Joint Appendix — International Paper Co. v. Ouellette
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EPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
Petitioner,
HARMEL OUELLETTE and Lira OUELLETTE, CLIFTON BROWNE and
Epa BRownz, ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually,
on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all similarly situated
plaintiffs, H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN
THORNDIKE and ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE and
VIRGINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, Jr., and Lois
T. PATTERSON,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SL A TL TE ET TG: EN fA ER
JOINT APPENDIX
ON A BE ERR TEE AE a A ENE UE REE, OCIS SANT RAO PS ARERR Nt seta EES
Roy L. REARDON*
ALBERT X. Baber, Jr.
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
(a partnership which includes
professional corporations)
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, New York 10004
(212) 483-9000
DINSE, ERDMANN & CLAPP
209 Battery Street
P. O. Box 988
Burlington, Vermont 05402
(802) 864-5751
Counsel for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
PETER F. LANGROCK*
EMILY J. JOSELSON
LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER
& WooL
Drawer 351
Middlebury, Vermont 05753
(802) 388-6356
Counsel for Respondents
JEFFREY L. AMESTOY,
Attorney General
MERIDETH WRIGHT,
Assistant Attorney General
Pavilion Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
(802) 828-3171
Attorneys for State of Vermont as
Class Member
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 22, 1986
CERTIORARI GRANTED MARCH 24, 1986
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Docket Entries: Ouellette v. International Paper
Company, No. 78 Civ. 163, United States District
Court for the District of Vermont
Docket Entries: Ouellette v. International Paper
Company, No. 85 Civ. 7506, United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Order of the United States District Court of Ver-
mont Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Com-
plaint dated April 7, 1980
Opinion and Order of the United States District
Court of Vermont, Ouellette v. International
Paper Company, dated April 24, 1980
Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Cause
of Action dated June 22, 1981
Affidavit of Dana B. Dolloff Sworn to June 22, 1981
in Support of IPCO’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Cause of Action (“Dolloff Affidavit”) ...
Exhibit A to Dolloff Affidavit: (1) Stipulation
and Order of Dismissal dated September 23,
1974 in State of Vermont v. State of New
York, 419 U.S. 955 (1974)
PAGE
‘i
(2) Agreement of Settlement between the State
of Vermont and International Paper Company
dated September 23, 1974 (“Two-Party Agree-
EE Sa RESE oo bk bbb whee ces en i.
(3) Agreement of Settlement between the State
of Vermont, the State of New York, Interna-
tional Paper Company, and the United States
of America dated September 23, 1974 (“Four-
£ _« Soak RESIS. | Ges eneeae
Exhibit B to Dolloff Affidavit: National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System Permit
dated November 18, 1974 ..............
Exhibit C to Dolloff Affidavit: Environmental
Protection Agency of the United States Envi-
ronmental Compliance Schedule Letter dated
I a cs
Response of the Environmental Conservation Agen-
cy of the State of Vermont to Defendant Interna-
tional Paper Company’s Questionnaire to Class
Members dated September 23, 1981 .........
Order Granting Motion of the State of Vermont to
Allow Appearance and to Strike Request for Ex-
clusion dated March 23, 1983 ....... aadiss
Letter dated September 25, 1985, from Langrock
Sperry Parker & Wool to Second Circuit, with
attached remarks vy Senator Stafford, entered
into Congressional Record, September 12, 1985
IE SR en ae
Letter dated October 3, 1985, from Davis Polk &
Wardwell to Second Circuit ...............
PAGE
121
146
171
176
181
182
192
oe
United States Department of the Interior Survey
Map, Sediment Studies of South Lake Champlain,
Richard Haupt, p. 4 (1976), Produced by De-
fendant in Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories
I I TD 6 obec dc cccccccccccce
Location Map, Performance of Waste Treatment
Facilities at International Paper Company’s “New
Mill” at Ticonderoga, N.Y., Hydroscienccz, Inc.,
Figure 1 (1972), Produced by Defendant in Re-
sponse to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories on January
De, SE WAS Hb dha ee 608640 sc be vic ee
The following opinions, orders and judgments
have been omitted in printing this Joint Appendix
because they appear in the appendix to the Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court on Janu-
ary 22, 1986.
PAGE
197
198
Page in
Appendix
to Petition
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, Ouellette v. International
Paper Company, No. 85-8506, dated November
rem ao bh send eel elie o én eh 04 9 0-0 4
Opinion and Order of the District Court of Ver-
mont, Ouellette v. International Paper Company,
602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985) ............
Order and Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ouellette v. In-
ternational Paper Company, No. 85-7506, dated
rr ee ns ce mkeasdusese
JA 1
Docket Entries
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ViRMONT
78 Civ. 163
’
v
HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs
and
H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-
DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VIR-
GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lois
T. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Vv.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.
~*
4
Date NR Proceedings
1978
July 26 1 Filed Verified Petition for Removal.
July 26 2 Filed Bond for Removal.
July 26 3 Filed Notice of Petition for Re-
movai.
July 26 4 Filed Deft’s Answer. rer
July 28 5 Filed Docket entries, Complaint,
Summons and return of service re-
ceived from Addison County Super-
ior Court. rer
Nov. 3
Nov. 3
7
8
11
Proceedings
Filed Plaintiffs’ Objection to Re-
moval. cp
Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in
Support of Objection to Removal.
rpd
Filed Defendant’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand. cp
Filed Deft’s Certificate of Service re
P#8. rer
Filed Pitfs’ Reply Memorandum to
Deft’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Pitfs’ Motion to Remand. rer
Filed correcte:, copy of Page 2 of
Plaintiffs’ Reply Memo (P#10).
cp
In Chambers, Court advises counsel
of his personal concern of the lake
conditions (he feels he may be ob-_
jective in this matter). Peter Lang-
rock, Esq. and Susan Humphreys,
Esq. for plaintiffs; John Dinse, Esq..,
Spencer Knapp, Esq., James W.B.
Benkard, (Ms) Jamie Stern, Esq.
and Robert M. Hunziker, Esq. for
defendants.
All counsel state that they have no
qualms about the court deciding
this matter—Court to go forward in
this case.
Date
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
24
29
NR
12
13
14
15
16
JA 3
Proceedings
In open Court, hearing on plaintiffs’
“objection to removal” considered
by the court as a motion to remand.
ORDERED: Motion denied. Plain-
tiff has 90 days from today to file
motion for class action determina-
tion. gc
Filed motion of Pitfs and H. Vaughn
Griffin, Sr., Ardath Griffin, Alan
Thorndike & Ellen Thorndike, pro-
posed intervenors, to intervene.
Filed memorandum in Support of
motion to intervene.
At the Call of the Calendar before
Judge Coffrin, it was
Ordered: Case continued for term;
no further continuances granted.
Filed Order— Motion of H. Vaughn
Griffin, Sr., Ardath Griffin, Alan
Thorndike & Ellen Thorndike to
Intervene as party pltfs. granted.
Mailed copy to Attys. rer
Filed Deft’s Consent to granting of
Pitfs’ Motion for Intervention, P#
12. rer
Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Allow
Wesley C. Larrabee, Virginia Larra-
bee, F. Alfred Patterson, Jr., and
Lois T. Patterson to Intervene as
Plaintiffs. cp
Date
Dec. 22
Dec. 22
1979
Jan. 16
Jan. 16
Jan 16
Jan. 29
Jan. 29
Jan. 31
Feb. 11
23
24
JA 4
Proceedings
Filed Pitfs’ Interrogatories to Deft.
International Paper—First Set.
Filed Order motion to intervene as
party pltfs of Wesley C. & Virginia
Larabee, F. Alfred & Lois T. Patter-
son is granted. Copy to Attys.
Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Class De-
termination.
Filed Pltfs’ Memo in support of
P#19.
Filed Pitfs’ Certificate of Service re
P#19&20. rer
Filed Deft’s Motion for extension
of time for filing Memo in Opposi-
tion to Pitfs’ Motion for Class Ac-
tion, by 50 days.
Filed Deft’s Memo in support of
P#22. rer
Filed Stipulation—that the time for
defendant International Paper Com-
pany to answer or object to Plain-
tiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant
International Paper Co.—First Set
is extended from January 23, 1979
to February 22, 1979. cp
Upon consideration of Stipulation,
P#24, it is So Ordered that the
time be extended from January 23,
1979 to February 22, 1979. Mailed
copy to Attys. rar
Date
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
6
; oa
13
28
28
28
NR
25
27
28
29
30
31
JA 5
Proceedings
Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
Defendant to Respond to Interroga-
torics—First Set dated (12/21/78):
Memo in Support of Motion.
Filed Order—-Deft’s Motion for Ex-
tension of Time for filing Memo in
Opposition to Pitfs’ Motion for
Class Action granted; Deft. to file
Memo on or before 4-24-79. Mailed
copy to attys. rer
Filed Deft’s Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Pitfs’ Motion to
Compel Answers to Pitfs’ Interroga-
tories—with Exhibit 1 attached.
Filed Affidavit of James B. Ben-
kard, dated March 12—with Ex-
hibits “A” and “B” attached. gjl
Filed Affidavit of Jean Anderson,
Town Clerk of Shoreham, dated
March 26—wWith attached lists of
all landowners with property bor-
dering Lake Champlain in the
Town of Shoreham.
Filed Affidavit of Richard L. Ros-
corla, Town Clerk of Bridport,
dated March 22—With attached
lists of all lake shore land owners
of the Town of Bridport.
Filed Affidavit of Jane B. Grace,
Town Clerk of Addison, dated
March 22—wWith attached lists of
all lake shore land owners of the
Town of Addison.
Date
Mar. 28
April 19
April 19
April 27
April 27
May |!
May 1
May 9
May ‘0
May 11
NR
32
33
34
35
36
JA 6
Proceedings
Filed Certificate of Service for pgs.
#29, 30&31. gil
In open Court before Judge Coffrin,
hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to com-
pel. Peter Langrock, Esq. for plain-
tiffs; James W.B. Benkard, Esq. for
defendant.
Ordered: Motion denied.—Court
directs counsel to get together and
narrow the discovery area. gc
Filed Deft’s Memo in Opposition to
maintenance of case as class action.
Filed Affidavit of Robert J. Bachor-
ik with Exhibits A & B attached,
submitted by deft. rer
At the Call of the Calendar before
Judge Coffrin, it was
Ordered: Case continued. cb
Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Extension of
Time (14 days) in which to respond
by filing Memo in Opposition to
Deft’s Memo of Law in Opposition
to Maintenance of case as class ac-
tion, P#33. re
Based upon the foregoing Motion,
it is ORMZRED: granted. Copies
mailed to attys. gl
Filed Deft International Paper’s
Consent to Pitfs’ Motion for Exten-
sion of Time etc., P#35. rer
Date
June
19
52
JA 7
Proceedings
Filed Pitfs’ Reply Memo on Class
Certification Issue. rer
Filed Deposition of Lois Patterson.
Filed Deposition of F. Alfred Pat-
terson, Jr.
Filed Deposition of Clifton Browne.
Filed Deposition of Edla Browne.
Filed Deposition of Harmel Ouel-
lette.
Filed Deposition of Lila Ouellette.
Filed Deposition of Wesley Larra-
bee.
Filed Deposition of Virginia Larra-
bee. :
Filed Deposition of Ellen Thorn-
dike.
Filed Deposition of Alde Plooffe.
Filed Deposition of Shirley Plooffe.
Filed Deposition of Ardath Garrett
Griffin.
Filed Deposition of H. Vaughn Grif-
fin, Sr. gl
Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
Compiaint with Memorandum in
Support. cp
Filed Defendant’s Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion to Amend. gl
NR
53
54
JA 8
Proceedings
At the Call of the Calendar before
Judge Coffrin, it was
Ordered: Case passed until motions
heard.
Filed Deft’s Answers & Objections
to Pltfs’ Ist Set of Interrogatories,
P#17. rer
Calendar call before J udge Coffrin,
it was
Ordered: Case passed.
In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on plaintiffs’ motion to amend
Complaint. Peter Langrock, Esq.
and Susan Humphreys, Esq. for
plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,
James W.B. Benkard, Esq., Robert
M. Hunziker, Esq. and Kevin Sim-
mons, Esq. for defendant.
Ordered: Motion granted.
Hearing on motion for class Certi-
fication.
Statements made by Mr. Langrock
and by Mr. Benkard.
Taken under advisement. gc
Filed defendant's supplementary
memorandum of law in Opposition
to maintenance of this case as a
class action. gc
Date
Apr. 24
June
16
23
NR
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
JA 9 ,
Proceedings
Filed Opinion and Order—Certifi-
cation of Air Class—DENIED. Cer-
tification of Water Class AFFIRMED
for lakeshore owners in Towns of
Bridport and Shoreham. Counsel to
prepai. Notice to class members
and submit to court 21 days from
the date of this Order. Copy to
attorneys. cp
Filed Pitfs’ Motion for Reconsider-
ation.
Filed Pitfs’ Memo in support of P#
56 w/map attached.
Filed Pitfs’ Affidavit of Susan F.
Humphrey, Esq., in re P#56. rer
Filed Deft’s Motion for Amendment
of Opinion & Order.
Filed Deft’s Memo in support of P
#59 & Memo in Opposition to P
#56, Pitfs’ Motion for Reconsider-
ation. rer
Filed Affidavits of Susan F. Humph-
rey. rpd
Filed Stip.—Deft. Consents to en-
largement of class to inc. property
owners in Addison (south of Crown
Pt. Bridge) re P#56 & inre P#5S5,
Opinion & Order, & P#59, Deft’s
Mot:.on to Amend same, Pitfs’ have
no objections to modification but
Date
July 16
Aug. 13
Aug. 18
NR
63
64
JA 10
Proceedings
reserve right to challenge defenses
raised by deft. as not individual
with ORDER granting same thereon.
Mailed cpy/attys. rer
ORDERED: Notice to Class Mem-
bers should follow the format in
this order. 2. Pitts’ to prepare nec-
essary number of notices. 3. Pltfs’
shall address envelopes affix postage
and submit them to Clerk for stuf-
fing and mailing. 4. Pitfs’ shall also
cause to be prepared a return post-
card as described in the order. 5.
The notices, envelopes and cards
Shall be supplied to the Clerk’s Of-
fice for processing or before 8-29-
80. 6. Pltfs’ shall also furnish to
the Clerk, with copy to counsel a
typewritten list of the names and
addresses of all persons to whom
the envelopes are addressed. Copy
to Attys. gww
Filed copy of approved Notice to
Class Members. Mailed Original to
Attorney Eaton for further action.
cb
In Chambers before Judge Coffrin,
informal conference re differences
of counsel with respect to the lan-
guage in the notices. Peter Lang-
rock, Esq. for plaintiffs; Spencer
Knapp, Esq. for defendant.
JA il
Date NR Proceedings
Aug. 25 65 ‘Filed Plaintiff's letter with an at-
tached alphabetical list by towns of
lakeshore owners whom they ad-
dressed envelopes to receive the No-
tice pursuant to ORDER dated Jul
16, 1980, P#63. cp
Aug. 27 66 =‘ Filed Clerk’s Cert. of Serv. re No-
tices mailed to class members con-
cerning Oxder, P#63; list attach.
Mailed cpy/Cert. to attys.
Oct. 1 67 Filed List of Member Pltfs request-
ing exclusion in this action. cp
Oct. 1 68 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Of Freder-
ick deG. Harlow, Esq. for Paschal
F. and Esther D. Mondella, Class
members. gww
Oct. 3 69 INTERROGATORIES by Deft to all
Listed Pitfs & Class Members.
Oct. 3 70 CERTIFICATE of Service by Deft for
P#69. gww
Oct. 3 71 Request for Exclusion from Class
of Guy E. Smith. gww
Oct. 7 At the Call of the Calendar before
Judge Coffrin, it was
Ordered: Case continued.
Oct. 14 72 Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Pro-
tective Order.
Oct. 14 73 Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
Law in Support of P#72. cp
Oct. 16
Oct. 27
Oct. 31
NR
74
75
76
77
78
JA 12
Proceedings
Filed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Contact
Lessees.
Filed Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in
Support of P#74. cp
Filed Stiy.—Parties consent to ex-
tension o{ time (to 10-31-80) in
which deft. may file Memo in re-
sponse to P#72, Pitfs’ Motion for
Protective Order. rr
OrRDER—Stipulation, P#76, is so
Ordered. Copy to Attorneys. rpd
Filed Defendant’s Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tion for a Protective Order, P#72.
