Opposition Brief — Ulane v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
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Office-Supreme Court, U
FILED
MAR 14 1985
No. 84-1328 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK
In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OcTOBER TERM, 1984
KAREN FRANCES ULANE,
Petitioner,
\
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Of Counsel: Davin M. Brown
CATHERINE E. TINKER (Counsel of Record)
CONKLIN AND ADLER, LTD. SmitH, GAMBRELL & RuSSELL
100 West Grand Avenue 2400 First Atlanta Tower
Chicago, Illinois 60610 Atlanta, Georgia 30383
(312) 670-0220 (404) 656-1800
March 14, 1985 Attorney ,;or Respondent
a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES AND
SE Fee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .._..
A. Summary...
B. Petitioner’s Professional Background
C. Transsexualism |
D. The F.A.A. Certification Process .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
ES ee ee ree
I. TRANSSEXUALS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO
ATTEMPT TO “CHANGE SEX”, ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY TITLE VII..................
A. Courts Have Narrowly Defined the Term “Sex’”’
B. Legislative History & Subsequent Attempts to
ET cv vk bnb acces ncees ie
C. The EEOC Has Consistently Rejected
Petitioner's Position ......................
Il. PETITIONER CANNOT “BECOME A WOMAN”
FOR TITLE VII PURPOSES—A PRACTICAL
et i wey oie a hwnd + ARE wes 3's
Ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REVERSE
A DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING OF FACT ON
LESS THAN THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
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sos os wee gine 5 ou oe ow esa's
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11
13
15
18
il
LIST OF CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES
AND AFFILIATES
The partially owned subsidiaries and affiliates of Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. are:
Eastern Air Lines, S.A.
Eastern Air Lines Trading Company
EAL Properties, Inc.
Air Line Reporting Corporation
Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
Air Cargo, Inc.
Air Cargo Facilities, Inc.
Air Lines Clearing House, Inc.
Air Line Tarriff Publishers, Inc.
Arizona Fuel Facilities
Atlanta Air Terminal, Inc.
Bradley Facilities, Inc.
CATO Detroit, Michigan
CATO Evanston, Illinois
CATO Washington, D.C.
CATO White Plains, New York
Inter-American Flight Services Company
International Aeradio (Caribbean), Ltd.
Manhattan Air Terminal, Inc.
Portland Fuel Facilities
Societe Int’l de Telcom.
Tinicum Fuel Facilities Corp.
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63
Oy 54-5
Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895
(9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th
EE eee
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975)
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 US.
526 (1979) .......
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F. 2d 1115
ee
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of
Education, 11 EPD $10,686 (D.C.N.J. 1975) aff'd
538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976)
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659
I
Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U. S. 62
ell a
Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F. 2d 685
I ees cones cas
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748
ce cece esas
Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) |
Miscellaneous
EEOC Decision No. 76-75, CCH EEOC Decisions
(1983) { 6495 (1976) .............
EEOC Decision No. 76-67, CCH EEOC Decisions
(1983) 1 6493 (1976) ......
EEOC Decision No. 75-030, CCH EEOC Decisions
(1983) 1 6499 (1975)...
Page
10,
13
13
In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OcToBER TERM, 1984
No. 84-1328
KAREN FRANCES ULANE,
Petitioner,
Vv.
EASTERN AIR Lings, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Respondent Eastern Air Lines, Inc. respectfully requests
this Court to deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari seek-
ing review of the judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner’s statement of the case contains matters of
questionable relevance to the petition. However, for the
purpose of completeness and accuracy, the following addi-
tional statement is provided.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary
Petitioner was and is a biological male. Petitioner was
employed to pilot Eastern’s Boeing 727 aircraft for which
he was responsible for the safe transportation of approxi-
mately 6,000 passengers each month. In mid-1979, Peti-
tioner took a medical leave of absence in preparation for a
surgical procedure to treat his psychiatric disorder classified
2
by the American Psychiatric Association as Trannssexual-
ism. Many if not most practitioners consider such surgery
to be experimental at best. That surgery was performed in
1980. In 1981, Petitioner requested return to flight status.
After learning of Petitioner’s medical background, Eastern
denied that request. Instead, Eastern offered to find Peti-
tioner continued employment with the Company in a
ground position. Alternatively, Petitioner was offered medi-
cal disability retirement which included payments of
$25,200 per year until at least age 60, additional retirement
payments thereafter, medical, life insurance and other ben-
efits. Both offers were refused by Petitioner and termina-
tion from employment followed. Eastern continues to em-
ploy another surgically treated transexual in a ground
position where consideration of air safety do not arise.
