Opposition Brief — New York v. Class

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.

Ps

(3 Supreme Court, US.

FILED

GRIGINAL «| ww

ALEXANDER L STEVaS

CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1984 TERM

No. 84-1181

NEW YORK,

Petitioner,

~against-

BENIGNO CLASS,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM E. HELLERSTEIN

Attorney for Respondent

The Legal Aid Society

15 Park Row 18th Floor

New York, New York 10038

[212] 577-3428

MARK C. COGAN

Of Counsel /

ra

4

ee — et ee le

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the decision of the New York Cour

of Appeals which, by the court’s expres

Statement, was predicated on the State Con

Stitution as well as the Federal Constitu-

tion, and which cited a long line of the

court s prior search and seizure rulings, was

based on adequate and independent state

grounds, and this Court therefore lacks

jurisdiction.

' we

2. Whether this Court should deny the peti-

tion because, under the extreme facts of this

case, the New York Court of Appeals correctly

held that a police officer is not entitled,

after stopping a motorist for a routine traf-

fic infraction, to open up the car to inspect

the vehicle identification number where the

officer does not suspect, and lacks any rea-

son to believe, that the car is stolen.

nnn nn sttinnssnEEtnEE ten nEREnnEEtneeeaaeed

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUEASGLCCAON cccccccces

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Pens Ge Ge GD caccdccecccécscctoccctecccecseq 2

Reasons for Denying the Writ ........ cc cccccccccee 2

Point I

THE DECISION OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

WHICH, BY THE COURT'S EXPRESS STATEMENT, WAS

PREDICATED ON THE STATE CONSTITUTION AS WELL

AS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AND WHICH CITEL

A LONG LINE OF THE COURT'S PRIOR SEARCH ANI

SEIZURE RULINGS, WAS BASED ON ADEQUATE ANI

INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS, AND THIS COURT

THEREFORE LACKS JURISDICTION... ccc cc ccccccee

Point II

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION BECAUSE,

UNDER THE EXTREME FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE NEW

YORK COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT A

POLICE OFFICER 1S NOT ENTITLED, AFTER STOP-

PING A MOTORIST FOR A ROUTINE TRAFFIC INFRAC-

TION, TO OPEN UP THE CAR TO INSPECT THE

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WHERE THE OFFI-

CER DOES NOT SUSPECT, AND LACKS ANY REASON T°

BELIEVE, THAT THE CAR IS STOLEN....... €

ET SSS 60 ur bUtebebebees 66d eensebsscecbbininc

( '

TABLE OF QorTs MRITIES

Cases:

pce tianlian eae

Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967)..

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).............

Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968)........

Berb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 113 (1945)...cccccccccccccccee

Michigan v. Long, _—_—saU.S. __—,_: 77: L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)...

People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745 (1982)....

People v. Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 274 N.W.2d 430 (1979)...

People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, _._ N.E.2d_ _—s: (198 4)...

People v. Cruz, 34 N.Y.2d 362, 314 N.E.2d 39 (1974)......

People v. David L., 56 N.Y.2d 698, 436 N.E.2d 1324.

Cert. denied, 459 U.S. 866 (1982) ........ccccccces.-

People v. Elwell, 50 N.¥.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471 (1980)...

People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723 (1983)...

People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982).....

People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783 (1967).....

People v. Miller, 43 N.Y.2d 789, 373 N.E.24 286 (1977),

aff‘g, 52 A.D.2d 425 (lst Dept. 1976).............-.

People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2¢ 462, 315 N.E.24 452 (1974)...

People v. Fiper, 10] 111.App.34 296, 427 N.E.24 136)

Sees ereseccseouisccccicnbtdteiibinbidadinabamiai

People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.24 454 452 N.E.2d 1224 (1983)...

People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.24 69, 272 N.E.24 464 (1971)..

111

w

-

—-— — -~——- -- _- ee + ene

- - —

People v. Wolf, 60 111.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 766, cert.

Genie, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). ..cccccccccccccccccces 8

Shirley v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.24 432

EEE SE Ee. he ae 8

Sibron v. Wew York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)....ccccccccccceees 5

Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).. j

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)........... 5

State v. McGann, 467 A.2d 571 (N.H. 1983).........ccceee- 7

State v. Moore, 659 P.2d 70 (Hawaii 1983)................ 7

State v. Sedacca, 252 Md. 207, 249 A.2d 456 (1969)....... 7

State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)...

wee We «Ges FOS GG. 8 1D BBdecccccccncccccccccccocecs

United States v. Graham, 39) F.2d 439 (6th Cir.), cert.

