Respondents Brief — Hallstrom v. Tillamook County
Supreme Court brief1989
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ie 2 oe Aes d
Prete Ae Se
bi aly ome va ; J
a , rah so: NAO j
; Ee es 5 a ee 7 mie
* ‘ ree £: aes cn:
r ae « a we y
¢ . ’
ea ae ’ ’ ;
att... Lyne ~ ty
fn.) ek er oe a4 = hyp '
*¥
: 4
pet Vibes. : Ste, Pay
>
oak ‘ Pit 66%
ean a . i ae CONS
Estes.
a ae a. <i
- \ 2
> »
’ ws
a rey
4 } 2
he? .
BESTAVAILABLECOPY =i (atts
QUESTION PRESENTED
Is the 60-day notice requirement of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”) (42
U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.) a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
citizen’s suit [such as that filed by Petitioners (“the Hall-
stroms”)] brought under the Act?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CINE aoa ic osc cikevicscacsacscdekustea 1
ID vc sinc wc cesssccsuicnesanaes 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................++. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................000: 4
ARGUMENT
The failure of the Hallstroms to comply with the
60-day notice requirement in RCRA before filing
their lawsuit deprived the district court of juris-
diction over the lawsuit ....................... 6
A. The plain, unambiguous language of the
RCRA notice provision prohibits the com-
mencement of a citizen suit before the citi-
zen has complied with explicit notice and
waiting-period requirements ............... 7
1. The requirements for maintaining a citi-
zen suit under RCRA are jurisdictional. ... 7
2. The explicit language of the RCRA
notice provision is controlling. ............ 8
3. The requirements of the RCRA notice
provision are not subject to waiver, estoppel
or other equitable modification. ........... 12
B. The legislative history underlying RCRA and
other federal environmental statutes confirms
the clear meaning of the statutory requirements
for commencing a citiz-m suit................ 14
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
1. Congress’ intention was to establish a
hierarchy of preferred responses, and the
notice requirement is a key element in
achieving that goal. ...............-.++005-
2. The legislative history underlying RCRA
and other environmental statutes demon-
strates that the notice requirements were
intended to be applied literally. ...........
3. Congressional amendments to RCRA
support the conclusion that the notice
ent may not be waived or other-
wise satisfied after commencement of a citi-
DU I wa acedidacccdscccedeccccccvescoees
C. Federal courts may not deviate from explicit
statutory requirements established by Con-
CP UNEUME SSN AY) 4M b4O% cei d cee csccsccce.
1. The explicit requirements of the RCRA
notice provision must be literally applied
regardless of the effect on the Hallstroms’
Mae debe s acd edceccceesccapecce
2. Congress, not the federal courts, is con-
stitutionally empowered to define the cir-
cumstances under which a citizen may sue
to enforce federal environmental statutes.. .
ST Eases Esececociccccccecccccccseccccs
APPENDICES
Appendix A - RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.........
Appendix B- EPA tions on Prior Notice of
Citizen Suits under RCRA, 40
Se PO ccc cctscweccvcecccces
14
18
21
27
Al
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CasEs:
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson 456 U.S. 63
DM tas mad ducnscédhswdanencey eas catesebsescvece 22
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown 466
SA SE ED ok pccsrpecdeconvccvescaucascecns 13, 24
Burlington Northern v. Oklahoma Tax Comm. 481
SR IPE. bo cRvcbedes ceViednensieceesccccecs 9
= of Highland Park v. Train 519 F.2d 681 (7th
ir. 1978), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976) ........ 10
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102 (1980)...............e eee 9
Ex Parte Collett 337 U.S. 55 (1949)...............4.. 12
Friends of the Earth v. Carey 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977)............. 12
Garcia v. Cecos Intern., Inc. 761 F.2d 76 (ist Cir.
POU s ccd vbcb vncasscsrepaessndciuvnesine ses 10, 11, 18
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found
484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987)............... 9, 16
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County 844 F.2d 598 (9th
CAE. BEE 5 cdvcocccevonansweenbesrevereecesccs passim
Hempstead Cty. & Nevada Cty. Project v.
