Reply Brief — California v. Carney

NO. 83-859 OCT Yt Ui jena

IN THE | ALe areVAa

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

Vv.

CHARLES R. CARNEY,

Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,

Attorney General of the

State of California

STEVE WHITE,

Chief Assistant Attorney

General - Criminal Disvision

JOHN W. CARNEY,

Deputy Attorney General

LOUIS R. HANOIAN,

Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 700

San Diego, California, 92101

Telephone: (619) 237-7281

Attorneys for Petitioner

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED NOVEMBER 25, 1983

CERTIORARI GRANTED MARCH 19, 1984

TOPICAL INDEX

ARGUMENT l1=- 18

I THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME

COURT'S REVERSAL RESTED

SOLELY ON THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 3

II A VEHICLE EXCEPTION

BASED ON INHERENT

MOBILITY FULFILLS THE

INCONTROVERTIBLE NECESSITY

FOR A “BRIGHT LINE"

APPROACH TO VEHICLE SEARCH

CASES AND ENSURES THE

PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL

PRIVACY RIGHTS SOCIETY'S

RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND THE LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S

RIGHT TO SAFETY 4 - 20

A. The Carroll Doctrine,

Based as it is on

Inherent Mobility,

Presents the Most

Reasonable Approach to

Vehicle Search Cases 6 - 9

B. An Approach Which

Requires Police to

Distinguish Between

Vehicle Configurations

and to Ascertain

Subjective Use is

Unworkable and There-

fore Unreasonable 9 - 18

CONCLUSION 19 = 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGES

California v. Ramos (1983)

U.S. __———s 77:«SO&“L EEddw22dd 11171 3

Carroll v. United States (1925)

267 U.S. 132 5,6,7,8

Chambers v. Maroney (1970) ;

399 U.S. 42 15

Katz v. United States (1967)

389 U.S. 347 9

Michigan v. Long (1983)

U.S. 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 3

Oliver v. United States (1984)

U.S. , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 4,9

People v. Carney (1983)

34 Cal.3d 597 1,2,10

People v. Chavers (1983)

33 Cal.3d 462 2

People v. Minjares (1979)

24 Cal.3d 410 3

People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (1983)

35 Cal.3d 1l y)

Robbins v. California (1981) |

453 U.S. 420 12

United States v. Ross (1982)

456 U.S. 798 5,9

ele

NO. 83-859

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

Vv.

CHARLES R. CARNEY,

Respondent. |

REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT

I

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S REVERSAL

RESTED SOLELY ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

In People v. Carney (1983) 34

Cal.3d 597 [194 Cal.Rptr. 500; 668 P.2d

807], the California Supreme Court held:

"Accordingly, we conclude that

a motor home is fully protected

by the Fourth Amendment and is

not subject to the ‘automobile

exception.’ Of course this

does not preclude all

warrantless searches of motor

homes: it simply means that

such searches cannot be

justified by that particular

exception to the warrant

requirement. We therefore

proceed to inquire into the

remaining justification for the

search offered by the People."

(Id., at p. 610, emphasis

added.)

Contrary to respondent's con-

tention, no independent state ground

appears as the basis for the California

Court's reversal. (Respondent's Brief

on the Merits, pp. 1-15.) Had the

California Supreme Court intended to base

their reversal on state grounds they

would have explicitly done so.

(Compare, People v. Superior Court

(Valdez) (1983) 35 Cal.3d 11, 15-16 [196

Cal.Rptr. 359; 671 P.2d 863]; People v.

Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 466-469

[189 Cal.Rptr. 169; 658 P.2d 96];

- 3-

People v. Minjares (1979) 24 Cal.3d 410,

424 [153 Cal.Rptr. 224; 591 P.2d 514].)

