Appendix — Hobson v. Connecticut

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86 = 78. | +e:

IN THE | NOV 22 1986

SUPREME COURT OF THE unrrbo SER ES |

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

NO.

GLADYS HOBSON,

Petitioner

V.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

JOHN R. WILLIAMS,

SUE L. WISE

WILLIAMS AND WISE

265 Church Street

New Haven, CT 06510

Counsel for Petitioner

November 20, 1986

ee ee:

(i)

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A (Connecticut Appellate

Court Decision)....... la-32a

APPENDIX B- (Judgment of Superior

[trial] Court) ...se2s. 1b—5Sb

APPENDIX C (Order Denying Petition

for Certification to

Appeal to the Connec-

ticut Supreme Court).. lc-2c

APPENDIX D (Defendant's Motion

to Suppress Physical

ES. 4 6 ss ae ka we es ld-3d

t ie seaers oe ee eo

la

APPENDIX A

ae ae ee A Oe eee ae ee

June Term, 1986

STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. GLADYS HOBSON

HULL, SPALLONE and BEILUCH, Js.

Argued February 14, 1986-decision released

June 24, 1986

Substitute information charging the

defendant with the crime of larceny in the

third degree, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New

Haven and tried to the jury before Quinn,

J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from

which the defendant appealed to this

court. No error.

John R. Williams, for the appellant

(defendant).

Paul M. Scimonelli, assistant state's

2a

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were

Arnold Markle, state's attorney, and Julia

DiCocco Dewey and Paul J. Devlin,

assistant state's attorneys, for the

appellee (state).

HULL, J. After a trial to a jury, the

defendant was convicted of larceny in the

third degree violation of General Statutes

§53a-119(8) and §53a-124./ In this appeal

from that judgment, she claims that the

ij

“General Statutes §53a-119(8) provides

in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of

larceny by receiving stolen property if he

receives, retains, or disposes of stolen

property knowing that it has probably been

stolen or believing that it has probably

been stolen, unless the property is

received, retained or disposed of with

purpose to restore it to the owner."

General Statutes §53a-124(a) provides

in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of

larceny in the third degree when he

commits larceny as defined in section

53a-119 and: (1) The value of the property

Or service exceeds one thousand dollars."

3a

trial court erred in three respects: (1)

in refusing to suppress the fruits of two

searches of her home; (2) in failing to

declare a mistrial because of alleged jury

misconduct; and (3) in denying her motion

for judgment of acquittal based on

insufficiency of the evidence. We find no

error.

When ruling on the defendant's motion

to suppress, the trial court could

reasonably have found the following vice.

In September of 1982, officer John Dattilo

of the New Haven police department

obtained a warrant authorizing a search of

the defendant's Hazel Street home for

drugs which Dattilo believed were being

sold by one of the defendant's adult sons

4a

who lived with her.* While executing that

warrant, Dattilo observed many articles of

clothing of differing sizes, some with

store tags still attached, various kinds

of consumer goods, including stereo

equipment, five television sets, cameras,

projectors and numerous pieces of jewelry.

Because of the quantity and diversity of

goods, Dattilo suspected that some of the

merchandise was stolen. He therefore

recorded the serial numbers of several of

the items and through a later computer

check determined that two of them, a Sony

television set and handgun, had been

reported stolen. Based on this

information, Dattilo obtained a second

warrant authorizing him to search the

*is a result of the search, narcotics

and paraphernalia were discovered.

5a

defendant's home and person and to seize

the television and the gun.

On October 7, 1982, accompanied by

other officers including Francis Cacioli,

the detective in the New Haven police

department who was in charge of the theft

recovery unit, Dattilo entered the

defendant's house to execute the warrant.

In addition to seizing the two items

listed in the search warrant, the officers

took approximately 148 other articles they

reasonably believed might be stolen. In

an attempt to determine whether any of the

additional items was in fact stolen, the

police put them on display at headquarters

and invited members of the public to view

them. Several individuals identified

items as their property, and the defendant

6a

was charged with larceny of those items

and of the television set and the gun. At

trial, the defendant moved to suppress the

television set, the gun and the other

objects, claiming that both searches were

invalid and that the items seized were,

therefore, the inadmissible fruits of an

illegal search. The trial court denied.

the motion.

The defendant's first claim on appeal

is that the police, by looking for the

serial numbers on the television set and

the gun, conducted a search of those

items.° She argues that this search was

. =

“The defendant does not challenge the

search of her home, nor could she since

the first warrant authorized the police to

search the entire home for narcotics and

paraphernalia. Rather, it is the "search"

of the gun and the television which the

defendant claims was unlawful on the first

visit.

