conclusior we recognize that deference

must be giver to the tral judges decis

w eaclude Ir, Witt. in pertinent parr. Une

Supreme Cour stated

We note that. in addition w dispensing

with Witherspoon's reference to ‘auto

Matic decisionmaking, is Standard like

wise Goes not require that a jurors bia

.

m proved with ‘unmistakable clants

Tr i because determination f juror

bis an be recucec Ques nar

aMsWer se whic ‘2 ,

! Marner a calec? MW c

mor sense should have realzec

exper

ence has proved’ many veniremen simp)s

be asked enough questions &

reach the point where their bias has beer

made ‘unmistakably clear. these venire

men ma) know how they will react

when faced with imposing the death sen

tence, or may be unable two arucuilate. or

may wish w hide thew true feelings

Despite this lack of clarity in the printed

record, however, there will be situavions

where the tna! judge is lefi with the

definite impression that a prospecuve ju

ror would be unable to

cannot

not

faithfully and

imparually apply the law For reasons

13. See also Darden » Warnungt: “67> F 2d 7S>

bith Cir 1985). cert granted — LS ——. 10

06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

that will be developed more fully infra

this « why deference mus: be paid to thy

tna! judge

ror — |

who sees and hears the

S. at —. 0. 8 Ct at»

In our view. Judge Simpkir

taking!\

War parr

thoroush w

the Questior

prospective jurors, parti ’ tp

va *

obwrously had problems with t+ de

ality m genera Furthermer tt r

yedge afforded Grandson. hy» stand ‘

Lorne and the State s atlorre. an

poriunity to question the pr ‘

rors In short. we are satucfu .

entire procedure was carefu ere ‘

an effort wo obtain a fair and impartial jr

both a- uw the defendant a a. @

Xx

F y ; Cini

WA Indicated P b

to be impart

124] Grandison also argues that the tr

al judge erred in refusing uw stiri

cause Sic prospective juror: «wr * at

WH be impartia: wa craw no ser

quesuor because of ther a-er

iru: ana drug trefficki.,

1 def . ‘

far @ Tpuriia ur ’ a

OV ETI IAS nowueve

O: the prospective jurors fie Claim s!

have been struck were rehabilitate

through additional! quesuoning For exa

pie whe

heard the case was a drug-reiatec case a

Stated severa! times she thougr: she cou

base her decision on the evidence she hear

in the courtroom and the lias

Mrs. Dorsey disliked drugs. she

the following quesuon 0b

standby counsel!

‘MR. CRAWFORD. Couic ! ash yi

one more quesuon’ | am sorry Ge

ung back to this drug Dus:re f sore

acminmec she Ne

Mrs. Creasy

involve

War asne

Urendior

SC: 2) 8° LEd 2d 699 (1985) argue:

s

loped more fully wnfre

nce must be paid to th

sees and hears the ju

—, 105 $.Ct at 852

&52-53 (footnote omit

re Simpkins was pains

in the questonng of

particulars thos: wt

Tis - *? Pye te u ’

Purthermeaore the tri

ndison his standby at

le & allorne, an

, he pr -

are satisfied thai

s carefu exe ed

fair and imparta! jur

Want anc r “ta

\

fae Cour J

Pr fen i? ; y

m partic

Iso argues thal the tr

refusin

ng w strike for

e jurors whose at

draw. into senou

of thew aver mn wu

fick n,

' e of e

sr Whe ots

? fs tne 3

irors nie Clair shou

were rehabilitatec

yestioning. For exar

ho admitted she had

drug related case ais

she thougnt she could

the evidence she heard

nd the law involved

drugs. she Was askec

won by Grandison’s

RD. Could | ask you

" J am sorry. Get

rug business, if some

(198°. argued Januar

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 601

Cows os 908 ADd SED (id Pe

thing came out m tna! to indicate that

there were drugs involved. and sithouzh

this man ie not on trial for any drug

involvement, if it should develop dunmng

the course of the tna! that there ma)

have been some drug involvement, a!

though he is not on tna! for that, would

that have anv—make any difference U

you as how you arnved at a verdict

regarding what he is on tna for”

MRS DORSEY No. if it wasnt pert

nent to the case Like J said, J just dor t

like drugs | had an expenence in Grup

with my son. and he we thank Ue

] just don | hae Grug

Thus it is clear that Mrs Dorsey was stat

ing. in effect, that the Crug factor wou

make no difference in how she armvec ato

verdict if the case did not inveive dru

charge Mr Hankins @ Slated that

she would tr her very best Ww mane @

decision based on the evidence ana the law

Vrs Somers stated she WOUIC NOL Mare «@

decision on the fact of drugs alone anc

her decision would be based on the ¢

dence and the law Fina'iy. both Mr Bnr

er and Mr Serman testifiec that ®

drugs might influence then they would

follow the court instrucwuior w base their

Gecision n.the evidence @ 3

T while unremarns al. extre Py

aver us 3 ale “

make a decisior. based oF the es

une a Ir our vie™¥ rel 3 z “

tieo W no more

Death Qualified Jury

Grandison next contend> that he “as er

titled to be tmed by a jury from whiect

opponents to the death penalty were fn

excluded We recently had occasion W ac

dress this contention in Foster t Stote. W4

Md 439, 499 A2d 1236 11985) For the

reasons set forth in Par: IB of the Foster

opinion, 304 Md. at 453. 499 A 2¢ at 124

we again reject this contentio:

14. Genera tha: het re.ationsmip with ©

er. Susan “as ore ne “is “a

guod studen!. sporscrenics ane engagec

xi

Endence

Here certain evidence is argued to have

been erroneously admitted at tna That

evidence consists of, namely: (a) tesumon)

of Chery! Prechowicz concerning her hus

hand ar@ sister. (b) photographs of th

wieurns taken before the incident occurre

ic) phow graphs taken at the auto

each vic dG) testimons of Chery

cerT ng ner conversation with Janet M wore

ea™ 1] pists and if} an eniarg

e rand r Marc? 4

Moor

a

pra he trial. ( her Piechow ‘

fed 4 rai { ers far at»

sister & husband '' Otjection w U ‘

ur the ground f releva ,«

erru We perceive f en

par e tna! juare ruling

In - ’ S 92 Md 4 4

43 a.a 42 ¢ Qe?) holding th

ir cic rT , ry ne

mor at Une m ne 3 er

» ar we Stalec

“ ary ’

‘ “ °

, .

- t

str . ‘ hart

error The standard for Getermininy

hartr..¢ error. as thoughtfully laic

t Js*ae O Donne for th Court

Dorse. ». State 776 Md. 638. 65¥

A JG ° 67s «(1976 « whether a re

viewlr ¢ court. upon its owr independer

review of the record. is able u deciare a

belief, bevond a reasonabdie doubt. tha:

the error in no way influenced the ver

Gic* Upor such a review of the tmra

recor: . this case we Nave nm a:ffieu

n des amng bevond a reas ynable dou

that verdicts were nol &

-38-

a

the testimony concerning the daughter's

health. The record @ glutted with over: +

whelming evidence in support of the

jury's guilt determinatvons A rever

sal on this basis is thus not warranted.”