At trial, Eastern presented extensive medical evidence
concerning the psychiatric disorder of transsexualism in
general, the effect of such disorder on Petitioner individu-
ally as well as the adverse effect of all of the foregoing on
safety in commercial aviation. These medical and safety is-
sues were rejected by trial court but were presented by
Eastern to the Court of Appeals. At page 4 of the Petition
for Certiorari, Petitioner’s counsel incorrectly states the
following:
“The Court of Appeals decision makes clear that there
are no medical or safety issues in this case. The Court of
Appeals let stand the District Court’s finding that East-
ern’s safety and medical concerns were completely with-
out basis and pretextual.”
In fact, the Court of Appeals did precisely the opposite of
what counsel for Petitioner now contends. Because the
Court of Appeals dealt with specific issues of law, it did not
reach any of the additional medical or safety issues
presented by Eastern. This is made clear at footnote 8 of
the opinion by the Court of Appeals where it states: “East-
ern presented a substantial amount of testimony and evi-
dence at trial to prove that Ulane’s discharge was not due
to discrimination against her either as a trannssexual or as
3
a female, but we need not reach that issue.” (A-4) At foot-
note 13 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals states the fol-
lowing: “Because of our holding in Section A, however, we
need not and do not decide whether Eastern did actually
discriminate against Ulane because of her transsexuality.”
(A-12)
Petitioner’s suggestion that the Court of Appeals rejected
Eastern’s medical and safety concerns as without basis or
that Eastern simply banished this pilot to the ranks of the
unemployed without first attempting to reach a reasonable
accommodation is inaccurate and unnecessary at this level
of appellate advocacy.
B. Petitioner’s Professional Background
During the entire time that Petitioner was flying as a pi-
lot for Eastern, he was required to disclose to the Federal
Aviation Administration on an annual basis a full medical
history including current use of medication as well as all
medical treatment received within the last five years. Dur-
ing the entire time that this pilot was flying for Eastern, he
never disclosed any of the following facts either to the FAA
or to his employer, Eastern, and in fact falsified several re-
ports calling for the disclosure of this information. This
conduct formed an additional basis for Petitioner’s dis-
charge from employment but was also an issue not reached
by the Court of Appeals:
Petitioner first sought psychiatric treatment in the mili-
tary in 1968 and did not disclose that fact to Eastern when
he was employed as a pilot the following year. In 1970, he
unsuccessfully applied for surgical treatment of his psychi-
atric disorder. At that time, psychological testing showed he
was suffering from chronic depression with occasional sui-
cidal thoughts. For approximately the next two years, he
was under constant psychiatric care on a weekly basis. Dur-
ing this period of time, he also began taking the drug re-
ferred to as Estrodiol. He was simply given a large bottle
containing approximately 1,000 of those pills which he took
to counteract his urge to “cross-dress” as a female. After
4
exhausting this supply of drugs, he began treatment with
another doctor in the Chicago area at which time he was
unable to function unless he was either on Estrogens or
wearing female clothes. The average recommended dose of
Estrogens is .625 mgs. per day. When Petitioner began
treatment with tue new doctor, he was prescribed 1.25 mgs.
Several months later, the daily intake was increased to 3.75
mgs., at which time the doctor discussed with Petitioner his
concerns over such a high level of dosage. During this pe-
riod of time, Petitioner was undergoing certain physical
changes as a result of the Estrogens, which included the de-
velopment of large breasts. His doctor recommended a mas-
tectomy so that the Estrogen therapy would not be discov-
ered during Petitioner’s annual FAA physical examinations.
By January, 1978, Petitioner had increased the daily dosage
of Estrogens to 10 mgs. per day and was “feeling so badly”
that the Estrogens were being administered both orally and
by injection. On at least one occasion, Petitioner had to be
rushed for emergency medical treatment as a result of a re-
action to the drug therapy. Throughout this period of time,
Petitioner had seriously contemplated suicide on many
occasions.
