Opposition Brief — Whorton v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.

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Bupreme Court, U.S.

L ‘ 5

/ tH F. SPANIOL, JR.

@LERK

No. 86-1045 , -

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

CARL WHORTON, KEN WHOoRTON, et al.,

Petitioners,

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC., YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC.,

Fort WortH Cas & BaGGaGE Co., INc., CITY OF

DALLAS, TEXAS, CITY OF FortT WortTH, TEXAS, CITY OF

IRVING, TEXAS, CITY OF GRAPEVINE, TEXAS,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PRIVATE TAXI COMPANIES IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

STAN McMurry

RAIN HARRELL EMERY YOUNG & DOKE

4200 Republic Bank “Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 754-9484

Attorney for Respondents,

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC.

YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC.,

and FortH WoRTH CAB AND

BaGGAGE Co., INC.

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE

PRIVATE TAXI COMPANY RESPONDENTS

IS THERE A, CASE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO THE

PRIVATE TAXI COMPANY RESPONDENTS SINCE

THE LOWER COURT ALSO DISMISSED THE ACTION

AGAINST THEM ON AN INDEPENDENT AND AL-

TERNATIVE GROUND AS TO WHICH PETITIONERS

DO NOT SEEK REVIEW?

II.

WHEN THERE WAS EXTENSIVE STATE REGULA-

TION WHICH ESTABLISHED “A CLEARLY ARTIC-

ULATED AND AFFIRMATIVELY EXPRESSED STATE

POLICY” SHOWING “THE LEGISLATURE COMTEM-

PLATED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF” BEFORE ANY

AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTES IN QUESTION OC-

CURRED, DID THE LOWER COURT’S REFERENCE

TO A SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT, WHICH VALI-

DATED AND CONFIRMED THE CHALLENGED CON-

TRACTS AS “AN ADEQUATE INDICATION OF THE

STATES DESIRE TO ALLOW JOINT AIRPORT

BOARDS TO DISPENSE COMPETITION”, RAISE AN

IMPORTANT QUESTION RELATING TO RETROAC-

TIVITY?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PRIVATE TAXI

COMPANY RESPONDENTS .......ccccsseecceesssecceeeseeeeeeneess

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......cccccsccscscssccccccosccescescceces

STATUTES INVOLVED .....cccccccccccscccsscoccccssscscscccccoscsncs

JOMSBICTIONN cocniereccscccccccccscsersctseconscernanessacessstunssssass

STATEMENT OF THE CASE uaccccssscccscccssccssccccscceseceoess

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT .........cc+000

II.

There is no case or controversy as to the

private taxi company respondents under Ar-

ticle III of the Constitution. ...........ssseeseeeees

The petition does not present any issue of

importance, because the lower court’s judg-

ment does not depend upon a subsequent val-

idating provision in an amendment to

establish ‘‘a clearly articulated and affirma-

tively expressed policy” showing ‘“‘the legis-

lature contemplated the acts complained of,”

and there is no conflict with another Court

of Appeal or with this Court on any federal

question of importance. .........scseseeereeeeeerees

CORMNCERTORIONG c5svcsceinncscaconesneatdbietotcentiashaanaaae

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325

U.S. 450, 89 L.Ed. 1725 65 S.Ct. 1384

SII) cdenssdhinsidiasubunisdninssechicmeetdanapeaditctiehniiskeees

Amalgated Association v. Wisconsin Employment

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 416, 95 L.Ed. 389,

RE TE NED casonsccesnateccchiapipapiitertscionseee

Brownlowe v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216, 43 S.Ct. 263,

gk 5. RR 2a

DeFunis v. rat: 416 U.S. 312, 40 L.Ed. 2d

BI Be ie BAG CA GTE) oe cicsscntchdecscocerccoseces

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 20’ L.Ed. 2d 947, 88

SEEN ENE LE IND

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 37 L.Ed. 2d 407,

Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 108, 22 L.Ed. 2d 113,

ep I sso vs ciecivascndsacanectocsconecence

Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 24 L.Ed. 2d 214, 90

NN SIT MID Necantiniconseseasshasabibicladidccoussecees

Heitnuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 65 L.Ed. 990,

MM TT MUUEED. . sccedsvcndenensssniaceseeivaricsseccce ;

Honig v. Students of Cal. School for Blind, 471 U.S.

—, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. —__(1985)...

Independent Taxicy\, Drivers’ Employees v. Greater

Houston Transportation Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th

Cir.) cert. dented, __U.S. __(1985) 0.0.0.0...

Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 52 L.Ed. 2d 184,

OTE ceaneepatuniesigunonece

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 2d 154, 92.

ak ces chien

Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 71 L.Ed. 2d 508,

REID yo cacecceosnctnenacceseetecccocens

Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 35 L.Ed.

Ba UF Petes BU CADIS, covncsccccsccccectossee

25,26

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Local No. 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 4 L.Ed.

2 Fie. S Bi Bek Clee. eiiiieaicciwm, 26

Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 3 L.ED.

SOD = acisdees ata ick Mitantbekniaasenas 25

Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 40 L.Ed. 293, 16 S.Ct.

BEE CREE sik cakacsiitasiarcictetsiicvnisseibiedbbindatnter dines 25,26

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 71 L.Ed. 2d 353,

102 S.Ct. 1181 PIII uccncatgeaenninmsanaeiaghiniaktapes 24

Natural Milk Producers Association of California

v. City and County of San Francisco, 317 U.S.

423, 63 S.Ct. 359, 87 L.Ed. 375 (1943) Blanes 26

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 30 L.Ed. 2d

435, SE: A Ge CIEE ebceiscttitrcnstes 27

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674,

6 Fh I Te. ehignietniteicnstitietteeneticinencces 25,27

Pease v. Rathbren-Jones Engineering Co., 243 U.S.

