Reply Brief — Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

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2 NOV 27 1985

No. 84-1259 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE Ree aus

Supreme Court of the United States

ae

October Term, 1985

el

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

BY AND THROUGH ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

a

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

——

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

(sae a

JANE M. GOOTEE, Esq.

Counsel of Record

JAMES H. HANES, Esq.

BERND W. SANDT, Esq.

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

1111 Washington Street

Midland, Michigan 48674

| (517) 636-2663

Counsel for Petitioner

Interstate Brief & Record Co., Suite 731, David Whitney Building, Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 962-8745

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

pe er ee

ARGUMENT:

I.

Il.

Ill.

IV.

EPA UNREASONABLY INTRUDED INTO THE

DETAILS OF DOW’S SECURED, DEVELOPED IN-

DUSTRIAL FACILITY — EPA DID NOT MERELY

OBSERVE OUTDOOR ACTIVITY. ........

EPA’S AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PROMOTES NO

LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.

THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT

CORRESPOND TO THE FACTS. __........ . .. .

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FAR EXCEEDS THE

SCOPE OF EPA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

a ee re. ee ee

‘i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES:

Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa

Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (ISF@ . wc cece eeenn 8

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) ........ 13

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ....... 10

DuPont v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.

rr 16

Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Company, 283

U.S. 663 (1963) 2. eee c oe end eeeeeee 17

Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)...... 7,8

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .... 13, 14

Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 416

U.S. GOP ...ccccesss enn 16

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) 3, 7, 9, 17

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 80 L.Ed.2d 214

(199G) 0... cc cv evvevece cau ee 3, 4, 7

State v. Davis, 627 P.2d 492 (Or. App. 1981) .... 14

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) .......... 8

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)... 9, 10

United States v. Karo, _ U.S. —., 82 L.Ed.2d 530

0 Pee 8, 9, 13

United States v. Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Ha.

Perr rr 13, 14

ee 13, 14

ili

PAGE

United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.

Eee a wobec ce ses bcc c eee 3

United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.

DESC GG Sb ese csc esc ee cece 3

United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir.

PE eases sc crc cece secs 13, 14

STATUTES:

es eg wc cee te ee ee ee 11

6 he ets ee ee 15

Ee 1, 10

ie ow... 8... 11, 16, 17

Ee 11, 16

SE og wo ce tee ee eee 16

eS ss bc oe cee tc ec ee 16

REGULATIONS:

St ee ec ct ct os 14

ein so tcc tees 17

EE eee 11

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

re 1, 3, 9, 17

MISCELLANEOUS:

Federal Prying From The Sky, NATION’S BUSINESS,

IE, go ccs ccc cc ee ence 13

MANUAL OF COLOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY,

American Society of Photogrammetry (1968) 15

iv

Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939) ........... 16

The EPA’s Eye In The Sky Has Companies Seeing

Red, BUSINESS WEEK, October 28, 1985,

No. 84-1259

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ss

October Term, 1985

aa

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

BY AND THROUGH ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

a

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

—

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

ao

Dow believes that EPA’s surreptitious acquisition of

detailed aerial reconnaissance photographs of Dow’s

entire manufacturing facility for use as evidence in

enforcement litigation (A. 31-32) is both contrary to Sec-

tion 114 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7414) and an

unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amend-

ment. EPA completely bypassed the Judiciary and

engaged in its intrusive quest for evidence — despite

both Dow’s explicit refusal uf consent for a repetitive on-

site inspection with a camera (A. 29), and a Dow/EPA

discussion about the need for a search warrant (Pribila

Affidavit, Exh. A, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 120).

The government does not find fault with the holding

of the Court of Appeals that Dow has a reasonable

2

expectation of privacy from ground level intrusion (Pet.

App. A-8). The government does not argue that the

Dow facility is an open field from an aerial perspective.

The government does not assert that the Dow facility is

anything other than a secured, developed commercial

structure. The government admits “that aerial photo-

graphy allows more to be seen than mere observation

from the air by the unaided human eye” (Gov't. Brief,

p. 21). However, the government argues the case on

hypothetical facts — that is mere outdoor activity and

mere observation, and then erroneously concludes that

the principles applicable to mere observation of visible

property also control intrusive aerial photography (Gov't.

