Respondents Brief — Hallstrom v. Tillamook County

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the 60-day notice requirement of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”) (42

U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.) a jurisdictional prerequisite to a

citizen’s suit [such as that filed by Petitioners (“the Hall-

stroms”)] brought under the Act?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CINE aoa ic osc cikevicscacsacscdekustea 1

ID vc sinc wc cesssccsuicnesanaes 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................++. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................000: 4

ARGUMENT

The failure of the Hallstroms to comply with the

60-day notice requirement in RCRA before filing

their lawsuit deprived the district court of juris-

diction over the lawsuit ....................... 6

A. The plain, unambiguous language of the

RCRA notice provision prohibits the com-

mencement of a citizen suit before the citi-

zen has complied with explicit notice and

waiting-period requirements ............... 7

1. The requirements for maintaining a citi-

zen suit under RCRA are jurisdictional. ... 7

2. The explicit language of the RCRA

notice provision is controlling. ............ 8

3. The requirements of the RCRA notice

provision are not subject to waiver, estoppel

or other equitable modification. ........... 12

B. The legislative history underlying RCRA and

other federal environmental statutes confirms

the clear meaning of the statutory requirements

for commencing a citiz-m suit................ 14

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

1. Congress’ intention was to establish a

hierarchy of preferred responses, and the

notice requirement is a key element in

achieving that goal. ...............-.++005-

2. The legislative history underlying RCRA

and other environmental statutes demon-

strates that the notice requirements were

intended to be applied literally. ...........

3. Congressional amendments to RCRA

support the conclusion that the notice

ent may not be waived or other-

wise satisfied after commencement of a citi-

DU I wa acedidacccdscccedeccccccvescoees

C. Federal courts may not deviate from explicit

statutory requirements established by Con-

CP UNEUME SSN AY) 4M b4O% cei d cee csccsccce.

1. The explicit requirements of the RCRA

notice provision must be literally applied

regardless of the effect on the Hallstroms’

Mae debe s acd edceccceesccapecce

2. Congress, not the federal courts, is con-

stitutionally empowered to define the cir-

cumstances under which a citizen may sue

to enforce federal environmental statutes.. .

ST Eases Esececociccccccecccccccseccccs

APPENDICES

Appendix A - RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.........

Appendix B- EPA tions on Prior Notice of

Citizen Suits under RCRA, 40

Se PO ccc cctscweccvcecccces

14

18

21

27

Al

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CasEs:

American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson 456 U.S. 63

DM tas mad ducnscédhswdanencey eas catesebsescvece 22

Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown 466

SA SE ED ok pccsrpecdeconvccvescaucascecns 13, 24

Burlington Northern v. Oklahoma Tax Comm. 481

SR IPE. bo cRvcbedes ceViednensieceesccccecs 9

= of Highland Park v. Train 519 F.2d 681 (7th

ir. 1978), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976) ........ 10

Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Syl-

vania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102 (1980)...............e eee 9

Ex Parte Collett 337 U.S. 55 (1949)...............4.. 12

Friends of the Earth v. Carey 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977)............. 12

Garcia v. Cecos Intern., Inc. 761 F.2d 76 (ist Cir.

POU s ccd vbcb vncasscsrepaessndciuvnesine ses 10, 11, 18

Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found

484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987)............... 9, 16

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County 844 F.2d 598 (9th

CAE. BEE 5 cdvcocccevonansweenbesrevereecesccs passim

Hempstead Cty. & Nevada Cty. Project v.

U.S.E.P.A. 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983) ............ 11

Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803)............ 25

McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc. 856

Pe ee Ne GE vos vevnns sex tncecccsssccsccs 10

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers

GE BRN B GRRE oe bce ccice de sicccscccccecccsce 10, 11

——

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver 447 U.S. 807 (1980)...... 23, 26

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins __ U.S. __, 109

Nee a i ewan ve 3

Proffitt v. Commissioners, Bristol TP. 754 F.2d 504

i ae ee ansueee bs 11

Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens Etc. v. Eaton 644

ee MED, ccc ik cccduddaccebocbceces 11

Rubin v. United States 449 U.S. 424 (1981)........... 4

Schiavone v. Fortune 477 U.S. 21 (1986)............. 24

Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island

619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

SSE eUh eb iccnccscvencccceneaseneinceiss 12

TVA v. Hill 437 U.S. 153 (1977).......... 12, 24, 25, 26

Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. ___ U.S. __, 108

PE a evsdvcccrenesescoasonvonevece 24

US. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights __

JS. _, 106 S.Ct. 2268 (1988) .......ccccecrcnccees 8

United States v. Locke 471 U.S. 84 (1985) ......... 9, 22

Walls v. Waste Resource Corp. 761 F.2d 311 (6th

CO MERE Wiwds Cc ovens ccevencssevandeetes 10, 11, 20

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .... 26

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

"i v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455 U.S. 385

Ds Hie nbakthaswtk Cdbaneathnescansyaoessseses 12, 13

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

U.S. Constitution, Articles I-III]................00005. 26

STATUTES AND RULEs:

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TB WAG, © BRIBED occ ccc sccccccccdeccccsccscece 19

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)... 2... ccc cece eee eee eens 19

16 UB. © TBI. 00. ccc ccccrccccccccccvcccccece 23

ee ac cc cc cescsecsecceseeesvceses 19

SB UB. © TZDE BOG. noes cccccccccsccccccccceces 10

Be Pe IED cece cecccccvcccvecevesosonene 19

NI noi ccs ccc cncccsescsccsevenee 10

33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2)... ccc eee cette eee eeee 19

