Opposition Brief — Ulane v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

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Office-Supreme Court, U

FILED

MAR 14 1985

No. 84-1328 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

CLERK

In THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OcTOBER TERM, 1984

KAREN FRANCES ULANE,

Petitioner,

\

EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Of Counsel: Davin M. Brown

CATHERINE E. TINKER (Counsel of Record)

CONKLIN AND ADLER, LTD. SmitH, GAMBRELL & RuSSELL

100 West Grand Avenue 2400 First Atlanta Tower

Chicago, Illinois 60610 Atlanta, Georgia 30383

(312) 670-0220 (404) 656-1800

March 14, 1985 Attorney ,;or Respondent

a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES AND

SE Fee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .._..

A. Summary...

B. Petitioner’s Professional Background

C. Transsexualism |

D. The F.A.A. Certification Process .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

ES ee ee ree

I. TRANSSEXUALS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO

ATTEMPT TO “CHANGE SEX”, ARE NOT

PROTECTED BY TITLE VII..................

A. Courts Have Narrowly Defined the Term “Sex’”’

B. Legislative History & Subsequent Attempts to

ET cv vk bnb acces ncees ie

C. The EEOC Has Consistently Rejected

Petitioner's Position ......................

Il. PETITIONER CANNOT “BECOME A WOMAN”

FOR TITLE VII PURPOSES—A PRACTICAL

et i wey oie a hwnd + ARE wes 3's

Ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REVERSE

A DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING OF FACT ON

LESS THAN THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

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sos os wee gine 5 ou oe ow esa's

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11

13

15

18

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LIST OF CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES

AND AFFILIATES

The partially owned subsidiaries and affiliates of Eastern Air

Lines, Inc. are:

Eastern Air Lines, S.A.

Eastern Air Lines Trading Company

EAL Properties, Inc.

Air Line Reporting Corporation

Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Air Cargo, Inc.

Air Cargo Facilities, Inc.

Air Lines Clearing House, Inc.

Air Line Tarriff Publishers, Inc.

Arizona Fuel Facilities

Atlanta Air Terminal, Inc.

Bradley Facilities, Inc.

CATO Detroit, Michigan

CATO Evanston, Illinois

CATO Washington, D.C.

CATO White Plains, New York

Inter-American Flight Services Company

International Aeradio (Caribbean), Ltd.

Manhattan Air Terminal, Inc.

Portland Fuel Facilities

Societe Int’l de Telcom.

Tinicum Fuel Facilities Corp.

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63

Oy 54-5

Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895

(9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).

Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th

EE eee

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975)

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 US.

526 (1979) .......

Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F. 2d 1115

ee

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)

Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of

Education, 11 EPD $10,686 (D.C.N.J. 1975) aff'd

538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976)

Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659

I

Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U. S. 62

ell a

Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F. 2d 685

I ees cones cas

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)

Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748

ce cece esas

Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,

507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) |

Miscellaneous

EEOC Decision No. 76-75, CCH EEOC Decisions

(1983) { 6495 (1976) .............

EEOC Decision No. 76-67, CCH EEOC Decisions

(1983) 1 6493 (1976) ......

EEOC Decision No. 75-030, CCH EEOC Decisions

(1983) 1 6499 (1975)...

Page

10,

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13

In THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OcToBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-1328

KAREN FRANCES ULANE,

Petitioner,

Vv.

EASTERN AIR Lings, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Eastern Air Lines, Inc. respectfully requests

this Court to deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari seek-

ing review of the judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals.

Petitioner’s statement of the case contains matters of

questionable relevance to the petition. However, for the

purpose of completeness and accuracy, the following addi-

tional statement is provided.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary

Petitioner was and is a biological male. Petitioner was

employed to pilot Eastern’s Boeing 727 aircraft for which

he was responsible for the safe transportation of approxi-

mately 6,000 passengers each month. In mid-1979, Peti-

tioner took a medical leave of absence in preparation for a

surgical procedure to treat his psychiatric disorder classified

2

by the American Psychiatric Association as Trannssexual-

ism. Many if not most practitioners consider such surgery

to be experimental at best. That surgery was performed in

1980. In 1981, Petitioner requested return to flight status.

After learning of Petitioner’s medical background, Eastern

denied that request. Instead, Eastern offered to find Peti-

tioner continued employment with the Company in a

ground position. Alternatively, Petitioner was offered medi-

cal disability retirement which included payments of

$25,200 per year until at least age 60, additional retirement

payments thereafter, medical, life insurance and other ben-

efits. Both offers were refused by Petitioner and termina-

tion from employment followed. Eastern continues to em-

ploy another surgically treated transexual in a ground

position where consideration of air safety do not arise.