273, 61 L.Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283 (1917) _...... 25

Princeton University v. Schnid, 455 U.S. 100, 70

L.Ed. 855, 102 S.Ct. 867 (1982) .............0000 27

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 93

Ris ee EE tnta wi chistseceinpeniaminendsbiakatohonces 25

St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct.

Ue Tee ey BAe SD atcinntcinecnscstonncnctanees 26

Sierra Club v. rig. 405 U.S. 727, 31 L.Ed. 2d

636, 92 S.C _ 1361 IEE. - kcciciinsedeieimbdbenanne 26

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Orga-

nization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L.Ed. 2d 450, 96

Ge TEE SE ncbandeb can tekiessdideaaeerdnsioneccices 24

Socialist Tabor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 32

L.Ed. 2d 317, 92 S.Ct. 1716 (1972) ................ 26

Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United

States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S.Ct. 721, (1985)... 24

Tennessee v. Condors, 189 U.S. 64, 47 L.Ed. 709,

es I I | Gila cnigesdictneiiasipasetiasinns 25

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 714 104 S.Ct. 1818, 79

Rima TE FAN IIE ~ Bacesccencancesancenctnsssbunsnceses 30

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,

BE es es I iis dickip dis snasidetinsnnsinsenes 24

United States v. Alaska Steamship Company, 253

U.S. 118, 64 L.Ed. 808, 40 S.Ct. 448

PIED. cucceatiicicaiieiaichibaaiinanaaibtantbipitadneniabssesincia 27

United States v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567,

1 L.Ed. 2d 563, 77 S.Ct. 529 (1957) _............ 27

United States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 45 S.Ct.

MBG, GE LTE, GH CB) aincskcvcctccccccsscccccss: 30

Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S.

464, 70 L.Ed. 2d 700, 102 S.Ct. 752

CE nili asiisiniascdsaanhanthnieateniaadbiadindbeninevabausnscet 26

Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 801 F.2d 159, —(5th

ACMI: | daiecsciedbiealiicdntbiapicnimas iaiiiaia nid caihiabniinala eee 27

STATUTES:

Article III of the Constitution ........00.......ccccsseeeeeee ii,1,22

ee SED ~ eeiitttteiiccscsieierrersintnecss 1

Sree ee pice ieen eiieicaie 1

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1175 (Vernon 1968) ........ 1,13

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 46d (Vernon 1969) ...... passim

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964) .... passim

Tex. R. R. Comm’n, 16 Tex. Admin. Code §5,

SUE. acdaninicbhecohdieca tices chdeneuniieacamansmaaadenaaaiahas 1,19,20

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1045

CARL WuortTon, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC., ef al.

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PRIVATE TAXI COMPANIES IN

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATUTES INVOLVED

The federal statutes involved are Article III of the

Constitution; the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 and 2;

and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §35. The state stat-

utes involved are the Texas Home Rule Statute, Tex.

Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1175 (Vernon 1963); the Texas

Municipal Airport Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 46d

(Vernon 1969); and the Texas Motor Business Act,

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964).

JURISDICTION

The existance of an alternative defense as to the

private taxi company respondents precludes a case or

controversy under Article III of the Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport (‘Regional

Airport’’) is owned by the City of Dallas, Texas (‘‘Dal-

las”), and the City of Fort Worth, Texas (“Fort

Worth’’). The two cities built it between Dallas and

Fort Worth, in a cooperative effort, at the request

of the Federal Aviation Administration. The Dallas/

Fort Worth Regional Airport Board (‘Regional Air-

port Board’’) governs the Regional Airport, with rules

and regulations approved by Dallas and Fort Worth.

The system selected by Dallas, Fort Worth, and the

Regional Airport Board to regulate and authorize

taxicabs to serve the Regional Airport required con-

tractual authority. These rules and regulations re-

quired taxi drivers and companies who wished to

provide service to do so pursuant to a contract. Dal-

las, Fort Worth, and the Regional Airport Board con-

tracted with Surtran Taxicabs, Inc. for the period

from the end of 1974 to the start of 1985. The con-

tractual authorization system is no longer used, and

all drivers who wish to serve the Regional Airport

do so under a permit system (which petitioners do

not complain of) at the same cost they paid under

the contract system.

In 1970 the Regional Airport Board decided to se-

lect one operator to handle all ground transportation

needs, both bus and taxicab, from the Regional Air-

port to the ten-county area around the Regional Air-

port. Seven companies were invited to bid, but no

bids were submitted to provide both bus and taxicab

services. The decision of Dallas, Fort Worth, and the

Regional Airport Board to select one ground trans-

portation operator is at the heart of this controversy.

This decision was based on the recommendation of

an independent consultant who had been hired to

study transportation needs and to recommend means

of implementing service. Several consultants were

thereafter retained to provide technical assistance on

ground transportation matters. The consultants con-

tinued to recommend the single operator system, but

the system was later modified to allow all taxi drivers

who wished to provide service the opportunity to do

so.

When it became obvious that no single private

transportation company could meet the bid criteria,

Dallas and Fort Worth jointly formed the D/FW Sur-

tan System [‘‘Surtan System’’] to serve as the single

operator of all airport ground transportation services.

Surtan System in turn contracted with the Regional

Airport Board to provide all ground transportation

for hire from the Regional Airport. 7

Dallas, Fort Worth, and Surtran System deter-

mined that Surtan System would subcontract with the

private sector for taxicab services. Surtran System,

which was managed by the Dallas Transit Depart-

ment, provided bus service to or from the Regional

Airport. The final bid criteria, adopted by the Re-

gional Airport Board and approved by both Dallas

and Fort Worth, required the potential taxi subcon-

tractor to bid on outbound taxi service from the Re-

gional Airport to anywhere in the surrounding ten-

county area. The Dallas Transit Department, as man-

ager of Surtran System, solicited bids from local taxi

companies for taxi service.

Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc. and Fort Worth Cab &

Baggage Co., Inc. received approval from Surtran

System to form a corporation to bid for taxi services.

This company, Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., submitted the

only bid. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc. signed a contract

with Dallas, Fort Worth, and Surtran System. This

contract was renewed one time. Before the D/FW

Airport opened, Surtran Taxicab, Inc. applied for and

received, from the Railroad Commission of Texas

(‘Texas Railroad Commission’’) a Certificate of Public

Convenience and Necessity to serve the D/FW Air-

port. During the second contract, Yellow Cab of Dal-

las, Inc., applied for and received such a certificate.

No other company had such a certificate or authority

during the term of either of the two contracts.

In the years before the 1983 amendments, referred

to by petitioner, the two principal legislative acts by

which the State of Texas provided for regulation of

taxicab service at the Regional Airport were the Texas

Municipal Airport Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.

46d (Vernon 1969), and the Texas Motor Bus Act,

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964).

Under the Motor Bus Act, regulation was provided

by a state agency, the Texas Railroad Commission.

This regulation was mandatory and its terms were

detailed by the statute. Under the Texas Municipal

Airport Act, the regulation was provided by a joint

airport board. This regulation was of the type which

had traditionally been provided by cities within their

limits. Since the Texas Municipal Airport Act, allows

a joint airport board the same authority over taxicabs

at a regional airport as cities have over taxicabs

within their limits, one should also consider the au-

thority which the State of Texas gives cities such as

Dallas and Fort Worth to regulate taxicabs.

The following provisions of the Motor Bus Act, su-

pra, were applicable before the 1983 amendments re-

ferred to by petitioners:

eA ST arepony ea

stint ke

The term “Motor Bus Company” when

used in this Act means every corporation

*** owning, controlling, operating or man-

aging any motor propelled passenger vehicle

*** and engaged in the business of trans-

porting persons for compensation or hire over

the public highways within the State of

Texas, whether operating over fixed routes

or fixed schedules, or otherwise; * * * pro-

vided further, that the term ‘‘Motor Bus

Company” as used in this Act shall not in-

clude corporations or persons, * * * insofar

as they own, control, operate, or manage mo-

tor propelled passenger vehicles operated

wholly within the limits of any incorporated

town or city, and the suburbs thereof,

whether separately incorporated or other-

wise.

All motor-bus companies, as defined herein,

are hereby declared to be ‘‘common carriers”’

and subject to regulation by the State of

Texas, and shall not operate any motor pro-

pelled passenger vehicle for the regular

transportation of persons as passengers for

compensation or hire over any public high-

way in this State except in accordance with

the provision of this Act...

It is hereby declared that when existing

transportation facilities on any highway in

this State do not provide passenger service

which the Commission shall deem adequate

to provide for public convenience on such

highway, then such inadequacy of service

shall be corisidered as creating a condition

where the public convenience and necessity

require the designation of, and provision for,

additional service on such highway, and it

shall be the duty of the Commission to issue

certificate or certificates as herein provided,

if in the opinion of said Commission the is-

suance of such certificate will promote the

public welfare.

The Commission is hereby vested with

power and authority, and it is hereby made

its duty to supervise and regulate the public

service rendered by every motor bus com-

pany operating over the highways in this

State, to fix or approve the maximum, or

minimum, or maximum and minimum, fares,

rates or charges of, and to prescribe all rules

and regulations necessary for the govern-

ment of, each motor bus company; to pre-

scribe the routes, schedules, service, and

safety of operations of each such motor bus

company; to acquire the filing of such annual -

or other reports and of such other data by

such motor bus company as the Commission

may deem necessary.

** *

The Commission is further authorized and

empowered to supervise and regulate motor

bus companies in all other matters affecting

the relationship between such motor bus com-

panies and the traveling public that may be

necessary to the efficient operation of this

law.

It shall be unlawful for any motor bus com-

pany to sell any tickets for the transportation

See a eT ee

of passengers within this State over any mo-

tor bus line at any rates other than the rates,

authorized and approved by the Commission

under the terms of this law;

** *

No motor-bus company shall hereafter reg-

ularly operate for the transportation of per-

sons as passengers for compensation or hire

over the public highways of this State with-

out first having obtained from the Commis-

sion under the provisions of this Act a

certificate or permit declaring that the public

convenience and necessity require such’ op-

eration;

The Commission is hereby vested with

power and authority, and it is hereby made

its duty upon the filing of an application for

a certificate of public convenience and ne-

cessity, to ascertain and determine under

such rules and regulations as it may pro-

mulgate, after considering existing transpor-

tation facilities on such highway, the service

rendered and capable of being rendered

thereby, and the demand for, or need of ad-

ditional service, if there exists a public ne-

cessity for such service, and if public

convenience will be promoted by granting

said application and permitting the operating

of motor vehicles on the highways designated

in such application, as a common carrier for

hire.

* * *

Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of

any corporation and every other person who

violates or fails to comply with, or who pro-

cures, aids, or abets in the violation of any

provisions of this Act shall be guilty of a

misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof,

shall be punished by a fine not to exceed Five

Hundred ($500.00) Dollars, or by imprison-

ment in the county jail not exceeding one

year, or by both such fine and imprisonment;

and the violations occurring on each day shall

each constitute a separate offense.

Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of

any motor bus company as heretofore de-

fined, and any motor bus company, as here-

tofore defined and/or the owner or operator,

officer, servant, agent or employee, or any

such owner or operator of any bus terminal

who violates or fails to obey, observe or com-

ply with any order, decision, rule or regu-

lation, direction, demand or requirement of

the Commission shall be subject to and shall

pay a penalty not exceeding Five Hundred

($500.00) Dollars, for each and every day of

such violation. Such penalty to be recovered

in any court of competent jurisdiction in

Travis County, Texas, or in the County in

which the violation occurs. Suit for such pen-

alty or penalties shall be instituted and con-

ducted by the Attorney General of the State

of Texas, or by the county or district attorney

of the county in which the violation occurs,

in the name of the State of Texas, and by

direction of the Railroad Commission of

Texas. :

The following provisions of the Code of Rules and

Regulations of the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Air-

port Board were applicable before the 1983 amend-

ment referred to by petitioners:

| The provisions of this Code shall constitute

a special enactment of effect only within the

boundaries of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional

Airport, and adopted in cooperation and con-

cert with other Cities in recognition of the

unique and special requirements of the plan-

ning, ... operation, regulation, and protec-

tion and policing of the Dallas-Fort Worth

Regional Airport.... To the extent of any

conflict between the existing or future gen-

eral ordinances of any city and this Code,

this Code shall prevail only within the bound-

aries of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Air-

port and not otherwise.

It shall be unlawful for any person to so-

licit ground transportation business on the

Airport, or to pick up passengers or baggage

for hire on the Airport without a ground

transportation permit from the Airport

Board, or without having an Airport Board

Concession, License or Franchise therefor,

and, to the extent of any operations outside

the Airport Boundaries, without a license,

permit or franchise from any City through

which said business is conducted if lawfully

regulated by the ordinances of any such city.

Duly certified copies of all rules, regula-

tions and orders of the Dallas-Fort Worth

Regional Airport Board pertaining to the

subjects mentioned in Section 3; and pre-

scribing penalties for violations, shall be for-

warded by the Executive Director to the chief

administrative officer of each city adopting

this Code, and if the City Council of such

City shall elect to enact such rules, regula-

tions and orders in the manner and form

prescribed for other penal ordinances of such

City, the municipal court or courts of such

City shall each have concurrent jurisdiction

with any other proper forum over offenses

arising thereunder and within the corporate

limits of such City; and the duly authorized

and commissioned security officers or other

enforcement officers of the Dallas-Fort Worth

Regional Airport shall thereafter be author-

ized to file cases arising thereunder in such

municipal courts, in addition to any other

convenient and proper forum.

The authorized and commissioned security

officers of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional

Airport Board shall issue and use traffic ci-

tations and summons of the type now used

by the Texas Highway Patrol with such

changes as are necessitated to render same

applicable to the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional

Airport.

* * *

Airport Police. The primary responsibility

for police, fire and health security and for

;

PP ERED SE Sig POF

Sha teonc

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Ye. COCA RA teil ob eS Mn EL oes Ce

POM PUD SLO RB a ABA nasi I isd had Sat eb bed 2

the enforcement of regulations, and for the

performance of inspections and services

within the boundaries of the Dallas-Fort

Worth Regional Airport shall be vested in

the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport

Board and in the Police force and such health

officers as may from time to time be duly

appointed and commissioned as such officers

by the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport

Board.

...the violation of any provision of The

Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas-

Fort Worth Regional Airport Board where

an act or a failure to act is made unlawful

or is otherwise prohibited, shall be punishable

by a fine not to exceed Two Hundred Dollars

($200.00), and each day a violation shall con-

tinue shall constitute a separate offense; pro-

vided, however, where the offense is one for

which a penalty is fixed by state law, the

latter penalty shall govern.

The Municipal Airport Act, contained the following

provisions before the 1983 amendments referred to

by petitioners:

[t]wo (2) or more municipalities are specif-

ically authorized to make ... agreements...

for the joint acquisition and operation of air-

ports.... Concurrent action by ordinance,

resolution or otherwise of the governing bod-

ies of the participating public agencies shall

constitute joint action.

The joint board shall have power to ...

operate, regulate, protect and police any air-

port ... to be jointly acquired, controlled and

operated, and such board may exercise on

behalf of its constituent public agencies all

the powers of each with respect to such air-

port,. .. subject to the limitations of Subsec-

tion (d) of this Section.

Police Regulations. Any resolutions, rules,

regulations or orders of the joint board deal-

ing with subjects authorized by Section 7 of

the Act shall become effective only upon ap-

proval of the governing bodies of the con-

stituent public agencies provided that upon

such approval, the resolutions, rules, regu-

lations or orders of the joint board shall have

the same force and effect in the territories

or jurisdictions involved as the ordinances,

resolutions, rules, regulations or orders of

each public agency would have in its own

territory or jurisdiction.

* * *

[t]he ... operation, regulation, protection

and policing of airports ... and the exercise

of any other powers herein granted to mu-

nicipalities and ... to be severally or jointly

exercised, are hereby declared to be public

and governmental functions, exercised for a

public purpose, and matters of public neces-

sity; ... and in the case of any municipality

other than a county, are declared to.be mu-

nicipal functions and purposes as well as pub-

lic and governmental.

The act provides two cities may jointly do what a

city may do individually, and the act provides a city

may:

.. regulate, protect and police airports .. .,

: either within or without the territorial limits

of such municipality ... including the ...

4 operation at such airports of... facilities ...

: for the comfort and accommodation of air

travelers. ...