We find these principles applicable here

and dispositive of thw contenton

(b) & tc)

{26} During Chery!’s tesumony, two

color photographs were introduced. one, a

high school portrait of Susan Kennedy

(State's Exhibit #1), the other, the Pie

chowiezes at the beach (State's Exhibit

= 2)."° Whether a photograph ws of prac

tical value in a case and admussible at tna!

is 2 matter best left to the sound discrevion

of the trial judge. Johnson r. State, 303

Md. 487, 502. 495 A.2d 1, 8, cert denied

—US , 106 S.Ct 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907

(1985). Ordinarily a court's determination

as to the admissibility at tia) of photo

graphs will not be disturbed unless plainly

arbitrary. See Bowers v. State, 28 Md

115, 135-36, 468 A.2d 101, 111-12 (1983)

Considering first the photographs env

fied s State's Exhibits | and 2, we per

ceive no arbitrariness on the part of the

trial court in ruling those exhibits admiss)

ble The photograph of Kennedy was rele

vant to illustrate the similarity the netm

bore to her sister. Chery! Piechowiez, As

to the family photograph of the Preesow

iczes, we fail to see any prejudicial error in

admitting it, particularly in lght of the

overwhelming evidence against the ac

cused

{27} Two black and white photographs

one of each vicuin, marked Sw'e's Exhibits

23 and 24, are also contested as erroneous

18. The family photograph pictured the daughter

of Scom and Chery! as well Her image was

blackened out by the court prior to ts release tc

the jury

16. See also. Maryland Code (1982). HealthGen

eral Article. § S31 1(¢), whirh mates

"§ S311. Records

(d) Evidence —<1) In this subsector

“record

(:) Means the result of a mew oF examina

non of or an autopr. on 4 body anc

606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 34 SERIES

ly admitted. The photographs were taken

in connection with the medica! examiner's

sutopey report on each victim. We con

clude it was not error to admit these photo

graphs

Not only is the admissibility of such ev:

dence clearly within the tna! court's sound

discretion, Johnson, 303 Md at 503. 49

A.2d at 9,"* but we have had occasion &

recognize as proper the exerewe of suc!

discretion in receiving into evidence at tna

photographs depicting the condivon of the

victim and location of mjunes upon tn

deceased, Clarke 1 State, 23+ Md 1}, 2)

22, 207 A.2d 456, 461-62 (1965) and the

wounds of the victim. Madison vr State

200 Md 1, 7-8. 87 A2d 593, 595 (1952

Nor are the parucular phowgraphs

flammatory to the jury solely on the bas:

that they do not represent any ssue

controversy. Further. since the photo

graphs are mere graphuc representations of

undisputed facts already in evidence, their

introduction could not be held to have ir

jured the accused See, eg. Smith

State, 182 Md. 176. 187, 32 A2d 863, 86:

(1943)

id

Chery! Piechowie: tesufied over obje

tion that she conversed with coconspirer

Moore at the feders! courthouse on Marc!

14, 1983, while appellant's federa! drug u

a! was there pending An objecvor to the

substance of the conversation was sus

tained on grounds of hearsay. However

Chery! was permitted to testify that a cor

versation had taken place and that Moore

had “scared her Also, Chery! successfu

ly identified a photograph of Moore. Al

(u) Does oot wclude @ statemen' of a

witness or other individua

(2) A record of the office of the Chie! Med

ca! Exaruner or any deputs medica cra

uner. J made by the medical caaminer or

anvone under the medical examiner 5 direc

supervision or coniro!. or a cerufied war

scm of that record m competent endence

mm any court in this Sute of the matiers anc

facts coptained wv

cRIES

*

The photographs were taken

with the medical examiner's

t on each victim. We con

t error to admit these photo

the admussibility of such evi

within the trial court's sound

inson, 303 Md. at 503, 495

ut we have had occasion to

woper the exercise of such

ceiving into evidence at tna!

»picting the condition of the

ation of injumes upon the

ke v. State, 236 Md. 11, 2)-

456, 461-62 (1965) and the

victim, Madison v. State

3, 87 A.2d $93. 595 (1952)

particular photographs in

the jury solely on the basis

wl represent any issue in

Further, since the photo

e graphic representavons of

8 already in evidence, their

uld not-be held to have in

ised. See, eg9., Smith 1

176, 187, 32 A.2d 863, 867

(d)

ywiez testified over objec

nversed with co-contuirator

dera! courthouse on Marct

ippellant’s federal drug w

nding. An objection & the

he conversation was 6us

ids of hearsay. However

nitted to testify that a con

iken place and that Moore

Also, Chery! successfu!

yhotograph of Moore. Al

not include a statement of a

uber individual

of the office of the Chief Med:

or any deputy medical exam

by the medical examiner or by

r the medical examiner's direc:

~ control, or a cerufied wan

record, 1s competent evidence

n this State of the matters and

dwn”

GRANDISON +. STATE

Md 602

though not clear from ha bref, appellant's

argument seems to be that the admission

of Chery!’s testimony concerning her con’

versation with Moore was erroneous since

it had no relevance to the proceedings We

disagree

(28.29) As s preliminary matter, we

note that appellant's contention that Che

ry!'s admitted tesumony was wrelevant

was not preserved for appeal. and is there

fore waived Where specific grounds are

delineated for an objecuon. the one object

ing will be held to those grounds and will

ordinanly be deemed Ww have waved

grounds not specified Thomas v State

301 Md 294, 328, 483 A.2d 6, 23 (1954)

Since Grandison specifically objected wo the

testimony on hearsay grounds at tral, our

review is limited to that issue

{30} Despite the fact that the tal

judge sustained Grandison’s hearsay objec

tion, the court maintained discretion w al!

low introduction of evidence as to the exist

ence of the Moore conversation and its

effect on Chery!. A trial judge has broad

discretion to determine whether evidence

will be sufficiently helpful to the jury wo

justify an excursion into the subject. Sted

bing vr. State, 299 Md 331, 350, 473 A.2d

903, 912, cert. denied. — US. ——, 105

S.Ct 276. 88 LEd2d 212 (1984). Here

Moore was alleged w be part of the cor

spiracy; Cheryl's testimony was relevant

to lustrate that Moore acted in a manner

supportive of Grandison at the time of the

federa! hearings to frighten a crucial iden

uficauon witness

(e)

{31} The trial court similarly did not err

in admitting State's Exhibit 14, a MAC-11

pistol, into endence

Testimony adduced at trial revealed that

State's Exhibit 14 looked like the weapon

that changed hands between Kelly and Ev

ans and was seen by Charlene Sparrow

Additionally, a weapons expert concludec

at trial that the pistol he identified as a

VMAC-1] was the only type of firearm tha

could have discharged the bullets and eject

ed the parucular cartndges found at Uw

scene. Finally, the jury was wold that te

actual weapon that fired the fatal shot

had never been found

In light of this testimony, we perceive ni

error in the admission of State's Exhibit 14

We were presented with this precise iss ur

in Evans rv. State. Our discussion ther

dispositive of Grandison’s present arr

ment Citing C. MeCormick, Ever

§ 213 (3d ed 1984), at 670. we held that +’.

trial judge did not commit an abuse

discretion im admitting inv evidence 4

MAC-1] machine pisw! as a weapon re,rr

sentative of that allegedly used in the sls,

ing. Evans, 304 Md. at 520-21, 499 A 2c a:

127%. In the case sub judice. not only was

the proffered exhibit relevant and mavers

it was clearly an important par. of we

State's case in its attempt to link the wes;-

on offered to Evans on the day pnor & U«

murders to the weapon used to commit Vie

murders. Thus, we conclude the tra

judge did not err in admitung State's Ex

hibit 14 as there was ample evidence of

similarity between it and the weapon use<

if)

{32) Finally, appellant argues that a:

enlarged facsimile (State's Exhitit 45) of a”

origina! letter (State's Extiti: 44) eri

by appellant to Moore. dates Marc?

