Opposition Brief — Utah Division of State Lands v. United States
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FilLED
(s) | JUL 181986
No. 85-1772 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, UR.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General
DmK D. SNEL
STEVEN A. HERMAN
LAWRENCE W. PUCKETT
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
\e
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether title to the bed of Utah Lake, a navigable
body of water, passed to the State of Utah upon its
admission to the Union in 1896.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LEE ELSES i
EL SS TN 1
ee ssetiopaunathbgeverasnneces 2
a setempinntiinsesoveves 6
a sestotacttnrrence 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
a cecumensommutecess 7, 8,10
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 ..........00.000.... 3
Borax Consol. vy. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 _............ 7
California vy. United States, 438 U.S. 645 _............ 8,11, 12
Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395 .................. 13
Choctaw Nation y. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 _.......... 7,10
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen,
665 F.2d 951, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 ............. x
CFTC Vv. Schor, No. 85-621 (July 7, 1986) ............ 12
Ide Vv. United States, 263 U.S. 497 00000000. 8,11
Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, No. 83-
Cee ecciecoconcons 12-13
Lorillard v. Pons, 484 U.S. 575 .....................--.-....--- 13
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544... 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Sazbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 .............-0.. 13
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 ..............0..------..--- 5, 6, 7
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Nn cccuseueueces 7
United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, cert. denied,
ESET 8,11
United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 1081.. 8,11
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49... 5, 7,10
United States v. Mottaz, No. 85-546 (June 11,
ee ccusvovstoccovsesovervcees 3
(IIT)
IV
Statutes : Page
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 17, 26 Stat. 1101, 43
8 I SR en ee Een SS ens 12
Act of Feb. 26, 1897, ch. 335, 29 Stat. 599, 43 U.S.C.
I a a a a 12
Sundry Appropriations:
Act of Oct. 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505,
NIT sccsscsnsiicanitanminnnitentibiasimanisansl 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,9, 10
Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371,
SE oe sdabbnmmnnnanansenaimmecsanstill 4,5,11, 12
Quiet Title Act:
Do ssleecsnasennenshianiasdannnee 3
I I einibisaeinanidennnnntanininntinns 3
Submerged Lands Act:
PR BF a ae 2
I, I . ..scsissenesadenssiunstannaiensenmmendsontnmnseanine 3
Miscellaneous:
P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development
CII eciccietesicncsesnncincnocicceienanaceassestncsassnteianaesiatieinestae 8
Geological Survey:
1888-1889 Tenth Ann. Rep. ...................--.---------- 4,11
1889-1890 Eleventh Ann. Rep. ......................---- 4,11
1890-1891 Twelfth Ann. Rep. ......................-----. 4,11
Reservation of Lands for Irrigation Purposes, 19
Op. Att’y Gen. 564 (1890) _....-....-----.-.---1--eeeeneeenees 11
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
No. 85-1772
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1la-
27a) is reported at 780 F.2d 1515. The opinion of
the district court (Pet. App. 28a-41a) is reported
624 F. Supp. 622. ” Va
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on December 26, 1985. On March 12, 1986, Justice
White extended the time within which to file a peti-
(1)
2
tion for a writ of certiorari to and including April
25, 1986, and the petition was filed on April 24, 1986.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
This case concerns the ownership of the bed of
Utah Lake. The parties have stipulated that the
Lake was navigable on January 4, 1896, the date on
which petitioner, the State of Utah, was admitted to
the Union (Pet. App. 8a n.4). Petitioner claims that
by operation of the equal footing doctrine, it has
owned the bed of Utah Lake since that date. Both
courts below rejected this claim, holding that the
United States previously had selected the bed of the
Lake for purposes of a federal reservoir, reserved
pursuant to the Sundry Appropriations Act of Oct. 2,
1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-527."
