Amicus Curiae Brief — Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection
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vitice - Supreme Cou
FIL RD
APR & 1965
Nos. 84-801, 84-805
ALEXANDER , §
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME sadlibds aut
October Term, 1984
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
V-
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondent.
THOMAS J. O'NEILL,
Petitioner,
Ve
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
dd ed
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
RONALD A. ZUMBRUN
ROBERT K. BEST
COUNSEL OF RECORD
TIMOTHY A. BITTLE
OF COUNSEL
Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 350
Sacramento, California 95814
Telephone: (916)! 444-0154
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
3.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED. «cece eee eeeol
INTEREST OF AMICUS. .ccccccvesesevssessea
OPINION BELOW. ccc cece ceceseseveseseeed
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. .cccccccccsecsseed
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..eceeeseeveeee sO
ARGUMENT. cccccccccccccccccccscesscccsccel
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
ISSUE lly See
II. POLICE POWER ACTS THAT
AFFECT PROPERTY MUST
BE ANALYZED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER COMPENSATION IS OWED....9
COMO Me cece cee cee eee eee oceeeoeeeeoeoae
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
Cases
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)...9
Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40 (1960). ccccccccccccecs Ph
Berman v. Parker,
DR i En. «cc eeegececeeeooces 10
Eiger v. Garrity,
246 U.S. 97 (1918)......00e- eecccecces 9
Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, U.S. ‘
81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984).......... 10-11
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association,
452 U.S. 264 (1981)... cee veoes eccoehl
In the Matter of Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 912
(3d Cif. Dee heeeeeeeececeeccoeoce Se O
Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,
BBe Uses GLO CLSSBZ) co ccccccccccccceceh’
Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York,
438 UeWe 104 Pees eeeecoeoccococeehS
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanta Co.,
Wee a
ne Mr Mee CRORE). .ccccceccescekhS
eo 44 «
San Diego Gas & Electric Co.,
v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (198l)..cccccccveee Terr. |
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)......... 7
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corporation,
300 U.S. $5 (19ST) ccccccccccvcccese ll
United States v. General Moters
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)....-. sesveke
United States v. Security
Industrial Bank,
459 U.S. 70 TRG iccaceceese eeeee 12-14
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)........ 8
United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment..... eevee eees 4,6-7, BGs 18
- iii -
Nos. 84-801, 84-805
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
October Term, 1984
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
Ve
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondent.
THOMAS J. O'NEILL,
Petitioner,
Ve
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
i dd el
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
INTEREST OF AMICUS
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 36,
Pacific Legal Foundation respectfully subrits
this brief amicus curiae in support of
petitioners. Consent to the filing of this
brief has been granted by counsel for all
parties. Copies of the letters of consent
have been lodged with the Clerk of this
Court.
Pacific Legal Foundation is a
nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation,
incorporated under the laws of California for
the purpose of participating in litigation
affecting public policy. An independent
Board of Trustees authorizes participation in
a case only when it concludes that Pacific
Legal Foundation's position has broad public
support. The Board of Trustees has
authorized the filing of this prief.
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Pacific Legal Foundation's public
policy perspective in support of private
property rights will help provide this Court
with a more complete briefing of the
interests at stake in this litigation.
OPINION BELOW
The opinions of the United States
Court of Appeals are reported at 739 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1984), and 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir.
1984).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Quanta Resources Corporation, a
company which operated waste oil processing
facilities, went into bankruptcy. A trustee
was appointed to liquidate the company's
assets for distribution to creditors. Among
the company's assets were two storage
facilities; one located in New York, and one
located in New Jersey. Contaminated oil was
discovered at both sites, in violation of
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state environmental protection laws. The
trustee decided that the cost to the estate
of cleaning up these facilities exceeded
their value. He therefore proceeded to
abandon the assets back to Quanta, the party
responsible for the violation. New York and
New Jersey opposed the abandonment, claiming
that the trustee must clean up the
facilities, even if that meant using the
other assets in the estate to pay for it.