U.S.E.P.A. 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983) ............ 11
Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803)............ 25
McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc. 856
Pe ee Ne GE vos vevnns sex tncecccsssccsccs 10
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers
GE BRN B GRRE oe bce ccice de sicccscccccecccsce 10, 11
——
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver 447 U.S. 807 (1980)...... 23, 26
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins __ U.S. __, 109
Nee a i ewan ve 3
Proffitt v. Commissioners, Bristol TP. 754 F.2d 504
i ae ee ansueee bs 11
Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens Etc. v. Eaton 644
ee MED, ccc ik cccduddaccebocbceces 11
Rubin v. United States 449 U.S. 424 (1981)........... 4
Schiavone v. Fortune 477 U.S. 21 (1986)............. 24
Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island
619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
SSE eUh eb iccnccscvencccceneaseneinceiss 12
TVA v. Hill 437 U.S. 153 (1977).......... 12, 24, 25, 26
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. ___ U.S. __, 108
PE a evsdvcccrenesescoasonvonevece 24
US. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights __
JS. _, 106 S.Ct. 2268 (1988) .......ccccecrcnccees 8
United States v. Locke 471 U.S. 84 (1985) ......... 9, 22
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp. 761 F.2d 311 (6th
CO MERE Wiwds Cc ovens ccevencssevandeetes 10, 11, 20
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .... 26
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
"i v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455 U.S. 385
Ds Hie nbakthaswtk Cdbaneathnescansyaoessseses 12, 13
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
U.S. Constitution, Articles I-III]................00005. 26
STATUTES AND RULEs:
EE euac ccc ctsccccvvccetevassessoosenees 8
TB WAG, © BRIBED occ ccc sccccccccdeccccsccscece 19
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)... 2... ccc cece eee eee eens 19
16 UB. © TBI. 00. ccc ccccrccccccccccvcccccece 23
ee ac cc cc cescsecsecceseeesvceses 19
SB UB. © TZDE BOG. noes cccccccccsccccccccceces 10
Be Pe IED cece cecccccvcccvecevesosonene 19
NI noi ccs ccc cncccsescsccsevenee 10
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2)... ccc eee cette eee eeee 19
Sy Ce Oe Ds csv rvcccccvecepoveccsveeceess 19
reer eT 19
42 U.S.C. § 300j-B(D)(1) 0... cece eee eee eens 19
42 US.C. © BOGDOBUS). 00. ccc cccccccccccccccccvevees 13
Oe ie Pc wa oc cv ccccccccccccccesccccenas 13
42 U.S.C. § 4911(D)(1). 0. cee eee eens 19
42 U.S.C. § 6901 ef Seq... 2.66. e cece e eens passim
ET b ae cecevecctcescescuccccescceccoudans 2
vii
Page
ED Tikb snc Soccer ccncsccccccssecdesauene 2
GD TA, GID occ cccccccccccccscvcccsnes passim
Be eee re 3, 8, 21
ee EPPTTECTELTITTTI CTT LTT 15
Ge hs a oc ccc cece sccccccccccescccens 6, 23
42 USC. § TED)... 2. cc ccc cccccccccccccccccces 19
Ge Te Ew vec ccc cccccccccccscvccsesenes 19
Pe te I ccc ccc ccccncccccucecsoavetans 19
REGULATIONS:
EE BR av ceccsctcccctcncssccccsvcseesesensos 16
LgGcIsLATIVE History:
116 Cong. Rec. 32,381 (1970)............e eee eee eeee 19
116 Cong. Rec. 32,926 (1970). ......... eee eee eeees 16
116 Cong. Rec. 32,927 (1970)............. eee eee eees 20
116 Cong. Rec. 33,103 (1970). .......... cece ee eeeee 21
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970)
(report of Public Works Committee)............... 17
Hearings on S.3229, $.3466 and S.3546 Before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong.
Be I Ea Uv ce sanbiquieccavavassccccece 19
No. 88-42
ti
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
+
OLAF A. HALLSTROM and
MARY E. HALLSTROM,
Petitioners,
V.
TILLAMOOK COUNTY,
a municipal corporation,
Respondent.
+
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
+
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
—@—
OPINION BELOW
The Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals is
reported at 844 F.2d 598 (1988). (J.A. 87-96)
+
1
vr, =z_”6hUmTlUlUCc —————_—————
STATUTE INVOLVED
The pertinent portion of RCRA involved in this mat-
ter (42 U.S.C. § 6972) is set forth in Appendix “A” to this
Brief.
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Hallstroms own land near Respondent Tillamook
County’s (“the County”) landfill. The County operates
the landfill under a permit issued by the Oregon Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”). (J.A. 4, 11, 60,
61) Prior to April 1981, the Hallstroms became concerned
that contaminated ground and surface water from the
landfill was polluting their property. In April 1981, the
Hallstroms sent a written notice to the County claiming
violations of state and federal law and stating their inten-
tion to file a lawsuit. (J.A. 26-27, 38-39, 61)
In April 1982, the Hallstroms filed a lawsuit in fed-
eral court under the citizen-suit provision of RCRA Sec-
tion 7002(a) [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)]. The Hallstroms claimed
violations of standards governing landfill operation
established under RCRA and they also asserted pendent
state claims for damages for inverse condemnation, tres-
pass and nuisance. (J.A. 1, 3-10, 58-59, 61)
In their Complaint, the Hallstroms specifically
alleged that “[mJore than 60 days prior to the commence-
ment of this action, plaintiffs served a notice of intent to
file a citizen’s suit pursuant to [RCRA].” (J.A. 5) How-
ever, in January 1983 the County learned that the Hal-
Istroms had not given that required notice to either the
SS i ae Se ee a
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or to the DEQ
as required by RCRA [42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)]. (.A. 22-25,
41) Consequently, the County moved for Summary Judg-
suit was filed, the Hallstroms gave notice for the first
time to the EPA and DEQ.' (J.A. 27-28, 40-41, 61)
In April 1983, the district court denied the County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (J.A. 1, 56-57) Following
a trial and the entry of a Final Judgment and Decree (J.A.