1983, had the prejudicia! effect of overc*

phasizing a single piece of evidence over s

others. We cannot agree

The enlargement of the letver was ier:

fied and received into evidence dunng ¢

rect examination of Mr. Senter. a docume>:

examiner for the F.B.1. Though unciear

from the record. appellant seemed to objec:

to the display of the enlargement since

was shown to the jury pror Ww its adm

sion into evidence. Whether the dispis

overemphasized that piece of evidence ¥a

not questioned by appellant a: tral Sr

Thomas. 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6

Nevertheless. we find no error on U«

part of the tra! court in allowing Sale

Exhibit 45 to be admitted. nor du we fe

the appellant was prejuaicec D> Ue Gis pis

- * . ae

Ce oe

:

‘ Le ew * a .

; REPORTER, G4 SERIES

Cae

of that exhibit pride te fie formal sdmiasion able, there must be a prime for showing

twto evidence First, the origina) eter wes

already i evidence, its admissibility was

not challenged ce appeal Second, testimo

ny revealed thet the enlargement wee ap

exact, although enlarged, copy of the orig?

mal Finely, the enlargement wes em

ployed to demonstrate to ihe jury the bass

for witness Senter’s conclusion that the

origina! letter was indeed authored, draft

ed, and signed by Grandison.

In analyzing such evidence, t & the

statement itself which has substantive le

ga! significance. The means by which the

statement is recreated as evidence before

the jury is of secondary import, provided

that its authenticity is reasonably assured

Colbert ». State, 37 Md App. 383, 387, 377

A.24 585, 588 (1977). Accordingly, we bold

there was po error in the display or the

admission of State's Exhibit 45

XIII

Admission of Hearsay Evidence Under

The Coconspirator Exception

Grandison next argues that the trial

judge erred in allowing the admission of

hearsay evidence ander the co-conspirator

exception to the hearsay rule. Ths is so

he argues, because the State had pot prov

en the existence of a conspiracy by inde

pendent proof showing hus participation

therein. Furthermore, be argues that sev

eral of the statements related to matters

pot within the scope of the conspiracy and

several statements were made by someone

not alleged to be part of « conspiracy

After reviewing the record we perceive po

merit to Grandison's contentions

Grandison concedes that oot of court dec

larations of one conspirator made during

the course of and im furtherance of the

conspiracy are admissible against 4 cocon

spirator as an exception to the bearsay

rule. See Greenwald + State, 22) Md

245, 157 A2d 119, appeal dismissed, 363

US. 721, 80 S.Cx 1599, 4 LEd2¢ 1521

(1960). What Grandison seems to argue is

that before this hearsay exception is avail

of the existence of «& conspiracy and hs

participation therein

{83} ‘To the contrary, it is not necessary

that « conspiracy be conclusively estab

lished before the declarations are admiss:

ble. Flexibility mm the order of proof

allowed. Greenwald, 22) Md. at 257, 157

A.2d at 126; see Hill o State, 23) Md. 458

461, 190 A.2d 795, 796, cert denied, 375

US. 861, 84 S.Ct 127, 11 L.Ed.2d 87 (1963)

Mason, Taylor and Taylor v. State, 18

Md App. 130, 187, 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973)

{34} Ip the instant case, we have re

viewed the record and are persuaded that

there was ample evidence presented, inde

pendent of the challenged hearsay state

ments, of the existence of a conspiracy to

justify the trial court's application of this

hearsay exception. For example, Grand)

son's letter of March 14 to Janet Moore

telling ber to take “Short” (Evans) to see

Rodney (Kelly) to take care of something to

do with his upcoming trial; the evidence of

Evans’ and Moore's visit thereafter with

Grandison im the City Jail; and Theresa

Purdie’s testimony that Evans, Moore, and

Kelly al) spoke to Grandison over her

phone about protective glass at a motel

In addition, Calvin Harper testified that

Kelly took a gun to show tw Evans and the

next day Kelly left with the gun and re

turned without it. There was also testmo

ny to the effect that Kelly got $500.00 from

a Michae! Queen, which apparently was

used to obtain the gun

It is settled that not much im the way of

independent evidence s needed w show the

existence of a conspiracy and ac scrused’s

involvement therein See Brown v. State

281 Md 241, 378 A2d 1104 (1977). In our

view the independent evidence m thm case

was sufficent

Finally, Grandison contends that there

was one instance of double hearsay which

did not fal) within the co-conspirator excep

tion and that another statement could no!

be said to be in furtherance of the conspir

acy. Furthermore, he complains that one

eee

rt be & prime facie showing

2 of « couspirecy and bis

erew.

contrary, it is pot necessary

acy be conclusively estab

ve declarations are sdmissi

+ > the order of proof is

nwald, 221 Md. at 257, 167

¢ Hill o. State, 23) Md. 458,

7195, 796, cert denied, 375

% 127, 11 LEd.2d 87 (1963);

and Taylor v. State, 18

¥7, 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973)

instant case, we have re

ord and are persuaded that

le evidence presented, inde

challenged hearsay state

nistence of a conspiracy

court's application of thi

oo. For example, Grand)

March 14 to Janet Moore

ake “Short” (Evans) to see

» take care of something to

ying trial, the evidence of

ore’s visit thereafter with

ve City Jail; and Theresa

my that Evans, Moore, and

e to Grandison over her

otective glass at a motel

lin Harper testified that

» to show to Evans and the

left with the gun and re

t There was also testmo

that Kelly got $500.00 from

m, which apparently was

he gun

vat pot much mm the way of

lence is needed to show the

onspiracy and ap accused's

rem. See Brown v. State,

3 A2d 1104 (1977). In our

odent evidence m this case

dison contends that there

e of double hearsay which

w the co-conspirator excep

other statement could not

furtherance of the conspr

we, he complains that one

Reference to Federal Case

{35} Appellant also objected to the in

troduction of evidence relating to 8 feders!

charge against hum pending at the ume of

commission of the homicides in the case

sub fudice. The admissibility of this evr

dence forms the basis for Grandison s next

argument

The State maintains that evidence of ap

pellant’s pending federal charge was rele

vant to show bis motive for arranging the

murders and thus admussible We agree

The record reveals that at no Gme during

the proceeding? belo did the State revea!

or attempt to reveal the nature of the pend

ing federal charge against the appellant, its

result, or details related to 1 The refer

ences made to the federa! charge only stat

ed that there existed a federal charge

against Grandson for which the prosecu

tion had to prove be occupied » parbcular

room at the Warren House Motor Rote) in

November of 19&2

It is elementary that evidence of a de

fendant’s prior criminal acts may not be

introduced to prove that he is guilty of the

offense for which he is on tna! Straughn

¢. State, 2977 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166

1169 (1983). We applied this rule, common

ty referred to as the “other crimes rule,” ip

Ross v. State, 16 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d

680, 684 (1976), where we said

“[E\vidence which i any manner shows

or tends to show that the accused has

committed another crime wholly indepen

dent of that for which be is on trial, even

though it be a crime of the same type e

17. Evidenrr of othe cme & independently

relevant and thus edmussible WU mrroduced ©

prove or establish

“(1) mouve, (2) wient (3) absence of mis

whe. (4) 8 common sxbem or plan embrac

ing the commusmoo of two oF more crunes #6

qg77." See C. McCormick, Bvidence

§ 190 (8d ed.1984) The admissibiity of

the challenged evidence must be deter

mined through recogniuon of thu rule and

more parucularly, apphcavon of ts excep

Dons

We conclude that the acintilla of evidence

admitted relating to appellants federa

charge was relevant to establish appe!

lant’s motive for arranging the murders

Thus. the evidence does not fall prey the

rule of exclusion enunciated above. As our

cases make clear, that rule will act as a bar

to other crimes evidence unless the evr

dence is “substantially relevant for some

other purpose than to show a probability

that [the accused) committed the cmme on

trial because be is # man of criminal char

acter.” Ross, 716 Md at 669, 350 A2d at

684 (quoting McCormick, supra) (emphasis

supped)

Thus. the trial court did not err See

Straughn, 297 Md at 333-34 465 A.2d a:

1169 (trial court has broad diserebon wu

admitting other cnmes evidence) McCor

mich, supra Evidence of the exstence of

appellant's pending federa! charge was re!

evant to Mustrate his movve for arranging

the murders, it demonstrated s logics! con

nection between the crucial defense w'

pesses, the Piechowiczes and the sabse

quent homindes Further, the fact that

the State proffered no evidence other than

the existence of the pending federa) charge

renders any potential prejudice to Grand

son minima! in light of its probatve value

297 Md at 333-34, 465 A2d at 1169

related to cach other thet proof of one tends

to emablish the other and (5) the idenurty of

the person charged with the comumussion of 4

crume o0 tal.”