Sy Ce Oe Ds csv rvcccccvecepoveccsveeceess 19

reer eT 19

42 U.S.C. § 300j-B(D)(1) 0... cece eee eee eens 19

42 US.C. © BOGDOBUS). 00. ccc cccccccccccccccccvevees 13

Oe ie Pc wa oc cv ccccccccccccccesccccenas 13

42 U.S.C. § 4911(D)(1). 0. cee eee eens 19

42 U.S.C. § 6901 ef Seq... 2.66. e cece e eens passim

ET b ae cecevecctcescescuccccescceccoudans 2

vii

Page

ED Tikb snc Soccer ccncsccccccssecdesauene 2

GD TA, GID occ cccccccccccccscvcccsnes passim

Be eee re 3, 8, 21

ee EPPTTECTELTITTTI CTT LTT 15

Ge hs a oc ccc cece sccccccccccescccens 6, 23

42 USC. § TED)... 2. cc ccc cccccccccccccccccces 19

Ge Te Ew vec ccc cccccccccccscvccsesenes 19

Pe te I ccc ccc ccccncccccucecsoavetans 19

REGULATIONS:

EE BR av ceccsctcccctcncssccccsvcseesesensos 16

LgGcIsLATIVE History:

116 Cong. Rec. 32,381 (1970)............e eee eee eeee 19

116 Cong. Rec. 32,926 (1970). ......... eee eee eeees 16

116 Cong. Rec. 32,927 (1970)............. eee eee eees 20

116 Cong. Rec. 33,103 (1970). .......... cece ee eeeee 21

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970)

(report of Public Works Committee)............... 17

Hearings on S.3229, $.3466 and S.3546 Before the

Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the

Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong.

Be I Ea Uv ce sanbiquieccavavassccccece 19

No. 88-42

ti

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

+

OLAF A. HALLSTROM and

MARY E. HALLSTROM,

Petitioners,

V.

TILLAMOOK COUNTY,

a municipal corporation,

Respondent.

+

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

+

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

—@—

OPINION BELOW

The Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals is

reported at 844 F.2d 598 (1988). (J.A. 87-96)

+

1

vr, =z_”6hUmTlUlUCc —————_—————

STATUTE INVOLVED

The pertinent portion of RCRA involved in this mat-

ter (42 U.S.C. § 6972) is set forth in Appendix “A” to this

Brief.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Hallstroms own land near Respondent Tillamook

County’s (“the County”) landfill. The County operates

the landfill under a permit issued by the Oregon Depart-

ment of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”). (J.A. 4, 11, 60,

61) Prior to April 1981, the Hallstroms became concerned

that contaminated ground and surface water from the

landfill was polluting their property. In April 1981, the

Hallstroms sent a written notice to the County claiming

violations of state and federal law and stating their inten-

tion to file a lawsuit. (J.A. 26-27, 38-39, 61)

In April 1982, the Hallstroms filed a lawsuit in fed-

eral court under the citizen-suit provision of RCRA Sec-

tion 7002(a) [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)]. The Hallstroms claimed

violations of standards governing landfill operation

established under RCRA and they also asserted pendent

state claims for damages for inverse condemnation, tres-

pass and nuisance. (J.A. 1, 3-10, 58-59, 61)

In their Complaint, the Hallstroms specifically

alleged that “[mJore than 60 days prior to the commence-

ment of this action, plaintiffs served a notice of intent to

file a citizen’s suit pursuant to [RCRA].” (J.A. 5) How-

ever, in January 1983 the County learned that the Hal-

Istroms had not given that required notice to either the

SS i ae Se ee a

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or to the DEQ

as required by RCRA [42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)]. (.A. 22-25,

41) Consequently, the County moved for Summary Judg-

suit was filed, the Hallstroms gave notice for the first

time to the EPA and DEQ.' (J.A. 27-28, 40-41, 61)

In April 1983, the district court denied the County’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (J.A. 1, 56-57) Following

a trial and the entry of a Final Judgment and Decree (J.A.

74-86), the Hallstroms appealed certain rulings made by

! The Hallstroms contend that “(flor at least a year and a

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the district court in connection with their RCRA claim

and claims based on state law.2 The County cross-

appealed from the denial of its Motion for Summary

Judgment. (J.A. 87)

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the

district court on the RCRA notice requirement and

remanded the case to the district court to be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the RCRA 60-day notice

requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a

citizen suit under RCRA. Because the Hallstroms failed to

notify the EPA and DEQ before filing their lawsuit, the

Court of Appeals ruled that the district court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. (J.A. 87-96)

+

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Hallstroms asserted the existence of a federal

question under RCRA as their basis for federal subject-

matter jurisdiction. The provisions of RCRA that permit

enforcement of that Act by private citizens specifically

confer jurisdiction in the district courts. However, the

same provisions require that the plaintiff-citizen must

first give 60 days’ advance notice of the intent to sue to

2 As a result of the trial, the district court refused to grant

the injunctive relief sought by the Hallstroms of permanent

closure of the County landfill. Instead, the district court

perp iy Rew ny 4 submit a proposal to ensure that all

leachate generated by the landfill would be contained within

the boundaries of the County landfill in the future. (J.A. 74-86)

In addition, the jury found in favor of the County on the

Hallstroms’ state-law claims. (J.A. 75, 85-86)

the EPA and to the coordinate state agency responsible

for enforcing RCRA. Citizen suits are prohibited until

that requirement is met. It is undisputed that the 60-day

notice required by RCRA was not given to the EPA and

DEQ by the Hallstroms prior to commencing their law-

suit. Consequently, the district court lacked subject-mat-

ter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.

