Joint Appendix — International Paper Co. v. Ouellette

Supreme Court brief1987

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EPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,

Petitioner,

HARMEL OUELLETTE and Lira OUELLETTE, CLIFTON BROWNE and

Epa BRownz, ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually,

on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all similarly situated

plaintiffs, H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN

THORNDIKE and ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE and

VIRGINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, Jr., and Lois

T. PATTERSON,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SL A TL TE ET TG: EN fA ER

JOINT APPENDIX

ON A BE ERR TEE AE a A ENE UE REE, OCIS SANT RAO PS ARERR Nt seta EES

Roy L. REARDON*

ALBERT X. Baber, Jr.

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT

(a partnership which includes

professional corporations)

One Battery Park Plaza

New York, New York 10004

(212) 483-9000

DINSE, ERDMANN & CLAPP

209 Battery Street

P. O. Box 988

Burlington, Vermont 05402

(802) 864-5751

Counsel for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

PETER F. LANGROCK*

EMILY J. JOSELSON

LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER

& WooL

Drawer 351

Middlebury, Vermont 05753

(802) 388-6356

Counsel for Respondents

JEFFREY L. AMESTOY,

Attorney General

MERIDETH WRIGHT,

Assistant Attorney General

Pavilion Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

(802) 828-3171

Attorneys for State of Vermont as

Class Member

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 22, 1986

CERTIORARI GRANTED MARCH 24, 1986

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Docket Entries: Ouellette v. International Paper

Company, No. 78 Civ. 163, United States District

Court for the District of Vermont

Docket Entries: Ouellette v. International Paper

Company, No. 85 Civ. 7506, United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Order of the United States District Court of Ver-

mont Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Com-

plaint dated April 7, 1980

Opinion and Order of the United States District

Court of Vermont, Ouellette v. International

Paper Company, dated April 24, 1980

Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Cause

of Action dated June 22, 1981

Affidavit of Dana B. Dolloff Sworn to June 22, 1981

in Support of IPCO’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

First Cause of Action (“Dolloff Affidavit”) ...

Exhibit A to Dolloff Affidavit: (1) Stipulation

and Order of Dismissal dated September 23,

1974 in State of Vermont v. State of New

York, 419 U.S. 955 (1974)

PAGE

‘i

(2) Agreement of Settlement between the State

of Vermont and International Paper Company

dated September 23, 1974 (“Two-Party Agree-

EE Sa RESE oo bk bbb whee ces en i.

(3) Agreement of Settlement between the State

of Vermont, the State of New York, Interna-

tional Paper Company, and the United States

of America dated September 23, 1974 (“Four-

£ _« Soak RESIS. | Ges eneeae

Exhibit B to Dolloff Affidavit: National Pollu-

tant Discharge Elimination System Permit

dated November 18, 1974 ..............

Exhibit C to Dolloff Affidavit: Environmental

Protection Agency of the United States Envi-

ronmental Compliance Schedule Letter dated

I a cs

Response of the Environmental Conservation Agen-

cy of the State of Vermont to Defendant Interna-

tional Paper Company’s Questionnaire to Class

Members dated September 23, 1981 .........

Order Granting Motion of the State of Vermont to

Allow Appearance and to Strike Request for Ex-

clusion dated March 23, 1983 ....... aadiss

Letter dated September 25, 1985, from Langrock

Sperry Parker & Wool to Second Circuit, with

attached remarks vy Senator Stafford, entered

into Congressional Record, September 12, 1985

IE SR en ae

Letter dated October 3, 1985, from Davis Polk &

Wardwell to Second Circuit ...............

PAGE

121

146

171

176

181

182

192

oe

United States Department of the Interior Survey

Map, Sediment Studies of South Lake Champlain,

Richard Haupt, p. 4 (1976), Produced by De-

fendant in Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories

I I TD 6 obec dc cccccccccccce

Location Map, Performance of Waste Treatment

Facilities at International Paper Company’s “New

Mill” at Ticonderoga, N.Y., Hydroscienccz, Inc.,

Figure 1 (1972), Produced by Defendant in Re-

sponse to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories on January

De, SE WAS Hb dha ee 608640 sc be vic ee

The following opinions, orders and judgments

have been omitted in printing this Joint Appendix

because they appear in the appendix to the Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court on Janu-

ary 22, 1986.

PAGE

197

198

Page in

Appendix

to Petition

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, Ouellette v. International

Paper Company, No. 85-8506, dated November

rem ao bh send eel elie o én eh 04 9 0-0 4

Opinion and Order of the District Court of Ver-

mont, Ouellette v. International Paper Company,

602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985) ............

Order and Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ouellette v. In-

ternational Paper Company, No. 85-7506, dated

rr ee ns ce mkeasdusese

JA 1

Docket Entries

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ViRMONT

78 Civ. 163

’

v

HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs

and

H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-

DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VIR-

GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lois

T. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.

~*

4

Date NR Proceedings

1978

July 26 1 Filed Verified Petition for Removal.

July 26 2 Filed Bond for Removal.

July 26 3 Filed Notice of Petition for Re-

movai.

July 26 4 Filed Deft’s Answer. rer

July 28 5 Filed Docket entries, Complaint,

Summons and return of service re-

ceived from Addison County Super-

ior Court. rer

Nov. 3

Nov. 3

7

8

11

Proceedings

Filed Plaintiffs’ Objection to Re-

moval. cp

Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in

Support of Objection to Removal.

rpd

Filed Defendant’s Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Remand. cp

Filed Deft’s Certificate of Service re

P#8. rer

Filed Pitfs’ Reply Memorandum to

Deft’s Memorandum in Opposition

to Pitfs’ Motion to Remand. rer

Filed correcte:, copy of Page 2 of

Plaintiffs’ Reply Memo (P#10).

cp

In Chambers, Court advises counsel

of his personal concern of the lake

conditions (he feels he may be ob-_

jective in this matter). Peter Lang-

rock, Esq. and Susan Humphreys,

Esq. for plaintiffs; John Dinse, Esq..,

Spencer Knapp, Esq., James W.B.

Benkard, (Ms) Jamie Stern, Esq.

and Robert M. Hunziker, Esq. for

defendants.

All counsel state that they have no

qualms about the court deciding

this matter—Court to go forward in

this case.

Date

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

24

29

NR

12

13

14

15

16

JA 3

Proceedings

In open Court, hearing on plaintiffs’

“objection to removal” considered

by the court as a motion to remand.

ORDERED: Motion denied. Plain-

tiff has 90 days from today to file

motion for class action determina-

tion. gc

Filed motion of Pitfs and H. Vaughn

Griffin, Sr., Ardath Griffin, Alan

Thorndike & Ellen Thorndike, pro-

posed intervenors, to intervene.

Filed memorandum in Support of

motion to intervene.

At the Call of the Calendar before

Judge Coffrin, it was

Ordered: Case continued for term;

no further continuances granted.

Filed Order— Motion of H. Vaughn

Griffin, Sr., Ardath Griffin, Alan

Thorndike & Ellen Thorndike to

Intervene as party pltfs. granted.

Mailed copy to Attys. rer

Filed Deft’s Consent to granting of

Pitfs’ Motion for Intervention, P#

12. rer

Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Allow

Wesley C. Larrabee, Virginia Larra-

bee, F. Alfred Patterson, Jr., and

Lois T. Patterson to Intervene as

Plaintiffs. cp

Date

Dec. 22

Dec. 22

1979

Jan. 16

Jan. 16

Jan 16

Jan. 29

Jan. 29

Jan. 31

Feb. 11

23

24

JA 4

Proceedings

Filed Pitfs’ Interrogatories to Deft.

International Paper—First Set.

Filed Order motion to intervene as

party pltfs of Wesley C. & Virginia

Larabee, F. Alfred & Lois T. Patter-

son is granted. Copy to Attys.

Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Class De-

termination.

Filed Pltfs’ Memo in support of

P#19.

Filed Pitfs’ Certificate of Service re

P#19&20. rer

Filed Deft’s Motion for extension

of time for filing Memo in Opposi-

tion to Pitfs’ Motion for Class Ac-

tion, by 50 days.

Filed Deft’s Memo in support of

P#22. rer

Filed Stipulation—that the time for

defendant International Paper Com-

pany to answer or object to Plain-

tiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant

International Paper Co.—First Set

is extended from January 23, 1979

to February 22, 1979. cp

Upon consideration of Stipulation,

P#24, it is So Ordered that the

time be extended from January 23,

1979 to February 22, 1979. Mailed

copy to Attys. rar

Date

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

6

; oa

13

28

28

28

NR

25

27

28

29

30

31

JA 5

Proceedings

Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel

Defendant to Respond to Interroga-

torics—First Set dated (12/21/78):

Memo in Support of Motion.

Filed Order—-Deft’s Motion for Ex-

tension of Time for filing Memo in

Opposition to Pitfs’ Motion for

Class Action granted; Deft. to file

Memo on or before 4-24-79. Mailed

copy to attys. rer

Filed Deft’s Memorandum of Law

in Opposition to Pitfs’ Motion to

Compel Answers to Pitfs’ Interroga-

tories—with Exhibit 1 attached.

Filed Affidavit of James B. Ben-

kard, dated March 12—with Ex-

hibits “A” and “B” attached. gjl

Filed Affidavit of Jean Anderson,

Town Clerk of Shoreham, dated

March 26—wWith attached lists of

all landowners with property bor-

dering Lake Champlain in the

Town of Shoreham.

Filed Affidavit of Richard L. Ros-

corla, Town Clerk of Bridport,

dated March 22—With attached

lists of all lake shore land owners

of the Town of Bridport.

Filed Affidavit of Jane B. Grace,

Town Clerk of Addison, dated

March 22—wWith attached lists of

all lake shore land owners of the

Town of Addison.

Date

Mar. 28

April 19

April 19

April 27

April 27

May |!

May 1

May 9

May ‘0

May 11

NR

32

33

34

35

36

JA 6

Proceedings

Filed Certificate of Service for pgs.

#29, 30&31. gil

In open Court before Judge Coffrin,

hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to com-

pel. Peter Langrock, Esq. for plain-

tiffs; James W.B. Benkard, Esq. for

defendant.

Ordered: Motion denied.—Court

directs counsel to get together and

narrow the discovery area. gc

Filed Deft’s Memo in Opposition to

maintenance of case as class action.

Filed Affidavit of Robert J. Bachor-

ik with Exhibits A & B attached,

submitted by deft. rer

At the Call of the Calendar before

Judge Coffrin, it was

Ordered: Case continued. cb

Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Extension of

Time (14 days) in which to respond

by filing Memo in Opposition to

Deft’s Memo of Law in Opposition

to Maintenance of case as class ac-

tion, P#33. re

Based upon the foregoing Motion,

it is ORMZRED: granted. Copies

mailed to attys. gl

Filed Deft International Paper’s

Consent to Pitfs’ Motion for Exten-

sion of Time etc., P#35. rer

Date

June

19

52

JA 7

Proceedings

Filed Pitfs’ Reply Memo on Class

Certification Issue. rer

Filed Deposition of Lois Patterson.

Filed Deposition of F. Alfred Pat-

terson, Jr.

Filed Deposition of Clifton Browne.

Filed Deposition of Edla Browne.

Filed Deposition of Harmel Ouel-

lette.

Filed Deposition of Lila Ouellette.

Filed Deposition of Wesley Larra-

bee.

Filed Deposition of Virginia Larra-

bee. :

Filed Deposition of Ellen Thorn-

dike.

Filed Deposition of Alde Plooffe.

Filed Deposition of Shirley Plooffe.

Filed Deposition of Ardath Garrett

Griffin.

Filed Deposition of H. Vaughn Grif-

fin, Sr. gl

Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend

Compiaint with Memorandum in

Support. cp

Filed Defendant’s Memorandum of

Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’

Motion to Amend. gl

NR

53

54

JA 8

Proceedings

At the Call of the Calendar before

Judge Coffrin, it was

Ordered: Case passed until motions

heard.

Filed Deft’s Answers & Objections

to Pltfs’ Ist Set of Interrogatories,

P#17. rer

Calendar call before J udge Coffrin,

it was

Ordered: Case passed.

In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on plaintiffs’ motion to amend

Complaint. Peter Langrock, Esq.

and Susan Humphreys, Esq. for

plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,

James W.B. Benkard, Esq., Robert

M. Hunziker, Esq. and Kevin Sim-

mons, Esq. for defendant.

Ordered: Motion granted.

Hearing on motion for class Certi-

fication.

Statements made by Mr. Langrock

and by Mr. Benkard.

Taken under advisement. gc

Filed defendant's supplementary

memorandum of law in Opposition

to maintenance of this case as a

class action. gc

Date

Apr. 24

June

16

23

NR

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

JA 9 ,

Proceedings

Filed Opinion and Order—Certifi-

cation of Air Class—DENIED. Cer-

tification of Water Class AFFIRMED

for lakeshore owners in Towns of

Bridport and Shoreham. Counsel to

prepai. Notice to class members

and submit to court 21 days from

the date of this Order. Copy to

attorneys. cp

Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Reconsider-

ation.

Filed Pitfs’ Memo in support of P#

56 w/map attached.

Filed Pitfs’ Affidavit of Susan F.

Humphrey, Esq., in re P#56. rer

Filed Deft’s Motion for Amendment

of Opinion & Order.

Filed Deft’s Memo in support of P

#59 & Memo in Opposition to P

#56, Pitfs’ Motion for Reconsider-

ation. rer

Filed Affidavits of Susan F. Humph-

rey. rpd

Filed Stip.—Deft. Consents to en-

largement of class to inc. property

owners in Addison (south of Crown

Pt. Bridge) re P#56 & inre P#5S5,

Opinion & Order, & P#59, Deft’s

Mot:.on to Amend same, Pitfs’ have

no objections to modification but

Date

July 16

Aug. 13

Aug. 18

NR

63

64

JA 10

Proceedings

reserve right to challenge defenses

raised by deft. as not individual

with ORDER granting same thereon.

Mailed cpy/attys. rer

ORDERED: Notice to Class Mem-

bers should follow the format in

this order. 2. Pitts’ to prepare nec-

essary number of notices. 3. Pltfs’

shall address envelopes affix postage

and submit them to Clerk for stuf-

fing and mailing. 4. Pitfs’ shall also

cause to be prepared a return post-

card as described in the order. 5.

The notices, envelopes and cards

Shall be supplied to the Clerk’s Of-

fice for processing or before 8-29-

80. 6. Pltfs’ shall also furnish to

the Clerk, with copy to counsel a

typewritten list of the names and

addresses of all persons to whom

the envelopes are addressed. Copy

to Attys. gww

Filed copy of approved Notice to

Class Members. Mailed Original to

Attorney Eaton for further action.

cb

In Chambers before Judge Coffrin,

informal conference re differences

of counsel with respect to the lan-

guage in the notices. Peter Lang-

rock, Esq. for plaintiffs; Spencer

Knapp, Esq. for defendant.

JA il

Date NR Proceedings

Aug. 25 65 ‘Filed Plaintiff's letter with an at-

tached alphabetical list by towns of

lakeshore owners whom they ad-

dressed envelopes to receive the No-

tice pursuant to ORDER dated Jul

16, 1980, P#63. cp

Aug. 27 66 =‘ Filed Clerk’s Cert. of Serv. re No-

tices mailed to class members con-

cerning Oxder, P#63; list attach.

Mailed cpy/Cert. to attys.

Oct. 1 67 Filed List of Member Pltfs request-

ing exclusion in this action. cp

Oct. 1 68 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Of Freder-

ick deG. Harlow, Esq. for Paschal

F. and Esther D. Mondella, Class

members. gww

Oct. 3 69 INTERROGATORIES by Deft to all

Listed Pitfs & Class Members.

Oct. 3 70 CERTIFICATE of Service by Deft for

P#69. gww

Oct. 3 71 Request for Exclusion from Class

of Guy E. Smith. gww

Oct. 7 At the Call of the Calendar before

Judge Coffrin, it was

Ordered: Case continued.

Oct. 14 72 Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Pro-

tective Order.

Oct. 14 73 Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of

Law in Support of P#72. cp

Oct. 16

Oct. 27

Oct. 31

NR

74

75

76

77

78

JA 12

Proceedings

Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Contact

Lessees.

Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in

Support of P#74. cp

Filed Stiy.—Parties consent to ex-

tension o{ time (to 10-31-80) in

which deft. may file Memo in re-

sponse to P#72, Pitfs’ Motion for

Protective Order. rr

OrRDER—Stipulation, P#76, is so

Ordered. Copy to Attorneys. rpd

Filed Defendant’s Memorandum of

Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Mo-

tion for a Protective Order, P#72.

