Amicus Curiae Brief — Springfield Township School Dist. v. Knoll

FlLLED

32-1889 | wm 21 98

ALEXANDER L STEVAG,

No. CLERK

b oY UY 4 Office Supreme Court, us]

in the Supreme Court of the

Bnjted States

October Term, 1982

SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Political

Subdivision of the Commonwealth of lvania; RO-

MAN, LOUIS A., Su tendent, Wh es a

School District; LA , JOHN J., W, MARIE M.,

eld Township District,

Petitioners

vs.

KNOLL, MADELIN H..,

Respondent

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

; Capitol

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

1. The decision below conflicts with the deci-

sion of other courts of appeals as to the suit-

ability of applying to federal civil rights ac-

tions six-month statutes of limitations .......... 3

2. Heed gihguser Ss bane twee tga pede

federal law regarding

statutes of tanitations to federal civil rights

actions and conflicts with the decisions of

SR Aa So a

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES:

Board of Regents of the University of the State of

New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) ....4, 6,

7,9, 10

Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (ist Cir. 1980) ........ 5

Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) ........... 7

Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187

cc ecemmmseene 5

Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304

ER SATA SR AS mart a UP 7

Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1

(os aE cen 5

i

Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (1978) .....c..c0000 5

Holden v. Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-

crimination, 671 F.2d 30 (ist Cir.), cert. de-

nied 103 S.Ct. 97 (1982) ........cccccccccoscccsscesccsees 5

Hussey v. Sullivan, 651 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1981) ...... 5

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.

GIO CUBTED ccnesicciccscscidisecinitlidelibiabadiebediriees cli 4,7

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) ........ 9,10

Swyka v. Johnson, 649 F.2d 675 (1983), petition

for cert. filed, No. 82-1928 (May 19, 1983) .... 8

Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, cert.

denied 423 U.S. 855 (1975) ......ccccccccccceseeeeeeeee 5

STATUTES:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 41.1481 ..........ccccecccceee

Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 24-34504 ooo... cccccccccccceceeeeeeeees

Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 601 A. 15(12) ....cccccccccccceeeeeees

Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 44-1004 and 1005 .0........0..0.0....

Ky. Rev Stat. Sec. 344.200 .....ccccccccccoscssscccesseseccesessees

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B Sec. 5 ............ccccceee 2,

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 Sec. 4611 ..............ccccseeeee

Mich. Stat. Ann. Sec. 3.548 (601) II (b) ................

—

=)

A.

z

:

dl

yr

~

NN V NN NNN NN &§-& &— = =

ii

Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec, 363.06 ........esecssessesssensseeneenees 2

Mo. Ann. Stat. Sec. 213.120 ......cc.cccccessescesceseecereenees 2,6

Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 49-2-501 .........ccccescesesseseeneneees 2

Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 20-119 ........ccccccccsssesesseseeseescenees 2,6

Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 613.430 .........cccccescssessessesceneenees 2

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 354-A:09 .........ccccesceceeeees 2

N.J. Rev. Stat. Sec. 10: 5-18 ........ccccccccsseeseeseeseeceesenees 2

N.M. Stat. Ann. Sec. 28-1-10 ........ccccscssessescssessecceeees 2

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 4112.05 ........ccccccceseeseseeee 2

Oka. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 Sec. 1501 .........ccccccccsseeseeseeees 2

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Sec. 5522 (b) .....ccccsescssesesceseecenees 4

R.1. Gen. Laws Sec. 28-6-10 .......ccccccccesccssesessesseneeees 2

S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 65-2D (1) .......ccccssesseseeseeseneeeesees 2

S.D. Codified Laws Sec. 20-13-31 .......cccccccsceseeeeeeeees 2

Tenn. Code Amn. 4-21-117 ........cccceccesesseseeseeceneeceneeees 2

42 U.S.C. Section 1981 ............cccccccsessessesessesseseseeees 10

GO PC cevicencccncngssdecsutntintassscctecscssyube 10

I cinevtetcneseceentsnecnctmastanpenesnnns 1,9, 10

GB RA I I icecrccketnctectnccnnniernnceniinii 10

42 US.C. Section 1988 ............cccsccccessescereeseereeees 1,4,7,8

42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5 (€) ........ccccccescesesseseeneeeeees 8,9