The RCRA notice provision does not provide, as the

Halistroms contend, that a citizen-plaintiff may file a

RCRA claim and then give the proper notice so long as

the court does not rule on the plaintiff's claim for 60

days. While such a statutory scheme may have been possi-

ble, that is not the scheme that Congress adopted.

Congress deliberately chose a hierarchy of preferred

responses to a claimed RCRA violation: (1) voluntary

compliance by the alleged violator, (2) enforcement action

by the EPA or the coordinate state agency, and, only as a

last resort, (3) a private lawsuit by a citizen-plaintiff.

Congress consciously included the notice obligation in

RCRA to implement that choice.

The RCRA notice requirement is not a mere pro-

cedural technicality, but an essential component of the

overall statutory scheme. By requiring prior notice, Con-

gress ensured that there would be a meaningful oppor-

tunity for voluntary compliance and agency enforcement

before any private litigation is filed.

The Halistroms’ construction of RCRA would save

their lawsuit from dismissal. However, it defeats a funda-

mental purpose of the legislation.

+

Congress has authorized citizens to enforce RCRA

standards through civil litigation since RCRA was origi-

nally enacted in 1976. A citizen-plaintiff, however, is

required to give notice of intent to sue to the alleged

violator of RCRA and to the federal and state environ-

mental agencies at least 60 days prior to the commence-

ment of the citizen’s civil action. The citizen who

commences an action without first satisfying the statu-

tory requirements fails to properly invoke RCRA as a

basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.®

Based on the plain, unambiguous language of the

RCRA notice provision, underlying legislative history

and the separation of powers doctrine, the Hallstroms’

failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement in

3 A citizen’s failure to properly invoke RCRA as a basis of

federal jurisdiction has no effect on other remedies a ailable to

the citizen. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f), which provides:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which

any person (or class of persons) may have under any

statute or common law to seek enforcement of any stan-

dard or requirement relating to the management of solid

waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief

(including relief against the Administrator [of the EPA] or

a State agency).

See, ¢.g., Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1988).

7

RCRA constituted a jurisdictional defect and compelled a

dismissal of the Hallstroms’ lawsuit.

A. The plain, unambiguous of the RCRA

notice prohibits commencement

ofa suit before the citizen has complied

with explicit notice and waiting-period

requirements.

The plain meaning of the RCRA 60-day notice

requirement is clear. It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

the commencement of a citizen suit. It is not, as the

Hallstroms and Amici* erroneously contend, merely a

procedural requirement subject to equitable modification.

The Hallstroms and Amici strain to argue that the RCRA

notice requirement means something other than what it

clearly says - a citizen suit is “prohibited” and cannot be

commenced unless, at least 60 days prior to the

commencement of the suit, the citizen-plaintiff has given

notice of the claimed RCRA violations to the EPA and

coordinate state agency.

1. The aoe for maintaining a citizen suit

under RCRA are jurisdictional.

Significantly, the pertinent portion of the notice pro-

vision in RCRA is captioned “Actions prohibited”® and

* Amici Curiae Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc.,

National A Society, Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., and Wilderness (“Amici”) filed an Amici

Curiae Brief (“Am. Br.”) with this Court in support of the

Hallstroms.

5 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b).

states in unambiguous terms that “[nJo action may be

commenced” until 60 days after the citizen notifies the

EPA, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and

the alleged violator. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1). Under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 3, “[a) civil action is commenced by filing a com-

plaint with the court.” Thus, read together, RCRA and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 prohibit a citizen from “filing a com-

plaint” until the notice and waiting-period requirements

in RCRA have been satisfied.

A federal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to

act on any aspect of a lawsuit until a complaint has been

filed and an action “commenced.” Accordingly, Congress’

explicit “prohibition” of the commencement of a citizen

suit under RCRA prior to compliance with the statutory

notice requirement demonstrates that Congress intended

that requirement to have jurisdictional significance.®

2. The of the RCRA notice

den tf essuien” —

As the Hallstroms even acknowledge (Op. Br. 20),

“the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-

lacks

the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the absence of

notice to the EPA and DEQ. That argument ignores this Court's

recent decision in U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights, _

US. __, 108 S. Ct. 2268, 2270-71 (1988), in which this Court

held that courts have finite bounds of authority which are

fixed by the limits of their jurisdiction and that even non-

parties may object when those boundaries are crossed.

9

guage of the statute itself.” Consumer Product Safety

Comm'n -v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);

accord Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484

U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376, 381 (1987). The plain, unam-

biguous language of a statute ordinarily must be

regarded as conclusive. See Burlington Northern v. Okla-

homa Tax Comm., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987).

This Court has repeatedly recognized that when the

terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry gen-

erally is complete. See e.g. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.

424, 430 (1981). Indeed, this Court generally assumes that

the legislative purpose of a statute is expressed by the

ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. Accordingly,

a literal reading of statutory language generally is the

only proper reading. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,

93-95 (1985).

