Appendix — Minnesota v. Berndt

Supreme Court brief1987

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

25 1986

IN THE

pPUPTeIne VUUlL, Vids

EILED

\ JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

RK

Supreme Court of the Gnited

October Term, 1986

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Petitioner,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

THOMAS L. JOHNSON

Hennepin County Attorney

VERNON E. BERGSTROM

Chief, Appellate Section

Hennepin County

Attorney’s Office

BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Assistant Hennepin

County Attorney

Hennepin County

Attorney’s Office

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

(612) 348-8794

Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioner

LS

224-7631 - Review Publishing Ce, 257 E. 6th St., St. Paul, Minn. 55101 — 224-7631

APPENDIX INDEX

Appendix A—Order, Opinion and Judgment of the

Minnesota Supreme Court ;

Appendix B—Opinion and Judgment a Siananate

Supreme Court... .. sh are age eat oan eee |

Appendix C—Order and aiiaitieaitinan of the Henne-

Re Be ae. re

Appendix D—Motion for Order Directing District

Court to Deliver Trial Court Exhibits to Minnesota

i one errs pel na hase’ seat ;

Appendix E—Motion to Accept Photo Mieneenticns

of State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 .

Appendix F—(State’s Exhibit 18) .

Appendix G—(State’s Exhibit 19). .........

Appendix H-—Letter of John R. cick and Ceeitabie

Appendix I—Petition for Rehearing .

Appendix J—Transcript Excerpts of Ward Mahlen’ 8

ES ore ME Sar cl IN, ln b fasdtnl es terse Ora 9 sd

Appendix K—tTranscript Excerpts of Fire Marshal

Jerry Pedlar’s Testimony | aig.

Appendix L—tTranscript nisi of James Carl-

son’s Testimony

Appendix M—Transcript ieee of Deinihildin

Bhatt’s Testimony |

Appendix N—Transcript Sine of Richard Ton-

tarski’s Testimony .

Appendix tn Peennietas Rieiateind of ualienaney ian

taining to Gasoline Odor

Appendix P—Transcript Excerpts of Fire ‘Marshal

Bruce Ryden’s Testimony

Page

- 7 Ae

- hn

it |

< bs

or. tty

‘ AD ia

4a

4

t

eT) ae

App. Al

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Appellant.

ORDER

The court, having considered en banc the State’s petition

for rehearing as well as four motions of the State in connec-

tion therewith,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The original opinion in this case filed March 21, 1986

is hereby withdrawn.

2. The attached opinion which is identical to the original

y. «8 One exception replaces the original. That exception is:

(a) The last three complete sentences on page 7 of

the original slip opinion which read:

Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s life

insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota

where she was employed. He was not even a named

beneficiary on this policy. Berndt was surprised to

learn that the other policy would pay off a car loan.

are deleted and in their stead is inserted:

App. A2

Appellant was not named beneficiary on his wife’s

life insurance policy furnished as an automatic benefit

by the State of Minnesota where she was employed.

Berndt was surprised to learn that the other policy

would pay off the car loan.

3. In all other respects, the petition of the State for rehear-

ing is denied.

4. The four motions of the State entitled “Motion for

Clarification of Conditions of Release,’ ‘Motion for Oral

Argument on Petition for Rehearing,” “Motion to Order Trial

Court to Deliver Exhibits,” and “Motion to Accept Photo Re-

productions of State’s Exhibits” are each denied.

5. No attorney fees incurred by either party in connection.

with the petition for rehearing and/or the supportive motions

are allowed.

Dated: August 29, 1986.

By the Court:

GLENN E. KELLEY

Associate Justice

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

Hennepin County Kelley, J.

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Appellant.

App. A3

Filed August 29, 1986. Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk of Ap-

pellate Courts.

SYLLABUS

State failed to meet its burden to establish the guilt of an

accused, convicted of eight counts of first-degree murder,

when the convictions rested on circumstantial evidence which

was consistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt.

Reversed.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

Kelley, Justice.

Orville Berndt appeals from his conviction on eight counts

of first degree murder arising out of the deaths of his wife,

her two sons by a previous marriage, and the son of his wife

and himself. All four perished in a fire in August 1981 at the

family duplex home in Brooklyn Center. On appeal, Berndt

claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the con-

victions.' We agree. Accordingly, we reverse.

On August 20, 1981, appellant Orville Berndt lived in a

townhouse residence in Brooklyn Center with his wife,

Brenda; their son, Corey, age 3-1/2; and Brenda’s sons,

Richard Gage, age 13; and Michael Gage, age 10. Early in the

evening after work on August 20, Berndt and his wife went to

consult with their automobile insurance agent to obtain in-

surance coverage on a recently acquired used car. After com-

pleting that business, the couple first visited two bars, and

later ended up at the Earle Brown Bowl, ostensibly to cele-

brate the car purchase. They remained there, drinking beer

1In addition to raising the insufficiency of the evidence issue, ap-

pellant has alleged violation of discovery rules, an unconstitutional

search, and deprivation of a fair trial. Our disposition makes it

unnecessary to address those issues.

App. A4

and visiting with others until shortly before 1 a.m., August

21. During the course of the evening, in addition to the beer,

Berndt also imbibed two shots of tequila, and smoked some

marijuana. Witnesses who observed the Berndts that night

observed no arguments or altercations between them, and

described everyone there as having a good time.

When the couple arrived home, appellant, who had not eaten

an evening meal after work, fixed himself something to eat.

Thereafter, he smoked a cigarette with Brenda, laid down on

the couch, and eventually fell asleep while watching television.

Brenda was apparently in the room with him. The three

children were sleeping upstairs. Suddenly appellant was

awakened, by whom or what he is not sure, but he saw flames

by the dining room window. The house was extremely hot and

full of smoke. Brenda appeared to be heading through the

dining room toward the kitchen area.? Appellant was con-

fused; he panicked, and then ran out the front door. Shortly

afterwards, the house burst into flames.

As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor heard

him screaming for the fire department. The authorities were

immediately called. While waiting for the fire fighters, ap-

pellant tried to douse the fire with a garden hose.

Police Officer Adams was the first official on the scene.

At the time he arrived, the second story was not burning.

Both Adams and appeliant searched for a ladder to attempt

to save the children on the second floor. The search proved

fruitless.

2 Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused as to what

action Brenda had taken. In general, however, in each version, he

indicated Brenda was heading into the dining room while he pan-

icked and ran from the house because of the heat and smoke.

App. A5

When fire fighters eventually arrived,* appellant was ex-

tremely vocal, and voiced his indignation and ire at what he

considered an exorbitant lapse of time before fire fighters

responded to the alarm. He acted in a hysterical manner,

shouting obscenities at the fire fighters and police. His actions

so interfered with the fire fighters, they decided to remove

him from the scene. Berndt then was transported in a police

squad car to his sister’s house in Maple Grove by Police Officer

Adams.

Adams remained with appellant in Maple Grove until he

was ordered by Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar

to bring Berndt to the Brooklyn Center Police Department

for interrogation. Pedlar had been at the fire scene early.

From his observation of the fire’s unusual and rapid accelera-

tion, he concluded it might have had an intentional origin.

Pedlar ordered Officer Adams to treat Berndt as an arson

suspect during the return ride to Brooklyn Center because

appellant was the only surviving family member.

At approximately 6 a.m., Adams and appellant arrived at

the Brooklyn Center Police Station. Immediately after arrival

at the police station, Berndt spent approximately 45 minutes

in private with a minister, Chaplain Bodin, who informed

him of the deaths of members of his family and counseled him.

Thereafter, Pedlar, a Brooklyn Center Police Department

detective, and two deputies from the Hennepin County Sher-

iff’s office jointly questioned appellant. They informed him

that they suspected he had intentionally set the fire because

of the rapid spread of the fire and because he was the only

family survivor. After being given the Miranda warning and

3The time lapse between the alarm and the response of the fire

fighters is in dispute—the evidence ranges from 5 minutes to a

half hour.

App. A6

after agreeing to talk, Berndt related the events of the pre-

vious evening leading up to his discovery of the fire and his

escape from the burning house. Following this police inter-

view, a blood sample was taken from appellant at North

Memorial Medical Center. Medical testimony at the trial

indicated that appellant’s blood alcohol level at the time of

the fire could have been as high as .12 or .13 percent.

At all times during the early morning hours of August 21,

Berndt wore the clothing he had continuously worn since

returning home from work the previous evening. At the fire

scene, a neighbor woman, seeking to solace Berndt, hugged

him. She detected no odor of gasoline on his person. Officer

Adams was in close proximity to appellant during the drive

in a closed police squad car from Brooklyn Center to Maple

Grove and back, but he noted no odor of gasoline on Berndt

or his clothing. Chaplain Bodin, who had counseled Berndt for

approximately 45 minutes at the police station, detected no

odor of gasoline on appellant or his clothing. None of the

interrogating officers at the Brooklyn Center Police Depart-

ment, who were investigating what they considered an in-

cendiary fire, testified to the existence of a gasoline odor on

appellant. Trained fire and arson investigators suspecting the

use of a fire accelerant to commit arson undoubtedly would

be very conscious of the existence of such odors. Hospital tech-

nicians who drew Berndt’s blood to analyze his blood alcohol

level must have been in close proximity with appellant. The

state, however, offered no testimony from any hospital per-

sonnel on the existence of a gasoline odor on Berndt. Finally,

experienced police and fire investigators did not confiscate

appellant’s clothing.

From August 21 to August 24, 1981, arson investigators

collected 26 physical samples from the remains of the Berndt

App. A7

townhouse. These included wood cuttings, pieces of carpeting,

and viny] tile. Investigators also videotaped and photographed

areas inside the townhouse. Later these samples were analyzed

by the use of gas chromatography. The state’s analyst con-

cluded that five of the samples indicated the ies of an

accelerant—most probably gasoline.+

Other witnesses testified that to ignite a fire which would

exhibit the burning characteristics of the Berndt fire would

require the use of at least 5 gallons of gasoline. The state

theorized these 5 gallons had been carefully poured throughout

the townhouse, up the stairs and around the children’s bed-

rooms, to insure a fatal conflagration. Had the gasoline been

poured throughout the house in the manner hypothesized by

the state, it is clear the pouring would have been just before

ignition or otherwise its presence would have been obvious to

Brenda through her senses of sight and smell. Of course, if

she had been unconscious as the result of a fracture or con-

cussion, such observation might have been impossible. How-

ever, notwithstanding the severe burning of her body, the

4 At the trial, and in post-trial proceedings, the completeness and

validity of the tests performed by the state’s expert analyst were

matters of considerable dispute.

The state's hypothesis, based substantially on the testimony of

the test results by its expert, was that the fire had been set by

using gasoline as an accelerant. In corroboration of its theory, the

state had other evidence that a fire exhibiting the characteristics

of the Berndt fire could not have been accidentally ignited through

faulty electrical connection, a smoldering cigarette, ignition of

carpeting, etc. Appellant, to the contrary, presented testimony that

the fire was a “flash back” fire. A flash back fire is created when

a fresh supply of oxygen, such as a door opening, reignites a

smoldering fire or a build-up of gases, and the resulting fire

flashes back across a room. Because the state’s case relies so

heavily on the premise that a gasoline accelerant was employed,

for the purpose of this opinion we examine the record to ascer-

tain if any nexus exists between appellant and any gasoline.

App. A8&

Hennepin County medical examiner was able to determine

that prior to the fire Brenda had not suffered any major

type of injury prior to her fire death.°®

Even if the state’s theory is assumed correct, there is no

explanation how someone like Berndt, who, after a day’s work,

has spent an evening drinking and smoking marijuana, and

who had an estimated blood alcohol content at the time of the

fire of .12 or .13 percent, could have carefully poured gasoline

throughout the townhouse in the intricate pattern posited

by the state without spilling some of it on his person or

clothing. The odor of spilled gasoline on skin or clothing is

not easily eliminated. Yet, no witness—lay, police, or fire

fighter—smelled any gasoline odor at the fire scene. Nor did

any witness that morning smell the odor of gasoline on Berndt

outside the burning building, in the squad car, in the police

interrogation room or, apparently, at the hospital.

Furthermore, the record is completely devoid of any testi-

mony or other evidence that Berndt had acquired 5 gallons of

gasoline. No showing exists that Berndt ever purchased gas-

oline by container, or that he ever possessed a gas can. No

evidence was produced that any person residing in the town-

house project area was missing any gasoline nor any con-

tainer.

Within a very short time after arriving at the fire scene,

authorities suspected appellant had torched the home. Al-

though police and fire officials essentially had exclusive con-

trol of the fire remains for at least four days after the fire,

they found no containers which could have held the gasoline

used as an accelerant, nor did they find siphoning equipment

5 Because of burns to her head and face, he could not positively rule

out a blow to the face or head, but no fractures were ascertained

nor any other evidence of trauma to the head observed.

App. A9 —

to link Berndt to this fire. Notwithstanding the absence of

such tools, the state, by pure speculation, theorized either that

(1) appellant had stolen the gas from the caretaker’s supplies,

or (2) appellant had siphoned the gas from cars in the park-

ing lot, or (3) the reason no gas can or siphoning equipment

was found was that in all probability Berndt had thrown it

into a garbage dumpster which had been unloaded the morn-

ing after the fire.