At trial, Eastern presented extensive medical evidence

concerning the psychiatric disorder of transsexualism in

general, the effect of such disorder on Petitioner individu-

ally as well as the adverse effect of all of the foregoing on

safety in commercial aviation. These medical and safety is-

sues were rejected by trial court but were presented by

Eastern to the Court of Appeals. At page 4 of the Petition

for Certiorari, Petitioner’s counsel incorrectly states the

following:

“The Court of Appeals decision makes clear that there

are no medical or safety issues in this case. The Court of

Appeals let stand the District Court’s finding that East-

ern’s safety and medical concerns were completely with-

out basis and pretextual.”

In fact, the Court of Appeals did precisely the opposite of

what counsel for Petitioner now contends. Because the

Court of Appeals dealt with specific issues of law, it did not

reach any of the additional medical or safety issues

presented by Eastern. This is made clear at footnote 8 of

the opinion by the Court of Appeals where it states: “East-

ern presented a substantial amount of testimony and evi-

dence at trial to prove that Ulane’s discharge was not due

to discrimination against her either as a trannssexual or as

3

a female, but we need not reach that issue.” (A-4) At foot-

note 13 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals states the fol-

lowing: “Because of our holding in Section A, however, we

need not and do not decide whether Eastern did actually

discriminate against Ulane because of her transsexuality.”

(A-12)

Petitioner’s suggestion that the Court of Appeals rejected

Eastern’s medical and safety concerns as without basis or

that Eastern simply banished this pilot to the ranks of the

unemployed without first attempting to reach a reasonable

accommodation is inaccurate and unnecessary at this level

of appellate advocacy.

B. Petitioner’s Professional Background

During the entire time that Petitioner was flying as a pi-

lot for Eastern, he was required to disclose to the Federal

Aviation Administration on an annual basis a full medical

history including current use of medication as well as all

medical treatment received within the last five years. Dur-

ing the entire time that this pilot was flying for Eastern, he

never disclosed any of the following facts either to the FAA

or to his employer, Eastern, and in fact falsified several re-

ports calling for the disclosure of this information. This

conduct formed an additional basis for Petitioner’s dis-

charge from employment but was also an issue not reached

by the Court of Appeals:

Petitioner first sought psychiatric treatment in the mili-

tary in 1968 and did not disclose that fact to Eastern when

he was employed as a pilot the following year. In 1970, he

unsuccessfully applied for surgical treatment of his psychi-

atric disorder. At that time, psychological testing showed he

was suffering from chronic depression with occasional sui-

cidal thoughts. For approximately the next two years, he

was under constant psychiatric care on a weekly basis. Dur-

ing this period of time, he also began taking the drug re-

ferred to as Estrodiol. He was simply given a large bottle

containing approximately 1,000 of those pills which he took

to counteract his urge to “cross-dress” as a female. After

4

exhausting this supply of drugs, he began treatment with

another doctor in the Chicago area at which time he was

unable to function unless he was either on Estrogens or

wearing female clothes. The average recommended dose of

Estrogens is .625 mgs. per day. When Petitioner began

treatment with tue new doctor, he was prescribed 1.25 mgs.

Several months later, the daily intake was increased to 3.75

mgs., at which time the doctor discussed with Petitioner his

concerns over such a high level of dosage. During this pe-

riod of time, Petitioner was undergoing certain physical

changes as a result of the Estrogens, which included the de-

velopment of large breasts. His doctor recommended a mas-

tectomy so that the Estrogen therapy would not be discov-

ered during Petitioner’s annual FAA physical examinations.

By January, 1978, Petitioner had increased the daily dosage

of Estrogens to 10 mgs. per day and was “feeling so badly”

that the Estrogens were being administered both orally and

by injection. On at least one occasion, Petitioner had to be

rushed for emergency medical treatment as a result of a re-

action to the drug therapy. Throughout this period of time,

Petitioner had seriously contemplated suicide on many

occasions.