Consequently, there is no bar to this

Court considering the issues raised in

this petition. (California v. Ramos

(198 3) U.S. (77 L.Ed.2d 1171,

117], fn. 7; Michigan v. Long (1983)

U.S. 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1214.)

zx*eeekee®

II

A VEHICLE EXCEPTION BASED ON INHERENT

MOBILITY FULFILLS THE INCONTROVERTIBLE

NECESSITY FOR A “BRIGHT LINE” APPROACH

TO VEHICLE SEARCH CASES AND ENSURES THE

PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS,

SOCIETY'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICER'S RIGHT TO SAFETY

As argued in detail in

petitioner's brief on the merits, for the

constitutional protections granted by the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to

remain vital a “bright line” vehicle

search rule must be articulated in this

case. (See, Oliver v. United States

(1984) _——s:dUwS. _ , 80 LLEG.20 214,

226.)

The Fourth Amendment's require-

ment of reasonableness envisions a common

sense approach to search and seizure law.

Even if attainable, a “perfect rule”

shimmering in intellectual purity, but

incapable of application in the field

‘

without the wisdom of Solomon, is neither

desirable nor required by the

Constitution. As a substitute for the

perfect rule, a bright line approach,

grounded in common sense application of

settled doctrine already exists in the

context of the Carroll Doctrine. (Carroll

v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132.)

The Carroll Doctrine strikes an even

balance between the competing interests

which come to play in every vehicle

search situation, specifically: indivi-

dual privacy, society's interest in

effective law enforcement and the offi-

cer's right to safety. Accordingly,

petitioner submits the vehicle exception

created in Carroll and reaffirmed in

United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S.

798, should be applied to all vehicles,

including Mr. Carney's fully operational

motor home.

A. The Carroll Doctrine

Based as it is on Inherent

Mobilit Presents the Most

ae Se roach to

Vehicle a Cases

Application of the Carroll

Doctrine to vehicle searches, regardless

of configuration or subjective use, pre-

sents a bright line approach to vehicle

search law. Neither respondent nor his

amici dispute the ability of law enfor-

cement officers to determine what is and

is not an inherently mobile vehicle.

Consequently, application of this long

standing doctrine to the facts of this

case promotes the advantages which accom-

pany clarity and consistency in the law.

Contrary to the cries of

respondent, privacy rights play an impor-

tant part in the Carroll Doctrine. The

Carroll Court weighed Mr. Carroll's indi-

vidual privacy rights against society's

legitimate interest in preventing crime

and apprehending criminals and concluded

that the exigency created by the car's

ability to move overcame Mr. Carroll's

privacy interests.

The configuration of the

vehicle and its potential use do nothing

to diminish the exigency created by

inherent mobility and therefore does not

serve to exclude certain vehicle con-

figurations from the Carroll Doctrine.

This conclusion is provided for in

Carroll itself, which equated an auto-

mobile with a ship, motor boat and wagon,

all of which could serve as temporary or

permanent residences. (Carroll v.

United States, supra, 267 U.S. at p.

153.) Thus, even vehicles and vessels

cloaked with residential potential must

yield to the exigency of mobility, just

as an automobile and its private compart-

ments must yield.

The Carroll Doctrine is not a

perfect solution to the vehicle search

issue. However, it is a solution which

focuses on the realities of the applica-

tion of the Fourth Amendment in the real

world. Premised on principles announced

by this Court, the mobility based vehicle

exception provides law enforcement with

the guidance necessary to ensure that

police officers will fulfill their law

enforcement duties without overstepping

the bounds of their authority. Limited

by probable cause and enforced through

the exclusionary rule, the rights of the

individual are protected.

Furthermore, the rule is reason-

able and fair. Everyone has been placed

on notice that their movable vessels may

be stopped and searched on probable

cause, without the protection afforded by

a magistrate's prior evaluation of the

- 9 =-

facts. (United States v. Ross, supra,

456 U.S. at p. 806, fn. 8; see, Oliver v.

United States, supra, 80 L.Ed.2d at p.

223; Katz v. United States (1967) 389

U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) .)