Ros. 176 Md at 666-70 380 Ald a 684 (cre

pons omuned)

, Hho nvm

7 th

;.

Erroneous Admission ef Hearsay

Evidence Rervulting tn Prejudwe

(96) During the State's case-in-chief,

one James Savage, the prosecutor ip the

feders) drug tria! against Grandison, wes

permitted to testify that Scott Piechowie:

had provided the federal suthorives certain

evidence against Grandson The tenor of

this evidence was to show that despite the

fact that Piechowicz could not make & posr

tive identification of Grandison, he could

help establish that Grandison had occupied

s room at the Warren Mote! at & ume

critical to the federal prosecution Pie

chowicz had related to Savage that he had

seen & ticket on an individual's belt indicat

ing that the individual had been to the

Sugar Ray Leonard benefit Apparently

this ticket was found in the room occupied

by Grandison

We find no error in the trial courts re

fusal to preclude Savage testifying as 8

State witness. from relating this evidence

Grandison complained at the instant tria!

that his right of confrontavon was violated

and the evidence was hearsay This argu

ment is meritiess. Hearsay was not

volved as these extrajudicial statements

were not being offered for they wut

Lunsford v. Bd. of Education of Prince

George's County. 250 Md. 665, 374 A2c

1162 (1977); McCall's Ferry Co. ' Price

108 Md. 96, 69 A. 832 (1908), Sun Cab Ce

y. Walston, 15 Md.App. 113, 289 A 2d 804

(1972), aff'd on other grounds, 267 Md

559 298 A.2d 391 (1973). Through Savage

the State sought to establish a mouve for

the murder of Scott Piechowicz Thus, the

veracity of Piechowicz's statements to Sav

age was of no import The mere fact that

they were made supplied s motive for the

Piechowiez killing. At the instant trial

Savage was under oath and available for

crossexamination as to whether Piechos

iez actually made the statements Hence

his testimony was admussible

A second ground for complaint arose

when the State, in cross examining Detec

tive Duckworth, elicited certam alleged

the Suute

On cross-examination the State sought &

establish the nature of the dispute precip

jtating the second summons Without ob

jection. Detective Duckworth testified Unst

his investigation of the summons had re

vealed that Piechowiez and one Erx Aller

had disagreed over the amount of money

Allen owed for a room at the Warrer

House This line of quesvoning proceeded

unt) Duckworth was asked if he had inter

viewed Mr. Allen. At this point, Grandisor

objected stating, “Al! the « hearsay.

This objection was properly overruled be

cause quite simply the quesvon to whict

the bearsay objecbon was directed was po!

one wvolving hearsay Duckworth kne«

of his own knowledge whether be had @

terviewed Mr. Allen. Thus, the quesvor

was cearly proper. Further, ths

inquiry had been initiated by Grandisor

and we State was certainly privileged &

develo; the sue on cross-examunavoo!

See Culler v. Standard On! Co., 127 Md

405. 9€ A. 558 (1916), see also Walters

State. 156 Md. 240, 144 A 252 (1929), Koo

gle r. Cline, 110 Md. 587, 73 A. 672 (1909

line

(37) The final testimonia! complaint oc

curred when appellant recalled James Say

age wo testify that « person named Anthony

Garrison had registered for the hotel room

at issue in the federal trial and that Garn

son and Grandison were different people

On cross-examination the State pursued

this tne of questioning over objecbon and

elicted certain testimony which Grandisor

now contends was sufficiently preyudicia

to warrant reversal of his convicvon Spe

r Scott Piechowiez. Grandi

8 testimony from Duckworth

\ination without objectvon by

mination the State sought to

vature of the dispute prenip

ond summons. Without ob

ive Duckworth testified that

on of the summons had re

schowiez and one Eric Allen

over the amount of money

or @ room at the Warren

une of questioning proceeded

jd was asked if he had inter

en. At this point, Grandison

g. “All this is bearsay.”

bp was properly overruled be

mply the question to which

jection was directed was not

hearsay. Duckworth knew

ywledge whether he had »

Allen. Thus, the quesvor

oper. Further, this line of

xen initiated by Grandison

was certainly privileged &

ssue OM cross-examinavor

Standard Oil Co., 127 Md

(1916); see also Walters +

240, 144 A. 252 (1929); Koo

0 Md. 587, 73 A. 672 (1909)

ia) testimonia) complaint oc

ypellant recalled James Sav

vat & person named Anthony

»gustered for the hotel room

federa) tria) and that Garn

ison were different people

ination the State pursued

‘stoning over objection and

testimony which Grandison

was sufficently prejudicua!

rsa) of his conviction. Spe

—

plained that a showing that Grandison was

connected with s particular room at the

Warren House Hote! was crucial to convict

Grandison on federa) drug charges

The admission of tus tesumony does pot

warrant reversal. A review of the record

shows that each of these facts with the

exception of the fact that Garrisor recerved

remuneration for registering for the room,

was independently established through

unodjected to tesumony For instance

Chery! Prechowiet testified that she had

been summoned to appear as 8 witness

the federal drug tria! of Anthony Grand

sop to make an identificabon of Grandson

as an occupant of s room at the Warren

House. In addition, Savage when called as

a State's witness stated that the tesumony

of Scott and Chery! Piechownez inking

Grandison to s certain room in the Warren

House was critical to the federal! drug case

Also. in the very colloquy of which Grand

son now complains, Savage was permitted

to testify, “Mr Garnson requested the

room. Mr. Grandison occupied the room’

without objection or a movon to strike by

the defense. Finally, oo redirect examina

tion by Mr. Grandison, Savage tesufied

that Grandison had s key to the hotel room

in his possessior when he was arrested on

the federal drug charge

Thus, the only fact established over ob

jection by the complained of testimony was

that Garrison was paid by Grandison for

regustenng for the hotel! room at issue @

the federal drug trial. In light of the col

lateral nature of this evidence, we fail to

see how its admission prejudiced Grandr

son. Consequently, we find no reversible

error

1& North Carolina v Alford, 0 US 25.91 SC

ear"? . u oe

. % Kvl

* Denial of Request to Interner

Potential Witness

Grandison also challenges the proprety

of the trial court's refusal to allow hin to

interview & potential defense

witness, Rodney Kelly

Like Grandison, Kelly was considered a

substanua! security mek He had already

entered an Alford” plea to the crime of

conspiracy © murder Scott Prechowiez and

Susan Kennedy. As ® result of his plea

Kelly had received s state sentence of fifty

years He also had received 8 federa! hfe

sentence for the same acts At the ume of

the Grandison trial, Kelly was incarcerated

in federal prison in Lewisburg Pennsylva

nia While in confinement he had alleged!)