74-86), the Hallstroms appealed certain rulings made by
! The Hallstroms contend that “(flor at least a year and a
z
|
z
A
B
E
|
|
i
j
:
|
EES
:3S¢
i
the district court in connection with their RCRA claim
and claims based on state law.2 The County cross-
appealed from the denial of its Motion for Summary
Judgment. (J.A. 87)
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
district court on the RCRA notice requirement and
remanded the case to the district court to be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the RCRA 60-day notice
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a
citizen suit under RCRA. Because the Hallstroms failed to
notify the EPA and DEQ before filing their lawsuit, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. (J.A. 87-96)
+
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Hallstroms asserted the existence of a federal
question under RCRA as their basis for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction. The provisions of RCRA that permit
enforcement of that Act by private citizens specifically
confer jurisdiction in the district courts. However, the
same provisions require that the plaintiff-citizen must
first give 60 days’ advance notice of the intent to sue to
2 As a result of the trial, the district court refused to grant
the injunctive relief sought by the Hallstroms of permanent
closure of the County landfill. Instead, the district court
perp iy Rew ny 4 submit a proposal to ensure that all
leachate generated by the landfill would be contained within
the boundaries of the County landfill in the future. (J.A. 74-86)
In addition, the jury found in favor of the County on the
Hallstroms’ state-law claims. (J.A. 75, 85-86)
the EPA and to the coordinate state agency responsible
for enforcing RCRA. Citizen suits are prohibited until
that requirement is met. It is undisputed that the 60-day
notice required by RCRA was not given to the EPA and
DEQ by the Hallstroms prior to commencing their law-
suit. Consequently, the district court lacked subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
The RCRA notice provision does not provide, as the
Halistroms contend, that a citizen-plaintiff may file a
RCRA claim and then give the proper notice so long as
the court does not rule on the plaintiff's claim for 60
days. While such a statutory scheme may have been possi-
ble, that is not the scheme that Congress adopted.
Congress deliberately chose a hierarchy of preferred
responses to a claimed RCRA violation: (1) voluntary
compliance by the alleged violator, (2) enforcement action
by the EPA or the coordinate state agency, and, only as a
last resort, (3) a private lawsuit by a citizen-plaintiff.
Congress consciously included the notice obligation in
RCRA to implement that choice.
The RCRA notice requirement is not a mere pro-
cedural technicality, but an essential component of the
overall statutory scheme. By requiring prior notice, Con-
gress ensured that there would be a meaningful oppor-
tunity for voluntary compliance and agency enforcement
before any private litigation is filed.
The Halistroms’ construction of RCRA would save
their lawsuit from dismissal. However, it defeats a funda-
mental purpose of the legislation.
+
Congress has authorized citizens to enforce RCRA
standards through civil litigation since RCRA was origi-
nally enacted in 1976. A citizen-plaintiff, however, is
required to give notice of intent to sue to the alleged
violator of RCRA and to the federal and state environ-
mental agencies at least 60 days prior to the commence-
ment of the citizen’s civil action. The citizen who
commences an action without first satisfying the statu-
tory requirements fails to properly invoke RCRA as a
basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.®
Based on the plain, unambiguous language of the
RCRA notice provision, underlying legislative history
and the separation of powers doctrine, the Hallstroms’
failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement in
3 A citizen’s failure to properly invoke RCRA as a basis of
federal jurisdiction has no effect on other remedies a ailable to
the citizen. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f), which provides:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any stan-
dard or requirement relating to the management of solid
waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator [of the EPA] or
a State agency).
See, ¢.g., Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
7
RCRA constituted a jurisdictional defect and compelled a
dismissal of the Hallstroms’ lawsuit.
A. The plain, unambiguous of the RCRA
notice prohibits commencement
ofa suit before the citizen has complied
with explicit notice and waiting-period
requirements.
The plain meaning of the RCRA 60-day notice
requirement is clear. It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
the commencement of a citizen suit. It is not, as the
Hallstroms and Amici* erroneously contend, merely a
procedural requirement subject to equitable modification.
The Hallstroms and Amici strain to argue that the RCRA
notice requirement means something other than what it
clearly says - a citizen suit is “prohibited” and cannot be
commenced unless, at least 60 days prior to the
commencement of the suit, the citizen-plaintiff has given
notice of the claimed RCRA violations to the EPA and
coordinate state agency.
1. The aoe for maintaining a citizen suit
under RCRA are jurisdictional.
Significantly, the pertinent portion of the notice pro-
vision in RCRA is captioned “Actions prohibited”® and
* Amici Curiae Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc.,
National A Society, Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., and Wilderness (“Amici”) filed an Amici
Curiae Brief (“Am. Br.”) with this Court in support of the
Hallstroms.
5 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b).
states in unambiguous terms that “[nJo action may be
commenced” until 60 days after the citizen notifies the
EPA, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and
the alleged violator. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1). Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 3, “[a) civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court.” Thus, read together, RCRA and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 prohibit a citizen from “filing a com-
plaint” until the notice and waiting-period requirements
in RCRA have been satisfied.
A federal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to
act on any aspect of a lawsuit until a complaint has been
filed and an action “commenced.” Accordingly, Congress’
explicit “prohibition” of the commencement of a citizen
suit under RCRA prior to compliance with the statutory
notice requirement demonstrates that Congress intended
that requirement to have jurisdictional significance.®
2. The of the RCRA notice
den tf essuien” —
As the Hallstroms even acknowledge (Op. Br. 20),
“the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-
lacks
the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the absence of
notice to the EPA and DEQ. That argument ignores this Court's
recent decision in U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights, _
US. __, 108 S. Ct. 2268, 2270-71 (1988), in which this Court
held that courts have finite bounds of authority which are
fixed by the limits of their jurisdiction and that even non-
parties may object when those boundaries are crossed.
9
guage of the statute itself.” Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n -v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
accord Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484
U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376, 381 (1987). The plain, unam-
biguous language of a statute ordinarily must be
regarded as conclusive. See Burlington Northern v. Okla-
homa Tax Comm., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987).