Filed Defendant’s Certificate of
Service. cp
Request for Exclusion from class
action of Nicholas Biscoe. rr
Mailed Ltr to Messers Burrell and
Dolphin, possible class members ad-
vising them of their right as lessees
to Revoke their previous requests
for exclusion. (P#67) Reply card
to be returned to Clerk of Court
within 10 days.
In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on plaintiffs’ motion for protec-
tive order. Susan Eaton, Esq. for
plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,
James Benkard, Esq. and Kevin
Simmons, Esg. for defendant.
JA 13
Date NR Proceedings
Dec. 15 Matter held under advisement.
Court suggests that counsel work
out a modified method of discovery
or interrogatories. (Counsel to ad-
vise the court as to the status of the
matter) gc
Dec. 16 80 = Filed Pltfs’ Response to Question 6
of Deft’s First set of Interrogatories.
rpd
Dec. 22 81 Filed Letter dated 12-17-80 from
Pitfs’ attorney relative to inclusion
of Mrs. Ethel Kelley as a class mem-
ber of this law suit. rer
1981
Feb. 6 82 Filed Letter to counsel from Clerk
re inclusion of Mrs. Ethel Kelley as
a class member (refer to pp. 81 and
67). cb
June 22 83 Filed defendant’s Notice of motion
to dismiss.
June 22 84 Filed Memorandum of law in sup-
port of defendant’s motion to dis-
miss =laintiffs’ first cause of action.
gc
June 22 Status Conference held. Peter Lang-
rock, Esq. and Susan Eaton, Esq.
for plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.,
James Benkard, Esq. and Ms. Jamie
Stern, Esq. for defendant.
nN
Statements made by counsel.
June 2
Date
June 22
June 22
July 23
Aug. 5
Sep. 25
1982
Feb. |!
Mar. 16
NR
85
87
89
JA 14
Proceedings
Ordered: plaintiffs have 30 days to
respond to defendant’s motion to
dismiss (paper # 83); defendant
has an additional 10 days thereafter
to file reply memorandum.
Court will subsequently set a date
for hearing on defendant’s motion
to dismiss and further preliminary
conference as to how the case
should be tried. gc
Filed plaintiffs’ memorandum of
law in opposition to defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss. gc
Fiied defendant’s reply memeoran-
dum of law in support of defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss piaintiffs’
first cave? of action. gc
LETTER ‘rom Atty Eaton stating
that Phiuip Small of Shoreham
shouid be removed from list of class
members.
LETTER dated 1-28-82 from Law-
rence and Wanda Krause stating
new address is 3471 Bender Ave-
nue, Akron, Ohio 44319. rer
Copy to attys. gww
LETTER change of ownership of
classmember from Howard, Leonard
A., Jr., and Virginia to Holzinger,
Ulrich G. and Jean M. gww
Date
May 7
May 7
May 20
May 26
July 1
July 1
Sep. 24
Sep. 24
93
94
JA 15
Proceedings
MoTION to Reconsider Denial of
Air Crass by Pitfs.
MEMORANDUM in support of P#
90. gww
STIPULATION that deft be granted
an extension of time, until 7-1-82,
in which to file a memorandum of
law in opposition to pltfs’ Motion
to Reconsider Denial of Class Cer-
tification of the Air Class, P#56.
rer
ORDER—STIPULATION—SO OR-
DERED. Cy to attys. (re: P#92)
cp
MEMORANDUM in Opposition to
Pitfs’ Motion to Reconsider Denial
of Class Certification of the Air
Class, P# 91, with attachments.
rer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re P#93.
rer
In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on plaintiffs’ motion to recon-
sider denial of class certification of
the Air Class. Peter Langrock, Esq.
and Susan Eaton, Esq. for plaintiffs;
James W. B. Benkard, Esq. and
John Dinse, Esq. for defendant.
Statements made to court by coun-
sel.
Date
Sep. 24
Oct. 29
Nov.
26
13
13
17
22
NR
95
96
97
98
99
100
JA 16
Proceedings
Taken under advisement. gc
OPINION AND ORDER — AWC —
Pitfs directed to identify potential
class members (members of the cer-
tified water class who have not opted
out) with 21 days of this order.
Pitfs and Deft are directed to jointly
prepare a draft of proposed notice
to class members and submit it to
court for consideration. Cy to par-
ties. rer
ORDER (copy)—AWC—approviug
NoTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS.
Mailed original to Attorney Eaton
for further action. cb
ORDER (ORIGINAL )—AWC—aprov-
ing NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS, &
sample of Notice as mailed.
MAILED NOTICE To CLASS MEM-
BERS pursuant to order P#97. gww
Appress List (updated) for class
members. Notices remailed 12-17-
82 by GWW. rer
AppREss List (updated) for class
members. Notices remailed |2-17-
82 by GWW. gww
REQUESTS for exclusion from air
class (attachments) as certified by
Clerk. rer Mailed cy to attys.
Date
Feb. 7
Feb. 28
Mar. 8
Mar. 8
Mar. 24
1984
April 4
April 9
NR
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
JA 17
Proceedings
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE of John
H. Chase, Assistant Atty General,
for State of VT Depts. of Fish
& Game and Forests, Parks and
Recreation. jj
REQUESTS for exclusion re Law-
rence and Wanda Krause and Wal-
ter and Helen Welch with letter
dated 2-21-83 from Atty Eaton ad-
dressing the question of late exclu-
sions and situation as to Patricia
Noll. rer
Motion & MEMo to ailow appear-
ance and to Strike Request for Ex-
clusion by VT Atty General.
AFFIDAVIT of John H. Chase. gl
ORDER—AWC—Upon consiveration
of P#103, it is hereby OrDERED:
That said motion be granted. The
appearance of the Atty General of
the State of VT for the State of VT.
Dept. of Forests and Parks, shall be
allowed and the request for exclu-
sion previously filed on behalf of
the Dept of Forests and Parks shall
be stricken. Cy to attys. jj
LETTER dated 4/2/84 in support
of Deft International Paper Com-
pany’s motion to dismiss pltfs’ First
Cause of Action. amn
LETTER dated 4/9/84 in RESPONSE
by Pitfs. (re: P#106) cp
Date
April 12
May 1
May 21
June 1
Aug. 16
Nov. 26
Nov. 26
Nov. 26
NR
108
109
110
11]
112
JA 18
Proceedings
ORDER—AWC—Defts to have until
5-1-84 in which to file additional
brief and Pitfs to have until 5-23-84
in which to file responsive briefs.
Cy to parties. rer
MEMORANDUM, Supplemental, in
support of Defts Motion to Dismiss
Pitfs’ First Cause of Action, P# 83.
rer
MEMORANDUM, Supplemental, in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by
Pitfs re P#83. rer
LETTER dated 5/29/84 from Atty.
James Benkard as a Reply Memo-
randum to Mitfs’ Supplemental
Memorandum. (Re: P#83 and
110) cab
LETTER dated 8-14-84 from Atty.
James Benkard—with attachments
—in support of Motion to Dismiss,
P# 83. rer
In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff's first cause of action. Peter
Langrock, Esq., Susan Eaton, Esq.
for plaintiff; John Chase, Esq. for
the state; James Benkard, Esq.,
Jamie Stern, Esq. and Austin Hart,
Esq. for defendant.
Statements made by counsel.
Taken under advisement. gc
Date
1985
Feb. 5
Feb. 19
Feb. 20
Mar. 5
Mar. 14
April 3
April 23
May 6
NR
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
JA 19
Proceedings
ORDER—AWC—Deft’s_ motion to
dismiss is denied. Cys to attys. cab
MOTION for Certi‘ication pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to amend
Court’s Order to permit an inter-
locutory appeal and For Stay with
MEMORANDUM by Deft. (P#113)
wi
MEMORANDUM in SUPPORT by Deft.
(P#114) wf
MEMORANDUM in Opposition to
Motion for Certification and Stay by
Pitf. (P#114) wf
MEMORANDUM (Reply) in support
of Motion for Certification and
Stay Deft (P#114). amn
APPEARANCE of Merideth Wright,
Ass’t Attorney General for State of
Vermont, Substituting for John H.
Chose, Esq. rer
STARTEw FOLDER NO. 5
Plaintiff class member State of Ver-
mont’s position in opposition to de-
fendant’s motion for certification
and stay. gc
In court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on defendant's motion for cer-
tificate pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Sec.
1292(b).
June
June
June
June
20
11
1]
12
24
24
NR
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
JA 20
Proceedings
Statements made by Mr. Benkard.
Ordered: Motion granted; defendant
to prepare a proposed order for
Court’s signature (to be reviewed
by Plaintiffs’ counsel).
Court suggests that defendant pur-
sue the class certification of the air
class. gc
OrDER—AWC—Granting Motion
for Certification to permit an inter-
locutory appeal. Cy to attys. cp
NoTICE OF MOTION to Dismiss
MEMORANDUM in Support of Deft’s.
motion to Dismiss Pltf’s. Second
Cause of Action (P#121)
AFFIDAVIT of Allen Cawrse (P#
121) lf
Motion for Extension of Time
within which to Respond to P# 122
by pitfs. jj
ORDERED — AWC — Motion
Granted. Pitfs to respond by 7/23/
85. Cy to attys. jj
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM Of Pitfs
(P# 124). rer
OrDER—2d. Cir. entered 6-18-85—
Permission to Appeal pursuant to
28 USC § 1292(b) is granted. cb
Received $65 docketing fee for ap-
peal from Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp.
JA 21
Docket Entries
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
85 Civ. 7506
-¢
HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OQUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE, EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY
PLouFFE, individually, on behalf of themselves, and on
behalf cf all similarly situated plaintiffs, H. VAUGHN
CRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORNDIKE and
ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE and VIRGINIA
LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR. and Lois T.
PATTERSON,
Date
05-28-85
05-28-85
05-28-85
05-29-85
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
—
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
Defendant-A ppellant.
+
vv
Filings—Proceedings
Movant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY No-
tice of Motion for Lease to Appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), filed.
Movant INTL. PAPER Co. memo of law in sup-
port of motion received.
Movant INTL. PAPER Co. Notice of Motion for
permission to exceed page limitation in second
circuit rule 27(a) (2) (b), filed.
Order granting the movants motion for permis-
sion to exceed pg. limit etc., filed. (By: ALK).
Date
05-29-85
05-31-85
06-05-85
06-18-85
06-21-85
06-26-85
06-26-85
06-26-85
06-28-85
07-01-85
07-17-85
07-22-85
07-22-85
08-12-85
JA 22
Filings—Proceedings
Movant INTL. PAPER Co. memo of law in sup-
port of 1292b motion, filed.
Respondents HARMEL QUELLETTE ef al. An-
swer to Movant’s Petition for Permission to
Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) filed
(w/pfs) (all ccs to Calendar Unit).
Movant INTL. PAPER Co. Reply Memorandum
in support of its motion for leave to appeal,
filed. (orig & 3cc Calendaring).
Order granting the appellant INTERNATIONAL
PAPER COMPANY Motion for leave to appeal.
filed. (By: EAVG, GCP, & EDR, US Cit).
Certified copy of the order filed on 6-18-85
issued to the district court, Vermont.
Copy of receipt re: Payment of docketing fee in
district court filed.
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
Form C (filed w/pfs).
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
Form D filed.
Scheduling Order No. 1, filed.
Copy of district court docket entries, filed.
Record on appeal original district court papers
filed.
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
briefs filed w/pfs.
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
joint appendices filed w/pfs.
Appellee’s HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA
OUELLETTE briefs filed (w/p/s).
Date
08-19-85
08-21-85
08-21-85
08-23-85
08-23-85
08-04-85
09-01-85
10-17-85
11-04-85
11-04-85
JA 23
Filings—Proceedings
Movant Atty. General of the State of New York,
amicus curiae motion for leave to file brief out
of time and to participate in oral argument filed.
(see order filed 8-23-85)
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER motion for
extension of time to file reply brief pursuant to
FRAP w/pfs filed.
See order filed 8/23/85. 14 days after 9/3.
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co. memo-
randum in response to motion to file a amicus
brief w/pfs filed. (see order filed 8-15-85)
Order granting appellant INTERNATIONAL
PAPER Co. motion for cross-motion for exten-
sion of time to file reply brief pursuant to
F.R.A.P. 26 b) filed.
Order granting amicus curiae Atty Gen. of the
State of New York motion for leave to file
amicus curiae out of time and INT’L PAPER is
given 14 days thereafter to file its reply brief,
filed.
Appellant INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co. reply
brief filed (w/pfs).
Letter of State of Vermont adopting the points
and arguments of appellee Ouellette brief filed.
Case heard before Kaufman, Pratt, Miner,
C.JJ.
Judgment affirmed by published signed opinion
per curiam.
Judgment filed.
Date
11-19-85
12-05-85
12-10-85
12-10-85
01-30-86
03-27-86
04-14-86
JA 24
Filings—Proceedings
Appellee’s HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA
QUELLETTE itemized and verified bill received
(w/pfs) [federal expressed, per D.G.}.
Mandate (judgment, opinion) issued to VT.
Appellees HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA
QUELLETTE statement of costs filed.
Certified copy of statement of costs issued with
letter.
Notice of filing of petition for writ of certiorari,
petitioner INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
Supreme Court docket No. 85-1233, filed.
Certified copy of order of Supreme Court grant-
ing petition for writ of certiorari, filed.
Certified original record and proceedings (Dis-
trict Court and US Court of Appeals sent to
Supreme Court).
JA 25
Summons
ADDISON SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF VERMONT
ADDISON COUNTY, SS
Civil Action, Docket No.
@
¥
HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, on behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,
V.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
ry
To the above named defendant(s):
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
Peter F. Langrock, Esquire, plaintiffs attorney, whose
address is Langrock Sperry Parker and Stahl, P.O. Drawer
351, Middlebury, Vermont 05753, in answer to the com-
plaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days
after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day
of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be
taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Your answer must be filed with the court. Unless the relief
demanded in the complaint is for damage covered by a li-
ability insurance policy under which the insurer has the right
or obligation to conduct the defense, or unless otherwise
provided in Rule 13(a), your answer must state as a
JA 26
counterclaim any related claim which you may have against
the plaintiff, or you will thereafter be barred from making
Dated: 3d June 1976
/s/ PETER F. LANGROCK, ESQUIRE
Pla.atiff’s Attorney
Peter F. Langrock, Esquire
Served on 7-5-78
Deputy Sheriff
JA 27
Complaint
ADDISON SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF VERMONT
ADDISON COUNTY
Docket No.
4
¥
HARMEL OUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, »n behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,
V.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
COMPLAINT
Now~come the Plaintiffs, HARMEL OUELLETTE and
LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON BROWNE and EDLA BROWNE,
ALDEE PLOUFFE and SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, individually, on
behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all similarly situated
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Peter F. Langrock,
Esquire, of the law firm of Langrock Sperry Parker and
Stahl, and complain as follows:
First CAUSE OF ACTION
CountT I
1. Plaintiffs Harmel Ouellette, Lila Ouellette, Clifton
Browne, Edla Browne, Aldee Plouffe, Shirley Plouffe, are
citizens of the Town of Bridport, County of Addison, State
of Vermont.
2. Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of New York with its principal place of business
JA 28
in the state of New York, and registered to do business in
Vermont.
3. Plaintiffs bring this Court of this action on behalf
of themselves and, under Rule 23 of the Vermont Rules
of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other Lake Champlain
lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees similarly sit-
uated and located in the Towns of Shoreham, Bridport
and Addison, County of Addison, State of Vermont; the
said lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees in the
Towns of Shoreham, Bridport and Addison number ap-
proximately 250 and it is therefore impracticable to bring
them all before this Court.
4. There are questions of law and fact common to the
entire class of lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees
similarly situated and located in the Towns of Addison,
Bridport and Shoreham; the claims of the plaintiffs herein
are typical of the claims of the said class; and the plaintiffs
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of and rep-
resent said class; the common questions of law and fact
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this con-
troversy.
5. The Defendant, International Paper Company, oper-
ates and has operated a pulp and paper making plant ap-
proximately four miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga,
‘New York.
6. At all times material hereto the Defendant, Inter-
national Paper Company, has discharged pulp and paper
making waste from said plant into Lake Champlain.
7. Said wastes exceed the capacity of Lake Champlain
to assimilate them and are detrimental to the Lake, and its
fish and plant life.