Brief, p. 7). Aerial observation with the naked eye is not

at issue.

When applied to the facts of this suit, the cases and

authorities cited by the government are either not appli-

cable or they support Dow.

ARGUMENT

EPA UNREASONABLY INTRUDED INTO THE DETAILS OF

DOW’S SECURED, DEVELOPED INDUSTRIAL FACILITY

— EPA DID NOT MERELY OBSERVE OUTDOOR ACTIVITY.

The government incorrectly and persistently mischar-

acterizes the case by utilizing such terms as “outdoor

activity” or “outdoor plant” (over 40 references) and

“observation” or “viewing” (over 90 times). Those terms

are surely intended to prompt the Court to think of the

Dow property as an open field rather than the secured,

developed industrial facility that it is. The characteriza-

tion of EPA’s sortie as a mere observation or viewing

ignores both the fact that the aerial photography cap-

3

tured vivid detail beyond the perception of the human

eye or mind (Pet. App. B-27; Gov't Brief, p. 21), and the

fact that no EPA personnel were even in the plane to

observe or view the Dow facility.

Oliver v. United States, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 224-225, and

n. 8, 10, 11 (1984)' confirms that secured commercial

structures such as the Dow property are enclaves that

should be free from arbitrary government interference

while open and undeveloped “open fields” are not so

protected.

Before discussing what arguments the government

made and what arguments are conspicuous by their

absence, the case should be put into perspective.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Dis-

trict Court that Dow has a reasonable expectation of pri-

vacy from ground level intrusions (Pet. App. A-8). The

Court of Appeals then created an internal inconsistency

in its own opinion and reversed the District Court's

summary judgment ruling on the basis that from an

aerial perspective, the Dow facility is “like open fields”

(Pet. App. A-9). But for the open fields analogy, the

Court of Appeals would have found that EPA’s actions

constituted a search, that Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436

U.S. 307 (1978) controls, and that Dow’s Fourth Amend-

ment rights were violated (Pet. App. A-5). The Court of

Appeals is clearly in error in holding that Dow’s Mid-

land facility is an open field from the air.

' Contrary to the statement on page 4 of the government's brief,

the District Court made its ruling not only on the basis of the panel

decision in United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981), but

confirmed the correctness of its ruling (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 223), in

response to EPA’s Second Motion For Reconsideration (Dist. Ct. Dkt.

218), which was based on the en banc Oliver decision, 686 F.2d 356

(6th Cir. 1982), which reversed the panel decision.

4

As depicted in Photograph 3 of the Sealed Joint

Appendix”, Dow’s Midland manufacturing facility covers

4500 acres (about 2000 are inside the fence line) and

includes 710 buildings and open-air structures which are

connected by nearly 40 miles of roadways, where thou-

sands of employees in 80 production plants (all within

the fence line) manufacture about 500 products. It is

hard to imagine a more secured and developed man-

ufacturing complex (Pet. App. B-19-21). The degree of

development is reflected in the more than $10 million in

property taxes the Dow Midland manufacturing facility

pays each year. This is not the “unoccupied or unde-

veloped” open fields referenced in Oliver, supra at 225,

n. 10.

Photograph 1 in the Sealed Joint Appendix depicts

one of the dozens of open-air plants in the secured Dow

Midland facility. An “open-air” plant is a three-

dimensional commercial structure which encompasses

the production equipment and know-how and which

does not have a traditional roof. Plants are designed as

open-air production processes for reasons of worker

safety, economics and industry custom (A. 59-60, 64-65,

71-72 and 74). For instance, routine maintenance in the

plant shown on Photograph 1 requires cranes with 100-

foot booms to move equipment weighing up to 50 tons

(A. 75). A roof is not needed and would be totally

impractical from an engineering standpoint (A. 74). With

respect to the issues in this case, physical “protection”

from mere aerial observation is unnecessary since the

2 Contrary to the assertion in n.5 on p. 18 of the government's

brief, Photograph 3 is a Dow photograph and not a photo taken for

EPA. Photograph 3 is representative of what a person would “ob-

serve” unaided from the air. It, and a demonstrative enlargement

found at Dist. Ct. Dkt. 172, was used to easily distinguish between

“mere observation” and the intrusive, detailed EPA aerial Photo-

graphs 1 and 2.