This Court has repeatedly recognized that when the
terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry gen-
erally is complete. See e.g. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424, 430 (1981). Indeed, this Court generally assumes that
the legislative purpose of a statute is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. Accordingly,
a literal reading of statutory language generally is the
only proper reading. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,
93-95 (1985).
The notice requirement in RCRA is unambiguous. A
citizen suit is “prohibited” and may not be “commenced”
until the citizen has satisfied the explicit notice require-
ments set forth in the Act. Congress could not have
provided in clearer terms what steps a citizen must take
before commencing a civil action under RCRA. The
unequivocal clarity of the notice requirements in RCRA
and other federal environmental statutes led the Court of
Appeals in this matter to conclude that “[a]nything other
than a literal interpretation of the 60-day notice require-
ment ... would effectively render those provisions
worthless.” Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598,
601 (1988).
The Court of Appeals in this matter correctly ruled
that the 60-day notice requirement is jurisdictional based
on the “plain language” of RCRA:
10
[Senior Circuit] Judge Wisdom wrote, “The plain
language of § 6972(b) commands sixty days’ notice
before commencement of the suit. To accept anything
less ‘constitutes, in effect, judicial amendment in
abrogation of explicit, unconditional statutory lan-
e.’” Garcia [v. Cecos Intern., Inc.], 761 F.2d [76,] 78
fist C Cir. 1985]. “The notice requirement is not a tech-
nical wrinkle or superfluous formality that federal
courts may waive at will. [I]t is part of the
jurisdictional conferral from Congress that cannot be
altered by the courts.” Id. at 79.
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 600; see
also McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39,
43 (6th Cir. 1988); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d
311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519
F.2d 681, 691 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927
(1976).
This Court has not expressly interpreted the notice
requirements of RCRA. However, in Middlesex Cty. Sew-
erage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), this Court
ruled that the comprehensive enforcement provisions of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251
et seq.) and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctu-
aries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) are intended to
be exclusive and that the citizen-plaintiffs involved in
that matter were not entitled to maintain any lawsuit or
action under any legal theory except in the manner set
forth in those statutes. 453 U.S. at 18. With respect to the
jurisdictional character of the notice provisions in those
statutes that are virtually identical to the notice provision
in RCRA (see 453 U.S. at 6-7 n. 9), this Court ruled:
These citizen-suit provisions authorize private per-
sons to sue for injunctions to enforce these statutes.
Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must comply
11
with specified procedures - which respondents here
ignored — including in most cases 60 said prior
notice to potential defendants.
453 U.S. at 14 (footnote omitted).
This Court in Middlesex did not address the con-
sequences of failing to give such notice. The Hallstroms,
however, erroneously contend that “the language this
Court chose, i.e., ‘specified procedures,’ suggests that
notice is a procedural, rather than a jurisdictional,
requirement.” (Op. Br. 34) The clear implication of Mid-
dlesex is that the notice requirements set forth in federal
environmental statutes have jurisdictional significance
and that citizen-plaintiffs who intend to maintain an
action under those statutes must strictly comply with
those requirements. Indeed, both the First Circuit in Gar-
cia v. Cecos Intern., Inc., supra, 761 F.2d at 80, and the Sixth
Circuit in Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., supra, 761 F.2d at
316-17, expressly stated that their respective rulings that
the 60-day RCRA notice requirement is jurisdictional
were consistent with the approach of this Court in
Middlesex.
Those courts that allow a stay or othe wise attempt
to remedy a citizen lawsuit not commenced in compliance
with RCRA in effect sanction the maintenance of a federal
lawsuit beyond the scope provided by Congress.” That
7 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Commissioners, Bristol TP., 754 F.2d 504
(3d Cir. 1985); Hempstead Cty. & Nevada Cty. Project v.
U.S.E.P.A., 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983); Pymatuning Water Shed
(Continued on following page)
12
approach has no support in the plain, unambiguous lan-
guage of RCRA. Accordingly, there is no need to even
look beyond RCRA’s unambiguous terms to its legislative
history. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n. 29 (1977),
citing, Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).
3. The requirements of the RCRA notice provision
are not subject to waiver, estoppel or other equi-
table modification.
The Hallstroms erroneously contend that this Court’s
decisions in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
(1982), and its progeny suggest that the notice require-
ments established in RCRA and other federal environ-
mental statutes should be interpreted flexibly and with
regard to equitable considerations. (Op. Br. 34-37) In
(Continued from previous page)
Citizens Etc. v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981); Susquehanna
Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Friends of the Earth v. Carey,
535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). (Op.
Br. 24; Am. Br. 11-13, 16-18) Amici perceive in these cases “a
willingness of the courts to respond to the exigencies of the
case at hand and fashion a result that best serves the interests
of justice.” (Am. Br. 19) What Amici perceive, and apparently
endorse, as result-oriented jurisprudence is in fact nothing
more than the erroneous perception of certain courts that
actual knowledge by the EPA and the coordinate state agency
of a citizen-plaintiff’s claim before the lawsuit is commenced
amounts to substantial compliance with the RCRA notice
requirement. That approach is inconsistent with the explicit
provisions of the RCRA notice requirement and, in any event,
has no relevance to this matter. Neither the EPA nor the DEQ
in this matter had actual knowledge or formal, written notice
of the Hallstroms’ intent to sue under RCRA before the Hal-
Istroms commenced their citizen suit.