Filed Defendant’s Certificate of

Service. cp

Request for Exclusion from class

action of Nicholas Biscoe. rr

Mailed Ltr to Messers Burrell and

Dolphin, possible class members ad-

vising them of their right as lessees

to Revoke their previous requests

for exclusion. (P#67) Reply card

to be returned to Clerk of Court

within 10 days.

In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on plaintiffs’ motion for protec-

tive order. Susan Eaton, Esq. for

plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,

James Benkard, Esq. and Kevin

Simmons, Esg. for defendant.

JA 13

Date NR Proceedings

Dec. 15 Matter held under advisement.

Court suggests that counsel work

out a modified method of discovery

or interrogatories. (Counsel to ad-

vise the court as to the status of the

matter) gc

Dec. 16 80 = Filed Pltfs’ Response to Question 6

of Deft’s First set of Interrogatories.

rpd

Dec. 22 81 Filed Letter dated 12-17-80 from

Pitfs’ attorney relative to inclusion

of Mrs. Ethel Kelley as a class mem-

ber of this law suit. rer

1981

Feb. 6 82 Filed Letter to counsel from Clerk

re inclusion of Mrs. Ethel Kelley as

a class member (refer to pp. 81 and

67). cb

June 22 83 Filed defendant’s Notice of motion

to dismiss.

June 22 84 Filed Memorandum of law in sup-

port of defendant’s motion to dis-

miss =laintiffs’ first cause of action.

gc

June 22 Status Conference held. Peter Lang-

rock, Esq. and Susan Eaton, Esq.

for plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,

James Benkard, Esq. and Ms. Jamie

Stern, Esq. for defendant.

nN

Statements made by counsel.

June 2

Date

June 22

June 22

July 23

Aug. 5

Sep. 25

1982

Feb. |!

Mar. 16

NR

85

87

89

JA 14

Proceedings

Ordered: plaintiffs have 30 days to

respond to defendant’s motion to

dismiss (paper # 83); defendant

has an additional 10 days thereafter

to file reply memorandum.

Court will subsequently set a date

for hearing on defendant’s motion

to dismiss and further preliminary

conference as to how the case

should be tried. gc

Filed plaintiffs’ memorandum of

law in opposition to defendant’s mo-

tion to dismiss. gc

Fiied defendant’s reply memeoran-

dum of law in support of defen-

dant’s motion to dismiss piaintiffs’

first cave? of action. gc

LETTER ‘rom Atty Eaton stating

that Phiuip Small of Shoreham

shouid be removed from list of class

members.

LETTER dated 1-28-82 from Law-

rence and Wanda Krause stating

new address is 3471 Bender Ave-

nue, Akron, Ohio 44319. rer

Copy to attys. gww

LETTER change of ownership of

classmember from Howard, Leonard

A., Jr., and Virginia to Holzinger,

Ulrich G. and Jean M. gww

Date

May 7

May 7

May 20

May 26

July 1

July 1

Sep. 24

Sep. 24

93

94

JA 15

Proceedings

MoTION to Reconsider Denial of

Air Crass by Pitfs.

MEMORANDUM in support of P#

90. gww

STIPULATION that deft be granted

an extension of time, until 7-1-82,

in which to file a memorandum of

law in opposition to pltfs’ Motion

to Reconsider Denial of Class Cer-

tification of the Air Class, P#56.

rer

ORDER—STIPULATION—SO OR-

DERED. Cy to attys. (re: P#92)

cp

MEMORANDUM in Opposition to

Pitfs’ Motion to Reconsider Denial

of Class Certification of the Air

Class, P# 91, with attachments.

rer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re P#93.

rer

In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on plaintiffs’ motion to recon-

sider denial of class certification of

the Air Class. Peter Langrock, Esq.

and Susan Eaton, Esq. for plaintiffs;

James W. B. Benkard, Esq. and

John Dinse, Esq. for defendant.

Statements made to court by coun-

sel.

Date

Sep. 24

Oct. 29

Nov.

26

13

13

17

22

NR

95

96

97

98

99

100

JA 16

Proceedings

Taken under advisement. gc

OPINION AND ORDER — AWC —

Pitfs directed to identify potential

class members (members of the cer-

tified water class who have not opted

out) with 21 days of this order.

Pitfs and Deft are directed to jointly

prepare a draft of proposed notice

to class members and submit it to

court for consideration. Cy to par-

ties. rer

ORDER (copy)—AWC—approviug

NoTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS.

Mailed original to Attorney Eaton

for further action. cb

ORDER (ORIGINAL )—AWC—aprov-

ing NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS, &

sample of Notice as mailed.

MAILED NOTICE To CLASS MEM-

BERS pursuant to order P#97. gww

Appress List (updated) for class

members. Notices remailed 12-17-

82 by GWW. rer

AppREss List (updated) for class

members. Notices remailed |2-17-

82 by GWW. gww

REQUESTS for exclusion from air

class (attachments) as certified by

Clerk. rer Mailed cy to attys.

Date

Feb. 7

Feb. 28

Mar. 8

Mar. 8

Mar. 24

1984

April 4

April 9

NR

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

JA 17

Proceedings

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE of John

H. Chase, Assistant Atty General,

for State of VT Depts. of Fish

& Game and Forests, Parks and

Recreation. jj

REQUESTS for exclusion re Law-

rence and Wanda Krause and Wal-

ter and Helen Welch with letter

dated 2-21-83 from Atty Eaton ad-

dressing the question of late exclu-

sions and situation as to Patricia

Noll. rer

Motion & MEMo to ailow appear-

ance and to Strike Request for Ex-

clusion by VT Atty General.

AFFIDAVIT of John H. Chase. gl

ORDER—AWC—Upon consiveration

of P#103, it is hereby OrDERED:

That said motion be granted. The

appearance of the Atty General of

the State of VT for the State of VT.

Dept. of Forests and Parks, shall be

allowed and the request for exclu-

sion previously filed on behalf of

the Dept of Forests and Parks shall

be stricken. Cy to attys. jj

LETTER dated 4/2/84 in support

of Deft International Paper Com-

pany’s motion to dismiss pltfs’ First

Cause of Action. amn

LETTER dated 4/9/84 in RESPONSE

by Pitfs. (re: P#106) cp

Date

April 12

May 1

May 21

June 1

Aug. 16

Nov. 26

Nov. 26

Nov. 26

NR

108

109

110

11]

112

JA 18

Proceedings

ORDER—AWC—Defts to have until

5-1-84 in which to file additional

brief and Pitfs to have until 5-23-84

in which to file responsive briefs.

Cy to parties. rer

MEMORANDUM, Supplemental, in

support of Defts Motion to Dismiss

Pitfs’ First Cause of Action, P# 83.

rer

MEMORANDUM, Supplemental, in

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by

Pitfs re P#83. rer

LETTER dated 5/29/84 from Atty.

James Benkard as a Reply Memo-

randum to Mitfs’ Supplemental

Memorandum. (Re: P#83 and

110) cab

LETTER dated 8-14-84 from Atty.

James Benkard—with attachments

—in support of Motion to Dismiss,

P# 83. rer

In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff's first cause of action. Peter

Langrock, Esq., Susan Eaton, Esq.

for plaintiff; John Chase, Esq. for

the state; James Benkard, Esq.,

Jamie Stern, Esq. and Austin Hart,

Esq. for defendant.

Statements made by counsel.

Taken under advisement. gc

Date

1985

Feb. 5

Feb. 19

Feb. 20

Mar. 5

Mar. 14

April 3

April 23

May 6

NR

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

JA 19

Proceedings

ORDER—AWC—Deft’s_ motion to

dismiss is denied. Cys to attys. cab

MOTION for Certi‘ication pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to amend

Court’s Order to permit an inter-

locutory appeal and For Stay with

MEMORANDUM by Deft. (P#113)

wi

MEMORANDUM in SUPPORT by Deft.

(P#114) wf

MEMORANDUM in Opposition to

Motion for Certification and Stay by

Pitf. (P#114) wf

MEMORANDUM (Reply) in support

of Motion for Certification and

Stay Deft (P#114). amn

APPEARANCE of Merideth Wright,

Ass’t Attorney General for State of

Vermont, Substituting for John H.

Chose, Esq. rer

STARTEw FOLDER NO. 5

Plaintiff class member State of Ver-

mont’s position in opposition to de-

fendant’s motion for certification

and stay. gc

In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on defendant's motion for cer-

tificate pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Sec.

1292(b).

June

June

June

June

20

11

1]

12

24

24

NR

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

JA 20

Proceedings

Statements made by Mr. Benkard.

Ordered: Motion granted; defendant

to prepare a proposed order for

Court’s signature (to be reviewed

by Plaintiffs’ counsel).

Court suggests that defendant pur-

sue the class certification of the air

class. gc

OrDER—AWC—Granting Motion

for Certification to permit an inter-

locutory appeal. Cy to attys. cp

NoTICE OF MOTION to Dismiss

MEMORANDUM in Support of Deft’s.

motion to Dismiss Pltf’s. Second

Cause of Action (P#121)

AFFIDAVIT of Allen Cawrse (P#

121) lf

Motion for Extension of Time

within which to Respond to P# 122

by pitfs. jj

ORDERED — AWC — Motion

Granted. Pitfs to respond by 7/23/

85. Cy to attys. jj

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM Of Pitfs

(P# 124). rer

OrDER—2d. Cir. entered 6-18-85—

Permission to Appeal pursuant to

28 USC § 1292(b) is granted. cb

Received $65 docketing fee for ap-

peal from Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp.

JA 21

Docket Entries

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

85 Civ. 7506

-¢

HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OQUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE, EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY

PLouFFE, individually, on behalf of themselves, and on

behalf cf all similarly situated plaintiffs, H. VAUGHN

CRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORNDIKE and

ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE and VIRGINIA

LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR. and Lois T.

PATTERSON,

Date

05-28-85

05-28-85

05-28-85

05-29-85

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

—

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,

Defendant-A ppellant.

+

vv

Filings—Proceedings

Movant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY No-

tice of Motion for Lease to Appeal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), filed.

Movant INTL. PAPER Co. memo of law in sup-

port of motion received.

Movant INTL. PAPER Co. Notice of Motion for

permission to exceed page limitation in second

circuit rule 27(a) (2) (b), filed.

Order granting the movants motion for permis-

sion to exceed pg. limit etc., filed. (By: ALK).

Date

05-29-85

05-31-85

06-05-85

06-18-85

06-21-85

06-26-85

06-26-85

06-26-85

06-28-85

07-01-85

07-17-85

07-22-85

07-22-85

08-12-85

JA 22

Filings—Proceedings

Movant INTL. PAPER Co. memo of law in sup-

port of 1292b motion, filed.

Respondents HARMEL QUELLETTE ef al. An-

swer to Movant’s Petition for Permission to

Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) filed

(w/pfs) (all ccs to Calendar Unit).

Movant INTL. PAPER Co. Reply Memorandum

in support of its motion for leave to appeal,

filed. (orig & 3cc Calendaring).

Order granting the appellant INTERNATIONAL

PAPER COMPANY Motion for leave to appeal.

filed. (By: EAVG, GCP, & EDR, US Cit).

Certified copy of the order filed on 6-18-85

issued to the district court, Vermont.

Copy of receipt re: Payment of docketing fee in

district court filed.

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

Form C (filed w/pfs).

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

Form D filed.

Scheduling Order No. 1, filed.

Copy of district court docket entries, filed.

Record on appeal original district court papers

filed.

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

briefs filed w/pfs.

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

joint appendices filed w/pfs.

Appellee’s HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA

OUELLETTE briefs filed (w/p/s).

Date

08-19-85

08-21-85

08-21-85

08-23-85

08-23-85

08-04-85

09-01-85

10-17-85

11-04-85

11-04-85

JA 23

Filings—Proceedings

Movant Atty. General of the State of New York,

amicus curiae motion for leave to file brief out

of time and to participate in oral argument filed.

(see order filed 8-23-85)

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER motion for

extension of time to file reply brief pursuant to

FRAP w/pfs filed.

See order filed 8/23/85. 14 days after 9/3.

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co. memo-

randum in response to motion to file a amicus

brief w/pfs filed. (see order filed 8-15-85)

Order granting appellant INTERNATIONAL

PAPER Co. motion for cross-motion for exten-

sion of time to file reply brief pursuant to

F.R.A.P. 26 b) filed.

Order granting amicus curiae Atty Gen. of the

State of New York motion for leave to file

amicus curiae out of time and INT’L PAPER is

given 14 days thereafter to file its reply brief,

filed.

Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co. reply

brief filed (w/pfs).

Letter of State of Vermont adopting the points

and arguments of appellee Ouellette brief filed.

Case heard before Kaufman, Pratt, Miner,

C.JJ.

Judgment affirmed by published signed opinion

per curiam.

Judgment filed.

Date

11-19-85

12-05-85

12-10-85

12-10-85

01-30-86

03-27-86

04-14-86

JA 24

Filings—Proceedings

Appellee’s HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA

QUELLETTE itemized and verified bill received

(w/pfs) [federal expressed, per D.G.}.

Mandate (judgment, opinion) issued to VT.

Appellees HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA

QUELLETTE statement of costs filed.

Certified copy of statement of costs issued with

letter.

Notice of filing of petition for writ of certiorari,

petitioner INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,

Supreme Court docket No. 85-1233, filed.

Certified copy of order of Supreme Court grant-

ing petition for writ of certiorari, filed.

Certified original record and proceedings (Dis-

trict Court and US Court of Appeals sent to

Supreme Court).

JA 25

Summons

ADDISON SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF VERMONT

ADDISON COUNTY, SS

Civil Action, Docket No.

@

¥

HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, on behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,

V.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

ry

To the above named defendant(s):

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon

Peter F. Langrock, Esquire, plaintiffs attorney, whose

address is Langrock Sperry Parker and Stahl, P.O. Drawer

351, Middlebury, Vermont 05753, in answer to the com-

plaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days

after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day

of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be

taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

Your answer must be filed with the court. Unless the relief

demanded in the complaint is for damage covered by a li-

ability insurance policy under which the insurer has the right

or obligation to conduct the defense, or unless otherwise

provided in Rule 13(a), your answer must state as a

JA 26

counterclaim any related claim which you may have against

the plaintiff, or you will thereafter be barred from making

Dated: 3d June 1976

/s/ PETER F. LANGROCK, ESQUIRE

Pla.atiff’s Attorney

Peter F. Langrock, Esquire

Served on 7-5-78

Deputy Sheriff

JA 27

Complaint

ADDISON SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF VERMONT

ADDISON COUNTY

Docket No.

4

¥

HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, »n behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,

V.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

COMPLAINT

Now~come the Plaintiffs, HARMEL OUELLETTE and

LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE,

ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, on

behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all similarly situated

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Peter F. Langrock,

Esquire, of the law firm of Langrock Sperry Parker and

Stahl, and complain as follows:

First CAUSE OF ACTION

CountT I

1. Plaintiffs Harmel Ouellette, Lila Ouellette, Clifton

Browne, Edla Browne, Aldee Plouffe, Shirley Plouffe, are

citizens of the Town of Bridport, County of Addison, State

of Vermont.

2. Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws

of the State of New York with its principal place of business

JA 28

in the state of New York, and registered to do business in

Vermont.

3. Plaintiffs bring this Court of this action on behalf

of themselves and, under Rule 23 of the Vermont Rules

of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other Lake Champlain

lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees similarly sit-

uated and located in the Towns of Shoreham, Bridport

and Addison, County of Addison, State of Vermont; the

said lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees in the

Towns of Shoreham, Bridport and Addison number ap-

proximately 250 and it is therefore impracticable to bring

them all before this Court.

4. There are questions of law and fact common to the

entire class of lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees

similarly situated and located in the Towns of Addison,

Bridport and Shoreham; the claims of the plaintiffs herein

are typical of the claims of the said class; and the plaintiffs

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of and rep-

resent said class; the common questions of law and fact

predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members, and a class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this con-

troversy.

5. The Defendant, International Paper Company, oper-

ates and has operated a pulp and paper making plant ap-

proximately four miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga,

‘New York.

6. At all times material hereto the Defendant, Inter-

national Paper Company, has discharged pulp and paper

making waste from said plant into Lake Champlain.