All three of those contentions were purely speculative with

no factual basis. The caretaker testified that none of his gas-

oline was missing. There was complete absence of any evi-

dence to substantiate the claim appellant had siphoned gas

from parked cars. Though a dumpster had been unloaded the

morning of the fire, absolutely no evidence existed that ap-

pellant had thrown anything into it. In sum, nothing in the

evidence justifies an inference establishing a nexus between

appellant and the gasoline—at least 5 gallons of it—used to

accelerate the townhouse fire.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the state has no

burden of establishing a motive for the crime. Nonetheless, if

. the state can establish a credible motive, credibility is lent

to the state’s contention that the accused committed the crime.

The state in this case sought to establish a motive by intro-

ducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship with Brenda,

in particular, his propensity to flirt and be promiscuous, In-

cidents in corroboration of this contention occurred long be-

fore the fire date. Moreover, appellant did not deny the

incidents, but contended those problems had been resolved

well before the fire. No evidence rebuts that assertion. Sec-

ondly, the state sought to raise a financial motive by introduc-

ing evidence of two insurance policies totaling $33,900 on

Brenda’s life. Appellant was not named beneficiary on his

App. Al0

wife’s life insurance policy furnished as an automatic benefit

by the State of Minnesota where she was employed. Berndt

was surprised to learn that the other policy would pay off the

car loan. A reading of the trial record leaves us with the

firm impression that the state failed to establish a credible

motive for causing Brenda’s death. No motive at all was

established for the deaths of the children.

Absent any direct evidence connecting appellant with gas-

oline or any other kind of accelerant, it is clear that appel-

lant’s conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.

We recognize that normally a jury is in the best position to

evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime

and that the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference. See

State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986) and State v.

Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985). However, as we

have previously stated:

The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-

titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence

so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with

the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent

with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.

State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1982) (citing

State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919

(1971); State v. Kaster, 211 Minn. 119, 121, 300 N.W. 897,

899 (1941)). See also State v. Ngoc Van Vu, 389 N.W.2d 892,

898 (Minn. 1983); State v. Threinen, 328 N.W.2d 154, 156

* Admission of evidence of the kind and nature used to suggest a

motive for the alleged killings is generally discretionary with the

trial court. However, in this case arguably there may have been

an abuse of discretion. A reading of the record leaves us with a

firm impression that the jury's verdict may well have been tainted

by such evidence. Jury members may have convicted Berndt be-

cause they were offended by his morals.

App. All

(Minn. 1983); State v. Gibbons, 305 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn.

1981); State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Minn. 1978).

Except for the fact that appellant was physically present

in his home when the fire started, there exist no other cir-

cumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of guilt. To

the contrary, substantially all of the circumstances are con-

sistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. It is not

rational to infer that, after a day’s work and long hours of

drinking and partying, with a blood alcohol content sufficient

to make him legally under the influence of alcohol, appellant

could slosh 5 gallons of gasoline around the townhouse with-

out almost inevitably spilling some of the gas on himself or

his clothing. Yet, no witness, most of whom were in close

proximity to him that morning, detected a gasoline odor about

his person or clothing, even though authorities almost imme-

diately suspected that he was an arsonist.

Nevertheless, the state contends that the Berndt fire was

started and accelerated by the use of gasoline. The bodies of

three children had high levels of carbon monoxide—a fact

that is inconsistent with the state’s theory, but is consistent

with the defense theory of a flashback fire. Likewise, the

autopsy report on Brenda was more consistent with appel-

lant’s theory than with that of the state.

Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in

panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the conten-

tion is irrational because appellant would have been injured

had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence appellant

had singed hair on the left side of his body, and that all the

skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown and peeled off a

few days after the fire.

The state’s theory with respect to the alleged motive for

killing Brenda appears to be without rational basis. Though

App. Al2

admitting that in the years before the fire there had been

problems between himself and Brenda because of his alleged

philandering, the evidence was unrebutted that those disagree-

ments had been ironed out long preceding the fire. The un-

contradicted evidence was that appellant loved the boys and

enjoyed their company. There exists no consistency, in the

light of that undisputed fact, with the state’s claim that ap-

pellant spread gasoline at the door of the children’s bedroom—

including that of his own son.

The state’s entire case was bottomed on mere speculation

or upon hypothesized “facts” not in evidence. Notwithstanding

the absence of even a scintilla of evidence from any lay or

professional witness of any concussion, blow, or fracture to

Brenda’s head, the state urged the jury to speculate that

Berndt and his wife had fought that evening, resulting in a

blow to Brenda’s head sufficient to render her unconscious.

The state produced evidence which, if credited by the jury,

would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire had been

ignited with the use of a gasoline accelerant. About all the

state produced to show appellant was the culprit was sus-

picion unsupported by facts. Some circumstances proved were

consistent with the state’s claim of an intentional fire, but

other circumstances proved were generally consistent with

the rational hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.

The state’s burden was to prove the arson-murders beyond

a reasonable doubt. Here, the state failed to meet that burden.

The circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a ra-

tional hypothesis other than guilt.

Accordingly, the convictions are reversed.

App. Bl

APPENDIX B

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

Hennepin County Kelley, J.

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Appellant.

Filed August 29, 1986. Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk of Ap-

pellate Courts.

SYLLABUS

S.ate failed to meet its burden to establish the guilt of an

accused, convicted of eight counts of first-degree murder,

when the convictions rested on circumstantial evidence which

was consistent with a rationa! hypothesis other than guilt.

Reversed.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

Kelley, Justice.

Orville Berndt appeals from his convictions on eight counts

of first degree murder arising out of the deaths of his wife,

her two sons by a previous marriage, and the son of his wife

and himself. All four perished in a fire in August 1981 at the

family duplex home in Brooklyn Center. On appeal, Berndt

App. B2

claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the con-

victions.' We agree. Accordingly, we reverse.

On August 20, 1981, appellant Orville Berndt lived in a

townhouse residence in Brooklyn Center with his wife,

Brenda; their son, Corey, age 3-1/2; and Brenda’s sons,

Richard Gage, age 13; and Michael Gage, age 10. Early in the

evening after work on August 20, Berndt and his wife went to

consult with their automobile insurance agent to obtain in-

surance coverage on a recently acquired used car. After com-

pleting that business, the couple first visited two bars, and

later ended up at the Earle Brown Bowl, ostensibly to cele-

brate the car purchase. They remained there, drinking beer

and visiting with others until shortly before 1 a.m., August

21. During the course of the evening, in addition to the beer,

Berndt also imbibed two shots of tequila, and smoked some

marijuana. Witnesses who observed the Berndts that night

observed no arguments or altercations between them, and

described everyone there as having a good time.

When the couple arrived home, appellant, who had not eaten

an evening meal after work, fixed himself something to eat.

Thereafter, he smoked a cigarette with Brenda, laid down on

the couch, and eventually fell asleep while watching television.

Brenda was apparently in the room with him. The three

children were sleeping upstairs. Suddenly appellant was

awakened, by whom or what he is not sure, but he saw flames

by the dining room window. The house was extremely hot and

full of smoke. Brenda appeared to be heading through the

1In addition to raising the insufficiency of the evidence issue, ap-

pellant has alleged violation of discovery rules, an unconstitutional

search, and deprivation of a fair trial. Our disposition makes it

unnecessary to address those issues.

App. B3

dining room toward the kitchen area.2 Appellant was con-

fused; he panicked, and then ran out the front door. Shortly

afterwards, the house burst into flames.

As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor heard

him screaming for the fire department. The authorities were

immediately called. While waiting for the fire fighters, ap-

pellant tried to douse the fire with a garden hose.

Police Officer Adams was the first official on the scene.

At the time he arrived, the second story was not burning.

Both Adams and appellant searched for a ladder to attempt

to save the children on the second floor. The search proved

fruitless.

When fire fighters eventually arrived,’ appellant was ex-

tremely vocal, and voiced his indignation and ire at what he

considered an exorbitant lapse of time before fire fighters

responded to the alarm. He acted in a hysterical manner,

shouting obscenities at the fire fighters and police. His actions

so interfered with the fire fighters, they decided to remove

him from the scene. Berndt then was transported in a police

squad car to his sister’s house in Maple Grove by Police Officer

Adams.

Adams remained with appellant in Maple Grove until he

was ordered by Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar

to bring Berndt to the Brooklyn Center Police Department

for interrogation. Pedlar had been at the fire scene early.

From his observation of the fire’s unusual and rapid accelera-

tion, he concluded it might have had an intentional origin.

2 Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused as to what

action Brenda had taken. In general, however, in each version, he

indicated Brenda was heading into the dining room while he pan-

icked and ran from the house because of the heat and smoke.

%The time lapse between the alarm and the response of the fire

fighters is in dispute—the evidence ranges from 5 minutes to a

half hour.

App. B4

Pedlar ordered Officer Adams to treat Berndt as an arson

suspect during the return ride to Brooklyn Center because

appellant was the only surviving family member.

At approximately 6 a.m., Adams and appellant arrived at

the Brooklyn Center Police Station. Immediately after arrival

at the police station, Berndt spent approximately 45 minutes

in private with a minister, Chaplain Bodin, who informed

him of the deaths of members of his family and counseled him.

Thereafter, Pedlar, a Brooklyn Center Police Department

detective, and two deputies from the Hennepin County Sher-

iff’s office jointly questioned appellant. They informed him

that they suspected he had intentionally set the fire because

of the rapid spread of the fire and because he was the only

family survivor. After being given the Miranda warning and

after agreeing to talk, Berndt related the events of the pre-

vious evening leading up to his discovery of the fire and his

escape from the burning house. Following this police inter-

view, a blood sample was taken from appellant at North

Memorial Medical Center. Medical testimony at the trial

indicated that appellant’s blood alcohol level at the time of

the fire could have been as high as .12 or .13 percent.

At all times during the early morning hours of August 21,

Berndt wore the clothing he had continuously worn since

returning home from work the previous evening. At the fire

scene, a neighbor woman, seeking to solace Berndt, hugged

him. She detected no odor of gasoline on his person. Officer

Adams was in close proximity to appellant during the drive

in a closed police squad car from Brooklyn Center to Maple

Grove and back, but he noted no odor of gasoline on Berndt

or his clothing. Chaplain Bodin, who had counseled Berndt for

approximately 45 minutes at the police station, detected no

odor of gasoline on appellant or his clothing. None of the

interrogating officers at the Brooklyn Center Police Depart-

App. B5

ment, who were investigating what they considered an in-

cendiary fire, testified to the existence of a gasoline odor on

appellant. Trained fire and arson investigators suspecting the

use of a fire accelerant to commit arson undoubtedly would

be very conscious of the existence of such odors. Hospital tech-

nicians who drew Berndt’s blood to analyze his blood alcohol

level must have been in close proximity with appellant. The

state, however, offered no testimony from any hospital per-

sonnel on the existence of a gasoline odor on Berndt. Finally,

experienced police and fire investigators did not confiscate

appellant’s clothing.

From August 21 to August 24, 1981, arson investigators

collected 26 physical samples from the remains of the Berndt

townhouse. These included wood cuttings, pieces of carpeting,

and viny] tile. Investigators also videotaped and photographed

areas inside the townhouse. Later these samples were analyzed

by the use of gas chromatography. The state’s analyst con-

cluded that five of the samples indicated the presence of an

accelerant—most probably gasoline.*

4 At the trial, and in post-trial proceedings, the completeness and

validity of the tests performed by the state’s expert analyst were

matters of considerable dispute.

The state’s hypothesis, based substantially on the testimony of

the test results by its expert, was that the fire had been set by

using gasoline as an accelerant. In corroboration of its theory, the

state had other evidence that a fire exhibiting the characteristics

of the Berndt fire could not have been accidentally ignited through

faulty electrical connection, a smoldering cigarette, ignition of

carpeting, etc. Appellant, to the contrary, prescnted testimony that

the fire was a “flash back” fire. A flash back fire is created when

a fresh supply of oxygen, such as a door opening, reignites a

smoldering fire or a build-up of gases, and the resulting fire

flashes back across a room. Because the state’s case relies so

heavily on the premise that a gasoline accelerant was employed,

for the purpose of this opinion we examine the record to ascer-

tain if any nexus exists between appellant and any gasoline.

App. B6

Other witnesses testified that to ignite a fire which would

exhibit the burning characteristics of the Berndt fire would

require the use of at least 5 gallons of gasoline. The state

theorized these 5 gallons had been carefully poured throughout

the townhouse, up the stairs and around the children’s bed-

rooms, to insure a fatal conflagration. Had the gasoline been

poured throughout the house in the manner hypothesized by

the state, it is clear the pouring would have been just befare

ignition or otherwise its presence would have been obvious to

Brenda through her senses of sight and smell. Of course, if

she had been unconscious as the result of a fracture or con-

cussion, such observation might have been impossible. How-

ever, notwithstanding the severe burning of her body, the

Hennepin County medical examiner was able to determine

that prior to the fire Brenda had not suffered any major

type of injury prior to her fire death.®

Even if the state’s theory is assumed correct, there is no

explanation how someone like Berndt, who, after a day’s work,

has spent an evening drinking and smoking marijuana, and

who had an estimated blood alcohol content at the time of the

fire of .12 or .13 percent, could have carefully poured gasoline

throughout the towi..:ouse in the intricate pattern posited

by the state without spilling some of it on his person or

clothing. The odor of spilled gasoline on skin or clothing is

not easily eliminated. Yet, no witness—lay, police, or fire

fighter—smelled any gasoline odor at the fire scene. Nor did

any witness that morning smell the odor of gasoline on Berndt

outside the burning building, in the squad car, in the police

interrogation room or, apparently, at the hospital.

5 Because of burns to her head and face, he could not positively rule

out a blow to the face.or head, but no fractures were ascertained

nor any other evidence of trauma to the head observed.