committed another murder and thos

charges were pending

At the onset it must be noted that We

court did pot unequivocal!) deny the de

fense access to the potentia! witness The

trial judge offered to make Kelly available

if the defense wanted to intervie® hirr

through standby counsel Grandison, how

ever, declined to avail himself of this oppor

tunity

The propriety of the tra courts ruling

denying Grandson persona contact witt

the prospecuve defense siiness raise> @

quesuon not heretofore disposiuvely ac

dres 2d by this Court However, dicta u

Kardy v. Shook 237 Md 524, S41, 20°

A.2d 83, 92 (1965), ndcates that a defend

ant and his counsel are at perfect liberty &

interview and interrogate prospecuve wt

pesses, subject to the witnesses 8cqu

escence ip such interrogavons

The Court of Special Appeals has twice

discussed this ssue. In Barnetit State *

Md App. 35, 42, 257 A.2a 466, 470 (1969

the intermediate appellate court noted that

there are po property rights mn witnesses

each party may wlerview the other's wit

nesses to ascertain facts within that #7

pess' knowledge. Subsequent!) that cour

suggested that under certain curcumstances

160. 27 LEd2d 162 (1970

Zz

au

the denial of « defense request to interview

a prospective witness would sot entitle tbe

defendant to s mistrial Johnson # State,

18 Md.App. ST1, 676, 908 Add 426, <2

(1978)

(38) It is our opinion that the cream

stances ander which » defendant can oe

duct « pretrial interview of a prospective

witness are a matter best left to the tris!

court's discretion Here, we find no abuse

of that discretion. In the instant case we

are not confronted with a complete derua!

of an opportunity to ascertain facts within

the potentaa! witness’ knowledge. To the

contrary, Grandison was st perfect liberty

to do so through standby counsel. Fur

ther, he was not compelled to prepare hus

defense without prior knowledge of the

potenua! significance and thrust of Kelly's

testimony. The two men had had substan

tia] contact throughout the earlier federal

proceedings

(39) In effect, the tial court placed «

condition on the inlernew—* condibon

with which Grandison was not willing to

comply. Other jurisdictions vary oD the

propriety of such conditions. See Annot

14 A.LR.3d 652 (1967). The better view ©

to permit the tral judge to place certau

ymitations and restmcvons on 8 party's ac

to potenua! witnesses if in the courts

discreuion such restmctuuons are reasonab!)

necessary for the protecvon of the witness

or for security purposes See State t

Gress, 210 Kan. 850, 504 P26 256 (1972)

Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 5305

299 N.E.24 308 (1965), State » Balsamch.

113 N.H. 53, 300 A.2d 52) (1973); Holladay

e State, 130 Tex.Cr. 591, 95 S$. W.2d 119

(1936)

(40) Under the circumstances of tus

case. we find Judge Simpkins’ ruling was

reasonable. Clearly, the trial court's ap

prehension over allowing these co-conspus

tors to confer im private was well-founded

Both men were in custody and considered

+”

cess

19. The State argues that undeed there was *

finding of guilt. Its abundantly clear from the

record that Kelly entered a guilty plea which

was acoepred The proper accepance of an

was the decision of Mr. Grandisce not to é

so. Hence, no interview of Kelly wes ever

conducted Ip fact Kelly was never called

as & witness for reasons discussed st sec

tion XVII, infra, which have nothing to é

with this alleged denis! of « pretra! inter

vew

Furthermore, Grandison was sot prejy

diced by the trial courts refusal to allow

him direct contact with Kelly By Grand

son's own admission, Kelly had been wm hus

presence throughout the feders’ oe

Consequently, he had ample opportunity %

ascertain the tenor of Kellys potent! les

timony. Moreover, Grandison pever prof

fered the contents of the tesumon)y w' be

elicited from Kelly. in lg of thes

factors, no showing of prejudice has beer

made. Thus this Court cannot bow *)

that the trial judge's refusa! & grant Grar

dison the requested mterview amounted &

ap abuse of discrevon

Accordingly, we find no reversible error

here

KV1I

Admisnon of Eridence of ar

Alford Plea

{41} Grandison complains that the tru

judge erred in ruling that if Rodney Kelly

was called as a witness for the defense, Une

State would be allowed to cross-examine

him on his Alford, supra note If plea for

impeachment purposes The plea was of

fered and apparenUy accepted to 8 charge

of conspiracy. Grandson argues there

was po admission of guilt, nor indeed a

finding thereof.”

The State points out that there Ss pouhing

for as wo review as Kelly did not testify

and no proffer was made of what his test

mony would have been We agree In the

Altord type guilty plea reaults in 8 valid coovK

won Sec Hudson v. Siete 286 Md 36°.

Ald #2 (1979 and North Carolina » All wd

mo L.S 25. 91 $C 160. 27 LEd2d 162 (1970

cus. To manta socert

e requested the mlerview

ugh standby counsel k

of Mr. Grandisce not to do

terview of Kely was ever

ct Kelly was never called

reasons discussed at sec

which have nothing to do

denial of a pretrial mter

jrandison was pot preju

| court's refusal to allow

t with Kelly. By Grand

ion, Kelly had been in his

hout the federal tna!

had ample opportunity to

or of Kelly's potential tes

»r, Grandison never prof

as of the testimony to be

oily. In light of these

ng of prejudice has been

s Court cannot now sa)

e's refusa! to grant Grap

ed mterview amounted to

etuon

e find no reversible error

xXvil

of Evidence of an

'ford Plea

n complains that the tra

ling that if Rodney Kelly

itness for the defense, the

allowed to cross-examine

i, supra note 18, plea for

poses. The plea was of

nuy accepted to a charge

Grandison argues there

n of guilt, nor indeed

s out that there is nothing

as Kelly did pot testify,

as made of what his test

been. We agree. In the

plea results in 2 walid convic

«sv State, 286 Md 569, 409

und North Caroline Alford.

t. 160, 27 L.Ed.2¢ 162 (1970)

“Nevertheless, assuming

cap be preserved by s pretre motion, it

in settled that whenever one & complain

ing sbout 8 trial court's refusal to admit

there be « proffer of what the evidence

would have been. Mack © State, #00

Md. 583, 603, 479 A-2d 1344 (1984), Hoo

71) Md. 565, 571, 318 A2d 614 (1974),

Keys 0. Keys 251 Md 247, 250, 247 A2d

282 (1968).”

At no time in the present case did Gran

dison make any proffer or make any show-

ing on the record of the nature of the

actual testimony which he desired to elicit

from Kelly. Accordingly there is nothing

for us to review

XVI)

Grand Jury Testimony of

Gwen Farmer

Next at msue is whether the appellant

was denied a fair tna! because the trial

court refused to either admit the grand

jury tesumony of Gwen Farmer or grant a

postponement to allow the defense to lo

cate ber. We are unable to conclude that

the trial court erred under the facts herein

presented

At the outset we note that the transcript

of the grand jury tesumony was not

marked for identficavon and does not ap

pear im the record A portion of it, how

ever, was read to the trial court outside the

bearing of the jury

Farmer had testified before the Federal

Grand Jury oo May 2, 1983 that Kelly had

not driven ber car on the night of April 23.