13
Zipes, this Court held that the requirement of a timely
filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
suit in district court. This Court reasoned that that time
deadline, like a statute of limitation, was subject to equi-
table considerations such as waiver and tolling. 455 U.S.
at 393.
In contrast, in this matter this Court is not confronted
with statutory requirements that, like a statute of limita-
tion, potentially raise an absolute bar to a party’s right to
pursue a remedy in federal court. A literal interpretation
of the RCRA notice requirement at most will delay a
citizen’s right to sue under RCRA and, in fact, may
entirely obviate the need to pursue an action if regulatory
authorities are allowed the opportunity to resolve the
dispute nonjudicially in the manner contemplated by
Congress. Thus, equitable considerations offer no persua-
sive justification for ignoring the explicit prohibition by
Congress on the commencement of actions by citizens
prior to compliance with the RCRA notice requirement.
See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
149-50 (1984) [declining to depart from or modify Fed. R.
Civ. P. 3 in determining when an action is “commenced”
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)).
In any event, the Hallstroms erroneously contend
that, “[uJnder the facts [of this matter], the [60-day
notice] requirement was either waived or subject to equi-
table modification or cure.” (Op. Br. 36) Even if the lack
of jurisdiction could somehow be waived, the County
clearly did not waive anything. The County filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment or. the jurisdictional issue
14
immediately after it discovered that, contrary to the alle-
gations in the Hallstroms’ Complaint, the Hallstroms had
not given notice as required by RCRA. In addition, the
County carefully preserved that issue before the district
court and raised it on cross-appeal. Thus, there has been
no waiver of that issue by the County and the County
should not be deemed to be estopped from asserting that
jurisdictional defect. Neither should any action or inac-
tion on the part of EPA or DEQ constitute waiver or
estoppel, as neither agency was a party to the Hallstroms’
lawsuit and neither can waive the jurisdictional require-
ment or estop the County.
B. The ve history underlying RCRA and
other environmental statutes confirms
the clear of the ents
<= <<.
Even if this Court chooses to consider the legislative
history underlying RCRA and other federal environmen-
tal statutes, that history clearly shows that the notice
requirement is an intentional and integral part of the
overall statutory scheme established by Congress. Noth-
ing in that legislative history justifies disregard of the
plain, unambiguous language used by Congress in the
RCRA notice provision.
1. pp tle. yoneenmennaag ely pene nine erat
preferred and the notice require-
ment fo & ina chanient .
_ Beth sides and Amici agree that “the court should
interpret the statute [RCRA] to carry into effect the end
15
Congress wanted to accomplish.” (Op. Br. 28) The County
certainly does not disagree with the Hallstroms and
Amici that citizen-suit provisions were enacted “to
encourage citizen participation in the enforcement of
environmental legislation as a supplement to agency enforce-
ment.” (Am. Br. 6, emphasis added) However, the legisla-
tive history clearly evidences Congress’ intent to
establish a three-tier hierarchy for responding to alleged
environmental violations: (1) voluntary compliance by
the violaior after having received the requisite 60-day
notice, (2) government enforcement action against the
violator [see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)], and (3) a citizen suit
against the violator only after the requisite notice has
been given, 60 days have expired, and there has been no
voluntary compliance or governmental agency action
commenced.
The legislative history (even that relied on by the
Hallstroms and Amici) makes it clear that the third tier or
alternative — the citizen suit — is the least preferred of the
three tiers or alternatives and cannot be utilized unless
and until the other two tiers or alternatives have first
been exhausted:
(1) Voluntary compliance
Notice to the violator gives him a chance to
bring himself into complete compliance in 60
days. If the violator comes into complete compli-
ance in 60 days and it is absolutely clear that the
violation cannot reasonably be expected to recur,
then the citizen suit is unnecessary. (Op. Br. 13)
This Court recently recognized that one purpose of a
citizen-suit notice provision is to give the alleged violator
“an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance
16
with the [law] and thus likewise render unnecessary a
citizen suit.” Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., supra, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.
(2) Government enforcement action
Notice of the violation to the government
government action. Senate
on the Clean Air Amend-
of intent to file such action on the Federal
and State air pollution control agency and
the alleged ter.
116 Cong. Rec. 32,926 (1970). (Op. Br. 13-14)
As Amici aptly state: “Committee members believed that
the notice provision would serve to trigger administrative
action to remedy the alleged violation, thereby eliminat-
ing the need for the private citizen to seek relief in the
courts.” (Am. Br. 9-10)
® It is significant that this legislative history refers to a
“notice of intent to file such action.” This legislative history is
consistent with Regulations
Regulations (40 C.F.R. § 254; see Op. Br. in
Appendix “B” to this Brief and explicitly require “notice of
intent to file suit,” which is how the Hallstroms characterized
their notice.
ioe icin -?. .
ee Se ee a Ee as it cette ) hte Sin
17
(3) Citizen suit
The legislative history that Amici rely on [S. Rep. No.
1196, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970) (report of Public
Works Committee)] makes it clear that Congress antici-
pated that government agencies, federal and state, wou'd
be “primarily responsible for enforcement” and that pri-
vate citizens “were encouraged to uncover violations that
otherwise might escape notice, and motivate the agencies
to take action.” (Am. Br. 8) That same legislative history
makes it clear that it is only when the government agen-
cies fail to act that citizens should be able to bring their
enforcement actions in the form of citizen suits.