The notice requirement in RCRA is unambiguous. A

citizen suit is “prohibited” and may not be “commenced”

until the citizen has satisfied the explicit notice require-

ments set forth in the Act. Congress could not have

provided in clearer terms what steps a citizen must take

before commencing a civil action under RCRA. The

unequivocal clarity of the notice requirements in RCRA

and other federal environmental statutes led the Court of

Appeals in this matter to conclude that “[a]nything other

than a literal interpretation of the 60-day notice require-

ment ... would effectively render those provisions

worthless.” Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598,

601 (1988).

The Court of Appeals in this matter correctly ruled

that the 60-day notice requirement is jurisdictional based

on the “plain language” of RCRA:

10

[Senior Circuit] Judge Wisdom wrote, “The plain

language of § 6972(b) commands sixty days’ notice

before commencement of the suit. To accept anything

less ‘constitutes, in effect, judicial amendment in

abrogation of explicit, unconditional statutory lan-

e.’” Garcia [v. Cecos Intern., Inc.], 761 F.2d [76,] 78

fist C Cir. 1985]. “The notice requirement is not a tech-

nical wrinkle or superfluous formality that federal

courts may waive at will. [I]t is part of the

jurisdictional conferral from Congress that cannot be

altered by the courts.” Id. at 79.

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 600; see

also McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39,

43 (6th Cir. 1988); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d

311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519

F.2d 681, 691 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927

(1976).

This Court has not expressly interpreted the notice

requirements of RCRA. However, in Middlesex Cty. Sew-

erage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), this Court

ruled that the comprehensive enforcement provisions of

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251

et seq.) and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctu-

aries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) are intended to

be exclusive and that the citizen-plaintiffs involved in

that matter were not entitled to maintain any lawsuit or

action under any legal theory except in the manner set

forth in those statutes. 453 U.S. at 18. With respect to the

jurisdictional character of the notice provisions in those

statutes that are virtually identical to the notice provision

in RCRA (see 453 U.S. at 6-7 n. 9), this Court ruled:

These citizen-suit provisions authorize private per-

sons to sue for injunctions to enforce these statutes.

Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must comply

11

with specified procedures - which respondents here

ignored — including in most cases 60 said prior

notice to potential defendants.

453 U.S. at 14 (footnote omitted).

This Court in Middlesex did not address the con-

sequences of failing to give such notice. The Hallstroms,

however, erroneously contend that “the language this

Court chose, i.e., ‘specified procedures,’ suggests that

notice is a procedural, rather than a jurisdictional,

requirement.” (Op. Br. 34) The clear implication of Mid-

dlesex is that the notice requirements set forth in federal

environmental statutes have jurisdictional significance

and that citizen-plaintiffs who intend to maintain an

action under those statutes must strictly comply with

those requirements. Indeed, both the First Circuit in Gar-

cia v. Cecos Intern., Inc., supra, 761 F.2d at 80, and the Sixth

Circuit in Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., supra, 761 F.2d at

316-17, expressly stated that their respective rulings that

the 60-day RCRA notice requirement is jurisdictional

were consistent with the approach of this Court in

Middlesex.

Those courts that allow a stay or othe wise attempt

to remedy a citizen lawsuit not commenced in compliance

with RCRA in effect sanction the maintenance of a federal

lawsuit beyond the scope provided by Congress.” That

7 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Commissioners, Bristol TP., 754 F.2d 504

(3d Cir. 1985); Hempstead Cty. & Nevada Cty. Project v.

U.S.E.P.A., 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983); Pymatuning Water Shed

(Continued on following page)

12

approach has no support in the plain, unambiguous lan-

guage of RCRA. Accordingly, there is no need to even

look beyond RCRA’s unambiguous terms to its legislative

history. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n. 29 (1977),

citing, Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).

3. The requirements of the RCRA notice provision

are not subject to waiver, estoppel or other equi-

table modification.

The Hallstroms erroneously contend that this Court’s

decisions in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

(1982), and its progeny suggest that the notice require-

ments established in RCRA and other federal environ-

mental statutes should be interpreted flexibly and with

regard to equitable considerations. (Op. Br. 34-37) In

(Continued from previous page)

Citizens Etc. v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981); Susquehanna

Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Friends of the Earth v. Carey,

535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). (Op.

Br. 24; Am. Br. 11-13, 16-18) Amici perceive in these cases “a

willingness of the courts to respond to the exigencies of the

case at hand and fashion a result that best serves the interests

of justice.” (Am. Br. 19) What Amici perceive, and apparently

endorse, as result-oriented jurisprudence is in fact nothing

more than the erroneous perception of certain courts that

actual knowledge by the EPA and the coordinate state agency

of a citizen-plaintiff’s claim before the lawsuit is commenced

amounts to substantial compliance with the RCRA notice

requirement. That approach is inconsistent with the explicit

provisions of the RCRA notice requirement and, in any event,

has no relevance to this matter. Neither the EPA nor the DEQ

in this matter had actual knowledge or formal, written notice

of the Hallstroms’ intent to sue under RCRA before the Hal-

Istroms commenced their citizen suit.

13

Zipes, this Court held that the requirement of a timely

filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a

suit in district court. This Court reasoned that that time

deadline, like a statute of limitation, was subject to equi-

table considerations such as waiver and tolling. 455 U.S.

at 393.