7. Said wastes exceed the capacity of Lake Champlain

to assimilate them and are detrimental to the Lake, and its

fish and plant life.

JA 29

8. Said discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aes-

thetically unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around

and adjacent to Plaintiffs’ lakeshore properties, and the

lakeshore properties of other members of the class, make

said waters turbid, and make them unfit for recreational

use.

9. Said discharges constitute a continuing nuisance to

the Plaintiffs and other members of the class, and interfere

with their use and enjoyment of their property and have

diminished and will continue to diminish the fair market

value and rental value of their property.

WHERGFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

other members of the Class, pray for judgment in the

amount of TWENTY MILLION Do.Lars ($20,000,000.00),

together with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and

for such other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs

request trial by jury.

Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief

be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate

all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws

water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be in

direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets

on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from

its manufacturing operations that have been treated through

its waste treatment system.

Count II

1. Plaintiffs realiege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I

of the First Cause of Action.

2. On November 18, 1974, the Regional Administrator

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Region II made a final determination pursuant to Section

JA 30

402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972, 33 USC § 1342, to issue a National Pol-

lutant Discharge Elimination System permit for the dis-

charge of pollutants from the said plant into. Lake

Champlain (permit numbers NY 002 0036 and NY 000

4413), said permit to be effective on December 31, 1974.

Said permit was later amended effective March 15, 1977.

3. Defendant, International Paper Company, has con-

sistently, knowingly and deliberately violated the terms of

this permit by discharging into Lake Champlain waste

materials in excess of the amounts specified under the

permit.

4. These discharges, in violation of the permit, exceed

the capacity of Lake Champlain to assimilate them and

are detrimental to the Lake and its fish and plant life. These

discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically

unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around and adjacent

to Plaintifs’ lakeshore properties, and the lakeshore pro-

perties of other members of the class, make said waters

turbid, and make them unfit for recreational use. Said

discharges interfere with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of

their property and have decreased the market value and

rental value of their property.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

other members of the Class, pray for judgment in the

amount of TWENTY MILLION DoLLars ($20,000,000.00),

together with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and for

such other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs re-

quest trial by jury.

Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief

be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate

all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws

water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be

JA 31

in direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets

on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from

its manufacturing operations that have been treated through

its waste treatment system.

Count III

1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 8 of Count I

of the First Cause of Action.

2. The uses of the waters of Lake Champlain by the

defendant as aforesaid are unreasonable and in violation

of the rights of the Plaintiffs and other members of the

class to the use of said waters as riparian owners.

3. The Defendant, as a proximate result of the afore-

Said use, has damaged and permanently reduced the value

of the riparian rights of the Plaintiffs and other members

of the Class in that the Defendant has impaired the recrea-

tional value of the waters of Lake Champlain in, around,

and adjacent to the lakeshore properties of the Plaintiffs

and other members of the class, in that the Defendant has

so polluted said waters that they are unfit for any reasonable

use.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

other members of the Class, vray for judgment against the

Defendant in the amount of TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS

($20,000,000.00) together with interest and costs and

attorneys’ fees, and for such other relief as this Court deems

proper. Plaintiffs request trial by jury.

Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief

be granted: That this Court order Defen4@nt to relocate

all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws

water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be

in direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets

JA 32

on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from

its manufacturing operations that have been treated through

its waste treatment system.

\

Count IV

1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 5 of Count I

of the First Cause of Action.

2. At all times material hereto, the Defendant, Inter-

national Paper Company, in violation of its duty to other

lakeshore property owners has negligently discharged pulp

and paper making waste into Lake Champlain.

3. Said wastes exceed the capacity of Lake Champlain

to assimilate them and are detrimental to the Lake and its

fish and plant life.

4. Said discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and

aesthetically unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around

and adjacent to Plaintiffs’ lakeshore properties, and the

lakeshore properties of other members of the class, make

said waters turbid, and make them unfit for recreational

use.

5. Said discharges interfere with Plaintiffs’ use and en-

joyment of their property and have diminished and will

continue to diminish the fair market value and rental value

of their property.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other

members of the Class, pray for judgment in the amount of

TWENTY MILLION DoLLars ($20,000,000.00), together

with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and for such

other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs request

trial by jury.

Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief

be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate

JA 33

ail water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws

water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be in

direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets

on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from

its manufacturing operations that have been treated through

its waste treatment system. .

CouNT V

l. Plhintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 9 of Count I,

Paragraphs 2 through 4 of Count II, Paragraphs 2 through

3 of Count III and Paragraphs 2 through 5 of Count IV,

of the First Cause of Action.

2. The Defendant had and has the means at its reason-

able disposal of dealing with the waste and pollutants of its

plant so as not to affect the interests of the Plaintiffs and

other members of the class, but has failed and continues

to fail to use such means.

3. Defendant deliberately located said plant on Lake

Champlain, which plant became operational in 1971, know-

ing full well from its experience with its old plant, located

in the Village of Ticonderoga, New York, that Lake

Champlain is unable to assimilate said discharges. ;

4. The actions of the Defendant as set forth above were

and are malicious, willful, and undertaken with reckless and

wanton disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

all members of the Class, pray that they be awarded puni-

tive and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE

HUNDRED MILLION DoLtars ($100,000,000.00).

The Plaintiffs further pray that such sums as are awarded

for such exemplary and punitive damages be set aside for

the benefit of encouraging a pollution-free environment

JA 34

in the area of Lake Champlain and its tributaries, under

such terms and conditions as are set forth by this Court

or, in the alternative, that such funds be distributed in

equal amiounts among the Class; and the Plaintiffs further

pray that this matter be tried by jury.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Count |

1. Plaintiffs Harmel Ouellette, Lila Ouellette, Clifton

Browne, Edla Browne, Aldee Plouffe, Shirley Plouffe, are

citizens of the Town of Bridport, County of Addison, State

of Vermont.

2. Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws

of the State of New York with its principal place of busi-

ness in the state of New York, and registered to do business

in Vermont.

3. Plaintiffs bring this Count of this action on behalf

of themselves and, under Rule 23 of the Vermont Rules

of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other residents and

property owners and lessees similarly situated and located

in the Towns of Shoreham, Bridport, Addison, and Orwell,

County of Addison, State of Vermont; the said residents,

property owners, and lessees number approximately 3,150

and it is therefore impracticable to bring them all before

the Court.

4. There are questions of law and fact common to the

entire class of residents, property owners, and lessees located

in the Towns of Addison, Bridport, Shoreham, Orwell; the

claims of the Pl. tiffs herein are typical of the claims

of the said class; and the Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately

protect the interest of and represent said class; the common

questions of law and fect predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and a class action is

‘i

JA 35

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy.

5. At all times material hereto, the Defendant, Inter-

| national Paper Company, operates and has operated a pulp

and paper making plant approximately four miles north of

the Village of Ticonderoga, New York.

6. Said plant discharges, smoke, fumes and other dis-

charges, which smoke, fumes and other discharges are foul,

unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically unpleasing. Said smoke

and fumes travel across Lake Champlain to the Towns of

Shoreham, Bridport, Addison and Orwell. The presence

of said smoke and fumes and other discharges in Plaintiffs’

town and in the towns of other members of the class, has

impaired their health and that of their families and has

diminished and will continue to diminish the fair market

value and rentai value of their property. Said smoke and

fumes and other discharges constitute a nuisance, and inter-

fere with Plaintiffs’ and other class members’ use and

enjoyment of their property.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

other members of the class, demand judgment against the

Defendant in the amount of Sixty -Two MILLION DoLLaRs

($62,000,000.00), together with interest and costs and at-

torneys’ fees. Plaintiffs request trial by jury.

Count II

1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I of

the Second Cause of Action.

2. Defendant, International Paper Company, in viola-

tion of its duty to Plaintiffs and other members of the class,

negligently discharges smoke and fumes and other dis-

charges from said plant, which smoke and fumes and other

JA 36

discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically un-

pleasing. Said smoke and fumes and other discharges travel

across Lake Champlain to the Towns of Shoreham, Brid-

port, Addison and Orwell. The presence of said smoke

and fumes in Plaintiffs’ town and in the towns of other

members of the class, has impaired their health and that

of their families and has diminished and will continue to

diminish the fair market value and rental value of their

property. Said smoke and fumes and other discharges in-

terfere with Plaintiffs’ and other ciass members’ use and

enjoyment of their property.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

other members of the class, demand judgment against the

Defendant ‘1 the amount of Sixty-Two MILLION DOLLARS

($62,000,' )0.00), together with interest and costs and

attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs request’ trial by jury.

CounT Il

1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though

specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I

and Paragraph 2 of Count II of the Second Cause of Action.

2. The Defendant had and has the means at its reason-

able disposal of dealing with the smoke and fumes and other

discharges of its plant so as to not affect the interests of the

Plaintiffs and other members of the class, but it has failed

and continues to fail to use such means.

3. The actions of the Defendant, as set forth above,

are malicious, willful, and undertaken with reckless and

wanton disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and

all members of the class, pray that they be awarded puni-

tive and exemplary damages in the amount ONE HUNDRED

MILLION DoLiars ($100,000,000.00).

ere

JA 37

Plaintiffs further pray that such sums as are awarded

for such exemplary and punitive damages be set aside for

the benefit of encouraging a pollution free atmosphere in

the Towns of Addison, Shoreham, Bridport, Orwell; or in

the alternative that such funds be distributed in equal

amounts among the members of the class.

Plaintiffs request trial by jury.

DaTED at Middlebury, in the County of Addison and

State of Vermont this 30th day of June, 1978.

LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER AND STAHL

By /S/ PETER F. LANGROCK, EsQuirRE

Peter F. Langrock, Esquire

A Member of the Firm

P.O. Drawer 351

Middlebury, Vermont 05753

[Affidavit of Service omitted in printing]

JA 38

Answer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF VERMONT

«

HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLouFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,

Defendant.

“~~

vv

Defendant International Paper Company, by its attorneys

Dinse, Allen & Erdmann, for its answer to the Complaint

herein:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Count I

1. Lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a

belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in para-

graph 1.

2. Admits paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3, except admits that the plaintiffs

purport to bring this Count on behalf of the class of persons

alleged therein.

4. Denies paragraph 4.

5. Admits paragraph 5.

JA 39

Denies paragraph 6.

Denies paragraph 7.

Denies paragraph 8.

po om ND

Denies paragraph 9.

Count II

1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 to Count I of the First

Cause of Action.

2. Admits paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3.

4. Denies paragraph 4.

Count III

1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 8 to Count I of the First

Cause of Action.

2. Denies paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3.

Count IV

1. Answering paragraph 1. defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as thougu specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 8 to Count I of the First

Cause of Action. ;

2. Denies paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3.

JA 40

4. Denies paragraph 4.

5. Denies paragraph 5.

CouNT V

1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 9 to Count I, paragraphs

2 through 4 to Count II, paragraphs 2 and 3 to Count III,

and paragraphs 2 through 5 to Count IV of the First

Cause of Action.

2. Denies paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3.

4. Denies paragraph 4.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTON

CounT I

1. Lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form

a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1.

2. Admits paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3, except admits that the plaintiffs

purport to bring this Count on behalf of the class of persons

alleged therein.

4. Denies paragraph 4.

5. Denies paragraph 5, except admits that defendant

Operates and has operated a pulp and paper making plant

approximately four miles north of the Village of Ticonder-

oga, New York.

6. Denies paragraph 6.

JA 41

Count II

1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I of the Second

Cause of Action.

2. Denies paragraph 2.

Count III

1. Answezing paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-

corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the

answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I and para-

graph 2 to Count II of the Second Cause of Action.

2. Denies paragraph 2.

3. Denies paragraph 3.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

2. The claims set forth in the Complaint are barred in

whole or in part by the statute of limitations.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

3. The claims set forth in the Complaint are barred in

whole or in part by laches.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

4. Plaintiffs lack standing to obtain the equitable relief

prayed for.

ii

JA 42

FIFTH AFFIRMAT:VE DEFENSE

5. Plaintiffs have failed to join persons needed for a just

adjudication of the actions.

WHEREFORE, defendant International Paper Company

demands judgment dismissing the Complaint herein, to-

gether with the costs and disbursements of this action, and

such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: Burlington, Vermont

July 24, 1978

Dinse, Allen & Erdmann

186 College Street

Burlington, Vermont

By Illegible

A Member of the Firm

Davis Polk & Wardwell

One Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York

By Illegible

A Member of the Firm

Attorneys for Defendant

International Paper Company

Robert McK. Hunziker, Esq.

International Paper Company

Of Counsel

JA 43

Motion to Amend Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FoR THE

DISTRICT OF VERMONT

CiviL ACTION

File No. 78-163

+

HARMEL OUELLETTE, et al.

V.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER CoMPANY

a

MOTION TO AMEND

Now COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney

Susan F. Humphrey, of the law firm of Langrock Sperry

Parker and Stahl, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and request permission of this

Court to amend their Complaint to add the following re-

quested relief to Counts I, II and III of the Second Cause

of Action:

Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable

relief be granted: That this Court order Defendant

to reduce the emissions of smoke, fumes and other

discharges to a level whereby they do not travel

across Lake Champlain and interfere with Plaintiffs’

use and enjoyment of their property.

DATED at Middlebury, in the County of Addison and

State of Vermont this 6th day of June, 1979.

LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER and STAHL

Susan F. Humphrey, Esquire

A Member of the Firm

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

JA 44

Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Complaint—Docket Entry

~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

- For THE District oF VERMONT

78 Civ. 163

®

HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OQUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and Epa BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs

| and

H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-

DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VirR-

GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lots

T. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.

;

Date NR Proceedings

1980

Apr. 7 In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-

ing on plaintiffs’ motion to amend

Complaint. Peter Langrock, Esq.

and Susan Humphreys, Esq. for

plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.

James W.B. Benkard, Esq., Robert

M. Hunziker Esq. and Kevin Sim-

mons Esq. for defendant.

Apr. 7 Ordered: Motion granted.

ree ee . —_ at a

JA 45

Opinion and Order

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF VERMONT

Civ. A. No. 78-163

.

HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON

BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and

SHIRLEY PLouFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,

and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs

and

H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-

DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VIR-

GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lois

T. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

Vv. }

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.

°

Peter F. Langrock and Susan Humphrey, Langrock,

Sperry, Parker & Stahl, Middlebury, Vt., for plaintiffs.

John M. Dinse and Spencer Knapp, Dinse, Allen & Erd-

mann, Burlington, Vt., James W.B. Benkard, Robert M.

Hunziker and Kevin Simmons, Davis, Polk & Wardwell,

New York City, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

CoFFRIN, District Judge.

In this diversity action for damages and injunctive relief,

plaintiffs have moved for certification of two plaintiff classes

JA 46

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Complaint is styled in

two “causes of action” and different classes are proposed for

each. Defendant opposes certification of both proposed

Classes.

Facts

This action began on July 5, 1978, in Vermont’s Addi-

son County Superior Court and defendant properly removed

it to this court on July 25, 1978. Following removal several

of the presently named plaintiffs were permitted to inter-

vene. This case is the latest expression of some Vermonters’

unhappiness with the condition of Lake Champlain’s waters.

It represents a continuation of both private, e.g., Zahn v.

International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971 >,

aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 US. 291,

94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed.2d 511 (1973), and public efforts

to impose liability on International Paper Company (IPC)

for its discharges into Lake Champlain. Vermont v. New

York, 406 U.S. 186, 92 S. Ct. 1603, 31 L. Ed.2d 785

(1972) (motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted),

dismissed, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 246, 42 L. Ed.2d 260

(1974); see Note, The Battle of Lake Champlain—Inter-

state Pollution and the Inadequacy of the Judicial Process:

Vermont v. New York, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 175 (1976).

Plaintiffs are Vermont residents who own property on or

near the “south lake” area of Lake Champlain in the vicinity

of the Crown Point Bridge; defendant is a New York corpo-

ration with its principal place of business in New York. It

operates a paper mill near Ticonderoga, New York, across

the south lake from plaintiffs’ property. Jurisdiction is:

grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Plaintiffs request certification of two classes which we will

refer to as the “water class” and the “air class.” The water

class would consist of approximately 400 lakeshore property

owners and lessees in the towns of Shoreham, Bridport and

JA 47

Addison. Plaintiffs claim on behalf of this class that IPC’s

discharge of papermaking waste into Lake Champlain con-

stitutes a nuisance that diminishes the value and interferes

with the enjoyment of their property.