However, as Amici correctly note, those federal
courts that have considered the notice requirements in
the Clean Air Act Amendments and other federal envi-
ronmental statutes “have consistently recognized that
Congress sought to facilitate and encourage citizen
involvement while preserving the primary enforcement role
of the federal and state regulatory agencies and shielding
the federal courts from an unmanageable number of citi-
zen suits.” (Am. Br. 11, emphasis added) Thus, as Amici
even acknowledge, “Congress intended to provide for
citizen suits in a manner least likely to clog the courts
and most likely to trigger agency enforcement.” (Id.)
There is nothing in RCRA or in the underlying legis-
lative history that implies that a citizen may resort to a
court without first satisfying the explicit notice require-
ment or that a citizen who has not satisfied the notice
requirement may nevertheless commence a lawsuit under
RCRA and ask the court to hold the action in abeyance in
order for the citizen to comply with the 60-day notice
requirement. A citizen (like the Hallstroms) who com-
mences a lawsuit before providing the requisite notice
18
frustrates the primary and underlying objectives of
accomplishing voluntary compliance, triggering appro-
priate administrative action to remedy the alleged viola-
tion, and avoiding unnecessary civil litigation. Indeed,
the Court of Appeals in this matter concluded that its
ruling serves “the underlying policy aims of encouraging
non-judicial resolution of environmental conflicts”:
[O}nce a suit is filed, positions become hardened,
parties incur legal fees, and relations become adver-
sarial so that cooperation and compromise is less
likely. Garcia, [supra,] 761 F.2d at 82. The pragmatic
a fails to + -y that “a mere adjustment
of the trial date or the filing of a supplemental or
amended complaint to cure defective notice cannot
restore a sixty-day nonadversarial period to the par-
.. . [If a citizen-plaintiff could file a suit under
RCRA without follo the notice requirements and
avoid a motion to dismiss simply by arguing that the
EPA or other relevent authority had more than 60
days to act prior to the commencement of trial or
discovery proceedings, then, under the realities of
modenhaiey litigation, no one would ever comply
with this soquisaanent. We will not attribute to Con-
an intent to enact a provision after hours of
ebate that could be evaded by every potential plain-
tiff, thus rendering it meaningless.
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 601.
2. The legislative history underlying RCRA and
other environmental statutes demonstrates that
the notice uirements were intended to be
applied .
The citizen-suit provision in RCRA was modeled on
the analogous provision in the Clean Air Act Amend-
19
ments. The legislative history underlying the Clear Air
Act provision shows that Congress intended the notice
provision to play a significant role. Even proponents of
citizen participation in connection with the Clean Air Act
were concerned that private-enforcement lawsuits could
interfere with the enforcement responsibilities delegated
to governmental authorities. See Hearings on S.3229,
S.3466 and S.3546 Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1184 (1970). Opponents of citizen enforce-
ment were concerned that citizen lawsuits would foster
unproductive adversary relations between public, busi-
ness and private factions. Id. at 1570. The 60-day notice
requirement was intended to reconcile those concerns
with the perception that citizens and government author-
ities working together could more effectively resolve
environmental disputes than through immediate resort
by citizens to the courts. See 116 Cong. Rec. 32,381 (1970).
* 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1). See also Section 505(b)(1) of the
Federal Water Pollution Cont:ol Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b)(1); Sec-
tion 310(d)(1) of the Comprenensive Environmental Response,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9659(d)(1); Section
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC. 261%b)(1); Section
11(b)(1) of an Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C.
20
Based on its review of the underlying legislative his-
tory, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in this
matter that “[nJon-judicial resolution of such conflicts is
more likely if parties consider their interests and posi-
tions in a nonadversarial setting before suit is filed” and
that “[l]itigation should be a last resort only after other
efforts have failed”:
Section 6972(b) and its legislative history reflect
Congress’s belief that the citizen-plaintiff working
with the state or the EPA can better resolve environ-
mental disputes than can the courts. Congress believed
that citizen through the courts should be
to rative heed ag erg
notice requirement of § 6972(b) was to “trig-
ger administrative action to che soled that $e
citizen] ht otherwise seek in the courts.” 116
Cong. Rec. (1970).
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 601
(emphasis added); accord Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,
supra, 761 F.2d at 317 (“the legislative history shows that
far from being a mere formality, prior notice was viewed
by Congress as crucial in defining the proper role of the
citizen suit”).
The legislative history does not suggest, much less
establish, persuasive grounds to disregard the statutory
prohibition against a citizen's commencement of a law-
suit before complying with explicit notice requirements.
The comments of one sponsor of the Bill that became the
Clean Air Act citizen-suit provision capture the intent of
the legislation’s proponents to allow citizen participation
only after notice has been given and government enforce-
ment mechanisms have had an opportunity to respond:
2 ee oe ee concerned
of intent to so, and the viola-
tion which he has in mind. In words, idea is
cited in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at
|
© 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) was amended in 1984 (over two
years after this lawsuit was filed) to provide for an exception
that waives the 60-day notice requirement if the alleged viola-
tion involves hazardous waste. That amendment, however,
does not apply to this matter. (J.A. 3, 35-36, 60-62, 67-68) See,
also, Hallstrom vo. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 600-01
(“[t]his provision makes clear that Congress considered the 60-
day notice requirement and intended that it apply in all cases,
except those involving hazardous waste”)
22
RCRA citizen suits is further proof that Congress
intended the other terms of the RCRA citizen-suit provi-
sion to remain intact as originally and literally enacted.