App. B7

Furthermore, the record is completely devoid of any testi-

mony or other evidence that Berndt had acquired 5 gallons of

gasoline. No showing exists that Berndt ever purchased gas-

oline by container, or that he ever possessed a gas can. No

evidence was produced that any person residing in the town-

house project area was missing any gasoline nor any con-

tainer.

Within a very short time after arriving at the fire scene,

authorities suspected appellant had torched the home. Al-

though police and fire officials essentially had exclusive con-

trol of the fire remains for at least four days after the fire,

they found no containers which could have held the gasoline

used as an accelerant, nor did they find siphoning equipment

to link Berndt to this fire. Notwithstanding the absence of

such tools, the state, by pure speculation, theorized either that

(1) appellant had stolen the gas from the caretaker’s supplies,

or (2) appellant had siphoned the gas from cars in the park-

ing lot, or (3) the reason no gas can or siphoning equipment

was found was that in all probability Berndt had thrown it

into a garbage dumpster which had been unloaded the morn-

ing after the fire.

All three of those contentions were purely speculative with

no factual basis. The caretaker testified that none of his gas-

oline was missing. There was complete absence of any evi-

dence to substantiate the claim appellant had siphoned gas

from parked cars. Though a dumpster had been unloaded the

morning of the fire, absolutely no evidence existed that ap-

pellant had thrown anything into it. In sum, nothing in the

evidence justifies an inference establishing a nexus between

appellant and the gasoline—at least 5 gallons of it—used to

accelerate the townhouse fire.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the state has no

burden of establishing a motive for the crime. Nonetheless, if

App. B8

the state can establish a credible motive, credibility is lent

to the state’s.contention that the accused committed the crime.

The state in this case sought to establish a motive by intro-

ducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship with Brenda,

in particular, his propensity to flirt and be promiscuous. In-

cidents in corroboration of this contention occurred long be-

fore the fire date. Moreover, appellant did not deny the

incidents, but contended those problems had been resolved

well before the fire. No evidence rebuts that assertion. Sec-

ondly, the state sought to raise a financial motive by introduc-

ing evidence of two insurance policies totaling $33,900 on

Brenda’s life. Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s

life insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota where

she was employed. He was not even a named beneficiary on

this policy. Berndt was surprised to learn that the other policy

would pay off a car loan. A reading of the trial record leaves

us with the firm impression that the state failed to establish

a credible motive for causing Brenda’s death.*° No motive at

all was established for the deaths of. the children.

Absent any direct evidence connecting appellant with gas-

oline or any other kind of accelerant, it is clear that appel-

lant’s conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.

We recognize that normally a jury is in the best position to

evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime

and that the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference. See

State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986) and State v.

6 Admission of evidence of the kind and nature used to suggest a

motive for the alleged killings is generally discretionary with the

trial court. However, in this case arguably there may have been

an abuse of discretion. A reading of the record leaves us with a

firm impression that the jury’s verdict may well have been tainted

by such evidence. Jury members may have convicted Berndt be-

cause they were offended by his morals.

App. B9

Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985). However, as we

have previously stated:

The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-

titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence

so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with

the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent

with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.

State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1982) (cing

State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919

(1971); State v. Kaster, 211 Minn. 119, 121, 300 N.W. 897,

899 (1941)). See also State v. Ngoc Van Vu, 339 N.W.2d 892,

898 (Minn. 1983); State v. Threinen, 328 N.W.2d 154, 156

(Minn. 1983) ; State v. Gibbons, 305 N.W.2d 331i, 336 (Minn.

1981) ; State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Minn. 1978).

Except for the fact that appellant was physically present

in his home when the fire started, there exist no other cir-

cumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of guilt. To

the contrary, substantially all of the circumstances are con-

sistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. It is not

rational to infer that, after a day’s work and long hours of

drinking and partying, with a blood alcohol content sufficient

to make him legally under the influence of alcohol, appellant

could slosh 5 gallons of gasoline around the townhouse with-

out almost inevitably spilling some of the gas on himself or

his clothing. Yet, no witness, most of whom were in close

proximity to him that morning, detected a gasoline odor about

his person or clothing, even though authorities almost imme-

diately suspected that he was an arsonist.

Nevertheless, the state contends that the Berndt fire was

started and accelerated by the use of gasoline. The bodies of

three children had high levels of carbon monoxide—a fact

that is inconsistent with the state’s theory, but is consistent

App. B10

with the defense theory of a flashback fire. Likewise, the

autopsy report on Brenda wa more consistent with appel-

lant’s theory than with that of the state.

Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in

panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the conten-

tion is irrational because appellant would have been injured

had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence appellant

had singed hair on the left side of his body, and that all the

skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown and peeled off a

few days after the fire.

The state’s theory with respect to the alleged motive for

killing Brenda appears to be without rational basis. Though

admitting that in the years before the fire there had been

problems between himself and Brenda because of his alleged

philandering, the evidence was unrebutted that those disagree-

ments had been ironed out long preceding the fire. The un-

contradicted evidence was that appellant loved the boys and

enjoyed their company. There exists no consistency, in the

light of that undisputed fact, with the state’s claim that ap-

pellant spread gasoline at the door of the children’s bedroom—

including that of his own son.

The state’s entire case was bottomed on mere speculation

or upon hypothesized “facts” not in evidence. Notwithstanding

the absence of even a scintilla of evidence from any lay or

professional witness of any concussion, blow, or fracture to

Brenda’s head, the state urged the jury to speculate that

Berndt and his wife had fought that evening, resulting in a

blow to Brenda’s head sufficient to render her unconscious.

The state produced evidence which, if credited by the jury,

would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire had been

ignited with the use of a gasoline accelerant. About all the

state produced to show appellant was the culprit was sus-

App. Bll

picion unsupported by facts. Some circumstances proved were

consirtent with the state’s claim of an intentional fire, but

other circumstances proved were generally consistent with

the rational hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.

The state’s burden was to prove the arson-murders beyond

a reasonable doubt. Here, the state failed to meet that burden.

The circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a ra-

tional hypothesis other than guilt.

Accordingly, the convictions are reversed.

App. Cl

APPENDIX C

State of Minnesota District Court

County of Hennepin Fourth Judicial District

D.C. File 80973-01

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Defendant.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

The above matter came before the undersigned sitting by

special appointment as a District Court Judge for determina-

tion of post-trial motion brought on behalf of defendant re-

questing that the court grant a new trial or order judgment

of acquittal pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04(1) (1). Said

motion was continued from time to time for the purpose of

taking testimony of defense expert Robert Davis and conduct-

ing the deposition of state expert Rick Tontarski. All neces-

sary transcripts and memoranda were received by the court

by July 24, 1984.

Daniel F. Byrne, Esq. appeared on behalf of the State of

Minnesota; Craig Cascarano, Esq. appeared on behalf of the

defendant.

Based upon the files, records, depositions, testimony, and

written memoranda of both counsel,

IT IS ORDERED:

App. C2

1. That defendant’s motion for a new trial or for judgment

of acquittal is denied in its entirety.

2. That the attached memorandum shall be construed as

part of this order.

DATED: August 1, 1984

By the Court

DORIS OHLSEN HUSPENI

Acting District Court Judge by

Special Appointment

MEMORANDUM

On November 12, 1983, Orville Berndt, Jr. was convicted

after a jury trial on eight counts of first degree murder in-

volving the death of his wife, their son, and his wife’s two

children by a prior marriage.

The trial lasted several weeks. The State’s theory was that

Berndt poured gasoline throughout the house, ignited the gas-

oline, and then went outside. The State claimed that its theory

was supported by Orville Berndt’s unusual behavior at the

time of the fire, by burn patterns in the house, by the rapidity

of the fire, and by expert testimony that traces of gasoline

were found in some physical samples taken from the fire scene.

Defendant’s motion relates to this last evidence.

At trial the State’s expert, Rick Tontarski, testified exten-

sively that gasoline was found in 5 of 26 samples taken from

the fire scene. He reached this conclusion by analyzing all 26

samples in a gas chromatograph which produces a graphic

representation of a sample called a chromatogram. By match-

ing the sample chromatograms to standard gasoline chromato-

grams, Tontarski concluded that gasoline was present in 5

samples. These results were disputed by the defense expert,

App. C3

Robert Davis. Davis indicated that the 5 so-called positive

chromatograms in fact did not contain gasoline.

Both Tontarski and Davis testified extensively at trial. Both

were: extensively cross-examined. On the last day of trial,

Tontarski was recalled for rebuttal testimony. At that time,

a State’s proposed exhibit (not received) was discovered to be

a chromatogram which had not been made available to defen-

dant through discovery. Tontarski had, in fact, made more

than one chromatogram for each of the 5 samples in which he

had identified gasoline. The additional chromatograms were

in his Maryland laboratory. Prior to trial, he had turned over

to the defense one chromatogram for each positive sample.

Nothing relating to the additional chromatograms was ad-

mitted into evidence at trial. Pursuant to a post-trial motion,

all positive chromatograms were produced for the defense.

Defendant’s motion raises two issues:

1. Whether there was a Rule 9 violation and, if so, would

it mandate a new trial.

2. Whether the additional chromatograms are newly dis-

covered evidence that requires a new trial.

1. Reports of examinations and tests are discoverable by

the defendant without court order:

The prosecuting attorney shall disclose and permit cde-

fense counsel to inspect and reproduce any results or re-

ports of .. . scientific tests, experiments or comparisons

made with the particular case.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01(1) (4). Throughout the discovery stage

of this case, the defense requested Tontarski to produce only

chromatograms regarding the five positive samples. Discovery

of chromatograms taken from the 21 negative samples has

never been an issue and is not an issue in this motion. The

defense claims that it was unaware that more than one chro-

App. C4

matogram was made for each positive sample. Tontarski in-

sists that he informed the defense at some point during dis-

covery that more than one chromatogram existed for each

positive sample. Prior to trial, Tontarski turned over to the

defense the one chromatogram for each positive sample that

he relied upon for making his identification of gasoline. The

other positive chromatograms, while of assistance to Tontar-

ski and while reflecting the presence of gasoline, were merely

preparatory to insure the right sample volume, select the right

amplification setting, or determine the need for clean-up pro-

cedures.

Discovery requests between the defense and prosecution

were not in writing. Therefore it is difficult to determine

whether the discovery request necessarily encompassed all

chromatograms showing evidence of gasoline, or only those

5 chromatograms that Tontarski relied on for his opinion. In

any event, there was no bad faith on Tontarski’s part in not

turning over all the chromatograms.

Rule 9 itself is not helpful in determining the extent of

Tontarski’s obligation to produce, but the principles under-

lying that rule lend guidance. Discovery is intended to give:

both parties the maximum possible amount of informa-

tion with which to prepare their cases and thereby re-

duces the possibility of surprise at trial.

State v. Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1982). In Schwan-

tes, the court reversed a conviction because the prosecutor

failed to disclose evidence it had before trial that was used to

impeach the defendant’s alibi.

This case is very different. Before trial, the defense was

equipped with Tontarski’s conclusions and with the underly-

ing information on which he relied. The preliminary chro-

matograms shed no appreciably brighter light on either his

App. C5

technique or on his ultimate opinions. Unlike Schwantes, any

potential surprise here was minimized by keeping the addi-

tional chromatograms out of evidence. The prosecutor did not

use the information to his advantage. In fact, it was the

| prosecutor who was responsible for calling the entire matter

to the court’s attention. Trial preparation was not seriously

impeded. The defense was not prejudiced.

Even if Rule 9 were violated, it would not necessitate a new

trial, especially since the failure to disclose was in good faith

and was nonprejudicial. See, State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172

(Minn. 1983). To avoid these issues in the future, no doubt

the better procedure would be to put requests in writing.

2. To justify a new trial, newly discovered evidence must

be of a sort that could not have been discovered before trial

by due diligence and that would materially have affected the

outcome of the trial. State v. Meldahl, 310 Minn. 136, 245

N.W.2d 252 (1976); Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04(1). The defense

arguments do not meet this standard.

At the post-trial hearing, Davis testified that the additional

chromatograms showed that Tontarski’s technique was un-

reliable, that Tontarski was operating without standards, that

ordinary building compounds were incorrectly considered, and

that he believed Tontarski’s samples were contaminated. Davis

also expressed the concern that the additional chromatograms

did not closely resemble the chromatograms that were sup-

plied in pre-trial discovery.

Virtually all of these matters were exhaustively dealt with

at trial. The question of standards, specifically a carbon di-

sulphide standard, was explicitly raised at trial. Moreover,

at his deposition Tontarski showed that his file on the case in

fact contained that standard. Davis’ concerns about contam-

ination arose chiefly from the fact that sample containers

i i

App. C6

were punctured to “purge and trap” the contents. He argued

that puncturing may have introduced foreign elements into

the samples. These punctures were quite noticeable in the con-

tainers during trial, so the contamination argument was avail-

able to Davis at that time. In any event, Tontarski testified

at his deposition regarding the safeguards taken to protect

the integrity of the samples. The fact that Tontarski ran no

contro! samples of building compounds in the house, such as

carpeting, also was an issue before the jury. The one concern

most directly related to the belated discovery of additional

chromatograms was that they did not match the chromato-

grams which were turned over to the defense before trial. At

his deposition, Tontarski explained that this was to be ex-

pected since in many instances his equipment was adjusted

or the sample was cleaned of impurities to permit more ac-

curate identification. These adjustments and cleansings would

change the shape of the graph in each chromatogram.

_The post-trial discovery of additional chromatograms pro-

vided no significant opportunities for cross-examination of

Tontarski that did not exist at trial. Their disclosure before

trial would not have made a material difference to the out-

come. For these reasons, the defendant’s motions are denied.