5

complexity and the smallness of the detail is its own

protection from the unaided aerial human eye (cf. Photo-

graph 1 versus Photograph 3).

Private homes and outbuildings are clearly depicted

on Photograph 1 (one of many EPA photographs

showing non-Dow property). The homes are in the

lower right-hand corner of the photograph. Moving

“up” the photograph, one traverses the county road, the

Dow 8-foot fence, the berm (roughly 50 yards in from

the fence; part of the snow-covered berm is hard to dis-

tinguish since it parallels the afternoon sun rays and

does not create a shadow), and then enters the 30-acre

production plant (A. 74-76). Turning to Photograph 2,

which is a 60% overlap of Photograph 1°, the manufac-

turing plant is now in the lower part of the frame and

Dow’s West Side Power Plant (one of the targets of

EPA’s quest) is “above” the production plant.

Looking at the 30-acre manufacturing plant on either

Photograph 1 or 2, it is easy to see how interrelated the

two major buildings (the building with the tan roof in

the “upper” portion of the plant, and the building

housing the control room with the flat, snow-covered

roof near the center of the plant) are to the other con-

tiguous parts of the commercial structures which com-

* Contrary to n.i on p.3 of the government's brief, the two

frames selected as representative of what EPA did and what Dow

was trying to protect were frames 9505 and 9506 — not 8505 and

9506. The consecutive frames are important because it is the 60% for-

ward overlap (A. 43) that allows stereoscopic viewing which shows

depth (e.g., the height of tanks) (Lake Depo. I, pp. 82-83, Dist. Ct.

Dkt. 41). Such work is done with original contact prints, as Photo-

graphs 1 and 2, not with enlargements. Photointerpretive analysis

was requested by EPA on the photos of Dow (A. 44). EPA people

with experience in photographic analysis, enhancement or reconnais-

sance examined the photographs (A. 36). Both frames 9505 and 9506

were enlarged 10x and 20x for demonstrative purposes (See, Dist.

Ct. Dkt. 171, under seal).

6

prise the production process. In fact, Photograph 4

shows that process equipment abuts the control room

building, which is the snow-covered roofed structure in

the upper right corner of the photograph.*

Photograph 4 also shows that walking through the

plant is similar to walking on a city street lined by tall

buildings. Contrary to the government's statement on

p. 49 of its brief (substituting, of course, the phrase “de-

tailed aerial photography” for mere “observation”), the

authority expressly conferred on EPA to enter premises

at ground level for specific purposes is undoubtedly not

more intrusive than detailed aerial photography. Such

surreptitious photography amounted to a nonparticular-

ized, general, fence-to-fence search which captured

much more detail of the entire 2000-acre secured facility

than an on-site inspection ever could.

The minute details of the plant which are so important

to Dow, which are not visible by aerial naked-eye obser-

vation, and which establish the constitutionally-offensive

intrusion in this case, are contained on the original EPA

contact prints — Photographs 1 and 2 in the Sealed Joint

Appendix. The government, apparently forgetting that it

made enlargements of the very plant in question (Dist.

Ct. Dkt. 15, under seal)*, attempts to cloud the issue

* The Dow enlargements were made for demonstrative purposes

such as this. Photointerpreters use the original contact prints for

their work — not enlargements such as Photographs 4 or 5.

> EPA made three complete sets of contact prints along with 50

2 x enlargements (5 each of 10 frames) (A. 42). At page 3 of its brief

the government leaves the impression that only one significant

enlargement was made. A number of the enlargements of the power

house made by EPA depict the exact manufacturing facility shown in

Photographs 1 and 2 of the Sealed Joint Appendix (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15).

The government erroneously states that Dow made the only enlarge-

ments of consequence and also that Dow does not assert the exis-

tence of private information in the pictures of the power plants (e.g.,

Gov't. Brief, pp. 28, 31 and 40 n. 27).

7

and persuade the Court that the offensive detail is only

on the Dow enlargements (Gov't. Brief, pp. 27-28).°

Using hand-held magnification and the orig wl EPA

contact prints, the Dow plant manager discerned items

and equipment as small as '2-inch in diameter (A. 53-54).