The air class would consist of approximately 3150 prop-

erty owners, lessees and residents in Shoreham, Bridport,

Addison and Orwell. On behalf of this class plaintiffs claim

that the airborne discharges from defendant’s paper mill

travel across Lake Champlain and create a nuisance in the

designated towns. In addition to diminished property value,

plaintiffs claim this class has suffered impaired health as

a result of defendant's alleged air pollution.’

On behalf of both proposed classes plaintiffs seek mone-

tary damages and equitable relief ordering IPC to relocate

the source of its water intake system closer to the source

of its waste discharge system.

Discussion

To maintain this as a class action, plaintiffs must Satisfy

the four prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and the two

elements of the rule 23(b) (3) form of action they propose.

We consider these separately below.

1. Prerequisites

We have no difficulty finding that the proposed classes

are sufficiently numerous that joinder is impracticable, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), and that there are questions of law

or fact common to the classes. /d. (a)(2). Although

numbers alone do not determine impracticability of joinder,

see, e.g., EWH v. Monarch Wine Co., 73 F.R.D. 131, 133

? At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification the

argument of plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the allegation in the com-

plaint of impaired health was somewhat equivocal. The court did

not understand, however, that the claim was being withdrawn.

JA 48

(E.D.N.Y. 1977), and geographical distribution of a pro-

posed class is of considerable importance, Glover v. Mc-

Murray, 361 F. Supp. 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d and

remanded on other grounds, 487 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973),

vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 963, 94

S. Ct. 3166, 41 L. Ed.2d 1136 (1974), we are nevertheless

persuaded by the numbers involved in the proposed classes.

Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs’ approximations of

size—determined on the basis of information obtained from

the respective Towns’ Clerks and population reports in the

Vermont Year Book—and we have found such numbers to

be convincing in the past. D. C. v. Surles, No. 78-91 (D.

Vt. December 6, 1978).

Similarly we are satisfied that there are questions of law

and fact common to the classes. Plaintiffs seek redress for

injuries allegeuly caused by continuing acts of defendant.

Central to the claims of all members of the proposed classes

are the fact questions of the quality, amount and distribution

of defendant’s discharges and the legal questions of de-

fendant’s liability therefor. In addition, defendant may have

defenses that would be common to the claims of all the

class members. These questions are “shared in the griev-

ances of the prospective class[es] as defined,” 3B Moore’s

Federal Practice 4 23.06-1, at 23-173 (2d ed. 1979), and

we conclude that the requirement of rule 23(a)(2) is also

met in this case. Although in its argument concerning rule

23(b)(3) defendant opposes certification on the basis of

rules 23(a)(1) and (2) its primary contention is that rules

23(a)(3) and (4) are not satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the proposed representa-

tive’s claims be typical of the claims of the proposed class.

At least one commentator doubts that rule 23(a)(3)

imposes a requirement of independent significance, 3B

Moore’s Federal Practice 4 23.06-2, at 23-185 (2d ed.

JA 49

1979), but we are more inclined to agree with J udge Muir

that we should not lightly conclude that a meaningless pro-

vision was promulgated. In re Anthracite Coal Anti-trust

Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 709, 716 (M.D. Pa. 1978); see, e. g.,

Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 269-70 (10th

Cir. 1975) (rule 23(a)(3) requires comparison of plain-

tiff's claims with those of proposed class). We ar> satisfied,

however, that a comparison of the named plaintiffs’ claims

with those of the proposed classes need not reveal identity

to be “typical.” “Factual variations are not fatal to a pro-

posed class when the claims arise out of the same remedial

and legal theory.” Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78

F.R.D. 460, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1978). To be “typical,” plain-

tiffs’ claims must be “co-extensive with, and not inimical

to, those of the proposed class,” Levine v. Berg, 79 F.R.D.

95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and they must not be subject to

unique defenses that are inapplicable to other members of

the proposed class. Greenspan v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130,

132 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The rough benchmark in this circuit

apears to measure typicality by the likelihood that all mem-

bers of the proposed class “ ‘will be helped’ ” if the would-be

representatives establish their claim, Gill v. Monroe County

Department of Social Services, 79 F.R.D. 316, 326 (W.D.

N.Y. 1978) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391

F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds,

417 U.S. 156, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed.2d 732 (1974)),

and the lack of adverse interests between the named plain-

tiffs and the proposed class members. Women’s Committee

for Equal Employment Opportunity vy. National Broad-

casting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cutner

V. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

Defendant, relying on its depositions of plaintiffs, argues

that they do not all allege the same kinds of damage they

claim on behalf of the classes they purport to represent.

JA 50

According to defendant this proves as a matter of logic that

plaintiffs’ claims are not typical. But defendant appears

to misapprehend the nature of rule 23(a)(3)’s require-

ment. Although the Advisory Committee’s notes, Proposed

Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United

States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966), do little

to illuminate this aspect of the rule, decisional law has made

clear that whether or not it has independent significance

the importance of the typicality requirement lies in assuring

that the named plaintiffs will adequately represent those

who are unnamed. Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173,

1193 (E.D.N.Y.), affd 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970),

aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S. Ct. 2169, 29 L. Ed.2d 157

(1971). Differences in the degree of harm suffered, or even

in the ability to prove damages, Sanders v. Faraday Labora-

tories, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), do not

vitiate the typicality of a representative’s claims. Typicality,

therefore, should be evaluated in terms cf the plaintiffs’

claims as to liability. Jd., cases cited therein.

With this in mind, we find the named plaintiffs’ claims

typical of the classes they seek to represent. Proof of de-

fendant’s liability for the alleged pollution of the air and

Lake Champlain will benefit ali members of the proposed

classes, Eisen; that the damages, if any, may reach a de

minimis level at some point among the class members does

not make the named plaintiffs’ claims atypical.

The last prerequisite of rule 23(a) is that the representa-

tives must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. Of considerable importance to our finding on this

issue is the compjetence of plaintiffs’ counsel, Eisen, 391

F.2d at 562, which defendant concedes. We concur. Never-

theless, defendant contends that issues going to proof of

damages will create antagonism among the class members

making their representation by plaintiffs inadequate. This

JA 51

contention is easily disposed of by noting that there is no

necessity that all issues be tried in one proceeding. The class

aspects may be tried before the individual damages claims,

if that should prove necessary. See In re Caesars Paiace

Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 399 (S.D.N.Y.

1973) (individual questions of reliance and damages not

fatal to class action charging securities violations); Dolgow

Vv. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.O.8.Y. 1968) (com-

mon issues need not dispose of entire litigation ).

Thus we find that the proposed classes Satisfy the pre-

requisites of rule 23(a).

2. Maintenance of 23(b)(3) action.

Defendant’s most strenuous objection to certification of

these classes relates to the rule 23(b)(3) elements. To

maintain an action under subdivision (b)(3), plaintiffs

must demonstrate, and the court must find, that common

questions of fact of law predominate and that a Class action

is superior to other methods available for fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy. Defendant contends that

neither of these characteristics obtains in this case.

Defendant’s contentions also go to the heart of an emerg-

ing and important question concerning the propriety of class

action as a procedure for redressing environmental injury.

This question has lurked in the background of the few

decisions we have found involv’ ag claims similar to those

of the instant case, but it har uot been addressed directly,

so far as we have been able to determine. In cases of this

kind the allegedly harmful discharges are released into the

environment in 2 concentrated state at a source. They dis-

perse thereafter in a manner dictated by natural forces, and

their effect, if any, on the surrounding environment is neces-

sarily a function of proximity to the source and prevailing

natural conditions. Because of this, no two property owners

at random points in an affected area are likely to urge the

JA 52

same pattern of dispersion. Defendant points this out and

argues from it that plaintiffs’ claims are therefore atypical

and that plaintiffs are unable because of their individual

interests to protect fairly and adequately the interests of the

class. This assertion reduces itself inexorably to the proposi-

tion that a class action mav never proceed against an alleged

polluter; defendant’s 1° would almost invariably dis-

qualify each would-be r aber from representing the pro-

posed class. Therefore, be ‘ore proceeding with our analysis

of subdivision (b) (3), ‘ve feel constrained to respond to

defendant’s assertion and examine the general proposition

to which it leads.

The function of subdivision (b) (3) is to reach the group

of cases for which class treatment would be inappropriate

under the (b)(1) or (b) (2) categories but would be con-

venient and desirable nevertheless. In the Advisory Com-

mittee’s words, subdivision (b) (3) was intended for “those

cases in which a class action would achieve economies of

time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of deci-

sion as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing

procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable re-

sults.” Proposed Amendments, 39 F.R.D. at 102-03.

The Advisory Committee felt that some categories of

cases, mass accidents for instance, would be inappropriate

for class action because of the likelihood of individual ques-

tions of liability and defenses to liability. Id. at 103. The

same might be true of certain kinds of private damage

antitrust cases. Jd. We find the Committee's inclusive

language more descriptive of the kind of case presently

before us than its exclusive language. We have not found

a case to suggest the contrary. We conclude that as a genre

the instant case is not inappropriate for class treatment and

we reject the implication of defendant’s argument. As a

theoretical matter, we find, for instance, that it would be

JA 53

desirable from the standpoint of consistency and conven-

ience to develop in a single proceeding the quantum, quality

and dispersion pattern of a source’s discharges. Time, effort

and expense might be saved by such a procedure, even

though all issues may not be resolvable at once. In separate

trials the questions of fact respecting defendant’s discharges

and their dispersion might be resolved inconsistently, con-

trary to sense and logic. Similar inconsistency could arise

with separately determined questions of liability or defenses

to liability, and this would be undesirable as a matter of

“uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated.”

Id. In our opinion the type of suit represented by this case

is not the sort envisioned by the Advisory Committee as

generally inappropriate for class treatment under subdivi-

sion (b)(3). See also Weinstein, Some Reflections on the

“A busiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 305 (sug-

gesting the propriety of class action in the area of environ-

mental control). There are fundamental differences be-

tween the case plaintiffs bring and the “mass accident” case

that concerned the Advisory Committee, which we will

discuss below. But what is important at this point in our

discussion is that the Advisory Committee felt the considera-

tions of rule 23(b)(3) were fatal to class treatment of a

“mass accident,” whereas defendant in effect is urging that

the considerations of rule 23(a) are fatal to class treatment

of the instant sort of case. We have found no support for

such a conclusion in law or logic, and we find it contrary to

the thinking behind rule 23.

It remains, then, for us to consider whether the instant

case satisfies the two requirements of subdivision (b)(3).

Predominance of Common Questions

of Law and Fact

Defendant’s position is that the differences among the

proposed classes’ members do not relate merely to the

JA 54

damages each claims, but go to the issue of IPC’s liability

for the claimed damages. In defendant’s view this is a case

in which liability-is a separate issue as to each member of

the proposed classes, which makes individual questions pre-

dominate over the common ones. The cases that it cites in

support of this contention are mostly cases where the actual

definition of the proposed class depended on individual

findings of liability. In Pendleton v. Trans Union Systems

Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court denied

certification of a class of consumers who were denied credit

because of errors in the defendant’s credit reports. The

court observed that because there could be no liability

without an erroneous or inaccurate credit report it would

not be possible to establish liability as to an entire class

without resolving separate questions about individual re-

ports. This was not a case such as Biechele v. Norfolk &

Western Railway Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969),

where in the Pendleton court’s opinion, “geographic limita-

tions defined the class in such a way that the Court could

conclude that all of the plaintiffs were injured in various

respects and to various extents by the defendant’s opera-

tions.” Pendleton, 76 F.R.D. at 195.

Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D.

Tex. 1974) is to the same effect. The plaintiffs sought certi-

fication of a class of former employees and survivors of

for-aer employees allegedly suffering illness and death from

exposure to asbestos in the defendant's plant. The court

denied certification because among the class there were

varying periods of exposure to varying concentrations of

asbestos; some may have had pre-exisiing illnesses; and

individual questions existed as to the availability and usc

of safety devices, and the availability of affirmative de-

fenses such as the statute of limitations. In short, the

uncommon questions bearing un the defendant's liability at

JA 55

all to each class member were predominant. Viewed

another way, this was a case where, as in Pendleton, the class

of those to whom the defendant would be liable could not

be defined without separate trials on the liability issues.

In Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78

(M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.

1974), residents of York County, Pennsylvania, sought to

maintain a class action for damages and injunctive relief

against two defendant corporations whose operations re-

leased contaminants into the air. The court denied class

certification, observing that the only common fact alleged

by the claims of the proposed class was that their damages

were caused by the same source. /d. at 84. The variety of

types of damage alleged made a single finding of liability

impossible in a single mass proceeding. Jd. at 85.

Unlike these and the “mass accident” cases defendant

cites, the water class in the present case offers a geographic-

ally discrete group asserting theoretically consistent claims

as to which individual defenses to liability do not appear.

Identical evidence would be required in each individual’s

case to determine whether IP pollutes Lake Champlain

and is lable to lakeshore owners and lessees whose property

values and enjoyment, including recreational use, are di-

minished thereby. See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward,

61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (Sth

Cir. 1975) (class treatment of defendant’s negligence in

supplying contaminated food and water for cruise Passen-

gers’ consumption); American Trading and Production

Corporation v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 155

(N.D. Ill. 1969) (class treatment of defendant’s negligent

handling ot electrical wiring in exhibition hall resulting in

fire damage to exhibitors’ goods). Moreover, the water

class in this case differs fundamentally from the “mass tort”

class that the Advisory Committee considered inappropriate

JA 56

for certification: there are no personal injuries claimed and

there are no individual defenses asserted. See Judge Steger’s

discussion in Yandle, 45 F.R.D. at 569.

We find that in a class treatment of the facts respecting

IPC’s discharges and its liability for diminished property

value and enjoyment of use caused thereby, common ques-

tions will predominate.

We do not, however, find that this is so as to the entire

proposed water class. The Town of Addison fronts on a

lake that is markedly different from that which meets the

Towns of Bridport and Shoreham. Addison lies north of

the Crown Point Bridge in an area known locally as the

“broad lake,” which is deeper and composed of water that

is of a generally different quality than that of the “south

lake” where Bridport and Shoreham are located. In addi-

tion, none of the proposed class representatives resides in

Addison, which raises doubts about the adequacy of Addi-

son residents’ representation. We conclude, therefore that a

water class comprised of all three towns’ lakeshore property

owners would be inappropriate. Thus we limit our final

conclusions about the propriety of a water class to those

proposed class members residing in Shoreham and Bridport.

The proposed air class presents a somewhat different

picture. This class is more like that proposed and denied in

Boring, where the “nature of the differing injuries runs the

gamut from damage to fee simple and leasehold interests in

real estate to damaged personalty, unpieasant surroundings

and . . . compensable personal injury.” Boring, 63 F.R.D.

at 84-85. Defendant would no doubt offer separate defenses

to the claims of impaired health, and such claims are likely

to be the kind that individuals have an interest in prosecut-

ings parately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). See Yandle,

65 F.R.D. at 572 (“[MlJembers of the purported class have

a vital interest in controlling their own litigation because it

JA 57

involves serious personal injuries . . . .”). There is no

“ ‘common nucleus of operative facts,’ ” Eisen, 391 F.2d

at 566 (citing Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 271 F. Supp.

722 (N.D. Cal. 1967)), that unites the liability claims of

this proposed class as there is in the water class. Whereas

the pollution of the lake may uniformly limit the enjoyment

and decrease the value of all lakeshore property because

the lake is acommon source of recreation, the same may not

be said of air pollution’s effect on the inland property. For

instance, unpleasant odors may not affect the value of a

dairy farm, if at ail, in the way they would a strictly resi-

dential area. The various uses to which property is put in

the area of the proposed air class makes class treatment of

property damage claims as inappropriate as class treatment

of health impairment claims. We find that common ques-

tions of law and fact will not predominate in a class treat-

ment of the air class’s claims and we therefore deny

certification of the air class.

SUPERIORITY OF CLASS ACTION

We have considered the matters pertinent to our findings

under subdivision (b) (3), Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-

(D), and the alternative methods for handling this litiga-

tion, and we find that class treatment of the water class’s

claims would be superior. The claims are not such that

class members would be interested in individual prosecution,

we are aware of no litigation currently under way that

involves this controversy, the desirability of uniform deci-

sions respecting the class’s claims counsels for concentrating

the claims in a single forum, and the proposed class presents

no management difficulties as the class is finite and easily

identifiable. The alternatives of joinder and intervention do

not offer the simplicity and conclusiveness of proceeding

with these claims as a class action. IPC may offer its

JA 58

defenses in one forum at one time and, if successful, can

put an end to this kind of litigation over the polluting effects

of its discharges. The class members can pool their re-

sources, present their most effective case in one proceeding

and share the benefits if they succeed.