JA 29
8. Said discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aes-
thetically unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around
and adjacent to Plaintiffs’ lakeshore properties, and the
lakeshore properties of other members of the class, make
said waters turbid, and make them unfit for recreational
use.
9. Said discharges constitute a continuing nuisance to
the Plaintiffs and other members of the class, and interfere
with their use and enjoyment of their property and have
diminished and will continue to diminish the fair market
value and rental value of their property.
WHERGFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
other members of the Class, pray for judgment in the
amount of TWENTY MILLION Do.Lars ($20,000,000.00),
together with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and
for such other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs
request trial by jury.
Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief
be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate
all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws
water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be in
direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets
on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from
its manufacturing operations that have been treated through
its waste treatment system.
Count II
1. Plaintiffs realiege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I
of the First Cause of Action.
2. On November 18, 1974, the Regional Administrator
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Region II made a final determination pursuant to Section
JA 30
402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 33 USC § 1342, to issue a National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System permit for the dis-
charge of pollutants from the said plant into. Lake
Champlain (permit numbers NY 002 0036 and NY 000
4413), said permit to be effective on December 31, 1974.
Said permit was later amended effective March 15, 1977.
3. Defendant, International Paper Company, has con-
sistently, knowingly and deliberately violated the terms of
this permit by discharging into Lake Champlain waste
materials in excess of the amounts specified under the
permit.
4. These discharges, in violation of the permit, exceed
the capacity of Lake Champlain to assimilate them and
are detrimental to the Lake and its fish and plant life. These
discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically
unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around and adjacent
to Plaintifs’ lakeshore properties, and the lakeshore pro-
perties of other members of the class, make said waters
turbid, and make them unfit for recreational use. Said
discharges interfere with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of
their property and have decreased the market value and
rental value of their property.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
other members of the Class, pray for judgment in the
amount of TWENTY MILLION DoLLars ($20,000,000.00),
together with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and for
such other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs re-
quest trial by jury.
Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief
be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate
all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws
water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be
JA 31
in direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets
on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from
its manufacturing operations that have been treated through
its waste treatment system.
Count III
1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 8 of Count I
of the First Cause of Action.
2. The uses of the waters of Lake Champlain by the
defendant as aforesaid are unreasonable and in violation
of the rights of the Plaintiffs and other members of the
class to the use of said waters as riparian owners.
3. The Defendant, as a proximate result of the afore-
Said use, has damaged and permanently reduced the value
of the riparian rights of the Plaintiffs and other members
of the Class in that the Defendant has impaired the recrea-
tional value of the waters of Lake Champlain in, around,
and adjacent to the lakeshore properties of the Plaintiffs
and other members of the class, in that the Defendant has
so polluted said waters that they are unfit for any reasonable
use.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
other members of the Class, vray for judgment against the
Defendant in the amount of TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS
($20,000,000.00) together with interest and costs and
attorneys’ fees, and for such other relief as this Court deems
proper. Plaintiffs request trial by jury.
Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief
be granted: That this Court order Defen4@nt to relocate
all water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws
water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be
in direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets
JA 32
on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from
its manufacturing operations that have been treated through
its waste treatment system.
\
Count IV
1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 5 of Count I
of the First Cause of Action.
2. At all times material hereto, the Defendant, Inter-
national Paper Company, in violation of its duty to other
lakeshore property owners has negligently discharged pulp
and paper making waste into Lake Champlain.
3. Said wastes exceed the capacity of Lake Champlain
to assimilate them and are detrimental to the Lake and its
fish and plant life.
4. Said discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and
aesthetically unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around
and adjacent to Plaintiffs’ lakeshore properties, and the
lakeshore properties of other members of the class, make
said waters turbid, and make them unfit for recreational
use.
5. Said discharges interfere with Plaintiffs’ use and en-
joyment of their property and have diminished and will
continue to diminish the fair market value and rental value
of their property.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other
members of the Class, pray for judgment in the amount of
TWENTY MILLION DoLLars ($20,000,000.00), together
with interest and costs and attorneys’ fees, and for such
other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs request
trial by jury.
Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable relief
be granted: That this Court order Defendant to relocate
JA 33
ail water intakes on Lake Champlain (by which it draws
water from Lake Champlain for use in said plant) to be in
direct proximity with the opening of all discharge outlets
on Lake Champlain from which it discharges wastes from
its manufacturing operations that have been treated through
its waste treatment system. .
CouNT V
l. Plhintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 9 of Count I,
Paragraphs 2 through 4 of Count II, Paragraphs 2 through
3 of Count III and Paragraphs 2 through 5 of Count IV,
of the First Cause of Action.
2. The Defendant had and has the means at its reason-
able disposal of dealing with the waste and pollutants of its
plant so as not to affect the interests of the Plaintiffs and
other members of the class, but has failed and continues
to fail to use such means.
3. Defendant deliberately located said plant on Lake
Champlain, which plant became operational in 1971, know-
ing full well from its experience with its old plant, located
in the Village of Ticonderoga, New York, that Lake
Champlain is unable to assimilate said discharges. ;
4. The actions of the Defendant as set forth above were
and are malicious, willful, and undertaken with reckless and
wanton disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
all members of the Class, pray that they be awarded puni-
tive and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED MILLION DoLtars ($100,000,000.00).
The Plaintiffs further pray that such sums as are awarded
for such exemplary and punitive damages be set aside for
the benefit of encouraging a pollution-free environment
JA 34
in the area of Lake Champlain and its tributaries, under
such terms and conditions as are set forth by this Court
or, in the alternative, that such funds be distributed in
equal amiounts among the Class; and the Plaintiffs further
pray that this matter be tried by jury.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Count |
1. Plaintiffs Harmel Ouellette, Lila Ouellette, Clifton
Browne, Edla Browne, Aldee Plouffe, Shirley Plouffe, are
citizens of the Town of Bridport, County of Addison, State
of Vermont.
2. Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of New York with its principal place of busi-
ness in the state of New York, and registered to do business
in Vermont.
3. Plaintiffs bring this Count of this action on behalf
of themselves and, under Rule 23 of the Vermont Rules
of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other residents and
property owners and lessees similarly situated and located
in the Towns of Shoreham, Bridport, Addison, and Orwell,
County of Addison, State of Vermont; the said residents,
property owners, and lessees number approximately 3,150
and it is therefore impracticable to bring them all before
the Court.
4. There are questions of law and fact common to the
entire class of residents, property owners, and lessees located
in the Towns of Addison, Bridport, Shoreham, Orwell; the
claims of the Pl. tiffs herein are typical of the claims
of the said class; and the Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of and represent said class; the common
questions of law and fect predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and a class action is
‘i
JA 35
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy.
5. At all times material hereto, the Defendant, Inter-
| national Paper Company, operates and has operated a pulp
and paper making plant approximately four miles north of
the Village of Ticonderoga, New York.
6. Said plant discharges, smoke, fumes and other dis-
charges, which smoke, fumes and other discharges are foul,
unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically unpleasing. Said smoke
and fumes travel across Lake Champlain to the Towns of
Shoreham, Bridport, Addison and Orwell. The presence
of said smoke and fumes and other discharges in Plaintiffs’
town and in the towns of other members of the class, has
impaired their health and that of their families and has
diminished and will continue to diminish the fair market
value and rentai value of their property. Said smoke and
fumes and other discharges constitute a nuisance, and inter-
fere with Plaintiffs’ and other class members’ use and
enjoyment of their property.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
other members of the class, demand judgment against the
Defendant in the amount of Sixty -Two MILLION DoLLaRs
($62,000,000.00), together with interest and costs and at-
torneys’ fees. Plaintiffs request trial by jury.
Count II
1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I of
the Second Cause of Action.
2. Defendant, International Paper Company, in viola-
tion of its duty to Plaintiffs and other members of the class,
negligently discharges smoke and fumes and other dis-
charges from said plant, which smoke and fumes and other
JA 36
discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly, and aesthetically un-
pleasing. Said smoke and fumes and other discharges travel
across Lake Champlain to the Towns of Shoreham, Brid-
port, Addison and Orwell. The presence of said smoke
and fumes in Plaintiffs’ town and in the towns of other
members of the class, has impaired their health and that
of their families and has diminished and will continue to
diminish the fair market value and rental value of their
property. Said smoke and fumes and other discharges in-
terfere with Plaintiffs’ and other ciass members’ use and
enjoyment of their property.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
other members of the class, demand judgment against the
Defendant ‘1 the amount of Sixty-Two MILLION DOLLARS
($62,000,' )0.00), together with interest and costs and
attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs request’ trial by jury.
CounT Il
1. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein as though
specifically set forth Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I
and Paragraph 2 of Count II of the Second Cause of Action.
2. The Defendant had and has the means at its reason-
able disposal of dealing with the smoke and fumes and other
discharges of its plant so as to not affect the interests of the
Plaintiffs and other members of the class, but it has failed
and continues to fail to use such means.
3. The actions of the Defendant, as set forth above,
are malicious, willful, and undertaken with reckless and
wanton disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
all members of the class, pray that they be awarded puni-
tive and exemplary damages in the amount ONE HUNDRED
MILLION DoLiars ($100,000,000.00).
ere
JA 37
Plaintiffs further pray that such sums as are awarded
for such exemplary and punitive damages be set aside for
the benefit of encouraging a pollution free atmosphere in
the Towns of Addison, Shoreham, Bridport, Orwell; or in
the alternative that such funds be distributed in equal
amounts among the members of the class.
Plaintiffs request trial by jury.
DaTED at Middlebury, in the County of Addison and
State of Vermont this 30th day of June, 1978.
LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER AND STAHL
By /S/ PETER F. LANGROCK, EsQuirRE
Peter F. Langrock, Esquire
A Member of the Firm
P.O. Drawer 351
Middlebury, Vermont 05753
[Affidavit of Service omitted in printing]
JA 38
Answer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
«
HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA QUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLouFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
Defendant.
“~~
vv
Defendant International Paper Company, by its attorneys
Dinse, Allen & Erdmann, for its answer to the Complaint
herein:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Count I
1. Lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in para-
graph 1.
2. Admits paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3, except admits that the plaintiffs
purport to bring this Count on behalf of the class of persons
alleged therein.
4. Denies paragraph 4.
5. Admits paragraph 5.
JA 39
Denies paragraph 6.
Denies paragraph 7.
Denies paragraph 8.
po om ND
Denies paragraph 9.
Count II
1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 to Count I of the First
Cause of Action.
2. Admits paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3.
4. Denies paragraph 4.
Count III
1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 8 to Count I of the First
Cause of Action.
2. Denies paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3.
Count IV
1. Answering paragraph 1. defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as thougu specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 8 to Count I of the First
Cause of Action. ;
2. Denies paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3.
JA 40
4. Denies paragraph 4.
5. Denies paragraph 5.
CouNT V
1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 9 to Count I, paragraphs
2 through 4 to Count II, paragraphs 2 and 3 to Count III,
and paragraphs 2 through 5 to Count IV of the First
Cause of Action.
2. Denies paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3.
4. Denies paragraph 4.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTON
CounT I
1. Lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1.
2. Admits paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3, except admits that the plaintiffs
purport to bring this Count on behalf of the class of persons
alleged therein.
4. Denies paragraph 4.
5. Denies paragraph 5, except admits that defendant
Operates and has operated a pulp and paper making plant
approximately four miles north of the Village of Ticonder-
oga, New York.
6. Denies paragraph 6.
JA 41
Count II
1. Answering paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I of the Second
Cause of Action.
2. Denies paragraph 2.
Count III
1. Answezing paragraph 1, defendant repeats and in-
corporates herein, as though specifically set forth, the
answers of paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I and para-
graph 2 to Count II of the Second Cause of Action.
2. Denies paragraph 2.
3. Denies paragraph 3.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2. The claims set forth in the Complaint are barred in
whole or in part by the statute of limitations.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
3. The claims set forth in the Complaint are barred in
whole or in part by laches.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
4. Plaintiffs lack standing to obtain the equitable relief
prayed for.
ii
JA 42
FIFTH AFFIRMAT:VE DEFENSE
5. Plaintiffs have failed to join persons needed for a just
adjudication of the actions.
WHEREFORE, defendant International Paper Company
demands judgment dismissing the Complaint herein, to-
gether with the costs and disbursements of this action, and
such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
Dated: Burlington, Vermont
July 24, 1978
Dinse, Allen & Erdmann
186 College Street
Burlington, Vermont
By Illegible
A Member of the Firm
Davis Polk & Wardwell
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York
By Illegible
A Member of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
International Paper Company
Robert McK. Hunziker, Esq.
International Paper Company
Of Counsel
JA 43
Motion to Amend Complaint
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FoR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
CiviL ACTION
File No. 78-163
+
HARMEL OUELLETTE, et al.
V.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CoMPANY
a
MOTION TO AMEND
Now COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney
Susan F. Humphrey, of the law firm of Langrock Sperry
Parker and Stahl, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and request permission of this
Court to amend their Complaint to add the following re-
quested relief to Counts I, II and III of the Second Cause
of Action:
Plaintiffs further pray that the following equitable
relief be granted: That this Court order Defendant
to reduce the emissions of smoke, fumes and other
discharges to a level whereby they do not travel
across Lake Champlain and interfere with Plaintiffs’
use and enjoyment of their property.
DATED at Middlebury, in the County of Addison and
State of Vermont this 6th day of June, 1979.
LANGROCK SPERRY PARKER and STAHL
Susan F. Humphrey, Esquire
A Member of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
JA 44
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
Complaint—Docket Entry
~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
- For THE District oF VERMONT
78 Civ. 163
®
HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OQUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and Epa BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLOUFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs
| and
H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-
DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VirR-
GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lots
T. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Vv.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.
;
Date NR Proceedings
1980
Apr. 7 In Court before Judge Coffrin, hear-
ing on plaintiffs’ motion to amend
Complaint. Peter Langrock, Esq.
and Susan Humphreys, Esq. for
plaintiffs; Spencer Knapp, Esq.
James W.B. Benkard, Esq., Robert
M. Hunziker Esq. and Kevin Sim-
mons Esq. for defendant.
Apr. 7 Ordered: Motion granted.
ree ee . —_ at a
JA 45
Opinion and Order
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Civ. A. No. 78-163
.
HARMEL QUELLETTE and LILA OUELLETTE, CLIFTON
BROWNE and EpLA BROWNE, ALDEE PLOUFFE and
SHIRLEY PLouFFE, Individually, on behalf of themselves,
and on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs
and
H. VAUGHN GRIFFIN, SR., ARDATH GRIFFIN, ALAN THORN-
DIKE, ELLEN THORNDIKE, WESLEY C. LARRABEE, VIR-
GINIA LARRABEE, F. ALFRED PATTERSON, JR., and Lois
T. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Vv. }
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.
°
Peter F. Langrock and Susan Humphrey, Langrock,
Sperry, Parker & Stahl, Middlebury, Vt., for plaintiffs.
John M. Dinse and Spencer Knapp, Dinse, Allen & Erd-
mann, Burlington, Vt., James W.B. Benkard, Robert M.
Hunziker and Kevin Simmons, Davis, Polk & Wardwell,
New York City, for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
CoFFRIN, District Judge.
In this diversity action for damages and injunctive relief,
plaintiffs have moved for certification of two plaintiff classes
JA 46
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Complaint is styled in
two “causes of action” and different classes are proposed for
each. Defendant opposes certification of both proposed
Classes.
Facts
This action began on July 5, 1978, in Vermont’s Addi-
son County Superior Court and defendant properly removed
it to this court on July 25, 1978. Following removal several
of the presently named plaintiffs were permitted to inter-
vene. This case is the latest expression of some Vermonters’
unhappiness with the condition of Lake Champlain’s waters.
It represents a continuation of both private, e.g., Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971 >,
aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 US. 291,
94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed.2d 511 (1973), and public efforts
to impose liability on International Paper Company (IPC)
for its discharges into Lake Champlain. Vermont v. New
York, 406 U.S. 186, 92 S. Ct. 1603, 31 L. Ed.2d 785
(1972) (motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted),
dismissed, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 246, 42 L. Ed.2d 260
(1974); see Note, The Battle of Lake Champlain—Inter-
state Pollution and the Inadequacy of the Judicial Process:
Vermont v. New York, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 175 (1976).