B. An Approach Which Requires

n

Police to Distinguish Between

Vehicle Configurations and

to Ascertain Subjective

Use is Unworkable an

Therefore Unreasonable

Respondent's position con-

templates a twofold analysis. First, a

police officer must determine if the

vehicle he stopped is a motor home or

something else. If the vehicle is a

motor home, a secondary analysis is

required. A motor home stopped “in transit"

(i.e., while moving) may be searched

without a warrant while a parked motor

home is not subject to a warrantless

/

/

- 19 -

search without one of the exigent cir-

cumstances which justify the search of a

house .+/ (Respondent's Brief on the

Merits, pp. 28-41.) ‘

Step one of respondent's

analysis is impossible to perform in a

consistent manner. (Respondent's Brief

on the Merits, p. 40.) What is a “motor

home?" What ‘is it about the outward

| appearance of a vehicle which suggests

| it is likely to be serving as at least a

temporary residence? Is size the deter-

mining factor? If so, how big is a

motor home? Does it have curtains?

a

How about tinted glass? What happens

OE SO a ed

1. Respondent abandons the

California Supreme Court's holding in

People v. Carney which boldly stated the

automobile exception” is not based on

mobility and flatly held the exception

could not be applied to a motor home.

(People v. Carney, supra, 34 Cal.3d at

pp. 605, 610.)

- ll -

when an officer looks into the beckeset

of a 1972 Ford LTD or the back of a Dodge

pickup truck and sees a rolled out

sleeping bag? Has he looked into a

motor home? What is it about the LTD or

pickup tryck that separates them from a

35 foot Pace Arrow so that the latter is

entitled to preferential treatment?

Where is the line to be drawn between

motor home and automobile? What are

worthy vehicles and what are unworthy

vehicles?

By accepting respondent's posi-

tion, this Court would sentence police

officers to years of hard labor

deciphering the constitutional distinc-

tion between worthy and unworthy

vehicles. Police officers, though

trained professionals, are not equipped

to distinguish between the subleties of

complex constitutional doctrine the way

- 12 «

appellate court judges, lawyers and law

professors are equipped. Yet, they

would be required to make these subtle

distinctions instantaneously, in the con-

text of infinite factual situations.

The task of applying the rule

proposed by respondent would challenge a

constitutional scholar. However, in the

context of the closed container cases,

this Court declined the opportunity to

distinguish between worthy and unworthy

containers because such a distinction

would be improper. (Robbins v.

California (1981) 453 U.S. 420, 426-427

(plurality); id., at p. 436 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting); id., at p. 443

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id., at p.

447 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .) It is

no less improper for police to make a

Similar evaluation regarding vehicles.

The task inflicted on the police is

-13-

impossible without clear guidance, and

neither respondent nor the California

Court provide such guidance.

For obvious reasons criminals

do not wish police to be provided with

workable guidelines in vehicle search

cases. If the constable blunders all the

evidence obtained as a result will be

lost to the exclusionary rule. It is

therefore beneficial to respondent, and

all lawbreakers, for police to work at

risk when conducting vehicle searches.

Respondent notes with relish that the

substantive criminal law is “clotted with

*hair-splitting’ distinctions" and that

police officers are asked to make instan-

taneous decisions about where to split

the hair. (Respondent's Brief on the

Merits, p~. 39.) Providing another hair-

splitting factor does not protect consti-

tutional rights and can only benefit the

lawbreaker.

So long as police officers work

at risk in conducting warrantless

seraches and seizures they must be pro-

vided with bright line guidance. Though

he or she acts in the best of faith,

endeavoring to protect an individual's

rights, if the officer makes a sistake,

in this area where a mistake could so

easily be made, the evidence obtained as

a result of that mistake is suppressed

and a murderer may go free. Some accomo-

dation to the officers must be made, be

it a bright line rule which illuminates

the officer's task or some adaption of

the exclusionary rule which would require

consideration by the courts of the

complexity of the officers task and the

good faith with which he carries it out.