Estrogen doses in the amount of 5 mgs. per day or more

increase the risk of heart attack, pulmonary embolism, in-

creased mental depression, stroke, and gradual or sudden

loss of vision. While on such dosages of Estrogens, patients

are to be considered at “clear risk” for any and all of the

foregoing.

Petitioner correctly points out that he never had an “ac-

cident” while flying Eastern aircraft. However, if Petitioner

ever experienced an emergency situation while flying East-

ern aircraft as now contended in the Petition, such was

never reported either to Eastern or the FAA, which would

have been in further violation of federal regulations, com-

pany policy and basic pilot responsibility.

C. Transsexualism

Petitioner’s explanation of the psychiatric disorder of

transsexualism is incomplete. A review of the medical au-

thorities cited in the decision of the Court of Appeals and

as developed at a trial of this action show that the essential

features of the disorder go well beyond a simple sense of

discomfort as Petitioner contends. Frequently, the social

and occupational functioning of the patient are markedly

impaired, depression is common and it can lead to suicide

attempts. Without treatment, the course of the disorder is

chronic and unremiiting. Since surgical treatment is st*"’ in

an experimental stage, the long-term course of th » psychiat-

ric disorder with this treatment is unknown to the medical

profession. The disorder is rare. Both the cause and the

cure for transsexualism is unknown. Surgical treatment is

not designed to cure transsexualism. At most, it is designed

to give the patient some subjective relief. Even after the

surgery, the person still has the psychiatric disorder.

Transsexuals suffer from moderate to 2evere personality

disturbances and, frequently, from considerable anxiety and

depression. Prior to surgery, the transsexual patient is fre-

quently suicidal and may engage in self-mutilation. The

transsexual candidate is highly intelligent, very verbal and

given to much fantasy. Their speech is filled with resentful

comments about medicine and law and in spite of their do-

cility, they take considerable risks. Deep depression is an

“imminent danger” among both pre and _ post-surgical

transsexuals.

The long-term medical study of post-surgical transsexu-

als is difficult because few patients return for follow-up

studies and few such studies have been conducted. The

studies that have been conducted on this subject have iden-

tified varying degrees of a return to pre-existing depressive

state leading up to and including suicide.

Medical science has not advanced to the point where it

can predict wth any degree of reasonable certainty whether

a surgically-treated transsexual will later regret the decision

and suffer psychologically debilitating results in the future.

6

Whether surgery should be used as a treatment of

transsexuals and, if so, which patients are best suited for

the surgery is an unresolved medical question and contin-

ues to be a highly controversial issue, subject to extensive

debate within the medical community’

D. The FAA Certification Process.

After Petitioner ceased flying for Eastern in 1979, his

medical certificate issued by the F.A.A. expired by its own

terms. In June, 1980, Petitioner reapplied for a new certifi-

cate. At that time, the F.A.A. Medical Examiner refused to

issue such a certificate on the basis that Petitioner was un-

fit for flight duties. Several months later, the F.A.A. recon-

sidered that determination and eventually issued Petitioner

a medical certificate valid for approximately 90 days and

subject to repeated psychiatric examinations “with empha-

sis on your emotional adjustment as it relates to your flying

activities.” Whether the certificate would ever be renewed

was subject to the following: “If during the surveillance pe-

riod there have been no adverse findings, a determination

will be made regarding the need for continued surveillance

of your mental health status.”

Prior to this case, neither the F.A.A. nor any commercial

air carrier had ever had experience with pilots with the di-

agnosed psychiatric disorder of transsexualism.*

' Additionally, the ability to distinguish between transvestites

& transsexuals is extremely difficult. On March 1976 Petitioners

Psychiatrist stated “I do not see this m.n as transsexual in any

way. He seems to be a transvestite . . .” He just changed that

diagnosis to Transsexualism in February 1980, just two months

before surgery was performed.

* Arguably, Eastern did have the experience of Pilot Ulane’s

service with the company. That service was hallmarked by a re-

peated failure to disclose obviously serious psychiatric problems

and to place at risk every flight to which he had been assigned.

his failure to disclose past medical problems including falsifica-

tion cf records to cover-up the same makes it virtually impossible

for any air carrier to rely on this individual to disclose any future

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Transsexuals Are Not Protected Under Title

VII of the Civili Rights Act of 1964.