Plaintiffs are Vermont residents who own property on or
near the “south lake” area of Lake Champlain in the vicinity
of the Crown Point Bridge; defendant is a New York corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in New York. It
operates a paper mill near Ticonderoga, New York, across
the south lake from plaintiffs’ property. Jurisdiction is:
grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Plaintiffs request certification of two classes which we will
refer to as the “water class” and the “air class.” The water
class would consist of approximately 400 lakeshore property
owners and lessees in the towns of Shoreham, Bridport and
JA 47
Addison. Plaintiffs claim on behalf of this class that IPC’s
discharge of papermaking waste into Lake Champlain con-
stitutes a nuisance that diminishes the value and interferes
with the enjoyment of their property.
The air class would consist of approximately 3150 prop-
erty owners, lessees and residents in Shoreham, Bridport,
Addison and Orwell. On behalf of this class plaintiffs claim
that the airborne discharges from defendant’s paper mill
travel across Lake Champlain and create a nuisance in the
designated towns. In addition to diminished property value,
plaintiffs claim this class has suffered impaired health as
a result of defendant's alleged air pollution.’
On behalf of both proposed classes plaintiffs seek mone-
tary damages and equitable relief ordering IPC to relocate
the source of its water intake system closer to the source
of its waste discharge system.
Discussion
To maintain this as a class action, plaintiffs must Satisfy
the four prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and the two
elements of the rule 23(b) (3) form of action they propose.
We consider these separately below.
1. Prerequisites
We have no difficulty finding that the proposed classes
are sufficiently numerous that joinder is impracticable, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), and that there are questions of law
or fact common to the classes. /d. (a)(2). Although
numbers alone do not determine impracticability of joinder,
see, e.g., EWH v. Monarch Wine Co., 73 F.R.D. 131, 133
? At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification the
argument of plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the allegation in the com-
plaint of impaired health was somewhat equivocal. The court did
not understand, however, that the claim was being withdrawn.
JA 48
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), and geographical distribution of a pro-
posed class is of considerable importance, Glover v. Mc-
Murray, 361 F. Supp. 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d and
remanded on other grounds, 487 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 963, 94
S. Ct. 3166, 41 L. Ed.2d 1136 (1974), we are nevertheless
persuaded by the numbers involved in the proposed classes.
Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs’ approximations of
size—determined on the basis of information obtained from
the respective Towns’ Clerks and population reports in the
Vermont Year Book—and we have found such numbers to
be convincing in the past. D. C. v. Surles, No. 78-91 (D.
Vt. December 6, 1978).
Similarly we are satisfied that there are questions of law
and fact common to the classes. Plaintiffs seek redress for
injuries allegeuly caused by continuing acts of defendant.
Central to the claims of all members of the proposed classes
are the fact questions of the quality, amount and distribution
of defendant’s discharges and the legal questions of de-
fendant’s liability therefor. In addition, defendant may have
defenses that would be common to the claims of all the
class members. These questions are “shared in the griev-
ances of the prospective class[es] as defined,” 3B Moore’s
Federal Practice 4 23.06-1, at 23-173 (2d ed. 1979), and
we conclude that the requirement of rule 23(a)(2) is also
met in this case. Although in its argument concerning rule
23(b)(3) defendant opposes certification on the basis of
rules 23(a)(1) and (2) its primary contention is that rules
23(a)(3) and (4) are not satisfied.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the proposed representa-
tive’s claims be typical of the claims of the proposed class.
At least one commentator doubts that rule 23(a)(3)
imposes a requirement of independent significance, 3B
Moore’s Federal Practice 4 23.06-2, at 23-185 (2d ed.
JA 49
1979), but we are more inclined to agree with J udge Muir
that we should not lightly conclude that a meaningless pro-
vision was promulgated. In re Anthracite Coal Anti-trust
Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 709, 716 (M.D. Pa. 1978); see, e. g.,
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 269-70 (10th
Cir. 1975) (rule 23(a)(3) requires comparison of plain-
tiff's claims with those of proposed class). We ar> satisfied,
however, that a comparison of the named plaintiffs’ claims
with those of the proposed classes need not reveal identity
to be “typical.” “Factual variations are not fatal to a pro-
posed class when the claims arise out of the same remedial
and legal theory.” Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 460, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1978). To be “typical,” plain-
tiffs’ claims must be “co-extensive with, and not inimical
to, those of the proposed class,” Levine v. Berg, 79 F.R.D.
95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and they must not be subject to
unique defenses that are inapplicable to other members of
the proposed class. Greenspan v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130,
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The rough benchmark in this circuit
apears to measure typicality by the likelihood that all mem-
bers of the proposed class “ ‘will be helped’ ” if the would-be
representatives establish their claim, Gill v. Monroe County
Department of Social Services, 79 F.R.D. 316, 326 (W.D.
N.Y. 1978) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds,
417 U.S. 156, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed.2d 732 (1974)),
and the lack of adverse interests between the named plain-
tiffs and the proposed class members. Women’s Committee
for Equal Employment Opportunity vy. National Broad-
casting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cutner
V. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Defendant, relying on its depositions of plaintiffs, argues
that they do not all allege the same kinds of damage they
claim on behalf of the classes they purport to represent.
JA 50
According to defendant this proves as a matter of logic that
plaintiffs’ claims are not typical. But defendant appears
to misapprehend the nature of rule 23(a)(3)’s require-
ment. Although the Advisory Committee’s notes, Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966), do little
to illuminate this aspect of the rule, decisional law has made
clear that whether or not it has independent significance
the importance of the typicality requirement lies in assuring
that the named plaintiffs will adequately represent those
who are unnamed. Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173,
1193 (E.D.N.Y.), affd 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S. Ct. 2169, 29 L. Ed.2d 157
(1971). Differences in the degree of harm suffered, or even
in the ability to prove damages, Sanders v. Faraday Labora-
tories, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), do not
vitiate the typicality of a representative’s claims. Typicality,
therefore, should be evaluated in terms cf the plaintiffs’
claims as to liability. Jd., cases cited therein.
With this in mind, we find the named plaintiffs’ claims
typical of the classes they seek to represent. Proof of de-
fendant’s liability for the alleged pollution of the air and
Lake Champlain will benefit ali members of the proposed
classes, Eisen; that the damages, if any, may reach a de
minimis level at some point among the class members does
not make the named plaintiffs’ claims atypical.
The last prerequisite of rule 23(a) is that the representa-
tives must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. Of considerable importance to our finding on this
issue is the compjetence of plaintiffs’ counsel, Eisen, 391
F.2d at 562, which defendant concedes. We concur. Never-
theless, defendant contends that issues going to proof of
damages will create antagonism among the class members
making their representation by plaintiffs inadequate. This
JA 51
contention is easily disposed of by noting that there is no
necessity that all issues be tried in one proceeding. The class
aspects may be tried before the individual damages claims,
if that should prove necessary. See In re Caesars Paiace
Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (individual questions of reliance and damages not
fatal to class action charging securities violations); Dolgow
Vv. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.O.8.Y. 1968) (com-
mon issues need not dispose of entire litigation ).
Thus we find that the proposed classes Satisfy the pre-
requisites of rule 23(a).
2. Maintenance of 23(b)(3) action.
Defendant’s most strenuous objection to certification of
these classes relates to the rule 23(b)(3) elements. To
maintain an action under subdivision (b)(3), plaintiffs
must demonstrate, and the court must find, that common
questions of fact of law predominate and that a Class action
is superior to other methods available for fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. Defendant contends that
neither of these characteristics obtains in this case.
Defendant’s contentions also go to the heart of an emerg-
ing and important question concerning the propriety of class
action as a procedure for redressing environmental injury.
This question has lurked in the background of the few
decisions we have found involv’ ag claims similar to those
of the instant case, but it har uot been addressed directly,
so far as we have been able to determine. In cases of this
kind the allegedly harmful discharges are released into the
environment in 2 concentrated state at a source. They dis-
perse thereafter in a manner dictated by natural forces, and
their effect, if any, on the surrounding environment is neces-
sarily a function of proximity to the source and prevailing
natural conditions. Because of this, no two property owners
at random points in an affected area are likely to urge the
JA 52
same pattern of dispersion. Defendant points this out and
argues from it that plaintiffs’ claims are therefore atypical
and that plaintiffs are unable because of their individual
interests to protect fairly and adequately the interests of the
class. This assertion reduces itself inexorably to the proposi-
tion that a class action mav never proceed against an alleged
polluter; defendant’s 1° would almost invariably dis-
qualify each would-be r aber from representing the pro-
posed class. Therefore, be ‘ore proceeding with our analysis
of subdivision (b) (3), ‘ve feel constrained to respond to
defendant’s assertion and examine the general proposition
to which it leads.
The function of subdivision (b) (3) is to reach the group
of cases for which class treatment would be inappropriate
under the (b)(1) or (b) (2) categories but would be con-
venient and desirable nevertheless. In the Advisory Com-
mittee’s words, subdivision (b) (3) was intended for “those
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of deci-
sion as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable re-
sults.” Proposed Amendments, 39 F.R.D. at 102-03.
The Advisory Committee felt that some categories of
cases, mass accidents for instance, would be inappropriate
for class action because of the likelihood of individual ques-
tions of liability and defenses to liability. Id. at 103. The
same might be true of certain kinds of private damage
antitrust cases. Jd. We find the Committee's inclusive
language more descriptive of the kind of case presently
before us than its exclusive language. We have not found
a case to suggest the contrary. We conclude that as a genre
the instant case is not inappropriate for class treatment and
we reject the implication of defendant’s argument. As a
theoretical matter, we find, for instance, that it would be
JA 53
desirable from the standpoint of consistency and conven-
ience to develop in a single proceeding the quantum, quality
and dispersion pattern of a source’s discharges. Time, effort
and expense might be saved by such a procedure, even
though all issues may not be resolvable at once. In separate
trials the questions of fact respecting defendant’s discharges
and their dispersion might be resolved inconsistently, con-
trary to sense and logic. Similar inconsistency could arise
with separately determined questions of liability or defenses
to liability, and this would be undesirable as a matter of
“uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated.”
Id. In our opinion the type of suit represented by this case
is not the sort envisioned by the Advisory Committee as
generally inappropriate for class treatment under subdivi-
sion (b)(3). See also Weinstein, Some Reflections on the
“A busiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 305 (sug-
gesting the propriety of class action in the area of environ-
mental control). There are fundamental differences be-
tween the case plaintiffs bring and the “mass accident” case
that concerned the Advisory Committee, which we will
discuss below. But what is important at this point in our
discussion is that the Advisory Committee felt the considera-
tions of rule 23(b)(3) were fatal to class treatment of a
“mass accident,” whereas defendant in effect is urging that
the considerations of rule 23(a) are fatal to class treatment
of the instant sort of case. We have found no support for
such a conclusion in law or logic, and we find it contrary to
the thinking behind rule 23.
It remains, then, for us to consider whether the instant
case satisfies the two requirements of subdivision (b)(3).
Predominance of Common Questions
of Law and Fact
Defendant’s position is that the differences among the
proposed classes’ members do not relate merely to the
JA 54
damages each claims, but go to the issue of IPC’s liability
for the claimed damages. In defendant’s view this is a case
in which liability-is a separate issue as to each member of
the proposed classes, which makes individual questions pre-
dominate over the common ones. The cases that it cites in
support of this contention are mostly cases where the actual
definition of the proposed class depended on individual
findings of liability. In Pendleton v. Trans Union Systems
Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court denied
certification of a class of consumers who were denied credit
because of errors in the defendant’s credit reports. The
court observed that because there could be no liability
without an erroneous or inaccurate credit report it would
not be possible to establish liability as to an entire class
without resolving separate questions about individual re-
ports. This was not a case such as Biechele v. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
where in the Pendleton court’s opinion, “geographic limita-
tions defined the class in such a way that the Court could
conclude that all of the plaintiffs were injured in various
respects and to various extents by the defendant’s opera-
tions.” Pendleton, 76 F.R.D. at 195.
Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D.
Tex. 1974) is to the same effect. The plaintiffs sought certi-
fication of a class of former employees and survivors of
for-aer employees allegedly suffering illness and death from
exposure to asbestos in the defendant's plant. The court
denied certification because among the class there were
varying periods of exposure to varying concentrations of
asbestos; some may have had pre-exisiing illnesses; and
individual questions existed as to the availability and usc
of safety devices, and the availability of affirmative de-
fenses such as the statute of limitations. In short, the
uncommon questions bearing un the defendant's liability at
JA 55
all to each class member were predominant. Viewed
another way, this was a case where, as in Pendleton, the class
of those to whom the defendant would be liable could not
be defined without separate trials on the liability issues.
In Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78
(M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.
1974), residents of York County, Pennsylvania, sought to
maintain a class action for damages and injunctive relief
against two defendant corporations whose operations re-
leased contaminants into the air. The court denied class
certification, observing that the only common fact alleged
by the claims of the proposed class was that their damages
were caused by the same source. /d. at 84. The variety of
types of damage alleged made a single finding of liability
impossible in a single mass proceeding. Jd. at 85.
Unlike these and the “mass accident” cases defendant
cites, the water class in the present case offers a geographic-
ally discrete group asserting theoretically consistent claims
as to which individual defenses to liability do not appear.
Identical evidence would be required in each individual’s
case to determine whether IP pollutes Lake Champlain
and is lable to lakeshore owners and lessees whose property
values and enjoyment, including recreational use, are di-
minished thereby. See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward,
61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (Sth
Cir. 1975) (class treatment of defendant’s negligence in
supplying contaminated food and water for cruise Passen-
gers’ consumption); American Trading and Production
Corporation v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 155
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (class treatment of defendant’s negligent
handling ot electrical wiring in exhibition hall resulting in
fire damage to exhibitors’ goods). Moreover, the water
class in this case differs fundamentally from the “mass tort”
class that the Advisory Committee considered inappropriate
JA 56
for certification: there are no personal injuries claimed and
there are no individual defenses asserted. See Judge Steger’s
discussion in Yandle, 45 F.R.D. at 569.
We find that in a class treatment of the facts respecting
IPC’s discharges and its liability for diminished property
value and enjoyment of use caused thereby, common ques-
tions will predominate.
We do not, however, find that this is so as to the entire
proposed water class. The Town of Addison fronts on a
lake that is markedly different from that which meets the
Towns of Bridport and Shoreham. Addison lies north of
the Crown Point Bridge in an area known locally as the
“broad lake,” which is deeper and composed of water that
is of a generally different quality than that of the “south
lake” where Bridport and Shoreham are located. In addi-
tion, none of the proposed class representatives resides in
Addison, which raises doubts about the adequacy of Addi-
son residents’ representation. We conclude, therefore that a
water class comprised of all three towns’ lakeshore property
owners would be inappropriate. Thus we limit our final
conclusions about the propriety of a water class to those
proposed class members residing in Shoreham and Bridport.
The proposed air class presents a somewhat different
picture. This class is more like that proposed and denied in
Boring, where the “nature of the differing injuries runs the
gamut from damage to fee simple and leasehold interests in
real estate to damaged personalty, unpieasant surroundings
and . . . compensable personal injury.” Boring, 63 F.R.D.
at 84-85. Defendant would no doubt offer separate defenses
to the claims of impaired health, and such claims are likely
to be the kind that individuals have an interest in prosecut-
ings parately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). See Yandle,
65 F.R.D. at 572 (“[MlJembers of the purported class have
a vital interest in controlling their own litigation because it
JA 57
involves serious personal injuries . . . .”). There is no
“ ‘common nucleus of operative facts,’ ” Eisen, 391 F.2d
at 566 (citing Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 271 F. Supp.
722 (N.D. Cal. 1967)), that unites the liability claims of
this proposed class as there is in the water class. Whereas
the pollution of the lake may uniformly limit the enjoyment
and decrease the value of all lakeshore property because
the lake is acommon source of recreation, the same may not
be said of air pollution’s effect on the inland property. For
instance, unpleasant odors may not affect the value of a
dairy farm, if at ail, in the way they would a strictly resi-
dential area. The various uses to which property is put in
the area of the proposed air class makes class treatment of
property damage claims as inappropriate as class treatment
of health impairment claims. We find that common ques-
tions of law and fact will not predominate in a class treat-
ment of the air class’s claims and we therefore deny
certification of the air class.