Society is entitled to be protected from

criminals.

@ 18 -

Once a vehicle has been iden-

tified as a motor home, under respon-

dent's approach it will fall under the

vehicle exception if it is "in transit”

(i.e., moving), but not if it is parked.

(Respondent's Brief on the Merits, pp.

35-36.) He concedes that the con-

siderations which make the securing of a

warrant for an automobile impractical

(i.e., mobility) operate with equal vigor

when a motor home is moving.

(Respondent's Brief on the Merits, p.

35.) He is right.

However, respondent is wrong

to assume the same factors do not apply

when the motor home is parked, yet fully

capable of moving. The opportunity to

search is fleeting because a vehicle is

"readily movable.” (Chambers v. Maroney

(1970) 399 U.S. 42, 51.) A parked motor

home requires only the insertion of a key

- 1g -

into the ignition to be capable of moving

into the next jurisdiction. Thus, so

long as the motor home retains the objec-

tive indicia of mobility it remains ,

readily movable and the reason for the

vehicle exception applies.

To differentiate between motor

homes because one is moving and one is

parked cannot be reconciled with respon-

dent's privacy analysis. For example, a

motor home which is parked: at a gas

pump, or on the street while the owner

buys a loaf of bread, or in a parking lot

while the owner is at work, or in

countless other situations, is not being

used as a residence. These vehicles are

in the stream of commerce and are not

entitled to treatment different from that

accorded a moving motor home or another

vehicle in a like situation. These

parked motor homes are just as capable

@ 19 «

of movement and present an identical

danger that they will disappear long

before a warrant can be obtained. The

owner of these parked motor homes cannot

reasonably expect his vehicle will be

treated as a residence when he is using

it for transportation

The problem is not solved by

differentiating between where the motor

home is parked. Defining a “worthy”

parking spot becomes another hair-

splitting task for police with the

dangers of inconsistent application

inherent in that task. Again, the

police are at risk in this treatment of

the parking place. Furthermore,

regardless of where the vehicle is

parked, so long as it retains the ability

to move it can disappear at a moments

notice.

- 18 -

Finally, differentiating between

moving and parked motor homes does not

protect an individual's privacy interests

in their motor home. The desire for pri-

vacy which stands at the core of respon-

dent's position can be defeated merely by

placing the key into the ignition and

driving the motor home. The nature of

the objects contained in the vehicle

remain the same and the desire to keep

them secret is the same. Since the

objects and the individual's desires

remain constant, to afford the motor home

different treatment merely because it is

parked in one instance and not another is

illogical, and must not be the basis for

this Court's ruling.

- 19 «

CONCLUSION

The necessity for bright line

guidance in vehicle search cases is

exemplified by the present facts.

Police officers must know the limits of

their authority before they encounter a

vehicle in order to confidently perform

their sworn duties. The People have a

right to know the limits of the officer's

authority so they may know what to expect

and can conform their conduct accordingly.

Only by providing workable guidelines can

the constitutional guarantee of reaso-

nableness have meaning.

Application of the Carroll

Doctrine to all vehicles regardless of

their configuration or subjective use

provides such guidance and predictability.

It is based on the long recognized notion

that the ability to move creates a societal

need which outweighs one's personal

- 20 -

wishes. Since the rule depends on

an objective evaluation of the factors

which impact mobility, it is capable of

accurate and consistent application in

all parts of the country. It is, ina

word, reasonable.

Because Mr. Carney's motor home

was clearly capable of movement, the

existence of probable cause justified the

search of his vehicle. Consequently,

the judgment of the California Supreme

Court should be reversed.

~

—= = = = = = = “SS

= 21 <

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,

Attorney General of the

State of California

STEVE WHITE,

Chief Assistant Attorney

General - Criminal Division

JOHN W. CARNEY,

Deputy Attorney General

Se

LOUIS R. HANOIAN,

Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 700

San Diego, California 92101

Telephone: (619) 237-7281

Attorneys for Petitioner

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