This holding by the Court of Appeals was correctly based

on its review of the legislative history leading to the enact-

ment of Title VII, the numerous unsuccessful legislative at-

tempts to expand the narrow definition of “sex’’ as con-

tained in that statute as well as 20 years of judicial

authority including identical holdings by the Eighth and

Ninth Circuits.

Petitioner appears to now have conceded the correctness

of this holding but seeks to avoid its affect by arguing that

those transsexuals which can financially afford cosmetic

surgery to treat the symptoms of the disorder can acquire a

new and different sex within the meaning of the statute.

That argument runs contrary to this Court’s repeated ad-

monition that statutes should be interpreted to avoid un-

tenable distinctions and unreasonable results. American

Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 at 71 (1982).

B. One Cannot “Change Sex” for Purposes of Ti-

tle VII.

The Seventh Circuit, as well as the Eighth and Ninth

Circuits, correctly concluded that the term “sex” as used in

Title VII is to be given its plain and traditional meaning of

biological sex, i.e., that immutable characteristic with which

each is endowed at birth. Congress has repeatedly rejected

atterapts to expand the definition of the word “sex” in Title

VII. Therefore, Petitioner’s position is an invitation for this

Court to enter into a legislative function. Petitioner’s ar~u-

ment for the expansion of the scope of Title VII should be

addressed to the Congress where the social, economic and

problems, whether relating to his psychiatric disorder or even a

totally unrelated medical problem. Trustworthiness and reliabil-

ity are attributes of a commercial pilot at least as important as

the ability to mechanically manipulate the controls of an aircraft.

8

even religious aspects of the issue may be more fully de-

bated and considered.

Furthermore, the suggestion that the definition of the

word “sex” in Title VII should be given a more subjective

judicial interpretation which would include the ability to

change biological sex creates a burden on all employers sub-

ject to the act which is both unjust and unworkable as part

of a national labor policy. Such a subjective approach would

logically extend to national origin and even race. If a

change in these traditional notions of immutable character-

istics is to be thrust upon employers, it should be done only

after the use of the legislative process, which to date the

Congress has refused to do.

Finally, a male transsexual retains the male sex for pur-

poses of Title VII and can state a cause of action for dis-

crimination against a male but not against a female. Sex,

for purposes of Title VII, is immutable. To hold otherwise

would be to provide to transsexuals super status under Ti-

tle VII. They could claim coverage as both male and female,

a result not enjoyed by non-transsexuals and certainly not

intended by the Congress.

C. The Court Below Did Not Violate Its Appel-

late Authority.

Even if a biological male could “become a female” for Ti-

tle VII purposes, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded

that there was no evidence to support a finding of discrimi-

nation on that basis even if such a finding had been made

by the trial court. There is nothing in the Court of Appeals

decision that would even suggest that it reversed a specific

finding of fact on less than a clearly erroneous standard.

Sufficiency of evidence, or lack thereof, is a question of law

properly within the jurisdiction of any appellate court. The

Court of Appeals did not consider the weight of the evi-

dence which was the error committed by the Fifth Circuit

in the Pullman-Standard case.

9

ARGUMENT

I. TRANSSEXUALS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO

ATTEMPT TO “CHANGE SEX,” ARE NOT

PROTECTED BY TITLE VII.

A. Courts Have Narrowly Defined the Term

“Sex”

Petitioner contends that the word “sex” as it appears in

Title VII should be given an expansive interpretation be-

yond the traditional concept of biological sex. Petitioner

urges the Court to accept what some commentators and the

trial court below have characterized as “psychological sex,”

i.e., our sex is determined by how we perceive ourselves as

weli as how we are perceived by others. This Court has not

addressed the meaning of the word “sex” as it appears in

Title VII. However, in the case Frontiero v. Richardson,

411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, (4973) this Court observed the

following in a case alleging discrimination against service

women in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment:

Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an

immutable characteristic determined solely by the acci-

dent of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon

the members of a particular sex because of their sex

would seem to violate the basic concept of our system

that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi-

vidual responsibility . . . 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S. Ct. at

1770.

That same traditional interpretation of the word “sex”

has been adopted by every Court that has considered the

meaning of the word wthin the Title VII context. The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the uniformly ac-

cepted approach to the proper interpretation of the Con-

gressional intent behind Title VII in Garcia v. Gloor, 618

F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) as follows:

Save for religion, the discriminations on which the Act

focuses its laser of prohibition are those that are either

10

beyond the victim’s power to alter . . . or that impose a

burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases.