We conclude that the water class, as limited, meets the

requirements of rule 23 and certify the lakeshore owners

in the Towns of Bridport and Shoreham as a class to main-

tain this suit.

3. Notice

tRule 23(c)(2) requires that the court direct to the class

members the best notice practicable under the circum-

stances. This includes individual notice to those members

who can be identified through reasonable effort. It appears

that the class members in this case can be identified rather

easily through town records, and we direct plaintiffs to

determine who the individual class members are within

twenty-one days from the date of this order. Within the

same period, plaintiffs and defendant are directed to prepare

jointly a draft of a proposed notice to the class members

and submit it to the court for its consideration. SO OR-

DERED.

Dated at Burlington in the District of Vermont, this

twenty fourth day of April, 1980.

'

/s/ ALBERT W. COFFRIN

Chief Judge

JA 59

Notice of Motion to Dismiss

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT

Civil Action—File No. 78-163

@

HARMEL OUELLETTE, et al.

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

r

Now COMES Defendant International Paper Company

by and through their attorneys, Dinse, Allen & Erdmann,

and pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, move this Court for an order

dismissing plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action.

'

Dated: Burlington, Vermont

June 22, 1981

DINSE, ALLEN & ERDMAN, Esos.

209 Battery Street

Burlington, Vermont

By: /s/ JoHN M. DINsE

A Member of the Firm

To:

JA 60

Davis PoLK & WARDWELL, Esas.

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, N.Y. 10005

By: /S/ JAMES W.B. BENKARD

A Member of the Firm

Attorneys for Defendant

International Paper

Company

PETER F. LANGROCK, Esq.

Langrock, Sperry, Parker and Stahl

P.O. Drawer 351

Middlebury, Vermont 05753

FEDERICK deG. HaRLow, Esa.

Smith, Harlow & Liccardi

110 Merchants Row

P.O. Box 323

Rutland, Vermont 05701

JA 61

Affidavit of Dana B. Dolloff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FoR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT

Civil Action—File No. 78-163

ee

vv

HARMEL QUELLETTE, et al.

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

ry

STATE OF NEW York ) os :

CouNTY 0” NEW York { **:

Dana B. Do_torr, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. For approximately sixteen years, | have been an

employee of defendant International Paper Company

(“IPCo.”) and I make this affidavit in support of IPCo.’s

motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action Stated in this

lawsuit.

2. From 1969 to 1972, I served as Supervisor of Air

and Water Management for IPCo.’s operations in and

around Ticonderoga, New York. From 1967 until 1972,

I was involved in the design, construction, and initial

operation of IPCo.’s paper mill located approximately three

miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga. Thereafter, I

was transferred to the corporate environmental staff of

IPCo. at its headquarters in New York City, where I was

Coordinator of Air/Water Programs. As Coordinator, I

participated extensively in the continuing operations of the

Ticonderoga Mill, including assisting in IPCo.’s defense

JA 62

in the trial of Vermont v. New York and International

Paper Company (Original Number 50, United States Su-

preme Court). When that suit terminated in 1974, I con-

tinued to have extensive contacts with the Ticonderoga Mill

and, in particular, I was one of IPCo.’s representatives in

the negotiations with the various state and federal agencies

concerning that Mill which culminated in the issuance of

a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit

in 1977. Set forth below is a chronology of the judicial and

administrative proceedings involving the Ticonderoga Mill

between 1970 and 1977.

The Supreme Court Action

3. In December 1970, the State of Vermont instituted

an action in the United States Supreme Court against the

State of New York and International Paper Company. The

claims made and the relief sought in the original complaint

related only to the discharges of another paper mill (the

“Old Mill”) owned and operated by IPCo. in the Village of

Ticonderoga itself. That Mill had ceased operations prior

to the institution of the Supreme Court case and IPCo. had

already undertaken the construction of a new mill, three

miles to the north of the Village of Ticonderoga. (It is the

new mill which is the subject of this action.) The Supreme

Court accepted the jurisdiction of the Vermont suit in

1972 and appointed a Special Master, R. Ammi Cutter,

to hear the matter. The motion of the United States to

intervene was granted; the Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) joined the proceedings and participated

throughout the ensuing trial and settlement negotiations.

4. Prior to trial, Vermont amended its complaint to add

claims relating to the new mill, alleging that its air and

water discharge constituted a nuisance and a trespass.

JA 63

The Settlement Agreement

5. After nearly a year of trial, settlement negotiations

commenced. The negotiations lasted several months and,

on September 23, 1974 the parties reached an agreement

which was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court

(by granting a consensual motion to dismiss the complaint).

A copy of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal is at-

tached hereto as Exhibit A. While disposing of Vermont’s

claims concerning the Old Mill, the settlement also stipu-

lated that IPCo. would make further improvements tc the

new mill including increased air pollution control equipment

and would accept limitations on the amount of certain sub-

stances that could be included in its liquid discharge to the

southern portion of Lake Champlain (the “South Lake”).

6. By way of information, the standard method of

stating a limitation on the discharge of a particular sub-

stance in an effluent, is to prescribe a given limit on the

amount of milligrams of the substance that may be allowed

per liter of effluent (mg/1). That limitation is then con-

verted into a daily poundage limit by multiplying the con-

centration by the average daily discharge in total gallons,

or liters, of the effluent using appropriate conversion factors.

Occasionally, the concentration standard (mg/1) is in-

cluded as an additional, or alternative, limitation.

7. The settlement with Vermont provided that the

amount of biochemical oxygen demand (“BOD”) in the

effluent should not exceed 4400 pounds per day as a

monthly average* and the amount of phosphorus should

not exceed a concentration of 0.5 mg/l as a monthly

average or 88 pounds per day as a monthly average, which-

* This limitation, which was already in the New York State permit

— which IPCo. operated at that time, computes to approximately

25 mg/1.

JA 64

ever was more restrictive. These limitations were agreed to

by both the EPA and New York.

8. The agreement did not resolve all the issues between

the parties concerning the content and nature of the liquid

discharge from the new mill and the parties recognized that

questions would be dealt with by “action of regulatory or

executive agencies of the United States or the State of New

York in the performance of their official duties.” Exhibit A,

Agreement of Settlement between The State of Vermont

And International Paper Company, Article IV(H), at

000686-87. Among other obligations, IPCo. agreed to

permit representatives of Vermont to make visits to the

mill, inspect its facilities, interview its personnel, and take

samples from the treatment system. Id., T11(G)(1) at

000677. The Company also agreed to provide Vermont

with copies of all regular reports concerning its discharges

that IPCo. subtiitted to the State of New York or the EPA.

Id., 11(G) (4) at 000678.

Proceedings Involving The Issuance

Of An NPDES Permit

9. Prior to the approval by the Supreme Court of the

Settlement Agreement, the EPA took over the permitting

process from New York State and, on May 15, 1974 issued

_ to the mill a “draft” National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-

tion System (NPDES) permit pursuant to the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Prior

to that time, IPCo. had been operating under a permit issued

by the New York State Department of Environmental Con-

servation.

10. The draft permit included a wide variety of limita-

tions and standards, many of which were based upon

regulations, promulgated by the EPA, incorporating effluent

JA 65

limitations for all similar mills. The draft permit consisted

of 26 pages and included: detailed limitations and prohi-

bitions relating to discharges of various substances in the

effluent; the manner of measuring for those substances: a

schedule for compliance; methods of testing; instructions

for reporting to the EPA; and directions for reporting and

explaining instances of non-compliance, among other mat-

ters.* In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the

draft permit incorporated the limitations agreed upon by

IPCo. and Vermont involving the discharge of biochemical

oxygen demand and phosphorus.

11. As an “affected” state, Vermont received notice of

the draft permit and responded in writing, stating 14 sep-

arate “conditions” that it demanded the permit included.

IPCo. also submitted its comments and EPA subsequently

circulated a revised permit on November 29, 1974.

12 On December 9, 1974, IPCo. formally requested an

adjudicatory hearing concerning the need for or appro-

priateness of a number of the limitations and standards set

forth in the most recent draft of the permit. Provisions of

the permit not challenged by IPCo. became effective on

January 27, 1975. EPA granted IPCo.’s request for an

adjudicatory hearing and, thereafter, Vermont, New York

and the Lake Champlain Committee (the principal private

environmental organization in the Champlain Valley with a

membership at that time of more than 2000) requested and

were granted status as parties to the hearing.

13. While the parties had raised a number of issues for

the hearing, the predominant question concerned the exist-

ing and proposed limitations upon the allowable amount of

suspended soiids in the discharge from the mill. The draft

* A copy of the final permit is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

JA 66

permit specified an “interim” limitation on suspended solids

—applicable until July 1, 1977—of 32,000 pounds a day

as a daily average with a daily maximum of 48,000 pounds.

As of July 1, 1977, the statutory deadline for application of

standards based upon “best practicable treatment”, the draft

permit required that the daily average discharge of sus-

pended solids be no greater than 6800 pounds, with a daily

maximum of 16,320. IPCo. had no objection to the interim

limitation as the mill’s daily average discharge of sus-

pended solids between 1974-1977 was approximately

17,000 pounds, or well under the 32,000 pound limit.

IPCo. did object to the proposed 1977 standard, which was

based upon the application to the mill of EPA’s published

(but still tentative) “Interim Effluent Guidance” applicable

to all bleached kraft paper mills. The paper industry, in-

cluding IPCo., contended that those effluent guidelines were

unreasonably stringent and could not be achieved by best

practical treatment. Vermont, on the other hand, took the

position that the final standard should be enforced at 6800

pounds.

14. During 1975, representatives of all the parties at-

tended a pre-hearing conference and, thereafter, IPCo. made

available to Vermont, New York and EPA extensive in-

formation on its waste water treatment system. IPCo. aiso

offered to meet whatever standard would result from appli-

cation of the Final Effiuent Guidelines (whenever they were

finally promulgated) to the mill. Nevertheless, a settlement

was not reached on the solids issue and in May, 1976 EPA

informed the parties that an adjudicatory hearing would

have to be held.

15. By the summer of 1976, the suspended solids stand-

ard in the EPA Interim Guidelines controlling July 1, 1977

standards for bleached kraft mills had been substantially

relaxed. Application of those guidelines to the Ticonderoga

JA 67

Mill would have allowed a daily average discharge of over

16,000 pounds per day as an average. On August 10, 1976,

however, the New York Department of Environmentai Con-

serv“tion certified the southern part of Lake Champlain as

“water quality limited”. This designation allowed the regu-

latory agencies to impose a stricter standard upon the

Ticonderoga Mill than would pertain to other mills dis-

charging into non-water quality limited bodies of water.

Representatives of New York, EPA, and Vermont consulted

and came to the conclusion that a limitation of 10,000

pounds per day of suspended solids should be required for

the Ticonderoga Mill discharge as of J uly 1, 1977. Hence,

the suspended solids limits (as well as BOD, for that mat-

ter) would be based on both the state and federal agency

determinations of discharge levels appropriate to protect

the water quality of Lake Champlain.

16. At the instance of IPCo., the parties met again to

try and reach a settlement of the solids issue which would

obviate the need for a hearing. At this time, IPCo. was

achieving an average daily discharge of approximately

14,000 pounds of suspended solids—thereby already better-

ing the standard (16,000 pounds) which would not apply

to the industry until the following year. IPCo.’s experts

and consultants reached the view, however, that the existing

system, which required the addition of $700,000 a year in

chemicals (chiefly alum) to enhance removal of solids, was

not capable of achieving the 10,000 pounds standard on a

regular basis. Thus, IPCo. proposed a radical solution:

the installation of a $3,000,000 addition to its waste water

treatment system consisting of two large reactor-type clari-

fiers with associated equipment. With these improvements,

it was anticipated that the waste water treatment system

could meet a standard of 10,000 pounds.

JA 68

17. The proposed time schedule for design and con-

struction of this addition called for a one-year pilot study

from October 1976 to October 1977 and two years for

engineering and construction, running from October 1977

to October 1979. As IPCo. informed the parties to the

proceeding, the pilot plant tests (the results of which would

detine the design of the system) could only be meaningful

if the chemical (alum) addition to the treatment system

was suspended for the duration of the pilot program. With

the agreement of all parties, these tests commenced in

October 1976, even before approval of the proposed settle-

ment.

18. On November 23, 1976, all parties met at the New

York Department of Environmental Conservation in Al-

bany, New York to resolve the remaining issues concerning

the NPDES permit for the new mill. At this meeting, the

following agreement was reached: IPCo. would operate

under an interim standard of 32,000 pounds of suspended

solids as its daily average until July 1, 1977; from Ju’y 1,

1977, until the completion of construction of the new

system (in 1979), the standard would be 17,000 pounds;

and thereafter the standard would go down to 10,000

pounds. Once the parties reached a consensus on this point,

the remaining issues were resolved swiftly.

EPA Issues An Environmental

Compliance Schedule Letter

19. Because EPA took the position that it did not have

the statutory authority to grant an extension of compliance

with the 10,000 pound standard after July 1, 1977, the final

permit provided that, notwithstanding the agreement among

the parties, IPCo. would be required to meet the 10,000

pound standard as of July 1, 1977. As this would be im-

possible until completion of the tert.ary system (not sched-

ee

JA 69

uled until 1979), IPCo. requested, and EPA subsequently

issued with the concurrence of all parties (including V_..

mont), an Environmental Compliance Schedule Letter

(ECSL). A copy of the ECSL is attached hereto as

Exhibit C. This document contains a qualified commitment

by EPA that it will not seek sanctions for technical viola-

tions of the suspended solids limitations in the permit after

July 1, 1977 so long as IPCo. is undertaking good-faith

efforts, pursuant to the program, to construct a facility

which will enable it to meet the standards at issue.

20. On March 15, 1977, representatives of all parties

met in New York for the formal signing of the stipulation

embodying the parties settlement of the adjudicatory hear-

ing which resulted in the issuance of a final permit issued

to IPCo. High representatives of the state government of

Vermont and New York attended as did senior officials

from EPA. The ECSL was issued and the permit, as re-

vised, became fully effective.

EPA Institutes Administrative

Proceedings

21. As IPCo. had forewarned the parties, once it ceased

the addition of alum to its waste water system in order that

the pilot plant tests could be meaningful, the suspended

solids, and, subsequently, the BOD readings in the discharge

to the South Lake increased substantially. Before the sys-

tem returned to equilibrium, there were violations of the

interim standards set forth in the permit during the winter

months of 1976-1977. On April 15, 1977 the EPA insti-

tuted an administrative proceeding by issuing “Findings

of Violation and Order to Show Cause” seeking sanctions

against IPCo. for the violations mentioned above.

22. IPCo. responded by noting that the violations were

the inevitable result of necessary testing for the system that

would achieve the rigid standards agreed to by the parties.

JA 70

Settlement of EPA Proceeding

23. Representatives of all interested parties met in New

York on May 6, 1977 to discuss the issue. Thereafter, on

July 15, 1977, IPCo. and EPA settled tae proceeding. In

consideration of the dismissal of the proceeding and waiver

of any monetary penalties, IPCo. agreed to reintroduce alum

into the system (at an approximate cost of $60,000) on

September 1, 1977 instead of October 1, 1977 (the end of

the 12-month period originally contemplated as necessary

for the pilot program).

24. Pursuant to the above Settlement Agreement be-

tween the parties, the daily average limitation dropped from

32,000 pounds to 17,150 pounds on September 1, 1977.

IPCo. completed construction of the improvements to the

waste water treatment system in October 1979, whereupon

the limitation of 10,000 pounds took effect.

25. Having duly qualified under the Federal Water Pol-

lution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known

as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)

as a permit granting agency, New York State now admin-

isters the permit under the supervision of the EPA. Regular

monthly reports on the performance of the waste water

treatment system are sent to New York, EPA, and Vermont.

The Mill’s Complicance With

The NPDES Permit

26. During the seven years of extensive regulation, ne-

gotiation, and technical innovations, the IPCo. mill has

operated successfully under a permit incorporating dis-

charge standards substantially more restrictive than those

pertaining to any comparable mill in the country. Since

October 1979, when the tertiary treatment system was in

JA 71

operation, the mill’s effluent has exceeded the BOD limit on

one day (in December 1980) and the suspended solids limit

on one day (in March 1980); pH was outside the permit

limits for portions of four days (in February and March

1980 and February and March 1981) while the phosphate

limit has not been exceeded.

