Appendix — Minnesota v. Berndt
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25 1986
IN THE
pPUPTeIne VUUlL, Vids
EILED
\ JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
RK
Supreme Court of the Gnited
October Term, 1986
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Respondent.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
THOMAS L. JOHNSON
Hennepin County Attorney
VERNON E. BERGSTROM
Chief, Appellate Section
Hennepin County
Attorney’s Office
BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Assistant Hennepin
County Attorney
Hennepin County
Attorney’s Office
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
(612) 348-8794
Counsel of Record
Attorneys for Petitioner
LS
224-7631 - Review Publishing Ce, 257 E. 6th St., St. Paul, Minn. 55101 — 224-7631
APPENDIX INDEX
Appendix A—Order, Opinion and Judgment of the
Minnesota Supreme Court ;
Appendix B—Opinion and Judgment a Siananate
Supreme Court... .. sh are age eat oan eee |
Appendix C—Order and aiiaitieaitinan of the Henne-
Re Be ae. re
Appendix D—Motion for Order Directing District
Court to Deliver Trial Court Exhibits to Minnesota
i one errs pel na hase’ seat ;
Appendix E—Motion to Accept Photo Mieneenticns
of State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 .
Appendix F—(State’s Exhibit 18) .
Appendix G—(State’s Exhibit 19). .........
Appendix H-—Letter of John R. cick and Ceeitabie
Appendix I—Petition for Rehearing .
Appendix J—Transcript Excerpts of Ward Mahlen’ 8
ES ore ME Sar cl IN, ln b fasdtnl es terse Ora 9 sd
Appendix K—tTranscript Excerpts of Fire Marshal
Jerry Pedlar’s Testimony | aig.
Appendix L—tTranscript nisi of James Carl-
son’s Testimony
Appendix M—Transcript ieee of Deinihildin
Bhatt’s Testimony |
Appendix N—Transcript Sine of Richard Ton-
tarski’s Testimony .
Appendix tn Peennietas Rieiateind of ualienaney ian
taining to Gasoline Odor
Appendix P—Transcript Excerpts of Fire ‘Marshal
Bruce Ryden’s Testimony
Page
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App. Al
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Appellant.
ORDER
The court, having considered en banc the State’s petition
for rehearing as well as four motions of the State in connec-
tion therewith,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The original opinion in this case filed March 21, 1986
is hereby withdrawn.
2. The attached opinion which is identical to the original
y. «8 One exception replaces the original. That exception is:
(a) The last three complete sentences on page 7 of
the original slip opinion which read:
Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s life
insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota
where she was employed. He was not even a named
beneficiary on this policy. Berndt was surprised to
learn that the other policy would pay off a car loan.
are deleted and in their stead is inserted:
App. A2
Appellant was not named beneficiary on his wife’s
life insurance policy furnished as an automatic benefit
by the State of Minnesota where she was employed.
Berndt was surprised to learn that the other policy
would pay off the car loan.
3. In all other respects, the petition of the State for rehear-
ing is denied.
4. The four motions of the State entitled “Motion for
Clarification of Conditions of Release,’ ‘Motion for Oral
Argument on Petition for Rehearing,” “Motion to Order Trial
Court to Deliver Exhibits,” and “Motion to Accept Photo Re-
productions of State’s Exhibits” are each denied.
5. No attorney fees incurred by either party in connection.
with the petition for rehearing and/or the supportive motions
are allowed.
Dated: August 29, 1986.
By the Court:
GLENN E. KELLEY
Associate Justice
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
Hennepin County Kelley, J.
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Appellant.
App. A3
Filed August 29, 1986. Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk of Ap-
pellate Courts.
SYLLABUS
State failed to meet its burden to establish the guilt of an
accused, convicted of eight counts of first-degree murder,
when the convictions rested on circumstantial evidence which
was consistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt.
Reversed.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
OPINION
Kelley, Justice.
Orville Berndt appeals from his conviction on eight counts
of first degree murder arising out of the deaths of his wife,
her two sons by a previous marriage, and the son of his wife
and himself. All four perished in a fire in August 1981 at the
family duplex home in Brooklyn Center. On appeal, Berndt
claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the con-
victions.' We agree. Accordingly, we reverse.
On August 20, 1981, appellant Orville Berndt lived in a
townhouse residence in Brooklyn Center with his wife,
Brenda; their son, Corey, age 3-1/2; and Brenda’s sons,
Richard Gage, age 13; and Michael Gage, age 10. Early in the
evening after work on August 20, Berndt and his wife went to
consult with their automobile insurance agent to obtain in-
surance coverage on a recently acquired used car. After com-
pleting that business, the couple first visited two bars, and
later ended up at the Earle Brown Bowl, ostensibly to cele-
brate the car purchase. They remained there, drinking beer
1In addition to raising the insufficiency of the evidence issue, ap-
pellant has alleged violation of discovery rules, an unconstitutional
search, and deprivation of a fair trial. Our disposition makes it
unnecessary to address those issues.
App. A4
and visiting with others until shortly before 1 a.m., August
21. During the course of the evening, in addition to the beer,
Berndt also imbibed two shots of tequila, and smoked some
marijuana. Witnesses who observed the Berndts that night
observed no arguments or altercations between them, and
described everyone there as having a good time.
When the couple arrived home, appellant, who had not eaten
an evening meal after work, fixed himself something to eat.
Thereafter, he smoked a cigarette with Brenda, laid down on
the couch, and eventually fell asleep while watching television.
Brenda was apparently in the room with him. The three
children were sleeping upstairs. Suddenly appellant was
awakened, by whom or what he is not sure, but he saw flames
by the dining room window. The house was extremely hot and
full of smoke. Brenda appeared to be heading through the
dining room toward the kitchen area.? Appellant was con-
fused; he panicked, and then ran out the front door. Shortly
afterwards, the house burst into flames.
As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor heard
him screaming for the fire department. The authorities were
immediately called. While waiting for the fire fighters, ap-
pellant tried to douse the fire with a garden hose.
Police Officer Adams was the first official on the scene.
At the time he arrived, the second story was not burning.
Both Adams and appeliant searched for a ladder to attempt
to save the children on the second floor. The search proved
fruitless.
2 Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused as to what
action Brenda had taken. In general, however, in each version, he
indicated Brenda was heading into the dining room while he pan-
icked and ran from the house because of the heat and smoke.
App. A5
When fire fighters eventually arrived,* appellant was ex-
tremely vocal, and voiced his indignation and ire at what he
considered an exorbitant lapse of time before fire fighters
responded to the alarm. He acted in a hysterical manner,
shouting obscenities at the fire fighters and police. His actions
so interfered with the fire fighters, they decided to remove
him from the scene. Berndt then was transported in a police
squad car to his sister’s house in Maple Grove by Police Officer
Adams.
Adams remained with appellant in Maple Grove until he
was ordered by Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar
to bring Berndt to the Brooklyn Center Police Department
for interrogation. Pedlar had been at the fire scene early.
From his observation of the fire’s unusual and rapid accelera-
tion, he concluded it might have had an intentional origin.
Pedlar ordered Officer Adams to treat Berndt as an arson
suspect during the return ride to Brooklyn Center because
appellant was the only surviving family member.
At approximately 6 a.m., Adams and appellant arrived at
the Brooklyn Center Police Station. Immediately after arrival
at the police station, Berndt spent approximately 45 minutes
in private with a minister, Chaplain Bodin, who informed
him of the deaths of members of his family and counseled him.
Thereafter, Pedlar, a Brooklyn Center Police Department
detective, and two deputies from the Hennepin County Sher-
iff’s office jointly questioned appellant. They informed him
that they suspected he had intentionally set the fire because
of the rapid spread of the fire and because he was the only
family survivor. After being given the Miranda warning and
3The time lapse between the alarm and the response of the fire
fighters is in dispute—the evidence ranges from 5 minutes to a
half hour.
App. A6
after agreeing to talk, Berndt related the events of the pre-
vious evening leading up to his discovery of the fire and his
escape from the burning house. Following this police inter-
view, a blood sample was taken from appellant at North
Memorial Medical Center. Medical testimony at the trial
indicated that appellant’s blood alcohol level at the time of
the fire could have been as high as .12 or .13 percent.
At all times during the early morning hours of August 21,
Berndt wore the clothing he had continuously worn since
returning home from work the previous evening. At the fire
scene, a neighbor woman, seeking to solace Berndt, hugged
him. She detected no odor of gasoline on his person. Officer
Adams was in close proximity to appellant during the drive
in a closed police squad car from Brooklyn Center to Maple
Grove and back, but he noted no odor of gasoline on Berndt
or his clothing. Chaplain Bodin, who had counseled Berndt for
approximately 45 minutes at the police station, detected no
odor of gasoline on appellant or his clothing. None of the
interrogating officers at the Brooklyn Center Police Depart-
ment, who were investigating what they considered an in-
cendiary fire, testified to the existence of a gasoline odor on
appellant. Trained fire and arson investigators suspecting the
use of a fire accelerant to commit arson undoubtedly would
be very conscious of the existence of such odors. Hospital tech-
nicians who drew Berndt’s blood to analyze his blood alcohol
level must have been in close proximity with appellant. The
state, however, offered no testimony from any hospital per-
sonnel on the existence of a gasoline odor on Berndt. Finally,
experienced police and fire investigators did not confiscate
appellant’s clothing.
From August 21 to August 24, 1981, arson investigators
collected 26 physical samples from the remains of the Berndt
App. A7
townhouse. These included wood cuttings, pieces of carpeting,
and viny] tile. Investigators also videotaped and photographed
areas inside the townhouse. Later these samples were analyzed
by the use of gas chromatography. The state’s analyst con-
cluded that five of the samples indicated the ies of an
accelerant—most probably gasoline.+
Other witnesses testified that to ignite a fire which would
exhibit the burning characteristics of the Berndt fire would
require the use of at least 5 gallons of gasoline. The state
theorized these 5 gallons had been carefully poured throughout
the townhouse, up the stairs and around the children’s bed-
rooms, to insure a fatal conflagration. Had the gasoline been
poured throughout the house in the manner hypothesized by
the state, it is clear the pouring would have been just before
ignition or otherwise its presence would have been obvious to
Brenda through her senses of sight and smell. Of course, if
she had been unconscious as the result of a fracture or con-
cussion, such observation might have been impossible. How-
ever, notwithstanding the severe burning of her body, the
4 At the trial, and in post-trial proceedings, the completeness and
validity of the tests performed by the state’s expert analyst were
matters of considerable dispute.
The state's hypothesis, based substantially on the testimony of
the test results by its expert, was that the fire had been set by
using gasoline as an accelerant. In corroboration of its theory, the
state had other evidence that a fire exhibiting the characteristics
of the Berndt fire could not have been accidentally ignited through
faulty electrical connection, a smoldering cigarette, ignition of
carpeting, etc. Appellant, to the contrary, presented testimony that
the fire was a “flash back” fire. A flash back fire is created when
a fresh supply of oxygen, such as a door opening, reignites a
smoldering fire or a build-up of gases, and the resulting fire
flashes back across a room. Because the state’s case relies so
heavily on the premise that a gasoline accelerant was employed,
for the purpose of this opinion we examine the record to ascer-
tain if any nexus exists between appellant and any gasoline.
App. A8&
Hennepin County medical examiner was able to determine
that prior to the fire Brenda had not suffered any major
type of injury prior to her fire death.°®
Even if the state’s theory is assumed correct, there is no
explanation how someone like Berndt, who, after a day’s work,
has spent an evening drinking and smoking marijuana, and
who had an estimated blood alcohol content at the time of the
fire of .12 or .13 percent, could have carefully poured gasoline
throughout the townhouse in the intricate pattern posited
by the state without spilling some of it on his person or
clothing. The odor of spilled gasoline on skin or clothing is
not easily eliminated. Yet, no witness—lay, police, or fire
fighter—smelled any gasoline odor at the fire scene. Nor did
any witness that morning smell the odor of gasoline on Berndt
outside the burning building, in the squad car, in the police
interrogation room or, apparently, at the hospital.
Furthermore, the record is completely devoid of any testi-
mony or other evidence that Berndt had acquired 5 gallons of
gasoline. No showing exists that Berndt ever purchased gas-
oline by container, or that he ever possessed a gas can. No
evidence was produced that any person residing in the town-
house project area was missing any gasoline nor any con-
tainer.
Within a very short time after arriving at the fire scene,
authorities suspected appellant had torched the home. Al-
though police and fire officials essentially had exclusive con-
trol of the fire remains for at least four days after the fire,
they found no containers which could have held the gasoline
used as an accelerant, nor did they find siphoning equipment
5 Because of burns to her head and face, he could not positively rule
out a blow to the face or head, but no fractures were ascertained
nor any other evidence of trauma to the head observed.
App. A9 —
to link Berndt to this fire. Notwithstanding the absence of
such tools, the state, by pure speculation, theorized either that
(1) appellant had stolen the gas from the caretaker’s supplies,
or (2) appellant had siphoned the gas from cars in the park-
ing lot, or (3) the reason no gas can or siphoning equipment
was found was that in all probability Berndt had thrown it
into a garbage dumpster which had been unloaded the morn-
ing after the fire.
All three of those contentions were purely speculative with
no factual basis. The caretaker testified that none of his gas-
oline was missing. There was complete absence of any evi-
dence to substantiate the claim appellant had siphoned gas
from parked cars. Though a dumpster had been unloaded the
morning of the fire, absolutely no evidence existed that ap-
pellant had thrown anything into it. In sum, nothing in the
evidence justifies an inference establishing a nexus between
appellant and the gasoline—at least 5 gallons of it—used to
accelerate the townhouse fire.
In a first-degree murder prosecution, the state has no
burden of establishing a motive for the crime. Nonetheless, if
. the state can establish a credible motive, credibility is lent
to the state’s contention that the accused committed the crime.
The state in this case sought to establish a motive by intro-
ducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship with Brenda,
in particular, his propensity to flirt and be promiscuous, In-
cidents in corroboration of this contention occurred long be-
fore the fire date. Moreover, appellant did not deny the
incidents, but contended those problems had been resolved
well before the fire. No evidence rebuts that assertion. Sec-
ondly, the state sought to raise a financial motive by introduc-
ing evidence of two insurance policies totaling $33,900 on
Brenda’s life. Appellant was not named beneficiary on his
App. Al0
wife’s life insurance policy furnished as an automatic benefit
by the State of Minnesota where she was employed. Berndt
was surprised to learn that the other policy would pay off the
car loan. A reading of the trial record leaves us with the
firm impression that the state failed to establish a credible
motive for causing Brenda’s death. No motive at all was
established for the deaths of the children.
Absent any direct evidence connecting appellant with gas-
oline or any other kind of accelerant, it is clear that appel-
lant’s conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.
We recognize that normally a jury is in the best position to
evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime
and that the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference. See
State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986) and State v.
Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985). However, as we
have previously stated:
The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-
titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence
so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.
State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1982) (citing
State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919
(1971); State v. Kaster, 211 Minn. 119, 121, 300 N.W. 897,
899 (1941)). See also State v. Ngoc Van Vu, 389 N.W.2d 892,
898 (Minn. 1983); State v. Threinen, 328 N.W.2d 154, 156
* Admission of evidence of the kind and nature used to suggest a
motive for the alleged killings is generally discretionary with the
trial court. However, in this case arguably there may have been
an abuse of discretion. A reading of the record leaves us with a
firm impression that the jury's verdict may well have been tainted
by such evidence. Jury members may have convicted Berndt be-
cause they were offended by his morals.
App. All
(Minn. 1983); State v. Gibbons, 305 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn.
1981); State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Minn. 1978).
Except for the fact that appellant was physically present
in his home when the fire started, there exist no other cir-
cumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of guilt. To
the contrary, substantially all of the circumstances are con-
sistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. It is not
rational to infer that, after a day’s work and long hours of
drinking and partying, with a blood alcohol content sufficient
to make him legally under the influence of alcohol, appellant
could slosh 5 gallons of gasoline around the townhouse with-
out almost inevitably spilling some of the gas on himself or
his clothing. Yet, no witness, most of whom were in close
proximity to him that morning, detected a gasoline odor about
his person or clothing, even though authorities almost imme-
diately suspected that he was an arsonist.