No one can change his place of birth (national origin), the

place of birth of his forebears (national origin), his race

or fundamental sexual characteristics.

This same limited definition of sex as the “immutable

personal characteristic which one acquires at birth” will be

found in the following Title VII cases dealing with issues

other than transsexualisms: Willingham v. Macon Tele-

graph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en

banc); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895

(9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Longo v.

Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2nd Cir. 1976);

Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.

1977); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115

(D.C. Cir. 1973).

With these authorities as background, every Court that

has considered the issue has refused to extend Title VII

protection to transsexuals including those who have at-

tempted to voluntarily alter their original “immutable” sex

with which they were endowed at birth. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals addressed the issue in Holloway v. Arthur

Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). In rejecting

the argument which Petitioner now makes to this Court,

the Ninth Circuit observed the following:

Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict

the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning. Therefore, this

court will not expand Title VII’s application in the ab-

sence of Congresssional mandate . . . A transsexual indi-

vidual’s decision to undergo sex change surgery does not

bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within

the scope of Title VII. This Court refuses to extend the

coverage of Title VII to situations that Congress clearly

did not contemplate. 566 F.2d at 663-64.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s

argument for a “psychological sex” approach to Title VII in

Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir.

11

1982). In rejecting the claim of a biological male who

claimed employment discrimination based on a _ newly-

acquired female sex, the Eighth Circuit stated the

following:

Although this Circuit has not previously considered the

issue raised on this appeal, we are in agreement with the

district court that for the purposes of Title VII the plain

meaning must be ascribed to the term ‘sex’ in absence of

clear congressional intent to do otherwise. 667 F.2d at

750.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach to this is-

sue is represented in Grossman v. Bernards Township

Board of Education, 11 EPD 110, 686 (D.C.N.J. 1975) affd.

538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976). In that case a biological male

transsexual school teacher had been discharged by the local

school board after undergoing a “sex reassignment opera-

tion.” Plaintiff alleged that the operation had changed his

sex to that of a female for Title VII purposes, and that

“she” had been unlawfully discriminated against because of

her newly acquired female sex. The Third Circuit affirmed

the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint on the basis

that it failed to state a claim of unlawful job discrimination

based on “sex” under Title VII.

The numerous Federal District Court decisions which

have reached the same result are cited at length in the Sev-

enth Circuit’s decision in this case and will not be repeated

here.

B. Legislative History and Subsequent At-

tempts to Amend Title VII.

The legislative history concerning the inclusion of the

word “sex” in Title VII has also been reviewed at length in

the decision of te Court of Appeals in this case. Like all

other Courts before it, the Seventh Circuit has correctly de-

clined the invitation to expand the definition of sex dis-

crimination within the context of Title VII in the absence

of further action from the Congress. The reasoning for de-

12

clining to do so is summarized by the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing

Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) where the

following was stated:

We find the legislative history inconclusive at best and

draw but one conclusion, and that by way of negative in-

ference. Without more extensive consideration, Congress

in all probability did not intend for its proscription of

sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping

implications. We should not therefore extend the cover-

age of the Act to situations of questionable application

without some stronger Congressional mandate.

Not only has Congress refused to give such a mandate, it

has specifically declined numerous attempts to expand the

definition of sex discrimination beyond its traditional

meaning.

The Seventh Circuit in this case reviewed literally dozens

of attempts to amend Title VII to expand the definition of

“sex discrimination” to cover such concepts as affectional or

sexual orientation. The phrase “sexual orientation,” if it

had successfully been added to Title VII, would at least ar-

guably have been broad enough to cover transsexuals as

well as the “psychological sex” approach which Petitioner

now urges to this Court. Congress has repeatedly and con-

sistently refused to so extend the statutory protection of

Title VII with full knowledge of the judicial approach set

forth above.

Certainly, with this background the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals correctly concluded that to accept Peti-

tioner’s position in this case would go beyond the realm of

statutory interpretation and into the realm of legislating.

C. The E.E.O.C. Has Consistently Rejected Peti-

tioner’s Position.