SEBSSS, FOS GB. 94) CISEBdecccccccececccccceccecess 8

United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 44] (Sth Cir. 1970)... 8

United States v. Nikrash, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966)... 7

United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977) ........cccccccccee f

United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1972).... e

United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828, cert. denied, 409

ES REE ES ee eee enn t

United States v. Zemke, 457 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.), cert.

es Se Ws WD ORO ii ccccccccconcceceenéccece 8

Zacchini v. Scripps-fioward Broadcasting Co, 433 U.S.

Dee CEP Uieccccccccccenncscesesecoccococesecccccecss 6

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:

New York Constitution, Article I, Section 12............. passim

iv

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR Ci.\TIORAR:

Respondent requests that this Court deny the peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

the New York Court of Appeals entered in the instant

case on November 27, 1984. People v. Class, 63 N.Y.24

491, __—Ss N.E.2@ ss (1984).

JURISDICTION

Petitioner asserts this Court has Jurisdiction

under 26 U.S.C. §1257(3). Respondent maintains that

this Court lacks jurisdiction because the decision of

the New York Court of Appeals was based on adequate and

independent state grounds.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

he New York Constitution, Article I, Section 12, pro-

vides, in relevant part:

The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, Supported by

oath or affirmation, and particularly descri-

bing the place to be searched, and the per-

sons or things to be seized.

The United States Constitution, Amendment IV, pro-

vides:

The right of the People to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no warrants shal)

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by

Oath cr affirmation, and particularly descri-

bing the place to be searched, and the per-

sons or things to be seized.

—— i a i a tt ae . " — ei a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent accepts the factual stateaent set forth

in the Petition.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

POINT I

THE DECISION OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF ADP-

PEALS WHICH, BY THE COURT’S EXPRESS STATE-

MENT, WAS PREDICATED ON THE STATE CONSTITU-

TION AS WELL AS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AND

WHICH CITED A LONG LINE OF THE COURT’S PRIOR

SEARCH AND SEIZURE RULINGS, WAS BASED ON

ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS, AND

THIS COURT THEREFORE LACKS JURISDICTION.

The New York Court of Appeals held that Police

Officer McNamee violated Respondent s right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures when, lacking

any reason to believe the vehicle was stolen, he opened

Respondent's car and disturbed some papers on the dash-

board in an effort to examine the vehicle identifica-

tion number [VIN] (See Petition, at la-6a). The deci-

Sion was founded expressly on Article I, Section 12, of

the New York Constitution, as well as the Fourth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution. In addition tc

explicit reliance upon the State Constitution, the

court made it clear that its decision flowed from its

Own prior rulings in a host of cases: People v. David

L., 56 N.¥.2d 698, 436 N.E.2d 1324, cert. denied, 459

U.S. 866 (1982); People v. Miller, 43 N.Y.2d 789, 373

N.E.2d 286 (1977), aff‘g, 52 A.D.24 425 (lst Dept.

1976); People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 315 N.E.2a 452

(1974); People v. Cruz, 34 N.Y.2d 362, 314 N.E.2da 39

ee a me ee ee ee oe — - =~ — _——

1974); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.y.24 69, 272 ¥F *.24

464 (1971), and People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.24 98, 228

N.E.2¢d 783 (1967). Under this Court's precedents, the

decision of the New York Court of Appeals rested on an

adequate, independent state ground precluding review by

this Court.

In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 113, 125-126 (1945),

this Court wrote that limitations on its jurisdiction

and the rule against advisory opinions bar it from

reviewing judgments of state courts that rest on ade-

quate and independent state grounds. In order "“scrufpu-

lously to observe the long Standing rule |against ;e-

viewing) a judgment of a state court that rests on an

adequate and independent ground in state law,” the

Court held it could not decide the case unless the

state court indicated that its decision was mandated by

federal law. Id. at 128.

In Michigan v. Long, __ U.S. __,_ (177 L.Ed.24

1201, 1216 (1983), this Court held that a state court

decision which “relied exclusively on [federal case-

law)" in support of the result was not based on ade-

quate and independent state grounds (emphasis in origi-

nai). Inceed, an inspection of the decision of the

Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Long, 413 Mich.