7a

unlawful because the warrant under which

the police entered her home authorized

them to search only for drugs and drug

paraphernalia, an undertaking which one of

the police officers who conducted the

search conceded would not be aided by

looking for the serial numbers.

To challenge the legality of a search,

a defendant must first show that he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the

area searched. State v. Daay, 5 Conn.

App. 496, 498, 500 A.2d 248 (1985). The

defendant here made no such showing as to

the gun or the television set. She did

not claim at the suppression hearing’

either that she owned or that she pos-

A

“While there was no testimony at the

suppression hearing concerning the

defendant's interest in the television, at

trial the defendant claimed to own the

television set. We note that even had the

8a

sessed the television set and the gun

"although [s]he could have doe so without

running the risk of having that testimony

defendant made the requisite showing that

she had an expectation of privacy in the

television set and the gun, she would not

have prevailed. The basis of the

defendant's claim as to the gun is that

the police moved the television set from

the wall to record its serial number and

by so doing searched it. We disagree.

Our Supreme Court has recognized that

"when a police officer comes upon evidence

in open view, that discovery is not a

search at all." (Footnote »mitted.) State

v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 56, 425 A.2d

916 (1979). Here, the police officers saw

the television set in open view in the

defendant's bedroom while they were

executing a valid search warrant.

Accordingly, their discovery of the

television did not constitute a search.

Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the

officer did not conduct a search of the

television merely by moving it away from

the wall. The defendant's claim as to the

gun is similar: that the police searched

the gun by looking for its serial number.

There was, however, no testimony at the

suppression hearing as to where the serial

number on the gun was located.

Accordingly, there was no basis for the

trial court to determine whether or not

the items had been searched by the police.

9a

used to prove [her] guilt of the [larceny]

charge. Simmons v. United States, 390

0.8.. 377,. 394, @8 8.Ct. 967, 19 b. Ba. 26

1247 (1968)."> State v. Haynes, 7 Conn.

App. 550, 553, A.2d (1968).

Accordingly, she has not shown that she is

entitled to challenge any "search" of the

television set or of the gun, and we,

therefore, reject her claim that the trial

court erred in refusing to suppress the

gun and the television.°

i~<4

“The trial court did not base its

ruling on the defendant's motion to

suppress on a finding that the defendant

did not have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the gun and the television. We

are free, however, to sustain the trial

court's decision on grounds different from

those it adopted. Johnny Cake, Inc. v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296,

301,,429 A.2d 883 (1980).

The defendant also claims that the

police "searched" other items by looking

for their serial numbers, and thereby

unlawfully exceeded the scope of the

warrant. She has not, however, provided

10a

The defendant next claims that by

seizing 148 items in addition to the two

authorized by the warrant, the police,

during their second search of her home,

conducted a general search in violation of

the fourth amendment to the United States

constitution and article 1, §7 of the

Connecticut constitution. The state con-

tends that the seizure of these items was

lawful under the plain view doctrine.

"""(W)here a police officer has a

warrant to search a given area for

specified objects, and in the course of

an adequate record for the court to

determine the merits of this claim. While

there was testimony at the suppression

hearing that the police copied down serial

numbers from many items, there was no

testimony as to where the serial numbers

were located. Accordingly, we cannot

determine whether any search of those

items occurred, and cannot, therefore,

determine the merits of the defendant's

claim.

lla

the search comes across some other article

of incriminating character, the property

is seizable under the plain view

doctrine." United States v. Pacelli, 470

Pian 67, 70 {2G Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

Spe wees ees, 9S S.Ct. 1501, 36 L. Ed. 2d

178 (1973), citing Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. e643, 465, 514-16, 91

ee Meee. «ae te, EG. 24564 (1971).'

United States v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269,

274 (2d Cir. 1975).”" State v. Pepe, 176

Comms 7a, *9, £05 A.20 51 (1978). The

plain view doctrine may be invoked to

validate the seizure of contraband or

stolen goods not mentioned in a warrant

7 ee

where two requirements are satisfied:

=

‘There has been extensive dispute in

the United States Supreme Court; see Texas

w= meee Gee Us. 730, 103 &.Ct. 1535, 75

L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29

l2a

(1) the initial intrusion which enabled

the police to view the items was lawful;

and (2) the police had probable cause to

believe that the times were contraband or

stolen goods.® Ga, #3

Here, the first precondition for

application of the plain view doctrine was

fulfilled. The police had a legitimate

prior justification for being in a posi-

L. Ed. 2g 564 (1971); over whether a third

reguirement, that the police discover the

items inadvertently, snould be applied.