All of Petitioner’s “sex discrimination” claims were

presented to and rejected by the Equal Employment Op-

portunity Commission as beyond its jurisdiction. Further-

13

more, the E.E.O.C. has also accepted the position that

“when Congress used the word ‘sex’ in Title VII, it was re-

ferring to a person’s gender, an immutable characteristic

with which a person is born.”” EEOC Decision No. 76-75,

CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) 16495 (1976).

Thus the Commission has taken the position that Title

VII does not extend coverage to transsexuals or to those

who allege discrimination for having undergone a “sex

change operation.” EEOC Decision No. 76-67, CCH EKOC

Decisions (1983) 16493 (1976); EEOC Decision No. 75-030,

CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) 16499 (1975).

While the Commission’s interpretation of the application

of Title VII is certainly not binding upon this Court, it is

entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).

II. PETITIONER CANNOT “BECOME A WO-

MAN” FOR TITLE VII PURPOSES — A

PRACTICAL APPROACH.

As this Court has recently observed in American Tobacco

Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 at 71 (1982), statutes should

be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unrea-

sonable resuits wherever possible. The Court of Appeals de-

cision is consistent with this observation. Petitioner’s con-

tention that a biological male can change sex for purposes

of Title VII is not.

The subjective definition of sex which Petitioner urges to

this Court has no place in a statute which forms an integral

part of this country’s national labor policy. If such policy

should embody the concept that an employee can “change

sex,” how is an employer or indeed the Courts or the Com-

mission expected to know at what point this change of sex

has actually taken place. When does a biological male em-

ployee become a female employee for Title VII purposes?

Certainly it could not be solely at the point that surgical

castration takes place. If such an individual continues to

dress, act, speak and otherwise present himself in a male

role, the employer could never determine, either for its af-

14

firmative action program or otherwise, whether it is dealing

with a male or female.

Similarly, if this Court should judicially determine that

sex actually changes at the time of surgical castration under

the form of a “sex reassignment” operation, does that not

itself create an additional form of economic discrimination?

The surgery which Petitioner refers to is expensive. The

testimony in this record is that the plastic surgeon alone

charges as much as $10,000 in addition to the charges by

the hospital and psychiatrists. Certainly it would be inequi-

table to define sex on the basis of the economic ability to

pay.

The illogical extension of Petitioner’s position does not

end here. If one can change sex, either through cosmetic

surgery or otherwise, then the same can also be said of na-

tional origin and indeed even race. These otherwise immu-

table characteristics can certainly be changed through cos-

metic surgery, chemistry, dress, appearance and lifestyle to

the same extent as can sex. If Petitioner can “become a wo-

man” for Title VII purposes, an individual could also use

the same techniques to become an American Indian, a

Mexican-American, an Oriental and presumably even a

Black American. Such ability to change would be limited

only by the ability of medical science to affect these

changes through cosmetic surgery or otherwise.

Finally, after two decades, it is clear that Title VII pro-

tection for women and minorities was and is premised on a

basic concept of fairness. Since sex, race and national origin

are involuntarily acquired solely by reason of birth, such

qualities should have no adverse impact on employment.

Once the involuntary nature of these qualities is removed,

there would no longer be reason for statutory protection.

The decision to allow employees to choose a particular sex,

race or national origin is more properly within the legisla-

tive realm where all social, economic, medical and even reli-

gious aspects can be more fully debated and considered.

It is respectfully submitted that Petitioner’s position is

untenable and that the Circuit Court correctly concluded

15

that if the term “sex” as it is used in Title VII is to mean

more than biological male or biological female, that new

definition must come from the Congress.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RE-

VERSE A DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING

OF FACT ON LESS THAN THE CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS STANDARD.

The Circuit Court concluded that even if a biological

male could “become a iemale,” there was no evidence to

support a finding of such discrimination in this case. Since

Title VII does not cover such a change of sex, Petitioner’s

challenge to that aspect of the Court’s decision is moot.

However, it will be responded to briefly.

This Court’s decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456

U.S. 273 (1982), to which Petitioner refers was obviously di-

rected at a practice that had developed in the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals in distinguishing between “subsidiary

facts” which could be reversed only if clearly erroneous and

“ultimate facts” which the Fifth Circuit had come to con-

clude could be reversed on appeal even if they were pure

issues of fact which were not clearly erroneous. Nowhere in

the decision of the court below is there the slightest sugges-

tion that the “subsidiary fact” vs. the “ultimate fact” di-

chotomy addressed in Pullman-Standard was utilized in

any respect whatsoever in reversing Plaintiff’s claim of dis-

crimination against a female. Most important, there is not

the slightest suggestion that the Court below reversed any

finding of fact by the trial court on anything other than a

clearly erroneous standard.