42 U.S.C. Section 3610 (b) ....c.c.cceccesescesceseeeeseeeeeeees 9

Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7 (15) ....c.ccccccsessescerenseneeseneenes 2

a I Be cakdithecntecttnctescccscnovesrebibtcencetnatnias 2

W.Va. Code Sec. 5-11-10 .........ccccccssscsscsrenserenceecensess 2

Wyo. Stat. Sec. 27-9-106 ......cccccesesseseseseeseseseeseneennens 2

iii

—=—<—$

Interest of the Amici Curiae I

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CU" [AE

This case presents the question whether a federal

court properly may reject application of a state statute of

limitations, which it is required to borrow for purposes of

a civil rights action, because the court determines that the

limitations period is too short. The decision of the court

of appeals in this case, refusing to apply Pennsylvania’s

six-month statute of limitations to an employment discrim-

ination claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, will

have a broad impact on the states joining in this brief.

The states, their officers and employes are, perhaps,

the most frequent defendants in federal civil rights actions.

Although the civil rights statutes represent a strong federal

policy to encourage vindication of civil rights, Congress

likewise has expressed the firm view that certain interstices

in the civil rights scheme, including the prescription of

limitations periods, are to be filled by application of state

law. See 42 U.S.C. §1988. The amici have a substantial

interest in the vindication of their responsibility and power

to choose generally applicable limitations for actions.

The Third Circuit’s decision here, if permitted to

stand, will have a considerable effect on amici. In addi-

tion to the Pennsylvania statute at issue here, there are

statutes of limitations from at least 32 States’ which are

1 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41.1481 (six-month limita-

tion ; employment diserimination) ; COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34504

(90-day limitation ; housing discrimination) ; CONN. GEN. STAT.

§46a-82 (six-month limitation; employment discrimination) ; DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 6 §4605 (six-month limitation; housing discrim-

ination); FLA. STAT. ANN. §23.167 (six-month limitation; em-

2 Interest of the Amici Curiae

less than one year and which could be applied to civil

rights actions. With respect to each of these statutes, the

State has made a carefully considered policy choice in

ployment discrimination) ; GA. CODE ANN. §89-1714 (six-month

limitation ; employment discrimination); HAWAII REV. STAT.

§378-4 (90-day limitation; discrimination action); ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 68 §7-102 and 103 (180-day limitation ; civil rights vio-

lation) ; IND. CODE ANN. §34-4-16.5-7 (180-day limitation; po-

litical subdivision claim); IOWA CODE ANN. §601 A. 15(12)

(180-day limitation: employment discrimination); KAN. STAT.

ANN. §44-1004 and 1005 (six-month limitation; employment dis-

crimination) ; KY. REV. STAT. §344.200 (six-month limitation;

employment discrimination) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §4611

(six-month limitation ; employment discrimination) ; MASS. GEN.

LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §5 (six-month limitation ; employment dis-

crimination) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §3.548 (601) II(b) (90-day

limitation; employment discrimination); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§363.06 (six-month limitation; employment discrimination) ; MO.

ANN. STAT. §213.120 (180-day limitation, housing discrimina-

tion); MONT. CODE ANN. §49-2-501 (six-month limitation ; em-

ployment discrimination) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §20-119 (six-month

limitation ; housing discrimination) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §613.430

(six-month limitation; employment discrimination); N.H. REV.

STAT. ANN. §354-A:09 (90-day limitation; discrimination ac-

tion) ; N.J. REV. STAT. §10:5-18 (six-month limitation; discrim-

ination) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §28-1-10 (90-day limitation ; diserim-

ination action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.05 (six-month

limitation; discrimination action); OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25

§1501 (six-month limitation; discrimination action); R.I. GEN.

LAWS §28-6-10 (four-month limitation; employment discrimina-

tion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §20-13-31 (180-day limitation;

discrimination action); TENN. CODE ANN. 421-117 (180-day

limitation; discrimination action); UTAH CODE ANN. 34-35-

7(15) (30-day limitation; discrimination action); VA. CODE

§36-94 (180-day limitation ; housing discrimination); W. VA.

CODE §5-11-10 (90-day limitation ; diserimination action) ; WYO.

STAT. §27-9-106 (90-day limitation ; employment discrimination ).