In contrast, in this matter this Court is not confronted

with statutory requirements that, like a statute of limita-

tion, potentially raise an absolute bar to a party’s right to

pursue a remedy in federal court. A literal interpretation

of the RCRA notice requirement at most will delay a

citizen’s right to sue under RCRA and, in fact, may

entirely obviate the need to pursue an action if regulatory

authorities are allowed the opportunity to resolve the

dispute nonjudicially in the manner contemplated by

Congress. Thus, equitable considerations offer no persua-

sive justification for ignoring the explicit prohibition by

Congress on the commencement of actions by citizens

prior to compliance with the RCRA notice requirement.

See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,

149-50 (1984) [declining to depart from or modify Fed. R.

Civ. P. 3 in determining when an action is “commenced”

under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)).

In any event, the Hallstroms erroneously contend

that, “[uJnder the facts [of this matter], the [60-day

notice] requirement was either waived or subject to equi-

table modification or cure.” (Op. Br. 36) Even if the lack

of jurisdiction could somehow be waived, the County

clearly did not waive anything. The County filed its

Motion for Summary Judgment or. the jurisdictional issue

14

immediately after it discovered that, contrary to the alle-

gations in the Hallstroms’ Complaint, the Hallstroms had

not given notice as required by RCRA. In addition, the

County carefully preserved that issue before the district

court and raised it on cross-appeal. Thus, there has been

no waiver of that issue by the County and the County

should not be deemed to be estopped from asserting that

jurisdictional defect. Neither should any action or inac-

tion on the part of EPA or DEQ constitute waiver or

estoppel, as neither agency was a party to the Hallstroms’

lawsuit and neither can waive the jurisdictional require-

ment or estop the County.

B. The ve history underlying RCRA and

other environmental statutes confirms

the clear of the ents

<= <<.

Even if this Court chooses to consider the legislative

history underlying RCRA and other federal environmen-

tal statutes, that history clearly shows that the notice

requirement is an intentional and integral part of the

overall statutory scheme established by Congress. Noth-

ing in that legislative history justifies disregard of the

plain, unambiguous language used by Congress in the

RCRA notice provision.

1. pp tle. yoneenmennaag ely pene nine erat

preferred and the notice require-

ment fo & ina chanient .

_ Beth sides and Amici agree that “the court should

interpret the statute [RCRA] to carry into effect the end

15

Congress wanted to accomplish.” (Op. Br. 28) The County

certainly does not disagree with the Hallstroms and

Amici that citizen-suit provisions were enacted “to

encourage citizen participation in the enforcement of

environmental legislation as a supplement to agency enforce-

ment.” (Am. Br. 6, emphasis added) However, the legisla-

tive history clearly evidences Congress’ intent to

establish a three-tier hierarchy for responding to alleged

environmental violations: (1) voluntary compliance by

the violaior after having received the requisite 60-day

notice, (2) government enforcement action against the

violator [see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)], and (3) a citizen suit

against the violator only after the requisite notice has

been given, 60 days have expired, and there has been no

voluntary compliance or governmental agency action

commenced.

The legislative history (even that relied on by the

Hallstroms and Amici) makes it clear that the third tier or

alternative — the citizen suit — is the least preferred of the

three tiers or alternatives and cannot be utilized unless

and until the other two tiers or alternatives have first

been exhausted:

(1) Voluntary compliance

Notice to the violator gives him a chance to

bring himself into complete compliance in 60

days. If the violator comes into complete compli-

ance in 60 days and it is absolutely clear that the

violation cannot reasonably be expected to recur,

then the citizen suit is unnecessary. (Op. Br. 13)

This Court recently recognized that one purpose of a

citizen-suit notice provision is to give the alleged violator

“an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance

16

with the [law] and thus likewise render unnecessary a

citizen suit.” Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay

Found., supra, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.

(2) Government enforcement action

Notice of the violation to the government

government action. Senate

on the Clean Air Amend-

of intent to file such action on the Federal

and State air pollution control agency and

the alleged ter.

116 Cong. Rec. 32,926 (1970). (Op. Br. 13-14)

As Amici aptly state: “Committee members believed that

the notice provision would serve to trigger administrative

action to remedy the alleged violation, thereby eliminat-

ing the need for the private citizen to seek relief in the

courts.” (Am. Br. 9-10)

® It is significant that this legislative history refers to a

“notice of intent to file such action.” This legislative history is

consistent with Regulations

Regulations (40 C.F.R. § 254; see Op. Br. in

Appendix “B” to this Brief and explicitly require “notice of

intent to file suit,” which is how the Hallstroms characterized

their notice.

ioe icin -?. .

ee Se ee a Ee as it cette ) hte Sin

17

(3) Citizen suit

The legislative history that Amici rely on [S. Rep. No.

1196, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970) (report of Public

Works Committee)] makes it clear that Congress antici-

pated that government agencies, federal and state, wou'd

be “primarily responsible for enforcement” and that pri-

vate citizens “were encouraged to uncover violations that

otherwise might escape notice, and motivate the agencies

to take action.” (Am. Br. 8) That same legislative history

makes it clear that it is only when the government agen-

cies fail to act that citizens should be able to bring their

enforcement actions in the form of citizen suits.

However, as Amici correctly note, those federal

courts that have considered the notice requirements in

the Clean Air Act Amendments and other federal envi-

ronmental statutes “have consistently recognized that

Congress sought to facilitate and encourage citizen

involvement while preserving the primary enforcement role

of the federal and state regulatory agencies and shielding

the federal courts from an unmanageable number of citi-

zen suits.” (Am. Br. 11, emphasis added) Thus, as Amici

even acknowledge, “Congress intended to provide for

citizen suits in a manner least likely to clog the courts

and most likely to trigger agency enforcement.” (Id.)