Nevertheless, the state contends that the Berndt fire was
started and accelerated by the use of gasoline. The bodies of
three children had high levels of carbon monoxide—a fact
that is inconsistent with the state’s theory, but is consistent
with the defense theory of a flashback fire. Likewise, the
autopsy report on Brenda was more consistent with appel-
lant’s theory than with that of the state.
Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in
panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the conten-
tion is irrational because appellant would have been injured
had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence appellant
had singed hair on the left side of his body, and that all the
skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown and peeled off a
few days after the fire.
The state’s theory with respect to the alleged motive for
killing Brenda appears to be without rational basis. Though
App. Al2
admitting that in the years before the fire there had been
problems between himself and Brenda because of his alleged
philandering, the evidence was unrebutted that those disagree-
ments had been ironed out long preceding the fire. The un-
contradicted evidence was that appellant loved the boys and
enjoyed their company. There exists no consistency, in the
light of that undisputed fact, with the state’s claim that ap-
pellant spread gasoline at the door of the children’s bedroom—
including that of his own son.
The state’s entire case was bottomed on mere speculation
or upon hypothesized “facts” not in evidence. Notwithstanding
the absence of even a scintilla of evidence from any lay or
professional witness of any concussion, blow, or fracture to
Brenda’s head, the state urged the jury to speculate that
Berndt and his wife had fought that evening, resulting in a
blow to Brenda’s head sufficient to render her unconscious.
The state produced evidence which, if credited by the jury,
would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire had been
ignited with the use of a gasoline accelerant. About all the
state produced to show appellant was the culprit was sus-
picion unsupported by facts. Some circumstances proved were
consistent with the state’s claim of an intentional fire, but
other circumstances proved were generally consistent with
the rational hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.
The state’s burden was to prove the arson-murders beyond
a reasonable doubt. Here, the state failed to meet that burden.
The circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a ra-
tional hypothesis other than guilt.
Accordingly, the convictions are reversed.
App. Bl
APPENDIX B
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
Hennepin County Kelley, J.
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Appellant.
Filed August 29, 1986. Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk of Ap-
pellate Courts.
SYLLABUS
S.ate failed to meet its burden to establish the guilt of an
accused, convicted of eight counts of first-degree murder,
when the convictions rested on circumstantial evidence which
was consistent with a rationa! hypothesis other than guilt.
Reversed.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
OPINION
Kelley, Justice.
Orville Berndt appeals from his convictions on eight counts
of first degree murder arising out of the deaths of his wife,
her two sons by a previous marriage, and the son of his wife
and himself. All four perished in a fire in August 1981 at the
family duplex home in Brooklyn Center. On appeal, Berndt
App. B2
claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the con-
victions.' We agree. Accordingly, we reverse.
On August 20, 1981, appellant Orville Berndt lived in a
townhouse residence in Brooklyn Center with his wife,
Brenda; their son, Corey, age 3-1/2; and Brenda’s sons,
Richard Gage, age 13; and Michael Gage, age 10. Early in the
evening after work on August 20, Berndt and his wife went to
consult with their automobile insurance agent to obtain in-
surance coverage on a recently acquired used car. After com-
pleting that business, the couple first visited two bars, and
later ended up at the Earle Brown Bowl, ostensibly to cele-
brate the car purchase. They remained there, drinking beer
and visiting with others until shortly before 1 a.m., August
21. During the course of the evening, in addition to the beer,
Berndt also imbibed two shots of tequila, and smoked some
marijuana. Witnesses who observed the Berndts that night
observed no arguments or altercations between them, and
described everyone there as having a good time.
When the couple arrived home, appellant, who had not eaten
an evening meal after work, fixed himself something to eat.
Thereafter, he smoked a cigarette with Brenda, laid down on
the couch, and eventually fell asleep while watching television.
Brenda was apparently in the room with him. The three
children were sleeping upstairs. Suddenly appellant was
awakened, by whom or what he is not sure, but he saw flames
by the dining room window. The house was extremely hot and
full of smoke. Brenda appeared to be heading through the
1In addition to raising the insufficiency of the evidence issue, ap-
pellant has alleged violation of discovery rules, an unconstitutional
search, and deprivation of a fair trial. Our disposition makes it
unnecessary to address those issues.
App. B3
dining room toward the kitchen area.2 Appellant was con-
fused; he panicked, and then ran out the front door. Shortly
afterwards, the house burst into flames.
As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor heard
him screaming for the fire department. The authorities were
immediately called. While waiting for the fire fighters, ap-
pellant tried to douse the fire with a garden hose.
Police Officer Adams was the first official on the scene.
At the time he arrived, the second story was not burning.
Both Adams and appellant searched for a ladder to attempt
to save the children on the second floor. The search proved
fruitless.
When fire fighters eventually arrived,’ appellant was ex-
tremely vocal, and voiced his indignation and ire at what he
considered an exorbitant lapse of time before fire fighters
responded to the alarm. He acted in a hysterical manner,
shouting obscenities at the fire fighters and police. His actions
so interfered with the fire fighters, they decided to remove
him from the scene. Berndt then was transported in a police
squad car to his sister’s house in Maple Grove by Police Officer
Adams.
Adams remained with appellant in Maple Grove until he
was ordered by Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar
to bring Berndt to the Brooklyn Center Police Department
for interrogation. Pedlar had been at the fire scene early.
From his observation of the fire’s unusual and rapid accelera-
tion, he concluded it might have had an intentional origin.
2 Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused as to what
action Brenda had taken. In general, however, in each version, he
indicated Brenda was heading into the dining room while he pan-
icked and ran from the house because of the heat and smoke.
%The time lapse between the alarm and the response of the fire
fighters is in dispute—the evidence ranges from 5 minutes to a
half hour.
App. B4
Pedlar ordered Officer Adams to treat Berndt as an arson
suspect during the return ride to Brooklyn Center because
appellant was the only surviving family member.
At approximately 6 a.m., Adams and appellant arrived at
the Brooklyn Center Police Station. Immediately after arrival
at the police station, Berndt spent approximately 45 minutes
in private with a minister, Chaplain Bodin, who informed
him of the deaths of members of his family and counseled him.
Thereafter, Pedlar, a Brooklyn Center Police Department
detective, and two deputies from the Hennepin County Sher-
iff’s office jointly questioned appellant. They informed him
that they suspected he had intentionally set the fire because
of the rapid spread of the fire and because he was the only
family survivor. After being given the Miranda warning and
after agreeing to talk, Berndt related the events of the pre-
vious evening leading up to his discovery of the fire and his
escape from the burning house. Following this police inter-
view, a blood sample was taken from appellant at North
Memorial Medical Center. Medical testimony at the trial
indicated that appellant’s blood alcohol level at the time of
the fire could have been as high as .12 or .13 percent.
At all times during the early morning hours of August 21,
Berndt wore the clothing he had continuously worn since
returning home from work the previous evening. At the fire
scene, a neighbor woman, seeking to solace Berndt, hugged
him. She detected no odor of gasoline on his person. Officer
Adams was in close proximity to appellant during the drive
in a closed police squad car from Brooklyn Center to Maple
Grove and back, but he noted no odor of gasoline on Berndt
or his clothing. Chaplain Bodin, who had counseled Berndt for
approximately 45 minutes at the police station, detected no
odor of gasoline on appellant or his clothing. None of the
interrogating officers at the Brooklyn Center Police Depart-
App. B5
ment, who were investigating what they considered an in-
cendiary fire, testified to the existence of a gasoline odor on
appellant. Trained fire and arson investigators suspecting the
use of a fire accelerant to commit arson undoubtedly would
be very conscious of the existence of such odors. Hospital tech-
nicians who drew Berndt’s blood to analyze his blood alcohol
level must have been in close proximity with appellant. The
state, however, offered no testimony from any hospital per-
sonnel on the existence of a gasoline odor on Berndt. Finally,
experienced police and fire investigators did not confiscate
appellant’s clothing.
From August 21 to August 24, 1981, arson investigators
collected 26 physical samples from the remains of the Berndt
townhouse. These included wood cuttings, pieces of carpeting,
and viny] tile. Investigators also videotaped and photographed
areas inside the townhouse. Later these samples were analyzed
by the use of gas chromatography. The state’s analyst con-
cluded that five of the samples indicated the presence of an
accelerant—most probably gasoline.*
4 At the trial, and in post-trial proceedings, the completeness and
validity of the tests performed by the state’s expert analyst were
matters of considerable dispute.
The state’s hypothesis, based substantially on the testimony of
the test results by its expert, was that the fire had been set by
using gasoline as an accelerant. In corroboration of its theory, the
state had other evidence that a fire exhibiting the characteristics
of the Berndt fire could not have been accidentally ignited through
faulty electrical connection, a smoldering cigarette, ignition of
carpeting, etc. Appellant, to the contrary, prescnted testimony that
the fire was a “flash back” fire. A flash back fire is created when
a fresh supply of oxygen, such as a door opening, reignites a
smoldering fire or a build-up of gases, and the resulting fire
flashes back across a room. Because the state’s case relies so
heavily on the premise that a gasoline accelerant was employed,
for the purpose of this opinion we examine the record to ascer-
tain if any nexus exists between appellant and any gasoline.
App. B6
Other witnesses testified that to ignite a fire which would
exhibit the burning characteristics of the Berndt fire would
require the use of at least 5 gallons of gasoline. The state
theorized these 5 gallons had been carefully poured throughout
the townhouse, up the stairs and around the children’s bed-
rooms, to insure a fatal conflagration. Had the gasoline been
poured throughout the house in the manner hypothesized by
the state, it is clear the pouring would have been just befare
ignition or otherwise its presence would have been obvious to
Brenda through her senses of sight and smell. Of course, if
she had been unconscious as the result of a fracture or con-
cussion, such observation might have been impossible. How-
ever, notwithstanding the severe burning of her body, the
Hennepin County medical examiner was able to determine
that prior to the fire Brenda had not suffered any major
type of injury prior to her fire death.®
Even if the state’s theory is assumed correct, there is no
explanation how someone like Berndt, who, after a day’s work,
has spent an evening drinking and smoking marijuana, and
who had an estimated blood alcohol content at the time of the
fire of .12 or .13 percent, could have carefully poured gasoline
throughout the towi..:ouse in the intricate pattern posited
by the state without spilling some of it on his person or
clothing. The odor of spilled gasoline on skin or clothing is
not easily eliminated. Yet, no witness—lay, police, or fire
fighter—smelled any gasoline odor at the fire scene. Nor did
any witness that morning smell the odor of gasoline on Berndt
outside the burning building, in the squad car, in the police
interrogation room or, apparently, at the hospital.
5 Because of burns to her head and face, he could not positively rule
out a blow to the face.or head, but no fractures were ascertained
nor any other evidence of trauma to the head observed.
App. B7
Furthermore, the record is completely devoid of any testi-
mony or other evidence that Berndt had acquired 5 gallons of
gasoline. No showing exists that Berndt ever purchased gas-
oline by container, or that he ever possessed a gas can. No
evidence was produced that any person residing in the town-
house project area was missing any gasoline nor any con-
tainer.
Within a very short time after arriving at the fire scene,
authorities suspected appellant had torched the home. Al-
though police and fire officials essentially had exclusive con-
trol of the fire remains for at least four days after the fire,
they found no containers which could have held the gasoline
used as an accelerant, nor did they find siphoning equipment
to link Berndt to this fire. Notwithstanding the absence of
such tools, the state, by pure speculation, theorized either that
(1) appellant had stolen the gas from the caretaker’s supplies,
or (2) appellant had siphoned the gas from cars in the park-
ing lot, or (3) the reason no gas can or siphoning equipment
was found was that in all probability Berndt had thrown it
into a garbage dumpster which had been unloaded the morn-
ing after the fire.
All three of those contentions were purely speculative with
no factual basis. The caretaker testified that none of his gas-
oline was missing. There was complete absence of any evi-
dence to substantiate the claim appellant had siphoned gas
from parked cars. Though a dumpster had been unloaded the
morning of the fire, absolutely no evidence existed that ap-
pellant had thrown anything into it. In sum, nothing in the
evidence justifies an inference establishing a nexus between
appellant and the gasoline—at least 5 gallons of it—used to
accelerate the townhouse fire.
In a first-degree murder prosecution, the state has no
burden of establishing a motive for the crime. Nonetheless, if
App. B8
the state can establish a credible motive, credibility is lent
to the state’s.contention that the accused committed the crime.
The state in this case sought to establish a motive by intro-
ducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship with Brenda,
in particular, his propensity to flirt and be promiscuous. In-
cidents in corroboration of this contention occurred long be-
fore the fire date. Moreover, appellant did not deny the
incidents, but contended those problems had been resolved
well before the fire. No evidence rebuts that assertion. Sec-
ondly, the state sought to raise a financial motive by introduc-
ing evidence of two insurance policies totaling $33,900 on
Brenda’s life. Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s
life insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota where
she was employed. He was not even a named beneficiary on
this policy. Berndt was surprised to learn that the other policy
would pay off a car loan. A reading of the trial record leaves
us with the firm impression that the state failed to establish
a credible motive for causing Brenda’s death.*° No motive at
all was established for the deaths of. the children.
Absent any direct evidence connecting appellant with gas-
oline or any other kind of accelerant, it is clear that appel-
lant’s conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.
We recognize that normally a jury is in the best position to
evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime
and that the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference. See
State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986) and State v.
6 Admission of evidence of the kind and nature used to suggest a
motive for the alleged killings is generally discretionary with the
trial court. However, in this case arguably there may have been
an abuse of discretion. A reading of the record leaves us with a
firm impression that the jury’s verdict may well have been tainted
by such evidence. Jury members may have convicted Berndt be-
cause they were offended by his morals.
App. B9
Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985). However, as we
have previously stated:
The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-
titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence
so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.
State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1982) (cing
State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919
(1971); State v. Kaster, 211 Minn. 119, 121, 300 N.W. 897,
899 (1941)). See also State v. Ngoc Van Vu, 339 N.W.2d 892,
898 (Minn. 1983); State v. Threinen, 328 N.W.2d 154, 156
(Minn. 1983) ; State v. Gibbons, 305 N.W.2d 331i, 336 (Minn.
1981) ; State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Minn. 1978).
Except for the fact that appellant was physically present
in his home when the fire started, there exist no other cir-
cumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of guilt. To
the contrary, substantially all of the circumstances are con-
sistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. It is not
rational to infer that, after a day’s work and long hours of
drinking and partying, with a blood alcohol content sufficient
to make him legally under the influence of alcohol, appellant
could slosh 5 gallons of gasoline around the townhouse with-
out almost inevitably spilling some of the gas on himself or
his clothing. Yet, no witness, most of whom were in close
proximity to him that morning, detected a gasoline odor about
his person or clothing, even though authorities almost imme-
diately suspected that he was an arsonist.
Nevertheless, the state contends that the Berndt fire was
started and accelerated by the use of gasoline. The bodies of
three children had high levels of carbon monoxide—a fact
that is inconsistent with the state’s theory, but is consistent
App. B10
with the defense theory of a flashback fire. Likewise, the
autopsy report on Brenda wa more consistent with appel-
lant’s theory than with that of the state.
Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in
panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the conten-
tion is irrational because appellant would have been injured
had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence appellant
had singed hair on the left side of his body, and that all the
skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown and peeled off a
few days after the fire.
The state’s theory with respect to the alleged motive for
killing Brenda appears to be without rational basis. Though
admitting that in the years before the fire there had been
problems between himself and Brenda because of his alleged
philandering, the evidence was unrebutted that those disagree-
ments had been ironed out long preceding the fire. The un-
contradicted evidence was that appellant loved the boys and
enjoyed their company. There exists no consistency, in the
light of that undisputed fact, with the state’s claim that ap-
pellant spread gasoline at the door of the children’s bedroom—
including that of his own son.
The state’s entire case was bottomed on mere speculation
or upon hypothesized “facts” not in evidence. Notwithstanding
the absence of even a scintilla of evidence from any lay or
professional witness of any concussion, blow, or fracture to
Brenda’s head, the state urged the jury to speculate that
Berndt and his wife had fought that evening, resulting in a
blow to Brenda’s head sufficient to render her unconscious.
The state produced evidence which, if credited by the jury,
would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire had been
ignited with the use of a gasoline accelerant. About all the
state produced to show appellant was the culprit was sus-
App. Bll
picion unsupported by facts. Some circumstances proved were
consirtent with the state’s claim of an intentional fire, but
other circumstances proved were generally consistent with
the rational hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.