1. In late 1976, the Department of the Interior
issued federal oil and gas leases on the bed of Utah
Lake (Pet. App. 2a). Petitioner protested, contend-
ing that the leasing encroached upon its property
interests. After unsuccessful negotiations to resolve
the dispute, petitioner commenced this suit in May
1979 in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah against the United States, the Secre-
tary of the Interior, the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management, and the Director of the Bureau’s
Utah State Office. Petitioner sought a declaratory
judgment that it, rather than the United States, had
1 Petitioner also contended in the courts below that it ob-
tained title to the bed of Utah Lake under the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, 48 U.S.C. 13801-1343. That additional claim
also was rejected by the courts below (Pet. App. 24a-26a, 40a-
41a), and petitioner does not renew it here.
title to the lake bed and sought an injunction against
interference by respondents with petitioner’s alleged
ownership and right to manage the lake bed (id. at
3a, 28a-29a).? The district court granted summary
judgment for respondents, declaring that title to the
lake bed is in the United States. On petitidner’s ap-
peal, the court of appeals affirmed on grounds virtually
identical to those relied upon by the district court.
The question of title resolved by the courts below
turns on the particular consequences of actions per-
taining to Utah Lake that were taken by federal
officials pursuant to the Sundry Appropriations Act
of Oct. 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-527. That
Act authorized the United States Geological Survey
to select “sites for reservoirs and other hydraulic
works necessary for the storage and utilization of
water for irrigation and the prevention of floods and
overflows” (25 Stat. 526). The Act further provided
that “all the lands which may hereafter be desig-
nated or selected * * * for sites for reservoirs * * *
are from this time henceforth hereby reserved from
sale as the property of the United States, and shall
not be subject after the passage of this act, to entry,
settlement or occupation until further provided by
law” (25 Stat. 527 (emphasis added) ). Pursuant to
this authority, both Utah Lake and the land sur-
rounding it were selected as a reservoir site and for-
mally reserved as property of the United States.
? The district court held that it had jurisdiction over the
suit under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.
1346(f) and 2409a (Pet. App. 3la-32a, 36a). However, the
court of appeals, relying on Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S.
273 (1983), held that the Quiet Title Act was the exclusive
basis of jurisdiction (Pet. App. 4a n.2). See also United
States v. Mottaz, No. 85-546 (June 11, 1986).
A
Thus, in a report dated April 6, 1889, John Wesley
Powell, then Director of the Geological Survey, in-
formed the Secretary of the Interior that “the site of
Utah Lake in the Territory of Utah is hereby selected
as a reservoir site, together with all lands situated
within two statute miles of the border of said lake at
high water” (Pet. App. 10a). Both courts below held
on the basis of this and other documents that the se-
jection of Utah Lake included the bed of Utah Lake,
thereby reserving the bed as property of the United
States under the 1888 Act (Pet. App. 13a, 37a-38a).°
Thereafter, in the Sundry Appropriations Act of
Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371, 391, Congress,
on a prospective basis, repealed the relevant provi-
sions of the 1888 Act. But Congress expressly did not
3 The Geological Survey’s selection of the bed of the Lake is
confirmed by the Survey’s official reports. The Tenth Annual
Report (1888-1889) stated that Utah Lake had been examined
“with reference to its capacity for a reservoir site” and that
the Survey had determined “the specifications for its with-
drawal as such under the law, so far as the lands covered or
overflowed by it or the lands bordering upon it were still public
lands’”” (Pet. App. lla (emphasis added)). The Survey’s
Eleventh Annual Report (1889-1890) stated that “a careful
survey was made of Utah Lake * * *. This land being, there-
fore, the natural flood ground of the lake should be reserved
up to the high-water line. Accordingly, the segregation * * *
was made to include not only the bed but the lowlands up to
mean high water” (Pet. App. lla-12a (emphasis added) ).
The Survey’s Twelfth Annual Report (1890-1891) also re-
ferred to Utah Lake, stating that “the segregation of the land
around and under the lake was made to a contour line which
should be 5 feet above the low-water mark of 1879” (Pet.
App. 18a (emphasis added)). The contemporaneous under-
standing therefore was that the Director of the Geological
Survey intended in 1889 to select, for purposes of the 1888
Act, the lands submerged by the waters of Utah Lake.
5
rescind the reserved status of any land selections,
such as that at issue here, that already had been
made. An exception to the 1890 Act stated “that
reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall re-
main segregated and reserved from entry or settle-
ment as provided by [the 1888 Act], until otherwise
provided by law” (26 Stat. 391).
