Amicus Curiae Brief — Colorado v. Spring

hl i lille il i, Ce i Tl,

No. 85-1517

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JOHN LEROY SPRING,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF INDIANA

AND THE COMMONWEALTHS AND STATES

OF GUAM, ILLINOIS, IOWA, LOUISIANA,

MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA,

NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NORTH CAROLINA,

OKLAHOMA, VERMONT, AND WYOMING

LINLEY E.. PEARSON

Attorney General of Indiana

WiLLIAM E. DAILY

Deputy Attorney General

LISA M. PAUNICKA

Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney Genera!

219 State House

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Telephone: (317) 232-6351

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities

Interest of the Amici ¢

Statement of the Case

Argument

Conclusion

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

f {j )

Berken V/ ( j S 104 te | »*

(1984) (

Carter Gar m. 656 F.2d 68. (4th Cir. 1981) (ner

l? mM) i | Ss. YOZ LO? S.( 145%

LOX? (>

( Bri 4, 492 F.2d >, (3d Cir. 1974

denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 1401 (1974)

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) .

Michiga Pucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357 (1974) 2

Miranda Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 woo 7

(1966) oe .. 1,2.3.5,.6.7.8.9

Moran Burb bie No 34 | 1X5 (L) S March LQ. LY) . 6

(Jrego) ; my STOC [] SS 105 S ( t LPRD5 { LYS) 6

United States v. Burger, 728 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1984) 6

No. 85-1517

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term. 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

} Potof

f

JOHN LEROY SPRING

Re

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF INDIANA

AND THE COMMONWEALTHS AND STATES

OF GUAM, ILLINOIS, IOWA, LOUISIANA,

MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA,

NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NORTH CAROLINA,

OKLAHOMA, VERMONT, AND WYOMING

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Twenty years ago in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that the

fruits of custodial interrogation had to be suppressed at

,

?

I

trial unless a defendant had beer irned of his rights to

silence and to counsel! prior 1 | gation. Throughout

the years, the “prophylact f Miranda have

worked well. Indeed, the 1! rofessionalism of

police that has resulted fro: n has benefited

both the police and prosecuto! n preparing cases

Moreover, since Miranda, there are ft alms of coerced

confession in trials where the “coercion” involves police

practices more abusive than violations of the Miranda rule

itself. Due to the rigid, nontechnical guidelines set forth in

Miranda, the range of police behavior has narrowed.

Miranda has aided in the continuing pursuit of a lawful

and just society.

Despite the clarity of Miranda, the Supreme Court of

Colorado appends to the decision an additional

requirement: an individual must be informed of the

charges about which he is to be questioned prior to waiving

his rights. The SupremeCourt of Colorado has also imposed

a duty of inquiry” on interrogating officers when a suspect,

who has waived his rights and agreed to interrogation,

refuses to answer a specific question. The amici curiae

assert that the rulings of the Supreme Court of Colorado

unnecessarily lessen the desired clarity of Miranda and

serve to exclude reliable evidence in cases where a suspect's

procedural or substantive rights have not been violated.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent, John Leroy Spring, was charged with

the first degree murder of Donald Walker. At trial,

evidence established that Walker was shot to death during

an elk hunt, in dhe 1979, while in the company of the

Respondent and Donald Wagner. At the site of the hunt

Walker was asked to walk ahead and to search a ravine for

elk. Wagner iske 1d the Respondent to shine a flashlight in

the direction of Walker. Subsequently, Wagner not only

fired a rifle shot that hit Walker in the head. but als:

approached him and fired a second shot which resulted

Walker’s death.

The Respondent later informed George Dennison, at

informant working with agents of the Federal Bureau of

Al tm Tobacco, and Firearms (hereinafter, ATF)

irder. Dennison related details of the murder, as well as

nformation regarding illegal firearm transactions to ATF

agents. On March 30, 1979, the Respondent was arrested

due to federal firearm charges. The Respondent, twic

advised of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver of righ

form. The Respondent was not informed of the subjec

matter of the impending interrogation. At the conclusion of

the interrogation concerning “pias violations, the

Respondent was questioned about the murder. The

ek td

Respondent denied presence in Colorado and invoiveme:

+L, , _— .

in the murder.

Soon after, the Respondent was charged with murder

and entered a plea of guilty to a federal firearms violation.