/s/ DANA B. DOLLoFF

Sworn to before me this

22nd day of June, 1981.

(Signature Illegible )

a

JA 72

Exhibit A to Dolloff Affidavit

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 50 Original

S

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Montpelier, Vermont,

Plaintiff,

V.

STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,

Albany, New York

and

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing

under the laws of the State of New York, located at New

York, New York,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

.

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

nent

JA 73

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

October 29, 1974

Hon. Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Bldg.

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

RE: Vermont v. New York et al., No. 50

Original

Dear Mr. Cheney:

Enclosed is a certified copy of the Stipulation to dismiss

the bill of complaint and order of dismissal, pursuant to

Rule 60 in the above-entitled case.

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL Ropak, Jr., Clerk

By Name Illegible

(Mrs.) Evelyn R. Limstrong

Assistant

Enclosure

cc: Louis J. Lefkowitz, Esq. (w/encl)

Atty. General of N.Y.

2 World Trade Center

New York, N. Y. 10047

Taggart Whipple, Esq. (w/encl)

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, N.Y. 10005

Hon. Robert H. Bork (w/encl)

JA 74

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 50, ORIGINAL

¢

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Montpelier, Vermont,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,

Albany, New York,

and

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing

under the laws of the State of New York, located at New

York, New York,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Intervenor.

' SJ

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL

It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the

attorneys of record for the respective parties hereto, that

the amiended complaint in this case be dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.

The parties have also reached agreement with respect to

the payment of costs incurred in this case, as reflected in

their joint Petition For An Order With Respect To Fee

And Expenses Of Special Master, which is being filed with

the Court concurrently with this Stipulation For Dismissal.

JA 75

Dated: September 23, 1974

STATE OF VERMONT

/S/ KIMBERLY B. mesa

Kimberly B. ronal

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Vermont

INTERNATIONAL PAPER

COMPANY

/8/ TAGGART WHIPPLE

Taggart Whipple

Davis PoLk & WARDWELL

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York. New York 10005

Attorney for Defendant

International Paper

Company

Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF NEW YorkK

/S/ Louis J. LerKowitz

Louis J. Lefkowitz

Attorney General of New

York

2 World Trade Center

New York, N! Y. 10047

Attorney for Defendant

State of New York

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

/S/ RoBERT H. Bork

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the

United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorney for Intervenor

United States of

America

1974—October 29. The foregoiug stipulation to dismiss

the bill of complaint having been received by the Clerk

JA 76

and no fees due, the bill of complaint is now here dismissed,

pursuant to Rule 60 of this Court.

(SEAL)

MICHAEL RODAK, JR.

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

United States

By /S/ FRANCIS J. LORSON

Deputy

A true copy MICHAEL Ropak, JR.

Test:

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

United States

By /s/ FRANCIS J. LORSON

--* ee oe

JA 77

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICF OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543 _

October 29, 1974

Hon. Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vt. 05602

RE: VERMONT v. NEW York,

50 Original

Dear Sir:

The Court today entered the following order in the above-

entitled case:

It is ordered by this Court that the Honorable R. Ammi

Cutter be, and he is hereby, awarded the sum of $50,000

as compensation for his services as Special Master in this

case, and that his disbursements totaling $5,150 be allowed.

It is further ordered that the fee and disbursements be paid

by the parties in the following amounts: $20,000 by the

State of Vermont and $35,150 by the International Paper

Company.

JA 78

It is farther ordered that the Special Master is hereby

discharged.

cc: Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz

Atty. Gen. of New York

Taggart Whipple, Esq.

Davis, PoLK & WARDWELL

Very truly yours,

Hon. Robert H. Bork MICHAEL Ropak, JR.,

Solicitor General of U.S. Clerk

Hon. R. Ammi Cutter By

Special Master in 50 Original

62 Sparks St. /s/ HELEN TAYLOR

Cambridge, Mass 02138 = =—=— wc ee ee ee ee enters

Helen Taylor, (Mrs. )

Assistant Clerk

September 23, 1974

Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.

Clerk

Supreme Court of the United States

Washington, D.C. 20543

RE: STATE OF VERMONT Vv. STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.

No. 50 Original

Dear Mr. Rodak:

In Part II of its June 3, 1974 Opinion in the above case,

the Court suggested that settlement of this case might be

achieved by agreement of the parties and that “such a settle-

ment might be the basis for a motion to dismiss the com-

plaint. Cf. 32., Orig., Missouri v. Nebraska, decided May

~~ ion, UR *

Such an agreement has now been reached, which will

not involve any continuing supervision by the Court with

respect to this matter. This agreement is embodied in two

“Agreements of Settlement”, copies of which are enclosed.

The parties therefore respectfully submit the enclosed

Stipulation For Dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 60

of the Rules of the Court, along with a separate Stipulation

Concerning Transcript And Exhibits.

The parties have also reached agreement with respect

to the payment of costs incurred in this case. This agree-

ment is embodied in the parties’ joint Petition For An

Order With Respect To Fee And Expenses Of Special

Master, whicii is being filed concurrently with the Stipula-

tion For Dismissal.

JA 80

Thank you for your attention in thi, matter.

Yours truly,

/S/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Vermont

/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE

Taggart Whipple

Davis PoLK & WARDWELL

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Attorney for Defendant

International Paper

Company

/s/ Louis J. LEFKowITz

Louis J. Lefkowitz

Attorney General of New

York

2 World Trade Center

New York, N. Y. 10047

Attorney for Defendant

State of New York

/s/ RoBerT H. Bork

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the

United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorney for Intervenor

United States of

America

JA 81

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 50, ORIGINAL

October Term, 1974

¢

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Montpelier, Vermont,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Albany, New York,

and

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing

under the laws of the State of New York, located at New

York, New York,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

s

PETITION FOR AN ORDER WITH RESPECT TO

FEE AND EXPENSES OF SPECIAL MASTER

JA 82

STATE OF VERMONT

Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Vermont

INTERNATIONAL PAPER

COMPANY

Taggart Whipple

Davis PoLK & WARDWELI.

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Attorney for Defendant

International Paper

Company

STATE OF NEW YORK

Louis J. Lefkowitz

Attorney General of New

York

2 World Trade Center

New York, N. Y. 10047

Attorney for Defendant

State of New York

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the

United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorney for Intervenor

United States of

America

JA 83

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 50, ORIGINAL

October Term, 1974

-—?

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Montpelier, Vermont,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,

Albany, New York,

and

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing

under the laws of the State of New York, located at New

York, New York,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

°

PETITION FOR AN ORDER WITH RESPECT TO

FEE AND EXPENSES OF SPECIAL MASTER

WHEREAS, the parties hereto have settled this case by

agreement and moved to dismiss the amended complaint

in this case pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court;

and

WHEREAS, there being no further necessity or occasion

for the services of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter, appointed by the

Court as Special Master in this case; and

a

JA 84

WHEREAS, the parties have been authorized by Hon. R.

Ammi Cutter to state that he has read and has no objection

with respect to this Petition:

Now, THEREFORE, the parties hezeto respectfully petition

the Court to enter an order with respect to the fee and

expenses of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter, appointed by the Court

as Special Master in this case, on the following terms:

The fee to be awarded Hon. R. Ammi Cutter as

compensation for his services as Special Master in this

case shall be in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars

($50,000). This amount shall be paid as follows:

Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000) by the State of

Vermont and Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000) by

International Paper Company.

The actual expenses of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter in-

curred in connection with his services as Special

Master in this case, totaling Five Thousand One Hun-

dred Fifty Dollars ($5,150), are allowed. This amount

shall be paid by International Paper Company.

Dated: September 23, 1974

STATE OF VERMONT

/3/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for Plaintiff

Stat. of Vermont

INTERNATIONAL PAPER

COMPANY

/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE

Taggart Whipple

Davis PoLK & WARDWELL

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Attorney for Defendant

International Paper

Company

JA 85

Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF NEW York

/s/ Louis J. LerKow1tTz

Lovi; J. Lefkowitz

Attorney General of New

York

2 World Trade Cente

New York, N. Y. 10047

Attorney for Defendant

State of New York

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

/S/ ROBERT H. Bork

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the

United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorney for Intervenor

United States of

America

JA 86

IN THE

SUUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 50, ORIGINAL

°

STATE OF VERMONT, a soveriegn state,

Montpelier, Vermont,

° Plaintij,,

v.

STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,

Albany, New York,

and

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, 4 corporation existing

under the laws of the State of New York, located at New

York, New York,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

+

STIPULATION CONCERNING TRANSCRIPT

AND EXHIBITS

It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the

attorneys of record for the respective parties hereto, as

follows:

1. One copy of the transcript of the testimony in No. 50,

Original, together with a compilation of all requests for

transcript corrections made to the court stenographer prior

to November 1, 1974, shall be preserved and maintained

as a public record by the State of Vermont.

JA 87

2. Prior to November 1, 1974, the parties shall file with

the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court a Stipulation

listing the exhibits received in evidence in No. 50, Original

and stating which party shall maintain custody of each such

exhibit.

Dated: September 23, 1974

STATE OF VERMONT

/S/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

Kimberly B. Cheney

Attorney General of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Vermont

INTERNATIONAL PAPER

COMPANY

/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE

Taggart Whipple

Davis PoLK & WARDWELL

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Attorney for Defendant

International Paper

Company

Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF NEW YorK

/s/ Louis J. LEFKow1Tz

Louis J, Lefkowitz

Attorney General of New

York

2 World Trade Center

New York, N. Y. 10047

Attorney for Defendant

State of New York

‘ UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

/S/ RoBERT H. Bork

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the

United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorney for Intervenor

United States of

America

JA 88

AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT

BETWEEN

THE STATE OF VERMONT

AND

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preamble

I. Definitions

II. Obligations of the Company

III. Obligations of the State of Vermont

IV. General Provisions

V. Resolution of Issues Which May Arise Under

this Agreement

Schedule 1—The South Lake Referee and the

Appeal Board

Schedule 2—The Bark Pile

Schedule 3—New Mill Air Emissions

Schedule 4—New Mill Water Discharge

Appendix A to Agreement—Document to be

Executed by Vermont

PAGE

a es ere

JA 89

AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT

BETWEEN

THE STATE OF VERMONT

AND

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY

AGREEMENT, made this 23rd day of September, 1974

between the State of. Vermont and International Paper

Company;

WHEREAS, by per curiam Opinion, dated June 3, 1974,

the Supreme Court of the United States declined to approve

a proposed consent decree signed on April 24, 1974 by

counsel for each of the parties (including the intervenor)

in Vermont v. New York et al., No. 50, Original, for rea-

sons more fully stated in the Opinion;

WHEREAS, the Court in Part II of that Opinion stated:

"A settlement of this interstate aispute by agreement

of the parties is another alternative. Once a consensus

is reached there is no reason, absent a conflict with

an interstate compact, why such a settlement would

not be binding. And such a settlement might be the

basis for a motion to dismiss the complaint. Cf. 32

Orig., Missouri v. Nebraska, decided May 28, 1974,

US. “te

WHEREAS, all parties to No. 50, Original desire to settle

that action in the manner suggested in the above-quoted

language of the Court’s Opinion and to file a Motion to

Dismiss without prejudice the amended complaint in No.

50, Original on the basis of the settlement set forth, in

part, in this Agreement: and

JA 90

WHEREAS, all parties to No. 50, Original have, con-

temporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by

the State of Vermont and International Paper Company,

executed a separate agreement upon whicn the Motion

to Dismiss will also be based;

Now, THEREFORE, the State of Vermont and Interna-

tional Paper Company (hereinafter collectively referred

to as the “parties” to this Agreement) hereby stipulate and

agree that this Agreement may be filed with the Clerk

of the Supreme Court of the United States as the basis,

in part, for a Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint

in No. 50, Original. In the event that the Motion to Dismiss

the amended complaint in No. 50, Original is not granted,

this Agreement, the Appendix annexed hereto, and accom-

panying documents executed in connection with this Agree-

ment shall be of no effect whatsoever in No. 50, Original

or any other litigation, proceeding, or otherwise, and the

making of this Agreement, the Appendix annexed hereto,

and accompanying documents shall not in any manner

prejudice any consenting signatory in No. 50, Original

or any other litigation, proceeding, or otherwise. This

Agreement shall constitute a contract in settlement of No.

50, Original but shall not constitute an adjudication or

finding on any issue of fact or law, or evidence or admission

by any party with respect to any such issue raised therein.

In consideration of the mutual rights and obligations herein

set forth, the following provisions are agreed to and ac-

cepted by the parties and shall be binding upon them

respectively.

I. Definitions

Whenever used or referred to in this Agreement, unless

a different meaning appears clearly from the context:

JA 91

(A) “The Company” means International Paper

Company, a New York corporation, having it« prin-

cipal office at 220 East 42nd Street, New York, New

York, and its successors and assigns, inluding any

person, Corporation, or other entity that succeeds to

the business of International Paper Company;

(B) “Agreement” means this Agreement executed

and consented to by the parties, including the Sched-

ules and any amendments made from time to time,

but does not include the document annexed hereto and

marked as Appendix A;

(C) “BOD:” means the five-day biochemical oxy-

gen demand of the process waste water effluent, as

measured by method No. 219 set forth at pages 489,

et seq., of Standard Methods for the Examination of

Water and Wastewater (13th ed.), or any other

method agreed upon by the parties;

(D) “Daily arithmetic average” means the result

obtained by (1) calculating the area under the curve

generated by an automatic recording device for a

period of twenty-four hours and dividing that area

by the time span considered, or (2) any other equally

accurate method of computation;

(E) “Federal Water Pollution Control Act” means

Public Law No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as heretofore

amended;

(F) “New Miil” means the land, buildings, equip-

ment, and materials, including any additions or

modifications thereto, at the manufacturing and waste

treatment system sites owned and used by the Com-

pany and located approximately four miles north of

the Village of Ticonderoga, New York;

JA 92

(G) “Old Mill” means the land, buildings, equip-

ment, and materials, including any additions or modi-

fications thereto, located in the Village of Ticonde-

roga, New York, owned and formerly operated as a

kraft pulp and paper mill by the Company, but does

not include the dam and certain contiguous property

specified in Chapter 675 of the Laws of 1973 of the

State of New York;

(H) “Process waste water effluent” means any

water that comes into direct contact with, or results

from the production or use of, any raw material, inter-

mediate product, finished product, byproduct, or was:e

product during manufacturing or processing, as dis-

charged to South Lake Champlain from the New Mill;

(1) “South Lake Champlain” means that portion

of Lake Champlain extending from Whitehall, New

York to the Lake Champlain Bridge near Crown

Point, New York;

(J) “Thermal oxidation” means the process of

raising the tempexature of a gas stream to 1500°F.

or more, with a residence time of one-half a second

or more;

(K) “Total phosphorus (as P)” means all of the

phosphorus present in the process waste water effluent;

and

(L) “Twenty-four hour composite sample” means

a sample collected over a continuous 24-hour period,

consisting of not less than twelve individual samples

of equal volume taken at two-hour intervals during

the 24 hours of sampling.

JA 93

II. Obligations of the Company

(A) With respect to the Old Mill, the Company,

and any person, corporation, or other entity that ac-

quires ownership or control of, or a recordable in-

terest in, the Old Mill, shall continue hereafter to

refrain and desist from all discharges of process and

Sanitary waste water and air emissions originating

from the Old Mill, except discharges and emissions

receiving the necessary approvals from federal, State

of New York, and local authorities. The Company

shall not be liable, however, for any actions in which

it has not participated and which are taken in contra-

vention of the terms of this paragraph if the person,

corporation, or other entity taking such actions has

actual or constructive notice of this paragraph. This

paragraph shall be set forth or incorporated by refer-

ence in any deed, lease, or other recordable instru-

ment of conveyance of the Old Mill, and in any agree-

ment whereby there is a change of ownership or control

of the Old Mill, and shall be cast as a restrictive

covenant running with the land.

(B) It shall take such actions with respect to the

bark pile (located on the north shore of Ticonderoga

Creek approximately one-half mile northeast of the

Old Mill) as are provided in Schedule 2.

(C) [t shall take such actions with respect to New

Mill ai: «missions as are provided in Schedule 3.

(D) It shall take such actions with respect to New

Mill water discharge as are provided in Schedule 4.