SUPERIORITY OF CLASS ACTION
We have considered the matters pertinent to our findings
under subdivision (b) (3), Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-
(D), and the alternative methods for handling this litiga-
tion, and we find that class treatment of the water class’s
claims would be superior. The claims are not such that
class members would be interested in individual prosecution,
we are aware of no litigation currently under way that
involves this controversy, the desirability of uniform deci-
sions respecting the class’s claims counsels for concentrating
the claims in a single forum, and the proposed class presents
no management difficulties as the class is finite and easily
identifiable. The alternatives of joinder and intervention do
not offer the simplicity and conclusiveness of proceeding
with these claims as a class action. IPC may offer its
JA 58
defenses in one forum at one time and, if successful, can
put an end to this kind of litigation over the polluting effects
of its discharges. The class members can pool their re-
sources, present their most effective case in one proceeding
and share the benefits if they succeed.
We conclude that the water class, as limited, meets the
requirements of rule 23 and certify the lakeshore owners
in the Towns of Bridport and Shoreham as a class to main-
tain this suit.
3. Notice
tRule 23(c)(2) requires that the court direct to the class
members the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances. This includes individual notice to those members
who can be identified through reasonable effort. It appears
that the class members in this case can be identified rather
easily through town records, and we direct plaintiffs to
determine who the individual class members are within
twenty-one days from the date of this order. Within the
same period, plaintiffs and defendant are directed to prepare
jointly a draft of a proposed notice to the class members
and submit it to the court for its consideration. SO OR-
DERED.
Dated at Burlington in the District of Vermont, this
twenty fourth day of April, 1980.
'
/s/ ALBERT W. COFFRIN
Chief Judge
JA 59
Notice of Motion to Dismiss
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Civil Action—File No. 78-163
@
HARMEL OUELLETTE, et al.
Vv.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
r
Now COMES Defendant International Paper Company
by and through their attorneys, Dinse, Allen & Erdmann,
and pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, move this Court for an order
dismissing plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action.
'
Dated: Burlington, Vermont
June 22, 1981
DINSE, ALLEN & ERDMAN, Esos.
209 Battery Street
Burlington, Vermont
By: /s/ JoHN M. DINsE
A Member of the Firm
To:
JA 60
Davis PoLK & WARDWELL, Esas.
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005
By: /S/ JAMES W.B. BENKARD
A Member of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
International Paper
Company
PETER F. LANGROCK, Esq.
Langrock, Sperry, Parker and Stahl
P.O. Drawer 351
Middlebury, Vermont 05753
FEDERICK deG. HaRLow, Esa.
Smith, Harlow & Liccardi
110 Merchants Row
P.O. Box 323
Rutland, Vermont 05701
JA 61
Affidavit of Dana B. Dolloff
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FoR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Civil Action—File No. 78-163
ee
vv
HARMEL QUELLETTE, et al.
Vv.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
ry
STATE OF NEW York ) os :
CouNTY 0” NEW York { **:
Dana B. Do_torr, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. For approximately sixteen years, | have been an
employee of defendant International Paper Company
(“IPCo.”) and I make this affidavit in support of IPCo.’s
motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action Stated in this
lawsuit.
2. From 1969 to 1972, I served as Supervisor of Air
and Water Management for IPCo.’s operations in and
around Ticonderoga, New York. From 1967 until 1972,
I was involved in the design, construction, and initial
operation of IPCo.’s paper mill located approximately three
miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga. Thereafter, I
was transferred to the corporate environmental staff of
IPCo. at its headquarters in New York City, where I was
Coordinator of Air/Water Programs. As Coordinator, I
participated extensively in the continuing operations of the
Ticonderoga Mill, including assisting in IPCo.’s defense
JA 62
in the trial of Vermont v. New York and International
Paper Company (Original Number 50, United States Su-
preme Court). When that suit terminated in 1974, I con-
tinued to have extensive contacts with the Ticonderoga Mill
and, in particular, I was one of IPCo.’s representatives in
the negotiations with the various state and federal agencies
concerning that Mill which culminated in the issuance of
a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
in 1977. Set forth below is a chronology of the judicial and
administrative proceedings involving the Ticonderoga Mill
between 1970 and 1977.
The Supreme Court Action
3. In December 1970, the State of Vermont instituted
an action in the United States Supreme Court against the
State of New York and International Paper Company. The
claims made and the relief sought in the original complaint
related only to the discharges of another paper mill (the
“Old Mill”) owned and operated by IPCo. in the Village of
Ticonderoga itself. That Mill had ceased operations prior
to the institution of the Supreme Court case and IPCo. had
already undertaken the construction of a new mill, three
miles to the north of the Village of Ticonderoga. (It is the
new mill which is the subject of this action.) The Supreme
Court accepted the jurisdiction of the Vermont suit in
1972 and appointed a Special Master, R. Ammi Cutter,
to hear the matter. The motion of the United States to
intervene was granted; the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) joined the proceedings and participated
throughout the ensuing trial and settlement negotiations.
4. Prior to trial, Vermont amended its complaint to add
claims relating to the new mill, alleging that its air and
water discharge constituted a nuisance and a trespass.
JA 63
The Settlement Agreement
5. After nearly a year of trial, settlement negotiations
commenced. The negotiations lasted several months and,
on September 23, 1974 the parties reached an agreement
which was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court
(by granting a consensual motion to dismiss the complaint).
A copy of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal is at-
tached hereto as Exhibit A. While disposing of Vermont’s
claims concerning the Old Mill, the settlement also stipu-
lated that IPCo. would make further improvements tc the
new mill including increased air pollution control equipment
and would accept limitations on the amount of certain sub-
stances that could be included in its liquid discharge to the
southern portion of Lake Champlain (the “South Lake”).
6. By way of information, the standard method of
stating a limitation on the discharge of a particular sub-
stance in an effluent, is to prescribe a given limit on the
amount of milligrams of the substance that may be allowed
per liter of effluent (mg/1). That limitation is then con-
verted into a daily poundage limit by multiplying the con-
centration by the average daily discharge in total gallons,
or liters, of the effluent using appropriate conversion factors.
Occasionally, the concentration standard (mg/1) is in-
cluded as an additional, or alternative, limitation.
7. The settlement with Vermont provided that the
amount of biochemical oxygen demand (“BOD”) in the
effluent should not exceed 4400 pounds per day as a
monthly average* and the amount of phosphorus should
not exceed a concentration of 0.5 mg/l as a monthly
average or 88 pounds per day as a monthly average, which-
* This limitation, which was already in the New York State permit
— which IPCo. operated at that time, computes to approximately
25 mg/1.
JA 64
ever was more restrictive. These limitations were agreed to
by both the EPA and New York.
8. The agreement did not resolve all the issues between
the parties concerning the content and nature of the liquid
discharge from the new mill and the parties recognized that
questions would be dealt with by “action of regulatory or
executive agencies of the United States or the State of New
York in the performance of their official duties.” Exhibit A,
Agreement of Settlement between The State of Vermont
And International Paper Company, Article IV(H), at
000686-87. Among other obligations, IPCo. agreed to
permit representatives of Vermont to make visits to the
mill, inspect its facilities, interview its personnel, and take
samples from the treatment system. Id., T11(G)(1) at
000677. The Company also agreed to provide Vermont
with copies of all regular reports concerning its discharges
that IPCo. subtiitted to the State of New York or the EPA.
Id., 11(G) (4) at 000678.
Proceedings Involving The Issuance
Of An NPDES Permit
9. Prior to the approval by the Supreme Court of the
Settlement Agreement, the EPA took over the permitting
process from New York State and, on May 15, 1974 issued
_ to the mill a “draft” National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permit pursuant to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Prior
to that time, IPCo. had been operating under a permit issued
by the New York State Department of Environmental Con-
servation.
10. The draft permit included a wide variety of limita-
tions and standards, many of which were based upon
regulations, promulgated by the EPA, incorporating effluent
JA 65
limitations for all similar mills. The draft permit consisted
of 26 pages and included: detailed limitations and prohi-
bitions relating to discharges of various substances in the
effluent; the manner of measuring for those substances: a
schedule for compliance; methods of testing; instructions
for reporting to the EPA; and directions for reporting and
explaining instances of non-compliance, among other mat-
ters.* In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the
draft permit incorporated the limitations agreed upon by
IPCo. and Vermont involving the discharge of biochemical
oxygen demand and phosphorus.
11. As an “affected” state, Vermont received notice of
the draft permit and responded in writing, stating 14 sep-
arate “conditions” that it demanded the permit included.
IPCo. also submitted its comments and EPA subsequently
circulated a revised permit on November 29, 1974.
12 On December 9, 1974, IPCo. formally requested an
adjudicatory hearing concerning the need for or appro-
priateness of a number of the limitations and standards set
forth in the most recent draft of the permit. Provisions of
the permit not challenged by IPCo. became effective on
January 27, 1975. EPA granted IPCo.’s request for an
adjudicatory hearing and, thereafter, Vermont, New York
and the Lake Champlain Committee (the principal private
environmental organization in the Champlain Valley with a
membership at that time of more than 2000) requested and
were granted status as parties to the hearing.
13. While the parties had raised a number of issues for
the hearing, the predominant question concerned the exist-
ing and proposed limitations upon the allowable amount of
suspended soiids in the discharge from the mill. The draft
* A copy of the final permit is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
JA 66
permit specified an “interim” limitation on suspended solids
—applicable until July 1, 1977—of 32,000 pounds a day
as a daily average with a daily maximum of 48,000 pounds.
As of July 1, 1977, the statutory deadline for application of
standards based upon “best practicable treatment”, the draft
permit required that the daily average discharge of sus-
pended solids be no greater than 6800 pounds, with a daily
maximum of 16,320. IPCo. had no objection to the interim
limitation as the mill’s daily average discharge of sus-
pended solids between 1974-1977 was approximately
17,000 pounds, or well under the 32,000 pound limit.
IPCo. did object to the proposed 1977 standard, which was
based upon the application to the mill of EPA’s published
(but still tentative) “Interim Effluent Guidance” applicable
to all bleached kraft paper mills. The paper industry, in-
cluding IPCo., contended that those effluent guidelines were
unreasonably stringent and could not be achieved by best
practical treatment. Vermont, on the other hand, took the
position that the final standard should be enforced at 6800
pounds.
14. During 1975, representatives of all the parties at-
tended a pre-hearing conference and, thereafter, IPCo. made
available to Vermont, New York and EPA extensive in-
formation on its waste water treatment system. IPCo. aiso
offered to meet whatever standard would result from appli-
cation of the Final Effiuent Guidelines (whenever they were
finally promulgated) to the mill. Nevertheless, a settlement
was not reached on the solids issue and in May, 1976 EPA
informed the parties that an adjudicatory hearing would
have to be held.
15. By the summer of 1976, the suspended solids stand-
ard in the EPA Interim Guidelines controlling July 1, 1977
standards for bleached kraft mills had been substantially
relaxed. Application of those guidelines to the Ticonderoga
JA 67
Mill would have allowed a daily average discharge of over
16,000 pounds per day as an average. On August 10, 1976,
however, the New York Department of Environmentai Con-
serv“tion certified the southern part of Lake Champlain as
“water quality limited”. This designation allowed the regu-
latory agencies to impose a stricter standard upon the
Ticonderoga Mill than would pertain to other mills dis-
charging into non-water quality limited bodies of water.
Representatives of New York, EPA, and Vermont consulted
and came to the conclusion that a limitation of 10,000
pounds per day of suspended solids should be required for
the Ticonderoga Mill discharge as of J uly 1, 1977. Hence,
the suspended solids limits (as well as BOD, for that mat-
ter) would be based on both the state and federal agency
determinations of discharge levels appropriate to protect
the water quality of Lake Champlain.
16. At the instance of IPCo., the parties met again to
try and reach a settlement of the solids issue which would
obviate the need for a hearing. At this time, IPCo. was
achieving an average daily discharge of approximately
14,000 pounds of suspended solids—thereby already better-
ing the standard (16,000 pounds) which would not apply
to the industry until the following year. IPCo.’s experts
and consultants reached the view, however, that the existing
system, which required the addition of $700,000 a year in
chemicals (chiefly alum) to enhance removal of solids, was
not capable of achieving the 10,000 pounds standard on a
regular basis. Thus, IPCo. proposed a radical solution:
the installation of a $3,000,000 addition to its waste water
treatment system consisting of two large reactor-type clari-
fiers with associated equipment. With these improvements,
it was anticipated that the waste water treatment system
could meet a standard of 10,000 pounds.
JA 68
17. The proposed time schedule for design and con-
struction of this addition called for a one-year pilot study
from October 1976 to October 1977 and two years for
engineering and construction, running from October 1977
to October 1979. As IPCo. informed the parties to the
proceeding, the pilot plant tests (the results of which would
detine the design of the system) could only be meaningful
if the chemical (alum) addition to the treatment system
was suspended for the duration of the pilot program. With
the agreement of all parties, these tests commenced in
October 1976, even before approval of the proposed settle-
ment.
18. On November 23, 1976, all parties met at the New
York Department of Environmental Conservation in Al-
bany, New York to resolve the remaining issues concerning
the NPDES permit for the new mill. At this meeting, the
following agreement was reached: IPCo. would operate
under an interim standard of 32,000 pounds of suspended
solids as its daily average until July 1, 1977; from Ju’y 1,
1977, until the completion of construction of the new
system (in 1979), the standard would be 17,000 pounds;
and thereafter the standard would go down to 10,000
pounds. Once the parties reached a consensus on this point,
the remaining issues were resolved swiftly.
EPA Issues An Environmental
Compliance Schedule Letter
19. Because EPA took the position that it did not have
the statutory authority to grant an extension of compliance
with the 10,000 pound standard after July 1, 1977, the final
permit provided that, notwithstanding the agreement among
the parties, IPCo. would be required to meet the 10,000
pound standard as of July 1, 1977. As this would be im-
possible until completion of the tert.ary system (not sched-
ee
JA 69
uled until 1979), IPCo. requested, and EPA subsequently
issued with the concurrence of all parties (including V_..
mont), an Environmental Compliance Schedule Letter
(ECSL). A copy of the ECSL is attached hereto as
Exhibit C. This document contains a qualified commitment
by EPA that it will not seek sanctions for technical viola-
tions of the suspended solids limitations in the permit after
July 1, 1977 so long as IPCo. is undertaking good-faith
efforts, pursuant to the program, to construct a facility
which will enable it to meet the standards at issue.
20. On March 15, 1977, representatives of all parties
met in New York for the formal signing of the stipulation
embodying the parties settlement of the adjudicatory hear-
ing which resulted in the issuance of a final permit issued
to IPCo. High representatives of the state government of
Vermont and New York attended as did senior officials
from EPA. The ECSL was issued and the permit, as re-
vised, became fully effective.
EPA Institutes Administrative
Proceedings
21. As IPCo. had forewarned the parties, once it ceased
the addition of alum to its waste water system in order that
the pilot plant tests could be meaningful, the suspended
solids, and, subsequently, the BOD readings in the discharge
to the South Lake increased substantially. Before the sys-
tem returned to equilibrium, there were violations of the
interim standards set forth in the permit during the winter
months of 1976-1977. On April 15, 1977 the EPA insti-
tuted an administrative proceeding by issuing “Findings
of Violation and Order to Show Cause” seeking sanctions
against IPCo. for the violations mentioned above.
22. IPCo. responded by noting that the violations were
the inevitable result of necessary testing for the system that
would achieve the rigid standards agreed to by the parties.
JA 70
Settlement of EPA Proceeding
23. Representatives of all interested parties met in New
York on May 6, 1977 to discuss the issue. Thereafter, on
July 15, 1977, IPCo. and EPA settled tae proceeding. In
consideration of the dismissal of the proceeding and waiver
of any monetary penalties, IPCo. agreed to reintroduce alum
into the system (at an approximate cost of $60,000) on
September 1, 1977 instead of October 1, 1977 (the end of
the 12-month period originally contemplated as necessary
for the pilot program).
24. Pursuant to the above Settlement Agreement be-
tween the parties, the daily average limitation dropped from
32,000 pounds to 17,150 pounds on September 1, 1977.
IPCo. completed construction of the improvements to the
waste water treatment system in October 1979, whereupon
the limitation of 10,000 pounds took effect.
25. Having duly qualified under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known
as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)
as a permit granting agency, New York State now admin-
isters the permit under the supervision of the EPA. Regular
monthly reports on the performance of the waste water
treatment system are sent to New York, EPA, and Vermont.