1983. She vestified Uat she had had her

car at work during the day and at approx?

mately 5:00 had gone © Kelly's mother's

Appellant contends that Farmer's Feder

a) Grand Jary testimony should have been

admitted below since the testimony wes

relevant, given ander oath, bore persuasive

assurances of trustworthiness, and Farmer

was unavailable

The State, however, contends that the

transcript of Farmer's tesumony did not

qualify for sdmussion 86 former tesumon)

since that testimony, give during an early

exploratory phase of the mvesugavon, was

pot elicited with the same motvavon that

would attend crossexaminaton by the

State prosecutor had Ms Farmer tesufied

at tral

by s witness under oath, presenuy uns

vailable, and im s proceeding addressed

substantially the same sues as the cur

rent proceeding Further there must have

been reasonable opportunity and simular

motivation on the pror occasior for cross

examination of the declarant by the part)

against shor the tesumony is now being

offered. Crawford 1 State 222 Md 21\

214-15, 383 A.2d 1097, 1100 qig7é). C

McCormick, Evidence § 255-258 (2d ec

1972) See Commonwealth t Meech,

Mass 490, 403 N E.2d 1174 1177-78 (1980

Likewise, for former tesumon) to be adrmut

ted at a subsequent a there must exis!

a substantia! entity of parves and issues

Yellow Cad Co. v. Henderson. 183 Md. 546

556. 39 A.2d 546, 552 (1944)

{43} We do not bebeve the genera! rule

is satisfied where, as bere Grandson of

fers the Federal Grand Jury testumony

against the State in a subsequent unde per

dent criminal proceeding since the State

was not a party to nor did it parucipate in

7m a

os

am -* ® Bvt me ~PER. Oe SKRIES

.* ss ef wterf?¢

the feders) proceedings * and thas was ast sioe of the transcript of Farmer's Feders!

ie the position of @ Oe

federa! proceedings. Purther, the United

States’ Attorneys, while investigating the

matters of the Warren House, would aot

have been aware of all the facts that devel

oped subsequent to that proceeding They

were in bo position to examine Parmer

the extent they would have been able to

had these facts been known to them, a

they were to the State here

In light of this and the absence of an

opportunity for the State to cross-examine

Farmer, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion m refusing to admit her Federal

Grand Jury testimony In our view, the

testimony lacked the persuasive assurances

of trustworthiness essental to any hearsay

excepoon

[44] In addition, Grandison st. tial

sought to mtroduce Farmer's testimony up

der former Maryland Rule 740h 1(d)." The

tria) court responded, staung part,

“Now, the whole thing boils down to

whether [the transcript of the grand jury

proceeding) B 8 deposition or not ts

pot

As | understand the rule, it doesn't apply

to this type of situabon I am going to

deny your ([Grandison'’s) mobon P

The trial judge did not err Former Rule

140 anequivocally refers to the admissibil>

ty and substantive use of depositons

Since the rule was clearly inapplicable it

could not serve as the basis for the sdmis

alleges that Mr. Levitz, the State '

during Farmer's before the

Feders! Grand Jury oo September 19 1983, be

Grand Jury sestimony.

(45) Finally, the trial court did not er

in refusing to grant s continuance to appeh

lant so a2 to allow appellant the opportum

ty to secure Farmer's presence for tra!

The matter was within the trial court's

discretion and wil! not be disturbed absent

a showing of abuse prejudicia! to the de

fendant Jackson v. State, 288 Md. 19)

194, 416 A.2d 278, 281 (1980) In light of

the fact that Farmer's presence could not

be guaranteed by the appellant and since

the case was otherwise ready for the jury

there was no pressing reason for the tu

court to further delay submission of the

case to the jury

XIX

Failure to Disclose Exculpatory

Information

This issue concerns a contenvon by Grar

dison that since be had made ® pret

request of the State for Brady™ matera

in its possession, the trial judge erred ©

denying his movon to compe! the State &

turn over to him an FB! report made by a»

agent who was testifying. It appears tha"

one Janet Bannister had given 8 statement

to federal agents; Bannister was not caliec

trial. Grandison, troug’

ment

statement contained exculpatory masters’

ip that she referred therein to seeing one

Helen Kondilidis in the parking jot at the

eneans. unless the absence was procured

the party offering bis depomuon”

2 Brady v. Maryland. 373 US. 83, 83 SC 11%

10 LEd.2d 215 (1963)

aEs

script of Farmer's Federal

imoey.

the trial court did not err

‘ant a continuance to appel

puse prejudicial to the de

on v. State, 238 Md. 191

78, 281 (1980). In light of

umer’s presence could not

yy the appellant and since

verwise ready for the jury

essing reason for the tra!

- delay submission of the

XIX

Disclose Exculpatory

nformation

serns a contention by Gran

» be had made a pretna!

‘tate for Brady = matena!

», the trial judge erred

jon to compel the State to

an FBI report made by an

estifying. It appears that

ster had given a statement

:; Bannister was not called

trial) Grandison, through

‘dings in his federa! tra!

edited copy of this state

claimed that Bannister s

ined exculpatory maternal!

rred therein to seeing one

in the parking lot at the

auve Evidence.

ng or trial » part or all of »

© far as otherwise admissibic

les of evidence, may be used as

ess is absent from the bearing

hat the party offering his depo

sep unable tw procure his a!

summons or other reasonabic

3 the absence was procured by

ening his deposv0n.~

land 373 US. 83, 83 S.Cu 11

1963)

There is po question but that Grandson

was entitled to any exculpatory matena! 1

the hands of the State or under its contro!

See former Rule 741. However, as the

trial judge stated, he could not order the

State to turn over something tt did not

have. In so holding, we observe that Gran-

dison had obtained ap edited copy of Ban-

nister’s statement through his federa! tna!

and thereby had more evidence than the

State

xx

The Request for Data Relevant for

Proportionality Renew

[46] lp May of 1984, Grandison's stand

by counsel filed on his behalf # motson to

compe! the State to provide Grandison with

certain information concerning ’

statistics.” The specific imformation was

as follows

“(}) The names of all defendants indicted

for murder after July 1. 1978, m

which aggravating circumstances,

as defined m Article 27, Secton 413

existed

(2) As to each defendant so listed, ind>

cate those cases im which the State

elected to seek the death penalty

(3) The disposition of each defendant's

case, indicating if disposivons were

the result of plea or trial

(4) The ful plea negotiations in those

cases im which the State accepted a

ples.”

As the motion indicates, this mformavon

was being sought to support Grandison’s

motion to dismiss the State's electon to

seek the death penalty on the basis that

such elecbon was anconstitutionally rar

argument made to that effect when ths

present motion was heard, Grandison ar

ques to us that he needed the informsbon

in order to prepare an argument on propor:

tionality renew In our view be has aban

doned the arbitrary elecvon argument and

we need not address it

As a practca! matter, at the time of the

request (after he had been found guilty but

prior to hus sentencing proceeding) the >

formation sought for proportionality re

view purposes was Dot needed by Grand

son. Indeed, that nformaton would never

be needed unti) the sentencing proceeding

resulted in the imposition of 8 death sep

tence. See Tichnell v. State, 297 Md 432,

468 A.24 1 (1983) for a thorough discussi0D

of the statutory proportionality review pro

cedure required of this Court

xX)

Motion to Dismiss for Violation of

Federc! Dua! Prosecution Policy

Ip an apparent response to the concern

expressed by the Supreme Court Petite

c United States, 361 US 529, 80 S.CL

450, 4 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1960), over the fairness

of multiple prosecubons, the Department

of Justice established s policy precluding

the initiaton or continuavon of a federa!

prosecution following 8 prwr federal or

state prosecution based on the same trans:

action unless there = & compelling mterest

supporting the subsequent prosecubon

See also Rinaldi ». United States, 44 US

22. 98 S.Cu 81, 54 LEA2d 207 (1977). Be

lieving that the present state prosecuBon &

based on the same transaction for which be

was prosecuted w the federa) courts, Grap-

dison attempts to invoke the federal De

partment of Jusuee poly and contends his

~~,

i ee

due process rights beve been violated

Whhout jodging the merits of the pobcy we

do not believe Kk has any relevancy > the

state prosecution and thus find no merit o

this contention.

xXx

Use of the Act Constituting the Offense

as an Aggravating Factor

[47] Grandison argues, for the first

time, that the finding that he entered into

an agreement with Evans to have the Pie

chowiczs murdered for remuneration ®

could not, standing alone, properly be re

bed upon to impose the death penalty. He

argues that “the act of contracting was the

crime itself, hence it could not also be an

aggravating factor.”