2. Both courts below held that the 1888 Act au-
thorized the Geological Survey to select submerged
lands, such as those beneath Utah Lake, and that the
selection in this case was sufficient to prevent title to
the lake bed from passing to petitioner upon its ad-
mission to the Union (Pet. App. 13a-15a, 21a-24a,
38a-40a). The district court held that title to the
lake bed did not pass to Utah under the equal footing
doctrine because “[t]he withdrawal of Utah Lake
was made ‘after acquiring the territory and before
the creation of the state’ for the carrying out of ‘pub-
lic purposes appropriate to the objects for which the
territory was held’” (id. at 39a-40a, quoting United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1926) ). The court specifically found that those “ap-
propriate” public purposes “include irrigation for the
benefit of future settlers of the arid West” (Pet. App.
40a).
The court of appeals also specifically addressed
petitioner’s claim that Utah could not be deprived of
title to the lake bed unless the prior reservation was
mandated by some “public exigency” or “public ne-
cessity” (Pet. App. 21a). The court of appeals
emphasized (id. at 22a) that the conclusion that the
reservation served an “appropriate public purpose”
was based on this Court’s own formulation in Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), which held that Con-
gress may convey lands underlying navigable waters,
and thereby defeat the State’s title thereto, in order
6
to carry out “ ‘public purposes appropriate to the ob-
jects for which the United States hold the Territory’ ”
(Pet. App. 22a, quoting 152 U.S. at 48, as quoted in
Montana vy. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) ).
The court of appeals further observed, however, that
“fa]lthough the [district] court did not characterize
its holding explicitly in terms of a ‘public exigency,’
we are satisfied that the withdrawal of Utah [L]ake,
including its bed, was made for a public purpose
motivated by a public exigency, given Congress’
stated concerns [in the 1888 Act] that arid lands of
the western states be orderly and fairly irrigated,
reclaimed, and settled” (Pet. App. 23a).
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and
does not conflict with any decision of this Court or
of any court of appeals. The court of appeals’ ap-
plication of the equal footing doctrine to the particu-
lar circumstances of this case is fully consistent with
the principles recently reiterated and confirmed in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Review by this Court therefore is not warranted.
1. States admitted to the Union after the adoption
of the Constitution are deemed to be on an “equal
footing” with the original 13 states. One aspect of
this principle is that a newly admitted state in gen-
eral has the same right as the original states to lands
beneath navigable waters. Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894). At the same time, however,
Congress has the unquestioned power to reserve or
otherwise dispose of such submerged lands that have
not been included within a state, and thereby to de-
feat the title to such lands that otherwise would pass
to the state under the equal footing doctrine at the
7
time of its admission to the Union. Congress may do
so in order “ ‘to perform international obligations,’ ”
to facilitate commerce, or “ ‘to carry out other public
purposes appropriate to the objects for which the
United States hold the Territory.” Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. at 551 (quoting Shively, 152
U.S. at 48). See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
397 U.S. 620, 633-634 (1970); Alaska Pacific Fish-
erties v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87 (1918).* In
other words, although lands underlying navigable
waters are presumed to pass to the State upon ad-
mission, that presumption may be overcome where
the federal government has otherwise provided for
a disposition of the land prior to statehood, based on
“ ‘some international duty or public exigency’ ” (Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 552, quoting
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55
(1926)). The court of appeals adhered to and cor-
rectly applied those principles here.
2. As an initial matter, there can be little doubt
that the selection and reservation of Utah Lake and
the surrounding lands as property of the United
States was for a “public purpose[] appropriate to
the objects for which the United States h[e]ld the
Territory” and that the United States responded to
a “public exigency” in doing so. Before the passage
of the 1888 Act, officials of the United States were
* Even after statehood, Congress may validly authorize pro-
ceedings and transactions to confirm the pre-statehood dis-
position of such submerged lands to others (Borax Consol. v.
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 21 (1935) ; Summa Corp. v. Cali-
fornia ex rel. State Lands Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198, 205 (1984) ),
and a state that fails to present timely claims in the confirma-
tory proceedings is barred thereafter (Summa Corp., 466 U.S.
at 206-207 n.4).
8
“actively conducting investigations and collecting
data with a view to developing and formulating a
feasible plan for taking up and prosecuting” the work
of reclaiming, through irrigation, the arid lands west
of the 100th meridian. Jde v. United States, 263 U.S.