* * *

| In operating an airport ..., such munici-

pality may, ... enter into contracts, ... and

; other arrangements for a term not exceeding

: forty (40) years with any persons:

(1) granting the privilege of using ... such

airport :.., or space therein for commercial

purposes;

(2) conferring the privilege of supplying

.., services ... at such airport....

(3) making available services to be fur-

nished by the municipality ... at such air-

port. ...

In each case the municipality may establish

the terms and conditions and fix the charges,

. or fees for the privileges or services,

which shall be reasonable and uniform for the

; same class of privilege or service and shall

be established with due regard to the prop-

: erty and improvements used and the ex-

penses of operation to the municipality.

The Texas Home Rule Statute included the follow-

ing provisions prior to the 1983 amendment referred

to by petitioners:

... (home rule cities) shall have full power

: of local self-government, and among the other

UAW howinten lids Gledhdtrci ese “ds Routan

powers that may be exercised by any such

city the following are hereby enumerated for

greater certainty:

To hold ... any character of property,. .. .

To prohibit the use of any street, ..., or

grounds of the city by any ... character of

public utility without first obtaining the con-

sent of the governing authorities expressed

by ordinance and upon paying such compen-

sation as may be prescribed and upon such

condition as may be provided by any such

ordinance. To determine, fix and regulate the

charges, fares or rates of any person, firm

or corporation enjoying or that may enjoy the

franchise or exercising any other public priv-

ilege in said city and to prescribe the kind

of service to be furnished by such person,

firm or corporation, and the manner in which

it shall be rendered. ...

** *

To license, operate and control the oper-

ation of all character of vehicles using the

public streets, including ..., automobiles... .

To regulate, license and fix the charges or

fares made by any person owning, operating

or controlling any vehicle of any character

used for the carrying of passengers for hire

. on the public streets and alleys of the

city.

To license any lawful business, occupation

or calling that is susceptible to the control

of the police power.

During the 1983 legislative year, the Texas legis-

lature passed House Bill 593. In the portion of House

Bill 593 which dealt with the Texas Railroad Com-

mission’s authcrity over motor bus companies, the

legislature provided that the Railroad Commission

would continue to exercise authority over taxicab

companies providing service from the Dallas/Fort

Worth Regional Airport. That bill provides in part as

follows:

AN ACT

Relating to the administration, power, du-

ties, and continuation of the Railroad Com-

mission of Texas, including the regulation of

transportation. .. .

Section 14. Subsection (c), Section 1, Chap-

ter 270, Acts of the 40th Legislature, Reg-

ular Session, 1927 (Article 9lla, Vernon’s

Texas Civil Statutes), is amended to read as

follows:

used in this Act means every corporation, or

persons as herein defined, their lessees,

trustees, receivers or trustees appointed by

any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,

operating or managing any motor propelled

passenger vehicle not usually operated on or

over rails, and engaged in the business of

transporting persons for compensation or hire

over the public highways within the State of

Texas, whether operating over fixed routes

or fixed schedules, or otherwise. However,

the term “Motor Bus Company” as used in

this Act shall not include: ...

(3) corporations or persons, their lessees,

trustees, or receivers, or trustees appointed

by any court whatsoever, insofar as they own,

control, operate, or manage motor propelled

taxicabs designed for carrying no more than

five passengers; permits, licenses, or certif-

icates issued prior to June 1, 1983, would

not be affected by the provisions of this ex-

clusion. Such taxicabs are motor buses only

when they operate to or from an airport es-

tablished pursuant to Chapter 114, Acts of the

50th Legislature, 1947, as amended (Article

46d-1 et seq., Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes).

[Emphasis supplied.] ,

This amendment clearly affirmed the jurisdiction of

the Texas Railroad Commission over taxicab service

at the Regional Airport.

In the same 1983 legislative session, the legislature

also passed Senate Bill 960, which provides in per-

tinent part:

SECTION 2. Subsection (d) Section 14,

Municipal Airports Act (Article 46d-14, Ver-

non’s Texas Civil Statutes), is amended by

adding Subdivisions (6) and (7) to read as

follows: ‘(6) Taxicab Licensing. Notwith-

standing any contrary provisions in H.B. 593,

Acts of the 68th Legislature, Regular Ses-

sion, 1983, a joint airport board established

pursuant to Chapter 114, Acts of the 50th

Legislature, Regular Session, 1947, as

amended (Article 46d-14, Vernon’s Texas

Civil Statutes), shall have power to license

taxicabs picking up passengers at or deliv-

ering passengers to the airport.

(7) Regulations. Any resolutions, rules, reg-

ulations, or orders of the joint board dealing

with subjects authorized by Subdivision (6) of

this subsection become effective only upon

approval of the governing bodies of the con-

stituent public agencies. Upon the approval,

the resolutions, rules, regulations, or orders

of the joint board have the same force and

effect in the territories or jurisdictions in-

volved as the ordinances, resolutions, or or-

der of each public agency would have in its

| own territory or jurisdiction.

This language expressly authorized the use of a li-

cense system by a Regional Airport Board in addition

to the contractual system which continued to be au-

thorized.

Subsequent to the passage of House Bill 593 and

. Senate Bill 960, the 1983 legislature passed Senate

Bill 28. That act amended House Bill 593, and pro-

. vides in pertinent part as follows:

AN ACT

Relating to the regulation of taxicabs serv-

ing airports

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLA-

TURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:

SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section 1,

Chapter 270, Acts of the 40th Legislature,

Regular Session, 1927 (Article 9lla, Ver-

non’s Texas Civil Statutes), as amended by

H.B. 598, Acts of the 68th Legislature, Reg-

ular Session, 1983, is amended to read as

follows:

“(c) The term ‘Motor Bus Company’ when

used in this Act means every corporation or

persons as herein defined, their lessees,

trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by

any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,

operating or managing any motor propelled

passenger vehicle not usually operated on or

over rails, and engaged in the business of

transporting persons for compensation or hire

over the public highways within the State of

Texas, whether operating: over fixed routes

or fixed schedules, or otherwise. However,

the term ‘Motor Bus Company’ as used in

this Act shall not include: ...