(E) With respect to the New Mill, the Company,

and any person, corporation, or other entity that

acquires ownership or control of, or a recordable in-

terest in, the New Mill, shall set forth or incorporate

JA 94

by reference the provisions of this Agreement ap-

plicable to the New Mill in any deed, lease, or other

recordable instrument of conveyance of the New Mill,

and in any agreement whereby there is a change of

ownership or control of the New Mill, and such pro-

visions shall be cast as restrictive covenants running

with the land. The Company shall not be liable, how-

ever, for any actions which contravene the provisions

of this Agreement applicable to the New Mill and

in which it has not participated if the person, cor-

poration, or other entity taking such actions has actual

or constructive notice of such provisions.

(F) Within 60 days after the entry of an order

dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,

the Company shall pay to the State of Vermont the

sum of $500,000. This money shall be paid by the

Company and received by the State of Vermont as a

contribution by the Company to the State of Vermont,

to be used in the future solely for the purpose of pro-

tecting and preserving the natural environment of the

Lake Champlain basin, and shall be maintained by

the State of Vermont in a segregated account for this

express purpose; provided, however, that the State of

Vermont shall have sole discretion as to the manner

in which the contribution is to be used for the fore-

going purpose. This contribution shall not create a

trust.

(G) The Company shall:

(1) permit official representatives of the State

of Vermont, at reasonable times, on reasonable

notice, and in a reasonable manner, to inspect and

take samples from the pollution control facilities

at the New Mill and to inspect and copy records

a Ae Rl ae ll

JA 95

related thereto that are not privileged, and to inter-

view the persons responsible therefor, in order to

determine the effectiveness of operation of such

facilities;

(2) take appropriate Steps to inform its directors

and responsible officers of the contents of this

Agreement and Appendix A annexed hereto;

(3) provide expanded technical training and

instructional courses (including refresher courses

where appropriate) for all personnel engaged in

the operation of the pollution control facilities at

the New Mill, and provide instructional memoranda

and bulletins with respect to the proper operation

of such facilities; and

(4) provide to the State of Vermont: (a) a

copy of each report with respect to process waste

water effluent and air emissions from the New Mill

that the Company regularly submits to the State

of New York or to the United States, at the same

time that it submits such reports to the State of

New York or the United States, and (b) a monthly

summary of process waste water effluent data, in

the same format and containing the same informa-

tion that has been supplied to the parties during

No. 50, Original, by the last day of the month fol-

lowing that month for which the summary has been

compiled.

III. Obligations of the State of Vermont

(A)(1) Within 60 days after the entry of an order

dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,

Vermont shall deliver to the Company a separate,

executed copy of the document annexed hereto as

JA 96

Appendix A. The parties agree that Appendix A shall

be construed and take effect as a coverant not to sue

at common law in that: (a) it shall prevent the State

of Vermont from proceeding against the Company

in any manner or respect specified in Appendix A,

and (b) it shall not have the effect of barring,

diminishing, or affecting in any way any legal or equit-

able rights or claims, actions, suits, causes of action, Or

demands that the State of Vermont may have against

the State of New York or any person other than the

Company, except as the enforcement of the same may

be precluded by subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.

The parties agree not to assert in any litigation or

proceeding or otherwise that Appendix A has any

effect other than as stated in this subparagraph.

(2) Notwithstanding any provision of Appendix A

or any reservation by the State of Vermont made

therein and notwithstanding the fact that No. 50,

Original is to be dismissed without prejudice, the

State of Vermont shall not seek to recover from any

party to No. 50, Original damages for harm to the

South Lake, its waters, shores, adjacent areas, and

the atmosphere above and near it, allegedly suffered

on or prior to the entry of an order dismissing the

amended complaint in No. 50, Original for which

the State of Vermont could have sought recovery in

No. 50, Original.

(B) The State of Vermont sb ill make available

to the Company for inspection and copying, et the Com-

pany’s expense, all financial records relating directly or

indirectly to the contribution referred to in Article II(F) of

this Agreement.

(C) The State of Vermont shall:

JA 97

(1) submit:to the Company by April 15 of each

year, a written report describing the activities and

Studies relating to the natural environment of the

South Lake Champlain basin that are contemplated

to be undertaken by or for its Department of Water

Resourc_s during the following period of May 1—

November 30;

(2) submit to the Company by February 15 of

each following year, a written report describing all

the activities and studies relating to the natural

environment of the South Lake Champlain basin

actually undertaken by or for its Department of

Water Resources during the precedin; period of

May 1—November 30; and

(3) make available to the Company upon re-

quest, for inspection and copying of any documents,

not privileged, relating in whole or in part to the

activities and studies referred to in subparagraphs

(1) and (2) of this paragraph.

(D) The State of Vermont shall:

(1) study and recommend control of septic tank,

sewer, agricultural, and other discharges within the

Vermont portion of the South Lake Champlain

basin;

(2) study and recommend the enactment of

legislation or the promulgation of regulations con-

cerning the use of detergents in Vermont:

(3) submit annually to the Company a written

report describing its activities undertaken pursuant

to subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph;

and

JA 98

(4) make available to the Company, upon re-

quest, for inspection and copying, any documents,

not privileged, relating in whole or in part to its

activities undertaken pursuant to subparagraphs

(1) and (2) of this paragraph.

(E) The State of Vermont shall take such steps

as are necessary to inform the appropriate members

of the Vermont State Government (including, without

limitation, the appropriate officials of the Vermont

Agency of Environmental Conservation) of the con-

tents of this Agreement and Appendix A annexed

hereto.

(F) Subject to the relief available pursuant to Sec-

tion 1.5(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and only

with respect to the specific limitations in Sections 3.4

and 3.5 of Schedule 3 and Section 4.1 of Schedule 4:

(1) prior to January 1, 1983, the State of

Vermont shall not propose or support any proposal

that more stringent limitations than those set forth

in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of Schedule 3 and Section

4.1(b) of Sched'> 4 be included in any permit

issued or to be issued to the Company with respect

to the New Mill; provided, however, that in the

event that the Company at any time prior to ! anuary

1, 1983, proposes or supports any proposal that

any limitation referred to in this subparagraph be

made less stringent, the State of Vermont's obliga-

tions under this subparagraph shall not apply with

respect to that limitation only; and

(2) prior to June 1, 1979, or the commencement

of any administrative action with respect to the

second National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

IV.

JA 99

System (hereinafter reierred to as the NPDES)

permit to be issued to the Company with respect

to the New Mill, whichever is earlier, the State of

Vermont shall not propose or Support any proposal

that a more stringent limitation than that set forth

in Section 4.1(a) of Schedule 4 be included in any

permit issued or to be issued to the Company with

respect to the New Mill; provided, however, that

in the event that the Company at any time prior to

June 1, 1979, proposes or supports any proposal

that the limitation referred to in this subparagraph

be made less stringent, the State of Vermont’s

obligation under this subparagraph shall not apply.

(G) The State of Vermont shall monitor, on a

regular basis and in a scientifically acceptable manner,

the water quality in that part of Lake Champlain from

Chipman Point to the Lake Champlain Bridge near

Crown Point, New York, and shall make the results

of such monitoring available to the Company for in-

spection and copying upon reasonable request.

General Provisions

(A) The provisions of this Agreement shall be

applicable and limited to the activities of the Com-

pany at the Old and New Mills and shall not be con-

strued as applicable to, or in any way providing a

precedent with respect to, any other mill, installation,

facility, or location.

(B) Subject to the provisions of Articles III(A)

(2) and III(F), nothing herein (including, but not

limited, to the emission and effluent limitations pre-

scribed in Schedule 3 and Schedule 4 of this Agree-

ment) shall be construed to affect the authority, if any,

JA 100

of any regulatory or law enforcement authority with

lawful jurisdiction:

(1) to regulate waste water discharges or air

emissions from the Old Mill and the New Mill;

(2) to seek to abate the effects of such discharges

or emissions; or

(3) to take such actions as are authorized by

law to accomplish these ends (including, but not

limited to, sampling at, or inspection of, the’ New

Mill and the Old Mill).

(C) The provisions of this Agreement shall not

be construed as, nor shall they operate as, an admis-

sion that the Company has or has not violated any law

or regulation or otherwise committed a breach of duty

at any time, and shall not constitute, in No. 50, Orig-

inal or any other litigation or proceeding or otherwise,

evidence or any implication of any such violation or

breach of duty.

(D) Any testimony taken or any exhibit received

in evidence in No. 50, Original shall be received in

evidence, if otherwise relevant and admissible, in any

hearing or proceeding between or among the parties

and neither party shall object to the introduction of

such testimony or exhibit on the ground that the offer-

ing party has failed to produce the witness to testify

with respect to such testimony or to authenticate such

exhibit. The parties, however, reserve their rights, if

any, to move to strike all or any portion of any testi-

mony taken and all or any portion of any exhibit re-

ceived in evidence in No. 50, Original.

(E) Either party may hile this Agreement for

recording in the appropriate land records pertaining

to the Old and New Mills.

JA 101

(F) Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting

any Claims or rights of any citizens or residents of the

State of Vermont that may exist against any party

to No. 50, Original.

(G) The provisions of this Agreement shall apply

to the New Mill as long as it exists, regardless of who

owns or operates the New Mill.

(H) This Agreement does not resolve certain issues

or claims raised by the pleadings in No. 50, Original.

This is so in part because such issues or claims are

likely to be dealt with by action of regulatory or execu-

tive agencies of the United States or the State of New

York in the performance of their official duties. This

Agreement shall not be construed as determinative of

any such unresolved issues or claims. Claims disposed

of in Appendix A annexed hereto and those covered

by Article III(A)(2) of this Agreement shall be re-

garded as resolved by this Agreement.

(I) If any provision of Article V or Schedule 1

of this Agreement is held by any court to be invalid

or unenforceable, the validity and the enforceability

of the remaining provisions of Article V, Schedule 1

and the rest of this Agreement shall not be affected

thereby, and the rights and obligations of the parties

shall be construed and enforced as if this Agreement

did not contain the particular provision or provisions

held to be invalid or unenforceable.

(J) The parties may waive any of the provisions

of this Agreement by joint written agreement.

V. Resolution of Issues Which May Arise Under this

Agreement

(A) The parties recognize that certain issues may

arise during the existence of this Agreement concern-

JA 102

ing the construction, enforcement, modification (in-

cluding, but not limited to, relief from), or termina-

tion of any of the provisions of this Agreement. In

order to expedite the resolution of any such issues,

the parties agree to submit these issues to binding

arbitration, in the manner and form set forth in

Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The parties further

agree that all applications for: construction of any

provision; enforcement of any obligation; modifica-

tion of any provision; or termination of any provision

of this Agreement shall be made only in accordance

with Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(B) Except as otherwise expressly set forth in

Schedule 1, any application by any party for modifica-

tion or termination of any provision of this Agreement

may be granted only upon a clear showing that it is

supported by: (a) conditions substantially changed

from those existing on the date of entry of an order

dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,

or (b) conditions not reasonably detectable on that

date, or (c) strong equitable considerations arising

thereafter.

SCHEDULE 1

THE SOUTH LAKE REFEREE AND THE APPEAL BOARD

SECTION 1.1

(a) Within 90 days after the entry of an order dismiss-

ing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, the parties

shall confer and endeavor to agree upon a person to serve

as South Lake Referee. The South Lake Referee shall be

a lawyer. If agreement cannot be reached within that time.

application may be made by any party to the President of

the American Arbitration Association for the appointment

of the South Lake Referee pursuant to the Rules of the

Association.

JA 103

(b) The South Lake Referee shall serve a term of three

years, and, upon the consent of the parties, may serve one

or more additional terms of three years. If the South Lake

Referee declines to serve an additional term, or if any party

withholds its consent to his reappointment as South Lake

Referee, the parties promptly shall confer and endeavor

to agree upon another individual to serve as South Lake

Referee. If an agreement cannot be reached within 45

days from the date the South Lake Referee declines to

serve another term, or from the date that consent to his

reappointment as South L.ake Referee is withheld by either

party, the successor shall be designated by a majority vote

of the Appeal Board. If the Appeal Board cannot agree

upon the successor within 45 days from the time the matter

is referred to it, the Chairman of the Appeal Board shall

designate the succcessor.

(c) In the event that the South Lake Referee dies, re-

signs, or is otherwise unable to perform his duties as South

Lake Referee, the parties promptly shali confer and en-

deavor to agree upon a successor. If agreement cannot be

reached within 45 days from the date that both parties

receive notice of the death, resignation or disability of the

South Lake Referee, the successor shall be designated by a

majority vote of the Appeal Board. If the Appeal Board

cannot agree upon the successor within 45 days from the

date the matter is referred to it, the Chairman of the Appeal

Board shall designate the successor.

(d) Subject to the provisions of Section 1.2(b) of this

Schedule, the South Lake Referee, in performing his duties

pursuant to this Agreement, shall have the same power and

authority as an arbitrator acting pursuant to federal law,

or if that is inapplicable, New York law, and also the au-

thority to take such other actions as are set forth in this

Schedule. Unless waived by the parties, final decisions of

JA 104

the South Lake Referee shall be based upon writtcn find-

ings of fact and, if appropriate, conclusions of iaw. Such

decisions, if appealed, shall be reviewable by the Appeal

Board according to the standard set forth in Section 1.2(b)

below.

SECTION 1.2

(a) The Appeal Board shall cons'st of three independent

persons, one of whom shall be designated by the State of

Vermont and one by the Company. Each member of the

Appeal Board shall be a lawyer. Such designations shall

be made within 90 days from the entry of an order dismiss-

ing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original. Each

party shall at all time be entitled to have one designee on

the Appeal Board. In the event, hcwever, that one party

fails to designate a member of the Appeal Board and a

matter is referred to the Appeal Board, the Chairman and

the other member of the Appeal Board shall designate a

person to serve as the second member. The third member

and Chairman of the Appeal Board, who shall be its pre-

siding officer, shall be the Honorable R. Ammi Cutter,

heretofore the Special Master in No. 50, Original. The

term of the Chairman shall be three years. At the end of

any three-year term, if the parties consent and the Chairman

is willing, he shall be reappointed for an additional term of

three years. In the event that the Chairman dies, resigns,

is not reappointed, or is otherwise unable to perform his

duties, the parties shall confer promptly and endeavor to

agree upon a successor Chairman. If an agreement cannot

be reached within 45 days from the date that both parties

receive notice of the death, resignation or disability of the

Chairman, the successor Chairman shall be designated by

the remaining members of the Appeal Board. If the re-

maining members of the Appeal Board cannot agree upon

eee Teen ven ey ee

;

7

JA 105

the successor Chairman within 45 days from the time the

matter is referred to them, the successor Chairman shall be

designated, upon application by either party, by the Presi-

dent of the American Arbitration Association pursuant to

the Rules of the Association.

(b) The Appeal Board shall hear and determine appeals

from decisions of the South Lake Referee with respect to

applications made to him by any party to this Agreement

pursuant to Article V and Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

The Appeal Board shall attirm any decision made by the

South Lake Referee if such decision is supported by sub-

stantial evidence viewed on the record as a whole.

(c) A decision of the Appeal Board shall be made by

a majority of its members, or by the unanimous vote of

the Board. Such a decision shall be considered an award

of arbitration and shall be given the same weight and effect

as an arbitration award pursuant to federal law, or if that

is inapplicable, New Youk law. The award of arbitration

may be confirmed, and a judgment entered upon the con-

firmation, in any court of competent jurisdiction.

SECTION 1.3

(a) If any party desires to raise a matter pursuant to

the provisions of Article V of this Agreement, the parties

shall confer promptly among themselves and, if appropriate,

with regulatory officials or boards, or other persons, in an

effoit to resolve the matter.

(b) In the event that the parties are unable to resolve

by conference any mattc~ under this Agreement that is also

subject to the lawful jurisdiction of the United States En-

vironmental Protection Agency or the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation, or both, the

party seeking relief shall, upon notice to the other party,

JA 106

make application to, and exhaust its administrative remedies

(excluding appellate review) before, such regulatory agency

or agencies in accordance with the requirements of ap-

plicable law and regulations. The party seeking relief, upon

notice to the other party, may make application to the

South Lake Referee for a waiver of the obligations set forth

in this subparagraph and the South Lake Referee may

grant the application upon a showing that the performance

of those obligations is not necessary and appropriate.