4 Reasons for Granting the Writ

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision of

Other Courts of Appeals as to the Suitability of Applying

to Federal Civil Rights Actions Six-Month Statutes of

Limitations

Section 1988 of Title 42 provides, in pertinent part,

that federal courts adjudicating civil rigt-- claims shall

refer to state law “when federal law provides no rule of

decision.” Board of Regents of the University of the State

of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980)

(hereinafter “Tomanio”). Because the civil rights statutes

have no statutes of limitations, state law supplies the rule

of decision. Under Section 1988, state law may be disre-

garded only if it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States”, or if it is “inconsistent with the

federal policy underlying the cause of action under con-

sideration.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).

Pennsylvania law prescribes a six-month statute of

limitations for actions brought against state and local gov- .

ernment officials.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5522(b). In re-

liance upon what it perceived to be the “remedial spirit”

242 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5522(b) provides as follows:

Commencement of Action Required.—The following ac-

tions and proceedings must be commenced within six months:

(1) An action against an officer of any government unit

for anything done in the execution of his office, «xcept an ec-

tion subject to another limitation specified in this sub-chapter.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 5

of the civil rights statutes, the Third Circuit concluded

here that six months simply is too short a time period in

which to expect the average plaintiff to realize the import

of the action taken against him and to file a lawsuit. In

reaching its decision, the Third Circuit ignored decisions

of the First and Eighth Circuits upholding application of

six-month limitations periods to civil rights claims.

In Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (ist Cir. 1980),

the court of appeals applied Massachusetts’ six-month

limitation to a civil rights race discrimination claim. The

First Circuit found the six-month period to be reasonable.

“Although it may take more than six months to properly

prepare a civil rights case, a complaint meeting the require-

ment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) can surely be filed in that

time. And amendments to the complaint and supplemental

pleadings may be sought after suit is brought. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15.” Id., at 106. The court also emphasized the “im-

portant policy reasons” which support using the limitations

applicable to similar actions in state court; a longer limita-

tions period for federal actions would encourage initial re-

sort to federal court thereby further involving the federal

courts in local matters. Jbid. The First Circuit consis-

tently has followed Burns. See. e.g. Hussey v. Sullivan,

651 F.2d 74 (ist Cir. 1981); Holden v. Massachusetts

Commission Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30 (ist

Cir.) , cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 97 (1982); Carter v. Super-

markets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (ist Cir. 1982);

Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1 (ist

Cir. 1982) .

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Warren v. Norman

Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855

(1975) and Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (1978),

applied to federal civil rights claims challenging local

ka’s and Missouri's fair housing laws.’

The Third Circuit here chose not to acknowledge the

decisions cited above or to canvass the important state

policies reflected in Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.

Instead, the court substituted its own judgment for that of

the state legislature as to what limitations period is fair

and reasonable. Because this decision conflicts with deci-

sions of the First and Eighth Circuits, certiorari should

be granted to review the judgment below.

2. This Case Involves an Important Question of Federal

Law Regarding Application of State Statutes of Limita-

tions to Federal Civil Rights Actions and Conflicts With

the Decisions of This Court

As Judge Adams observed in his dissent from the

denial of rehearing: “There is no indication that the opin-

ion in the present case follows Tomanio’s direction to give

weight to the significant policies underlying the state stat-

ute of limitations” (Pet. App. 34a; 699 F.2d, at 147).

The Third Circuit’s failure properly to apply the Tomanio

test justifies this Court’s review.

The teaching of Tomanio is that, in civil rights ac-

tions, “state statute[s] of limitations . . . are more than a

technical obstacle to be circumvented if possible. In most

cases, they are binding rules of law.” 446 US. at 484.

* Althongh no other vourts of appeals have addressed this ques-

tion, as we noted earlier (see note 1, supra), at least 33 States have

statutes of limitations of less than one year which, arguably, could

be applied to a civil rights action.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 7

Only if the policies underlying the state limitations period

are inconsistent with the federal policies reflected in the

civil rights statute may the state statute be ignored. 446

US. at 487. In this case the Third Circuit erred in fail-

ing even to consider the policies on ' hich the state statute

is based.

Statutes of limitations are inherently arbitrary in that

they involve “a value judgment concerning the point at

which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are

outweighed by the interests in prohibiting prosecution of

stale ones.” johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

421 US. 454, 463-464 (1975). See also Chase Securities

Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 US. 304, 314 (1945). The bor-

rowing provision. of 42 U.S.C. §1988 reflect a congres-

sional judgment to “rely on the State’s wisdom in setting

a limit” on the time for bringing an analogous action. 421

U.S., at 464. Generally, a state statute of limitations

which does not discriminate against federal rights and

which gives the party a reasonable time to sue must be

applied. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 US. 610, 615-616

(1895).