Estrogen doses in the amount of 5 mgs. per day or more
increase the risk of heart attack, pulmonary embolism, in-
creased mental depression, stroke, and gradual or sudden
loss of vision. While on such dosages of Estrogens, patients
are to be considered at “clear risk” for any and all of the
foregoing.
Petitioner correctly points out that he never had an “ac-
cident” while flying Eastern aircraft. However, if Petitioner
ever experienced an emergency situation while flying East-
ern aircraft as now contended in the Petition, such was
never reported either to Eastern or the FAA, which would
have been in further violation of federal regulations, com-
pany policy and basic pilot responsibility.
C. Transsexualism
Petitioner’s explanation of the psychiatric disorder of
transsexualism is incomplete. A review of the medical au-
thorities cited in the decision of the Court of Appeals and
as developed at a trial of this action show that the essential
features of the disorder go well beyond a simple sense of
discomfort as Petitioner contends. Frequently, the social
and occupational functioning of the patient are markedly
impaired, depression is common and it can lead to suicide
attempts. Without treatment, the course of the disorder is
chronic and unremiiting. Since surgical treatment is st*"’ in
an experimental stage, the long-term course of th » psychiat-
ric disorder with this treatment is unknown to the medical
profession. The disorder is rare. Both the cause and the
cure for transsexualism is unknown. Surgical treatment is
not designed to cure transsexualism. At most, it is designed
to give the patient some subjective relief. Even after the
surgery, the person still has the psychiatric disorder.
Transsexuals suffer from moderate to 2evere personality
disturbances and, frequently, from considerable anxiety and
depression. Prior to surgery, the transsexual patient is fre-
quently suicidal and may engage in self-mutilation. The
transsexual candidate is highly intelligent, very verbal and
given to much fantasy. Their speech is filled with resentful
comments about medicine and law and in spite of their do-
cility, they take considerable risks. Deep depression is an
“imminent danger” among both pre and _ post-surgical
transsexuals.
The long-term medical study of post-surgical transsexu-
als is difficult because few patients return for follow-up
studies and few such studies have been conducted. The
studies that have been conducted on this subject have iden-
tified varying degrees of a return to pre-existing depressive
state leading up to and including suicide.
Medical science has not advanced to the point where it
can predict wth any degree of reasonable certainty whether
a surgically-treated transsexual will later regret the decision
and suffer psychologically debilitating results in the future.
6
Whether surgery should be used as a treatment of
transsexuals and, if so, which patients are best suited for
the surgery is an unresolved medical question and contin-
ues to be a highly controversial issue, subject to extensive
debate within the medical community’
D. The FAA Certification Process.
After Petitioner ceased flying for Eastern in 1979, his
medical certificate issued by the F.A.A. expired by its own
terms. In June, 1980, Petitioner reapplied for a new certifi-
cate. At that time, the F.A.A. Medical Examiner refused to
issue such a certificate on the basis that Petitioner was un-
fit for flight duties. Several months later, the F.A.A. recon-
sidered that determination and eventually issued Petitioner
a medical certificate valid for approximately 90 days and
subject to repeated psychiatric examinations “with empha-
sis on your emotional adjustment as it relates to your flying
activities.” Whether the certificate would ever be renewed
was subject to the following: “If during the surveillance pe-
riod there have been no adverse findings, a determination
will be made regarding the need for continued surveillance
of your mental health status.”
Prior to this case, neither the F.A.A. nor any commercial
air carrier had ever had experience with pilots with the di-
agnosed psychiatric disorder of transsexualism.*
' Additionally, the ability to distinguish between transvestites
& transsexuals is extremely difficult. On March 1976 Petitioners
Psychiatrist stated “I do not see this m.n as transsexual in any
way. He seems to be a transvestite . . .” He just changed that
diagnosis to Transsexualism in February 1980, just two months
before surgery was performed.
* Arguably, Eastern did have the experience of Pilot Ulane’s
service with the company. That service was hallmarked by a re-
peated failure to disclose obviously serious psychiatric problems
and to place at risk every flight to which he had been assigned.
his failure to disclose past medical problems including falsifica-
tion cf records to cover-up the same makes it virtually impossible
for any air carrier to rely on this individual to disclose any future
7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. Transsexuals Are Not Protected Under Title
VII of the Civili Rights Act of 1964.