The trustee and creditors holding perfected
security interests in other assets argued
that the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment would be violated if the
government extinguished these security
interests to pay for the cleanup. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the "taking" claim ina
footnote, stating:
"CWJe are not persuaded by
the Trustee's argument
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that an unconstitutional
taking could result from
forbidding abandonment
here. ... [TJhe state's
enforcement of its
environmental protection
laws cannot be charac-
terized as a taking;
rather it is a permissible
exercise of the state's
regulatory power to
promote the public good
eeee” Matter of Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
at 922 n.1l.
It is this summary dismissal
of a claim to constitutional protections
which amicus curiae wishes to address,
because it “flatly contradicts clear
,
precedents of this Court." San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 647 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals did not
decide whether Quanta'’s creditors "own
property of the estate to the extent
that, if applied to other obligations of
the bankrupt, they must be
compensated. It never reached this
question because the majority apparently
concluded that the government's power to
regulate for the public good could
preempt the protections of the Fifth
Amendment. This brief will demonstrate
that the authority of government to take
property for public use is a police
power authority. When a valid exercise
of this police power takes a protected
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property interest the Fifth Amendment
requires the government to compensate
the owner or to withdraw the action.
ARGUMENT
I
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: ISSUE PRESENTED
The Court of Appeals held that
if the abandonment were denied, and
other assets in the Quanta estate were
applied under state law to clean up the
New York and New Jersey facilities, it
would be unnecessary to analyze whether
a “taking" had occurred. The court
based this holding on its conclusion
that no "taking" could occur, because a
state's enforcement of its environmental
protection laws is a permissible
exercise of the state's “regulatory
power to promote the public good," or in
other words, its police power. Matter
; —
of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
at 922 n.1l.
Amicus takes no position on
whether these creditors would be
entitled to compensation if the
abandonment were denied. That question
can be answered only by analyzing
whether these creditors have a protected
property interest (Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 161 (1980)), which will be
sufficiently interfered with so as to
cause them to bear an unfair share of a
public obligation. Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Amicus
believes, however, that these creditors
are entitled to have their claims
evaluated by a proper "taking"
analysis. The issue thus presented is
whether a “taking” could occur when a
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state engages in a permissible exercise
of its police power.
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POLICE POWER ACTS THAT
AFFECT PROPERTY MUST
BE ANALYZED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER COMPENSATION IS OWED
The police power is the power
of jovernment to serve the people for
which it exists. Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956
(1962). The police power authorizes
government to undertake any measure
deemed necessary, by the people's
elected representatives, to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 5l, 59
(1979); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97,
102-03 (1918). The government's
authority to take or damage property for
public use is one of the government's
police power authorities. Hawaii
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Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
U.S. , 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 196
(1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
31-32 (1954). Thus, contrary to the
suggestion by the majority of the Court
of Appeals, there is no distinction
between the government authority to take
ownership of property and the authority
to regulate that property. The ability
to take property is merely a subsidiary
power of the government's overall police
power.
Governmental activities
affecting property, then, are
constrained by the same limitations
placed on all exercises of the police
power; that is, the activity must
reasonably promote the public health,
safety, or welfare. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 81 L. Ed. 2d
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at 197 ("({tJhe ‘public use' requirement
is thus coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers").
Governmental activities affecting
property which do not promote public
health, safety, or welfare are therefore
not permissible exercises of the
government's police power. Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation,
300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
On the other hand, govern-
mental activities which do promote the
public health, safety, and welfare are
valid exercises of the police power
regardless of whether such governmental
activities take or damage property.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264,
300 (1981). When valid exercises of the
police power so affect property,
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however, the Fifth Amendment requires
the government to compensate the
owner. In Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), this Court recently stated:
"The Court of Appeals
determined that § 828 serves
-++ Legitimate public
purpose[s] ... and thus is
within the State's police
power. We have no reason to
question that determination.
It is a separate question,
however, whether an otherwise
valid regulation so frustrates
property rights that
compensation must be paid.”
Id. at 425.
Again, in United States v.
Security Industria. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
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(1982), a case involving issues similar
to those at bar, this Court repeated the
rule that valid exercises of
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governmental power may nonetheless
require compensation when property is
affected.