D.O.H.

App. Dl

APPENDIX D

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Petitioner-Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Respondent-Appellant.

MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING DISTRICT COURT

TO DELIVER TRIAL COURT EXHIBITS TO

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

To the Supreme Court, State of Minnesota:

This court filed a decision on March 21, 1986, reversing

Appellant’s four convictions for Murder in the First Degree.

Since the filing of this decision, Respondent has learned that

certain trial exhibits which were used at trial to explain the

testimony of the arson experts were never delivered by the

Hennepin County District Court to this court. See Affidavit

of Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, law clerk; Beverly J. Wolfe, at-

torney. Among the exhibits that were not delivered are the

following: State’s Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,

23, 24, 25, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48 and Defendant’s Exhibit M. See

Index attached to affidavits.

The State respectfully submits that the complicated arson

testimony cannot be adequately understood without reference

to the undelivered exhibits. The State is filing a Petition for

Rehearing in this case along with this motion. It is submitted

that it is essential that this court examine these undelivered

App. D2

exhibits when it considers this Petition. Therefore, Respon-

dent respectfully requests that this court order the district

court to deliver all trial court exhibits in this case to this court.

DATED: April 10, 1986

Respectfully submitted,

BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Assistant County Attorney

Atty. Lic. No. 181751

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Phone : 348-8794

Attorney for Petitioner-

Respondent

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Respondent,

vs.

ORVII.LE BERNDT, JR.,

Appellant.

AFFIDAVIT

State of Minnesota

County of Hennepin—ss.

Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, being first duly sworn on oath,

deposes and says:

1. That she is a law clerk for the State of Minnesota, the

Respondent in the above-entitled matter.

a ee

App. D3

2. That she notified Kim Kuch (297-1904), who works in

the Minnesota Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, on April 1, 1986,

that it was necessary for her to borrow State’s Exhibits Nos.

18 and 19 in the above-entitled manner for the purpose of

reproducing and reducing them to be used in Respondent’s

Petition for Rehearing.

3. That on April 1, 1986, she went to the Clerk’s Office to

pick up those exhibits.

4. That she learned at that time from Kim Kuehn that

State’s Exhibits Nos. 18-25 were not listed on the District

Court’s Index of trial court record and had never been de-

livered to the Supreme Court.

5. That she received from Kim Kuehn a copy of the Index

of the District Court File (see attachment) which showed

that a large number of trial court exhibits were never de-

livered to the Supreme Court.

6. That Kim Kuehn called the Hennepin County District

Court File Room for her and told her that these exhibits are

locked up on B level under the supervision of Jerry Wallner

and that a court order would be necessary to obtain them.

Further your affiant sayeth not.

Dated: April 8, 1986.

SUSAN LYNN-PAUL HAUGE

Law Clerk

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Phone: 348-3607

Law Clerk for Respondent

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of April,

1986. Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public.

Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public-—Minnesota, Ramsey

County, my commission expires Sept. 21, 1990.

App. D4

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Appellant.

AFFIDAVIT

State of Minnesota

County of Hennepin—ss.

Beverly J. Wolfe, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes

and says:

1. That she is an attorney for the State of Minnesota, the

Respondent in the above-entitled matter.

2. That she learned on April 1, 1986, from her law clerk

Susan Lynn-Paul Hauge, that numerous trial court exhibits

in the above-entitled case were never delivered by Hennepin

County District Court to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

3. That in June, 1985, she was absent from work due to

illness and that she spoke by phone with a woman (name

unknown) in the Hennepin County District Court Clerk’s

Office about her borrowing State’s Exhibits No. 35-37 (video

tapes) from the district court file. During this conversation,

she told the woman that because this was a complicated arson

case it was important that all of the trial court exhibits be

delivered to the supreme court. She was told by the woman

that the district court clerk’s office was in the process of pre-

App. D5

paring the exhibits and file for delivery to the supreme court.

4. That to the best of her knowledge, no copy of the trial

court record index was ever sent to her office.

5. That she was under the good faith belief that all the

trial court exhibits had been delivered to the supreme court.

j 6. That she has examined both the exhibits that were not

delivered and the trial transcript and it is her belief that

reference to the exhibits, especially State’s Exhibits Nos. 18

and 19, are necessary to understand the opinions by the State’s

arson experts that Appellant could not have been inside the

townhouse at the time the fire was ignited.

7. That she believes that transmission of these exhibits to

the supreme court is essential in order for this court to under-

stand the points that will be raised in the Petition for Re-

hearing that Respondent will be filing on or before April 10,

1986.

8. That her office has learned from Jerry Wallner of the

Hennepin County District Court Clerk’s Office that an order

by the supreme court is necessary before the district court can

deliver exhibits to the supreme court. —

Further your affiant sayeth not.

Dated: April 8, 1986.

BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Assistant County Attorney

Atty. Lic. No. 131751

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

; Attorney for Respondent

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of April,

1986, Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public.

Barbara A. Besta, Notary Public—Minnesota, Ramsey

County. My commission expires Sept. 21, 1990.

State of Minnesota

County of Hennepin

App. D6

May 14, 1985

District Court

Fourth Judicial District

APPELLATE/SUPREME COURT RECEIPT

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.

No. D.C. No. 80973-1

C2-84-1661

St. Paul, Minnesota

Received of Jack M. Provo District Court Administrator,

Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County, Minnesota, the

original file consisting of:

1. Indictment (Copy)

2.

3. Notice of Prosecuting Attorney of Evidence

10,

11.

FP PSF PT

Indictment (Original)

and Identification Procedure Pursuant to

Rule 7.01

Affidavit

Follow-up Report

Allied Fidelity Bond

Letter Filed

Notice of Motion and Motion

Notice of Motion and Motion

Order

Judgment

Date Filed

08-17-82

08-17-82

08-18-82

09-02-82

09 02-82

09-08-82

11-10-82

11-15-82

03-04-83

11-12-83

App. D7

. List of Possible State’s Witnesses

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's

Motion in Limine No. 1

. Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 1

Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's

Motion in Limine No. 3

Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 3

Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 5

State’s Memorandum

. Letter

. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's

Motion in Limine No. 5

Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 2

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

27. Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Guilty Verdict Sheet

Defendant's Proposed Witness List

Criminal Witness List

Jury List

Jury List

Criminal Witness List

Sentence Transcript

. Sentence Transcript

Notice of Motion and Motion

. Order

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-14-83

11-10-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-14-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-16-83

11-17-83

11-18-83

11-25-83

12-09-83

SSR SF SS&

SRAELBRSSSEAS SE

Order

Memorandum in Support of Motion for

New Trial

Memorandum Opposing Motion for New Trial

Letter

Letter

Letter

Letter

App. D8

Order And Memorandum

Order for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad

Prosequendum, Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad

Prosequendum

Writ Of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum

Letter

ress

ARFRS RR

PiEEEEEER?

App. D9

85. Filing of Appellant’s Brief

S#RESRE RE SSEAS

No. 7A - 7B

No. 8A - 8C

No. 9A - 91

No. 10A - 10F

No. LIA - 11K

No. 12

No. 13

No. ITA - 17D

No. 26

No. 27 - 30

No. 32-33

EXHIBIT’S

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-03-84

08-01-84

08-20-84

09-24-84

09-14-84

09-14-84

11-19-84

11-19-84

12-10-84

05-13-85

Item

Photo’s

Photo’s

Photo’s

Photo’s

Photo’s

Photo’s

Photo

Photo

Photo’s

Photo

Photo

Life Insurance Check

App. D10

98. No. 34 Life Insurance Policy

99. No. 38-39 Photo

100. No. 40-41 Diagram

101. No. 42-44 Photo

102. No. 35 - 37 Videotape’s

Defendant’s Exhibits: Item

103. A Graph’s

104. B-F Recording Charts

105. J-L Photo’s

106. N4-N53 Graphs

107. O Graph’s

108. P Graph’s

TRANSCRIPT’S

109. Omnibus Hearing 11-19-84

110. Motion 11-19-84

111. Volume III - XVI 11-19-84

112. Post Trial Hearing 04-26-85

in the above entitled cause.

App. El

APPENDIX E

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Petitioner-Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Respondent-Appellant.

MOTION TO ACCEPT PHOTO REPRODUCTIONS OF

STATE’S EXHIBITS NOS. 18 AND 19

TO THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MINNESOTA:

The State of Minnesota respectfully requests that this court

accept the State’s photo reproductions of State’s Exhibits

Nos. 18 and 19 and to have them distributed with the Peti-

tion for Rehearing. It is submitted that reference to these

photo reproductions are necessary to understand the State's

Petition for Rehearing.

Dated: April 10, 1986.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL RICHARDSON

For BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Assistant County Attorney

Atty. Lic. No. 91388

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Phone: 348-5988

Attorney for Petitioner-

Respondent

App. Fl

APPENDIX F

i YICNSddY

Se

ONINIG

DEL

‘App. Gl

APPENDIX G

SESE SE cau ==se y=

/~ AIMNSddv

Hiv

Pg oe

NmrAngag

a

~~

—

| -_

€# WO

AS

= WOO¥G38 Y3LSVN

¢# WOOUG3E

-

App. Hl

APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ARSON

INVESTIGATORS, INC.

25 Newton Street

P.O. Box 600

Marlboro, Massachusetts 01752

Telephone (617) 481-5977

April 8, 1986

Bruce Ryden, Fire Marshal

City of Roseville

2660 Civic Center Drive

Roseville, Minnesota 55113

Dear Mr. Ryden:

On Au; st 16, 1985 you filed a formal grievance against

Shelby Gallein with the Ethical Practices and Grievance Com-

mittee of the International Association of Arson Investigators,

Inc. This complaint concerned itself with trial testimony given

by Mr. Gallien in a multiple homicide-arson case that was

tried in Minneapolis.

The Committee has made numerous attempts to locate Mr.

Gallien. These attempts included efforts made by representa-

tives of the Committee to contact him personally, as well as

efforts made by telephone and by mail. All of these attempts

have been unsuccessful to date. The Committee is in receipt

of an unverified report that Mr. Gallien was seriously ill.

The grievance is still pending before this Committee and

efforts to locate Mr. Gallien will continue in order to bring

this matter to a conclusion.

Very truly yours,

JOHN R. LEWIS

Chairman

Ethical Practices and

Grievance Committee

App. H2

COMPLAINT

We, the undersigned, being members in good standing of

the International Association of Arson Investigators, do here-

by respectfully request the Officers & Board of Directors

of the Association consider sanctions as specified in Article

II, Section 7.b. of the Constitution & Bylaws against Mr.

Shelby Gallien, 1324 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette,

Indiana 47906 for violation of the Code of Ethics of the

Association.

The following section of said Code of Ethics are alleged to

have been violated:

1. “I will regard it my duty to know my work thoroughly.

It is my further duty to avail myself of every opportu-

nity to learn more about my profession.”

2. I will make no claims to professional qualification which

I do not possess.

3. I will bear in mind always that I am a truth seeker, not

a case maker. That it is more important to protect the

innocent than to convict the guilty.

Respectfully submitted,

Bruce E. Ryden . William H. Bruen

COMPLAINANTS INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL

The complainants were requested by the fire chief of the

municipality where the fire occurred and the prosecutor to

monitor the trial during the defense expert witness testimony

to offer rebuttal to this expert both to the prosecutor and to

testify if necessary.

Both complainants sat through the 1-1/2 days of direct

testimony and the 1-1/2 days of cross examination, redirect

and recross examination. it is the information obtained during

this period upon which the conplaint is based.

App. H3

BACKGROUND

In August 1981, a fire in a townhouse took the lives of a

mother and her three children. The father, allegedly asleep

on the couch in the living room, awoke to see his wife on the

floor of the dining room and a fire at the ceiling over his

wife. He ran from the house (barefooted) and suffered no

injuries. The wife died instantly of burns of the respiratory

tract and the children of smoke inhalation after they got out

of bed.

An investigation determined that. gasoline like residue was

found in samples of hardwood flooring, vinyl] tile flooring and

from the only piece of carpet left in the living room. AFT

Labs in Washington, D.C. did the analysis.

Classic flammable burn patterns were found at the entrance

to each of the children’s bedrooms, at the bottom of the stair-

way to the second floor, the kitchen floor, living room, around

the wife’s body in the dining room and in the entryway to the

townho.se.

A grand jury was impaneled and returned indictments on

four counts of murder in the first degree and four counts of

arson in the first degree against the father.

The trial was held in Minneapolis during which Shelby

Gallien of 1324 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette, Indi-

ana, testified for the defense. Mr. Gallien testified under direct

examination that he believed there were three possible causes

of the fire and the local investigators did an inadequate job of

investigating due to inexperience. His three possible points

of origin were:

1. Electrical fire in the exterior wall of the kitchen.

2. Frying pan left on kitchen range.

3. Cigarette dropped on carpet by wife next to her body.

App. H4

When asked if the fire could have been due to gasoline being

poured throughout the building and ignited from the outside,

he stated: “Absolutely not’.

Under cross examination, Mr. Gallien withdrew his opinions

as to the electrical origin after being reminied that all re-

ceptacles and switches were removed, examined and found to

have not been involved in the origin of the fire. He also with-

drew the frying pan theory when reminded that the defendant

and the investigators had testified the burners were all in the

off position.

He continued to stick to his theory that a cigarette dropped

on the carpet would melt the carpet back to its petroleum base,

cause the smoke and hot gases to buildup at the ceiling and

“flashback” in a localized area within 1-1/2 hours.