This holding by the Court of Appeals was correctly based
on its review of the legislative history leading to the enact-
ment of Title VII, the numerous unsuccessful legislative at-
tempts to expand the narrow definition of “sex’’ as con-
tained in that statute as well as 20 years of judicial
authority including identical holdings by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits.
Petitioner appears to now have conceded the correctness
of this holding but seeks to avoid its affect by arguing that
those transsexuals which can financially afford cosmetic
surgery to treat the symptoms of the disorder can acquire a
new and different sex within the meaning of the statute.
That argument runs contrary to this Court’s repeated ad-
monition that statutes should be interpreted to avoid un-
tenable distinctions and unreasonable results. American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 at 71 (1982).
B. One Cannot “Change Sex” for Purposes of Ti-
tle VII.
The Seventh Circuit, as well as the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, correctly concluded that the term “sex” as used in
Title VII is to be given its plain and traditional meaning of
biological sex, i.e., that immutable characteristic with which
each is endowed at birth. Congress has repeatedly rejected
atterapts to expand the definition of the word “sex” in Title
VII. Therefore, Petitioner’s position is an invitation for this
Court to enter into a legislative function. Petitioner’s ar~u-
ment for the expansion of the scope of Title VII should be
addressed to the Congress where the social, economic and
problems, whether relating to his psychiatric disorder or even a
totally unrelated medical problem. Trustworthiness and reliabil-
ity are attributes of a commercial pilot at least as important as
the ability to mechanically manipulate the controls of an aircraft.
8
even religious aspects of the issue may be more fully de-
bated and considered.
Furthermore, the suggestion that the definition of the
word “sex” in Title VII should be given a more subjective
judicial interpretation which would include the ability to
change biological sex creates a burden on all employers sub-
ject to the act which is both unjust and unworkable as part
of a national labor policy. Such a subjective approach would
logically extend to national origin and even race. If a
change in these traditional notions of immutable character-
istics is to be thrust upon employers, it should be done only
after the use of the legislative process, which to date the
Congress has refused to do.
Finally, a male transsexual retains the male sex for pur-
poses of Title VII and can state a cause of action for dis-
crimination against a male but not against a female. Sex,
for purposes of Title VII, is immutable. To hold otherwise
would be to provide to transsexuals super status under Ti-
tle VII. They could claim coverage as both male and female,
a result not enjoyed by non-transsexuals and certainly not
intended by the Congress.
C. The Court Below Did Not Violate Its Appel-
late Authority.
Even if a biological male could “become a female” for Ti-
tle VII purposes, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that there was no evidence to support a finding of discrimi-
nation on that basis even if such a finding had been made
by the trial court. There is nothing in the Court of Appeals
decision that would even suggest that it reversed a specific
finding of fact on less than a clearly erroneous standard.
Sufficiency of evidence, or lack thereof, is a question of law
properly within the jurisdiction of any appellate court. The
Court of Appeals did not consider the weight of the evi-
dence which was the error committed by the Fifth Circuit
in the Pullman-Standard case.
9
ARGUMENT
I. TRANSSEXUALS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO
ATTEMPT TO “CHANGE SEX,” ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY TITLE VII.
A. Courts Have Narrowly Defined the Term
“Sex”
Petitioner contends that the word “sex” as it appears in
Title VII should be given an expansive interpretation be-
yond the traditional concept of biological sex. Petitioner
urges the Court to accept what some commentators and the
trial court below have characterized as “psychological sex,”
i.e., our sex is determined by how we perceive ourselves as
weli as how we are perceived by others. This Court has not
addressed the meaning of the word “sex” as it appears in
Title VII. However, in the case Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, (4973) this Court observed the
following in a case alleging discrimination against service
women in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment:
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an
immutable characteristic determined solely by the acci-
dent of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon
the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi-
vidual responsibility . . . 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S. Ct. at
1770.
That same traditional interpretation of the word “sex”
has been adopted by every Court that has considered the
meaning of the word wthin the Title VII context. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the uniformly ac-
cepted approach to the proper interpretation of the Con-
gressional intent behind Title VII in Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) as follows:
Save for religion, the discriminations on which the Act
focuses its laser of prohibition are those that are either
10
beyond the victim’s power to alter . . . or that impose a
burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases.