Of course, that is not surprising since a naked-eye study

of those original contact prints reveals both power lines

and their shadows.

NOWHERE IN ITS BRIEF DOES THE GOVERNMENT

ARGUE, OR CITE ANY AUTHORITY, THAT THE DOW

FACILITY IS AN OPEN "IELD. The government does dis-

cuss cases such as Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57

(1924) and Oliver, supra, but it never relates those cases

to the facts of this case. Rather, the government gives

“secured, open-air commercial structure” the extremely

loose translation of “outdoor activity or plant,” and

equates “intrusive, detailed aerial photography” with

“observation or viewing,” and hopes for the best.

Dow urges the Court to think “secured, developed

open-air commercial structure” and “detailed aerial pho-

tography” whenever the government uses the terms

“outdoor plant or activity” and “observation.”

The government does not argue that the Dow prop-

erty is anything other than a secured, developed indus-

trial facility. That fact alone takes the case out of the

Hester “open field” ambit and places it within the pur-

view of Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra. The fact that the

“windows” in the Dow structure open to the vertical,

rather than the horizontal, perspective is of no constitu-

tional significance. The significance is the exploitation of

© Whatever detail is depicted on the enlargements is also neces-

sarily found on the original contact prints. The government implies

(p. 29) that by “manipulating” and enlarging the photos Dow

somehow created new images not captured on the original EPA

photos.

8

technological advances to intrude into a secured, devel-

oped commercial structure to reveal details about the

__interior of the premises that could not have been

obtained by mere visual surveillance. United States v.

Karo, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, 536, 541-2 (1984) reh. den. 82

L.Ed.2d 942.

The government on page 21 of its brief admits that

“aerial photography allows more to be seen than mere

observation from the air by the unaided human eye.”

Conspicuous by its absence, the government does not go

on to argue that the photographic detail it captured of

the Dow facility — detail that far exceeded the capabili-

ties of the unaided human eye — was not intrusive

surveillance into a secured, developed commercial

structure.

Rather, the government ignores the facts of the case

and basically argues that “observation” ought to be

allowed.” Then, with no distinctions as to quality, pur-

pose or authority re aerial photography, the government

arrives at the sweeping but unsupportable conclusion

that “[t]he same principles [concerning government

aerial observation] apply when a photograph is taken

from an airplane flying overhead” (Gov't. Brief, p. 7).

Since this is neither a “plain view” nor an “open field”

nor a “mere observation” case, cases such as Texas v.

Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), Air Pollution Variance Board v.

Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), Hester v. United

States, supra, and the many marijuana overflight/mere

” The government ignores both its admission that aerial photo-

graphy is more powerful/intrusive than mere observation and the

fact that the EPA did not even attempt to “observe” the Dow plant.

A contractor was hired to take about 100 color shots of the entire

Dow facility for the express purpose of capturing the details of the

operation for use as evidence and for photointerpretive work (A. 32,

39, 43, 44, 46).

9

observation cases cited in the government's brief do not

support the government’s argument. Here, the govern-

ment used technology to intrude into the non-visible

details of Dow’s secured facility. The technology of a

certified mapping camera did not merely enhance the

human visual sense, as a flashlight does; it goes far

beyond human capabilities and accomplishes a feat no

moving, airborne human eye could do. The camera per-

ceived and captured minute detail, the smallness of

which is protection from mere human aerial observation.

The surreptitious use of a technological aid to intrude

into a secured commercial structure, into details not dis-

cernible by visual surveillance, violates the Fourth

Amendment. United States v. Karo, supra at 541.

A search occurs when there is an unreasonable gov-

ernmental intrusion upon a reasonable expectation of

privacy; a seizure occurs when there is a meaningful

interference with a possessory interest in property.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94

(1984). The laws protecting trade secrets and Marshall v.

Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), were cited by Dow in

its Brief on the Merits to buttress the already-strong

argument that Dow’s expectation of privacy in the non-

public details of its secured commercial structures was

an expectation that society deems reasonable. The gov-

ernment’s argument beginning on page 37 of its brief

concerning the capturing of trade secrets or. the photo-

graphs misses the point. It is the intrusive surveillance

of detail (trade secret or otherwise) beyond the purview

of the naked eye that constitutes the Fourth Amendment

violation. The Fourth Amendment violation exists inde-

pendently of the capturing of any Dow trade secrets.