The Mill’s Complicance With
The NPDES Permit
26. During the seven years of extensive regulation, ne-
gotiation, and technical innovations, the IPCo. mill has
operated successfully under a permit incorporating dis-
charge standards substantially more restrictive than those
pertaining to any comparable mill in the country. Since
October 1979, when the tertiary treatment system was in
JA 71
operation, the mill’s effluent has exceeded the BOD limit on
one day (in December 1980) and the suspended solids limit
on one day (in March 1980); pH was outside the permit
limits for portions of four days (in February and March
1980 and February and March 1981) while the phosphate
limit has not been exceeded.
/s/ DANA B. DOLLoFF
Sworn to before me this
22nd day of June, 1981.
(Signature Illegible )
a
JA 72
Exhibit A to Dolloff Affidavit
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1973
No. 50 Original
S
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Montpelier, Vermont,
Plaintiff,
V.
STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,
Albany, New York
and
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New York, located at New
York, New York,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
.
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
nent
JA 73
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543
October 29, 1974
Hon. Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Bldg.
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
RE: Vermont v. New York et al., No. 50
Original
Dear Mr. Cheney:
Enclosed is a certified copy of the Stipulation to dismiss
the bill of complaint and order of dismissal, pursuant to
Rule 60 in the above-entitled case.
Very truly yours,
MICHAEL Ropak, Jr., Clerk
By Name Illegible
(Mrs.) Evelyn R. Limstrong
Assistant
Enclosure
cc: Louis J. Lefkowitz, Esq. (w/encl)
Atty. General of N.Y.
2 World Trade Center
New York, N. Y. 10047
Taggart Whipple, Esq. (w/encl)
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005
Hon. Robert H. Bork (w/encl)
JA 74
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 50, ORIGINAL
¢
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Montpelier, Vermont,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,
Albany, New York,
and
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New York, located at New
York, New York,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Intervenor.
' SJ
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL
It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the
attorneys of record for the respective parties hereto, that
the amiended complaint in this case be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.
The parties have also reached agreement with respect to
the payment of costs incurred in this case, as reflected in
their joint Petition For An Order With Respect To Fee
And Expenses Of Special Master, which is being filed with
the Court concurrently with this Stipulation For Dismissal.
JA 75
Dated: September 23, 1974
STATE OF VERMONT
/S/ KIMBERLY B. mesa
Kimberly B. ronal
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
Attorney for Plaintiff
State of Vermont
INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY
/8/ TAGGART WHIPPLE
Taggart Whipple
Davis PoLk & WARDWELL
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York. New York 10005
Attorney for Defendant
International Paper
Company
Respectfully submitted,
STATE OF NEW YorkK
/S/ Louis J. LerKowitz
Louis J. Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New
York
2 World Trade Center
New York, N! Y. 10047
Attorney for Defendant
State of New York
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
/S/ RoBERT H. Bork
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorney for Intervenor
United States of
America
1974—October 29. The foregoiug stipulation to dismiss
the bill of complaint having been received by the Clerk
JA 76
and no fees due, the bill of complaint is now here dismissed,
pursuant to Rule 60 of this Court.
(SEAL)
MICHAEL RODAK, JR.
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
By /S/ FRANCIS J. LORSON
Deputy
A true copy MICHAEL Ropak, JR.
Test:
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
By /s/ FRANCIS J. LORSON
--* ee oe
JA 77
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICF OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543 _
October 29, 1974
Hon. Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vt. 05602
RE: VERMONT v. NEW York,
50 Original
Dear Sir:
The Court today entered the following order in the above-
entitled case:
It is ordered by this Court that the Honorable R. Ammi
Cutter be, and he is hereby, awarded the sum of $50,000
as compensation for his services as Special Master in this
case, and that his disbursements totaling $5,150 be allowed.
It is further ordered that the fee and disbursements be paid
by the parties in the following amounts: $20,000 by the
State of Vermont and $35,150 by the International Paper
Company.
JA 78
It is farther ordered that the Special Master is hereby
discharged.
cc: Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz
Atty. Gen. of New York
Taggart Whipple, Esq.
Davis, PoLK & WARDWELL
Very truly yours,
Hon. Robert H. Bork MICHAEL Ropak, JR.,
Solicitor General of U.S. Clerk
Hon. R. Ammi Cutter By
Special Master in 50 Original
62 Sparks St. /s/ HELEN TAYLOR
Cambridge, Mass 02138 = =—=— wc ee ee ee ee enters
Helen Taylor, (Mrs. )
Assistant Clerk
September 23, 1974
Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
RE: STATE OF VERMONT Vv. STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.
No. 50 Original
Dear Mr. Rodak:
In Part II of its June 3, 1974 Opinion in the above case,
the Court suggested that settlement of this case might be
achieved by agreement of the parties and that “such a settle-
ment might be the basis for a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. Cf. 32., Orig., Missouri v. Nebraska, decided May
~~ ion, UR *
Such an agreement has now been reached, which will
not involve any continuing supervision by the Court with
respect to this matter. This agreement is embodied in two
“Agreements of Settlement”, copies of which are enclosed.
The parties therefore respectfully submit the enclosed
Stipulation For Dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 60
of the Rules of the Court, along with a separate Stipulation
Concerning Transcript And Exhibits.
The parties have also reached agreement with respect
to the payment of costs incurred in this case. This agree-
ment is embodied in the parties’ joint Petition For An
Order With Respect To Fee And Expenses Of Special
Master, whicii is being filed concurrently with the Stipula-
tion For Dismissal.
JA 80
Thank you for your attention in thi, matter.
Yours truly,
/S/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY
Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
Attorney for Plaintiff
State of Vermont
/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE
Taggart Whipple
Davis PoLK & WARDWELL
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Attorney for Defendant
International Paper
Company
/s/ Louis J. LEFKowITz
Louis J. Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New
York
2 World Trade Center
New York, N. Y. 10047
Attorney for Defendant
State of New York
/s/ RoBerT H. Bork
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorney for Intervenor
United States of
America
JA 81
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 50, ORIGINAL
October Term, 1974
¢
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Montpelier, Vermont,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Albany, New York,
and
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New York, located at New
York, New York,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
s
PETITION FOR AN ORDER WITH RESPECT TO
FEE AND EXPENSES OF SPECIAL MASTER
JA 82
STATE OF VERMONT
Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
Attorney for Plaintiff
State of Vermont
INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY
Taggart Whipple
Davis PoLK & WARDWELI.
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Attorney for Defendant
International Paper
Company
STATE OF NEW YORK
Louis J. Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New
York
2 World Trade Center
New York, N. Y. 10047
Attorney for Defendant
State of New York
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorney for Intervenor
United States of
America
JA 83
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 50, ORIGINAL
October Term, 1974
-—?
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Montpelier, Vermont,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
STATE OF NEW YORK, a sovereign state,
Albany, New York,
and
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New York, located at New
York, New York,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
°
PETITION FOR AN ORDER WITH RESPECT TO
FEE AND EXPENSES OF SPECIAL MASTER
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have settled this case by
agreement and moved to dismiss the amended complaint
in this case pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court;
and
WHEREAS, there being no further necessity or occasion
for the services of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter, appointed by the
Court as Special Master in this case; and
a
JA 84
WHEREAS, the parties have been authorized by Hon. R.
Ammi Cutter to state that he has read and has no objection
with respect to this Petition:
Now, THEREFORE, the parties hezeto respectfully petition
the Court to enter an order with respect to the fee and
expenses of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter, appointed by the Court
as Special Master in this case, on the following terms:
The fee to be awarded Hon. R. Ammi Cutter as
compensation for his services as Special Master in this
case shall be in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000). This amount shall be paid as follows:
Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000) by the State of
Vermont and Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000) by
International Paper Company.
The actual expenses of Hon. R. Ammi Cutter in-
curred in connection with his services as Special
Master in this case, totaling Five Thousand One Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars ($5,150), are allowed. This amount
shall be paid by International Paper Company.
Dated: September 23, 1974
STATE OF VERMONT
/3/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY
Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
Attorney for Plaintiff
Stat. of Vermont
INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY
/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE
Taggart Whipple
Davis PoLK & WARDWELL
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Attorney for Defendant
International Paper
Company
JA 85
Respectfully submitted,
STATE OF NEW York
/s/ Louis J. LerKow1tTz
Lovi; J. Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New
York
2 World Trade Cente
New York, N. Y. 10047
Attorney for Defendant
State of New York
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
/S/ ROBERT H. Bork
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorney for Intervenor
United States of
America
JA 86
IN THE
SUUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 50, ORIGINAL
°
STATE OF VERMONT, a soveriegn state,
Montpelier, Vermont,
° Plaintij,,
v.
STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state,
Albany, New York,
and
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, 4 corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New York, located at New
York, New York,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
+
STIPULATION CONCERNING TRANSCRIPT
AND EXHIBITS
It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the
attorneys of record for the respective parties hereto, as
follows:
1. One copy of the transcript of the testimony in No. 50,
Original, together with a compilation of all requests for
transcript corrections made to the court stenographer prior
to November 1, 1974, shall be preserved and maintained
as a public record by the State of Vermont.
JA 87
2. Prior to November 1, 1974, the parties shall file with
the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court a Stipulation
listing the exhibits received in evidence in No. 50, Original
and stating which party shall maintain custody of each such
exhibit.
Dated: September 23, 1974
STATE OF VERMONT
/S/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY
Kimberly B. Cheney
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
Attorney for Plaintiff
State of Vermont
INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY
/S/ TAGGART WHIPPLE
Taggart Whipple
Davis PoLK & WARDWELL
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Attorney for Defendant
International Paper
Company
Respectfully submitted,
STATE OF NEW YorK
/s/ Louis J. LEFKow1Tz
Louis J, Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New
York
2 World Trade Center
New York, N. Y. 10047
Attorney for Defendant
State of New York
‘ UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
/S/ RoBERT H. Bork
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorney for Intervenor
United States of
America
JA 88
AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT
BETWEEN
THE STATE OF VERMONT
AND
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preamble
I. Definitions
II. Obligations of the Company
III. Obligations of the State of Vermont
IV. General Provisions
V. Resolution of Issues Which May Arise Under
this Agreement
Schedule 1—The South Lake Referee and the
Appeal Board
Schedule 2—The Bark Pile
Schedule 3—New Mill Air Emissions
Schedule 4—New Mill Water Discharge
Appendix A to Agreement—Document to be
Executed by Vermont
PAGE
a es ere
JA 89
AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT
BETWEEN
THE STATE OF VERMONT
AND
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
AGREEMENT, made this 23rd day of September, 1974
between the State of. Vermont and International Paper
Company;
WHEREAS, by per curiam Opinion, dated June 3, 1974,
the Supreme Court of the United States declined to approve
a proposed consent decree signed on April 24, 1974 by
counsel for each of the parties (including the intervenor)
in Vermont v. New York et al., No. 50, Original, for rea-
sons more fully stated in the Opinion;
WHEREAS, the Court in Part II of that Opinion stated:
"A settlement of this interstate aispute by agreement
of the parties is another alternative. Once a consensus
is reached there is no reason, absent a conflict with
an interstate compact, why such a settlement would
not be binding. And such a settlement might be the
basis for a motion to dismiss the complaint. Cf. 32
Orig., Missouri v. Nebraska, decided May 28, 1974,
US. “te
WHEREAS, all parties to No. 50, Original desire to settle
that action in the manner suggested in the above-quoted
language of the Court’s Opinion and to file a Motion to
Dismiss without prejudice the amended complaint in No.
50, Original on the basis of the settlement set forth, in
part, in this Agreement: and
JA 90
WHEREAS, all parties to No. 50, Original have, con-
temporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by
the State of Vermont and International Paper Company,
executed a separate agreement upon whicn the Motion
to Dismiss will also be based;
Now, THEREFORE, the State of Vermont and Interna-
tional Paper Company (hereinafter collectively referred
to as the “parties” to this Agreement) hereby stipulate and
agree that this Agreement may be filed with the Clerk
of the Supreme Court of the United States as the basis,
in part, for a Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint
in No. 50, Original. In the event that the Motion to Dismiss
the amended complaint in No. 50, Original is not granted,
this Agreement, the Appendix annexed hereto, and accom-
panying documents executed in connection with this Agree-
ment shall be of no effect whatsoever in No. 50, Original
or any other litigation, proceeding, or otherwise, and the
making of this Agreement, the Appendix annexed hereto,
and accompanying documents shall not in any manner
prejudice any consenting signatory in No. 50, Original
or any other litigation, proceeding, or otherwise. This
Agreement shall constitute a contract in settlement of No.
50, Original but shall not constitute an adjudication or
finding on any issue of fact or law, or evidence or admission
by any party with respect to any such issue raised therein.
In consideration of the mutual rights and obligations herein
set forth, the following provisions are agreed to and ac-
cepted by the parties and shall be binding upon them
respectively.
I. Definitions
Whenever used or referred to in this Agreement, unless
a different meaning appears clearly from the context:
JA 91
(A) “The Company” means International Paper
Company, a New York corporation, having it« prin-
cipal office at 220 East 42nd Street, New York, New
York, and its successors and assigns, inluding any
person, Corporation, or other entity that succeeds to
the business of International Paper Company;
(B) “Agreement” means this Agreement executed
and consented to by the parties, including the Sched-
ules and any amendments made from time to time,
but does not include the document annexed hereto and
marked as Appendix A;
(C) “BOD:” means the five-day biochemical oxy-
gen demand of the process waste water effluent, as
measured by method No. 219 set forth at pages 489,
et seq., of Standard Methods for the Examination of
Water and Wastewater (13th ed.), or any other
method agreed upon by the parties;
(D) “Daily arithmetic average” means the result
obtained by (1) calculating the area under the curve
generated by an automatic recording device for a
period of twenty-four hours and dividing that area
by the time span considered, or (2) any other equally
accurate method of computation;
(E) “Federal Water Pollution Control Act” means
Public Law No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as heretofore
amended;
(F) “New Miil” means the land, buildings, equip-
ment, and materials, including any additions or
modifications thereto, at the manufacturing and waste
treatment system sites owned and used by the Com-
pany and located approximately four miles north of
the Village of Ticonderoga, New York;
JA 92
(G) “Old Mill” means the land, buildings, equip-
ment, and materials, including any additions or modi-
fications thereto, located in the Village of Ticonde-
roga, New York, owned and formerly operated as a
kraft pulp and paper mill by the Company, but does
not include the dam and certain contiguous property
specified in Chapter 675 of the Laws of 1973 of the
State of New York;
(H) “Process waste water effluent” means any
water that comes into direct contact with, or results
from the production or use of, any raw material, inter-
mediate product, finished product, byproduct, or was:e
product during manufacturing or processing, as dis-
charged to South Lake Champlain from the New Mill;
(1) “South Lake Champlain” means that portion
of Lake Champlain extending from Whitehall, New
York to the Lake Champlain Bridge near Crown
Point, New York;
(J) “Thermal oxidation” means the process of
raising the tempexature of a gas stream to 1500°F.
or more, with a residence time of one-half a second
or more;
(K) “Total phosphorus (as P)” means all of the
phosphorus present in the process waste water effluent;
and
(L) “Twenty-four hour composite sample” means
a sample collected over a continuous 24-hour period,
consisting of not less than twelve individual samples
of equal volume taken at two-hour intervals during
the 24 hours of sampling.
JA 93
II. Obligations of the Company
(A) With respect to the Old Mill, the Company,
and any person, corporation, or other entity that ac-
quires ownership or control of, or a recordable in-
terest in, the Old Mill, shall continue hereafter to
refrain and desist from all discharges of process and
Sanitary waste water and air emissions originating
from the Old Mill, except discharges and emissions
receiving the necessary approvals from federal, State
of New York, and local authorities. The Company
shall not be liable, however, for any actions in which
it has not participated and which are taken in contra-
vention of the terms of this paragraph if the person,
corporation, or other entity taking such actions has
actual or constructive notice of this paragraph. This
paragraph shall be set forth or incorporated by refer-
ence in any deed, lease, or other recordable instru-
ment of conveyance of the Old Mill, and in any agree-
ment whereby there is a change of ownership or control
of the Old Mill, and shall be cast as a restrictive
covenant running with the land.
(B) It shall take such actions with respect to the
bark pile (located on the north shore of Ticonderoga
Creek approximately one-half mile northeast of the
Old Mill) as are provided in Schedule 2.
(C) [t shall take such actions with respect to New
Mill ai: «missions as are provided in Schedule 3.
(D) It shall take such actions with respect to New
Mill water discharge as are provided in Schedule 4.