No one can change his place of birth (national origin), the
place of birth of his forebears (national origin), his race
or fundamental sexual characteristics.
This same limited definition of sex as the “immutable
personal characteristic which one acquires at birth” will be
found in the following Title VII cases dealing with issues
other than transsexualisms: Willingham v. Macon Tele-
graph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en
banc); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895
(9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Longo v.
Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2nd Cir. 1976);
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.
1977); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
With these authorities as background, every Court that
has considered the issue has refused to extend Title VII
protection to transsexuals including those who have at-
tempted to voluntarily alter their original “immutable” sex
with which they were endowed at birth. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the issue in Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). In rejecting
the argument which Petitioner now makes to this Court,
the Ninth Circuit observed the following:
Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict
the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning. Therefore, this
court will not expand Title VII’s application in the ab-
sence of Congresssional mandate . . . A transsexual indi-
vidual’s decision to undergo sex change surgery does not
bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within
the scope of Title VII. This Court refuses to extend the
coverage of Title VII to situations that Congress clearly
did not contemplate. 566 F.2d at 663-64.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s
argument for a “psychological sex” approach to Title VII in
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir.
11
1982). In rejecting the claim of a biological male who
claimed employment discrimination based on a _ newly-
acquired female sex, the Eighth Circuit stated the
following:
Although this Circuit has not previously considered the
issue raised on this appeal, we are in agreement with the
district court that for the purposes of Title VII the plain
meaning must be ascribed to the term ‘sex’ in absence of
clear congressional intent to do otherwise. 667 F.2d at
750.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach to this is-
sue is represented in Grossman v. Bernards Township
Board of Education, 11 EPD 110, 686 (D.C.N.J. 1975) affd.
538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976). In that case a biological male
transsexual school teacher had been discharged by the local
school board after undergoing a “sex reassignment opera-
tion.” Plaintiff alleged that the operation had changed his
sex to that of a female for Title VII purposes, and that
“she” had been unlawfully discriminated against because of
her newly acquired female sex. The Third Circuit affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint on the basis
that it failed to state a claim of unlawful job discrimination
based on “sex” under Title VII.
The numerous Federal District Court decisions which
have reached the same result are cited at length in the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision in this case and will not be repeated
here.
B. Legislative History and Subsequent At-
tempts to Amend Title VII.
The legislative history concerning the inclusion of the
word “sex” in Title VII has also been reviewed at length in
the decision of te Court of Appeals in this case. Like all
other Courts before it, the Seventh Circuit has correctly de-
clined the invitation to expand the definition of sex dis-
crimination within the context of Title VII in the absence
of further action from the Congress. The reasoning for de-
12
clining to do so is summarized by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) where the
following was stated:
We find the legislative history inconclusive at best and
draw but one conclusion, and that by way of negative in-
ference. Without more extensive consideration, Congress
in all probability did not intend for its proscription of
sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping
implications. We should not therefore extend the cover-
age of the Act to situations of questionable application
without some stronger Congressional mandate.
Not only has Congress refused to give such a mandate, it
has specifically declined numerous attempts to expand the
definition of sex discrimination beyond its traditional
meaning.
The Seventh Circuit in this case reviewed literally dozens
of attempts to amend Title VII to expand the definition of
“sex discrimination” to cover such concepts as affectional or
sexual orientation. The phrase “sexual orientation,” if it
had successfully been added to Title VII, would at least ar-
guably have been broad enough to cover transsexuals as
well as the “psychological sex” approach which Petitioner
now urges to this Court. Congress has repeatedly and con-
sistently refused to so extend the statutory protection of
Title VII with full knowledge of the judicial approach set
forth above.
Certainly, with this background the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals correctly concluded that to accept Peti-
tioner’s position in this case would go beyond the realm of
statutory interpretation and into the realm of legislating.
C. The E.E.O.C. Has Consistently Rejected Peti-
tioner’s Position.