The state’s burden was to prove the arson-murders beyond
a reasonable doubt. Here, the state failed to meet that burden.
The circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a ra-
tional hypothesis other than guilt.
Accordingly, the convictions are reversed.
App. Cl
APPENDIX C
State of Minnesota District Court
County of Hennepin Fourth Judicial District
D.C. File 80973-01
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
The above matter came before the undersigned sitting by
special appointment as a District Court Judge for determina-
tion of post-trial motion brought on behalf of defendant re-
questing that the court grant a new trial or order judgment
of acquittal pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04(1) (1). Said
motion was continued from time to time for the purpose of
taking testimony of defense expert Robert Davis and conduct-
ing the deposition of state expert Rick Tontarski. All neces-
sary transcripts and memoranda were received by the court
by July 24, 1984.
Daniel F. Byrne, Esq. appeared on behalf of the State of
Minnesota; Craig Cascarano, Esq. appeared on behalf of the
defendant.
Based upon the files, records, depositions, testimony, and
written memoranda of both counsel,
IT IS ORDERED:
App. C2
1. That defendant’s motion for a new trial or for judgment
of acquittal is denied in its entirety.
2. That the attached memorandum shall be construed as
part of this order.
DATED: August 1, 1984
By the Court
DORIS OHLSEN HUSPENI
Acting District Court Judge by
Special Appointment
MEMORANDUM
On November 12, 1983, Orville Berndt, Jr. was convicted
after a jury trial on eight counts of first degree murder in-
volving the death of his wife, their son, and his wife’s two
children by a prior marriage.
The trial lasted several weeks. The State’s theory was that
Berndt poured gasoline throughout the house, ignited the gas-
oline, and then went outside. The State claimed that its theory
was supported by Orville Berndt’s unusual behavior at the
time of the fire, by burn patterns in the house, by the rapidity
of the fire, and by expert testimony that traces of gasoline
were found in some physical samples taken from the fire scene.
Defendant’s motion relates to this last evidence.
At trial the State’s expert, Rick Tontarski, testified exten-
sively that gasoline was found in 5 of 26 samples taken from
the fire scene. He reached this conclusion by analyzing all 26
samples in a gas chromatograph which produces a graphic
representation of a sample called a chromatogram. By match-
ing the sample chromatograms to standard gasoline chromato-
grams, Tontarski concluded that gasoline was present in 5
samples. These results were disputed by the defense expert,
App. C3
Robert Davis. Davis indicated that the 5 so-called positive
chromatograms in fact did not contain gasoline.
Both Tontarski and Davis testified extensively at trial. Both
were: extensively cross-examined. On the last day of trial,
Tontarski was recalled for rebuttal testimony. At that time,
a State’s proposed exhibit (not received) was discovered to be
a chromatogram which had not been made available to defen-
dant through discovery. Tontarski had, in fact, made more
than one chromatogram for each of the 5 samples in which he
had identified gasoline. The additional chromatograms were
in his Maryland laboratory. Prior to trial, he had turned over
to the defense one chromatogram for each positive sample.
Nothing relating to the additional chromatograms was ad-
mitted into evidence at trial. Pursuant to a post-trial motion,
all positive chromatograms were produced for the defense.
Defendant’s motion raises two issues:
1. Whether there was a Rule 9 violation and, if so, would
it mandate a new trial.
2. Whether the additional chromatograms are newly dis-
covered evidence that requires a new trial.
1. Reports of examinations and tests are discoverable by
the defendant without court order:
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose and permit cde-
fense counsel to inspect and reproduce any results or re-
ports of .. . scientific tests, experiments or comparisons
made with the particular case.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01(1) (4). Throughout the discovery stage
of this case, the defense requested Tontarski to produce only
chromatograms regarding the five positive samples. Discovery
of chromatograms taken from the 21 negative samples has
never been an issue and is not an issue in this motion. The
defense claims that it was unaware that more than one chro-
App. C4
matogram was made for each positive sample. Tontarski in-
sists that he informed the defense at some point during dis-
covery that more than one chromatogram existed for each
positive sample. Prior to trial, Tontarski turned over to the
defense the one chromatogram for each positive sample that
he relied upon for making his identification of gasoline. The
other positive chromatograms, while of assistance to Tontar-
ski and while reflecting the presence of gasoline, were merely
preparatory to insure the right sample volume, select the right
amplification setting, or determine the need for clean-up pro-
cedures.
Discovery requests between the defense and prosecution
were not in writing. Therefore it is difficult to determine
whether the discovery request necessarily encompassed all
chromatograms showing evidence of gasoline, or only those
5 chromatograms that Tontarski relied on for his opinion. In
any event, there was no bad faith on Tontarski’s part in not
turning over all the chromatograms.
Rule 9 itself is not helpful in determining the extent of
Tontarski’s obligation to produce, but the principles under-
lying that rule lend guidance. Discovery is intended to give:
both parties the maximum possible amount of informa-
tion with which to prepare their cases and thereby re-
duces the possibility of surprise at trial.
State v. Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1982). In Schwan-
tes, the court reversed a conviction because the prosecutor
failed to disclose evidence it had before trial that was used to
impeach the defendant’s alibi.
This case is very different. Before trial, the defense was
equipped with Tontarski’s conclusions and with the underly-
ing information on which he relied. The preliminary chro-
matograms shed no appreciably brighter light on either his
App. C5
technique or on his ultimate opinions. Unlike Schwantes, any
potential surprise here was minimized by keeping the addi-
tional chromatograms out of evidence. The prosecutor did not
use the information to his advantage. In fact, it was the
| prosecutor who was responsible for calling the entire matter
to the court’s attention. Trial preparation was not seriously
impeded. The defense was not prejudiced.
Even if Rule 9 were violated, it would not necessitate a new
trial, especially since the failure to disclose was in good faith
and was nonprejudicial. See, State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172
(Minn. 1983). To avoid these issues in the future, no doubt
the better procedure would be to put requests in writing.
2. To justify a new trial, newly discovered evidence must
be of a sort that could not have been discovered before trial
by due diligence and that would materially have affected the
outcome of the trial. State v. Meldahl, 310 Minn. 136, 245
N.W.2d 252 (1976); Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04(1). The defense
arguments do not meet this standard.
At the post-trial hearing, Davis testified that the additional
chromatograms showed that Tontarski’s technique was un-
reliable, that Tontarski was operating without standards, that
ordinary building compounds were incorrectly considered, and
that he believed Tontarski’s samples were contaminated. Davis
also expressed the concern that the additional chromatograms
did not closely resemble the chromatograms that were sup-
plied in pre-trial discovery.
Virtually all of these matters were exhaustively dealt with
at trial. The question of standards, specifically a carbon di-
sulphide standard, was explicitly raised at trial. Moreover,
at his deposition Tontarski showed that his file on the case in
fact contained that standard. Davis’ concerns about contam-
ination arose chiefly from the fact that sample containers
i i
App. C6
were punctured to “purge and trap” the contents. He argued
that puncturing may have introduced foreign elements into
the samples. These punctures were quite noticeable in the con-
tainers during trial, so the contamination argument was avail-
able to Davis at that time. In any event, Tontarski testified
at his deposition regarding the safeguards taken to protect
the integrity of the samples. The fact that Tontarski ran no
contro! samples of building compounds in the house, such as
carpeting, also was an issue before the jury. The one concern
most directly related to the belated discovery of additional
chromatograms was that they did not match the chromato-
grams which were turned over to the defense before trial. At
his deposition, Tontarski explained that this was to be ex-
pected since in many instances his equipment was adjusted
or the sample was cleaned of impurities to permit more ac-
curate identification. These adjustments and cleansings would
change the shape of the graph in each chromatogram.
_The post-trial discovery of additional chromatograms pro-
vided no significant opportunities for cross-examination of
Tontarski that did not exist at trial. Their disclosure before
trial would not have made a material difference to the out-
come. For these reasons, the defendant’s motions are denied.
D.O.H.
App. Dl
APPENDIX D
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Petitioner-Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING DISTRICT COURT
TO DELIVER TRIAL COURT EXHIBITS TO
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
To the Supreme Court, State of Minnesota:
This court filed a decision on March 21, 1986, reversing
Appellant’s four convictions for Murder in the First Degree.
Since the filing of this decision, Respondent has learned that
certain trial exhibits which were used at trial to explain the
testimony of the arson experts were never delivered by the
Hennepin County District Court to this court. See Affidavit
of Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, law clerk; Beverly J. Wolfe, at-
torney. Among the exhibits that were not delivered are the
following: State’s Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48 and Defendant’s Exhibit M. See
Index attached to affidavits.
The State respectfully submits that the complicated arson
testimony cannot be adequately understood without reference
to the undelivered exhibits. The State is filing a Petition for
Rehearing in this case along with this motion. It is submitted
that it is essential that this court examine these undelivered
App. D2
exhibits when it considers this Petition. Therefore, Respon-
dent respectfully requests that this court order the district
court to deliver all trial court exhibits in this case to this court.
DATED: April 10, 1986
Respectfully submitted,
BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Assistant County Attorney
Atty. Lic. No. 181751
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Phone : 348-8794
Attorney for Petitioner-
Respondent
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Respondent,
vs.
ORVII.LE BERNDT, JR.,
Appellant.
AFFIDAVIT
State of Minnesota
County of Hennepin—ss.
Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:
1. That she is a law clerk for the State of Minnesota, the
Respondent in the above-entitled matter.
a ee
App. D3
2. That she notified Kim Kuch (297-1904), who works in
the Minnesota Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, on April 1, 1986,
that it was necessary for her to borrow State’s Exhibits Nos.
18 and 19 in the above-entitled manner for the purpose of
reproducing and reducing them to be used in Respondent’s
Petition for Rehearing.
3. That on April 1, 1986, she went to the Clerk’s Office to
pick up those exhibits.
4. That she learned at that time from Kim Kuehn that
State’s Exhibits Nos. 18-25 were not listed on the District
Court’s Index of trial court record and had never been de-
livered to the Supreme Court.
5. That she received from Kim Kuehn a copy of the Index
of the District Court File (see attachment) which showed
that a large number of trial court exhibits were never de-
livered to the Supreme Court.
6. That Kim Kuehn called the Hennepin County District
Court File Room for her and told her that these exhibits are
locked up on B level under the supervision of Jerry Wallner
and that a court order would be necessary to obtain them.
Further your affiant sayeth not.
Dated: April 8, 1986.
SUSAN LYNN-PAUL HAUGE
Law Clerk
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Phone: 348-3607
Law Clerk for Respondent
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of April,
1986. Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public.
Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public-—Minnesota, Ramsey
County, my commission expires Sept. 21, 1990.
App. D4
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Appellant.
AFFIDAVIT
State of Minnesota
County of Hennepin—ss.
Beverly J. Wolfe, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and says:
1. That she is an attorney for the State of Minnesota, the
Respondent in the above-entitled matter.
2. That she learned on April 1, 1986, from her law clerk
Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, that numerous trial court exhibits
in the above-entitled case were never delivered by Hennepin
County District Court to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
3. That in June, 1985, she was absent from work due to
illness and that she spoke by phone with a woman (name
unknown) in the Hennepin County District Court Clerk’s
Office about her borrowing State’s Exhibits No. 35-37 (video
tapes) from the district court file. During this conversation,
she told the woman that because this was a complicated arson
case it was important that all of the trial court exhibits be
delivered to the supreme court. She was told by the woman
that the district court clerk’s office was in the process of pre-
App. D5
paring the exhibits and file for delivery to the supreme court.
4. That to the best of her knowledge, no copy of the trial
court record index was ever sent to her office.
5. That she was under the good faith belief that all the
trial court exhibits had been delivered to the supreme court.
j 6. That she has examined both the exhibits that were not
delivered and the trial transcript and it is her belief that
reference to the exhibits, especially State’s Exhibits Nos. 18
and 19, are necessary to understand the opinions by the State’s
arson experts that Appellant could not have been inside the
townhouse at the time the fire was ignited.
7. That she believes that transmission of these exhibits to
the supreme court is essential in order for this court to under-
stand the points that will be raised in the Petition for Re-
hearing that Respondent will be filing on or before April 10,
1986.
8. That her office has learned from Jerry Wallner of the
Hennepin County District Court Clerk’s Office that an order
by the supreme court is necessary before the district court can
deliver exhibits to the supreme court. —
Further your affiant sayeth not.
Dated: April 8, 1986.
BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Assistant County Attorney
Atty. Lic. No. 131751
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
; Attorney for Respondent
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of April,
1986, Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public.
Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public—Minnesota, Ramsey
County. My commission expires Sept. 21, 1990.
State of Minnesota
County of Hennepin
App. D6
May 14, 1985
District Court
Fourth Judicial District
APPELLATE/SUPREME COURT RECEIPT
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.
No. D.C. No. 80973-1
C2-84-1661
St. Paul, Minnesota
Received of Jack M. Provo District Court Administrator,
Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County, Minnesota, the
original file consisting of:
1. Indictment (Copy)
2.
3. Notice of Prosecuting Attorney of Evidence
10,
11.
FP PSF PT
Indictment (Original)
and Identification Procedure Pursuant to
Rule 7.01
Affidavit
Follow-up Report
Allied Fidelity Bond
Letter Filed
Notice of Motion and Motion
Notice of Motion and Motion
Order
Judgment
Date Filed
08-17-82
08-17-82
08-18-82
09-02-82
09 02-82
09-08-82
11-10-82
11-15-82
03-04-83
11-12-83
App. D7
. List of Possible State’s Witnesses
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion in Limine No. 1
. Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 1
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion in Limine No. 3
Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 3
Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 5
State’s Memorandum
. Letter
. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion in Limine No. 5
Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 2
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
27. Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Guilty Verdict Sheet
Defendant's Proposed Witness List
Criminal Witness List
Jury List
Jury List
Criminal Witness List
Sentence Transcript
. Sentence Transcript
Notice of Motion and Motion
. Order
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-14-83
11-10-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-14-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-16-83
11-17-83
11-18-83
11-25-83
12-09-83
SSR SF SS&
SRAELBRSSSEAS SE
Order
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
New Trial
Memorandum Opposing Motion for New Trial
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
App. D8
Order And Memorandum
Order for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum, Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum
Writ Of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum
Letter
ress
ARFRS RR
PiEEEEEER?
App. D9
85. Filing of Appellant’s Brief
S#RESRE RE SSEAS
No. 7A - 7B
No. 8A - 8C
No. 9A - 91
No. 10A - 10F
No. LIA - 11K
No. 12
No. 13
No. ITA - 17D
No. 26
No. 27 - 30
No. 32-33
EXHIBIT’S
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-03-84
08-01-84
08-20-84
09-24-84
09-14-84
09-14-84
11-19-84
11-19-84
12-10-84
05-13-85
Item
Photo’s
Photo’s
Photo’s
Photo’s
Photo’s
Photo’s
Photo
Photo
Photo’s
Photo
Photo
Life Insurance Check
App. D10
98. No. 34 Life Insurance Policy
99. No. 38-39 Photo
100. No. 40-41 Diagram
101. No. 42-44 Photo
102. No. 35 - 37 Videotape’s
Defendant’s Exhibits: Item
103. A Graph’s
104. B-F Recording Charts
105. J-L Photo’s
106. N4-N53 Graphs
107. O Graph’s
108. P Graph’s
TRANSCRIPT’S
109. Omnibus Hearing 11-19-84
110. Motion 11-19-84
111. Volume III - XVI 11-19-84
112. Post Trial Hearing 04-26-85
in the above entitled cause.
App. El
APPENDIX E
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Petitioner-Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
MOTION TO ACCEPT PHOTO REPRODUCTIONS OF
STATE’S EXHIBITS NOS. 18 AND 19
TO THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MINNESOTA:
The State of Minnesota respectfully requests that this court
accept the State’s photo reproductions of State’s Exhibits
Nos. 18 and 19 and to have them distributed with the Peti-
tion for Rehearing. It is submitted that reference to these
photo reproductions are necessary to understand the State's
Petition for Rehearing.
Dated: April 10, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL RICHARDSON
For BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Assistant County Attorney
Atty. Lic. No. 91388
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Phone: 348-5988
Attorney for Petitioner-
Respondent
App. Fl
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APPENDIX H
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ARSON
INVESTIGATORS, INC.