While this issue was not raised in the

tria) court and we need not address it (see

Md. Rule 885), we shall do so in recognivon

of the seriousness of the case. In Stebding

». Stote, 299 Md 331, 358-361, 473 A.2d

903, cert. denied, — US. —, 105 S.Cr

276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), we bad occasion

to discuss # similar contention made in the

context of using an underlying felony as an

aggravating factor ns felony murder case

in the capital sentencing phase Judge Ro

dowsky stated for the Court

“Maryland's capital punishment stat

ute, Art. 27, §§ 412-414 makes plain the

legislative intent that the commission of

certain felonies, underlying s felony mur

der conviction, is to be considered an

aggravating circumstance iD the capita!

sentencing proceeding. At least 30 days

prior to trial, the State must notify the

accused of its intent to seek a sentence

of death and must advise the accused ‘of

each aggravating circumstance’ upon

which it intends to rely. § 412(d) Sec-

tion 413(c1) provides that the ‘following

type of evidence is admissible in [a sen

tencing) proceeding:

(ij) Evidence relating to any aggravat

ing circumstance listed in subsection (d

zB Art 27, § 41MGK7)

REPORTER YM SERIES

of which the State had notified the de

fendant pursuant to § 412(b).’”

Jd. at 359-60, 478 A2d at 917.

Section 413(d) lists the aggravating circum

stances, of which the seventh is that “the

defendant engaged or employed another

person to commit the murder and the mur

der was committed pursuant to an agree

ment or contract for remuneravon or the

promise of remuneration ”" Ip our view the

same rationale used in Stebbing is applica

ble. the intent of the legislature is as clear

in the instant case as it was in Stebing

We reject Grandison’s argument

XXIII

Proportionality Renew

(48) Grandison next assails his sentence

of death on the basis that such sentence

has not been given in any other case where

the defendant had been convicted of cor

tract murder (hiring someone else © com

mit the killing). Ip the only case of this

nature where the State sought the death

penalty, Myers t State, 58 Md.App. 211

472 A24 1071, cert. denied, 300 Md 454

479 A.2d 373 (1984), Myers was givens life

sentence. In Myers, several milgeune

factors were found to exist, Myers had not

previously been found guilty of a cmme of

violence nor entered a plea of guilty or

nolo contendere thereto, he acted under

substantial duress, dominatbon or provoca

tion of another person; his capacity © ap

te the criminality of his conduct was

substantially impaired, his act was not the

sole prommate cause of the victim's death

it was found unlikely he would engage

further criminal activity; one co-defendant

was given 2 life sentence and the other a

grant of immunity. I the iustant case

only two mitigating factors were found

Grandison had no prior record of a convic

tion for a crime of violence, and he was po!

the sole proximate cause of the killings

Other cases cited by Grandison are &

sketchy that we do not find them helpfu! w

trying to make @ proportionality rene*

-49-

he State had notified the de

reuant to § 412%(b)."”

, 473 A2é at 917.

) liste the aggravaung circum

hich the seventh is that “the

gaged or employed another

umit the murder and the mur-

mitted pursuant to an agree

ract for remuneration or the

muneration.” Ip our view the

e used in Stebbing is applica

t of the legislature is as clear

case as it was in Stebbing

indison's argument

XXIII

vortionality Reviex

lison next assails his sentence

he basis that such sentence

riven in any other case where

had been convicted of con

(hiring someone else to com

z). In the only case of this

the State sought the death

3 v. State, 58 Md.App. 211,

, cert. denied, 300 Md 484

1984), Myers was given a life

Myers, severa) mitigating

ound to exist; Myers had not

n found guilty of a crime of

entered a plea of guilty or

ere thereto: he acted under

ress, domimabon or provoca

r person; his capacity to ap

iminality of his conduct was

mpaired, his act was not the

cause of the victim's death

anlikely he would engage in

a! activity; one co-defendant

fe sentence and the other a

unity. Ip the imstant case

gating factors were found

no prior record of @ convic

e of violence, and he was not

mate cause of the killings

cited by Grandison are so

e do not find them helpful in

e a proportionality review

a

What we said in Brena cupra, bears re

peating tee a, 7

“The murders giving rise to this prose

cation were as beinous as those m any

case to come before us under the present

capita) punishment statute. No killings

could have been more premeditated and

deliberate than those bere.”

304 Md. at 539, 499 A.2d at 1288

While we acknowledge that Grandison

was pot the “triggerman,” but for him

these murders would not have occurred

In our view Grandison is as culpable as

Evans and it is clear the legislature intend

ed that he be so found

XXIV

Denial of Effective Assistance of

Counsel at Sentencing

{49} On February 3, 1984, some two

and one half months before trial, while the

court was preparing to hear a motion filed

by Grandison, the court observed that

Grandison intended to represent himself

Accordingly, the court proceeded to con:

duct a hearing to satisfy itself that Grand

sop knew he had a right to counsel! and was

knowingly and voluntarily waiving that

right See former Md. Rule 723 ¢, now

4-215b).™ During the course of the collo

quy with Grandson, the tna! judge pointed

out the advantages of having a lawyer to

assist at trial and sentencing. Grandison

advised the judge be understood, but that

he had never waived his right to counsel,

he stated he wanted standby counsel who

the judge told him would be furnished

Being satisfied that Grandison understood

his right to counsel and chose to represent

himself, the court made a finding that

Grandison had made an intelligent and i-

tentiona! waiver of his right to ap attorney

There the matter rested until after the

guilt or innocence phase of the trial had

passed On May 28, 1984, the parves ap

peared in court for s hearing on Grand

24. Judge Simpkins, the trial judge also noted

that Judge Fader. of the Circwt Court for Balu:

more County, had apparently previously gone

over the same matier with Grandisoo

+. S7aTe ..-

Ox = i i me te ee

Md 613

ou's motion for a new trial and sentenc

ing. It was brought to the trial judge's

attention that Grandison and his standby

counse! had agreed, after the guilty ver-

dict, that standby counse! would handle the

sentencing Grandison maintained that he

was entitled to change his mind about rep

resentation because the case actually was

two separate trials. The trial judge disa

greed with this contention Nevertheless

because neither Grandison nor standby

counse] was prepared to proceed to sen

tencing. the court allowed an eight day

postponement, which was satisfactory to

Grandison. Thereafter, 8 sentencing pro

ceeding was had in front of a jury wherein

Grandison himself produced witnesses and

allocuted. the jury imposed the death pen

alty

Grandison argues here that as the sen-

tencing proceeding was 8 matter separate

from the guilt or innocence proceeding, he

was entitied to counsel. He recognizes

that be had previously effectively waived

counsel bot contends that waiver did not

prevent him from having counsel for sen

tencing ander the ravonale of Faretta v

California, 422 US. 806, 95 S Ct 2525, 45

LEd2d 562 (1975). We find nothing »

Faretta which supports Grandison’s argu

ment. That case stands for the principle

that the State may not force an attorney on

an accused who has knowingly and intelli

genuy made a voluntary election to repre

sent himself, which be has a right to do

{50} Grandison also maintains that any

prior waiver cannot be held to operate to

deny him the right to counse! at s subse

quent separate proceeding He relies on

former Md. Rule 723,% which he argues

mandates readvisement (of mght to coun-

se!) at every separate proceeding: his re

liance is misplaced. Section d 2 of Rule 7123

provides

25. Now Rule 4215. effective after this tna!

arr

—e

‘oO

614 ua - a ier :

. 7e

7 to Dag

ie e@ileuae

“Ll the defendant apghat ie eoutt with

out counsel, at any after bs

appearance parsuast to section 0 of this

Rule, the court may not proceed before

determining whether the defendant st

that time desires to waive counsel, or

hos woived counsel, either affirmative

ly or by neglecting or refusing to ob

tain counsel” (emphasis added).