There is nothing in RCRA or in the underlying legis-

lative history that implies that a citizen may resort to a

court without first satisfying the explicit notice require-

ment or that a citizen who has not satisfied the notice

requirement may nevertheless commence a lawsuit under

RCRA and ask the court to hold the action in abeyance in

order for the citizen to comply with the 60-day notice

requirement. A citizen (like the Hallstroms) who com-

mences a lawsuit before providing the requisite notice

18

frustrates the primary and underlying objectives of

accomplishing voluntary compliance, triggering appro-

priate administrative action to remedy the alleged viola-

tion, and avoiding unnecessary civil litigation. Indeed,

the Court of Appeals in this matter concluded that its

ruling serves “the underlying policy aims of encouraging

non-judicial resolution of environmental conflicts”:

[O}nce a suit is filed, positions become hardened,

parties incur legal fees, and relations become adver-

sarial so that cooperation and compromise is less

likely. Garcia, [supra,] 761 F.2d at 82. The pragmatic

a fails to + -y that “a mere adjustment

of the trial date or the filing of a supplemental or

amended complaint to cure defective notice cannot

restore a sixty-day nonadversarial period to the par-

.. . [If a citizen-plaintiff could file a suit under

RCRA without follo the notice requirements and

avoid a motion to dismiss simply by arguing that the

EPA or other relevent authority had more than 60

days to act prior to the commencement of trial or

discovery proceedings, then, under the realities of

modenhaiey litigation, no one would ever comply

with this soquisaanent. We will not attribute to Con-

an intent to enact a provision after hours of

ebate that could be evaded by every potential plain-

tiff, thus rendering it meaningless.

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 601.

2. The legislative history underlying RCRA and

other environmental statutes demonstrates that

the notice uirements were intended to be

applied .

The citizen-suit provision in RCRA was modeled on

the analogous provision in the Clean Air Act Amend-

19

ments. The legislative history underlying the Clear Air

Act provision shows that Congress intended the notice

provision to play a significant role. Even proponents of

citizen participation in connection with the Clean Air Act

were concerned that private-enforcement lawsuits could

interfere with the enforcement responsibilities delegated

to governmental authorities. See Hearings on S.3229,

S.3466 and S.3546 Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water

Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st

Cong., 2d Sess. 1184 (1970). Opponents of citizen enforce-

ment were concerned that citizen lawsuits would foster

unproductive adversary relations between public, busi-

ness and private factions. Id. at 1570. The 60-day notice

requirement was intended to reconcile those concerns

with the perception that citizens and government author-

ities working together could more effectively resolve

environmental disputes than through immediate resort

by citizens to the courts. See 116 Cong. Rec. 32,381 (1970).

* 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1). See also Section 505(b)(1) of the

Federal Water Pollution Cont:ol Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b)(1); Sec-

tion 310(d)(1) of the Comprenensive Environmental Response,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9659(d)(1); Section

Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.

Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC. 261%b)(1); Section

11(b)(1) of an Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C.

20

Based on its review of the underlying legislative his-

tory, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in this

matter that “[nJon-judicial resolution of such conflicts is

more likely if parties consider their interests and posi-

tions in a nonadversarial setting before suit is filed” and

that “[l]itigation should be a last resort only after other

efforts have failed”:

Section 6972(b) and its legislative history reflect

Congress’s belief that the citizen-plaintiff working

with the state or the EPA can better resolve environ-

mental disputes than can the courts. Congress believed

that citizen through the courts should be

to rative heed ag erg

notice requirement of § 6972(b) was to “trig-

ger administrative action to che soled that $e

citizen] ht otherwise seek in the courts.” 116

Cong. Rec. (1970).

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 601

(emphasis added); accord Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,

supra, 761 F.2d at 317 (“the legislative history shows that

far from being a mere formality, prior notice was viewed

by Congress as crucial in defining the proper role of the

citizen suit”).

The legislative history does not suggest, much less

establish, persuasive grounds to disregard the statutory

prohibition against a citizen's commencement of a law-

suit before complying with explicit notice requirements.

The comments of one sponsor of the Bill that became the

Clean Air Act citizen-suit provision capture the intent of

the legislation’s proponents to allow citizen participation

only after notice has been given and government enforce-

ment mechanisms have had an opportunity to respond:

2 ee oe ee concerned

of intent to so, and the viola-

tion which he has in mind. In words, idea is

cited in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at

|

© 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) was amended in 1984 (over two

years after this lawsuit was filed) to provide for an exception

that waives the 60-day notice requirement if the alleged viola-

tion involves hazardous waste. That amendment, however,

does not apply to this matter. (J.A. 3, 35-36, 60-62, 67-68) See,

also, Hallstrom vo. Tillamook County, supra, 844 F.2d at 600-01

(“[t]his provision makes clear that Congress considered the 60-

day notice requirement and intended that it apply in all cases,

except those involving hazardous waste”)

22

RCRA citizen suits is further proof that Congress

intended the other terms of the RCRA citizen-suit provi-

sion to remain intact as originally and literally enacted.

This Court has cautioned that “[gloing behind the

plain language of a statute in search of a possibly con-

trary congressional intent is ‘a step to be taken cau-

tiously’ even under the best of circumstances.” See

American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 US. 63, 75 (1982),

quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).