(E) With respect to the New Mill, the Company,
and any person, corporation, or other entity that
acquires ownership or control of, or a recordable in-
terest in, the New Mill, shall set forth or incorporate
JA 94
by reference the provisions of this Agreement ap-
plicable to the New Mill in any deed, lease, or other
recordable instrument of conveyance of the New Mill,
and in any agreement whereby there is a change of
ownership or control of the New Mill, and such pro-
visions shall be cast as restrictive covenants running
with the land. The Company shall not be liable, how-
ever, for any actions which contravene the provisions
of this Agreement applicable to the New Mill and
in which it has not participated if the person, cor-
poration, or other entity taking such actions has actual
or constructive notice of such provisions.
(F) Within 60 days after the entry of an order
dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,
the Company shall pay to the State of Vermont the
sum of $500,000. This money shall be paid by the
Company and received by the State of Vermont as a
contribution by the Company to the State of Vermont,
to be used in the future solely for the purpose of pro-
tecting and preserving the natural environment of the
Lake Champlain basin, and shall be maintained by
the State of Vermont in a segregated account for this
express purpose; provided, however, that the State of
Vermont shall have sole discretion as to the manner
in which the contribution is to be used for the fore-
going purpose. This contribution shall not create a
trust.
(G) The Company shall:
(1) permit official representatives of the State
of Vermont, at reasonable times, on reasonable
notice, and in a reasonable manner, to inspect and
take samples from the pollution control facilities
at the New Mill and to inspect and copy records
a Ae Rl ae ll
JA 95
related thereto that are not privileged, and to inter-
view the persons responsible therefor, in order to
determine the effectiveness of operation of such
facilities;
(2) take appropriate Steps to inform its directors
and responsible officers of the contents of this
Agreement and Appendix A annexed hereto;
(3) provide expanded technical training and
instructional courses (including refresher courses
where appropriate) for all personnel engaged in
the operation of the pollution control facilities at
the New Mill, and provide instructional memoranda
and bulletins with respect to the proper operation
of such facilities; and
(4) provide to the State of Vermont: (a) a
copy of each report with respect to process waste
water effluent and air emissions from the New Mill
that the Company regularly submits to the State
of New York or to the United States, at the same
time that it submits such reports to the State of
New York or the United States, and (b) a monthly
summary of process waste water effluent data, in
the same format and containing the same informa-
tion that has been supplied to the parties during
No. 50, Original, by the last day of the month fol-
lowing that month for which the summary has been
compiled.
III. Obligations of the State of Vermont
(A)(1) Within 60 days after the entry of an order
dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,
Vermont shall deliver to the Company a separate,
executed copy of the document annexed hereto as
JA 96
Appendix A. The parties agree that Appendix A shall
be construed and take effect as a coverant not to sue
at common law in that: (a) it shall prevent the State
of Vermont from proceeding against the Company
in any manner or respect specified in Appendix A,
and (b) it shall not have the effect of barring,
diminishing, or affecting in any way any legal or equit-
able rights or claims, actions, suits, causes of action, Or
demands that the State of Vermont may have against
the State of New York or any person other than the
Company, except as the enforcement of the same may
be precluded by subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
The parties agree not to assert in any litigation or
proceeding or otherwise that Appendix A has any
effect other than as stated in this subparagraph.
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of Appendix A
or any reservation by the State of Vermont made
therein and notwithstanding the fact that No. 50,
Original is to be dismissed without prejudice, the
State of Vermont shall not seek to recover from any
party to No. 50, Original damages for harm to the
South Lake, its waters, shores, adjacent areas, and
the atmosphere above and near it, allegedly suffered
on or prior to the entry of an order dismissing the
amended complaint in No. 50, Original for which
the State of Vermont could have sought recovery in
No. 50, Original.
(B) The State of Vermont sb ill make available
to the Company for inspection and copying, et the Com-
pany’s expense, all financial records relating directly or
indirectly to the contribution referred to in Article II(F) of
this Agreement.
(C) The State of Vermont shall:
JA 97
(1) submit:to the Company by April 15 of each
year, a written report describing the activities and
Studies relating to the natural environment of the
South Lake Champlain basin that are contemplated
to be undertaken by or for its Department of Water
Resourc_s during the following period of May 1—
November 30;
(2) submit to the Company by February 15 of
each following year, a written report describing all
the activities and studies relating to the natural
environment of the South Lake Champlain basin
actually undertaken by or for its Department of
Water Resources during the precedin; period of
May 1—November 30; and
(3) make available to the Company upon re-
quest, for inspection and copying of any documents,
not privileged, relating in whole or in part to the
activities and studies referred to in subparagraphs
(1) and (2) of this paragraph.
(D) The State of Vermont shall:
(1) study and recommend control of septic tank,
sewer, agricultural, and other discharges within the
Vermont portion of the South Lake Champlain
basin;
(2) study and recommend the enactment of
legislation or the promulgation of regulations con-
cerning the use of detergents in Vermont:
(3) submit annually to the Company a written
report describing its activities undertaken pursuant
to subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph;
and
JA 98
(4) make available to the Company, upon re-
quest, for inspection and copying, any documents,
not privileged, relating in whole or in part to its
activities undertaken pursuant to subparagraphs
(1) and (2) of this paragraph.
(E) The State of Vermont shall take such steps
as are necessary to inform the appropriate members
of the Vermont State Government (including, without
limitation, the appropriate officials of the Vermont
Agency of Environmental Conservation) of the con-
tents of this Agreement and Appendix A annexed
hereto.
(F) Subject to the relief available pursuant to Sec-
tion 1.5(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and only
with respect to the specific limitations in Sections 3.4
and 3.5 of Schedule 3 and Section 4.1 of Schedule 4:
(1) prior to January 1, 1983, the State of
Vermont shall not propose or support any proposal
that more stringent limitations than those set forth
in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of Schedule 3 and Section
4.1(b) of Sched'> 4 be included in any permit
issued or to be issued to the Company with respect
to the New Mill; provided, however, that in the
event that the Company at any time prior to ! anuary
1, 1983, proposes or supports any proposal that
any limitation referred to in this subparagraph be
made less stringent, the State of Vermont's obliga-
tions under this subparagraph shall not apply with
respect to that limitation only; and
(2) prior to June 1, 1979, or the commencement
of any administrative action with respect to the
second National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
IV.
JA 99
System (hereinafter reierred to as the NPDES)
permit to be issued to the Company with respect
to the New Mill, whichever is earlier, the State of
Vermont shall not propose or Support any proposal
that a more stringent limitation than that set forth
in Section 4.1(a) of Schedule 4 be included in any
permit issued or to be issued to the Company with
respect to the New Mill; provided, however, that
in the event that the Company at any time prior to
June 1, 1979, proposes or supports any proposal
that the limitation referred to in this subparagraph
be made less stringent, the State of Vermont’s
obligation under this subparagraph shall not apply.
(G) The State of Vermont shall monitor, on a
regular basis and in a scientifically acceptable manner,
the water quality in that part of Lake Champlain from
Chipman Point to the Lake Champlain Bridge near
Crown Point, New York, and shall make the results
of such monitoring available to the Company for in-
spection and copying upon reasonable request.
General Provisions
(A) The provisions of this Agreement shall be
applicable and limited to the activities of the Com-
pany at the Old and New Mills and shall not be con-
strued as applicable to, or in any way providing a
precedent with respect to, any other mill, installation,
facility, or location.
(B) Subject to the provisions of Articles III(A)
(2) and III(F), nothing herein (including, but not
limited, to the emission and effluent limitations pre-
scribed in Schedule 3 and Schedule 4 of this Agree-
ment) shall be construed to affect the authority, if any,
JA 100
of any regulatory or law enforcement authority with
lawful jurisdiction:
(1) to regulate waste water discharges or air
emissions from the Old Mill and the New Mill;
(2) to seek to abate the effects of such discharges
or emissions; or
(3) to take such actions as are authorized by
law to accomplish these ends (including, but not
limited to, sampling at, or inspection of, the’ New
Mill and the Old Mill).
(C) The provisions of this Agreement shall not
be construed as, nor shall they operate as, an admis-
sion that the Company has or has not violated any law
or regulation or otherwise committed a breach of duty
at any time, and shall not constitute, in No. 50, Orig-
inal or any other litigation or proceeding or otherwise,
evidence or any implication of any such violation or
breach of duty.
(D) Any testimony taken or any exhibit received
in evidence in No. 50, Original shall be received in
evidence, if otherwise relevant and admissible, in any
hearing or proceeding between or among the parties
and neither party shall object to the introduction of
such testimony or exhibit on the ground that the offer-
ing party has failed to produce the witness to testify
with respect to such testimony or to authenticate such
exhibit. The parties, however, reserve their rights, if
any, to move to strike all or any portion of any testi-
mony taken and all or any portion of any exhibit re-
ceived in evidence in No. 50, Original.
(E) Either party may hile this Agreement for
recording in the appropriate land records pertaining
to the Old and New Mills.
JA 101
(F) Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting
any Claims or rights of any citizens or residents of the
State of Vermont that may exist against any party
to No. 50, Original.
(G) The provisions of this Agreement shall apply
to the New Mill as long as it exists, regardless of who
owns or operates the New Mill.
(H) This Agreement does not resolve certain issues
or claims raised by the pleadings in No. 50, Original.
This is so in part because such issues or claims are
likely to be dealt with by action of regulatory or execu-
tive agencies of the United States or the State of New
York in the performance of their official duties. This
Agreement shall not be construed as determinative of
any such unresolved issues or claims. Claims disposed
of in Appendix A annexed hereto and those covered
by Article III(A)(2) of this Agreement shall be re-
garded as resolved by this Agreement.
(I) If any provision of Article V or Schedule 1
of this Agreement is held by any court to be invalid
or unenforceable, the validity and the enforceability
of the remaining provisions of Article V, Schedule 1
and the rest of this Agreement shall not be affected
thereby, and the rights and obligations of the parties
shall be construed and enforced as if this Agreement
did not contain the particular provision or provisions
held to be invalid or unenforceable.
(J) The parties may waive any of the provisions
of this Agreement by joint written agreement.
V. Resolution of Issues Which May Arise Under this
Agreement
(A) The parties recognize that certain issues may
arise during the existence of this Agreement concern-
JA 102
ing the construction, enforcement, modification (in-
cluding, but not limited to, relief from), or termina-
tion of any of the provisions of this Agreement. In
order to expedite the resolution of any such issues,
the parties agree to submit these issues to binding
arbitration, in the manner and form set forth in
Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The parties further
agree that all applications for: construction of any
provision; enforcement of any obligation; modifica-
tion of any provision; or termination of any provision
of this Agreement shall be made only in accordance
with Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
(B) Except as otherwise expressly set forth in
Schedule 1, any application by any party for modifica-
tion or termination of any provision of this Agreement
may be granted only upon a clear showing that it is
supported by: (a) conditions substantially changed
from those existing on the date of entry of an order
dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original,
or (b) conditions not reasonably detectable on that
date, or (c) strong equitable considerations arising
thereafter.
SCHEDULE 1
THE SOUTH LAKE REFEREE AND THE APPEAL BOARD
SECTION 1.1
(a) Within 90 days after the entry of an order dismiss-
ing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, the parties
shall confer and endeavor to agree upon a person to serve
as South Lake Referee. The South Lake Referee shall be
a lawyer. If agreement cannot be reached within that time.
application may be made by any party to the President of
the American Arbitration Association for the appointment
of the South Lake Referee pursuant to the Rules of the
Association.
JA 103
(b) The South Lake Referee shall serve a term of three
years, and, upon the consent of the parties, may serve one
or more additional terms of three years. If the South Lake
Referee declines to serve an additional term, or if any party
withholds its consent to his reappointment as South Lake
Referee, the parties promptly shall confer and endeavor
to agree upon another individual to serve as South Lake
Referee. If an agreement cannot be reached within 45
days from the date the South Lake Referee declines to
serve another term, or from the date that consent to his
reappointment as South L.ake Referee is withheld by either
party, the successor shall be designated by a majority vote
of the Appeal Board. If the Appeal Board cannot agree
upon the successor within 45 days from the time the matter
is referred to it, the Chairman of the Appeal Board shall
designate the succcessor.
(c) In the event that the South Lake Referee dies, re-
signs, or is otherwise unable to perform his duties as South
Lake Referee, the parties promptly shali confer and en-
deavor to agree upon a successor. If agreement cannot be
reached within 45 days from the date that both parties
receive notice of the death, resignation or disability of the
South Lake Referee, the successor shall be designated by a
majority vote of the Appeal Board. If the Appeal Board
cannot agree upon the successor within 45 days from the
date the matter is referred to it, the Chairman of the Appeal
Board shall designate the successor.
(d) Subject to the provisions of Section 1.2(b) of this
Schedule, the South Lake Referee, in performing his duties
pursuant to this Agreement, shall have the same power and
authority as an arbitrator acting pursuant to federal law,
or if that is inapplicable, New York law, and also the au-
thority to take such other actions as are set forth in this
Schedule. Unless waived by the parties, final decisions of
JA 104
the South Lake Referee shall be based upon writtcn find-
ings of fact and, if appropriate, conclusions of iaw. Such
decisions, if appealed, shall be reviewable by the Appeal
Board according to the standard set forth in Section 1.2(b)
below.
SECTION 1.2
(a) The Appeal Board shall cons'st of three independent
persons, one of whom shall be designated by the State of
Vermont and one by the Company. Each member of the
Appeal Board shall be a lawyer. Such designations shall
be made within 90 days from the entry of an order dismiss-
ing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original. Each
party shall at all time be entitled to have one designee on
the Appeal Board. In the event, hcwever, that one party
fails to designate a member of the Appeal Board and a
matter is referred to the Appeal Board, the Chairman and
the other member of the Appeal Board shall designate a
person to serve as the second member. The third member
and Chairman of the Appeal Board, who shall be its pre-
siding officer, shall be the Honorable R. Ammi Cutter,
heretofore the Special Master in No. 50, Original. The
term of the Chairman shall be three years. At the end of
any three-year term, if the parties consent and the Chairman
is willing, he shall be reappointed for an additional term of
three years. In the event that the Chairman dies, resigns,
is not reappointed, or is otherwise unable to perform his
duties, the parties shall confer promptly and endeavor to
agree upon a successor Chairman. If an agreement cannot
be reached within 45 days from the date that both parties
receive notice of the death, resignation or disability of the
Chairman, the successor Chairman shall be designated by
the remaining members of the Appeal Board. If the re-
maining members of the Appeal Board cannot agree upon
eee Teen ven ey ee
;
7
JA 105
the successor Chairman within 45 days from the time the
matter is referred to them, the successor Chairman shall be
designated, upon application by either party, by the Presi-
dent of the American Arbitration Association pursuant to
the Rules of the Association.
(b) The Appeal Board shall hear and determine appeals
from decisions of the South Lake Referee with respect to
applications made to him by any party to this Agreement
pursuant to Article V and Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
The Appeal Board shall attirm any decision made by the
South Lake Referee if such decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence viewed on the record as a whole.
(c) A decision of the Appeal Board shall be made by
a majority of its members, or by the unanimous vote of
the Board. Such a decision shall be considered an award
of arbitration and shall be given the same weight and effect
as an arbitration award pursuant to federal law, or if that
is inapplicable, New Youk law. The award of arbitration
may be confirmed, and a judgment entered upon the con-
firmation, in any court of competent jurisdiction.
SECTION 1.3
(a) If any party desires to raise a matter pursuant to
the provisions of Article V of this Agreement, the parties
shall confer promptly among themselves and, if appropriate,
with regulatory officials or boards, or other persons, in an
effoit to resolve the matter.
(b) In the event that the parties are unable to resolve
by conference any mattc~ under this Agreement that is also
subject to the lawful jurisdiction of the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency or the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, or both, the
party seeking relief shall, upon notice to the other party,
JA 106
make application to, and exhaust its administrative remedies
(excluding appellate review) before, such regulatory agency
or agencies in accordance with the requirements of ap-
plicable law and regulations. The party seeking relief, upon
notice to the other party, may make application to the
South Lake Referee for a waiver of the obligations set forth
in this subparagraph and the South Lake Referee may
grant the application upon a showing that the performance
of those obligations is not necessary and appropriate.