Per nsylvania’s six-month limitation period for claims

against public officials fosters important state policies be-

yond those reflected in limitations statutes generally. State

and local governments are more likely to experience fre-

quent changes in personnel than are other entities. The

almost constant flux in which government finds itself ex-

acerbates the problems of assembling evidence to defend

claims. Even a short passage of time often will result in

the departure from government of persons with knowledge

of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Frequently,

upon leaving government, former officials are less than

8 Reasons for Granting the Writ

cooperative in assisting the defense. Moreover, the large

volume of business and transactions handled by the gov-

ernment often creates serious problems in keeping track

of and assembling documents necessary to defend in litiga-

tion. These considerations provide additional justification

in the context of this case for respecting the state’s choice.‘

As petitioners have noted (Pet. 14-15), the policies

which support shorter limitations periods for actions

against public officials are particularly compelling when

the claim involves discrimination in public employment.

Every time a government agency fires, fails to promote or

refuses to hire a person, someone else fills the position.

The passage of time makes it increasingly difficult for the

agency to reverse its course if a court decides that the

agency violated the civil rights statutes by virtue of its

personnel decision. In fact, Congress itself explicitly

recognized this problem and prescribed a 180-day limita-

tions period for employment discrimination actions. See

42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (e) .”

When balanced against the federal policies which

underlie the civil rights statutes, it is clear that the state

policies in no way conflict with the federal aims. The

* In light of the strong policies which support the state’s choice

of a six-month limitation, it is particularly ironic that the court

of appeals held that a six-year limitation period applies to civil

rights actions (Pet. App. 15a; 699 F.2d at 145). That holding

clearly flies in the face of the presumption, created by Section

1988, that the states may be relied upon to make these policy

choices.

* The Third Cireuit has not limited its holding to employment

discrimination actions or any other categories of cases. See Swyka

v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 675 (1983), petition for cert. filed, No. 82-

1928 (May 19, 1983).

+

“

Reasons for Granting the Writ 9

“principal policies embodied in §1983 [are] deterrence

and compensation.” Tomanio, 446 US., at 488. It is

The court of appeals’ conclusion (Pet. App. 10a; 669

F.2d at 142) that six months simply is too short a time

in which to file a

|

:

as a federal policy, implicit in §1983, to favor vindication

of individual rights (Pet. App. 11a; 699 F.2d, at 143).

Once again, the statute at issue here has no direct impact

on that policy. If the Third Circuit is concerned that

some rights will not be vindicated because the statute will

bar the claim, it is sufficient to note that “a state statute

cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely

because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litiga-

tion.” Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) .

‘The court of appeals also relied upon what it con-

sidered to be a congressional policy of uniformity (Pet.

App. 10a-11a; 699 F.2d, at 143-144). The court found

10 Reasons for Granting the Writ

this policy to be undermined by the possibility that one

limitations period would apply to public officials under 42

U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985, while a different limitations peri-

od applied to private defendants sued under 42 USC.

§§1981, 1982 and 1985. Once again, the court ignored

this Court’s teachings.

As the Court observed in Tomanio, the claim that

federal policy requires uniformity in application of limita-

tions statutes to civil rights claims consistently has been

rejected. “The need for uniformity, while paramount

under some federal statutory schemes, has not been held

to warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations

for civil rights actions.” 446 US., at 489. Congressional

reliance on state law obviously presupposes the lack of

nationwide uniformity. Robertson v. Wegmann, supra,

436 US., at 594, n.11. The same rationale applies here.

If Congress had no difficuty with the application of vary-

ing limitations for the very same cause of action brought

in different states, it is unreasonable to suggest that federal

policy is substantially affected by the application of dif-

ferent limitations to different causes of action brought in

the same forum.

In the final analysis, there is no substantial basis in

this case to reject out of hand the state’s considered judg-

ment that claims against public officials must be com-

menced promptly. The féteral policies of compensation

for civil rights violations and deterrence of future miscon-

duct are not affected in the sightest by application of Penn-

sylvania’s six-month statute of limitations.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 11

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue

to review the decision of the Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

LERoy S. ZIMMERMAN

Attorney General

By: ANDREW S. GORDON

Deputy Attorney General

ALLEN C. WARSHAW

Deputy Attorney General

Chief, Special Litigation

Office of Attorney General

1545 Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

(717) 783-1471

Date: June 6, 1983