This Court has cautioned that “[gloing behind the
plain language of a statute in search of a possibly con-
trary congressional intent is ‘a step to be taken cau-
tiously’ even under the best of circumstances.” See
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 US. 63, 75 (1982),
quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
In this matter, no reason exists for this Court to even
consider the legislative history underlying the plain,
unambiguous language of the RCRA citizen-suit provi-
sion. However, even if this unnecessary step is taken,
nothing in the legislative history indicates congressional
intent demonstrably at odds with Congress’ chosen statu-
tory language.
C. Federal courts may not deviate from
statutory requirements established by
To ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the
RCRA notice requirement or even the underlying legisla-
ve history in order to construe RCRA in a manner
asserted by the Hallstroms and Amici would be to take
this Court “out of the realm of interpretation and place
[it] in the domain of legislation.” U.S. v. Locke, supra, 471
U.S. at 96. Moreover, the constitutional structure of our
government prohibits the federal courts from assuming
that role.
-_
—_ ———— _
23
1. The explicit a of the RCRA notice
must be literally applied regardless of
the effect on the Hallstroms’ lawsuit.
The plain, unambiguous language of and legislative
history underlying the RCRA notice requirement are
clear. The consequence of the Hallstroms’ failure to com-
ply with that requirement should not be mitigated by
reading into RCRA a degree of flexibility that simply is
not present in the statutory language chosen by Congress.
Indeed, strict adherence to the procedural requirements
established by Congress has proven to be the best guar-
antee of evenhanded administration of the law. See
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).
The Hallstroms and Amici suggest that a literal inter-
pretation of the RCRA notice requirement will have a
detrimental effect on the ability of citizens to enforce
federal environmental laws. However, if a literal inter-
pretation of the RCRA notice requirement leads to a
harsh result," the harshness “is imposed by the legisla-
Species Act as a “strik-
ing example of the absurd and harsh results of a formalistic
avoided had a district court possessed the authority to waive
or modify the waiting requirement. (Am. Br. 29). That argu-
ment, however, fails to take into account that the Endangered
other
i
;
:
Spe-
cies Act does not affect a citizen’s ability to invoke other
statutory or common-law procedures for seeking immediate
24
ture and not Sy the judicial process.” See Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., __ U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (1988)
(holding that specification of parties in a notice of appeal
is a jurisdictional prerequisite), quoting Schiavone v. For-
tune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986). Indeed, this Court has recog-
nized that statutory procedures established by Congress
for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be
disregarded by the courts out of sympathy for particular
litigants. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
supra 466 U.S. at 152.
2. Congress, not the federal courts, is constitu-
tionally 9 page to define the circumstances
under which a citizen may sue to enforce fed-
eral environmental statutes.
The Hallstroms and Amici essentially ask this Court
to rewrite the RCRA notice requirement and thereby leg-
islate in a manner reserved to Congress by Article I of the
Constitution. This Court has repeatedly rejected argu-
ments that would require it to extend its constitutionally-
assigned role. For example, in TVA v. Hill, supra, several
environmental groups brought an action under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 to enjoin the Tennessee
Valley Authority from completing the Tellico Dam. The
environmental groups argued that completion of the Dam
would eradicate an endangered species of snail darter or
destroy its critical habitat. This Court held that the
Endangered Species Act prohibited further work on the
Dam even though the Dam was virtually complete and
Congress continued to appropriate public funds toward
the project after being apprised of the Dam’s probable
impact on the snail darter’s survival. 437 U.S. at 171-95.
25
Significantly, this Court in TVA v. Hill refused to
ignore the statute’s plain language even though its literal
application would terminate the Tellico Dam project and
sacrifice millions of dollars in public funds. In affirming
the entry of an Order directing the district court to per-
manently enjoin further work on the project, this Court
reasoned:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite
one, with each h having certain de func-
tions snateally to it by the Constitution. While “[i]t
is emphatically the province and du tan a
deqetanant to th teat toe eo ta” "Marbu v. Mad-
ison, 1 Cranch 1 “177 (1803), i is equally Lo
emphatically — the exclusive province of the C
not only to formulate legislative policies ind tan
date programs and projects, but also to establish their
relative priority for the Nation. Once Con , exer-
its delegated powers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to
administer the laws and for the courts to enforce
them when enforcement is sought.
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or
unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected
by Cee Se cnre mee, tere 2 Te paeeenes of
interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enact-
ment is ed and its constitutionality deter-
mined, the judicial process comes to an . We do
not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested
with the power of veto. . .
We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our
constitutional system the commitment to the separa-
tion of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what
accords with “common sense and the public weal.”
Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
political branches.
26
437 U.S. at 194-95; see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, supra,
447 U.S. at 826 (courts may not “alter the balance struck
by Congress” by favoring one side or another in matters
of statutory construction).
This Court’s decision in TVA v. h.il reflects nothing
less than “a profound respect for the law and the proper
allocation of lawmaking responsibilities in our Govern-
ment.” See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
334-35 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting, footnote omitted).