On July 13, 1979, ATF agents er “8 Respondent,

ncarcerated in a Kansas City jail. After being advised of

is Miranda rights and told that he |

gi 0 at any time, the Respondent acknowledged that

he | ag omg his rights, but refused to sign a waiver of

rights form without first consulting an attorney. As the

lad ta right Lo cease

soa prepared to leave, the Respondent decided to talk

with them.

Thereafter, a discussion commenced regarding firearms

and explosives, the Respondent’s activities in Colorado, the

Colorado murder, and other crimes of which the

Respondent was a suspect. The Respondent was agai

advised of the option to cease questions. When

Respondent declined to talk about the Walker murder, th

agents changed the subject matter of the questions. The

Respondent, however, told the agents that a.22 caliber gun

that he possessed at the time of his arrest had been removed

from Walker at his death. The Respondent was later

}

convicted of first degree murder, sentenced to _ life

}

/

Imprisonment, and later appealed nis conviction

+

The Court of Appeals of Colorado reversed the

Respondent's conviction on the basis that the March 30,

1979 and July 13, 1979 statements were taken in violation of

the Respoendent’s constitutional rights and that the State

had failed to establish that a statement given on May 26,

1979 was not the fruit of the March 30 statement. Because

the Respondent was not informed, prior to the March 30

and July 13 interviews of the subject matter of the

interrogations, his waivers were not knowingly and

intelligently given. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the

agents, on July 13, improperly continued to question the

Respondent about the murder after he informed them that

he did not want to talk about the subject.

The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the decision of

the Court of Appeals by ruling that the State failed to prove

that the Respondent made a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary waiver of rights since he was not informed of the

subject matter of the interrogations prior to the interviews.

The Supreme Court also ruled the July 13 statement

inadmissible because “[o Jnce the defendant has indicated in

any way that he does not want to answer a question or

questions, the interrogating officers have an affirmative

and emphatic duty to determine whether the suspect is in

fact exercising his privilege against self-incrimination in

all respects, or is merely reluctant to answer particular

questions.”

ARGUMENT

A

In Miranda Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 160

(1966), the Supreme Court set forth a “bright line” test

admissibility which focused on the application of the F

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 1

custod\ interrogation: “| jhe prosecution may not

statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming

from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless

demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effectiv

secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” /d. at 444

86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Supreme Court directed police t

provide “procedural safeguards” when the suspect was

custody and prior to interrogation. The procedu

required that “(prior to any questioning, the person must

be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that an

statement he does make may be used as evidence against

nim, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorne)

either retained or appointed.” Jd. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612

The Court determined that a confession obtained during

custodial interrogation and in the absence of Miranda

warnings conclusively would be presumed the result

police coercion. Because such a confession was presumed

involuntary, it was inadmissible.

In order to provide “concrete constitutional guidelines

for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,’ the

case-by-case examination of police interrogation methods

’

was replaced by a concise requirement that the prescribed

warnings be given. As the Miranda Court stated

“tajssessments of the know ledge the defendant possessed,

-

based on information as to his age, education, intelligenc:

?

tna

7

or prior contact with authorities, can never be more

he Court also stated that “[t]k e defendant may waive effectuat

Lnese rights provided the waiver is n ade vo intariiv. Knowing

intelligently.” /d

id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611

6

speculation; a warning isaclear-cut fact.” /d. at 468-469, 56

S.Ct. at 1624-1625

It is clear that Miranda does not explicitly require that a

person in custody be informed of the charges which the

police are investigating. The language in Miranda is

painstakingly specific regarding the basic constitutional

rights which the police must advise a suspect prior to

questioning. /d. at 467-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-1630, Carter

Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1981)(per curiam) cert

denied, 455 U.S. 952, 102 S.Ct. 1458 (1982), United States

Burger, 728 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1984). Indeed, there is no

indication in Miranda that there must be a warning given

to a suspect concerning the nature of the crime which led to

the interrogation conference, the possible penalty, the

elements of the offense, and other sim lar matters.

Miranda re q' lires that an accuse d be advised of hisr igh ts

so that he may make a rational decision; not nece ssarils the

best decision or one that would be reached only after long

and arduous deliberation.