497, 502 (1924). Yet “[t]he opening of the arid lands
to homesteading raised the specter that settlers might
claim lands more suitable for reservoir sites or other
irrigation works, impeding future reclamation ef-
forts” (California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645,
659 (1978)). As petitioner concedes (Pet. 3, 13),
there was acute concern that reservoir sites would
“fall into the hands of ‘monopolistic speculators’ ”
(P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development
641 (1968)). These concerns plainly were perceived
by Congress in the late 19th century as giving rise to
a “public exigency” requiring decisive legislative ac-
tion, and that exigency is sufficient in this case to
overcome the presumption that the land underlying a
particular navigable body of water passes to the new
stateg upon its admission to the Union. See Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. at 87-
89; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen,
665 F.2d 951, 961-962 & n.27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 977 (1982); United States v. City of An-
chorage, 437 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766-767 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970).
The court of appeals in fact reiterated and applied
the principle, recognized in Montana vy. United States,
that the presumption that lands underlying navigable
waters passed to the new state ordinarily will be
overcome only upon a demonstration that the United
States responded to “ ‘some international duty or pub-
lic exigency’” (see Pet. App. 22a (quoting 450 U.S.
9
at 552)). Thus, the court of appeals concluded
that “the withdrawal of Utah Lake, including its bed,
was made for a public purpose motivated by a public
exigency, given Congress’ stated concerns that arid
lands of the western states be orderly and fairly
irrigated, reclaimed, and settled” (Pet. App. 23a
(emphasis added) ). The court of appeals’ applica-
tion of settled principles in the particular circum-
stances of this case does not warrant review by this
Court.°
3. As explained above (see page 4 & note 3,
supra), the Geological Survey’s selection and the
reservation of Utah Lake expressly included the bed
of the Lake. By the terms of the 1888 Act, this land,
including the bed, was to remain “as the property of
the United States” (25 Stat. 526-527), and it there-
° Petitioner contends (Pet. 15-16) that the court of appeals’
resting of its decision on a finding of “a public purpose moti-
vated by a public exigency” constituted a departure from the
_ Court’s reference in Montana v. United States to a “public
exigency.” However, there is no indication that the court of
appeals either intended or effected such a departure, especially
since it used the term “public exigency” and discussed this
Court’s analysis in some detail. See Pet. App. 22a-23a. More-
over, as the Court made clear in Montana v. United States,
the existence of a “public exigency” is principally a guide to
ascertaining whether the United States intended to reserve the
land for an “appropriate public purpose,” which in turn would
justify a disposition of the property in such a manner as to
prevent it from passing to the State under the equal footing
doctrine. See 450 U.S. at 556. In this case, the question of
intent is clear without the need to rely on inferences, because
the United States expressly reserved the bed of Utah Lake for
the manifestly “appropriate public purpose” of promoting
reclamation and orderly settlement of land. See note 3, supra,
and pages 8-10, infra.
10
fore did not pass to the State. Petitioner argues (Pet.
16, 18-21), however, that the Geological Survey’s
selection was insufficient because the 1888 Act did
not itself expressly refer to lands underlying naviga-
ble waters. But Montana v. United States, upon
which petitioner principally relies, makes clear that
an express reference in the governing Act is not re-
quired. Although the Court there stated that a pre-
statehood conveyance would not be lightly inferred,
it made clear at the same time that the intent to
withhold land from passing to the State need not be
shown by a definite declaration to that effect, so long
as the intent is “ ‘otherwise made very plain’” (450
U.S. at 552 (quoting Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 55) ).
Significantly, the Court also discussed with approval
its prior decisions in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma
and Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, both of
which held that. an intent sufficient to defeat the
State’s claim of title could be inferred from extrinsic
circumstances. See 450 U.S. at 555-556 & n.5.
Moreover, in this case the text of the 1888 Act was
broad in its coverage and definite in its consequences.
The enactment of the statute had the immediate
effect of “reserv[ing] from sale as the property of
the United States” all lands that might thereafter
be designated or selected for reservoir sites.’ The
*For this reason, petitioner errs in characterizing the
reservation of the bed of Utah Lake as an “administrative
withdrawal” by the Geological Survey in 1889 (Pet. 18-19).