25 Newton Street
P.O. Box 600
Marlboro, Massachusetts 01752
Telephone (617) 481-5977
April 8, 1986
Bruce Ryden, Fire Marshal
City of Roseville
2660 Civic Center Drive
Roseville, Minnesota 55113
Dear Mr. Ryden:
On Au; st 16, 1985 you filed a formal grievance against
Shelby Gallein with the Ethical Practices and Grievance Com-
mittee of the International Association of Arson Investigators,
Inc. This complaint concerned itself with trial testimony given
by Mr. Gallien in a multiple homicide-arson case that was
tried in Minneapolis.
The Committee has made numerous attempts to locate Mr.
Gallien. These attempts included efforts made by representa-
tives of the Committee to contact him personally, as well as
efforts made by telephone and by mail. All of these attempts
have been unsuccessful to date. The Committee is in receipt
of an unverified report that Mr. Gallien was seriously ill.
The grievance is still pending before this Committee and
efforts to locate Mr. Gallien will continue in order to bring
this matter to a conclusion.
Very truly yours,
JOHN R. LEWIS
Chairman
Ethical Practices and
Grievance Committee
App. H2
COMPLAINT
We, the undersigned, being members in good standing of
the International Association of Arson Investigators, do here-
by respectfully request the Officers & Board of Directors
of the Association consider sanctions as specified in Article
II, Section 7.b. of the Constitution & Bylaws against Mr.
Shelby Gallien, 1324 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette,
Indiana 47906 for violation of the Code of Ethics of the
Association.
The following section of said Code of Ethics are alleged to
have been violated:
1. “I will regard it my duty to know my work thoroughly.
It is my further duty to avail myself of every opportu-
nity to learn more about my profession.”
2. I will make no claims to professional qualification which
I do not possess.
3. I will bear in mind always that I am a truth seeker, not
a case maker. That it is more important to protect the
innocent than to convict the guilty.
Respectfully submitted,
Bruce E. Ryden . William H. Bruen
COMPLAINANTS INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL
The complainants were requested by the fire chief of the
municipality where the fire occurred and the prosecutor to
monitor the trial during the defense expert witness testimony
to offer rebuttal to this expert both to the prosecutor and to
testify if necessary.
Both complainants sat through the 1-1/2 days of direct
testimony and the 1-1/2 days of cross examination, redirect
and recross examination. it is the information obtained during
this period upon which the conplaint is based.
App. H3
BACKGROUND
In August 1981, a fire in a townhouse took the lives of a
mother and her three children. The father, allegedly asleep
on the couch in the living room, awoke to see his wife on the
floor of the dining room and a fire at the ceiling over his
wife. He ran from the house (barefooted) and suffered no
injuries. The wife died instantly of burns of the respiratory
tract and the children of smoke inhalation after they got out
of bed.
An investigation determined that. gasoline like residue was
found in samples of hardwood flooring, vinyl] tile flooring and
from the only piece of carpet left in the living room. AFT
Labs in Washington, D.C. did the analysis.
Classic flammable burn patterns were found at the entrance
to each of the children’s bedrooms, at the bottom of the stair-
way to the second floor, the kitchen floor, living room, around
the wife’s body in the dining room and in the entryway to the
townho.se.
A grand jury was impaneled and returned indictments on
four counts of murder in the first degree and four counts of
arson in the first degree against the father.
The trial was held in Minneapolis during which Shelby
Gallien of 1324 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette, Indi-
ana, testified for the defense. Mr. Gallien testified under direct
examination that he believed there were three possible causes
of the fire and the local investigators did an inadequate job of
investigating due to inexperience. His three possible points
of origin were:
1. Electrical fire in the exterior wall of the kitchen.
2. Frying pan left on kitchen range.
3. Cigarette dropped on carpet by wife next to her body.
App. H4
When asked if the fire could have been due to gasoline being
poured throughout the building and ignited from the outside,
he stated: “Absolutely not’.
Under cross examination, Mr. Gallien withdrew his opinions
as to the electrical origin after being reminied that all re-
ceptacles and switches were removed, examined and found to
have not been involved in the origin of the fire. He also with-
drew the frying pan theory when reminded that the defendant
and the investigators had testified the burners were all in the
off position.
He continued to stick to his theory that a cigarette dropped
on the carpet would melt the carpet back to its petroleum base,
cause the smoke and hot gases to buildup at the ceiling and
“flashback” in a localized area within 1-1/2 hours.
Under redirect examination, Mr. Gallien attempted to re-
fute his testimony under cross examination by saying the
prosecutor put words in his mouth but he (Mr. Gallien) had
in no way attempted to eliminate the possibilities of the elec-
trical or grease fire origins. He was still convinced that those
three points could not be eliminated due to the inadequate
investigation by the local investigators.
Under recross examination, Mr. Gallien’s testimony under
cross examination was read back and he stated, without any
prompting by the prosecutor, “I’ve eliminated the electrical as
a possible point of origin” and later, “I’ve eliminated the fry-
ing pan as a possible point of origin.” The prosecutor stated:
“Now lets get this straight, you originally had three possible
points of origin, first the electrical in the kitchen and you’ve
now eliminated that,” “Yes sir’. “Second, the frying pan on
the stove and you’ve now eliminated that”, “Yes sir’. At that
point both the prosecutor and defense attorney dismissed the
witness.
App. H5
The fire was investigated by members of the local fire de-
partment, the county sheriff department and, on consultation,
the then head of the Minneapolis Arson Squad.
The jury found the defendant guilty of four counts of
murder in the first degree, four counts of arson in the first
degree and he was sentenced to life in prison.
10.
11.
12.
SHELBY GALLIEN
DIRECT TESTIMONY
Claims to have started IAAI and trained, personally,
3,000 to 4,000 arson investigators.
Invented the use of the gas chromatograph in fire in-
vestigation.
Stated that if you do not have melted glass and melted
alum. you do not have an accelerated fire.
Gasoline accelerated fire will reach ‘“2,000° - 2,100° -
2,200°F”’.
Stated copper will melt if it is in an accelerated fire.
Could not light an accelerated (gasoline) fire and get
away without being badly burned.
Stated 1 gallon of gasoline equals 400 lbs. nitroglycer-
ine or 45 lbs. dynamite. Later changed to 85 lbs.
nitro — 54 lbs. dynamite in “footpower’’.
Gave flammable limits for gasoline as 1.75 - 4% in air.
Stated carpet would melt down, pool and leave a gas-
oline like residue.
Heavy soot on windows indicates it could not have been
a gasoline accelerated fire because gasoline burns
hotter and cleaner.
Stated gasoline accelerated fire would have burned
through floor—no burn through—no accelerant.
Explained burn patterns on hardwood floors being due
to hot roof tar dropping on floor. (Totally disregarded
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
App. H6
fact that there was gypsum wallboard and fiberglass
insulation between roof and flooring).
Also gave “floor oil” and heavy wax on floor as ex-
planation for burn patterns.
Stated size of alligatoring is not an indicator of the
speed of a fire.
Sample of floor tile in entryway came in positive for
accelerant. Gallien stated could not have been gasoline
or it would have burned and been consumed.
Was unable to differentiate between BX cable and thin-
wall conduit but stated that if a short had taken place,
a temperature of 4,000, 5,000 or 6,000° would have
melted the “iron” box and splattered molten metal all
over. Arc will continue until box is completely gone.
Dry wall corner beading was not melted because there
was no accelerant. If there had been an accelerant, it
would have melted the aluminum beading. Beading was
actually steel.
Courtroom was too large to have a flashover fire.
Testified the fire was slow starting fire with approx-
imately 1-1/2 hour delay. Smoke and hot gases built-up
to 3’ - 3-1/2’ deep at ceiling and “flashbacked’”’.
“Flashback” type of fire has 4 phases:
Phase 1. Smudge—such as from a cigarette—approx-
imately 1-1/2 hours long.
Phase 2. Heat level at ceiling—3’-5’ deep—flash-
back.
Phase 3. Natural burn.
Phase 4. Natural phase.
Testified “flashback” type of fire will flash down walls
and cause a localized burning in center of floor. Most
intense heat will be in center of the floor.
App. H7
22. Low burning is characteristic of a “flashback” fire.
23.
V patterns will show up in a “flashback” fire.
CROSS EXAMINATION
Mr. Gallien testified that:
1.
“Graduate of OSHA Institute’s course on Industrial
Fire Investigation”, there is no such course at OSHA.
NFPA determines flame spread rates.
Was not familiar with current standard tests on carpet-
ing.
Burn patterns on floors were due to either air currents
from windows or possibly from fire department fog
patterns.
Ordinary steel melts at 2,200°F. - 2,300°F. or 2,400°F.
Chrome steel melts at 2,600°F. - 2,700°F.
A drop of gasoline will fall faster than a drop of tar.
Light bulbs are not indicators that point to the origin
area of a fire.
Cigarettes burn for 22 minutes and will start a fire in
1-1/2 hours if uninsulated.
Carbon Dioxide is flammable in and of itself.
Fires burn without oxygen.
. Gasoline ignition temperature is 4 45°F.
“Flashback” fires can be limited to a very small area
of ceiling of a room.
Natural air drafts cause ruts to be burned in the floor.
REDIRECT
. Difference between 4% and 7.6% upper flammable
limit:
7.6% will be low order explosion—slower.
4% will be high order explosion—faster.
App. I1
APPENDIX I
C2-84-1661
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Petitioner-Respondent,
vs.
ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
WILLIAM R. KENNEDY HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Hennepin County Minnesota Attorney General
Public Defender 102 State Capitol
DAVID KNUTSON St. Paul, MN 55155
Assistant County THOMAS L. JOHNSON
Public Defender Hennepin County Attorney
C-2300 Government Center VERNON E. BERGSTROM
Minneapolis, MN 55487 Chief, Appellate Section
Attorneys for Respondent- By: BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Appellant Assistant County Attorney
Atty. Lic. No. 131751
Phone : 348-8794
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Attorneys for Petitioner-
Respondent
IV.
VI.
App. I2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of the Case. _s_ App. I3
. Summary of Petition... | App. I4
. In Holding That The iii Was Insufficient,
This Court Overlooked And Misconceived Mate-
rial Evidence In The Case. ...-_. _. App. 15
Examination Of The Material Evidence That
Was Overlooked And Misconceived By This Court
Makes Clear That The Evidence Viewed In The
Light Most Favorable To The Verdict Was Suf-
ficient To Sustain The Jury’s Verdicts. . App. I20
Because The Evidence Was Technically Sufficient
To Sustain The Jury’s Verdicts, The Interests Of
Justice Require Either That The Verdicts Be
Reinstated Or That The Case Be Remanded For
yO Pe ee
Conclusion PEO Me eer
App. I3
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 17, 1982, the Hennepin County Grand Jury re-
turned an indictment charging Orville Berndt, Jr., the Re-
spondent-Appellant in this case (hereinafter referred to as
Appellant) with four counts of Murder in the First Degree
in violation of Minn. Stat. §699.185(1) (intentional and pre-
meditated murder) and with four counts of Murder in the
First Degree in violation of Minn. Stat. §609.185(3) (1981)
(intentional murder by arson) for the deaths of his wife
Brenda Berndt, his son Corey Berndt and his wife’s two sons
Michael Gage and Richard Gage. Following Appellant’s pleas
of not guilty to all counts, jury trial commenced before The
Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on October 20, 1983 (T.1).
On November 12, 1983, the jury returned verdicts finding
Appellant guilty of all eight first degree murder counts (T.
2333). Immediately following these verdicts, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to mandatory terms of life imprisonment
for each first degree conviction pursuant to Minn. Stat. §609.-
185(3) and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently
(T.2340-42). Appellant’s remaining four first degree murder
convictions were merged pursuant to Minn. Stat. §609.035
(1981) (T.2342). Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial or
Judgment of Acauittal which was denied by the trial court on
August 1, 1984.
Appellant filed his Brief with this court on May 1, 1986.
The State of Minnesota, the Petitioner-Respondent in this
case, filed its Brief on July 12, 1986. Oral argument was held
before this court on November 7, 1985. On March 21, 1986,
this court filed a decision reversing Appellant’s eight convic-
tions of Murder in the First Degree. See State v. Berndt,
N.W.2d —— (Minn., filed March 21, 1986). From this deci-
sion reversing Appellant’s murder convictions, the State of
App. 14
Minnesota petitions this court for rehearing pursuant to Minn.
R.Civ.App.P. 140.01.
II. SUMMARY OF PETITION
In reversing the jury’s findings that Appellant was guilty
of eight counts of Murder in the First Degree for the deaths
of his family, this court held that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the verdicts. The State respectfully submits that
this court both overlooked critical portions of the evidence put
forth by the State’s arson experts and misconceived material
evidence in the record. The State also submits that when the
evidence that has been overlooked and misconceived is ex-
amined in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented by the State at trial is sufficient to sus-
tain the jury’s verdict.
Finally, it is submitted that the decision demonstrates that
this court reconsidered the weight of the evidence—crediting
testimony rejected by the jury and rejecting testimony
credited by the jury. In doing so this court has departed from
its usual standard of review and has, in effect, acted as a
“thirteenth juror.” Accordingly, pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court holding in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31
(1982), it is respectfully submitted that the interests of jus-
tice require a new trial. Moreover, a new trial would not
merely be a retrying of the same evidence since new evidence
supporting Appellant’s guilt has come to light. This new evi-
dence includes: (1) Appellant’s confession of the murders to
a fellow inmate in April, 1985, and (2) the initiation of dis-
ciplinary actions by the International Association of Arson
Investigators against the defense expert Shelby Gallien based
upon his testimony at Appellant’s trial.
App. I5
III. IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUF-
FICIENT, THIS COURT OVERLOOKED AND MIS-
CONCEIVED MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
The decision in this case demonstrates that this court has
overlooked and misconceived material evidence in this case.
The overlooked and misconceived evidence can be classified
into the following categories. !
A. The Decision Overlooked Material Exhibits and Ma-
terial Arson Expert Testimony.
(1) After this court filed its decision, the State learned
\for the first time that material exhibits that were received
into evidence were never delivered by the district court to this
court.” See Affidavits, reprinted at pp. 13-16 of Petitioner’s
Appendix. Specifically, State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 were
not delivered to the court.* These exhibits show: the layout
of both the first floor (Exhibit No. 18) and the second floor
1]t is respectfully submitted that the decision contains numerous
statements that either overlook conflicting evidence or are based
upon misconceptions of the evidence. For the purposes of this
Petition, the State will note only those statements that were ma-
terial to this court’s holding that the evidence of guilt was insuf-
ficient.
2 The State is filing along with this Petition a separate motion re-
questing an order directing the district court to deliver the ex-
hibits to this court. See Petitioner’s Appendix, pp. 11-12.
3 Due to the significance that State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 have
in the jury’s understanding of the testimony by the arson experts,
the State has had these two exhibits reproduced and is sending
fourteen copies of these exhibits to this court with this Petition.
App. I6
(Exhibit No. 19) of the townhouse (T.403) ;4 the location of
the victims’ bodies (T.410); the location of the suspicious
burn patterns (T.403, 407, 410); and the location from where
the positive gasoline samples were taken (T.414). At page 18,
n. 12 of its Brief, the State specifically referred this court to
Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 in explaining the testimony of its
arson experts. The unavailability of these exhibits has re-
sulted in this court overlooking crucial evidence pertaining
to the sufficiency issue. The jurors’ acceptance of the State’s
arson experts’ opinion that Appellant could not have escaped
from the house without incurring severe bodily harm was
based upon their examination and understanding of these
two exhibits. It is respectfully submitted that this court could
not have concluded that Appellant’s story of escape was ra-
tional or feasible had it examined these exhibits. See Berndt,
slip op. at 2-3.
Other significant exhibits not delivered to the court include
State’s Exhibits Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5. State Exhibit No. 1 shows
where the fire department is located in relationship to Ap-
pellant’s townhouse and where Officer Adams and the neigh-
bors were when they heard an explosion-type noise at 2:45
a.m. (T.53, 316). This exhibit buttresses the testimony by the
State’s witnesses that the fire was a rapidly-spreading fire
4“T” refers to the transcript of the trial that commenced before
The Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on October 20, 1983. The trial
transcript consists of Volumes I-XVI. |
This case also involved numerous pretrial and post trial hear-
ings. Hereinafter, this Petition will refer to the transcripts of
these various hearings as follows:
“O” refers .o the omnibus hearing held before The Honorable
Doris.Ohlsen Huspeni on October 3, 4 and 5, 1983.