Dow’s motive in this case is to protect its trade secrets

(assets) and commercial competitiveness. Dow’s interest

is to preserve its right to privacy and right to be free

10

from unreasonable government search in the form of

intrusive aerial photography.

Il.

EPA’S AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PROMOTES

NO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.

“{T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement

practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on ...

Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of

legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). There are no legitimate gov-

ernmental interests to balance against the severe intru-

sion upon Dow’s privacy in this case. In addition, aerial

photography is not a “law enforcement practice.” The

EPA’s action was entirely unchecked and without rea-

sonable safeguards.

As stated in its Brief on the Merits, Dow believes that

aerial photography as a site inspection technique is

totally outside of EPA’s statutory inspection authority. 42

U.S.C. § 7414.

EPA promoted no legitimate governmental interest in

this case. The photographs showed no smoke coming

from the powerhouses (A. 31), and thus they were

worthless as evidence in the enforcement action. The

aerial photography was a wholly ineffective technique

that lent no assistance to any legitimate governmental

function.

When the nature and quality of the intrusion on

Dow’s Fourth Amendment rights are balanced against

the government's actions in this case, EPA’s conduct is

clearly unreasonable. Cf., United States v. Jacobsen, supra

at 101. There are no governmental interests, much less

important ones, proffered to justify the intrusion. In

11

fact, long before the overflight the government had all

the evidence against Dow that it needed (A. 27-28).

The nature and quality of the intrusion clearly estab-

lish constitutionally offensive scrutiny. The magnitude of

the surreptitious, continuing intrusion is shocking. The

agency did not take one brief look at specific structures

in the Dow facility in which they arguably have an in-

terest. The agency conducted an exploratory search of

the entire 2000-acre Dow facility, permanently capturing

in vivid detail Dow personal property not otherwise

exposed to view.

EPA had a number of alternatives to aerial photo-

graphy. For instance, under section 114(a)(1) of the

Clean Air Act the Administrator may require any site

owner to maintain records, make reports and provide

such other information as required. 42 U.S.C. § 7414

(a)(1). As the record reflects, Dow had provided all the

schematics and diagrams of the powerhouses that EPA

requested prior to the time of the overflight (A. 25, 28).

EPA had requested no further information from Dow.

The giving of information to the EPA (as opposed to

surreptitious taking by EPA) allows the owner to claim

trade secret protection according to 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c)

and 40 C.F.R. 2.201, et seq. Otherwise, as in the case of

aerial photographs and photointerpretive reports, un-

marked documents are considered to be in the public

domain and available under the Freedom of Information

Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) to the extent the requestor is willing

to pay for reproduction (Trakowski Depo., pp. 26-30,

Dist. Ct. Dkt. 42).

In its nonchalant discussion of its possession of the

intimate details of Dow’s raison d’étre, the government

(Gov't. Brief, pp. 9, 40) attempts to lessen the actual

intrusion upon Dow’s rights and privacy. However, in

12

the two months after the flyover and before the film and

photos were placed under seal, the EPA shipped the

film and photos to and from their photographic labs in

Las Vegas via airline baggage/air freignt (A. 41; Beyer

Depo., p. 79, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30). Once the film and en-

largements were back in Chicago, the enlargements

were kept on heating ducts, on the floor and hung on

office walls, which offices had no doors (A. 52-53; Roth-

blatt Depo., pp. 36-37, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33). The pictures

were seen by other than “need to know” persons (Roth-

blatt Depo., pp. 54-55, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33; Beyer Depo.,

pp. 79-83, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30).

All of the film, prints and enlargements were to be

placed into the custody of the District Court and under

seal per a stipulated order entered April 7, 1978 (A. 3;

Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15). Despite that order, EPA “found” an

“extra” roll of prints in its possession in July, 1978 (Lake

Depo., p. 100, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 41). Contrary to the gov-

ernment’s position (pp. 9, 40), EPA’s actions with

respect to Dow’s personal property do cause Dow great

concern.