(c) In the event that the parties are unable to resolve
any such matter after exhaustion of the procedures set forth
in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Section, within 30
days thereafter any party may make written application to
the South Lake Referee pursuant to Article V for the pur-
pose of resolving the matter. The application shall be
served by certified mail upon the other party and shall set
forth the nature of the matter, the specific action requested,
and the reasons alleged why the application should be
granted. Upon receipt of the application, the party in Op-
position to the application shall serve responding papers
within 30 days. Thereafter, the South Lake Referee may
require a conference between the parties, or, if he deems it
necessary, a hearing on the matter. Such conference or
hearing may be held at any reasonable time and place
specified by the South Lake Referee.
SECTION 1.4
+—_In_any hearing held pursuant to Section 1.3(c) of this
Schedule, any party may introduce testimony or exhibits,
subject to evidentiary rulings by the South Lake Referee.
All witnesses shall be sworn and subject to ¢ -oss-examina-
tion. At the request of any party, a transcript shall be made
of the hearing. The parties shall have the right to submit,
and the South Lake Referee may require the submission
of, briefs or memoranda.
SECTION 1.5
Subject to review by the Appeal Board, the South Lake
Referee may take the following types of actions:
(a) He may grant, for good cause shown, reasonable
temporary exemptions from, and reasonable extensions of
time (not exceeding six months on any one application)
for, the performance of any act or the compliawce with any
standard required by this Agreement. In granting any such
exemptions or extensions, he may impose appropriate terms
and conditions. In acting under this subparagraph, he shall
take into account (among other relevant matters) whether
there has existed or occurred:
(1) timely receipt by the applicant of all federal,
state, and local permits required for all actions neces-
sary to comply with this Agreement;
(2) reasonable availability from others of the ser-
vices, materials, equipment, or supplies required for
the construction, modification, or operation of facilities
necessary to comply with this Agreement;
(3) the passage of a reasonable period of time re-
quired for the construction, modification, and opera-
tion of such facilities; or
(4) any event, such as an act of God, war, strike,
flood, riot, catastrophe, or any other similar event
beyond the control of the applicant which has affected
the ability of the applicant to comply with this Agree-
ment.
(b) Notwithstanding compliance by the Company with
the provisions of Schedule 3 of this Agrvement, if, after
November 1, 1975, objectionable odors attributable to the
New Mill are detected in the State of Vermont during a
significant period of time, he may order other or further
action or relief.
JA 108
(c) If there is, after the date of this Agreement, a change
in the Consent Order relating to New Mill air emissions
executed by the Company and the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation or in any NPDES
permit issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill,
he may order modification of this Agreement as appropriate
in light of the change in the Consent Order or the permit,
pursuant to the standards set forth in Article V(B) of this
Agreement.
(d) He may order modification or termination of any
provision of this Agreement pursuant to the standards set
forth in Article V(B) of this Agreement.
(e) He may con .rue or interpret any provision of this
Agreement upon ~. showing by any party that such provision
is ambiguous . reasonably susceptible of conflicting inter-
pretations.
(f) If it is alleged in an application to the South Lake
Referee that there has been a breach of any provision of
this Agreement, he may render a decision on the application,
including the ordering of relief, equitable or legal.
SECTION 1.6
In addition to the State of Vermont’s rights under Article
II(G)(1) of this Agreement, the State of Vermont may
apply to the South Lake Referee for an order permitting
its official representatives to inspect the Old Mill or the
New Mill, and the South Lake Referee may direct the Com-
pany to permit inspection of the Old Mill or the New Mill.
with or without notice to the Company, if, after hearing,
reasonable notice of which has been given to the Company,
the South Lake Referee determines that good cause has
been shown for such an inspection.
SECTION 1.7
As promptly as practicable after the conclusion of any
hearing and the submission of briefs and memoranda, the
South Lake Referee shall inform the parties in writing of
his decision. Unless any party appeals a decision of the
South Lake Referee to the Appeal Board within 30 days
after receipt of such decision, it shall be considered an award
of arbitration and shall be given the same weight and effect
as a decision of the Appeal Board pursuant to Section
1.2(c) of this Schedule.
SECTION 1.8
In connection with any appeal from a decision of the
South Lake Referee, the parties shall have the right to sub-
mit briefs and memoranda. The Appeal Board may require
the parties to submit briefs and memoranda, and, if appro-
priate, to present oral argument. Thereafter, by written
decision the Appeal Board may affirm, modify, or reverse
the decision of the South Lake Referee, or remand the
matter to the South Lake Referee for such action as the
Appeal Board directs.
SECTION 1.9
The parties shall pay, in equal shares, the fees and ex-
penses to which the South Lake Referee may be entitled
unless for just cause the Appeal Board or the South Lake
Referee shall direct that pay: 2nt thereof be borne in dif-
ferent proportions. In the event that the parties cannot
agree on the amount of such fees and expenses, they will be
set by the Appeal Board. The fees and expenses of the
Appeal Board shall be set by the parties. In the event that
the parties cannot agree on the amount of such fees or
expenses, they will be fixed by the President of the American
Arbitration Association pursuant to the Rules of the Associ-
ation.
JA 110
SECTION 1.10
Unless otherwise specifically provided, all questions of
choice of law relative to controversies under this Agreement
Shall be within the sound discretion of the South Lake
Referee and the Appeal Board.
SCHEDULE 2
The Bark Pile
The Company shall take the following measures by Sep-
tember 1, 1975 to reduce discharges into Ticonderoga
Creek from or through the bark pile in the Village of Ticon-
deroga, New York:
(a) Appropriate grading and covering of the bark pile
for the purpose of reducing, to the maximum extent feasible,
seepage from the bark pile into Ticonderoga Creek or any
watercourse flowing into Ticonderoga Creek; and
(b) The lowering of the water level in the pond ad-
jacent to the bark pile for the purpose of reducing, to the
maximum extent feasible, drainage from the pond through
the bark pile to Ticonderoga Creek or any watercourse
flowing into Ticonderoga Creek.
SCHEDULE 3
New Mili Air Emissions
SECTION 3.1
The Company shall endeavor in good faith to minimize
malodorous air emissions from the New Mill.
SECTION 3.2
The Company by November 1, 1975 shall treat by ther-
mal oxidation:
en ~~
JA 111
(a) the miscellaneous total reduced sulfur (here-
inafter TRS) gases currently vented through the
smelt tank scrubber;
(b) the gases from the condensate air stripper;
(c) the non-condensible gases currently burned in
the lime kiln;
(d) the TRS gases from the seal tank (under) vents
of the brown stock washers; and
(¢) the TRS gases from the brown stock washers’
exhaust system, including the hood vents.
SECTION 3.3
In the event that neither the power boiler nor the recovery
boiler is used as the primary means for thermal oxidation
of the non-condensible gases referred to in Section 3.2(c)
of this Schedule, the Company shall maintain and operate
the lime kiln, and appropriate equipment and fixtures, for
thermal oxidation of the non-condensible gases in the lime
kiln when the primary means of oxidation of the non-
condensible gases is inoperative.
SECTION 3.4
Upon the entry of an order dismissing the amended com-
plaint in No. 50, Original, the Company shall operate the
recovery bo:er in such a manner that (ie TRS emissions
from that source shall not exceed:
(a) 5 ppm (parts per million) or 2.8 pounds per
hour, whichever is more restrictive, as a daily arith-
metic average; and
(b) 10 ppm or 5.6 pounds per hour, whichever is
more restrictive, for more than 60 cumulative minutes
per day.
JA 112
The standards of performance referred to in this Section
shall not be applicable during a period of 24 hours immedi-
ately before shutdown or during a period of 24 hours
immediately following the commencement of startup opera-
tions of the recovery boiler.
SECTION 3.5
Commencing 90 days after the entry of an order dis-
missing the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, the
Company shall:
(a) operate the lime kiln in such a manner that the
TRS emissions from that source shall not exceed 10
ppm or 0.7 pounds per hour, whichever is more re-
strictive; provided, however, that this standard of per-
formance shall not be applicable during a period of
24 hours immediately following the commencement of
startup operations of the lime kiln;
(b) before any commencement of startup opera-
tions of the lime kiln and during any 2 t-hour startup
period, maintain a sufficient amount of caustic (sodium
hydroxide) in the scrubbing solution in the lime kiln
scrubber for optimum removal of TRS; and
(c) when such caustic is used, continuously moni-
tor and record the rate of flow of the caustic solution
of known concentration, and periodically (at least
once a shift) measure and record the pH of the scrub-
‘bing solution.
SECTION 3.6
The Company shall monitor continuously, in a reason-
ably accurate and reliable manner, the TRS emissions from
the recovery boiler and the lime kiln and shall record con-
tinuously the results for each such source on a reasonably
accurate and reliable automatic recording device.
SECTION 3.7
Emissions in excess of the limitations set forth in Section
3.4 or 3.5 of this Schedule shall not constitute a failure to
comply with this Agreement in the absence of a finding by
the South Lake Referee that objectionable odors attribut-
able to the New Mill have been detected in the State of
Vermont during a significant period of time.
SECTION 3.8
The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of Sections
3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of this Schedule in the Consent Order in
the proceeding now pending before the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation against the
Company pursuant to Article 19 of the New Yor’: State
Environmental Conservation Law.
SCHEDULE 4
New Mill Water Discharge
SECTION 4.1
The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of the
following effluent limitations in the first NPDES permit to
be issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill
pursuant to Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act:
(a) The amount of BOD: in the process waste
water effluent shall not exceed 4,400 pounds per day
as a monthly average; and
(b) The amount of total phosphorus (as P) in the
process waste water effluent shall not exceed a con-
ce’ vation of 0.5 mg/l as a monthly average or 88
pounds per day as a monthly average, whichever is
more restrictive.
JA 114
Until such time as the Company can demonstrate that
it has installed an effluent flow-measuring system that can
reliably measure the process waste water effluent on a con-
tinuous basis, the flow to be used in computing the loadings
in number of pounds per day shall be the measured intake
of water to the New Mill.
SECTION 4.2
The Company shall test the process waste water effluent
twice a year during 1975 and 1976 to determine whether it
is toxic to fish. To the extent feasible, one test per year
shall be conducted during normal operations when black
liquor is present in the process waste water effluent as a
result of its being released from the spill pond to the waste
treatment system and one test per year shall be conducted
during normal operations when no black liquor is present
in the process waste water effluent. The effluent shall be
considered to be toxic if, over a 96-hour period, 20 per cent
of the test fish fail to survive in a solution composed of
65 per cent process waste water effluent and 35 per cent
water taken from Lake Champlain. The test fish to be used
Shall be yellow perch no greater than four inches in length
taken from Lake Champlain at a point or points more than
five miles distant from the point of discharge of the process
waste water effluent. The procedures used and the results
of these tests shall be reported in writing to the State of
Vermont within 60 days after the tests have been completed.
SECTION 4.3
During the period from May 1 to November 30 of each
calendar year, the Company shall:
(a) minimize, to the extent practicable, discharges
of any type of black liquor through the waste water
treatment system; and
JA 115
(b) not discharge the contents of its spill pond
through the waste water treatment system; provided,
however, that it may discharge up to 15,000 pounds
of BOD: per day from the spill pond for the purpose
of maintaining the treatment system when the pulp
and paper manufacturing processes are not in opera-
tion. An analysis for BOD: in the spill pond shall be
conducted prior to discharge pursuant to the provisions
of this paragraph.
SECTION 4.4
The parties shall not oppose the incorporation of the
following requirements in the first NPDES permit to be
issued to the Company with respect to the New Mill pur-
suant to Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act:
(a) the Company shall sample and test its process
waste water effluent as follows: color—daily; BOD:
and total phosphorus (as P)—three days per week,
none of which shall be consecutive to each other;
settleable solids and suspended solids—five days per
week; flow, temperature, and pH—continuous;
(b) the test for BOD: shall be formed on a
twenty-four hour composite sampi t has been
refrigerated during collection and pnu to analysis,
and the analysis shall begin no more than two hours
after collection of the composite;
(c) the test for total phosphorus (as P) shall be
performed on the same sample as that referred to in
paragraph (b) of this Section within 24 hours after
collection of the composite, and such sample shall be
preserved within two hours of collection; and
JA 116
(d) the suspended solids shall be determined on
the composite referred to in paragraph (b) of this
Section, or on a minimum of four grab samples col-
lected at four separate times at not less than four-hour
intervals over a 16-hour period, at the option of the
Company; provided, however, that:
(¢) the requirements specified in paragraphs (a),
(b), (c), and (d) of this Section shall not be applic-
able during shutdowns or total closures of the New
Mill.
SECTION 4.5
All process waste water effluent samples to be tested for
total phosphorus (as P) shall be collected and stored uatil
analysis in Pyrex glass containers that have been pre-washed
in a ten per cent (10% ) solution of warm hydrochloric acid
and subsequently rinsed three times with distilled water.
SECTION 4.6
(a) The effluent limitations and requirements set forth
in Sections 4.1 and 4.4 of this Schedule, except for total
phosphorus (as P), shall be in force as a result of this Agree-
ment, effective upon the entry of an order dismissing the
amended complaint in No. 50, Original, even if such limi-
tations and requirements are not incorporated in the
NPDES permit.
(b) The limitation for total phosphorus (as P) set forth
in Section 4.1(b) of this Schedule shall become effective
and in force as a result of this Agreement on July 1, 1977,
even if such limitation is not incorporated in the NPDES
permit.
JA 117
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, through their au-
thorized agents, have executed this Ag‘eement this 23rd
day of September, 1974.
STATE OF VERMONT
(Illegible ) /s/ KIMBERLY B. CHENEY
SSP CSET SSS PSOGCC OCA aR 66 bd 2 ee eee ae ed eee 6s ee
COMPANY
Engineering and
Environmental
Management
ee ee
(Jurat omitted in printing]
JA 118
APPENDIX A
This document is delivered pursuant to Article III(A)
(1) of an “Agreement of Settlement” between the State of
Vermont and International Paper Company and Atricle
IV(A)(1) of an “Agreement of Settlement” between the
State of Vermont, International Paper Company, the State
of New York, and the United States, both dated September
23, 1974, which Agreements constitute the basis for the
settlement of State of Vermont v. State of New York, et al.,
No. 50, Original. The provisions of Articles III(A) and
IV(A) of those respective Agreements are incorporated
herein by reference.
1. THE STATE OF VERMONT, a sovereign state, and all
of its officers, agents, employees, and representatives, for
and in consideration of the execution of two Agreements
referred to above and the agreement of International Paper
Company (hereinafter referred to as “the Company”) to
comply with the provisions of such Agreements, does here-
by covenant not to sue, or bring or assert any claims, actions,
or demands whatsoever against, the Company (as defined
in paragraph 5 below) for or with respect to any matters
which were or might have been alleged by the State of
Vermont, or encompassed within the original or amended
complaint, in State of Vermont v. State of New York, et al.,
United States Supreme Court, No. 50, Original, relating
to (a) alleged past, present and future harm caused by or
arising from the accumulation of sediment in Ticonderoga
Creek and the Ticonderoga Bay area of Lake Champlain,
(b) alleged past, present and future harm caused by or
arising from discharges to the water from the Company’s
Old Mill (located in the Village of Ticonderoga, New York)
prior to the entry of an order dismissing the amended com-
plaint in No. 50, Original, (c) alleged past, present and
OO a A, iy tat ell,
JA 119
future harm caused by or arising from emissions to the air
from the Company’s Old Mill prior to the entry of an order
dismissing the amended complaint in No. 50, original and
(d) alleged harm caused by or arising from emissions to
the air from the Company’s New Mill (located approxi-
mately four miles north of the Village of Ticonderoga, New
York) prior to the entry of an order dismissing the amended
complaint in No. 50, Original.
2. This document shall inure only to the benefit of the
Company. It shall not inure to the benefit of the State of
New York or any other person, government or entity (in-
cluding, but not limited to, any alleged joint tortfeasor)
who may be liable, primarily or secondarily or otherwise,
at law or in equity, with respect to the alleged harm dealt
with in subparagraphs (a)-(d) of paragraph 1 of this docu-
ment, or the abatement thereof.
3. The State of Vermont expressly reserves all rights,
claims, actions, suits, demands and causes of action that it
has or may have against any person, government or entity
other than the Company to recover damages for all harm,
if any, arising after the date of entry of an order dismissing
the amended complaint in No. 50, Original, and to obtain
any legal, equitable or other relief to which it hereafter may
be entitled and which is related to or arises out of the mat-
ters dealt with in paragraph 1 of this document.
4. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto, and
it is their intention, that this document shall be construed
as, aud shall have the effect of: (a) a covenant not to sue
at common law, and (b) not barring, disminishing o
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