(c) In the event that the parties are unable to resolve

any such matter after exhaustion of the procedures set forth

in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Section, within 30

days thereafter any party may make written application to

the South Lake Referee pursuant to Article V for the pur-

pose of resolving the matter. The application shall be

served by certified mail upon the other party and shall set

forth the nature of the matter, the specific action requested,

and the reasons alleged why the application should be

granted. Upon receipt of the application, the party in Op-

position to the application shall serve responding papers

within 30 days. Thereafter, the South Lake Referee may

require a conference between the parties, or, if he deems it

necessary, a hearing on the matter. Such conference or

hearing may be held at any reasonable time and place

specified by the South Lake Referee.

SECTION 1.4

+—_In_any hearing held pursuant to Section 1.3(c) of this

Schedule, any party may introduce testimony or exhibits,

subject to evidentiary rulings by the South Lake Referee.

All witnesses shall be sworn and subject to ¢ -oss-examina-

tion. At the request of any party, a transcript shall be made

of the hearing. The parties shall have the right to submit,

and the South Lake Referee may require the submission

of, briefs or memoranda.

SECTION 1.5

Subject to review by the Appeal Board, the South Lake

Referee may take the following types of actions:

(a) He may grant, for good cause shown, reasonable

temporary exemptions from, and reasonable extensions of

time (not exceeding six months on any one application)

for, the performance of any act or the compliawce with any

standard required by this Agreement. In granting any such

exemptions or extensions, he may impose appropriate terms

and conditions. In acting under this subparagraph, he shall

take into account (among other relevant matters) whether

there has existed or occurred:

(1) timely receipt by the applicant of all federal,

state, and local permits required for all actions neces-

sary to comply with this Agreement;

(2) reasonable availability from others of the ser-

vices, materials, equipment, or supplies required for

the construction, modification, or operation of facilities

necessary to comply with this Agreement;

(3) the passage of a reasonable period of time re-

quired for the construction, modification, and opera-

tion of such facilities; or

(4) any event, such as an act of God, war, strike,

flood, riot, catastrophe, or any other similar event

beyond the control of the applicant which has affected

the ability of the applicant to comply with this Agree-

ment.

(b) Notwithstanding compliance by the Company with

the provisions of Schedule 3 of this Agrvement, if, after

November 1, 1975, objectionable odors attributable to the

New Mill are detected in the State of Vermont during a

significant period of time, he may order other or further

action or relief.

JA 108

(c) If there is, after the date of this Agreement, a change

in the Consent Order relating to New Mill air emissions

executed by the Company and the New York State Depart-

ment of Environmental Conservation or in any NPDES

permit issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill,

he may order modification of this Agreement as appropriate

in light of the change in the Consent Order or the permit,

pursuant to the standards set forth in Article V(B) of this

Agreement.

(d) He may order modification or termination of any

provision of this Agreement pursuant to the standards set

forth in Article V(B) of this Agreement.

(e) He may con .rue or interpret any provision of this

Agreement upon ~. showing by any party that such provision

is ambiguous . reasonably susceptible of conflicting inter-

pretations.

(f) If it is alleged in an application to the South Lake

Referee that there has been a breach of any provision of

this Agreement, he may render a decision on the application,

including the ordering of relief, equitable or legal.

SECTION 1.6

In addition to the State of Vermont’s rights under Article

II(G)(1) of this Agreement, the State of Vermont may

apply to the South Lake Referee for an order permitting

its official representatives to inspect the Old Mill or the

New Mill, and the South Lake Referee may direct the Com-

pany to permit inspection of the Old Mill or the New Mill.

with or without notice to the Company, if, after hearing,

reasonable notice of which has been given to the Company,

the South Lake Referee determines that good cause has

been shown for such an inspection.

SECTION 1.7

As promptly as practicable after the conclusion of any

hearing and the submission of briefs and memoranda, the

South Lake Referee shall inform the parties in writing of

his decision. Unless any party appeals a decision of the

South Lake Referee to the Appeal Board within 30 days

after receipt of such decision, it shall be considered an award

of arbitration and shall be given the same weight and effect

as a decision of the Appeal Board pursuant to Section

1.2(c) of this Schedule.

SECTION 1.8

In connection with any appeal from a decision of the

South Lake Referee, the parties shall have the right to sub-

mit briefs and memoranda. The Appeal Board may require

the parties to submit briefs and memoranda, and, if appro-

priate, to present oral argument. Thereafter, by written

decision the Appeal Board may affirm, modify, or reverse

the decision of the South Lake Referee, or remand the

matter to the South Lake Referee for such action as the

Appeal Board directs.

SECTION 1.9

The parties shall pay, in equal shares, the fees and ex-

penses to which the South Lake Referee may be entitled

unless for just cause the Appeal Board or the South Lake

Referee shall direct that pay: 2nt thereof be borne in dif-

ferent proportions. In the event that the parties cannot

agree on the amount of such fees and expenses, they will be

set by the Appeal Board. The fees and expenses of the

Appeal Board shall be set by the parties. In the event that

the parties cannot agree on the amount of such fees or

expenses, they will be fixed by the President of the American

Arbitration Association pursuant to the Rules of the Associ-

ation.

JA 110

SECTION 1.10

Unless otherwise specifically provided, all questions of

choice of law relative to controversies under this Agreement

Shall be within the sound discretion of the South Lake

Referee and the Appeal Board.

SCHEDULE 2

The Bark Pile

The Company shall take the following measures by Sep-

tember 1, 1975 to reduce discharges into Ticonderoga

Creek from or through the bark pile in the Village of Ticon-

deroga, New York:

(a) Appropriate grading and covering of the bark pile

for the purpose of reducing, to the maximum extent feasible,

seepage from the bark pile into Ticonderoga Creek or any

watercourse flowing into Ticonderoga Creek; and

(b) The lowering of the water level in the pond ad-

jacent to the bark pile for the purpose of reducing, to the

maximum extent feasible, drainage from the pond through

the bark pile to Ticonderoga Creek or any watercourse

flowing into Ticonderoga Creek.

SCHEDULE 3

New Mili Air Emissions

SECTION 3.1

The Company shall endeavor in good faith to minimize

malodorous air emissions from the New Mill.

SECTION 3.2

The Company by November 1, 1975 shall treat by ther-

mal oxidation:

en ~~

JA 111

(a) the miscellaneous total reduced sulfur (here-

inafter TRS) gases currently vented through the

smelt tank scrubber;

(b) the gases from the condensate air stripper;

(c) the non-condensible gases currently burned in

the lime kiln;

(d) the TRS gases from the seal tank (under) vents

of the brown stock washers; and

(¢) the TRS gases from the brown stock washers’

exhaust system, including the hood vents.

SECTION 3.3

In the event that neither the power boiler nor the recovery

boiler is used as the primary means for thermal oxidation

of the non-condensible gases referred to in Section 3.2(c)

of this Schedule, the Company shall maintain and operate

the lime kiln, and appropriate equipment and fixtures, for

thermal oxidation of the non-condensible gases in the lime

kiln when the primary means of oxidation of the non-

condensible gases is inoperative.

SECTION 3.4

Upon the entry of an order dismissing the amended com-

plaint in No. 50, Original, the Company shall operate the

recovery bo:er in such a manner that (ie TRS emissions

from that source shall not exceed:

(a) 5 ppm (parts per million) or 2.8 pounds per

hour, whichever is more restrictive, as a daily arith-

metic average; and

(b) 10 ppm or 5.6 pounds per hour, whichever is

more restrictive, for more than 60 cumulative minutes

per day.

JA 112

The standards of performance referred to in this Section

shall not be applicable during a period of 24 hours immedi-

ately before shutdown or during a period of 24 hours

immediately following the commencement of startup opera-

tions of the recovery boiler.

SECTION 3.5

Commencing 90 days after the entry of an order dis-

missing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, the

Company shall:

(a) operate the lime kiln in such a manner that the

TRS emissions from that source shall not exceed 10

ppm or 0.7 pounds per hour, whichever is more re-

strictive; provided, however, that this standard of per-

formance shall not be applicable during a period of

24 hours immediately following the commencement of

startup operations of the lime kiln;

(b) before any commencement of startup opera-

tions of the lime kiln and during any 2 t-hour startup

period, maintain a sufficient amount of caustic (sodium

hydroxide) in the scrubbing solution in the lime kiln

scrubber for optimum removal of TRS; and

(c) when such caustic is used, continuously moni-

tor and record the rate of flow of the caustic solution

of known concentration, and periodically (at least

once a shift) measure and record the pH of the scrub-

‘bing solution.

SECTION 3.6

The Company shall monitor continuously, in a reason-

ably accurate and reliable manner, the TRS emissions from

the recovery boiler and the lime kiln and shall record con-

tinuously the results for each such source on a reasonably

accurate and reliable automatic recording device.

SECTION 3.7

Emissions in excess of the limitations set forth in Section

3.4 or 3.5 of this Schedule shall not constitute a failure to

comply with this Agreement in the absence of a finding by

the South Lake Referee that objectionable odors attribut-

able to the New Mill have been detected in the State of

Vermont during a significant period of time.

SECTION 3.8

The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of Sections

3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of this Schedule in the Consent Order in

the proceeding now pending before the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation against the

Company pursuant to Article 19 of the New Yor’: State

Environmental Conservation Law.

SCHEDULE 4

New Mill Water Discharge

SECTION 4.1

The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of the

following effluent limitations in the first NPDES permit to

be issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill

pursuant to Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act:

(a) The amount of BOD: in the process waste

water effluent shall not exceed 4,400 pounds per day

as a monthly average; and

(b) The amount of total phosphorus (as P) in the

process waste water effluent shall not exceed a con-

ce’ vation of 0.5 mg/l as a monthly average or 88

pounds per day as a monthly average, whichever is

more restrictive.

JA 114

Until such time as the Company can demonstrate that

it has installed an effluent flow-measuring system that can

reliably measure the process waste water effluent on a con-

tinuous basis, the flow to be used in computing the loadings

in number of pounds per day shall be the measured intake

of water to the New Mill.

SECTION 4.2

The Company shall test the process waste water effluent

twice a year during 1975 and 1976 to determine whether it

is toxic to fish. To the extent feasible, one test per year

shall be conducted during normal operations when black

liquor is present in the process waste water effluent as a

result of its being released from the spill pond to the waste

treatment system and one test per year shall be conducted

during normal operations when no black liquor is present

in the process waste water effluent. The effluent shall be

considered to be toxic if, over a 96-hour period, 20 per cent

of the test fish fail to survive in a solution composed of

65 per cent process waste water effluent and 35 per cent

water taken from Lake Champlain. The test fish to be used

Shall be yellow perch no greater than four inches in length

taken from Lake Champlain at a point or points more than

five miles distant from the point of discharge of the process

waste water effluent. The procedures used and the results

of these tests shall be reported in writing to the State of

Vermont within 60 days after the tests have been completed.

SECTION 4.3

During the period from May 1 to November 30 of each

calendar year, the Company shall:

(a) minimize, to the extent practicable, discharges

of any type of black liquor through the waste water

treatment system; and

JA 115

(b) not discharge the contents of its spill pond

through the waste water treatment system; provided,

however, that it may discharge up to 15,000 pounds

of BOD: per day from the spill pond for the purpose

of maintaining the treatment system when the pulp

and paper manufacturing processes are not in opera-

tion. An analysis for BOD: in the spill pond shall be

conducted prior to discharge pursuant to the provisions

of this paragraph.

SECTION 4.4

The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of the

following requirements in the first NPDES permit to be

issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill pur-

suant to Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act:

(a) the Company shall sample and test its process

waste water effluent as follows: color—daily; BOD:

and total phosphorus (as P)—three days per week,

none of which shall be consecutive to each other;

settleable solids and suspended solids—five days per

week; flow, temperature, and pH—continuous;

(b) the test for BOD: shall be formed on a

twenty-four hour composite sampi t has been

refrigerated during collection and pnu to analysis,

and the analysis shall begin no more than two hours

after collection of the composite;

(c) the test for total phosphorus (as P) shall be

performed on the same sample as that referred to in

paragraph (b) of this Section within 24 hours after

collection of the composite, and such sample shall be

preserved within two hours of collection; and

JA 116

(d) the suspended solids shall be determined on

the composite referred to in paragraph (b) of this

Section, or on a minimum of four grab samples col-

lected at four separate times at not less than four-hour

intervals over a 16-hour period, at the option of the

Company; provided, however, that:

(¢) the requirements specified in paragraphs (a),

(b), (c), and (d) of this Section shall not be applic-

able during shutdowns or total closures of the New

Mill.

SECTION 4.5

All process waste water effluent samples to be tested for

total phosphorus (as P) shall be collected and stored uatil

analysis in Pyrex glass containers that have been pre-washed

in a ten per cent (10% ) solution of warm hydrochloric acid

and subsequently rinsed three times with distilled water.

SECTION 4.6

(a) The effluent limitations and requirements set forth

in Sections 4.1 and 4.4 of this Schedule, except for total

phosphorus (as P), shall be in force as a result of this Agree-

ment, effective upon the entry of an order dismissing the

amended complaint in No. 50, Original, even if such limi-

tations and requirements are not incorporated in the

NPDES permit.

(b) The limitation for total phosphorus (as P) set forth

in Section 4.1(b) of this Schedule shall become effective

and in force as a result of this Agreement on July 1, 1977,

even if such limitation is not incorporated in the NPDES

permit.

JA 117

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, through their au-

thorized agents, have executed this Ag‘eement this 23rd

day of September, 1974.

STATE OF VERMONT

(Illegible ) /s/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

SSP CSET SSS PSOGCC OCA aR 66 bd 2 ee eee ae ed eee 6s ee

COMPANY

Engineering and

Environmental

Management

ee ee

(Jurat omitted in printing]

JA 118

APPENDIX A

This document is delivered pursuant to Article III(A)

(1) of an “Agreement of Settlement” between the State of

Vermont and International Paper Company and Atricle

IV(A)(1) of an “Agreement of Settlement” between the

State of Vermont, International Paper Company, the State

of New York, and the United States, both dated September

23, 1974, which Agreements constitute the basis for the

settlement of State of Vermont v. State of New York, et al.,

No. 50, Original. The provisions of Articles III(A) and

IV(A) of those respective Agreements are incorporated

herein by reference.

1. THE STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state, and all

of its officers, agents, employees, and representatives, for

and in consideration of the execution of two Agreements

referred to above and the agreement of International Paper

Company (hereinafter referred to as “the Company”) to

comply with the provisions of such Agreements, does here-

by covenant not to sue, or bring or assert any claims, actions,

or demands whatsoever against, the Company (as defined

in paragraph 5 below) for or with respect to any matters

which were or might have been alleged by the State of

Vermont, or encompassed within the original or amended

complaint, in State of Vermont v. State of New York, et al.,

United States Supreme Court, No. 50, Original, relating

to (a) alleged past, present and future harm caused by or

arising from the accumulation of sediment in Ticonderoga

Creek and the Ticonderoga Bay area of Lake Champlain,

(b) alleged past, present and future harm caused by or

arising from discharges to the water from the Company’s

Old Mill (located in the Village of Ticonderoga, New York)

prior to the entry of an order dismissing the amended com-

plaint in No. 50, Original, (c) alleged past, present and

OO a A, iy tat ell,

JA 119

future harm caused by or arising from emissions to the air

from the Company’s Old Mill prior to the entry of an order

dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, original and

(d) alleged harm caused by or arising from emissions to

the air from the Company’s New Mill (located approxi-

mately four miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga, New

York) prior to the entry of an order dismissing the amended

complaint in No. 50, Original.

2. This document shall inure only to the benefit of the

Company. It shall not inure to the benefit of the State of

New York or any other person, government or entity (in-

cluding, but not limited to, any alleged joint tortfeasor)

who may be liable, primarily or secondarily or otherwise,

at law or in equity, with respect to the alleged harm dealt

with in subparagraphs (a)-(d) of paragraph 1 of this docu-

ment, or the abatement thereof.

3. The State of Vermont expressly reserves all rights,

claims, actions, suits, demands and causes of action that it

has or may have against any person, government or entity

other than the Company to recover damages for all harm,

if any, arising after the date of entry of an order dismissing

the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, and to obtain

any legal, equitable or other relief to which it hereafter may

be entitled and which is related to or arises out of the mat-

ters dealt with in paragraph 1 of this document.

4. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto, and

it is their intention, that this document shall be construed

as, aud shall have the effect of: (a) a covenant not to sue

at common law, and (b) not barring, disminishing o

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