(3) corporations or persons, their lessees,

trustees, or receivers, or trustees appointed

by any court whatsoever, insofar as they own,

control, operate, or manage motor propelled

taxicabs designed for carrying no more than

five passengers; permits, licenses, or certif-

icates issued prior to June 1, 1983, would

not be affected by the provisions of this ex-

clusion. Such taxicabs are motor buses only

when they operate to or from an airport es-

tablished pursuant to Section 14, Chapter 114,

Acts to the 50th Legislature, 1947, as amended

(Article 46d-14 Vernon’s Texas Civil Stat-

utes).”” [Emphasis supplied. ]

This legislation also made it clear that the Texas Rail-

road Commission retained its jurisdiction over motor

bus companies or taxicabs servicing a jointly-owned

municipal airport such as the Regional Airport in

question.

The Texas Railroad Commission then promulgated

a rule, 16 Texas Administrative Code § 5.248, which

had the effect of administratively deregulating the

Regional Airport from Texas Railroad Commission

regulation. This occurred during the final months of

Surtran Taxicab, Inc.’s second five-year contract.

When this rule was passed, Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.

and Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc. brought a declaratory

judgment against the Texas Railroad Commission,

Dallas, Fort Worth, and the Regional Airport Board.

A judgment was entered in the state district court

suit which considered and interpreted the statutes be-

fore the 1983 amendments, after the 1983 amend-

ments, and the rule which had been adopted by the

Texas Railroad Commission:

x * *

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that this is an appropriate action for a dec-

laratory judgment pursuant to Art. 6252-

13(a), V.T.C.A. and Art. 224-1 V.T.C.A., and

for injunction.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECHEED that the amended regula-

tions approved by the Dallas/Fort Worth Re-

gional Airport Board on or about December

16, 1988, and thereafter approved by the City

of Dallas and the City of Fort Worth, which

became effective January 1, 1984, are au-

thorized by the Municipal Airport Act Art.

46d-14, V.T.C.S. and said amended regula-

tions are lawful except for Sec. 8-5(b) and

are not inconsistent with the Motor Bus Act,

Art. 91la, V.T.C.S.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that the recent Rule

adopted by the Railroad Commission of

Texas, 16 Texas Administrative Code Sec.

5.248(b\2\c\Xi), is inconsistent with the Motor

Bus Act Art. 91la, V.T.C.S. and the portion

of said aforementioned Rule which provides

that taxicab service within the licensing ju-

risdiction of the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional

Airport Board may be performed without a

certificate issued by the Railroad Commission

of Texas is invalid.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that the Railroad Commis-

sion of Texas does not have authority to al-

low taxicabs to operate from the Dallas/Fort

Worth Regional Airport to the ten county

area around said airport without a Certificate

of Public Convenience and Necessity and

compliance with of ier provisions of the Mo-

tor Bus Act.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that no taxicab company

or taxicab driver may provide service from

the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport to

the ten county area around said airport un-

less they do so pursuant to both a Certificate

of Public Convenience and Necessity from the

Railroad Commission of Texas and authority

from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport

Board, and all taxicab companies and taxicab

drivers must comply with the provisions of

the Motor Bus Act, 911 V.T.C.S. and Dallas/

Fort Worth Regional Airport Board’s

amended regulations which became effective

January 1, 1984, before they may transport

passengers by taxicab from the Dallas/Fort

Worth Regional Airport to the ten county

area around the Airport.

The District concludes and it is AD-

JUDGED that the Railroad Commission of

Texas has the duty to regulate taxicab ser-

vice from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regidnal

Airport to the ten county area around the

Airport.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that Terminal Cab Com-

pany, Inc. is enjoined from providing taxi

service from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional

Airport without a Certificate of Public Con-

venience and Necessity from the Railroad

Commission of Texas.

*-*

This judgment confirmed concurrent jurisdiction at

the Regional Airport of both the Regional Airport

Board and the Texas Railroad Commission. The court

held that the Texas Railroad Commission was re-

quired by the Motor Bus Act, to regulate taxicab

service at the Regional Airport. This judgment was

appealed by the defendants and became moot while

on appeal in 1985 when the Texas legislature again

amended the Texas Motor Bus Act. This amendment

removed taxicabs from the definition of a motor bus

company. All taxicab companies now provide service

under a license system.

I. There Is No Case Or Controversy As. To The Private

Taxi Company Respondents Under Article III Of The

Constitution

Insofar as the private taxi company respondents are

concerned, the petition does not present a case or

controversy. Under Article III of the Constitution a

case or controversy is an indispensable prerequisite

to jurisdiction. As stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.

83, 20 L.Ed. 2d 947, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968):

The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined

and limited by Article III of the Constitution.

In terms relevant to the question for decision

in this case, the judicial power of federal

courts is constitutionally restricted to “‘cases”’

and “‘controversies.”’ As is so often the sit-

uation in constitutional adjudication, those

two words have an iceberg quality, contain-

ing beneath their surface simplicity sub-

merged complexities which go to the very

heart of our constitutional form of govern-

ment. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and

“controversies” are two complementary but

somewhat different limitations. In part those

words limit the business of federal courts to

questions presented in an adversary context

and in a form historically viewed as capable

of resolution through the judicial process.