In this matter, no reason exists for this Court to even

consider the legislative history underlying the plain,

unambiguous language of the RCRA citizen-suit provi-

sion. However, even if this unnecessary step is taken,

nothing in the legislative history indicates congressional

intent demonstrably at odds with Congress’ chosen statu-

tory language.

C. Federal courts may not deviate from

statutory requirements established by

To ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the

RCRA notice requirement or even the underlying legisla-

ve history in order to construe RCRA in a manner

asserted by the Hallstroms and Amici would be to take

this Court “out of the realm of interpretation and place

[it] in the domain of legislation.” U.S. v. Locke, supra, 471

U.S. at 96. Moreover, the constitutional structure of our

government prohibits the federal courts from assuming

that role.

-_

—_ ———— _

23

1. The explicit a of the RCRA notice

must be literally applied regardless of

the effect on the Hallstroms’ lawsuit.

The plain, unambiguous language of and legislative

history underlying the RCRA notice requirement are

clear. The consequence of the Hallstroms’ failure to com-

ply with that requirement should not be mitigated by

reading into RCRA a degree of flexibility that simply is

not present in the statutory language chosen by Congress.

Indeed, strict adherence to the procedural requirements

established by Congress has proven to be the best guar-

antee of evenhanded administration of the law. See

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).

The Hallstroms and Amici suggest that a literal inter-

pretation of the RCRA notice requirement will have a

detrimental effect on the ability of citizens to enforce

federal environmental laws. However, if a literal inter-

pretation of the RCRA notice requirement leads to a

harsh result," the harshness “is imposed by the legisla-

Species Act as a “strik-

ing example of the absurd and harsh results of a formalistic

avoided had a district court possessed the authority to waive

or modify the waiting requirement. (Am. Br. 29). That argu-

ment, however, fails to take into account that the Endangered

other

i

;

:

Spe-

cies Act does not affect a citizen’s ability to invoke other

statutory or common-law procedures for seeking immediate

24

ture and not Sy the judicial process.” See Torres v. Oakland

Scavenger Co., __ U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (1988)

(holding that specification of parties in a notice of appeal

is a jurisdictional prerequisite), quoting Schiavone v. For-

tune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986). Indeed, this Court has recog-

nized that statutory procedures established by Congress

for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be

disregarded by the courts out of sympathy for particular

litigants. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,

supra 466 U.S. at 152.

2. Congress, not the federal courts, is constitu-

tionally 9 page to define the circumstances

under which a citizen may sue to enforce fed-

eral environmental statutes.

The Hallstroms and Amici essentially ask this Court

to rewrite the RCRA notice requirement and thereby leg-

islate in a manner reserved to Congress by Article I of the

Constitution. This Court has repeatedly rejected argu-

ments that would require it to extend its constitutionally-

assigned role. For example, in TVA v. Hill, supra, several

environmental groups brought an action under the

Endangered Species Act of 1973 to enjoin the Tennessee

Valley Authority from completing the Tellico Dam. The

environmental groups argued that completion of the Dam

would eradicate an endangered species of snail darter or

destroy its critical habitat. This Court held that the

Endangered Species Act prohibited further work on the

Dam even though the Dam was virtually complete and

Congress continued to appropriate public funds toward

the project after being apprised of the Dam’s probable

impact on the snail darter’s survival. 437 U.S. at 171-95.

25

Significantly, this Court in TVA v. Hill refused to

ignore the statute’s plain language even though its literal

application would terminate the Tellico Dam project and

sacrifice millions of dollars in public funds. In affirming

the entry of an Order directing the district court to per-

manently enjoin further work on the project, this Court

reasoned:

Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite

one, with each h having certain de func-

tions snateally to it by the Constitution. While “[i]t

is emphatically the province and du tan a

deqetanant to th teat toe eo ta” "Marbu v. Mad-

ison, 1 Cranch 1 “177 (1803), i is equally Lo

emphatically — the exclusive province of the C

not only to formulate legislative policies ind tan

date programs and projects, but also to establish their

relative priority for the Nation. Once Con , exer-

its delegated powers, has decided the order of

priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to

administer the laws and for the courts to enforce

them when enforcement is sought.

Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or

unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected

by Cee Se cnre mee, tere 2 Te paeeenes of

interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enact-

ment is ed and its constitutionality deter-

mined, the judicial process comes to an . We do

not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested

with the power of veto. . .

We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our

constitutional system the commitment to the separa-

tion of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt

congressional action by judicially decreeing what

accords with “common sense and the public weal.”

Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the

political branches.

26

437 U.S. at 194-95; see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, supra,

447 U.S. at 826 (courts may not “alter the balance struck

by Congress” by favoring one side or another in matters

of statutory construction).

This Court’s decision in TVA v. h.il reflects nothing

less than “a profound respect for the law and the proper

allocation of lawmaking responsibilities in our Govern-

ment.” See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,

334-35 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting, footnote omitted).

That respect also should lead this Court to reject the

argument of the Hallstroms and Amici that Congress

meant something other than what it enacted in the RCRA

notice provision. The literal terms and the underlying

legislative history of that provision simply do not author-

ize a stay or any other judicial effort to remedy a citizen

suit commenced before the statutory notice requirement

has been met. Articles .-III of the Constitution and the

separation of powers doctrine prevent this Court from

reaching a contrary result.

—+

27

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals and the case should be remanded to the district

court for dismissal.