The 1888 Act legislatively reserved that land as of 1888, be-
cause the text of the 1888 Act provided that lands, even though
not yet designated or selected as reservoir sites, were “hereby”
reserved as of the enactment date; later selection by the Geo-
logical Survey merely established the dimensions of the legis-
lative withdrawal. This was the contemporaneous under-
standing of the Attorney General, who observed that selection
11
1888 Act covered “all the lands” so designated or
selected and, as the court below correctly observed,
imposed “no restriction * * * on the type of lands
that could be designated or selected” (Pet. App. 15a).
Furthermore, within a year of the Act’s passage,
Congress was made aware of the Geological Survey’s
selection of Utah Lake (see id. at 10a), and the
Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Annual Reports of the
Geological Survey made clear that this selection in-
cluded the Lake’s bed. Congress did not thereafter
act to repudiate either the Survey’s legal position
that the beds of navigable bodies of water were em-
braced by the reservation accomplished by the 1888
Act or the specific selection and reservation of the
bed of Utah Lake. This omission is significant, be-
cause the “storm of indignation from the people of
of a reservoir site, subsequent to the 1888 Act, would accom-
plish “the reservation thereof dating back to the passage of
this [1888] act.” 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 564, 566 (1890) (emphasis
added).
Because the 1888 Act had the “practical effect of reserving
all the public lands in the west from settlement” (California v.
United States, 438 U.S. at 659), Congress enacted the Sundry
Appropriation Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371, 391,
in order to repeal prospectively the legislative reservation
made by the 1888 Act (Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 502). In
respect to future reservoir selections, the 1890 Act made their
reservation effective as of the selection date (26 Stat. 391).
However, all prior site selections, such as the 1889 selection of
Utah Lake, were confirmed (ibid.).
At all events, contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 18-
21), the mere fact that a reservation of submerged lands
comes to fruition by administrative action does not undermine
its effectiveness for purposes of the equal footing doctrine.
See, e.g., United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d at 1082;
United States v. States of Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 765, 766-767
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970).
12
the West” (California v. United States, 438 U.S. at
659) persuaded Congress to narrow the 1888 Act in
the 1890 Sundry Appropriations Act to provide that
site reservations would take effect only on the date
of actual selection and designation of a site, not
before. But Congress in 1890 also expressly con-
firmed, by the savings clause in the 1890 Act, the
Geological Survey’s prior selection of Utah Lake (as
well as all other site selections) under the earlier
Act. Accordingly, even if there had been some doubt
regarding the authority of the Geological Survey to
select the bed of the Lake, despite John Wesley
Powell’s contemporaneous construction of the 1888
Act to the contrary (see pages 3-4, supra), the 1890
Act eliminated any such concerns.
Finally, when Congress again passed new laws con-
cerning reservoir sites—specifically Section 17 of the
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1101, 43 U.S.C.
663 (which limited the size of reserved sites to land
actually necessary for reservoir construction and
maintenance) and the Act of Feb. 26, 1897, ch. 335,
29 Stat. 599, 43 U.S.C. 664 (permitting non-federal
use and occupancy of such sites on certain conditions)
—it again did not repudiate the previously confirmed
reservation of Utah Lake and its bed.’ This failure
by Congress to overturn the administrative action
when it once again revisited the subject of reservoir
site selection lends still further support to the Geo-
logical Survey’s 1889 selection of the bed of Utah
Lake and the resulting failure of the bed to pass to
Utah at statehood in 1896. CFTC v. Schor, No. 85-
621 (July 7, 1986), slip op. 11; Lindahl v. Office of
™ The background of the 1891 and 1897 Acts was discussed
by this Court in California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 659-
662.
13
Personnel Management, No. 83-5954 (Mar. 20, 1985),
slip op. 12 n.15; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-
581 (1978) ; Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395,
410 (1975) ; Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).
Against this background, the courts below correctly
rejected petitioner’s efforts to reopen that question.
Further review therefore is not warranted.®
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General
DirkK D. SNEL
STEVEN A. HERMAN
LAWRENCE W. PUCKETT
Attorneys
JULY 1986
® The question of the ownership of the bed of Utah Lake also
does not at this time appear to be of significant practical
importance. Although the Bureau of Land Management issued
five exploratory oil and gas leases for the bed in 1976, we have
been informed by the Department of the Interior that these
leases were of 10-years’ duration and are about to expire and
that no drilling permits ever were issued for the production
of oil and gas from the bed of the Lake.
W oc. &. Government printine orrice; 1986 491507 20278
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