“M” refers to the post trial evidentiary hearing held before The
Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on March 21, 1984.
“D” refers to the deposition taken from Richard Tontarski on
May 8, 1984.
App. I7
and that the fire department arrived on the scene within
minutes of the fire being reported. State’s Exhibits Nos. 3,
4, and 5 show where Appellant’s neighbors’ bedroom window
was located and how their observance of the fire outside that
window was inconsistent with Appellant’s claim as to where
the fire was located when it first started (T.241-48, 253-54).
Examination of these exhibits was critical to the jurors’ eval-
uation of the witnesses’ testimony at trial and is necessary
to any appellate review of the jury’s findings.
(2) The court’s acceptance of Appellant’s testimony that
there was an isolated fire in the townhouse prior to his escape
from the house overlooks and misconceives the State’s arson
experts’ testimony. See Berndt, slip op. at 2-3. The State’s
experts testified that the presence and location of gasoline in
the house caused an automatic ignition throughout the first
floor which made the existence of a small isolated fire im-
possible for any period of time. The evidence accepted by the
jury at trial showed that gasoline was spread through the
kitchen, the living room in front of the sofa, the hallway
located between the living room and front door, on the stairs
and near the front entryway. See State’s Exhibit No. 18 (posi-
tive gasoline findings denoted in black ink). The evidence also
showed that the heaviest area of burning was in the living
room and in the area where living room and dining room
meet. See State Exhibit No. 18 (suspicious burn patterns de-
noted in red ink). On the basis of this evidence, the State’s
arson experts ruled out the possibility of a small isolated fire
for any period of time and testified that ignition of the fire
would cause automatic ignition throughout the first floor.
Specifically, the arson background and testimony of these
experts were as follows:
(a) Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar had
extensive experience as both a fire fighter and fire in-
App. I8
vestigator at the time he investigated the fire at Ap-
pellant’s townhouse (T.710-14). He was familiar with
the properties of gasoline and inflammability and had
set 60-80 practice fires involving gasoline (T.717, 859).
Based upon his experience and expertise, Mr. Pedlar tes-
tified that gasoline is “highly volatile’ and that “once
ignition has been made of the area [area with gasoline],
that you get an automatic ignition of the fumes through-
out the entire area’ (T.717, 794).
(b) Sharadchandra Bhatt had a Bachelor’s Degree in
Engineering, a Master of Science Degree with a major in
Industrial Engineering and had taken additional post-
master’s work in the same field at the time he reviewed
the arson evidence in this case (T.922-23). Mr. Bhatt
specifically had experience in testing and investigating
the use of accelerants in fires, including gasoline (T.927).
Mr. Bhatt testified that if there is ignition in an area
containing gasoline, there would be instantaneous com-
bustion of all the gasoline fumes (T.934-35) and it would
not be possible for there to be an isolated fire in the
downstairs area for any significant period of time
(T.935).
(c) Arson consultant James Carlson had been a mem-
ber of the Minneapolis Fire Department for thirty years
where he was a fire investigator for twelve years and
Chief Investigator for an additional five years (T.1061).
Based upon his experience with gasoline fires, Mr. Carl-
son testified that ignition of an area with gasoline results
in “immediate ignition of the entire room” (T.1071) and
that this is a “rapid ignition that happens within a frac-
tion of a second, resulting in a fire” (T.1070).
(3) The decision overlooked and misconceived testimony
by the State’s arson experts that in their professional opinion
App. I9
Appellant could not have escaped the townhouse without suf-
fering serious bodily harm. The decision specifically states.
that:
Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in
panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the con-
tention is irrational because appellant would have been
injured had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence
appellant had singed hair on the left side of his body, and
that all the skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown
and peeled off a few days after the fire.
Berndt, slip op. at 9. This court’s reference to the singeing of
Appellant’s hair and his brown feet demonstrates that it either
overlooked or misconceived the testimony by arson experts
that Appellant could not have run through the entire length
of the first floor without suffering severe bodily harm once
the gasoline was ignited. Specifically, the arson experts tes-
tified as follows:
(1) Fire Marshal Pedlar testified that on the basis of
the burn patterns and the findings of gasoline it was his
professional opinion that Appellant could not have es-
caped from the townhouse in the manner he claims he did
without being burned (T.783-84). Mr. Pedlar was aware
that Appellant had incurred some singeing on his left
hand, forearm and eye lashes when he testified that Ap-
pellant could not have escaped in the manner he claims
he escaped (T.832).
(b) Arson expert James Carlson specifically testified
as follows:
A. [by James Carlson] That under those circum-
stances, it would be impossible for a person to have
been in the room at the time of the ignition of these
App. 110
vapors and escaped without being killed or at least
harmed.
* * *
Q. [by the prosecutor] I say, severely harmed?
A. Yes, severely harmed. [T.1077, emphasis added. ]
Examination of State’s Exhibit No. 18 reveals that gasoline
was present by the sofa, in the hallway and by the front en-
trance (T.548, 549, 743, 744, 749). In order to go from the
sofa to the front door, Appellant would have had to go through
trailers of gasoline that would have already been automatically
ignited. It is respectfully submitted that it is not rational to
conclude that Appellant could have run through the areas of
the most severe burning and only suffer singeing of the hair
on one side of his body and brown feet. Moreover, the testi-
mony of Appellant’s own experts substantiate the State’s ex-
perts’ testimony that someone could not have been in the
center of a gasoline fire at ignition without suffering severe
injury. In support of the defense’s theory that there was no
gasoline in the house, both Robert Davis and Shelby Gallien
testified that a person igniting a gasoline fire under the con-
ditions in this case would either suffer serious injury or be
killed (T.1325-29, 1488-89, 1796, 1918). In relying upon Ap-
pellant’s claim of brown feet as proof that Appellant was
injured, this court overlooked both the fact that there was no
evidence showing that Appellant was treated by a doctor for
his feet (T.1144) and the fact that Appellant waited over six
weeks to tell the police about his feet at which time most of
the alleged brown skin was gone (T.983-84). Also, Appellant
only told the police about his brown feet after they told him
that they thought it would be impossible for him to escape
without injury (T.983).
(4) The decision overlooked testimony by experienced fire
fighters and investigators that it is not unusual to not smell
inl
App. I11
gasoline either at the fire scene or on the person who started
the fire once the gasoline has been ignited. In holding that the
evidence of Appellant’s guilt was insufficient, the decision
placed great weight upon the fact that neither Appellant nor
the fire scene smelled of gasoline after the fire was ignited.
Berndt, slip op. at 6 and 9. But numerous fire fighters and
fire investigators who were experienced in the ignition and
extinguishing of gasoline fires testified that it was not un-
usual to ot smell gasoline fumes once the fire has been
ignited. Specifically, these witnesses testified as follows:
(a) Stanley Owens, a fire fighter for 15-1/2 years
who had staged 45-50 practice fires with gasoline, testified
that it was not common to detect the odor of gasoline at
these practice fires (T.141-42). Instead, he stated that the
predominant odor at these fires was the material that
was burning (T.141-42).
(b) Gary Giving, a fire fighter for 16 years who had
experience in extinguishing approximately a dozen gaso-
line practice fires, testified that he was never able to
detect the odor of gasoline after these practice fires were
extinguished (T.156). He stated that the dominant smell
is “[{h]Jeat, burnt smoke smell” (T.156) and that the smell
of gasoline was only detected prior to ignition (T.165).
(c) Chief Ronald Boman of the Brooklyn Center Fire
Department testified that he had participated in ten to
fifteen practice gasoline fires (T.173). He further testi-
fied that the odor of gasoline was never detectable either
during or after the practice fires (T.173).
(d) Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar testified that from his
experience in setting 60-80 practice gasoline fires, he
knows that it’s possible not to detect the odor of gasoline
at the scene of a gasoline fire (T.774, 847). He testified
App. 112
that in gasoline fires, the gasoline is consumed and the
vapors are burned off during the fire (T.859).
(e) James Carlson testified that even though Appel-
lant was the person suspected of pouring and igniting the
gasoline, the fact that no one smelled gasoline on him was
not unusual (T.1089).
(f) Defense expert Shelby Gallien conceded that it is
possible that other smells such as smoke may “override”
gasoline odors (T.1610).
(5) This court misconceived the significance of Brenda
Berndt’s cause of death. The medical examiner testified that
the low level of carbon monoxide in Brenda Berndt was con-
sistent with a “superheated death” (T.898, 903, 906). A super-
heated death occurs when there is an instantaneous combus-
tion or a very hot fire which damages the victim’s lungs and
causes death before a lethal level of carbon monoxide can be
absorbed by the lungs (T.896). The decision stated that:
Likewise, the autopsy report on Brenda was more consis-
tent with appellant’s theory than with that of the State.
Berndt, slip op. at 9. This statement demonstrates that this
court misinterpreted both Appellant’s theory of an accidental
fire and the significance of Brenda Berndt’s cause of death.
Defense expert Shelby Gallien’s theory about a “flashback”
fire was Dased upon the premise that there was a build-up of
carbon monoxide gasses within the house-to such a level that
the gasses ignited (T.1400-05). Bruce Ryden, the Roseville
Fire Marshal, testified that if the type of “flashback” fire
that Mr. Gallien described had occurred, the build-up of gasses
prior to ignition would cause persons present in the house at
the time of the build-up to die of carbon monoxide poisoning
prior to ignition (T.2112-13). Thus, if a “flashback”’ fire had
occurred, Brenda would have died from inhaling a lethal level
App. 113
of carbon monoxide before the fire ignited rather than from
breathing superheated air. ;
The fact that Brenda died from breathing “superheated”
air is inconsistent with Appellant’s accidental “flashback” fire
theory and is consistent with the State’s evidence showing
that Brenda Berndt’s body was in the path of the gasoline
trailer when it was ignited (T.757). Moreover, the fact that
the boys’ autopsies showed that their lungs contained lethal
levels of carbon monoxide poisoning (T.881-82) is also con-
sistent with the State’s evidence of a gasoline fire. The sus-
picious burn patterns depicted in red ink on State’s Exhibit
No. 19 shows that the boys’ bodies were not directly in the
path of the suspicious burn patterns (T.304, 752). Thus, un-
like their mother, the boys were exposed to the smoke of the
fire but not to its intense heat before their deaths.
(6) The decision incorrectly states that the State’s gas
chromatography analyst “concluded that five of the samples
indicated the presence of an accelerant—most probably gas-
oline.” Berndt, slip op. at 5. The State’s analyst testified wn-
equivocally that the five samples contained gasoline (T.547,
548, 550, 551). He also noted that another sample contained
lighter fluid (T. 574).
(7) The decision incorrectly assumes that the State
claimed Appellant “carefully” poured the gasoline. Berndt,
slip op. at pp. 5 and 6. The State’s experts never testified that
the gasoline must have been carefully spread throughout the
townhouse. Indeed, evidence showing that the gasoline tr: ‘1-
ers varied in width from three to six inches to two feet and
that gasoline was on the kitchen table demonstrates that the
gasoline was not carefully poured (T.389, 775-76). Moreover,
the fact that no one smelled gasoline on Appellant does not
demonstrate that he poured th» «asoline carefully since other
evidence at trial established that the odor of gasoline is often
App. 114
masked by the smoke and other smells once the gasoline is
ignited (T.141-42, 156, 165, 173, 774, 847, 1089). See Part
III.A.(4) of this Petition).
B. The Decision Overlooked and Misconceived Material
Facts Concerning the Events Occurring Immediately
Before and During the Fire.
The decision fails to mention several material facts that
buttresses the State’s evidence showing that the fire was a
gasoline fire ignited by Appellant. Among these excluded facts
are the following:
(1) The decision incorrectly states that:
Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused
as to what action Brenda had taken. In general, however,
in each version, he indicated Brenda was heading into
the dining room while he panicked and ran from the
house because of the heat and smoke.
This statement ignores the fact that on August 21, 1981, the
day after the fire, Appellant told police investigators that
Brenda was upstairs on the night of the fire (T.969, 1183).
It further ignores the fact that even though Appellant sub-
sequently learned that the fire investigators found Brenda’s
body on the first floor, he again told the police on August 27,
1986, that Brenda was upstairs at the time of the fire (T.618,
979, 1184). It was not until October 6, 1981, when Appellant
was informed that gasoline had been found in the townhouse
(T.981), that he told the police that Brenda was on the sofa
with him and that he saw her run into the fire (T.984, 1185).
(2) Appellant was seen walking alone outside his town-
house prior to the fire by an eleven year old boy who lived in
the Georgetown townhouse complex (T.203-07, 781).
(3) The only witnesses who were awake prior to the fire
all testified that they heard an explosion-type noise at the
Oe te i ek
eal. 0 i AN he ne ya
App. 115
time the fire started. Officer Adams and two neighbors in the
nearby Chippewa Park apartments testified that at approxi-
mately 2:45 a.m. they heard a loud noise or “boom” (T.57,
310, 314, 319, 321). The boom caused the windows to shake in
the Chippewa complex (T.314, 321). As State Exhibit No. 1
shows, these four persons were all located within a block of
Appellant’s townhouse when they heard the boom. This evi-
dence supports the evidence showing that the fire was a
rapidly-spreading fire since within ten minutes of hearing
this loud noise, persons from a block away could see that the
townhouse was engulfed in flames (T.61, 315, 321-22). This
evidence also negates the defense’s theory that this was a
slow-starting fire (T.1400).
(4) The decision incorrectly states that when Officer
Adams returned to the scene, “the second story was not burn-
ing.” Berndt, slip op. at 3. On the contrary, Officer Adams
testified that the second story was in flames when he arrived.
Specifically, Officer Adams stated that although he did not
notice any smoke or flames when he left the scene at 2:48
a.m. (T.58), when he returned to the scene at 2:54 a.m.:
Every single window, door, opening of that place had
fire or flames coming out of it besides that one window
[the front window on the second floor]. That was the
only one that didn’t have anything coming out of it.
(T.61).
(5) The decision incorrectly states that “[b]oth Adams
and appellant searched for a ladder to attempt to save the
children on the second floor.” Berndt, slip op. at 3. Appellant
never scarched for a ladder. Only neighbor Tim Crandall and
Officer Adams looked for a ladder (T.62-63, 276). Moreover,
when Officer Adams asked Appellant if there was a ladder,
Appellant told him:
App. 116
There’s no ladder. You’re not going to find any ladder
around here. Besides, even if you did find a ladder, it’s
too late to save them. They’re all dead.
(0.10, T.63-64).
(6) The decision overlooks the fact that not only did Ap-
pellant not make any attempt to save his family (T.1205)
while two of his neighbors made such attempts (T.258-69,
274), he also adamantly refused to help save his family when
he would not tell the police where his wife and the boys were
located inside the house (T.65-66).
(7) The decision’s holding that “[n]o evidence was pro-
duced that any person residing in the townhouse project area
was missing any gasoline nor any container,” Berndt, slip op.
at p. 6, overlooks material evidence. First, the decision in-
correctly states that “[t]he caretaker testified that none of
his gasoline was missing.” Berndt, slip op. at p. 7. The care-
taker testified that Appellant had a key to one of the storage
garages where there was a one-gallon can of gasoline (T.910).
On the morning after the fire, the caretaker examined the
can and saw that it was half empty (T.911). The caretaker
also testified that there was a container in another garage
that contained five gallons of gasoline and that this container
was half empty the morning after the fire (T.911). The care-
taker never stated that none of the gasoline was missing.
Instead, he testified that:
When I say it was partially filled, I gather that my men
had used that portion of the gasoline that was gone.
(T.918, emphasis added). Thus, the caretaker did not positive-
ly state that there was no gasoline missing.
More importantly, the decision overlooks the fact that Ap-
pellant’s own car was parked near his townhouse on the night
of the fire (T.972-73).
AOI ie se aD a> iS Rte iI Sb KE TA Rit rha a A “
Perr ree ene verre Teter ot)
Al 3S ee aDONCE ae Ne tA:
App. 'I17
(8) The decision overlooks the fact that at the same time
Appellant claimed that there was an isolated fire in the area
of the dining room and kitchen, Appellant’s next door neigh-
bors Linda Kavai and Charlie Catron woke up to the roar of
a fire and observed a fire from out their back window (T.242-
43, 246, 253). Reference to State’s Exhibits No. 3, 4, and 5
show that Ms. Kavai and Mr. Catron could not have possibly
seen the fire from their bedroom window before Mr. Catron
went outside if the fire had been where Appellant claimed it
was before he allegediy ran out of the townhouse.