The petitioners only ask the Court to grant

certiorari to review of one of two propositions, either

one of which the lower court found was sufficient to

preclude any relief as to the private taxi companies.

Regarding the private taxi companies, the lower court ~

noted that the issues were:

I. Should these consolidated actions be dis-

missed because the Defendants’ challenged

activities are immune from scrutiny under the

antitrust laws by virtue of the state action

exemption?

* * *

III. Should the Plaintiffs’ claims against

the private taxi company defendants be dis-

missed as barred under the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine?

The lower court determined:

I. Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are DIS-

MISSED because the Defendants’ challenged

activities are immune from scrutiny under the

antitrust laws by virtue of the state action

exemption.

* * *

III. Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against the

private Defendants are DISMISSED as

barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The petition before this Court does not request

certiorari to review the lower court’s determination

that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was applicable as

a defense for the private taxi companies. Even if the

Court should, and it should not because such holding

was correct, reverse the lower court’s holding that

the state action exemption applied, the unchallenged

holding that the Noerr-Pennington defense also ap-

plied would still result in a dismissal of the petitioner’s

claims as to the private taxi companies. It is also

significant that the test under the state action ex-

emption for a private person is different from the

test for a governmental body. Town of Hallie v. City

of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 105 S.Ct. 17138, (1985)

and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.

United States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S.Ct. 721, (1985).

Whether there is a case or controversy is deter-

mined at the time the issue is considered. Golden v.

Zuickler, 394 U.S. 108, 22 L.Ed. 2d 1138, 89 S.Ct.

956 (1969). As of the time this petition is presented,

there is no case or controversy as to the private taxi

companies. First, if a favorable resolution of the ques-

tion petitioners seek to present as to these

respondents will not give the petitioners relief, the

minimum standards of a case or controversy have not

been met. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L.Ed. 2d 450, 96 S.Ct.

1917 (1976); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 71 L.Ed.

2d 353, 102 S.Ct. 1181 (1982). Even if the petitioners’

question on the state action defense were answered

in their favor, the private taxi companies’ Noerr-Pen-

nington antitrust immunity remains intact, barring

petitioners’ claim.

As this Court has stated, when any one of several

propositions would support the judgment rendered,

and one of the propositions is found sufficient, it is

unnecessary to consider the others:

The information consists of several counts,

to all of which exceptions are taken. The

Court however is of the opinion that the

Fourth Count is ,ood and this renders it un-

necessary to decide the others.

Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 3 L.Ed. 364. In

short, a federal court will not act on a question when

there is no case or controversy, O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974);

and there is none here.

A cause of action may present a case or controversy

as to some and not to other parties. Dismissal of the

parties in the action as to which there is no case or

controversy is proper. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35

L.Ed. 2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). Therefore, the

private taxicab companies must be dismissed since no

case or controversy exists as to them.

A second reason for denying the petition is moot-

ness. An issue is moot if no order of the Court could

properly affect the petitioner’s rights with respect to

the issue the Court is asked to review. Honig v. Stu-

dents of California School for the Blind, 471 U.S. —

, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. __(1985). The inability

of a Court to grant any effectual relief renders the

matter moot. Brownlowe v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216,

43 S.Ct. 263, 67 L.Ed. 620 (1923); Hettnuller v.

Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 65 L.Ed. 990, 41 S.Ct. 522

(1921); Pease v. Rathbren-Jones Engineering Co., 243

U.S. 278, 61 L.Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283 (1917); Tennessee

v. Condors, 189 U.S. 64, 47 L.Ed. 709, 23 S.Ct. 579

(1903); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 40 L.Ed. 293,

16 S.Ct. 132 (1985).

Because the private taxicab companies are immune

from antitrust liability on other valid grounds, the

state action defense question is moot as to them. This

Court has consistently held that it is its duty “to

decide actual controversies by a judgment which can

be carried into effect and not to give opinions on

moot questions or abstract propositions, or to decide

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the

matter in issue in the case before it.’’ Mills v. Green,

supra; Local No. 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 4

L.Ed. 2d 378, 8 S.Ct. 391 (1960).

There must be a personal stake in the outcome of

the controversy in order to assure the adverseness of

the litigation. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,

31 L.Ed. 2d 636, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972); Valley Forge

College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 70 L.Ed.

2d 700, 102 S.Ct. 752 (1982); Linda R. S. v. Richard

D., 410 U.S. 614, 35 L.Ed. 2d 536, 93 S.Ct. 1146

(1973), Socialist Tabor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S.

583, 32 L.Ed. 2d 317, 92 S.Ct. 1716 (1972). In fact,

“A federal court is without power to decide moot

questions or to give advisory opinions which cannot

affect the rights of the litigants ir the case before

it.”” St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct.

910 87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943) (emphasis added); DeFunis

v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 40 L.Ed. 2d 164, 94 S.Ct.

1704 (1974); Honig v. Students of Cal. School For

Blind, 471 U.S. __, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. _

(1985); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 24 L.Ed. 2d 214,

90 S.Ct. 200 (1969).

Here, the Courts’ opinion on whether the state ac-

tion exemption was properly applied to the private

respondents cannot affect the petitioners’ rights at

all. When a question becomes moot it is no longer

sufficient as a case or controversy. Lane v. Williams,

455 U.S. 624, 71 L.Ed. 2d 508, 102 S.Ct. 1322 (1982);

Natural Milk Producers Association of California v.

City and County of San Francisco, 317 U.!5. 423, 63

S.Ct. 359, 87 L.Ed. 375 (1943); Kremens v. Bartley,

431 U.S. 119, 52 L.Ed. 2d 184, 97 S.Ct. 1709 (1977);

Amalgated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Re-

lations Board, 340 U.S. 416, 95 L.Ed. 389, 71 S.Ct.