Respectfully submitted,

I. FRANKLIN HUNSAKER*

James G. Driscoit

Tuomas D. ADAmMs

BuULLIVANT, Houser, BaILey,

PenperGRASS & HorrMAN

1400 Pacwest Center

1211 S. W. Fifth Avenue

Portland, n 97204

Telephone: ) 228-6351

Attorneys for Respondent

*Counsel of Record

June 22, 1989

Al

APPENDIX A

Section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

of 1976, 90 Stat. 2825, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 ed., Supp. III)

§ 6972. Citizens suits

(a) In general

(b) Actions prohibited

No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(1)

of this section -

(1) to after the has given

ns a a ce Be

the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and

(C) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard,

regulation, condition, requirement, or order; or

ane ne So Sa

poe ey bw hy or criminal action

in a court of United States or a State to require

condition, A. 4, S cay HE iateon,

That in any such action in a court of the United

States, any person may intervene as a matter of right.

(c) Notice

No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2)

of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has

given notice to the Administrator that he will commence

such action, except that such action may be brought

immediately after such notification in the case of an

action under this section respecting a violation of sub-

chapter III of this chapter. Notice under this subsection

shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall

prescribe by regulation. Any action respecting a violation

under this chapter may be brought under this section

only in the judicial district in which such alleged viola-

tion occurs.

(d) Intervention

In any action under this section the Administrator, if

not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.

(e) Costs

The court, in issuing any final order in any action

brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of

litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert wit-

ness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines

such an award is appropriate. The court may, if a tempor-

ary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought,

require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(f) Other rights preserved

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which

any person (or class of persons) may have under any

statute or common law to seek enforcement of any stan-

dard or requirement relating to the management of solid

waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief

(including relief against the Administrator or a State

agency).

EPA Regulations on Prior Notice of Citizen Suits under

RCRA, 40 C.F.R. § 254

PART 254 - PRIOR NOTICE OF CITIZEN SUITS

AUTHORITY: Sec. 7002, Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2825

(42 U.S.C. 6972).

SOURCE: 42 FR 56114, Oct. 21, 1977, unless otherwise

to perform any act or duty under the Act, which is not

discretionary with the Administrator. These actions are to

be filed in accordance with the rules of the district court

in which the action is instituted. The purpose of this part

is to prescribe procedures governing the notice require-

ments of subsections (b) and (c) of section 7002 as a

prerequisite to the commencement of such actions.

§ 254.2 Service of notice.

(a) Notice of .ntent to file suit under subsection

7002(aX(1) of the Act shall be served upon an alleged

violator of any permit, standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, or order which has become effective under

this Act in the following manner:

(1) If the alleged violator is a private individual or

corporation, service of notice shall be accomplished by

registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or

by personal service upon, the owner or site manager of

the building, plant, installation, or facility alleged to be in

violation. A copy of the notice shall be mailed to the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,

the Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency for the region in which the violation is

alleged to have occurred, and the chief administrative

officer of the solid waste management agency for the

State in which the violation is alleged to have occurred. If

the alleged violator is a corporation, a copy of the notice

shall also be mailed to the registered agent, if any, of that

corporation in the State in which such violation is alleged

to have occurred.

(2) If the alleged violator is a State or local agency,

service of notice shall be accomplished by registered

mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or by per-

sonal service upon, the head of that agency. A copy of the

notice shall be mailed to the chief administrator of the

solid waste management agency for the State in wl .ch

the violetion is alleged to have occurred, the Administra-

tor of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the

Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency for the region in which the violation is alleged to

have occurred.

aE

p ‘ ‘e ? ¥ 7 : “s “

me sem = - - ae - - = ~~ en

(3) If the alleged violator is a Federal agency, ser-

vice of notice shall be accomplished by registered mail,

return receipt requested, addressed to, or by personal

service upon, the head of the agency. A copy of the notice

shall be mailed to the Administrator of the Environmen-

tal Protection Agency, the Regional Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency for the region in which

the violation is alleged to have occurred, the Attorney

General of the United States, and the chief administrative

officer of the solid waste management agency for the

State in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.

(b) Service of notice of intent to file suit under

subsection 7002(a)(2) of the Act shall be accomplished by

registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to, or

by personal service upon, the Administrator, Environ-

mental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460. A

copy of the notice shall be mailed to the Attorney General

of the United States.

(c) Notice given in accordance with the provisions

of this part shall be considered to have been served on

the date of receipt. If service was accomplished by mail,

the date of receipt will be considered to be the date noted

on the return receipt card.

§ 254.3 Contents of notice.

(a) Violation of permit, standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, or order. Notice regarding an alleged violation

of a permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,

or order which has become effective under this Act shall

include sufficient information to permit the recipient to

identify the specific permit, standard, regulation, condi-

tion, requirement, or order which has allegedly been

SR Ree EE ne

violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the

person or persons responsible for the alleged violation,

the date or dates of the violation, and the full name,

address, and telephone number of the person giving

notice.

(b) Failure to act. Notice regarding an alleged failure

of the Administrator to perform an act or duty which is

not discretionary under the Act shall identify the provi-

sions of the Act which require such act or create such

duty, shall describe with reasonable specificity the action

taken or not taken by the Administrator which is claimed

to constitute a failure to perform the act or duty, and shall

state the full name, address, and telephone number of the

person giving the notice.

(c) Identification of counsel. The notice shall state the

name, address, and telephone number of the legal coun-

sel, if any, representing the person giving the notice.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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