While this area has not been definitively

resolved, it is clear that in Connecticut

"inadvertence is not required if the items

seized fall under the category of

contraband, stolen property or objects

dangerous in themselves." State v.

Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 547, 482 A.2d 300,

cert. denied, 469 U.S. » i035 S.Ct.

967, .83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1984).

Where the seized object is evidence,

as opposed to contraband, the police must

have probable cause to believe that it was

"reasonably related, in an evidentiary

sense, to the commission of the crime."

State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 41, 425

A.2d 560 (1979).

l3a

tion to view the merchandise: they were

executing a valid warrant to search for

and seize the television set and the gun.

Whether or not the requirements for

applying the doctrine were met, therefore,

turns on whether there was probable cause

to believe that the seized items were

stolen. Probable cause to believe that

goods are stolen exists when there is

enough trustworthy information supporting

that proposition that a person of

reasonable caution would be justified in

believing it. See State v. Asherman, 193

Gonn. 695, 705, 478 A.2d 227, cert.

denied, 0.8. , 103 S. Ct. 1749, 84

L. Ed. 2d 814 (1984). "The quantum of

evidence necessary to establish probable

cause exceeds mere suspicion, but is

substantially less than that required for

l4a

conviction." State v. Acquin, 187 Conn.

647, 657, 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert.

denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 &.Ct. 3570, 77

L. Ed. 2d 1411 (1983).

In addition to the television set and

the gun, the state introduced into

evidence several other items which were

seized during the second search of the

defendant's home: a pocket watch, a cameo

pin, a bracelet, an earring, some coins, a

creamer, a sugar bowl, a gravy ladle and

accompanying tray, and a ring. When the

police seized these items, they had

extensive information to support their

hypothesis that they were stolen. Before

the police went into the defendant's home

to execute the first warrant, they had

probable cause to believe that narcotics

were being sold from the home, and in fact

15a

when they entered the home on that

occasion, they found narcotics ad

narcotics paraphernalia. They knew, on

the basis of their training and

experience, that stolen clothing and

consumer goods are often accepted in lieu

of cash as payment for drugs, and they saw

large quantities of such items in the

defendant's home: stacks of designer jeans

in different sizes, a rack containing

articles of clothing that still had store

tags attached to them, stereos, cameras,

television sets and several pieces of

jewelry. When the police entered the home

to execute the second warrant, having the

information gained from the first search

in mind, they again found similar objects

present. They also discovered a couple of

trash bags full of silverware and similar

l6a

objects, some with initials or inscrip-

tions which did not refer to the defendant

or her sons. Also present was a case of

exerciser equipment, and a fur ccat with

initials that did not match those of any

of the occupants of th2 house.

"Our cases have made clear that

'{t]here is often a fine line between mere

suspicion and probable cause, and "[t]hat

line necessarily must be drawn by an act

of judgment formed in light of the

particular situation and with account

taken of all the circumstances." Brinegar

v. United States, [338 J.S. 160, 176, 69

S§.Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)].° State

v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 155-56, 384

A.2d 356, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98

$.Ct. 2237, S36 Lb. 8. 24 64604 (1976) .*

State v. Acquin, supra, 657. Here, the

17a

evidence available was sufficient to cross

this line and provide the police with

probable cause to believe that the

articles were stolen.

In light of these factors, we accept

the state's contention that the technical

requirements for invocation of the plain

view doctrine were satisfied. There is,

however, an additional limitation to

application of the doctrine: it may not be

used to permit a general or exploratory

search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.8. 443, 466, 91 &.Ct. 2022, 29 &. Ba. 26

564 (1971); State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn.

23, 40, 425 A.2d 560 (1979). The

application of the doctrine to validate

the seizure of some of the articles found

in the defendant's home would have such an

effect. Here, the second warrant was

18a

extremely precise, authorizing the seizure

of only two specified articles: the gun

and the television. In spite of this, and

even though they found the television and

the gun in the defendant's bedroom where

they knew the articles had previously been

located, the police searched several other

rooms of the house, including the attic.

As a result of the search of the attic,

the police discovered and seized the

creamer, sugar bowl, and the gravy ladle

and its tray. In searching for and

seizing these items, the police ignored

the limits of the warrant and thereby

conducted a general or exploratory search

in violation of the prohibition on

unreasonab searches and seizures in both

our state and federal constitutions.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in

19a

refusing to suppress these items.