461, 320 W.W.2d F666 (19862), reveals thet the result

turned entirely on the state court's analysis of this

Court s holding in Terry wv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

a

el et te it ne es — _ - oom ~<a ss oe

GC

The New York Court of Appeals, which has a long

tradition of interpreting the State Constitution in

favor of the public’s right to be free from unreason-

able searches and seizures, ! relied on numerous deci-

sions of its own in support of its holding that a

police officer may not, absent any reason to suspect

that a car is stolen, open up the door and disturb

papers on the dashboard in an effort to inspect €

vehicle identification number. Therefore, on its face,

the decision of the New York Court of Appeals was based

on adequate and independent state grounds.

Examination of the cases cited by the Court of

Appeals confirms that its decision in the instant case

was based on adequate and independent state grounds.

The court s prior decisions in People v. David L,

Scpra, 56 N.Y.2d 698, People v. Miller, supra, 43

N.Y¥.2¢ 789, People v. Perel, supra, 34 N.Y.2d 462, and

People v. Cruz, supra, 34 N.Y.2d 362, were all based on

1. In People v. Elwell, 50 N.¥.2d 231, 241, 406 N.E.24

471, 477 (1980), the New York Court of Appesis held

that the New York Constitution goes beyond this Court's

holdings in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410

(1969), and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307

(1959), as to the corroboration required in order to

Sustain & warrantless search or arrest based on an

informant’s tip. Likewise, in People v. Belton, 55

N.¥.20 49, 51, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746 (1982), the Court of

Appeals interpreted the New York Constitution in a

manner differently than this Court had interpreted the

Fourth Amendment in the area of vehicle searches. For

other decisions holding that the New York Constitution

provides broader protection against unreasonable sea,r-

ches and seizures, See People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309,

312, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724 (1983) and People v. Smith, 59

N.¥.20 454, 457-459, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1983).

ee ee ee ow - ™

New York law. The cuurt’s reliance on New York law in

People v. Marsh, supra, 20 N.Y.24 98, cannot be dovubt-

ed. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that

relevant New York statutes failed to authorize the

police to conduct a search whenever they stop a moto-

rist for a traffic infraction. Id. at 100-101. The

court also held that the New York and United States

Constitutions mandated the same rule. Id. at 102. In

the instant case, the Court of Appeals cited People v.

Marsh to support its holding that a police officer,

Upon stopping a motorist for a routine traffic infrac-

tion, is not entitled to open up a car or disturt

papers on the dashboard in an effort to inspect the

vehicle identification number, where the officer lacks

any reason to believe that the car is stolen (see

Petition, at 5a). It if noteworthy that even the

dissenters in thas case acknowledge that the New York

Court of Appeals has carved out its own "expectation of

privacy” jurisprudence alongside that articulated by

this Court (see Petition, at 7a).

The mere fact that Article I, Section 12, of the

New York Constitution contains the Same language as the

Fourth Amendment in no way prevents the New York provi-

sion from being interpreted to provide greater pro-

tection to the public’s rignt to be free from unreason-

able searches and seizures than would the Federal Con-

stitution. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-6)

LE Ee le ae ~ oc — te elie

C3

(1968); People v. Belton, Supra, 55 N.Y.2d at 51, 432

N.E.2d at 746.

In a case where, as here, the decision souc t to

be reviewed rests on both state and federal grounds,

either of which would have been dispositive, this Court

lacks jurisdiction. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-

Casting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977). The Peiition

should therefore be denied.

POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION BECAUSE,

UNDER THE EXTREME FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE NEW

YORK COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT A

POLICE OFFICER IS NOT ENTI‘SLED, AFTER STOP-

PING A MOTORIST FOR A ROUTINE TRAFFIC INFRAC-

TION, TO OPEN UP THE CAR TO INSPECT THE

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WHERE THE OFFI-

CER DOES NOT SUSPECT, AND LACKS ANY REASON TC

BELIEVE, THAT THE CAR IS STOLEN.