What the court below did do is to identify the failure of

the trial court to make specific findings of fact capable of

supporting a finding of discrimination against a female as

opposed to discrimination against a transsexual. After iden-

tifying that void in the trial court’s findings, the appellate

court reviewed the entire record before it and concluded

that “it is clear from the evidence that if Eastern did dis-

criminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female,

16

but because Ulane is a transsexual.” To have remanded the

case to the lower court for entry of findings of fact for

which there was no evidence in the record and then to sub-

sequently review such findings on appeal and reverse them

as clearly erroneous would have been the ultimate useless

act. The procedure followed by the appellate court below is

that which has historically been followed and repeatedly

sanctioned by every federal appellate court in the system. It

is elementary that where a record before the appellate court

is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, remand

is totally inappropriate. In such cases, “effective judicial ad-

ministration” requires that the Court of Appeals draw the

inescapable factual conclusion itself rather than remand the

case to the district court for further needless proceedings.

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526

(1979); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826-827 (1975);

Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 62 at 170

(1967).

Ironically, the manner in which the Seventh Circuit

treated Petitioner’s contention that she was discriminated

against because she was a female was the same treatment

which the trial judge originally adopted at the conclusion of

his oral findings delivered on December 28, 1983 and which

appeared at C-34 of Petitioner’s Appendix. At the conclu-

sion of the trial court’s orally-delivered findings of fact and

conclusions of law, he had concluded that Petitioner was

discriminated against as a transsexual. At no time during

those findings did the trial court ever conclude that Peti-

tioner was either a female or had been discriminated

against on that basis. He specifically concluded his findings

with the following observation:

I’m going to enter judgment for the plaintiff and the

question is on what counts and against what defendants.

Count I alleges that plaintiff was discharged because she

is a woman. Court II alleges she was discharged because

she is a transsexual.

I feel more confortable with Count II. J believe that these

are truly alternative theories and that it cannot be both

17

ways. It has got to be one or the other. The evidence

much more clearly establishes in my opinion that

transsexuals are entitled to protection under the Act than

it does that an operated transsexual is now a woman.

(Emphasis supplied).

This reasoning used by the trial judge is essentially the

reasoning applied by the court of appeals on Petitioner’s

claim of discrimination against “a female.” Even if Peti-

tioner could legally “become a woman” for Title VII pur-

poses (an issue of law which has been addressed above),

such a claim could not be supported by the evidence in view

of the conclusion that discrimination was based on the sta-

tus of a transsexual rather than a female.

The only relevant procedural event that occurred after

the Court’s findings in December, 1983, was that in March,

1984, the court entered supplemental findings at the invita-

tion of Petitioner. Obviously no new evidence was taken as

the record was closed in December. Of significance is the

fact that those “supplemental findings” were limited to the

conclusion that “all of the evidence which supports the view

that plaintiff is a transsexual will also support the findings

that she is a female.” However, the trial judge made no

specific findings that Ulane had actually been discrimi-

nated against on the basis of being female. This lack of

necessary findings on that issue was identified by the Court

of Appeals. Petitioner does not argue with that portion of

the Court’s opinion. What Petitioner does argue with is the

fact that the Court of Appeals reviewed the entire record

and concluded that even if such a finding of discrimination

against a female had been made, there was no evidence to

support it. In the words of the Court: “It is clear from the

evidence that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it

was not because she was female... .”

Respectfully, if a fact is “clear from the evidence,” then a

contrary fact would be “clearly erroneous.” Petitioner is

merely engaging in semantics in support of this aspect of

the Petition and the argument is without substance.

18

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Of Counsel: Davip M. Brown

CATHERINE E. TINKER (Counsel of Record)

CONKLIN AND ADLER, LTD. SmitH, GAMBRELL & RusseLi

100 West Grand Avenue 2400 First Atianta Tower

Chicago, Illinois 60610 Atlanta, Georgia 30383

(312) 670-0220 (404) 656-1800

March 14, 1985 Attorney for Respondent

ee,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — Ulane v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · 471 U.S. 1017 | Frix