Under redirect examination, Mr. Gallien attempted to re-

fute his testimony under cross examination by saying the

prosecutor put words in his mouth but he (Mr. Gallien) had

in no way attempted to eliminate the possibilities of the elec-

trical or grease fire origins. He was still convinced that those

three points could not be eliminated due to the inadequate

investigation by the local investigators.

Under recross examination, Mr. Gallien’s testimony under

cross examination was read back and he stated, without any

prompting by the prosecutor, “I’ve eliminated the electrical as

a possible point of origin” and later, “I’ve eliminated the fry-

ing pan as a possible point of origin.” The prosecutor stated:

“Now lets get this straight, you originally had three possible

points of origin, first the electrical in the kitchen and you’ve

now eliminated that,” “Yes sir’. “Second, the frying pan on

the stove and you’ve now eliminated that”, “Yes sir’. At that

point both the prosecutor and defense attorney dismissed the

witness.

App. H5

The fire was investigated by members of the local fire de-

partment, the county sheriff department and, on consultation,

the then head of the Minneapolis Arson Squad.

The jury found the defendant guilty of four counts of

murder in the first degree, four counts of arson in the first

degree and he was sentenced to life in prison.

10.

11.

12.

SHELBY GALLIEN

DIRECT TESTIMONY

Claims to have started IAAI and trained, personally,

3,000 to 4,000 arson investigators.

Invented the use of the gas chromatograph in fire in-

vestigation.

Stated that if you do not have melted glass and melted

alum. you do not have an accelerated fire.

Gasoline accelerated fire will reach ‘“2,000° - 2,100° -

2,200°F”’.

Stated copper will melt if it is in an accelerated fire.

Could not light an accelerated (gasoline) fire and get

away without being badly burned.

Stated 1 gallon of gasoline equals 400 lbs. nitroglycer-

ine or 45 lbs. dynamite. Later changed to 85 lbs.

nitro — 54 lbs. dynamite in “footpower’’.

Gave flammable limits for gasoline as 1.75 - 4% in air.

Stated carpet would melt down, pool and leave a gas-

oline like residue.

Heavy soot on windows indicates it could not have been

a gasoline accelerated fire because gasoline burns

hotter and cleaner.

Stated gasoline accelerated fire would have burned

through floor—no burn through—no accelerant.

Explained burn patterns on hardwood floors being due

to hot roof tar dropping on floor. (Totally disregarded

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

App. H6

fact that there was gypsum wallboard and fiberglass

insulation between roof and flooring).

Also gave “floor oil” and heavy wax on floor as ex-

planation for burn patterns.

Stated size of alligatoring is not an indicator of the

speed of a fire.

Sample of floor tile in entryway came in positive for

accelerant. Gallien stated could not have been gasoline

or it would have burned and been consumed.

Was unable to differentiate between BX cable and thin-

wall conduit but stated that if a short had taken place,

a temperature of 4,000, 5,000 or 6,000° would have

melted the “iron” box and splattered molten metal all

over. Arc will continue until box is completely gone.

Dry wall corner beading was not melted because there

was no accelerant. If there had been an accelerant, it

would have melted the aluminum beading. Beading was

actually steel.

Courtroom was too large to have a flashover fire.

Testified the fire was slow starting fire with approx-

imately 1-1/2 hour delay. Smoke and hot gases built-up

to 3’ - 3-1/2’ deep at ceiling and “flashbacked’”’.

“Flashback” type of fire has 4 phases:

Phase 1. Smudge—such as from a cigarette—approx-

imately 1-1/2 hours long.

Phase 2. Heat level at ceiling—3’-5’ deep—flash-

back.

Phase 3. Natural burn.

Phase 4. Natural phase.

Testified “flashback” type of fire will flash down walls

and cause a localized burning in center of floor. Most

intense heat will be in center of the floor.

App. H7

22. Low burning is characteristic of a “flashback” fire.

23.

V patterns will show up in a “flashback” fire.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Mr. Gallien testified that:

1.

“Graduate of OSHA Institute’s course on Industrial

Fire Investigation”, there is no such course at OSHA.

NFPA determines flame spread rates.

Was not familiar with current standard tests on carpet-

ing.

Burn patterns on floors were due to either air currents

from windows or possibly from fire department fog

patterns.

Ordinary steel melts at 2,200°F. - 2,300°F. or 2,400°F.

Chrome steel melts at 2,600°F. - 2,700°F.

A drop of gasoline will fall faster than a drop of tar.

Light bulbs are not indicators that point to the origin

area of a fire.

Cigarettes burn for 22 minutes and will start a fire in

1-1/2 hours if uninsulated.

Carbon Dioxide is flammable in and of itself.

Fires burn without oxygen.

. Gasoline ignition temperature is 4 45°F.

“Flashback” fires can be limited to a very small area

of ceiling of a room.

Natural air drafts cause ruts to be burned in the floor.

REDIRECT

. Difference between 4% and 7.6% upper flammable

limit:

7.6% will be low order explosion—slower.

4% will be high order explosion—faster.

App. I1

APPENDIX I

C2-84-1661

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Petitioner-Respondent,

vs.

ORVILLE BERNDT, JR.,

Respondent-Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

WILLIAM R. KENNEDY HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Hennepin County Minnesota Attorney General

Public Defender 102 State Capitol

DAVID KNUTSON St. Paul, MN 55155

Assistant County THOMAS L. JOHNSON

Public Defender Hennepin County Attorney

C-2300 Government Center VERNON E. BERGSTROM

Minneapolis, MN 55487 Chief, Appellate Section

Attorneys for Respondent- By: BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Appellant Assistant County Attorney

Atty. Lic. No. 131751

Phone : 348-8794

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Attorneys for Petitioner-

Respondent

IV.

VI.

App. I2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement of the Case. _s_ App. I3

. Summary of Petition... | App. I4

. In Holding That The iii Was Insufficient,

This Court Overlooked And Misconceived Mate-

rial Evidence In The Case. ...-_. _. App. 15

Examination Of The Material Evidence That

Was Overlooked And Misconceived By This Court

Makes Clear That The Evidence Viewed In The

Light Most Favorable To The Verdict Was Suf-

ficient To Sustain The Jury’s Verdicts. . App. I20

Because The Evidence Was Technically Sufficient

To Sustain The Jury’s Verdicts, The Interests Of

Justice Require Either That The Verdicts Be

Reinstated Or That The Case Be Remanded For

yO Pe ee

Conclusion PEO Me eer

App. I3

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 17, 1982, the Hennepin County Grand Jury re-

turned an indictment charging Orville Berndt, Jr., the Re-

spondent-Appellant in this case (hereinafter referred to as

Appellant) with four counts of Murder in the First Degree

in violation of Minn. Stat. §699.185(1) (intentional and pre-

meditated murder) and with four counts of Murder in the

First Degree in violation of Minn. Stat. §609.185(3) (1981)

(intentional murder by arson) for the deaths of his wife

Brenda Berndt, his son Corey Berndt and his wife’s two sons

Michael Gage and Richard Gage. Following Appellant’s pleas

of not guilty to all counts, jury trial commenced before The

Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on October 20, 1983 (T.1).

On November 12, 1983, the jury returned verdicts finding

Appellant guilty of all eight first degree murder counts (T.

2333). Immediately following these verdicts, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to mandatory terms of life imprisonment

for each first degree conviction pursuant to Minn. Stat. §609.-

185(3) and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently

(T.2340-42). Appellant’s remaining four first degree murder

convictions were merged pursuant to Minn. Stat. §609.035

(1981) (T.2342). Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial or

Judgment of Acauittal which was denied by the trial court on

August 1, 1984.

Appellant filed his Brief with this court on May 1, 1986.

The State of Minnesota, the Petitioner-Respondent in this

case, filed its Brief on July 12, 1986. Oral argument was held

before this court on November 7, 1985. On March 21, 1986,

this court filed a decision reversing Appellant’s eight convic-

tions of Murder in the First Degree. See State v. Berndt,

N.W.2d —— (Minn., filed March 21, 1986). From this deci-

sion reversing Appellant’s murder convictions, the State of

App. 14

Minnesota petitions this court for rehearing pursuant to Minn.

R.Civ.App.P. 140.01.

II. SUMMARY OF PETITION

In reversing the jury’s findings that Appellant was guilty

of eight counts of Murder in the First Degree for the deaths

of his family, this court held that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain the verdicts. The State respectfully submits that

this court both overlooked critical portions of the evidence put

forth by the State’s arson experts and misconceived material

evidence in the record. The State also submits that when the

evidence that has been overlooked and misconceived is ex-

amined in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

evidence presented by the State at trial is sufficient to sus-

tain the jury’s verdict.

Finally, it is submitted that the decision demonstrates that

this court reconsidered the weight of the evidence—crediting

testimony rejected by the jury and rejecting testimony

credited by the jury. In doing so this court has departed from

its usual standard of review and has, in effect, acted as a

“thirteenth juror.” Accordingly, pursuant to the United States

Supreme Court holding in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31

(1982), it is respectfully submitted that the interests of jus-

tice require a new trial. Moreover, a new trial would not

merely be a retrying of the same evidence since new evidence

supporting Appellant’s guilt has come to light. This new evi-

dence includes: (1) Appellant’s confession of the murders to

a fellow inmate in April, 1985, and (2) the initiation of dis-

ciplinary actions by the International Association of Arson

Investigators against the defense expert Shelby Gallien based

upon his testimony at Appellant’s trial.

App. I5

III. IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUF-

FICIENT, THIS COURT OVERLOOKED AND MIS-

CONCEIVED MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

The decision in this case demonstrates that this court has

overlooked and misconceived material evidence in this case.

The overlooked and misconceived evidence can be classified

into the following categories. !

A. The Decision Overlooked Material Exhibits and Ma-

terial Arson Expert Testimony.

(1) After this court filed its decision, the State learned

\for the first time that material exhibits that were received

into evidence were never delivered by the district court to this

court.” See Affidavits, reprinted at pp. 13-16 of Petitioner’s

Appendix. Specifically, State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 were

not delivered to the court.* These exhibits show: the layout

of both the first floor (Exhibit No. 18) and the second floor

1]t is respectfully submitted that the decision contains numerous

statements that either overlook conflicting evidence or are based

upon misconceptions of the evidence. For the purposes of this

Petition, the State will note only those statements that were ma-

terial to this court’s holding that the evidence of guilt was insuf-

ficient.

2 The State is filing along with this Petition a separate motion re-

questing an order directing the district court to deliver the ex-

hibits to this court. See Petitioner’s Appendix, pp. 11-12.

3 Due to the significance that State’s Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 have

in the jury’s understanding of the testimony by the arson experts,

the State has had these two exhibits reproduced and is sending

fourteen copies of these exhibits to this court with this Petition.

App. I6

(Exhibit No. 19) of the townhouse (T.403) ;4 the location of

the victims’ bodies (T.410); the location of the suspicious

burn patterns (T.403, 407, 410); and the location from where

the positive gasoline samples were taken (T.414). At page 18,

n. 12 of its Brief, the State specifically referred this court to

Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19 in explaining the testimony of its

arson experts. The unavailability of these exhibits has re-

sulted in this court overlooking crucial evidence pertaining

to the sufficiency issue. The jurors’ acceptance of the State’s

arson experts’ opinion that Appellant could not have escaped

from the house without incurring severe bodily harm was

based upon their examination and understanding of these

two exhibits. It is respectfully submitted that this court could

not have concluded that Appellant’s story of escape was ra-

tional or feasible had it examined these exhibits. See Berndt,

slip op. at 2-3.

Other significant exhibits not delivered to the court include

State’s Exhibits Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5. State Exhibit No. 1 shows

where the fire department is located in relationship to Ap-

pellant’s townhouse and where Officer Adams and the neigh-

bors were when they heard an explosion-type noise at 2:45

a.m. (T.53, 316). This exhibit buttresses the testimony by the

State’s witnesses that the fire was a rapidly-spreading fire

4“T” refers to the transcript of the trial that commenced before

The Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on October 20, 1983. The trial

transcript consists of Volumes I-XVI. |

This case also involved numerous pretrial and post trial hear-

ings. Hereinafter, this Petition will refer to the transcripts of

these various hearings as follows:

“O” refers .o the omnibus hearing held before The Honorable

Doris.Ohlsen Huspeni on October 3, 4 and 5, 1983.

“M” refers to the post trial evidentiary hearing held before The

Honorable Doris Ohlsen Huspeni on March 21, 1984.

“D” refers to the deposition taken from Richard Tontarski on

May 8, 1984.

App. I7

and that the fire department arrived on the scene within

minutes of the fire being reported. State’s Exhibits Nos. 3,

4, and 5 show where Appellant’s neighbors’ bedroom window

was located and how their observance of the fire outside that

window was inconsistent with Appellant’s claim as to where

the fire was located when it first started (T.241-48, 253-54).

Examination of these exhibits was critical to the jurors’ eval-

uation of the witnesses’ testimony at trial and is necessary

to any appellate review of the jury’s findings.

(2) The court’s acceptance of Appellant’s testimony that

there was an isolated fire in the townhouse prior to his escape

from the house overlooks and misconceives the State’s arson

experts’ testimony. See Berndt, slip op. at 2-3. The State’s

experts testified that the presence and location of gasoline in

the house caused an automatic ignition throughout the first

floor which made the existence of a small isolated fire im-

possible for any period of time. The evidence accepted by the

jury at trial showed that gasoline was spread through the

kitchen, the living room in front of the sofa, the hallway

located between the living room and front door, on the stairs

and near the front entryway. See State’s Exhibit No. 18 (posi-

tive gasoline findings denoted in black ink). The evidence also

showed that the heaviest area of burning was in the living

room and in the area where living room and dining room

meet. See State Exhibit No. 18 (suspicious burn patterns de-

noted in red ink). On the basis of this evidence, the State’s

arson experts ruled out the possibility of a small isolated fire

for any period of time and testified that ignition of the fire

would cause automatic ignition throughout the first floor.