All of Petitioner’s “sex discrimination” claims were
presented to and rejected by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission as beyond its jurisdiction. Further-
13
more, the E.E.O.C. has also accepted the position that
“when Congress used the word ‘sex’ in Title VII, it was re-
ferring to a person’s gender, an immutable characteristic
with which a person is born.”” EEOC Decision No. 76-75,
CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) 16495 (1976).
Thus the Commission has taken the position that Title
VII does not extend coverage to transsexuals or to those
who allege discrimination for having undergone a “sex
change operation.” EEOC Decision No. 76-67, CCH EKOC
Decisions (1983) 16493 (1976); EEOC Decision No. 75-030,
CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) 16499 (1975).
While the Commission’s interpretation of the application
of Title VII is certainly not binding upon this Court, it is
entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
II. PETITIONER CANNOT “BECOME A WO-
MAN” FOR TITLE VII PURPOSES — A
PRACTICAL APPROACH.
As this Court has recently observed in American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 at 71 (1982), statutes should
be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unrea-
sonable resuits wherever possible. The Court of Appeals de-
cision is consistent with this observation. Petitioner’s con-
tention that a biological male can change sex for purposes
of Title VII is not.
The subjective definition of sex which Petitioner urges to
this Court has no place in a statute which forms an integral
part of this country’s national labor policy. If such policy
should embody the concept that an employee can “change
sex,” how is an employer or indeed the Courts or the Com-
mission expected to know at what point this change of sex
has actually taken place. When does a biological male em-
ployee become a female employee for Title VII purposes?
Certainly it could not be solely at the point that surgical
castration takes place. If such an individual continues to
dress, act, speak and otherwise present himself in a male
role, the employer could never determine, either for its af-
14
firmative action program or otherwise, whether it is dealing
with a male or female.
Similarly, if this Court should judicially determine that
sex actually changes at the time of surgical castration under
the form of a “sex reassignment” operation, does that not
itself create an additional form of economic discrimination?
The surgery which Petitioner refers to is expensive. The
testimony in this record is that the plastic surgeon alone
charges as much as $10,000 in addition to the charges by
the hospital and psychiatrists. Certainly it would be inequi-
table to define sex on the basis of the economic ability to
pay.
The illogical extension of Petitioner’s position does not
end here. If one can change sex, either through cosmetic
surgery or otherwise, then the same can also be said of na-
tional origin and indeed even race. These otherwise immu-
table characteristics can certainly be changed through cos-
metic surgery, chemistry, dress, appearance and lifestyle to
the same extent as can sex. If Petitioner can “become a wo-
man” for Title VII purposes, an individual could also use
the same techniques to become an American Indian, a
Mexican-American, an Oriental and presumably even a
Black American. Such ability to change would be limited
only by the ability of medical science to affect these
changes through cosmetic surgery or otherwise.
Finally, after two decades, it is clear that Title VII pro-
tection for women and minorities was and is premised on a
basic concept of fairness. Since sex, race and national origin
are involuntarily acquired solely by reason of birth, such
qualities should have no adverse impact on employment.
Once the involuntary nature of these qualities is removed,
there would no longer be reason for statutory protection.
The decision to allow employees to choose a particular sex,
race or national origin is more properly within the legisla-
tive realm where all social, economic, medical and even reli-
gious aspects can be more fully debated and considered.
It is respectfully submitted that Petitioner’s position is
untenable and that the Circuit Court correctly concluded
15
that if the term “sex” as it is used in Title VII is to mean
more than biological male or biological female, that new
definition must come from the Congress.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RE-
VERSE A DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING
OF FACT ON LESS THAN THE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS STANDARD.
The Circuit Court concluded that even if a biological
male could “become a iemale,” there was no evidence to
support a finding of such discrimination in this case. Since
Title VII does not cover such a change of sex, Petitioner’s
challenge to that aspect of the Court’s decision is moot.
However, it will be responded to briefly.
This Court’s decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273 (1982), to which Petitioner refers was obviously di-
rected at a practice that had developed in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in distinguishing between “subsidiary
facts” which could be reversed only if clearly erroneous and
“ultimate facts” which the Fifth Circuit had come to con-
clude could be reversed on appeal even if they were pure
issues of fact which were not clearly erroneous. Nowhere in
the decision of the court below is there the slightest sugges-
tion that the “subsidiary fact” vs. the “ultimate fact” di-
chotomy addressed in Pullman-Standard was utilized in
any respect whatsoever in reversing Plaintiff’s claim of dis-
crimination against a female. Most important, there is not
the slightest suggestion that the Court below reversed any
finding of fact by the trial court on anything other than a
clearly erroneous standard.