A police officer is not entitled to conduct a

search whenever he stops a otorist for a rovtine

traffic infraction. In order to conduct a warrantless,

search, rather the police must have reasonable

grounds, apart from the traffic violation itself. tc

believe that the motorist is guilty of a crime. Dyke

v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968

The officer who entered Respondent’s car to exam-

ine the vehicle identification number was so patently

lacking in legal justification that his conduct amount-

ed to an egregious violation of Respondent's right to

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Un-

like the situation in nearly every other reported case

Co

rash,

456,

case.

State v.

Petitioner

457

analyze

(1969),

the preci

was not supported

but

se

ee ene Ci ee

a police officer

is State v. Sedacca, 252 M

that decision

issue presented

has th

S&. 207,

did not

by the

©e rignt,

upon stopping a motorist for a routine traffic infrac-

rion, to open up the car in order to inspect the -

haicie identification number where the officer dces not

suspect, and lacks any reason to believe, that the car

is stolen Where, as in the instant case, a police

officer, lacking any reason to believe the car is

stolen, opens up the car in order t inspect its

ehicile identificatic umber, the officer icolates th

S right to be free from unreasonable searches

€izures. See State v. Moore, 659 P.2d 70 (Hawaii

People v. Piper, 101 111.App.3d 296, 427 N.E.24

1981); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.24

198 Vehicle identification number inspections

also been held unlawful in United States v. Nik-

367 F.2d 740, 743 7th Cir 1966); Simpson v.

United States, 346 F.2d 291, 294 (lOth Cir. 1965); and

McGann, 467 A.2d 571 (N.H. 1983 The on]

case that in any way supports the position urged by

ty

249 A.2

Closely

instant

The cases relied on by Petitioner (Petition, at 9)

ps ovide no support for the proposition that a police

officer, lacking any reason to believe a car is stolen,

is entitled to open it in order to view its vehicle

identification number. Every case Petitioner cites

involves a cituation where the circumstances give rise

to a reasonable belief that the vehicle was stolen:

United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977); Umited States v.

Ware, 457 F.2d 8628, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972);

United States v. Zemke, 457 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.), cert.

Genied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Squires,

456 F.2c 967 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Johnson,

431 F.2G 441 (Sth Cir. 1970); Umited States v. Graham,

391 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 94)

(1968); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.

1967); People v. Wolf, 60 111.2d 230, 326 N.E.24 166,

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Commonwealth v.

Bason, 387 Mass. 169, 439 N.E.2d 251 (1982): People v.

Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 274 N.W.24 430 (1979); and

Shirley v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432

(1977).

Because the record in the anstant case is devoid

of any suggestion that Respondent s car was stolen,

thas case is unrepresentative of the VIN cases that

have arisen elsewhere. The anstant case would, there-

fore, be a poor vehicle for this Court to address the

broad issues Petitioner seeks to reise nNerein isee

Se tt ee ee te + : . ~ <a

York (Petition, at 7). Requiring a police officer t

have a basis for suspecting that a particular car

stolen before he can open it up and inspect its vehic]

identification number, however, in no way increases th

risk that large numbers of stolen vehicles will evade

detection. Ina situation where, unlike the instan

case, a police officer has reason to believe a vehicle

is stolen, the decision of the New York Court of Ar

Mm

“

neificatior r

ntaracatio numb

A decision that a police officer has the right

lacking any basis t lieve that a car is stolen, t<

open a car to inspect its vehicle identification nun

ber, would serious undermine the publics right to t

free from unreasonable searches and seizures T

decision of the New York ¢< urt of Appeals should not t

MARK C. COGAN

CONCLUS1 ON

. ee AD wee amaee ee

A WRIT OF CERTIORAR SH

Respectfully submitted,

LLIAM E. HELLERSTEIN

.

wl

Attorney for kespondent

PROOF OF SERVICE -- CERTIFICATZ

BY A BAR MEMBER

HELLERSTEIN, the attorney for

Benigno Class, Respondent herein, and a member of

Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States,

hereby certify that, on the 2l1st Gay of February,

i served the foregoing Brief in Opposition on the

Opposing party thereto, as follows:

On Counsel for Petitioner, by mailing a copy in

addressed env lope, with postage prepaid, to

2i5 East l6lst Street,

New York 10451.

A

_LYa. Z Fr hd

Aone

he

WILLIAM E. HELLERSTEIN

Attorney for Respondent

The Legal Aid Society

15 Park Row - 18th Floor

New York, New York 10038

{[212) 577-3420