Specifically, the arson background and testimony of these

experts were as follows:

(a) Brooklyn Center Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar had

extensive experience as both a fire fighter and fire in-

App. I8

vestigator at the time he investigated the fire at Ap-

pellant’s townhouse (T.710-14). He was familiar with

the properties of gasoline and inflammability and had

set 60-80 practice fires involving gasoline (T.717, 859).

Based upon his experience and expertise, Mr. Pedlar tes-

tified that gasoline is “highly volatile’ and that “once

ignition has been made of the area [area with gasoline],

that you get an automatic ignition of the fumes through-

out the entire area’ (T.717, 794).

(b) Sharadchandra Bhatt had a Bachelor’s Degree in

Engineering, a Master of Science Degree with a major in

Industrial Engineering and had taken additional post-

master’s work in the same field at the time he reviewed

the arson evidence in this case (T.922-23). Mr. Bhatt

specifically had experience in testing and investigating

the use of accelerants in fires, including gasoline (T.927).

Mr. Bhatt testified that if there is ignition in an area

containing gasoline, there would be instantaneous com-

bustion of all the gasoline fumes (T.934-35) and it would

not be possible for there to be an isolated fire in the

downstairs area for any significant period of time

(T.935).

(c) Arson consultant James Carlson had been a mem-

ber of the Minneapolis Fire Department for thirty years

where he was a fire investigator for twelve years and

Chief Investigator for an additional five years (T.1061).

Based upon his experience with gasoline fires, Mr. Carl-

son testified that ignition of an area with gasoline results

in “immediate ignition of the entire room” (T.1071) and

that this is a “rapid ignition that happens within a frac-

tion of a second, resulting in a fire” (T.1070).

(3) The decision overlooked and misconceived testimony

by the State’s arson experts that in their professional opinion

App. I9

Appellant could not have escaped the townhouse without suf-

fering serious bodily harm. The decision specifically states.

that:

Upon discovery of the fire, appellant claims that he, in

panic, rushed from the house. The state suggests the con-

tention is irrational because appellant would have been

injured had he left in that manner. Yet, there is evidence

appellant had singed hair on the left side of his body, and

that all the skin on the bottom of his feet turned brown

and peeled off a few days after the fire.

Berndt, slip op. at 9. This court’s reference to the singeing of

Appellant’s hair and his brown feet demonstrates that it either

overlooked or misconceived the testimony by arson experts

that Appellant could not have run through the entire length

of the first floor without suffering severe bodily harm once

the gasoline was ignited. Specifically, the arson experts tes-

tified as follows:

(1) Fire Marshal Pedlar testified that on the basis of

the burn patterns and the findings of gasoline it was his

professional opinion that Appellant could not have es-

caped from the townhouse in the manner he claims he did

without being burned (T.783-84). Mr. Pedlar was aware

that Appellant had incurred some singeing on his left

hand, forearm and eye lashes when he testified that Ap-

pellant could not have escaped in the manner he claims

he escaped (T.832).

(b) Arson expert James Carlson specifically testified

as follows:

A. [by James Carlson] That under those circum-

stances, it would be impossible for a person to have

been in the room at the time of the ignition of these

App. 110

vapors and escaped without being killed or at least

harmed.

* * *

Q. [by the prosecutor] I say, severely harmed?

A. Yes, severely harmed. [T.1077, emphasis added. ]

Examination of State’s Exhibit No. 18 reveals that gasoline

was present by the sofa, in the hallway and by the front en-

trance (T.548, 549, 743, 744, 749). In order to go from the

sofa to the front door, Appellant would have had to go through

trailers of gasoline that would have already been automatically

ignited. It is respectfully submitted that it is not rational to

conclude that Appellant could have run through the areas of

the most severe burning and only suffer singeing of the hair

on one side of his body and brown feet. Moreover, the testi-

mony of Appellant’s own experts substantiate the State’s ex-

perts’ testimony that someone could not have been in the

center of a gasoline fire at ignition without suffering severe

injury. In support of the defense’s theory that there was no

gasoline in the house, both Robert Davis and Shelby Gallien

testified that a person igniting a gasoline fire under the con-

ditions in this case would either suffer serious injury or be

killed (T.1325-29, 1488-89, 1796, 1918). In relying upon Ap-

pellant’s claim of brown feet as proof that Appellant was

injured, this court overlooked both the fact that there was no

evidence showing that Appellant was treated by a doctor for

his feet (T.1144) and the fact that Appellant waited over six

weeks to tell the police about his feet at which time most of

the alleged brown skin was gone (T.983-84). Also, Appellant

only told the police about his brown feet after they told him

that they thought it would be impossible for him to escape

without injury (T.983).

(4) The decision overlooked testimony by experienced fire

fighters and investigators that it is not unusual to not smell

inl

App. I11

gasoline either at the fire scene or on the person who started

the fire once the gasoline has been ignited. In holding that the

evidence of Appellant’s guilt was insufficient, the decision

placed great weight upon the fact that neither Appellant nor

the fire scene smelled of gasoline after the fire was ignited.

Berndt, slip op. at 6 and 9. But numerous fire fighters and

fire investigators who were experienced in the ignition and

extinguishing of gasoline fires testified that it was not un-

usual to ot smell gasoline fumes once the fire has been

ignited. Specifically, these witnesses testified as follows:

(a) Stanley Owens, a fire fighter for 15-1/2 years

who had staged 45-50 practice fires with gasoline, testified

that it was not common to detect the odor of gasoline at

these practice fires (T.141-42). Instead, he stated that the

predominant odor at these fires was the material that

was burning (T.141-42).

(b) Gary Giving, a fire fighter for 16 years who had

experience in extinguishing approximately a dozen gaso-

line practice fires, testified that he was never able to

detect the odor of gasoline after these practice fires were

extinguished (T.156). He stated that the dominant smell

is “[{h]Jeat, burnt smoke smell” (T.156) and that the smell

of gasoline was only detected prior to ignition (T.165).

(c) Chief Ronald Boman of the Brooklyn Center Fire

Department testified that he had participated in ten to

fifteen practice gasoline fires (T.173). He further testi-

fied that the odor of gasoline was never detectable either

during or after the practice fires (T.173).

(d) Fire Marshal Jerry Pedlar testified that from his

experience in setting 60-80 practice gasoline fires, he

knows that it’s possible not to detect the odor of gasoline

at the scene of a gasoline fire (T.774, 847). He testified

App. 112

that in gasoline fires, the gasoline is consumed and the

vapors are burned off during the fire (T.859).

(e) James Carlson testified that even though Appel-

lant was the person suspected of pouring and igniting the

gasoline, the fact that no one smelled gasoline on him was

not unusual (T.1089).

(f) Defense expert Shelby Gallien conceded that it is

possible that other smells such as smoke may “override”

gasoline odors (T.1610).

(5) This court misconceived the significance of Brenda

Berndt’s cause of death. The medical examiner testified that

the low level of carbon monoxide in Brenda Berndt was con-

sistent with a “superheated death” (T.898, 903, 906). A super-

heated death occurs when there is an instantaneous combus-

tion or a very hot fire which damages the victim’s lungs and

causes death before a lethal level of carbon monoxide can be

absorbed by the lungs (T.896). The decision stated that:

Likewise, the autopsy report on Brenda was more consis-

tent with appellant’s theory than with that of the State.

Berndt, slip op. at 9. This statement demonstrates that this

court misinterpreted both Appellant’s theory of an accidental

fire and the significance of Brenda Berndt’s cause of death.

Defense expert Shelby Gallien’s theory about a “flashback”

fire was Dased upon the premise that there was a build-up of

carbon monoxide gasses within the house-to such a level that

the gasses ignited (T.1400-05). Bruce Ryden, the Roseville

Fire Marshal, testified that if the type of “flashback” fire

that Mr. Gallien described had occurred, the build-up of gasses

prior to ignition would cause persons present in the house at

the time of the build-up to die of carbon monoxide poisoning

prior to ignition (T.2112-13). Thus, if a “flashback”’ fire had

occurred, Brenda would have died from inhaling a lethal level

App. 113

of carbon monoxide before the fire ignited rather than from

breathing superheated air. ;

The fact that Brenda died from breathing “superheated”

air is inconsistent with Appellant’s accidental “flashback” fire

theory and is consistent with the State’s evidence showing

that Brenda Berndt’s body was in the path of the gasoline

trailer when it was ignited (T.757). Moreover, the fact that

the boys’ autopsies showed that their lungs contained lethal

levels of carbon monoxide poisoning (T.881-82) is also con-

sistent with the State’s evidence of a gasoline fire. The sus-

picious burn patterns depicted in red ink on State’s Exhibit

No. 19 shows that the boys’ bodies were not directly in the

path of the suspicious burn patterns (T.304, 752). Thus, un-

like their mother, the boys were exposed to the smoke of the

fire but not to its intense heat before their deaths.

(6) The decision incorrectly states that the State’s gas

chromatography analyst “concluded that five of the samples

indicated the presence of an accelerant—most probably gas-

oline.” Berndt, slip op. at 5. The State’s analyst testified wn-

equivocally that the five samples contained gasoline (T.547,

548, 550, 551). He also noted that another sample contained

lighter fluid (T. 574).

(7) The decision incorrectly assumes that the State

claimed Appellant “carefully” poured the gasoline. Berndt,

slip op. at pp. 5 and 6. The State’s experts never testified that

the gasoline must have been carefully spread throughout the

townhouse. Indeed, evidence showing that the gasoline tr: ‘1-

ers varied in width from three to six inches to two feet and

that gasoline was on the kitchen table demonstrates that the

gasoline was not carefully poured (T.389, 775-76). Moreover,

the fact that no one smelled gasoline on Appellant does not

demonstrate that he poured th» «asoline carefully since other

evidence at trial established that the odor of gasoline is often

App. 114

masked by the smoke and other smells once the gasoline is

ignited (T.141-42, 156, 165, 173, 774, 847, 1089). See Part

III.A.(4) of this Petition).

B. The Decision Overlooked and Misconceived Material

Facts Concerning the Events Occurring Immediately

Before and During the Fire.

The decision fails to mention several material facts that

buttresses the State’s evidence showing that the fire was a

gasoline fire ignited by Appellant. Among these excluded facts

are the following:

(1) The decision incorrectly states that:

Immediately after the fire, appellant appeared confused

as to what action Brenda had taken. In general, however,

in each version, he indicated Brenda was heading into

the dining room while he panicked and ran from the

house because of the heat and smoke.

This statement ignores the fact that on August 21, 1981, the

day after the fire, Appellant told police investigators that

Brenda was upstairs on the night of the fire (T.969, 1183).

It further ignores the fact that even though Appellant sub-

sequently learned that the fire investigators found Brenda’s

body on the first floor, he again told the police on August 27,

1986, that Brenda was upstairs at the time of the fire (T.618,

979, 1184). It was not until October 6, 1981, when Appellant

was informed that gasoline had been found in the townhouse

(T.981), that he told the police that Brenda was on the sofa

with him and that he saw her run into the fire (T.984, 1185).

(2) Appellant was seen walking alone outside his town-

house prior to the fire by an eleven year old boy who lived in

the Georgetown townhouse complex (T.203-07, 781).

(3) The only witnesses who were awake prior to the fire

all testified that they heard an explosion-type noise at the

Oe te i ek

eal. 0 i AN he ne ya

App. 115

time the fire started. Officer Adams and two neighbors in the

nearby Chippewa Park apartments testified that at approxi-

mately 2:45 a.m. they heard a loud noise or “boom” (T.57,

310, 314, 319, 321). The boom caused the windows to shake in

the Chippewa complex (T.314, 321). As State Exhibit No. 1

shows, these four persons were all located within a block of

Appellant’s townhouse when they heard the boom. This evi-

dence supports the evidence showing that the fire was a

rapidly-spreading fire since within ten minutes of hearing

this loud noise, persons from a block away could see that the

townhouse was engulfed in flames (T.61, 315, 321-22). This

evidence also negates the defense’s theory that this was a

slow-starting fire (T.1400).

(4) The decision incorrectly states that when Officer

Adams returned to the scene, “the second story was not burn-

ing.” Berndt, slip op. at 3. On the contrary, Officer Adams

testified that the second story was in flames when he arrived.

Specifically, Officer Adams stated that although he did not

notice any smoke or flames when he left the scene at 2:48

a.m. (T.58), when he returned to the scene at 2:54 a.m.:

Every single window, door, opening of that place had

fire or flames coming out of it besides that one window

[the front window on the second floor]. That was the

only one that didn’t have anything coming out of it.

(T.61).

(5) The decision incorrectly states that “[b]oth Adams

and appellant searched for a ladder to attempt to save the

children on the second floor.” Berndt, slip op. at 3. Appellant

never scarched for a ladder. Only neighbor Tim Crandall and

Officer Adams looked for a ladder (T.62-63, 276). Moreover,

when Officer Adams asked Appellant if there was a ladder,

Appellant told him:

App. 116

There’s no ladder. You’re not going to find any ladder

around here. Besides, even if you did find a ladder, it’s

too late to save them. They’re all dead.

(0.10, T.63-64).