That respect also should lead this Court to reject the
argument of the Hallstroms and Amici that Congress
meant something other than what it enacted in the RCRA
notice provision. The literal terms and the underlying
legislative history of that provision simply do not author-
ize a stay or any other judicial effort to remedy a citizen
suit commenced before the statutory notice requirement
has been met. Articles .-III of the Constitution and the
separation of powers doctrine prevent this Court from
reaching a contrary result.
—+
27
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the case should be remanded to the district
court for dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,
I. FRANKLIN HUNSAKER*
James G. Driscoit
Tuomas D. ADAmMs
BuULLIVANT, Houser, BaILey,
PenperGRASS & HorrMAN
1400 Pacwest Center
1211 S. W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, n 97204
Telephone: ) 228-6351
Attorneys for Respondent
*Counsel of Record
June 22, 1989
Al
APPENDIX A
Section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, 90 Stat. 2825, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 ed., Supp. III)
§ 6972. Citizens suits
(a) In general
(b) Actions prohibited
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(1)
of this section -
(1) to after the has given
ns a a ce Be
the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and
(C) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, or order; or
ane ne So Sa
poe ey bw hy or criminal action
in a court of United States or a State to require
condition, A. 4, S cay HE iateon,
That in any such action in a court of the United
States, any person may intervene as a matter of right.
(c) Notice
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2)
of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice to the Administrator that he will commence
such action, except that such action may be brought
immediately after such notification in the case of an
action under this section respecting a violation of sub-
chapter III of this chapter. Notice under this subsection
shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall
prescribe by regulation. Any action respecting a violation
under this chapter may be brought under this section
only in the judicial district in which such alleged viola-
tion occurs.
(d) Intervention
In any action under this section the Administrator, if
not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(e) Costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert wit-
ness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines
such an award is appropriate. The court may, if a tempor-
ary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought,
require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(f) Other rights preserved
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any stan-
dard or requirement relating to the management of solid
waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency).
EPA Regulations on Prior Notice of Citizen Suits under
RCRA, 40 C.F.R. § 254
PART 254 - PRIOR NOTICE OF CITIZEN SUITS
AUTHORITY: Sec. 7002, Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2825
(42 U.S.C. 6972).
SOURCE: 42 FR 56114, Oct. 21, 1977, unless otherwise
to perform any act or duty under the Act, which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. These actions are to
be filed in accordance with the rules of the district court
in which the action is instituted. The purpose of this part
is to prescribe procedures governing the notice require-
ments of subsections (b) and (c) of section 7002 as a
prerequisite to the commencement of such actions.
§ 254.2 Service of notice.
(a) Notice of .ntent to file suit under subsection
7002(aX(1) of the Act shall be served upon an alleged
violator of any permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, or order which has become effective under
this Act in the following manner:
(1) If the alleged violator is a private individual or
corporation, service of notice shall be accomplished by
registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or
by personal service upon, the owner or site manager of
the building, plant, installation, or facility alleged to be in
violation. A copy of the notice shall be mailed to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency for the region in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred, and the chief administrative
officer of the solid waste management agency for the
State in which the violation is alleged to have occurred. If
the alleged violator is a corporation, a copy of the notice
shall also be mailed to the registered agent, if any, of that
corporation in the State in which such violation is alleged
to have occurred.
(2) If the alleged violator is a State or local agency,
service of notice shall be accomplished by registered
mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or by per-
sonal service upon, the head of that agency. A copy of the
notice shall be mailed to the chief administrator of the
solid waste management agency for the State in wl .ch
the violetion is alleged to have occurred, the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency for the region in which the violation is alleged to
have occurred.
aE
p ‘ ‘e ? ¥ 7 : “s “
me sem = - - ae - - = ~~ en
(3) If the alleged violator is a Federal agency, ser-
vice of notice shall be accomplished by registered mail,
return receipt requested, addressed to, or by personal
service upon, the head of the agency. A copy of the notice
shall be mailed to the Administrator of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, the Regional Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency for the region in which
the violation is alleged to have occurred, the Attorney
General of the United States, and the chief administrative
officer of the solid waste management agency for the
State in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.
(b) Service of notice of intent to file suit under
subsection 7002(a)(2) of the Act shall be accomplished by
registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or
by personal service upon, the Administrator, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460. A
copy of the notice shall be mailed to the Attorney General
of the United States.
(c) Notice given in accordance with the provisions
of this part shall be considered to have been served on
the date of receipt. If service was accomplished by mail,
the date of receipt will be considered to be the date noted
on the return receipt card.
§ 254.3 Contents of notice.
(a) Violation of permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, or order. Notice regarding an alleged violation
of a permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
or order which has become effective under this Act shall
include sufficient information to permit the recipient to
identify the specific permit, standard, regulation, condi-
tion, requirement, or order which has allegedly been
SR Ree EE ne
violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the
person or persons responsible for the alleged violation,
the date or dates of the violation, and the full name,
address, and telephone number of the person giving
notice.
(b) Failure to act. Notice regarding an alleged failure
of the Administrator to perform an act or duty which is
not discretionary under the Act shall identify the provi-
sions of the Act which require such act or create such
duty, shall describe with reasonable specificity the action
taken or not taken by the Administrator which is claimed
to constitute a failure to perform the act or duty, and shall
state the full name, address, and telephone number of the
person giving the notice.
(c) Identification of counsel. The notice shall state the
name, address, and telephone number of the legal coun-
sel, if any, representing the person giving the notice.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.