(9) The decision incorrectly states that:
As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor
heard him screaming for the fire department.
Berndt, slip op. at 3. Appellant’s neighbor Charlie Catron
specifically testified that when he came out of his townhouse,
it “seemed” to him that Appellant was coming out of his town-
house (T.255). But Mr. Catron also testified that:
I didn’t see [Appellant] come out the door, but we both
went onto the lawn at the same time.
(T.255). Mr. Catron stated that when he first saw Appellant,
Appellant was either on or very near the front step (T.255).
At no point did Mr. Catron testify that Appellant was scream-
ing for the fire department when he came out of the front
door (T.255-56). Thus, the only evidence showing that Appel-
lant came out of his townhouse at the same time Mr. Catron
came out of the townhouse next door is Appellant’s testimony.
(10) The decision overlooks the fact that if Appellant did
not pour the gasoline and ignite the fire, a third person would
have had to break into the house, pour gasoline upstairs on the
stairs, around the first floor and near the sofa without waking
up either Appellant or Brenda who were allegedly sleeping on
App. 118
the sofa. Even Appellant adinitted that it was unlikely that
this could have happened (T.1224-25).
C. The Decision Overlooked and Misconceived Material
Facts Concerning Appellant’s Relationship with the
Victim Brenda Berndt. |
The decision overlooked and misstates material evidence
concerning Appellant’s relationship with his wife. Among
these facts are the following:
(1) The decision incorrectly states the following:
The state in this case sought to establish a motive by
introducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship
with Brenda, in particular, his propensity to flirt and
be promiscuous. Incidents in corroboration of this con-
tention occurred long before the fire date. Moreover, ap-
pellant did not deny the incidents, but contended those
problems had been resolved well before the fire. No evi-
dence rebuts that assertion.
Berndt, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). The evidence showed
that there had been major problems with promiscuity through-
out Appellant’s and Brenda’s seven year relationship. First,
as soon as Brenda and Appellant began living together in
1974, Appellant attempted to have a sexual relationship with
Brenda’s sister Marla Henne (T.610, 612). After he and
Brenda married in 1975, Appellant again physically grabbed
Marla Henne in 1978 (T.615) and repeatedly called her to
ask her to meet him in a motel for a sexual relationship
(T.616, 1155-56). Although Appellant ceased making over-
tures to Ms. Henne in late 1978, Ms. Henne did not tell Brenda
about Appellant’s propositions until 1980 (T.617, 624). In
addition, there was evidence that in 1979 Appellant physically
grabbed a thirteen year old babysitter (T.511-14) and Appel-
App. I19
lant admitted having three extramarital affairs during his six
year marriage with Brenda (T.1150-51).
More importantly, despite Appellant’s claim that he and
Brenda had worked everything out a year before the fire
(T.1113-14, 1157-59), there was significant evidence to rebut
this assertion. Specifically, there was evidence that Brenda
had a sexual relationship with a mutual acquaintance named
Scott Tollin several months before her death (T.653, 655).
Also, a couple of months before Brenda’s death, Appellant
physically grabbed the breasts of Sandra Jacobs in Brenda’s
presence (T.659, 1157). The evidence also showed that before
Brenda’s death, Appellant and Mr. Jacobs spent time together
at Ms. Jacobs’ home without Brenda being present (T.1263-
64). Finally, the evidence showed that either on the night of
the fire or shortly before that night, Appellant suggested to
Glenn Snow that the two of them do some wife swapping
(T.632-35).
Also, although the decision correctly states that no one
observed any argument between Appellant and Brenda at the
Earl Brown Bow], it overlooks the fact that Brenda’s ex-lover
Scott Tollin was present at the bar that night (T.630, 640).
It also overlooks the fact that Appellant took one of the women
from the bar out to his car for a ride where they were alone
together for at least fifteen minutes (T.642, 1122-23).
(2) The decision incorrectly states the following:
Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s life
insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota
where she was employed. He was not even a named
beneficiary on this policy.
Berndt, slip op. at 7. At no point in Appellant’s testimony did
Appellant ever claim that he was unaware of his wife’s in-
surance policy through the State of Minnesota (T.1108-1223).
AILABLE COPY
App. 120
To the contrary, Appellant told police investigators on the
morning after the fire that Brenda did have a life insurance
policy through her employer (0.118).
Also, although the policy did not specifically name Appel-
lant as beneficiary, the decision overlooks the fact that Appel-
lant as Brenda’s spouse had first priority as her beneficiary
(T.705-06). It also overlooks the fact that with both Brenda
and the boys dead, Appellant would be the only immediate
family member left to collect the insurance.
(3) The decision’s statement that the trial court may have
“arguably” abused its discretion in admitting evidence as to
Appellant’s extramarital affairs overlooks the fact that the
trial court excluded other evidence pertaining to Appellant’s
previous conduct. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the
State could not introduce evidence showing that Appellant
attempted to make a bomb to kill a police officer whom he
suspected was having an affair with his first wife (0.202-07,
250-51). Also, the State agreed not to introduce evidence
showing that Appellant had assaulted his first wife (0.201).
IV. EXAMINATION OF THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE
THAT WAS OVERLOOKED AND MISCONCEIVED
BY THIS COURT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE EVI-
DENCE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVOR-
ABLE TO THE VERDICT WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE JURY’S VERDICTS.
This court’s general standard for reviewing a claim of in-
sufficient evidence in a criminal case is set forth as follows:
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence we must
determine whether, under the facts in the record and any
legitimate inferences that can be drawn from them, a
jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the offense charged. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.
App. [21
2d 99 (Minn, 1978). The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and it is necessary
to assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Wahlberg, 296
N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1980).
State v. Ulvinen, 318 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1981). Although
the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was circumstantial in nature,
this court has repeatedly held that:
The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-
titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence
so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.
State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919
(1971). See State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn.
1982) (circumstantial evidence showing that fire had been
intentionally set and that defendant had financial motive to
set fire held sufficient to sustain arson verdict). This court
has also repeatedly held that normally a jury is in the best
position to evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding
the crime and the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference.
See e.g. State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. 1986) ;
State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985).
Examination of the evidence in this case pursuant to the
above-stated standards compels a finding that the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the verdict. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that this court’s holding of insufficiency was premised
upon both its overlooking of material facts and its miscon-
ception of the arson testimony. Accordingly, the State re-
spectfully requests that this holding of insufficiency be either
reversed or modified.
That the insufficiency holding was premised upon a mis-
conception of the evidence is demonstrated by the following
decision excerpt:
App. [22
The state produced evidence which, if credited by the
jury, would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire
had been ignited with the use of gasoline accelerant...
Some circumstances proved were consistent with the
state’s claim of an intentional fire, but other circum-
stances proved were generally consistent with the rational
hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.
Berndt, slip op. at 10. Despite this court’s agreement that
consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict supports a finding that this was an arson gasoline
fire, it relies upon evidence supporting the defendant’s theory
of an accidental fire to justify the holding that there were
“other circumstances” consistent with the rational hypothesis
that Appellant was not guilty. But the jury rejected the
credibility of the evidence showing “other circumstances”
since this evidence was inconsistent with the evidence that
showed that the fire was a gasoline fire.
Based on the rapidly spreading fire, the classic suspicious
low burn patterns and the positive gasoline findings, the
State’s experts testified that it was their conclusion that this
was an arson gasoline fire. One defense expert disputed the
gasoline findings and the other defense expert claimed that
the fire could have been caused by a smoldering cigarette. The
issue at trial became one of credibility between the two sets
of experts. The jury’s verdicts demonstrated that. it accepted
the expert conclusions of the State’s experts and rejected the
opinions put forth by the defense experts that were contrary
to these conclusions.
Examination of all of the evidence in the record below
shows that the jury could have reasonably credited the evi-
dence proving that this was an arson gasoline fire and have
reasonably rejected the defense testimony that was contrary
App. 123
to a finding of arson. More importantly, the record shows that
the evidence proving that this was a gasoline fire is consistent
with the hypothesis that Appellant is guilty and is inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.
A. The Circumstantial Evidence Proving that this was a
Gasoline Fire Compels the Conclusion that Appellant
Poured the Gasoline and Ignited the Fire.
That this court overlooked material evidence in this case is
evident from the following excerpt from the decision:
Except for the fact that appellant was physically present
in his home when the fire started, there exists no other
circumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of
guilt.
Berndt, slip op. at 8. Appellant’s guilt was not proven by his
presence in the home. On the contrary, his guilt was proven
by the evidence showing that he could not have possibly been
present inside the townhouse when it was ignited. The positive
gas samples and the suspicious low burn patterns showed that
gasoline was poured throughout the first floor with the largest
amount poured in the living room near the sofa where Appel-
lant claimed he was sleeping (T.372-75, 408, 549). See State’s
Exhibit No. 18. Since the State’s experts testified that a fire
in an area filled with gasoline would result in the immediate
ignition of the entire area (T.717, 794, 934-35, 1070, 1071),
the living room would have ignited while Appellant was still
on the sofa. State’s Exhibit No. 18 shows that had Appellant
been on the sofa at the time the fire began, he would have had
to run through a living room full of fire, a hallway full of fire
and a front entryway full of fire to get out the front door.
The State’s experts testified that Appellant could not have
escaped in the manner he claimed he did without suffering
severe injury (T.782, 783-84, 1077). These experts were aware
App. 124
that Appellant had incurred slight singeing of his hair on his
left side and claimed to have brown feet but they obviously
did not consider this to constitute severe injury (T.782). In-
stead, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the singeing
on the left side was more consistent with Appellant standing
outside throwing a match onto the gasoline than it was with
him running through a house full of gasoline fire. Moreover,
it is submitted that it was rational for the jury to conciude on
the basis of the experts’ testimony that Appellant’s injuries
would have consisted of more than brown feet had he run
through the entire length of the townhouse while it was ablaze
with ignited gasoline. -
The decision’s statement of the facts show that this court
accepted Appellant’s claim that he was on the sofa when the
fire started. See Berndt, slip op. at 2-3. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that this court cannot accept Appellant’s story of es-
cape as true if it views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict. Acceptance of Appellant’s claim requires rejec-
tion of the evidence showing that this was a gasoline fire
since there could not have been an isolated limited fire in the
dining room for any period of time if gasoline was spread
throughout the house (T.717, 794, 934-35, 1070-71).
Because the evidence shows that Appellant could not have
been inside the townhouse at the time the fire was ignited, the
only rational inference is that he was outside of the house.
Evidence showing both that he was outside of the house and
that he lied about being inside the house at the time of the
fire leads to only one rational conclusion—that Appellant ig-
nited the fire and lied about being inside in an effort to divert
suspicion from himself. What other rational hypothesis could
App. 125
there be?® It is not rational to conclude that Appellant stood
outside watching while some third person broke into the house,
spread the gasoline throughout the house, and ignited it.
In rejecting the jury’s finding that the circumstantial evi-
dence ruled out any rational hypothesis except that of Ap-
pellant’s guilt, this court relied upon the following factors:
(1) no one detected the odor of gasoline either on Appellant
or at the fire scene; (2) there was no evidence showing exactly
where Appellant obtained the gasoline; (3) no empty gasoline
containers or siphoning equipment was found at the fire
scene and (4) Appellant had insufficient motive to commit
the offense. If the jury’s finding that this was a gasoline fire
is accepted on appeal, none of the above-cited factors make
rational the hypothesis that someone other than Appellant
was the arsonist.
(1) No odor of gasoline.
The State’s arson experts were aware that no gasoline odor
was detected either on Appellant or at the fire scene. But
these experts, all of whom had extensive experience in ex-
tinguishing gasoline fires, testified that it is not unusual to not
smell gasoline either at the fire scene or on the person who
poured and ignited the gasoline once the gasoline has been
ignited (T.141-42, 156, 165,173, 774, 847, 1089). The expert
testimony established that when gasoline is ignited, the pre-
dominant odor becomes that of smoke and heat and these
smells will mask any gasoline odors (T.141-42, 156, 859).
Although the defense expert Mr. Gallien testified that if this
was a gasoline fire the witnesses should have been able to
detect gasoline odors both at the scene and on Appellant
5 Although this court stated that there were “other circumstances
... generally consistent with the rational hypothesis that the
defendant was not guilty,” Berndt slip op. at 10, the decision never
explained what this rational hypothesis was.
App. [26
(T.1321-23), Mr. Gallien also admitted that he no longer had
the ability to smell anything (T.1324). More importantly, the
jury obviously rejected Mr. Gallien’s opinion on this issue.
It is inconsistent for this court to accept the jury’s finding
that this was a gasoline fire even though no gasoline odor was
detected at the scene and yet refused to accept its finding that
Appellant was the arsonist on the basis that no one detected
gasoline odors on him. Although this court implied that it was
not rational to infer that Appellant, with a blood alcohol con-
tent that at its highest could only have been .12 or .13, could
have poured five gallons of gasoline “without spilling some of
it on his person or clothing,” Berndt, slip op. at 6, the alterna-
tive is even less rational. Even if the court could assume that
Appellant’s story of being inside the house was feasible, he
would have had to run barefoot over carpeting drenched with
gasoline in order to escape from the house. It is highly im-
probable that Appellant could have run through this gasoline
without getting some of it on his feet.
Finally, the court’s holding that the absence of gasoline
odors makes it irrational to infer that Appellant was the
arsonist is inconsistent with its recent decision in State v.
Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986). In Daniels the de-
fendant was accused of setting an apartment on fire with
middle petroleum distillate consistent with mineral spirits.
See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 780. In that case, as in this case,
the defendant had been drinking alcohol for several hours
prior to the fire. See Transcript for State v. Daniels, pp. 81-
83, reprinted in Petitioner’s Appendix. Also, as in this case,
the defendant did not have any odor of petroleum distillate or
mineral spirits and testing of his clothing did not reveal any
finding of a petroleum distillate. See Transcript for State v.
Daniels, pp. 179, 194, 359, 361, 393, 398, 401, reprinted in
App. [27
Petitioner’s Appendix. Despite the absence of any petroleum
odors on the defendant in the Daniels case, this court held that
the evidence was “consistent only with Daniels’ guilt and in-
consistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Daniels, 380 N.W.2d-at 782.
(2) Absence of Evidence Showing Exactly Where Appel-
lant Obtained the Gasoline.
It is submitted that the absence of evidence showing exactly
where Appellant obtained the gasoline does not make irra-
tional the jury’s finding that Appellant was the arsonist. The
evidence showed that a relatively small amount of gasoline—
five gallons—was used in the fire (T.930). The evidence also
showed that Appellant had a number of ready sources fro.
where he could have obtained this gasoline, including the
caretaker’s garage (to which he had a key) (T.910-11) and
nearby cars (T.1230-32). One of the nearby cars was Ap-
pellant’s own car (T.972-73). Five gallons of gasoline is not
a large amount— it is less than half a tankful for most cars.
The fact that no one reported gasoline missing does not make
the jury’s finding of guilt irrational. Appellant could have
easily taken gasoline from the caretaker’s garage or he could
have taken small amounts of gasoline from several parked
cars. The jury could have reasonably inferred from common
experience that someone could siphon one to two gallons from
a car tank without the car’s owner noticing that any gasoline
was gone. More importantly, Appellant could have easily ob-
tained all five gallons from his own car’s gas tank. The jury
could have reasonably concluded that had Appellant done so,
he would not have reported the gasoline loss after the fire.
Although evidence showing exactly where Appellant ob-
tained the gasoline would have strengthened the State’s case,
absence of this evidence does not justify a finding of insuf-
App. 128
ficiency. This is not a case where the evidence showed that
Appellant could not have obtained gasoline that night. To the
contrary, there was ample evidence showing that Appellant
had several ready sources from which he could have obtained
the five gallons of gasoline.
Again, this court’s reliance upon the absence of evidence
showing exactly where Appellant obtained the five gallons of
gasoline to reverse the convictions is inconsistent with its re-
cent decision in Daniels. In Daniels, the State did not show
exactly where the defendant obtained the petroleum distillate.
Instead the State in Daniels, as in this case, showed that Ap-
pellant had access to these flammable liquids even though there
was no positive showing that the liquids in the apartment
storeroom were in fact the liquids that were used in the fire.
See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 780.