(6) The decision overlooks the fact that not only did Ap-

pellant not make any attempt to save his family (T.1205)

while two of his neighbors made such attempts (T.258-69,

274), he also adamantly refused to help save his family when

he would not tell the police where his wife and the boys were

located inside the house (T.65-66).

(7) The decision’s holding that “[n]o evidence was pro-

duced that any person residing in the townhouse project area

was missing any gasoline nor any container,” Berndt, slip op.

at p. 6, overlooks material evidence. First, the decision in-

correctly states that “[t]he caretaker testified that none of

his gasoline was missing.” Berndt, slip op. at p. 7. The care-

taker testified that Appellant had a key to one of the storage

garages where there was a one-gallon can of gasoline (T.910).

On the morning after the fire, the caretaker examined the

can and saw that it was half empty (T.911). The caretaker

also testified that there was a container in another garage

that contained five gallons of gasoline and that this container

was half empty the morning after the fire (T.911). The care-

taker never stated that none of the gasoline was missing.

Instead, he testified that:

When I say it was partially filled, I gather that my men

had used that portion of the gasoline that was gone.

(T.918, emphasis added). Thus, the caretaker did not positive-

ly state that there was no gasoline missing.

More importantly, the decision overlooks the fact that Ap-

pellant’s own car was parked near his townhouse on the night

of the fire (T.972-73).

AOI ie se aD a> iS Rte iI Sb KE TA Rit rha a A “

Perr ree ene verre Teter ot)

Al 3S ee aDONCE ae Ne tA:

App. 'I17

(8) The decision overlooks the fact that at the same time

Appellant claimed that there was an isolated fire in the area

of the dining room and kitchen, Appellant’s next door neigh-

bors Linda Kavai and Charlie Catron woke up to the roar of

a fire and observed a fire from out their back window (T.242-

43, 246, 253). Reference to State’s Exhibits No. 3, 4, and 5

show that Ms. Kavai and Mr. Catron could not have possibly

seen the fire from their bedroom window before Mr. Catron

went outside if the fire had been where Appellant claimed it

was before he allegediy ran out of the townhouse.

(9) The decision incorrectly states that:

As Berndt came out the door, his next-door neighbor

heard him screaming for the fire department.

Berndt, slip op. at 3. Appellant’s neighbor Charlie Catron

specifically testified that when he came out of his townhouse,

it “seemed” to him that Appellant was coming out of his town-

house (T.255). But Mr. Catron also testified that:

I didn’t see [Appellant] come out the door, but we both

went onto the lawn at the same time.

(T.255). Mr. Catron stated that when he first saw Appellant,

Appellant was either on or very near the front step (T.255).

At no point did Mr. Catron testify that Appellant was scream-

ing for the fire department when he came out of the front

door (T.255-56). Thus, the only evidence showing that Appel-

lant came out of his townhouse at the same time Mr. Catron

came out of the townhouse next door is Appellant’s testimony.

(10) The decision overlooks the fact that if Appellant did

not pour the gasoline and ignite the fire, a third person would

have had to break into the house, pour gasoline upstairs on the

stairs, around the first floor and near the sofa without waking

up either Appellant or Brenda who were allegedly sleeping on

App. 118

the sofa. Even Appellant adinitted that it was unlikely that

this could have happened (T.1224-25).

C. The Decision Overlooked and Misconceived Material

Facts Concerning Appellant’s Relationship with the

Victim Brenda Berndt. |

The decision overlooked and misstates material evidence

concerning Appellant’s relationship with his wife. Among

these facts are the following:

(1) The decision incorrectly states the following:

The state in this case sought to establish a motive by

introducing evidence relating to Berndt’s relationship

with Brenda, in particular, his propensity to flirt and

be promiscuous. Incidents in corroboration of this con-

tention occurred long before the fire date. Moreover, ap-

pellant did not deny the incidents, but contended those

problems had been resolved well before the fire. No evi-

dence rebuts that assertion.

Berndt, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). The evidence showed

that there had been major problems with promiscuity through-

out Appellant’s and Brenda’s seven year relationship. First,

as soon as Brenda and Appellant began living together in

1974, Appellant attempted to have a sexual relationship with

Brenda’s sister Marla Henne (T.610, 612). After he and

Brenda married in 1975, Appellant again physically grabbed

Marla Henne in 1978 (T.615) and repeatedly called her to

ask her to meet him in a motel for a sexual relationship

(T.616, 1155-56). Although Appellant ceased making over-

tures to Ms. Henne in late 1978, Ms. Henne did not tell Brenda

about Appellant’s propositions until 1980 (T.617, 624). In

addition, there was evidence that in 1979 Appellant physically

grabbed a thirteen year old babysitter (T.511-14) and Appel-

App. I19

lant admitted having three extramarital affairs during his six

year marriage with Brenda (T.1150-51).

More importantly, despite Appellant’s claim that he and

Brenda had worked everything out a year before the fire

(T.1113-14, 1157-59), there was significant evidence to rebut

this assertion. Specifically, there was evidence that Brenda

had a sexual relationship with a mutual acquaintance named

Scott Tollin several months before her death (T.653, 655).

Also, a couple of months before Brenda’s death, Appellant

physically grabbed the breasts of Sandra Jacobs in Brenda’s

presence (T.659, 1157). The evidence also showed that before

Brenda’s death, Appellant and Mr. Jacobs spent time together

at Ms. Jacobs’ home without Brenda being present (T.1263-

64). Finally, the evidence showed that either on the night of

the fire or shortly before that night, Appellant suggested to

Glenn Snow that the two of them do some wife swapping

(T.632-35).

Also, although the decision correctly states that no one

observed any argument between Appellant and Brenda at the

Earl Brown Bow], it overlooks the fact that Brenda’s ex-lover

Scott Tollin was present at the bar that night (T.630, 640).

It also overlooks the fact that Appellant took one of the women

from the bar out to his car for a ride where they were alone

together for at least fifteen minutes (T.642, 1122-23).

(2) The decision incorrectly states the following:

Appellant claimed he was unaware of his wife’s life

insurance policy furnished by the State of Minnesota

where she was employed. He was not even a named

beneficiary on this policy.

Berndt, slip op. at 7. At no point in Appellant’s testimony did

Appellant ever claim that he was unaware of his wife’s in-

surance policy through the State of Minnesota (T.1108-1223).

AILABLE COPY

App. 120

To the contrary, Appellant told police investigators on the

morning after the fire that Brenda did have a life insurance

policy through her employer (0.118).

Also, although the policy did not specifically name Appel-

lant as beneficiary, the decision overlooks the fact that Appel-

lant as Brenda’s spouse had first priority as her beneficiary

(T.705-06). It also overlooks the fact that with both Brenda

and the boys dead, Appellant would be the only immediate

family member left to collect the insurance.

(3) The decision’s statement that the trial court may have

“arguably” abused its discretion in admitting evidence as to

Appellant’s extramarital affairs overlooks the fact that the

trial court excluded other evidence pertaining to Appellant’s

previous conduct. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the

State could not introduce evidence showing that Appellant

attempted to make a bomb to kill a police officer whom he

suspected was having an affair with his first wife (0.202-07,

250-51). Also, the State agreed not to introduce evidence

showing that Appellant had assaulted his first wife (0.201).

IV. EXAMINATION OF THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE

THAT WAS OVERLOOKED AND MISCONCEIVED

BY THIS COURT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE EVI-

DENCE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVOR-

ABLE TO THE VERDICT WAS SUFFICIENT TO

SUSTAIN THE JURY’S VERDICTS.

This court’s general standard for reviewing a claim of in-

sufficient evidence in a criminal case is set forth as follows:

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence we must

determine whether, under the facts in the record and any

legitimate inferences that can be drawn from them, a

jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was

guilty of the offense charged. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.

App. [21

2d 99 (Minn, 1978). The evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and it is necessary

to assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and

disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Wahlberg, 296

N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1980).

State v. Ulvinen, 318 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1981). Although

the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was circumstantial in nature,

this court has repeatedly held that:

The circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is en-

titled to as much weight as any other kind of evidence

so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with

the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent

with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.

State v. Morgan, 290 Minn. 558, 561, 188 N.W.2d 917, 919

(1971). See State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn.

1982) (circumstantial evidence showing that fire had been

intentionally set and that defendant had financial motive to

set fire held sufficient to sustain arson verdict). This court

has also repeatedly held that normally a jury is in the best

position to evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding

the crime and the jury’s verdict is entitled to due deference.

See e.g. State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. 1986) ;

State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985).

Examination of the evidence in this case pursuant to the

above-stated standards compels a finding that the evidence

was sufficient to sustain the verdict. It is respectfully sub-

mitted that this court’s holding of insufficiency was premised

upon both its overlooking of material facts and its miscon-

ception of the arson testimony. Accordingly, the State re-

spectfully requests that this holding of insufficiency be either

reversed or modified.

That the insufficiency holding was premised upon a mis-

conception of the evidence is demonstrated by the following

decision excerpt:

App. [22

The state produced evidence which, if credited by the

jury, would sustain its contention that the townhouse fire

had been ignited with the use of gasoline accelerant...

Some circumstances proved were consistent with the

state’s claim of an intentional fire, but other circum-

stances proved were generally consistent with the rational

hypothesis that the defendant was not guilty.

Berndt, slip op. at 10. Despite this court’s agreement that

consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict supports a finding that this was an arson gasoline

fire, it relies upon evidence supporting the defendant’s theory

of an accidental fire to justify the holding that there were

“other circumstances” consistent with the rational hypothesis

that Appellant was not guilty. But the jury rejected the

credibility of the evidence showing “other circumstances”

since this evidence was inconsistent with the evidence that

showed that the fire was a gasoline fire.

Based on the rapidly spreading fire, the classic suspicious

low burn patterns and the positive gasoline findings, the

State’s experts testified that it was their conclusion that this

was an arson gasoline fire. One defense expert disputed the

gasoline findings and the other defense expert claimed that

the fire could have been caused by a smoldering cigarette. The

issue at trial became one of credibility between the two sets

of experts. The jury’s verdicts demonstrated that. it accepted

the expert conclusions of the State’s experts and rejected the

opinions put forth by the defense experts that were contrary

to these conclusions.

Examination of all of the evidence in the record below

shows that the jury could have reasonably credited the evi-

dence proving that this was an arson gasoline fire and have

reasonably rejected the defense testimony that was contrary

App. 123

to a finding of arson. More importantly, the record shows that

the evidence proving that this was a gasoline fire is consistent

with the hypothesis that Appellant is guilty and is inconsistent

with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.

A. The Circumstantial Evidence Proving that this was a

Gasoline Fire Compels the Conclusion that Appellant

Poured the Gasoline and Ignited the Fire.

That this court overlooked material evidence in this case is

evident from the following excerpt from the decision:

Except for the fact that appellant was physically present

in his home when the fire started, there exists no other

circumstances consistent with the state’s hypothesis of

guilt.

Berndt, slip op. at 8. Appellant’s guilt was not proven by his

presence in the home. On the contrary, his guilt was proven

by the evidence showing that he could not have possibly been

present inside the townhouse when it was ignited. The positive

gas samples and the suspicious low burn patterns showed that

gasoline was poured throughout the first floor with the largest

amount poured in the living room near the sofa where Appel-

lant claimed he was sleeping (T.372-75, 408, 549). See State’s

Exhibit No. 18. Since the State’s experts testified that a fire

in an area filled with gasoline would result in the immediate

ignition of the entire area (T.717, 794, 934-35, 1070, 1071),

the living room would have ignited while Appellant was still

on the sofa. State’s Exhibit No. 18 shows that had Appellant

been on the sofa at the time the fire began, he would have had

to run through a living room full of fire, a hallway full of fire

and a front entryway full of fire to get out the front door.

The State’s experts testified that Appellant could not have

escaped in the manner he claimed he did without suffering

severe injury (T.782, 783-84, 1077). These experts were aware

App. 124

that Appellant had incurred slight singeing of his hair on his

left side and claimed to have brown feet but they obviously

did not consider this to constitute severe injury (T.782). In-

stead, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the singeing

on the left side was more consistent with Appellant standing

outside throwing a match onto the gasoline than it was with

him running through a house full of gasoline fire. Moreover,

it is submitted that it was rational for the jury to conciude on

the basis of the experts’ testimony that Appellant’s injuries

would have consisted of more than brown feet had he run

through the entire length of the townhouse while it was ablaze

with ignited gasoline. -

The decision’s statement of the facts show that this court

accepted Appellant’s claim that he was on the sofa when the

fire started. See Berndt, slip op. at 2-3. It is respectfully sub-

mitted that this court cannot accept Appellant’s story of es-

cape as true if it views the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict. Acceptance of Appellant’s claim requires rejec-

tion of the evidence showing that this was a gasoline fire

since there could not have been an isolated limited fire in the

dining room for any period of time if gasoline was spread

throughout the house (T.717, 794, 934-35, 1070-71).

Because the evidence shows that Appellant could not have

been inside the townhouse at the time the fire was ignited, the

only rational inference is that he was outside of the house.

Evidence showing both that he was outside of the house and

that he lied about being inside the house at the time of the

fire leads to only one rational conclusion—that Appellant ig-

nited the fire and lied about being inside in an effort to divert

suspicion from himself. What other rational hypothesis could

App. 125

there be?® It is not rational to conclude that Appellant stood

outside watching while some third person broke into the house,

spread the gasoline throughout the house, and ignited it.