Moreover. in Moran v. Burbine, No. 84-1485(U.S. March

10, 1986), a suspect was not informed that an attorn

retained by his relatives, was available to him. The Court

ruled that Miranda did not mandate the authorities to so

inform the suspect

No doubt, the additional information would have been

useful to the respondent; perhaps even it might have

affected his decision to confess. But we have never

read the Constitution to require that the pelice suppl)

a suspect with a flow of information to help him

ee eee erest in deciding whether to speak

or stand by his rights

Acco (If. (Jregon _ Els fad [).S. . . LOD S Ct

1285, 1297 (1985). Further, the Court in Berkemer

McCarty, U.S. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), indicated

that the police need not inform a suspect, prior to

suestioning, what the precise nature of the charges may be

The Court refused to accord the Miranda procedural

safeguards based upon a felony misdemeanor distinction

since police are often unaware at the time of the arrest

whether the arrestee committed a misdemeanor or a

felony. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to require

police to determine the nature of the offense as a condition

precedent to proper police procedure. /d., 104S.Ct. at 3146.

Also, as noted in Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d

Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 1401 (1974),

the waiver of Miranda rights does not compe! a suspect to

answer questions. When questioning progresses to an area

of illegal conduct, the person being interrogated may

+

retuse to answer

Finally, the amici curiae submit that the rule imposed by

the Supreme Court of Colorado would severely impair the

efforts of law enforcement officers who often do not know

what laws have been violated until an investigation is

complete. As written, Miranda strikes the proper balance

between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and

the protection of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.

2

I>

The waiver of Miranda rights by a person being

interrogated is not irrevocable. Miranda and its progeny

allow an interrogee to withdraw his waiver and fully assert

nis Fifth Amendment rights in the midst of the

interrogation process. In Miranda, the Supreme Court

stated:

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent

procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in an

manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,

that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must

cease. At this point, he has shown that he intends to

exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege: any

statement taken after the person invokes his privilege

cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle

or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning,

the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the

individual to overcome free choice in producing a

statement after the privilege has been once invoked.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

1627-1628. It is also settled that a suspect may selectively

waive his Fifth Amendment rights by indicating that he

will respond to some questions, but not to others. Under

Miranda, once a person in custody indicates that he wishes

to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. The

Supreme Court, however, rejected this literal

interpretation of Miranda by ruling that the exercise of the

right to remain silent does not preciude all further

questioning. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321

(1975). In Mosley, the Supreme Court refined its Miranda

holding as follows:

A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the

Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the

Court in that case to adopt “fully effective means. . .to

notify the person of his right of silence and to assure

that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously

honored...” 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. The

critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a

person's “right to cut off questioning.” /d. at 474, 86

S.Ct. at 1627. Through the exercise of his option to

terminate questioning he can control the time at which

questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the

duration of the interrogation. The requirement that

law enforcement authorities must respect a person's

exercise of that option counteracts the coerciv

pressures of the custodial setting.

Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326. In the instant cass

the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that interrogat

officers have an affirmative duty to determine if a susp

is exercising his privilege against self-incrimination or

merely reluctant to answer particular questions wher

suspect indicates that he does not wish to answer a quest

or questions. The amici curiae submit that this dut

clarification net only unduly restricts police, b

creates uncertainty.

he additional requirement which the Colorado

Supreme Court has imposed on its state police officers is

isive, procedurally ineffective, and generates intolerable

incertainty. Under the Colorado requirement, police must

carefully assess each word spoken by an interrogee in case

that a later review of a record of proceedings may reveal

words, arguably ambiguous, which possibly show a desire

to remain silent. This requirement also necessitates a case

by-case review which involves a balancing of variables

including the behavior of the police and the subjective

attributes of the suspect

Further, the Colorado rule unnecessarily blurs the

Viranda requirements. Indeed, an interrogee’s

| > . Ps om |

Villingness to answer certain questions and refusal to

speak when he does not so desire evidences an

inderstanding of his rights and his ability to discern those

areas in which he chooses to preserve his silence. The

imposition of the Colorado requirement would risk the

>

ns represented by Miranda v. Arizona

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the peti

. ~ . ' j — . ]

rtiorar! Siiouia be granted

LINLEY E. PEARSON

Attorne i Creneral of |

WILLIAM E. DAILY

Deputu Attorney Genera