373 (1951); United States v. Alaska Steamship Com-

pany, 253 U.S. 118, 64 L.Ed. 808, 40 S.Ct. 448 (1920).

A request for an advisory opinion or for an answer

to hypothetical question does not present a case or

controversy. Princeton University v. Schnid, 455 U.S.

100, 70 L.Ed. 855, 102 S.Ct. 867 (1982); Alabama

State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,

89 L.Ed. 1725 65 S.Ct. 1384 (1945); Gilligan v. Mor-

gan, 418 U.S. 1, 37 L.Ed. 2d 407, 98 S.Ct. 2440

(1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 2d 154,

92 S.Ct. 2318 (1972); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974). Because

there was a basis for denying liability on the part of

the private taxi company defendants which is not at

issue, any decision on the state action defense by this

Court would be merely advisory.

This Court does not decide issues ‘‘unless absolutely

necessary to a decision of the case.’ United States

v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567, 1 L.Ed. 2d 568,

77 S.Ct. 529 (1957). There is no such necessity here.

Because the Supreme Court “‘has frequently repeated

that federal courts are without power to decide ques-

tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the

case before them,”’ North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.

244, 30 L.Ed. 2d 413, 92 S.Ct. 402 (1971), the petition

does not present a case or controversy.

II. Because State Regulation Which Established “‘A

Clearly Articulated And Affirmatively Expressed

State Policy’’ Showing ‘“‘The Legislature Contem-

plated The Acts Complained Of’’ Without The Sub-

sequent Amendment Which Validated And Confirmed

The Contracts Complained Of, The Petition Presents

Nothing Of Importance

There are not special and important reasons for

granting a writ of certiorari here. This case does not

present a situation where the decision of the Court

of Appeals is in conflict with another Court of Appeals

on the same matter, and a federal question has not

been decided by the Court of Appeals in a way that

is in conflict with applicable decisions of this court.

Sup. Ct. R. 17. For these reasons alone, the

Petitioners’ Writ should be denied.

The Petitioners’ argument that a writ of certiorari

should be issued is based on the lower Court’s ref-

erence to language in a 1983 amendment to the Texas

Municipal Airport Act. According to Petitioners, this

reference indicated that the lower court had applied

a retroactive rather than prospective test. The

Petitioners attempted to use the same amendment in

the trial court to argue that during the period before

the 1983 Amendment, a “‘regulatory void’’ had existed

in which no governmental entity had any authority

to regulate taxi service at the airport. The argument

was rejected on the basis that ‘‘[t]he opposite is true,”’

and the lower Court held that “[tJhis clarifying leg-

islation does not suggest that no power to regulate

existed before its enactment.” Woolen v. Surtran

Taxicabs, 801 F.2d 159, —_(5th Cir. 1986).

There was direct regulation of taxicab service at

the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport, by the State

of Texas, both before and after the 1983 amendments

referred to by petitioners. A review of the applicable

acts set forth in the Statement Of The Case estab-

lishes that extensive state regulation existed through-

out the period in which the respondent taxicab

companies served the Regional Airport.

The Texas Municipal Airport Act gave cities which

jointly owned an airport outside their limits the same

authority to regulate taxicabs at such airport as they

had to regulate taxicabs in their city limits. The Re-

gional Airport Board therefore had extensive author-

ity to regulate taxicabs at the Regional Airport. The

provisions of the Texas Motor Bus Act gave the Texas

Railroad Commission extensive regulatory authority

over taxicabs or vehicles for hire which operated on

state highways from the Regional Airport. This reg-

ulation determined who could serve, the terms of this

service, and the rates charged. All these regulations

were enforced by a criminal penalty for a violation.

The conclusion by petitioners that a retroactive test

was utilized is based on a misconstruction of what

the lower court held and a disregard for what the

record reflects regarding applicable legislation. There

is no language in the opinion of the lower court which

states that a retroactive rather than prospective test

may be applied in any antitrust analysis. The refer-

ence to the subsequent amendment was viewed as

nothing more than confirmation that “the legislature

contemplated the kind of action complained of.’’ The

fact that the lower court expressly referred to the

amendment as “clarifying legislation’’ establishes that

this was not something new. In fact, the lower court

stated that the amendment relied upon by petitioner

“does not suggest that no power to regulate existed

before its enactment.”

At best the dispute turns on a factual analysis of

whether there was or was not sufficient statutory

regulation before the amendment referred to, and this

dispute is not sufficient for certiorari. United States

v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 45 S.Ct. 496, 69 L.Ed. 925

(1925); Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 714 104 S.Ct. 1318,

79 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1984). This case is identical to Jn-

dependent Taxicab Drivers’ Employees v. Greater

Houston Transportation Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.)

cert. denied, __ U.S. —_ (1985), in- all important re-

spects, and the denial of certiorari in that case in-

dicates certiorari should be denied in this case.

CONCLUSION

As to the private taxi company respondents, there

is no justifiable controversy. In the unlikely event that

all the points petitioners raised were resolved in

petitioners’ favor, petitioners would still not be en-

titled to relief as to the private taxi company

respondents. The lower court’s opinion is correct. It

follows the decisions of other circuit courts as well

as this Court’s decisions. The petition ignores appli-.

cable state statutes and misconstrues the lower court’s

decision in an attempt to interject some question of

importance in this matter when none exists. The

petition should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

STAN MCMuRRY

RAIN HARRELL EMERY YOUNG & DOKE

4200 RepublicBank Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 754-9484

Attorneys for Respondents

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC.,

YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC. AND

FORT WoRTH CAB & BAGGAGE Co., INC.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.