Although the government asserts (p. 45) that aerial

photography “materially assists” EPA in “the exercise of

important governmental functions,” the government

never offers an explanation of how it materially assists

or what important government functions it references.

On the bottom line it boils down to the fact that the

government had no need (or authority) for its actions

and it has nothing but empty rhetoric in defense of its

unauthorized, intrusive conduct.

13

THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT

CORRESPOND TO THE FACTS.

In addition to confusing mere observation and detailed

aerial photography, the government attempts to put aerial

photography rather than its own conduct under scrutiny

(Gov't. Brief, p. 32). This is not a case against aerial

photography any more than a wiretap case is against the

equipment employed, or a murder case is against the

gun or other weapon, or other surveillance cases are

against telescopes or beepers. E.g., United States v. Karo,

82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United

States v. Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Ha. 1976); United

States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. den. 459

U.S. 854; United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir.

1980). It is the exploitation of technological advances

that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere

existence. United States v. Karo, supra, at 539-540.

In its argument the government refuses to acknow-

ledge that all aerial photographs are not alike. The vari-

ables are numerous, including perspective (vertical or

oblique), resolution, weather conditions, camera and

quality. In conjunction with its security measures against

unauthorized aerial photography (A. 13-22), Dow does

release photographs of the production facility after inter-

nal review (A. 20). Although Dow tries to get a credit

line (e.g., Photo Courtesy of The Dow Chemical Com-

pany) (A. 13), sometimes it appears (Federal Prying

From The Sky, NATION’S BUSINESS, October 1985, pp.

34, 36), and sometimes it does not (The EPA’s Eye In

The Sky Has Companies Seeing Red, BUSINESS WEEK,

October 28, 1985, p. 90). In any event, those photo-

graphs released by the company are taken at an oblique

14

angle and have passed internal muster. They are obvi-

ously and easily distinguishable from the EPA photo-

graphs (cf., Photographs 1 and 2, Sealed Joint Appendix).

In its brief the government places importance on the

fact that the detailed aerial photographs were taken from

public airspace. So what? The question is whether the

surveillance intruded into Dow’s reasonable expectation

of privacy. Katz v. United States, supra. It did. The photo-

graphs captured and depicted more detail and informa-

tion than the unaided aerial human eye and mind could

ever hope to do (Pet. App. B-27; Gov't. Brief, p. 21). It

is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far

into a developed commercial structure that it can detect

items and equipment as smail as /2-inch in diameter and

still not be considered to have engaged in an unreason-

able search. Cf., United States v. Kim, supra, at 1256;

United States v. Lace, supra; and United States v. Taborda,

supra.

The fact that the photos were taken from lawful

altitude is of no moment.® FAA regulations were de-

signed to promote air safety, not to define reasonable

expectations of privacy. See, State v. Davis, 627 P.2d 492,

494 (Or. App. 1981).

In its attempts to make aerial photography seem ordi-

nary and mundane, the government: fails to recognize

that all aerial photographs are not of like quality and

® The minimum altitude over a congested area is not 1000 feet,

as the government states at p. 19. Rather, it is 1000 feet above the

highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2000 feet of the aircraft.

14 C.F.R. § 91.79. Although there is no “nearby tall building or water

tower” with reference to the Dow facility as speculated in n.4 on

p. 17 of the government's brief, there are structures within the Dow

facility that are over 200 feet high.

15

resolution’; fails to admit that the EPA photographic

labs are set up for vertical aerial mapping cameras and

printers (A. 51), not the hypothetical hand-held camera;

fails to acknowledge that the Michigan Department of

Natural Resources photograph (referenced at Gov't.

Brief, p. 23 and at A. 54 and filed as a part of the record

by EPA — Dist. Ct. Dkt. 167) bears absolutely no

resemblance to the intrusive detail contained in the EPA

photographs of the Dow plant; and finally, fails to

acknowledge that the only photographs taken of Dow's Mid-

land facility at the request of EPA are the subject of this

lawsuit (A. 33), and that the agency’s own enforcement

personnel thought the photos were novel (Beyer Depo.,

p. 81, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30; Rothblatt Depo., pp. 54-55, Dist.

Ct. Dkt. 33).