This language is clear and unambiguous; *

states no prohibition to proceeding when

there has been an affirmatve waiver of

counse! as here

XXV

Admissibility of Victim

Impact Statement

[51] We are bere asked to reconsider

our analysis in Lodowekn v State, 302 Md

691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), rev'd on other

grounds, — US. —, 106 S.C 1452, 88

LEd.24 —— (1986), of the admissibility of

victim impact statements in death penalty

cases, we decline to do so except in the

context of the prohibition against er pos!

focto laws. See ')S Constitution, art |,

§ 9; Md. Decl. of sts., art 17. Grandison

argues that prior 0 July |, 1983 the thrust

of the law relating to victim impact state

ments was to compensate the victim for

financial losses; that effective July 1, 1983,

the permissible scope of nico mmpact evr

dence was vastly broadened to include evr

dence of the effect of the crime on the

victim’s family and made this type of evr

dence admissible in capita) sentencing pro

ceedings. Consequently, he argues the

pew statute rendered the act of which be

was found guilty punishable in s manner Ip

which it was not punishable when & was

committed.

In our view Grandison has misread the

law in existence prior to July 1, 1963 Art

cle 41, § 124 of the Maryland Code was not

limited to compensation to 8 rxtm for fr

nancial losses. By its terms the act provid

ed;

“(cX2Ki) The presentence investgatvon

shal) include a victim impact state

ment, if

“t, The defendant, tp committing 8

felony, caused physical, psychology

eal, or economic injury to the vicurm

or

(8) A victim impact statement shal!

()) Identify the victim of the of

fense,

(ii) Itemize any economic loss suf

fered by the vicum as 8 result of the

offense;

(ii) Identify any physical myer)

suffered by the victim as 8 result of

the offense along with Ms serous

ness and permanence,

(iv) Describe any change in the

victim's persona! welfare or familia

relationships as a result of the of

fense;

(v) Identify any request for psy

chological services iniuated by the

victim or the victim's family as 8

result of the offense, and

(vi) Contain any other informator

related to the impact of the offense

wpon the victim that the court re

quires.”

It is clear, then, that considerations other

than financia) losses were allowed The

law as changed in 1983 specifically provid

ed for use of the statement in death pena

ty cases and inserted “or the vicum's fam:

ly” im subparagraph (vi) of paragraph (3)

subsection (c) and added s new paragraph

(4) which is not pertinent here We beleve

the prior law was broad enough to have

allowed the information now specifically

set out im the current law Consequenuy

amendment to Article 41,

procedural and ameborauve The change

simply set forth an additional source from

which victim impact information could be

obtained, namely, the victim's family The

pew statute does not change the quantum

of punishment attached to the crime

hence, the current law is DO more onerous

to Grandison than it was prior to its amenc

ed physical, psychologt

anic injury to the victim;

impact statement shall:

+ the victim of the of.

» any economic loss suf

victim as resv)t of the

fy any physica) injury

the victim as a result of

along with its senous

™manence,

be any change in the

ona! welfare or familia)

as a result of the of

y any request for psy

vices initiated by the

e victim's family as @

offense; and

n apy other information

e impact of the offense

‘tim that the court re

at considerations other

es were allowed The

1983 specifically provid

atement in death penal

d “or the victim's fam

: (vi) of paragraph (3) in

added a new paragraph

inent bere. We believe

broad enough to have

vation now specifically

nt law. Consequently,

to Grandison's ex post

Furthermore, the 1983

cle 41, § 124 was only

eliorative. The change

additional] source from

t information could be

ve victim's family. The

ot change the quantum

tached to the cnme,

aw is DO more onerous

was prior to its amend

_«

ment. Bee Tchad Wnet, 451 Md O86.

134-87, 416 ASd G90, 860-42 (1980) (Tict-

nell 1). Accordingly, we think ht clear that ,

the prohibitions against «x post fecto laws

were not violated in this case.

xxvl

Right of Jury to Extend Mercy

at Sentencing

{52} Grandison complains that the jr

im a death penalty sentencne proceeding

has the right to show mercy ...d compas

sion in its sentence determination and the

trial judge erred m not so allowing

Building on former Md. Rule 759 1

which was in force at the time of his sen

tencing, Grandison argues that nothing ™

the death penalty statute prohibits the ex

ercise of compassion or mercy pursuant

the rule. Section f of the rule staws

“{, Recommendation of Mercy

A jury may attach to its verdict a

recommendation to the court to show

mercy to a defendant The recommenda

tion is not binding upon the court”

The issue arose because of two circum

stances that occurred during the proceed

ings. First, during voir dire of prospecuve

jurors each was asked individually whether

after listening to all the evidence and to

what the judge said the law was, and hav

ing become convinced that based thereon

the lew required the death penalty, they

would be able to give the death penalty

Second, Grandison requested the tru!

judge give the following struction

“The State alleges that the following

aggravating circumstance applies in this

case

The Defendant engaged or employed

another person to commit the mur.

der and the murder was committed

pursuant to an agreement or con

tract for remuneration or the prom

ise of remunerabon

Unless you find beyond s reasonable

doubt that this particular aggraveung

circumstance exists, you must mark ‘No’

2% Now Rule +327\(c)

axln* GRAKDEBON v. STATE

nent ak Oak rem

fm the space opposite thet agyreveting

circumstance in Section | of the sentanc

ing form, and you may pot consider that

factor im determining the appropriate

sentence

Should you believe that the State has

established beyond a reasonable doubt

that ths aggravating factor exes and =

sufficient im your minds to call for the

penalty of death, then it m= proper for you

to exercise your own moral, factua! and

lega! judgment mm determining whether

that circumstance is sufficrent m your

minds to call for the punishment of

death.”

He also requested that the jury be instruct

ed

“You need not find a mitugatng cv

cumstance m order to unpose a sentence

of life unpnsonment Nothing the las

forbids you from extending mercy out of

compassion or belief that life impnsor

ment is sufficient punishment under al!

the circumstances.”

The trial judge overruled Grandison's ob

jection on the voir dire issue and dened the

two requested mstrucbons listed above

Keeping m mind that § 41 %gX8) of Art 27

specifically allows the jury to # forth w

writing any other facts which i finds as a

mitigating circumstance, mt strikes us tha!

indeed there is ample provision for the ur)

to show compassion or mercy, albert based

on articulated facts. Ip our view this com

ports with the mandates cf Furman ¢

Georgia, 408 US mm 22 SCA 27, B

L.Ed 24 346 (1972) and Gregg v. Geora.

428 US. 153, 96 S.Ca 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859

(1976). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US

586, 98 S.Cu 2954, 57 LEd 2d 973 (1978)

In Gregg. the Court stated ip part

“Furman mandates that where discre

tion is afforded a sentencing body on s

matter so grave as the determinavon of

whether a buman life should be taken or

spared, that discreton must be suitably

directed and limited so as to minimize the

‘

a oe — "ATX

ria of wholly erb@rary and capriciow

ection.” “rr.

e28 US ot 189, 068.00 at B952, 49 LEA 2d

at 63

Not only docs the Maryland death pena)

ty statute pass constitoGona! master, T\ch

nell v. State, 287 Md. 605, 416 A2d 830, &

is flexible enough to allow « jury to show

compassion and mercy should the facts and

circumstances of the case so warrant As

stated im Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 475,

499 A.2d 1236

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Appendix — Anthony Grandison v. Maryland · 479 U.S. 873 | Frix