(3) Absence of Gasoline Container and Siphoning Equip-
ment.
Although the finding of a gasoline container and/or siphon-
ing equipment would have made the State’s case stronger, the
absence of this evidence again does not justify a finding of
insufficiency. The jury could have considered a number of
rational explanations as to why no empty containers or siphon-
ing equipment were found. Appellant could have used a com-
bustible container which would have been consumed in the
fire. Similarly, siphoning equipment could have been consumed
in a fire. Also, Appellant could have disposed of these items
either in the trash that was hauled away (T.778-80, 913-15,
920) or in another location not found by the investigators.
Since the evidence shows that this was a gasoline fire, it
is clear that the gasoline was brought to the townhouse in
some type of container. Because the absence of such a con-
tainer does not make irrational the jury’s finding that this
App. I29
was a gasoline fire, absence of a container also does not make
irrational its finding that Appellant was the arsonist. Again,
the court’s reliance upon this factor in reversing Appellant’s
conviction is inconsistent with its holding in Daniels. As in
this case, no empty gasoline container was found near the
scene of fire in Daniels. That the partially filled containers
found in the storeroom in Daniels were the containers used
was based upon reasonable inference and not positive proof.
See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 781.
(4) Appellant’s Motive.
In its decision, this court stated that it had “the firm im-
pression that the state failed to establish a credible motive
for causing Brenda’s death.”’ Berndt, slip op. at 7-8. This im-
pression was based upon this court’s acceptance of Appellant’s
claim that he and Brenda had resolved their problems a year
previous to the fire. See Berndt, slip op. at 7. As previously
noted in Section II(C)(1) of this Petition, there was ample
evidence in the record rebutting Appellant’s claim. The evi-
dence showed that in the months immediately before the fire,
Brenda had a sexual affair with another man (T.653, 655)
while Appellant physically grabbed another woman’s breast
(T.659) and talked about wife swapping (T.632-35). The evi-
dence at trial showed that Appellant’s and Brenda’s seven
year relationship was a troubled one that was marked by
infidelity by both parties (T.653, 655, 1150-51). The evidence
also showed that when Appellant drank, he would become
moody and would direct his anger at Brenda (T.218-25, 684,
961). Appellant was having financial problems at the time of
the fire (T.1168) and the insurance money provided him with
a financial motive to kill Brenda (T.702-06). The jury could
have reasonably inferred that Appellant may have concluded
App. [30
that if the boys also perished in the fire, it would make
Brenda’s death appear to be less suspicious.
More importantly, the jury found that this was an arson
fire so someone had to have the motivation to murder the
victims. Appellant was the only person who would gain from
their deaths. There often is not a rational explanation for the
crime of familicide and the precise motivation is usually un-
known unless the perpetrator confesses. See generally, Malm-
quist, Psychiatric Aspects of Familicide, Bulletin of the AAPL
Vol. VIII, No. 3 at 298. Although at oral argument Appellant’s
counsel argued that Brenda’s ex-husband Harry Gage had a
motive to commit the murders, there is absolutely nothing in
the record to connect Mr. Gage to the fire. Also, since Appel-
lant could not have been inside the house at the time it was
ignited, acceptance of a theory that someone else started the
fire requires acceptance of the theory that Appellant stood
outside, watched as someone murdered his family and then
lied to the police to cover up the murders. It is respectfully
submitted that this hypothesis is not rational and was properly
rejected by the jury.
Finally, as this court noted, the State “has no burden of
establishing a motive for the crime.” Berndt, slip op. at 7.
The evidence established that Appellant was outside at the
time the fire was ignited and that he lied about being inside
at the time of the fire. This evidence conclusively shows that
Appellant was the arsonist and the absence of a clear motive
does not justify rejection of this evidence.
B. The Jury Could Have Reasonably Credited the Testi-
mony Proving that this was an Arson Gasoline Fire
and Have Reasonably Rejected any Contrary Testi-
mony.
BEST AVAI
App. I31
Although this court states that the evidence most favorable
to the jury verdict shows that this was a gasoline fire, other
comments in the decision demonstrate that this court did not
reject the evidence that was contrary to the jury’s verdict. The
| evidence in this record showed two directly opposing positions.
: The first position was that gasoline was present in the town-
house and that the fire was an arson gasoline fire. The second
) position was that there was no gasoline present in the town-
| house and that the fire was consistent with an accidental fire.
| The jury credited the evidence supporting the first pesition
i and rejected evidence supporting the second position. Because
| examination of the record demonstrates that the jury could
ve rationally a¢cepted the State’s arson evidence and re-
jected the defens@’s theory of accidental fire, this court in
eviewing the evidence must also reject evidence inconsistent
<
‘By with the State’s arson evidence.
a | (A) “the Jury Properly Credited Richard Tontarski’s Ex-
NY (_pert Opinion that the Samples Contained Gasoline.
ff he 26 gasoline samples taken from the townhouse were
| S\ “analyzed by Richard E. Tontarski, a forensic scientist em-
.’ eS ployed by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
i Firearms (ATF) at the National Laboratory Center in Rock-
ville, Maryland (T.527). Mr. Tontarski had completed the
| necessary course work to be classified as a chemist and re-
ceived a Masters Degree in Forensic Science from George
Washington University in 1978 (T.532). He has worked as a
scientist for the ATF since 1978 and at the time of trial had
analyzed fire scene samples for approximately 300 to 400
5 oie te
arson cases (T.530).
Mr. Tontarski testified to both his sampling procedures
and his identification procedures (‘1.535-542, 554, 572-73, 574-
75, 578, 580). Based upon his identification procedures, he
positively identified the presence of gasoline in five samples
ABLE COPY
App. 182
from the fire scene (T.547, 548, 550, 559). He testified that
he made the positive identification when he compared the
chromatograms produced by the samples with a 25% gasoline
standard (75% evaporation of gasoline) (T.1081). He made
this comparison by doing a side-by-side comparison of the
unknown chromatogram to the known standard (T.538). He
testified that the samples could not be analyzed by overlapping
their chromatograms with a known standard because there
are variations in machines and injection points (T.2081, 2096-
99, 2150-51).
Robert Davis testified as a gas chromatography expert for
the defense (T.1672). Mr. Davis received a Bachelor of
Science Degree from Illinois Wesleyan University in 1955 and
worked as an analytical chemist for the army, Pure Oil Com-
pany and Allied Chemical from 1955 to 1960 (T.1673-74). In
1962, Mr. Davis formed his own company where he conducted
quality control work for oil companies (T.672-73). In 1971,
his company also began conducting analytical work in the
area of forensic science (T.1072-73, 1861).
Mr. Davis compared the chromatograms produced by the
fire samples with the set of gasoline samples used by Mr.
Tontarski (T.1731). Mr. Davis testified that he disagreed
with Mr. Tontarski’s findings and stated that the chromato-
grams did not show gasoline (T.1751, 1755, 1759, 1772, 1777,
1783, 1790, 2217).
Although the jury had two opposite expert conclusions to
choose from, the record shows that there were several flaws
in Mr. Davis’ analysis of the chromatograms that seriously
undermined the credibility of his opinion:
(1) When Mr. Davis made his initial determination
that there was no gasoline, he was unaware of which
gasoline standard Mr. Tontarski based his opinion on
(T.1878). When he demonstrated to the jury that the
App. 133
chromatograms from the samples did not contain gaso-
line, he compared the samples to a 100% gasoline stan-
dard (T.1748, 1755, 1759, 1772, 1777, 1783, 1790). When
informed by the prosecutor that Mr. Tontarski based his
comparison upon a 25% gasoline standard, Mr. Davis
admitted that he should not have used the 100% gasoline
standard in making his comparison (T.1898, 1910).
(2) Despite the fact that Mr. Tontarski testified that
the chromatograms and standards should be analyzed in
a side-by-side comparison rather than by overlapping the
standards (T.2096-99, 2150-51), Mr. Davis conducted his
comparison by overlapping the standards (T.1741, 1754,
1758, 1771, 1772, 1783, 2009-27). ;
(3) Mr. Davis never: (a) looked at Mr. Tontarski’s
manual explaining his sample preparation and compari-
son techniques (T.1900-01); (b) contacted Mr. Tontarski
to ask about his techniques (T.1893, 1970-71); and (c)
looked at the cans containing the samples prior to trial
(T.1800).
(4) Mr. Davis admitted that he requires more match-
ing peaks in a comparison before making a finding of
gasoline than is legally required by the courts (T.1878,
1897).
From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Mr. Davis did not have sufficient background information
about Mr. Tontarski’s techniques to render a competent opin-
ion as to whether there was gasoline in the samples. That
Mr. Davis did not have sufficient information to offer a valid
opinion is supported by his post-trial testimony which showed
both that he never looked at Mr. Tontarski’s manual prior to
trial (M.4, D.6), and that he made incorrect assumptions
App. I34
about Mr. Tontarski’s sampling technique (M.7-8, 26, 40-43;
D.15, 14-19). Moreover, from Mr. Davis’ in-court comparison
of the sample chromatograms with the wrong gasoline stan-
dard, the jurors may have reasonably inferred that Mr. Davis
was attempting to confuse or mislead them. Thus, the jury
could reasonably have both accepted Mr. Tontarski’s opinion
and rejected Mr. Davis’ opinion pertaining to the presence of
gasoline. Since the defense never challenged Mr. Tontarski’s
credentials as an expert at trial, the jury’s acceptance of Mr.
Tontarski’s opinion should not be disregarded by this court.
(2) The Jury Could Have Reasonably Credited the Testi-
mony by the State’s Arson Experts That the Physical
Evidence at the Scene was Consistent with a Gasoline
Fire and Inconsistent with an Accidental Fire.
Jerry Pedlar, Fire Marshal for the Brooklyn Center Fire
Department, personally observed the arson scene and con-
cluded that the “fire was started as a result of flammable
liquids” (T.783). Two independent arson consultants, James
Carlson and Sharadchandra Bhatt, reviewed the reports, photos
and videotapes in this case (T.930, 1076-76). Both consultants
agreed that the evidence was consistent with a gasoline fire
and was inconsistent with either a cigarette or electrical fire
(T.944-45, 1076, 1093, 1095). These expert opinions were
based upon the following physical evidence:
(a) Numerous suspicious low burns that could not be
explained by the presence of a combustible in the area or
by the dropping down of items (T.363-65, 372-75, 387,
393, 397, 400-01, 752-53, 755), especially the deep scarring
and rutting in the living room area (T.372-74).
(b) The presence of “trailers” on both the ground
level including the stairway which were sixty feet in
App. I35
length with widths from three to six inches to two feet
(T.775-76).
(c) The unusual burn on and under the kitchen table
that was consistent with the presence of a liquid accel-
erant (T.388-90).
(d) The burning of the fire through the tread on the
stairs which could only be explained by the seeping of a
flammable liquid through the carpet and down into the
stair treads (T.388-89).
(e) The presence of gasoline in the front door entry-
way (T.548, 765), on the kitchen windowsill (T.391-92,
546-47), in the living room by the sofa (T.408, 549), on
the stairway (T.388-89, 549-50) and by the door to the
bedroom where two of the boys were trapped (T.551,
752).
(f) The determination that none of the electrical ap-
pliances, outlets or wiring could have been the cause of
the fire (T.422).
(g) The inability to find any other accidental cause
for the fire (T.423).
(h) The observations by the policemen, firemen and
neighbors showing that the fire spread through the house
at an extremely rapid rate (T.58, 59, 60-61, 70, 90-91,
106, 136, 164, 185, 186, 210-211, 214, 248, 245, 249, 256,
259, 275-76, 283, 312) and the firemen’s observations that
App. 136
this was the worst residential fire that they have ever
seen (T.114, 139-40, 149, 155, 172, 730).°¢
Although defense expert Shelby Gallien testified that the
physical evidence was consistent with an accidental fire and
was not consistent with a gasoline fire, the record demon-
strates that considerable evidence cast doubt upon the cred.
ibility of Mr. Gallien’s expert opinion:
(a) Mr. Gallien testified that the flammability range
for gasoline was 1-3/4% to 4% (T.1430-31). The correct
figure is 14% to 7.6% (7.1435, 1858). The defense’s
other expert, Mr. Davis, testified that Mr. Gallien’s testi-
mony on the flammability range constituted a “50 per-
cent” error which in his opinion was a “gross error”
(T.1858-59).
(b) Despite the fact that Mr. Gallien had copies of
the reports in this case for over six months prior to trial,
he was unable to reach any conclusion as to the cause of
the fire until a few days before he testified (T.1466-67,
1471).
6 The decision notes that “[t]he time lapse between the alarm and
the response of the fire fighters is in dispute.” Berndt, slip op. at 3,
n. 3. It is respectfully submitted that consideration of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict compels a finding that
the police arrived on the scene at 2:56 a.m., five minutes after the
fire was reported (T.106, 134-35, 151, 169, 110, 170-71). It was rationai
for the jury to make this finding since State’s Exhibit No. 1 shows
that the fire station was only one block from the townhouse
(T.168-69) and the first firemen on the scene lived within a block
of the fire station (T.168-69, 100, 152, 170-71). Also, although the
neighbors stated that it took the fire department a long time to
arrive, their presence at the fire could have easily altered their
perception of time (T.216, 1098). More importantly, the police of-
ficers and firemen who testified that the firemen arrived within
a short period of time were in constant contact with the dispatch-
er, Whose job it was to correctly record times of arrival (T.65, 92,
110, 152, 171).
App. 137
(c) Mr. Gallien testified on direct examination that
this was a slow starting fire which could have been
started by either a short in an electrical circuit, grease
burning in the frying pan or a cigarette smoldering on
the rug (T.1399-1401). When the prosecutor on cross
examination pointed out that the fire scene reports con-
tained information ruling out both an electrical or grease
fire, Mr. Gallien abruptly repudiated two of his three
theories concerning the fire’s possible origin (T.1632-33,
1657-63).
(d) Mr. Gallien’s only remaining theory concerning
the fire’s origin—that of a flashback fire caused by a
smoldering cigarette—was contradicted by the following
evidence:
(i) Buildup of gases for a flashback fire cannot
occur when windows are open (T.1958-59, 2111). Tes-
timony at trial showed that several windows in the
townhouse were open at the time of trial (T.337) ; and
(ii) Buildup of sufficient gasses on the first floor
to cause a flashback fire would have caused persons
present on the first floor to die of carbon monoxide
poisoning before the fire could ignite (T.1095, 2112).
But Appellant, who claims he was present on the first
floor of the townhouse, survived the fire. Also, Brenda
died from breathing superheated air and not from car-
bon monoxide poisoning (T.898, 903, 906).
(e) Mr. Gallien’s theory of an accidental fire was
‘based upon the belief that there was no gasoline present
in the townhouse (T.1348-49, 1357, 1367, 1369-70, 1392,
1422, 1644). But other evidence at trial showed that five
fire scene samples contained gasoline (T.391-92, 408, 546-
47, 548, 549-51).
App. I38
The above demonstrates that the jurors, who actually ob-
served the witnesses testify, could have rationally accepted
the opinions of the State’s experts. Moreover, the jury could
have reasonably rejected any contrary opinions by Mr. Gallien
since his testimony demonstrated both that he was not fully
familiar with all the fire scene evidence when he reached his
conclusions and that he was not fully acquainted with all the
properties of gasoline. Since the jury had a rational basis
upon which to reject Mr. Gallien’s opinion, it is respectfully
submitted that the requirement that evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict does not per-
mit reliance upon Mr. Gallien’s rejected theories as justifica-
tion for a finding of insufficiency.
(3) The Jury Could Have Reasonably Concluded that Ap-
pellant’s Story of Escape was not Credible.
The defense’s accidental fire theory was premised upon
Appellant’s testimony that when he woke up, he saw a limited
fire and ran through the house before the fire could spread.
But the following physical evidence in the record casts doubt
upon the credibility of this testimony:
(a) The findings of gasoline and the experts’ opinions
show that there could not have been a limited fire in the
townhouse for any period of time (T.717, 794, 934-35,
1070-71).
(b) Appellant did not suffer significant injuries. The
findings of gasoline and the experts’ opinions show that
Appellant could not have escaped the house in the manner
he claims he did without suffering severe bodily harm
(T.782-84, 1077).