The EPA aerial photographs of Dow’s facility are not

ordinary or mundane. To the best of Dow’s knowledge,

they are intrusively unique.

IV.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FAR EXCEEDS THE SCOPE

OF EPA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

The government's position on this issue is accurately

and succinctly stated in its Summary of Argument (p. 10):

the EPA assumed it could use the investigation technique

and then assumed the power.'® As noted on pages 42-49

® Although aerial photography may be “common” in the sense

that it can be acquired for a price, the government certainly slights

the capabilities of aerial photography and the training of aerial

photographers when it equates aerial photography and mere visual

observation in its brief, pp. 17-21. See generally, MANUAL OF COLOR

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, American Society of Photogrammetry (1968).

10 At one point EPA also “assumed” it could utilize the military

to aid in civilian law enforcement (about 50-60 times over 9 years) —

clearly in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

(Dybdahl Depo., pp. 62, 87-88, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 49).

16

of Dow’s Brief on the Merits, that assumption of power

is without statutory authority, is contrary to the plain

language of section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act (42

U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2)), and is inconsistent with both sec-

tion 114(c) of the Act and existing tort and criminal laws

protecting trade secrets. Neither the Court of Appeals’

decision nor the government cites any authority to the

contrary.

On page 10 of its brief the government blithely asserts

that “the agency is entitled to use any methods of inves-

tigation that could lawfully be employed by private

investigators.” The government then ignores the fact

that if private individuals procured aerial photographs

such as EPA’s Photographs 1 and 2 in the Sealed Joint

Appendix, Dow would press charges in both the crim-

inal and civil courts. Michigan Compiled Laws sections

752.772, 750.539a and d (Pet. App. E); Restatement of

Torts section 757 (1939) (Pet. App. C); Kewanee Oil Com-

pany v. Bicron Corporation, 416 U.S. 470, 475-476 (1974);

and DuPont vy. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),

cert. den. 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).

The government's citation (p. 46) to what federal law

enforcement agencies may do in support of what this

administrative agency can do is especially distressing.

That argument confuses the basic differences in purpose

and function among the agencies, ignores the explicit,

different terms of statutory authority granted to each

agency, and amounts to the repugnant bottom line that

“the government is the government and as long as any

agency has the power, all agencies have the power.”

Apparently some in the federal government forget that

it is a government of limited powers.

The government states (p. 48) that the Clean Air Act,

first enacted in 1970, somehow “expanded” the govern-

ment authority to investigate air pollution. The actual

17

statement made does not support the government's argu-

ment. The type of statement cited by the government,

remarks made during Senate Committee hearings, are

generally not used as statutory construction aids —

especially when there is plain meaning in the language

employed by Congress. Federal Trade Commission v.

Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 650 (1931).

Under the government's interpretation, section

114(a)(2) “devolves almost unbridled discretion upon

executive and administrative officers, particularly those

in the field, as to when to search and whom to search,”

the very situation in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.

307, 323 (1978) (OSHA inspection) which violated the

Fourth Amendment.

Unlike OSHA, which after public notice and comment

adopted regulations concerning site inspections (29

C.F.R. § 1903, et seq.), EPA has no regulations governing

inspections or its inspectors. EPA has assumed powers

not reasonably within the plain meaning of Congressional

language, and has gone about its self-perceived business

without public or judicial oversight. EPA has combined

unbridled discretion with an extremely intrusive inspec-

tion technique.

The government states (n. 32, p. 50), that EPA specifi-

cally addressed the issue of overflights in a May 1978

internal policy (no public notice and comment). Contrary

to the implication in the footnote, the notification of

companies after an overflight (not applicable to this case) :

was not an agency policy. It was merely a Region V pro-

gram (C.A. App. 160). As documented at pages 86-93 of

the Joint Appendix, Regions II and VII attempted prior

notification, which evoked the same corporate concern

for Fourth Amendment rights and trade secrets that

Dow asserts here.

18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in

Dow’s Brief on the Merits, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ JANE M. GOOTEE, Esq.

Counsel of Record

JAMES H. HANES, Esq.

BERND W. SANDT, Esq.

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

1111 Washington Street

Midland, Michigan 48674

(517) 636-2663

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: November 25, 1985

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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