The trial court correctly determined

that the items seized from the defendant's

bedroom should not be suppressed. The

police had a warrant authorizing them to

seize the television and the gun, and they

knew that the gun and television were

previously located in the defendant's

bedroom. The police, therefore, had

authority to enter the defendant's bedroom

and search that room to the extent

necessary to fina the gun and the

television. While lawfully present in the

defendant's room the police saw, in open

view on or around the defendant's dresser,

the pocket watch, pin, bracelet, earring,

coins and ring. They had, as discussed

above, probable cause to believe that

those items were stolen. Accordingly,

20a

under the plain view doctrine, the police

were entitled to seize those items. State

v. Pepe, supra, 79.

Having determined that the trial court

should have suppressed the gravy ladle,

tray, sugar bowl and creamer, we must

decide what remedy should be awarded to

the defendant. To prove the defendant

committed larceny in the third degree, the

state was required to show that he value

of the stolen items she received or

retained exceeded $1000. General Statutes

§53a-124. To establish the value of the

stolen items, the state elicited testimony

from Joseph Pari, an auctioneer and

appraiser. Pari testified that the market

value of the television set when stolen

was approximately $400. He estimated that

the combined value of the other items

2la

taken from the defendant's bedroom,

exclusive of the television and the gun,

was approximately $542.65. He testified

that the combined value of the four items

taken from the attic was approximately

$80. Stephen Prindle, the owner of a gun

store, testified that the market value of

the gun on October 7, 1982, was

approximately $100. Given this evidence,

the jury could reasonably have concluded

that the combined fair market value of the

items legally seized was over $1000 a

required to sustain a conviction under

General Statutes §53a-124. Had the court

properly suppressed the bowl, creamer,

ladle and tray, the jury would have been

allowed to consider the value of only the

television, gun, watch, pin, bracelet,

earring, coins and ring which the state's

22a

experts testified was approximately

$1042.65.” Accordingly, even had the

trial court properly suppressed the items

found in the attic, there would still have

been sufficient evidence from which the

jury could have found that the defendant

committed larceny in the third degree. we

conclude, therefore, that the trial

court's error-was harmless.

The defendant next claims that the

trial court erred in denying her motion

for mistrial based on alleged juror

misconduct. Before the close of evidence,

——While the defendant asserted that the

television and the gun_ should be

suppressed as the fruits of the unlawful

first search, she did not claim, nor could

she claim given the warrant, that the

seizure of the television and the gun was

unlawful independent of the first search.

Since we have rejected the defendant's

argument as to the first "search," we find

no basis for suppressing the television

and the gun now.

23a

while an argument was being made with the

jury absent, defense counsel claimed to

have heard someone in the adjoining jury

deliberation room shout that "It's a one

of a kind earring. She remembers what it

was, "19 After the incident occurred,

defense counsel moved for a mistrial, and

the court denied the motion and noted the

defendant's exception. The defendant now

claims that any premature juror

deliberation requires reversal if the

jurors did more than merely refresh their

memory of the evidence. We reject the

defendant's argument.

In State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419,

14

~ The comment apparently referred to

the testimony of one of the state's

witnesses in which she related that her

home had been burglarized and also

described some of the articles, including

an earring, which had been taken.

24a

429, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980), our Supreme

Court held that “it is error of

constitutional magnitude for the trial

judge expressly to instruct the jurors

that they may discuss the case among

themselves prior to its submission to them

- »« « « Accord State v. Castonguay, 194

Conn. 416, 434, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). In

this case, however, the trial court did

not expressly allow the jurors to

deliberate prematurely. In fact, it

affirmatively told them not to. Where a

trial court does not authorize the jury to

deliberate prematurely, a finding of error

is not automatic. In such circumstances,

"(t]he test is ‘whether or not the

misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to

the extent that he has not received a fair

trial.' United States v. Klee, [494 F.2d

2sa

Seecosee -ceun Car. 1974)].° State v.

McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 77, 444 A.2d 896

(1982). Here, there is no indication that

the fairness of the defendant's trial was

in any way affected by any premature

deliberation. "A trial court has a large

measure of discretion in dealing with a

motion for a mistrial; State v. Martinex,

7s comm. 342, 544, 378 A.2d 517 (1977);

and its decision as to the fairness of the

trial must be afforded great weight."

State v. McCall, supra, 77. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the defendant's motion for

mistrial.