(c) Appellant’s testimony that he saw a limited fire
in the portion of the dining room near the kitchen and
then came out of the house at the same time his neighbor
App. I39
Charlie Catron came out of his townhouse (T.335, 970,
1129-30, 1132-33) is inconsistent with Mr. Catron’s testi-
mony. At the same time Appellant allegedly saw a limited
fire, Mr. Catron and Linda Kavai looked out their bed-
room window and saw the fire (T.242-43, 247, 253).
Reference to the location of Mr. Catron’s window in
State’s Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 5 demonstrates that neither
Mr. Catron nor Ms. Kavai could have possibly seen the
fire from this window had it been confined to the dining
room area by the kitchen. The fire clearly must have
already spread throughout the rear of the living room by
the time Mr. Catron and Ms. Kavai observed it.
(d) Appellant’s story about Brenda getting up and
running directly into the fire is inconsistent with the
physical evidence showing that she would have had to
run through and past a wall of fire in order to end up
where she did on the dining room floor. See State’s Ex-
hibit 18. The physical evidence also shows that it is not
rational to conclude that Brenda would get up and run
through a wall of fire to reach the dining room since the
boys were located in an opposite part of the house and
there was no exit through the dining room.
In addition to the fact that the physical evidence contradicted
Appellant’s story, other evidence at trial cast doubt upon
Appellant’s credibility. This evidence includes the following:
(a) After telling the police on both August 21 and 27,
1981, that Brenda was upstairs at the time of the fire,
(T.769, 1183), Appellant waited until six weeks after the
fire to tell the police that he now thought Brenda was
downstairs with him on the sofa (T.984, 1185).
(b) Although Appellant claimed his feet turned
brown after the fire, there was no evidence showing that
App. 140
he had his feet examined by a doctor (T.1144). Also, he
did not tell the police about his feet until after the brown
skin was gone (T.983-84).
(c) Appellant’s claim that he and Brenda had worked
out all their problems a year before the fire was rebutted
by evidence showing that he both physically accosted
another woman in Brenda’s presence a couple months
before the fire and discussed wife swapping with another
man shortly before the fire (T.632-35, 659, 1113-14, 1157-
59, 1263-65).
Although the decision appears to rely heavily upon Appel-
lant’s testimony in support of its holding that there was a
rational hypothesis consistent with Appellant’s innocence, the
verdict demonstrates that the jurv did not find his story of
escape to be rational or credible. The significant inconsis-
tencies in Appellant’s statement to the police alone gave the
jury “substantial grounds to doubt the veracity of [his]
story.” State v. Race, N.W.2d —— (Minn., filed March
21, 1986) (slip op. at 13) (citing State v. Langley, 354 N.W.
2d 389, 394 (Minn. 1984). Since the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict shows that Appel-
lant’s claim of escape was impossible, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that this court cannot base a holding of insufficiency
upon Appellant’s impossible claim that there was a limited
fire from which he was able to escape without serious injury.
V. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS TECHNICALLY
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN TH! JURY’S VERDICTS,
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE EITHER
THAT THE VERDICTS BE REINSTATED OR THAT
THE CASE BE REMANDED FOR TRIAL.
Acceptance of the evidence showing that this was an arson
gasoline fire compels the conclusion that Appellant was the
arsonist. Thus, application for this court’s usual standard of
<x
App. 141
review requires reinstatement of the convictions upon this
rehearing. However, if this court declines to reinstate the
convictions, the State respectfully requests that this court
recognize that its reversal was based upon its re-evaluation of
the weight of the evidence as a “thirteenth juror” and remand
this case for retrial. See Tibbs v. United States, 457 U.S. 31
(1982).
A. Remanding this Case for Retrial is Permissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This court’s doubt of Appellant’s guilt could only be prem-
ised upon the rejection or questioning of both the State’s gas
chromatography expert’s findings and the arson experts’
opinion that a person could not run through a house ablazo
with ignited gasoline without suffering severe injury. Al-
though the State does not contest this court’s authority to
depart from its self-imposed review standard and act as a
“thirteenth juror,” it is respectfully submitted that this
court’s doubts about the arson experts’ testimony should not
result in Appellant receiving immunity for his crimes when
the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict. In-
stead, the interests of justice require that the case be remanded
for retrial so that a mew jury can evaluate the credibility of
the State’s expert witnesses. See generally Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (“[b]ut justice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser also”’).
Although the Sixth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes retrial when a reversal is based on insufficient evi-
dence, retrial is permissible when reversal is based on the
weight of the evidence. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 US. at
App. 142
46-47.’ The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to
prevent the State from having an attempt to prove its case
through successive prosecutions when it has failed to present
technically sufficient evidence in the first trial. See generally
Burks v. United States, 4837 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). But when a
reversal is based upon the weight of the evidence, the prosecu-
tion has already
presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and
has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply
affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a
favorable judgment.
Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43 (footnote omitted). Here, the State has
presented sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt and has
already persuaded one jury to convict. This court’s disagree-
ment with the jury’s assessment of the weight of the evidence
should not be deemed the equivalent of an acquittal since this
court re-evaluated the evidence without personally observing
the witnesses’ demeanor.
It is anticipated that Appellant will argue that a retrial
of the same evidence would be a waste of time since a success-
ful re-prosecution below would only result in this court again
re-weighing the same evidence again on appeal. However, the
United States Supreme Court noted that:
Although reversal of a first conviction based on sharply
conflicting testimony may serve the interests of justice,
reversal of a second conviction based on the same evi-
dence may not.
7It is anticipated that Appellant will argue that the rationale in
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) is inapplicable to this case be-
cause the Florida Supreme Court based its reversal on a state rule
that allows reversal and remand if the appellate court is convinced
that the weight of the evidence does not support the verdict. See
Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 36, n. 8. Although this court has never formally
enunciated a similar rule, it is respectfully submitted that since
the evidence was technically sufficient, this court has tacitly
adopted a similar rule in this case.
App. 143
Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43, n. 18. Here at a retrial, the defense will
have an opportunity to remedy its gas chromatography ex-
pert’s apparent lack of preparation ax the first trial. As noted
previously in Section IV(B)(1) of this Petition, Mr. Davis’
testimony demonstrated that he was unaware of either Mr.
Tontarski’s sampling technique or his method of analysis.
Consequently, the jury may well have discounted Mr. Davis’
opinion since he did not appear to have an adequate factual
background upon which to base his opinion. Conversely, upon
becoming fully informed about Mr. Tontarski’s technique, Mr.
Davis may well agree with Mr. Tontarski’s conclusion that the
samples contained gasoline.
Moreover, at a new trial “[i]t is possible that new evidence
. will make the State’s case even stronger during a second
trial than it was at the first.” Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43, n. 19. This
may be especially true in this case since new evidence has
come to light that if credited by a jury, would make the State’s
case even stronger. This new evidence includes the following:
(1) A fellow inmate of Appellant’s at Stillwater Pris-
on has reported that Appellant confessed to setting a
fire in a dwelling where children were present. See Affi-
davits and Statement reprinted in Petitioner’s Confi-
dential Appendix.* According to this inmate, he ard
Appellant were sharing a marijuana cigarette and watch-
ing a news program about another arson case involving
an arson of a dwelling with a child inside. In response
to this news report, Appellant told the inmate: “I did
the same thing.” Although this inmate is currently in-
* The name of this inmate is provided in the affidavits and state-
ment contained in Petitioner’s Confidential Appendix. To min’-
mize the risk that other inmates may take retaliatory actions
against this inmate, the State requests that this inmate’s identity
not be revealed to the public until a new trial is scheduled or until
this court determines that the dictates of justice require an earlier
release. A copy of Petitioner’s Confidential Appendix, however, is
being sent to Appellant’s counsel.
App. 144
carcerated, he has made no attempt to obtain any prom-
ises or deals from the prosecution in exchange for his
cooperation. Also, no threats or promises were made by
anyone to induce this inmate to provide this information.
The only consideration given to this inmate is the promise
that he will be transferred to a different Department of
Corrections Facility so that his safety would not be in
jeopardy from other inmates once it was revealed that
he has provided the prosecution with evidence against
Appellant. Because Appellant did not make this confes-
sion until April, 1985, it was not available as evidence
at Appellant’s initial trial.
(2) On August 16, 1985, a formal grievance complaint
against defense expert Shelby Gallien was filed with the
Ethical Practices and Grievance Committee of the Inter-
national Arson Investigators, Inc. See Letter of John R.
Lewis and Complaint reprinted at pp. 22-29 of Petition-
er’s Appendix. The complaint was based upon Mr. Gal-
lien’s alleged violations of ethical duties during his testi-
mony at Appellant’s trial. The complaint is still pending
because the Ethical Practices and Grievance Committee
has been unable to contact Mr. Gallien despite repeated
attempts to do so. The defense’s theory of accidental fire
was premised primarily upon Mr. Gallien’s expert opin-
ion. In qualifying himself as an expert at trial, Mr.
Gallien testified that he was a member of the Interna-
tional Association of Arson Investigators. At a retrial,
evidence of this ethical grievance would serve to impeach
both Mr. Gallien’s credentials as an expert and his expert
opinions.
It should be noted that the State is not requesting this court
to reinstate the convictions as a result of this new evidence
nor is it basing its request for a new trial on the ground that
=.
App. 145
it now has sufficient evidence to convict Appellant. The
State’s position is that the evidence at trial was technically
sufficient to sustain the convictions. See Section IV of Peti-
tion. This new evidence is noted solely for the purpose of
showing the court that if a jury credits this new evidence at
a retrial and Appellant is again convicted, the evidence on
appeal from a second successful prosecution may well resolve
any doubts this court now has about the weight of the evi-
dence.
B. Rehearing of this Case on Appeal is Permissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Appellant’s Objection to Motion to Enlarge Time to File
Petition for Rehearing, Appellant claims that because th2
decision stated that the evidence was insufficient, a rehearing
of this case violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although
under Rurks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), an appellate
decision holding that as a matter of law that the evidence is
insufficient bars retrial, double jeopardy does not bar further
appellate proceedings in a case if the applicable rules allow
for such proceedings. In this case, both Minn.R.Civ.App.P.
136.02 and 140.03 provide that the filing of a Petition for Re-
hearing stays the entering of judgment in this case until dis-
position of the petition.
Appellant’s reliance upon State v. Abraham, 335 N.W.2d
745 (Minn. 1983) is inapplicable to this proceeding since, in
reversing the convictions of this case, this court acted as a
reviewing tribunal and not as the trier of fact. Although an
acquittal by either the jury or a trial court judge cannot be
appealed, an appellate court’s finding of insufficiency is still
subject to further appellate review. See e.g. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at
47 (Florida Supreme Court’s reversal indicating sufficiency
as reversal grounds did not bar reconsideration of this deci-
sion in a separate appellate proceeding).
App. 146
VI. CONCLUSION
Consideration of the material evidence that was overlooked
or misconceived demonstrates that the evidence of guilt was
sufficient as a matter of law. Thus, this court’s reversal was
based upon a re-weighing of the evidence rather than a find-
ing of sufficiency.
Therefore, the State maaan requests that its Petition
for Rehearing be granted and that this court either reinstate
the jury’s verdicts finding Appellant guilty of eight counts of
Murder in the First Degree or remand the case for a new trial
in the interests of justice.
Dated: April 10, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III
Minnesota Attorney General
102 State Capitol
St. Paul, MN 55155
THOMAS L. JOHNSON
Hennepin County Attorney
VERNON E. BERGSTROM
Chief, Appellate Section
By: BEVERLY J. WOLFE
Assistant County Attorney
Atty. Lic. No. 131751
Phone: 348-8794
C-2000 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Attorneys for Petitioner-
Respondent
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App. Jl
APPENDIX J
Transcript Excerpts of Ward Mahlen’s Testimony
{[T.373] Mahlen—Direct
* * * has been overhauled and cleaned out.
Q. Dining room or living room?
A. Oh, I am sorry. I beg your pardon. The living room,
and, once again, it shows a hole in the floor where we cut out
a floor sample.
Q. And 9D, what does that show?
A. 9D is a closeup of some debris on the floor, which is
the area of the sofa directly-—-which was located directly
below the—if I have my directions right—south window of
the living room.
Q. This sofa here (indicating) ?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Which is located here (indicating) ?
A. That is correct.
Q. Where, in relationship to that sofa, was that piece of
wood cut out of the floor?
A. Approximately 8 feet north of the sofa—north of the
wall, so 3 or 4 feet in front of the sofa.
Q. Why did you cut that piece of wood out of there?
A. After we cleaned the floor, we saw unusual burn pat-
terns on the floor. Patterns which we could’t explain nat-
urally through any other accidental or natural burn process.
The burn patterns were, had burned through the carpet,
through three-quarter-inch sheet of particle board, and down
into the plywood [T.374] subfloor and had formed a trail all
of the way through the living room area.
Once again, we selected the area of the burned pattern that
we felt was—gave us the best area that might have been
App. J2
protected and may get the best chance to get a good sample.
Q. Did you take some pictures of those burn areas in the
floor you described?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you have them blown up?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Would you take a look at what is marked here as State’s
Exhibits 15 and 16, they are a little bit out of order in reila-
tionship to the others. But, can you tell me if you recognize
those photos and what they are—not what they are—and
whether or not they are good shots?
A. Yes, they are accurate photographs of the scene.
MR. BYRNE: I am going to offer into evidence the State’s
Exhibits 15 and 16.
MR. CASCARANO: I have no objection.
THE COURT: There being no objection, State’s 15 and 16
are received. :
BY MR. BYRNE:
Q. I wonder if you will take a look at 15, Deputy, and
[T.375] tell us what that is a picture of?
A. This is a picture of the deep scarring on the floor
showing a very distinct pattern or trail where, I believe,
accelerant had been poured. This is consistent with other—
with my experiences where I see—
MR. CASCARANO: Can we approach the Bench?
THE COURT: Yes, come along.
(Conversation at the Bench, not recorded.)
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.
BY MR. BYRNE:
Q. It is scarring and rutting in the floor, right?
A. Yes, it is. It also took place in the center of the floor.
a want you to just for a moment stick with me and my
question and then we will show the crowd where they were.
App. J3
Why don’t you take a look at Exhibit 16; tell us what that
shows? )
A. There is a little wider angle of the same area showing
scarring or rutting through the particle board in the floor.
Q. Are they two different locations?
A. Yes, I believe they are.
Q. Could you then, with whatever index you have or
record [T.3876] of where the photographs came from, step to
the model and with the pointer show the jury where each of
the patterns was?
First of all we will refer to State’s Exhibit 15.
A. Okay. Maybe on this area here—
Q. Well, yes.
A. Okay. We found two trails that went—one went this
direction; another went down this direction; and the third
connected the two. This area here (indicating).
Q. Fifteen?
A. Fifteen is an area of a burned trail. It was approxi-
mately in this area here in front of where these chairs would
be.
THE COURT: For the record, would you describe what
area it is that you are pointing out on the diagram?
THE WITNESS: Okay. That would be approximately 3 or
4 feet from the south common wall in the living room, in the
approximate center of the room from east to west, 3 or 4 feet
out. It ran east to west in the approximate center area of the
room.
BY MR. BYRNE:
Q. Then could you tell us where the rutting or scarring
that was visible in State’s Exhibit 16 is located?
Again referring to State’s Exhibit 4, the [T.3877] overhead
photograph.
App. J4
A. This photograph shows the rutting. This would be the
south end of the living room or—I beg your pardon, the west
end of the living room going toward the east end; would start
approximately in this area here and run almost all of the way
down to the hallway. We can also see another area coming
off here. This area was approximately—this area which con-
nected the two scars.
This would be a linear scarring running from east to west
on the north side of the living room.
Q. Extending off toward the dining room, is that correct?
A. Extending over to the dining room. :
Q. I wonder if you would like to take your seat.
MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I would like to offer these
photographs to the jury at this time?
THE COURT: All right, you may do that.
MR. BYRNE: Does the Court wish to see these?
BY MR. BYRNE:
Q. Now, I want you to take a look at 10A through 10F.
Tell me if you recognize those photos and if they are good
pictures of what they show?
A. Yes. These areaphotos of the living room and ceiling.
And they are accurate photos.
MR. BYRNE: I offer them into evidence.
* * *
[T.387] * * * significance with the jury.
Referring first to 11F.
A. This is a photograph of the northwest corner of the
kitchen, showing the kitchen table and the floor area. We will
be able to see it better when this area is cleaned out. Before
we cleaned it out, you could still
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.