What the court below did do is to identify the failure of
the trial court to make specific findings of fact capable of
supporting a finding of discrimination against a female as
opposed to discrimination against a transsexual. After iden-
tifying that void in the trial court’s findings, the appellate
court reviewed the entire record before it and concluded
that “it is clear from the evidence that if Eastern did dis-
criminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female,
16
but because Ulane is a transsexual.” To have remanded the
case to the lower court for entry of findings of fact for
which there was no evidence in the record and then to sub-
sequently review such findings on appeal and reverse them
as clearly erroneous would have been the ultimate useless
act. The procedure followed by the appellate court below is
that which has historically been followed and repeatedly
sanctioned by every federal appellate court in the system. It
is elementary that where a record before the appellate court
is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, remand
is totally inappropriate. In such cases, “effective judicial ad-
ministration” requires that the Court of Appeals draw the
inescapable factual conclusion itself rather than remand the
case to the district court for further needless proceedings.
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526
(1979); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826-827 (1975);
Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 62 at 170
(1967).
Ironically, the manner in which the Seventh Circuit
treated Petitioner’s contention that she was discriminated
against because she was a female was the same treatment
which the trial judge originally adopted at the conclusion of
his oral findings delivered on December 28, 1983 and which
appeared at C-34 of Petitioner’s Appendix. At the conclu-
sion of the trial court’s orally-delivered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, he had concluded that Petitioner was
discriminated against as a transsexual. At no time during
those findings did the trial court ever conclude that Peti-
tioner was either a female or had been discriminated
against on that basis. He specifically concluded his findings
with the following observation:
I’m going to enter judgment for the plaintiff and the
question is on what counts and against what defendants.
Count I alleges that plaintiff was discharged because she
is a woman. Court II alleges she was discharged because
she is a transsexual.
I feel more confortable with Count II. J believe that these
are truly alternative theories and that it cannot be both
17
ways. It has got to be one or the other. The evidence
much more clearly establishes in my opinion that
transsexuals are entitled to protection under the Act than
it does that an operated transsexual is now a woman.
(Emphasis supplied).
This reasoning used by the trial judge is essentially the
reasoning applied by the court of appeals on Petitioner’s
claim of discrimination against “a female.” Even if Peti-
tioner could legally “become a woman” for Title VII pur-
poses (an issue of law which has been addressed above),
such a claim could not be supported by the evidence in view
of the conclusion that discrimination was based on the sta-
tus of a transsexual rather than a female.
The only relevant procedural event that occurred after
the Court’s findings in December, 1983, was that in March,
1984, the court entered supplemental findings at the invita-
tion of Petitioner. Obviously no new evidence was taken as
the record was closed in December. Of significance is the
fact that those “supplemental findings” were limited to the
conclusion that “all of the evidence which supports the view
that plaintiff is a transsexual will also support the findings
that she is a female.” However, the trial judge made no
specific findings that Ulane had actually been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of being female. This lack of
necessary findings on that issue was identified by the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner does not argue with that portion of
the Court’s opinion. What Petitioner does argue with is the
fact that the Court of Appeals reviewed the entire record
and concluded that even if such a finding of discrimination
against a female had been made, there was no evidence to
support it. In the words of the Court: “It is clear from the
evidence that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it
was not because she was female... .”
Respectfully, if a fact is “clear from the evidence,” then a
contrary fact would be “clearly erroneous.” Petitioner is
merely engaging in semantics in support of this aspect of
the Petition and the argument is without substance.
18
CONCLUSION
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Of Counsel: Davip M. Brown
CATHERINE E. TINKER (Counsel of Record)
CONKLIN AND ADLER, LTD. SmitH, GAMBRELL & RusseLi
100 West Grand Avenue 2400 First Atianta Tower
Chicago, Illinois 60610 Atlanta, Georgia 30383
(312) 670-0220 (404) 656-1800
March 14, 1985 Attorney for Respondent
ee,
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.