The defendant claims that the state

failed to prove two of the elements of the

crime of larceny beyond a reasonable

doubt: that the defendant possessed the

26a

stolen items, and that she possessed them

knowing that they were probably stolen.

"Appellate review of such a claim requires

us to undertake a two step analysis. 'We

first review the evidence presented at the

trial, construing it in the light most

favorable to sustaining the jury's

verdict. We then determine whether, upon

the facts thus established and the

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the

jury could reasonably have concluded that

the cumulative effect of the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.' State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574,

$76, 500 a.2d $39 (1985)." State v.

Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352, 503 A.2d 566

(1986). Applying this standard, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to support the jury's verdict.

27a

The defendant first challenges the

sufficiency of the state's proof that she

possessed the stolen items. "In criminal

law, the word ‘'possession' generally

denotes ‘'"an intentional control of a

designated thing accompanied by knowledge

of its character." [Citation omitted.]'

State v. Harris, i159 Conn. $21, $31, 271

A.2d 74 (1970), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S.

1015, 91 8.Ct. $78, 27 tsa BA. 26 630

[1971]; see Webster, Third New

International Dictionary." State v. Kas,

171 Conn. 127, 130, 368 A.2d 196 (1976).

The evidence presented at trial, construed

in the light most favorable to sustaining

the verdict, showed that the defendant

owned and lived in the house from which

the items were seized. She admitted to

possessing, in fact she claimed to own,

28a

the television’ which was found in her

bedroom. As discussed above, the pocket

watch, pin, bracelet, earring, coins and

ring were also fund in the defendant's

bedroom, as was the gun. The objects were

on top of her dresser or in the dresser

area. The jury can hardly be deemed to

have engaged in speculation by concluding

that the defendant possessed items that

were found out in the open in her own

bedroom. +} The defendant was not merely

present in the home when the objects were

found; see id.; she owned the home and she

+ Be |

~~Generally, when faced with a claim

of insufficient evidence, we review the

evidence as presented at trial since if

the evidence as presented were

insufficient to support a guilty verdict,

then "the state would be barred by double

jeopardy principles from retrying the

defendant, and [she] would be entitled to

a judgment of acquittal rather than a new

trial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.

1, 98 §.Ct. 2141, 37 te wee ee eee”

29a

lived there. See State v. Chisolm, 165

Coon, @23, 84, 328 A.2€ 677 (1973)

(evidence that defendant possessed

narcotics found in locked bin in basement

insufficient where defendant did not live

on premises and where state did not show

that tenants of premises did not have

access to the bin).

The defendant's final claim is that

the state did not produce sufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that she possessed the items knowing

they were probably stolen. We disagree.

State v. Grant, 6 Conn. App. 24, 32, 502

A.2d 945 (1986). Here, however, we do not

need to review the sufficiency of the

evidence as to the defendant's possession

of the items seized from the attic since

we have already determined that they

should have been suppressed and even

without those items there was sufficient

evidence that the value of the property

exceeded $1000.

30a

"To convict a defendant of the crime of

receiving stolen goods, it is necessary

for the state to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he had actual knowledge that

the goods were stolen when he received

them. State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543,

546, 95 A.2d 695 [1953]; State v. Newman,

127 Conn. 398, 400, 17 A.2d 774 [1940].

Ordinarily, guilty knowledge can be

established only through an inference from

other proved facts and circumstances. The

inference may be drawn if the

circumstances are such that a reasonable

man of honest intentions, in the situation

of the defendant, would have concluded

that the property was stolen." State v.

Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d

581 (1961). Given the quantity,

diversity, and condition of the consumer

3la

goods, jewelry and clothing present in the

home, a reasonable man of honest

intentions would have concluded that the

items were stolen. The jury, therefore,

could infer that the defendant had the

requisite actual knowledge that the goods

were probably stolen. Additionally, we

note that possession of recently stolen

property "raises a permissible inference

of criminal connection with the property,

and if no explanation is forthcoming, the

inference of criminal connection may be as

a principal in the theft, or as a receiver

under the receiving statute, depending

upon the other facts and circumstances

which may be proven." State v. Palkimas,

153 Conn. $55, 559, 229 A.2@ 220 (1966).

The trial court did not err in denying the

32a

defendant's motion for judgment of aquit-

tal.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges

concurred.

lb

APPENDIX B

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NO. CR6-211459 SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

Vs. NEW HAVEN

GLADYS HOBSON DECEMBER 2, 1983

Present, Hon. Francis R. Quinn, Judge.

JUDGMENT.