“It may be readily agreed
that § 522(£)(2) is a rational
exercise of Congress’ authority
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however, obviate the additional
difficulty that arises when
that power is ... used to
defeat traditional property
interests. The bankruptcy
power is subject to the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against
taking private property without
compensation. ... Thus, however
‘rational’ the exercise of the
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bankruptcy power may be, that
inquiry is quite separate from
the question whether the
enactment takes property [so as
to require compensation]."
United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 459 U.S.
at 74-75.
The distinction between government
action to regulate property and
government action to take ownership in
property is not, as suggested by the
majority of the Court of Appeals, a
distinction in the source or validity of
the authority; rather, the distinction
is in the remedy. An invalid exercise
of the police power will be set aside,
but when property is taken or damaged by
valid regulation, the government is
entitled to keep the property, or
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inflict the damage, so long as it
compensates the owner. Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., U.S. » CL ke BAe BC
815, 841 (1984). Such compensation must
be available “to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. at 49; Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
——
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). If government
can "“pre-empt" property rights by merely
exercising its police power, "then the
Taking Clause has lost all vitality."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 8l L. Ed.
2d at 838.
Applying this body of law to
the case at bar, the secured creditors
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of Quanta have claimed a property
interest in the assets of Quanta's
estate which will be “taken” if
abandonment of the New Jersey and New
York facilities is disallowed. This
claim of a "taking" does not arise from
the direct application of the states'
environmental laws. It arises from the
potential transfer of liability from the
culpable party to innocent creditors by
requiring the trustee to accept
responsibility for the cleanup costs.
Therefore, contrary to the suggestion by
the majority of the Court of Appeals,
this case does not present a conflict
between environmental regulation and
protection of private property rights.
The creditors do not argue that the
environmental laws should not be
enforced; their claim is that their
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protected property interests may be
taken. Having raised this claim, they
are entitled to have a court analyze
whether their claim is meritorious. The
Court of Appeals, however, did not
analyze whether the creditors have a
valid "taking" claim. It avoided this
question by finding that the states'
enforcement of environmental protection
laws was a valid exercise of their
police power. The determination of the
"taking" claim, however, should not turn
on an analysis of the regulatory power
employed. The question is whether the
creditors would lose a protected
property interest and be forced to bear
more than their fair share of a public
obligation. If so, compensation to
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those individuals would be owed. United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 378 (1945).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth
above amicus requests this Court to
expressly disapprove the Court of
Appeals‘ conclusion that prohibiting
abandonment cannot raise the question of
an uncompensated taking of a protected
property interest in violation of the
protections of the Fifth Amendment.
DATED: April 5, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD A. ZUMBRUN
ROBERT K. BEST
COUNSEL OF RECORD
TIMOTHY A. BITTLE
OF COUNSEL
Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 350
Telephone: (916) 444-0154
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
oe 18 «
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I, Linda S. Schaupp, declare as
follows:
I am a citizen of the United
States, residing or employed in
Sacramento, California.
My business address is 555
Capitol Mall, Suite 350, Sacramento,
California.
I am over the age of 18 years,
and am not a party to the above-entitled
action.
On April 5, 1985, true copies
of BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
were placed in envelopes addressed to:
Mr. William F. McEnroe
Nolan, O'Neill & Moore
60 Park Place
Newark, NJ 07102
Mr. Robert Abrams
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Mr. Norman Spiegel
Assistant Attorney General
2 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10047
Mr. Irwin I. Kimmelman
Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey
Mr. Richard F. Engel
Deputy Attorney General
Cc. N. 112
Trenton, NJ 08625
Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Corporation Counsel for the
City of New York
Mr. Gary Tarnoff
Assistant Corporate Counsel
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
Mr. A. Dennis Terrell
Shanley and Fisher
131 Madison Avenue
Morristown, NJ 07960
which envelopes, with postage thereon fully
prepaid, were then sealed and deposited ina
mailbox regularly maintained by the United
States Postal Service in Sacramento,
California.
I declare under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct and
that this declaration was executed this
5th day of April, 1985, at Sacramento,
California.
/s/ LINDA S. SCHAUPP
LINDA S. SCHAUPP
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.