The information of an Assistant

State's Attorney, within and for the

Judicial District of New Haven, charging

Gladys Hobson with the crimes of Larceny,

2nd Degree by possession and Larceny, 3rd

Degree by possession, and Theft of a

firearm, and a substituted information

charging said Gladys Hobson with the

crimes of Larceny, lst Degree, by

possession and Theft of firearm, as by

informations on file will appear, were

2b

filed in the Superior Court, Geographical

Area 6 in the September, 1982 criminal

term of said Court, and thence to October

15, 1982 when said action was transferred

to this Court, and thence to November 2,

1982 when the defendant filed a Motion for

appointment of Special Public Defender,

which the Court (Fishman, J.) on said date

granted and appointed Francis D'Urso

Special Public Defender, and when the

defendant appeared before this Court and

for pleas said Not Guilty to both counts

of said substituted information and

elected to be tried by a jury of 6, thence

to October 18, 1983 when the State

Attorney, with permission of the Court

filed a second substituted information

charging Larceny, 3rd Degree, and thence

to October 18, 1983 when the State

3b

Attorney, with permission of the Court

filed a second substituted information

charging Larceny, 3rd Degree, and thence

to October 20, 1983 when the Court (Quinn,

J.) granted in part and denied in part the

Motion of the defendant filed October 19,

1983 for discovery and inspection, and

thence to October 24, 1983 when the Court

(Quinn, J.) granted the Motion of the

defendant filed October 19, 1983 to

require notice of uncharged misconduct

evidence and granted the Motion of the

defendant filed October 19, 1983 in limine

to establish fair procedures for the

examination of witnesses and statements,

and on said October 24, 1983 the Court

(Quinn, J.) granted the Motion of the

defendant filed October 19, 1983 for

production at trial, and on said date the

4b

Court (Quinn, J.) denied the Motions of

the defendant filed October 19, 1983 to

dismiss and to suppress physical evidence,

and when the defendant filed a Motion in

limine- re: testimony concerning

narcotics, which the Court on said date

(Quinn, J.) granted, and thence to October

26, 1983 when the State filed a list of

stolen items to be offered at trial, and

thence to October 28, 1983 when the

defendant filed a Motion for judgment of

acquittal, and when all the evidence

having been submitted, said action was

committed to the jury who returned a

verdict of Guilty as charged to count one

of said second substituted information,

which verdict was accepted and ordered

recorded by the Court, and when the

defendant filed a Motion for new trial,

5b

and thence to the present time when the

parties appeared and were heard by the

Court on said Motions for acquittal and

for new trial, and when the Court denied

said Motions, and the defendant appeared

for sentence.

Whereupon it is adjudged that the

defendant be committed to the Commissioner

of Correction for a term of three years,

suspended after service of one year, and

placed on probation for three years.

By the Court

Chief Clerk.

le

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NO. PSC-86-1020

State of Connecticut

Vv.

Gladys Hobson

ORDER OF PETITION FOR

CERTIFICATION TO APPEAL

On consideration of the petition by

the defendant for certification to appeal

from the Appellate Court (8 Conn. App. 13)

it is hereby ordered that said petition

be, and the same hereby is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

zc

Dated: September 24, 1986

9-24-86

Notice to:

Clerk, Superior Court, New Haven,

CR6-121459

Clerk, Appellate Court

Arnold Markle, S.A.

Robert Devlin, A.S.A.

Julia DiCocco Dewey, A.S.A.

Paul M. Scimonelli, S.D.A.S.A.

Williams & Wise

John R. Williams in support of petition.

mlv

ld

APPENDIX D

NO. CR6-211459

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPERIOR COURT

VS. : J. D. OF NEW HAVEN

GLADYS HOBSON : OCTOBER 24, 1983

MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States

Constitution, the defendant moves that:

1. The Sony television set and Colt

handgun seized from her house on October

7, 1982, be suppressed on the ground that

the warrant authorizing the seizure of

these items was the fruit of an illegal

search and seizure conducted on the

premises on September 24, 1982.

2. All items not listed in the search

warrant dated October 6, 1982, and seized

on October 7, 1982, be suppressed on the

following grounds:

a. The seizure of these items was not

authorized under a search warrant;

b. The seizure of these items fell

within no exception to the warrant

requirement.

3. All testimony pertaining to these

items be suppressed.

THE DEFENDANT

BY

JOSEPH G. BRUCKMAN

Her Attorney

3d

ORDER

The foregoing motion having been

considered this 24th day of October, 1983,

it is hereby DENIED

ORDERED:

Service certified per Practice Book