In rejecting the jury’s finding that the circumstantial evi-

dence ruled out any rational hypothesis except that of Ap-

pellant’s guilt, this court relied upon the following factors:

(1) no one detected the odor of gasoline either on Appellant

or at the fire scene; (2) there was no evidence showing exactly

where Appellant obtained the gasoline; (3) no empty gasoline

containers or siphoning equipment was found at the fire

scene and (4) Appellant had insufficient motive to commit

the offense. If the jury’s finding that this was a gasoline fire

is accepted on appeal, none of the above-cited factors make

rational the hypothesis that someone other than Appellant

was the arsonist.

(1) No odor of gasoline.

The State’s arson experts were aware that no gasoline odor

was detected either on Appellant or at the fire scene. But

these experts, all of whom had extensive experience in ex-

tinguishing gasoline fires, testified that it is not unusual to not

smell gasoline either at the fire scene or on the person who

poured and ignited the gasoline once the gasoline has been

ignited (T.141-42, 156, 165,173, 774, 847, 1089). The expert

testimony established that when gasoline is ignited, the pre-

dominant odor becomes that of smoke and heat and these

smells will mask any gasoline odors (T.141-42, 156, 859).

Although the defense expert Mr. Gallien testified that if this

was a gasoline fire the witnesses should have been able to

detect gasoline odors both at the scene and on Appellant

5 Although this court stated that there were “other circumstances

... generally consistent with the rational hypothesis that the

defendant was not guilty,” Berndt slip op. at 10, the decision never

explained what this rational hypothesis was.

App. [26

(T.1321-23), Mr. Gallien also admitted that he no longer had

the ability to smell anything (T.1324). More importantly, the

jury obviously rejected Mr. Gallien’s opinion on this issue.

It is inconsistent for this court to accept the jury’s finding

that this was a gasoline fire even though no gasoline odor was

detected at the scene and yet refused to accept its finding that

Appellant was the arsonist on the basis that no one detected

gasoline odors on him. Although this court implied that it was

not rational to infer that Appellant, with a blood alcohol con-

tent that at its highest could only have been .12 or .13, could

have poured five gallons of gasoline “without spilling some of

it on his person or clothing,” Berndt, slip op. at 6, the alterna-

tive is even less rational. Even if the court could assume that

Appellant’s story of being inside the house was feasible, he

would have had to run barefoot over carpeting drenched with

gasoline in order to escape from the house. It is highly im-

probable that Appellant could have run through this gasoline

without getting some of it on his feet.

Finally, the court’s holding that the absence of gasoline

odors makes it irrational to infer that Appellant was the

arsonist is inconsistent with its recent decision in State v.

Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986). In Daniels the de-

fendant was accused of setting an apartment on fire with

middle petroleum distillate consistent with mineral spirits.

See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 780. In that case, as in this case,

the defendant had been drinking alcohol for several hours

prior to the fire. See Transcript for State v. Daniels, pp. 81-

83, reprinted in Petitioner’s Appendix. Also, as in this case,

the defendant did not have any odor of petroleum distillate or

mineral spirits and testing of his clothing did not reveal any

finding of a petroleum distillate. See Transcript for State v.

Daniels, pp. 179, 194, 359, 361, 393, 398, 401, reprinted in

App. [27

Petitioner’s Appendix. Despite the absence of any petroleum

odors on the defendant in the Daniels case, this court held that

the evidence was “consistent only with Daniels’ guilt and in-

consistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”

Daniels, 380 N.W.2d-at 782.

(2) Absence of Evidence Showing Exactly Where Appel-

lant Obtained the Gasoline.

It is submitted that the absence of evidence showing exactly

where Appellant obtained the gasoline does not make irra-

tional the jury’s finding that Appellant was the arsonist. The

evidence showed that a relatively small amount of gasoline—

five gallons—was used in the fire (T.930). The evidence also

showed that Appellant had a number of ready sources fro.

where he could have obtained this gasoline, including the

caretaker’s garage (to which he had a key) (T.910-11) and

nearby cars (T.1230-32). One of the nearby cars was Ap-

pellant’s own car (T.972-73). Five gallons of gasoline is not

a large amount— it is less than half a tankful for most cars.

The fact that no one reported gasoline missing does not make

the jury’s finding of guilt irrational. Appellant could have

easily taken gasoline from the caretaker’s garage or he could

have taken small amounts of gasoline from several parked

cars. The jury could have reasonably inferred from common

experience that someone could siphon one to two gallons from

a car tank without the car’s owner noticing that any gasoline

was gone. More importantly, Appellant could have easily ob-

tained all five gallons from his own car’s gas tank. The jury

could have reasonably concluded that had Appellant done so,

he would not have reported the gasoline loss after the fire.

Although evidence showing exactly where Appellant ob-

tained the gasoline would have strengthened the State’s case,

absence of this evidence does not justify a finding of insuf-

App. 128

ficiency. This is not a case where the evidence showed that

Appellant could not have obtained gasoline that night. To the

contrary, there was ample evidence showing that Appellant

had several ready sources from which he could have obtained

the five gallons of gasoline.

Again, this court’s reliance upon the absence of evidence

showing exactly where Appellant obtained the five gallons of

gasoline to reverse the convictions is inconsistent with its re-

cent decision in Daniels. In Daniels, the State did not show

exactly where the defendant obtained the petroleum distillate.

Instead the State in Daniels, as in this case, showed that Ap-

pellant had access to these flammable liquids even though there

was no positive showing that the liquids in the apartment

storeroom were in fact the liquids that were used in the fire.

See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 780.

(3) Absence of Gasoline Container and Siphoning Equip-

ment.

Although the finding of a gasoline container and/or siphon-

ing equipment would have made the State’s case stronger, the

absence of this evidence again does not justify a finding of

insufficiency. The jury could have considered a number of

rational explanations as to why no empty containers or siphon-

ing equipment were found. Appellant could have used a com-

bustible container which would have been consumed in the

fire. Similarly, siphoning equipment could have been consumed

in a fire. Also, Appellant could have disposed of these items

either in the trash that was hauled away (T.778-80, 913-15,

920) or in another location not found by the investigators.

Since the evidence shows that this was a gasoline fire, it

is clear that the gasoline was brought to the townhouse in

some type of container. Because the absence of such a con-

tainer does not make irrational the jury’s finding that this

App. I29

was a gasoline fire, absence of a container also does not make

irrational its finding that Appellant was the arsonist. Again,

the court’s reliance upon this factor in reversing Appellant’s

conviction is inconsistent with its holding in Daniels. As in

this case, no empty gasoline container was found near the

scene of fire in Daniels. That the partially filled containers

found in the storeroom in Daniels were the containers used

was based upon reasonable inference and not positive proof.

See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 781.

(4) Appellant’s Motive.

In its decision, this court stated that it had “the firm im-

pression that the state failed to establish a credible motive

for causing Brenda’s death.”’ Berndt, slip op. at 7-8. This im-

pression was based upon this court’s acceptance of Appellant’s

claim that he and Brenda had resolved their problems a year

previous to the fire. See Berndt, slip op. at 7. As previously

noted in Section II(C)(1) of this Petition, there was ample

evidence in the record rebutting Appellant’s claim. The evi-

dence showed that in the months immediately before the fire,

Brenda had a sexual affair with another man (T.653, 655)

while Appellant physically grabbed another woman’s breast

(T.659) and talked about wife swapping (T.632-35). The evi-

dence at trial showed that Appellant’s and Brenda’s seven

year relationship was a troubled one that was marked by

infidelity by both parties (T.653, 655, 1150-51). The evidence

also showed that when Appellant drank, he would become

moody and would direct his anger at Brenda (T.218-25, 684,

961). Appellant was having financial problems at the time of

the fire (T.1168) and the insurance money provided him with

a financial motive to kill Brenda (T.702-06). The jury could

have reasonably inferred that Appellant may have concluded

App. [30

that if the boys also perished in the fire, it would make

Brenda’s death appear to be less suspicious.

More importantly, the jury found that this was an arson

fire so someone had to have the motivation to murder the

victims. Appellant was the only person who would gain from

their deaths. There often is not a rational explanation for the

crime of familicide and the precise motivation is usually un-

known unless the perpetrator confesses. See generally, Malm-

quist, Psychiatric Aspects of Familicide, Bulletin of the AAPL

Vol. VIII, No. 3 at 298. Although at oral argument Appellant’s

counsel argued that Brenda’s ex-husband Harry Gage had a

motive to commit the murders, there is absolutely nothing in

the record to connect Mr. Gage to the fire. Also, since Appel-

lant could not have been inside the house at the time it was

ignited, acceptance of a theory that someone else started the

fire requires acceptance of the theory that Appellant stood

outside, watched as someone murdered his family and then

lied to the police to cover up the murders. It is respectfully

submitted that this hypothesis is not rational and was properly

rejected by the jury.

Finally, as this court noted, the State “has no burden of

establishing a motive for the crime.” Berndt, slip op. at 7.

The evidence established that Appellant was outside at the

time the fire was ignited and that he lied about being inside

at the time of the fire. This evidence conclusively shows that

Appellant was the arsonist and the absence of a clear motive

does not justify rejection of this evidence.

B. The Jury Could Have Reasonably Credited the Testi-

mony Proving that this was an Arson Gasoline Fire

and Have Reasonably Rejected any Contrary Testi-

mony.

BEST AVAI

App. I31

Although this court states that the evidence most favorable

to the jury verdict shows that this was a gasoline fire, other

comments in the decision demonstrate that this court did not

reject the evidence that was contrary to the jury’s verdict. The

| evidence in this record showed two directly opposing positions.

: The first position was that gasoline was present in the town-

house and that the fire was an arson gasoline fire. The second

) position was that there was no gasoline present in the town-

| house and that the fire was consistent with an accidental fire.

| The jury credited the evidence supporting the first pesition

i and rejected evidence supporting the second position. Because

| examination of the record demonstrates that the jury could

ve rationally a¢cepted the State’s arson evidence and re-

jected the defens@’s theory of accidental fire, this court in

eviewing the evidence must also reject evidence inconsistent

<

‘By with the State’s arson evidence.

a | (A) “the Jury Properly Credited Richard Tontarski’s Ex-

NY (_pert Opinion that the Samples Contained Gasoline.

ff he 26 gasoline samples taken from the townhouse were

| S\ “analyzed by Richard E. Tontarski, a forensic scientist em-

.’ eS ployed by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

i Firearms (ATF) at the National Laboratory Center in Rock-

ville, Maryland (T.527). Mr. Tontarski had completed the

| necessary course work to be classified as a chemist and re-

ceived a Masters Degree in Forensic Science from George

Washington University in 1978 (T.532). He has worked as a

scientist for the ATF since 1978 and at the time of trial had

analyzed fire scene samples for approximately 300 to 400

5 oie te

arson cases (T.530).

Mr. Tontarski testified to both his sampling procedures

and his identification procedures (‘1.535-542, 554, 572-73, 574-

75, 578, 580). Based upon his identification procedures, he

positively identified the presence of gasoline in five samples

ABLE COPY

App. 182

from the fire scene (T.547, 548, 550, 559). He testified that

he made the positive identification when he compared the

chromatograms produced by the samples with a 25% gasoline

standard (75% evaporation of gasoline) (T.1081). He made

this comparison by doing a side-by-side comparison of the

unknown chromatogram to the known standard (T.538). He

testified that the samples could not be analyzed by overlapping

their chromatograms with a known standard because there

are variations in machines and injection points (T.2081, 2096-

99, 2150-51).

Robert Davis testified as a gas chromatography expert for

the defense (T.1672). Mr. Davis received a Bachelor of

Science Degree from Illinois Wesleyan University in 1955 and

worked as an analytical chemist for the army, Pure Oil Com-

pany and Allied Chemical from 1955 to 1960 (T.1673-74). In

1962, Mr. Davis formed his own company where he conducted

quality control work for oil companies (T.672-73). In 1971,

his company also began conducting analytical work in the

area of forensic science (T.1072-73, 1861).

Mr. Davis compared the chromatograms produced by the

fire samples with the set of gasoline samples used by Mr.

Tontarski (T.1731). Mr. Davis testified that he disagreed

with Mr. Tontarski’s findings and stated that the chromato-

grams did not show gasoline (T.1751, 1755, 1759, 1772, 1777,

1783, 1790, 2217).

Although the jury had two opposite expert conclusions to

choose from, the record shows that there were several flaws

in Mr. Davis’ analysis of the chromatograms that seriously

undermined the credibility of his opinion:

(1) When Mr. Davis made his initial determination

that there was no gasoline, he was unaware of which

gasoline standard Mr. Tontarski based his opinion on

(T.1878). When he demonstrated to the jury that the

App. 133

chromatograms from the samples did not contain gaso-

line, he compared the samples to a 100% gasoline stan-

dard (T.1748, 1755, 1759, 1772, 1777, 1783, 1790). When

informed by the prosecutor that Mr. Tontarski based his

comparison upon a 25% gasoline standard, Mr. Davis

admitted that he should not have used the 100% gasoline

standard in making his comparison (T.1898, 1910).

(2) Despite the fact that Mr. Tontarski testified that

the chromatograms and standards should be analyzed in

a side-by-side comparison rather than by overlapping the

standards (T.2096-99, 2150-51), Mr. Davis conducted his

comparison by overlapping the standards (T.1741, 1754,

1758, 1771, 1772, 1783, 2009-27). ;

(3) Mr. Davis never: (a) looked at Mr. Tontarski’s

manual explaining his sample preparation and compari-

son techniques (T.1900-01); (b) contacted Mr. Tontarski

to ask about his techniques (T.1893, 1970-71); and (c)

looked at the cans containing the samples prior to trial

(T.1800).

(4) Mr. Davis admitted that he requires more match-

ing peaks in a comparison before making a finding of

gasoline than is legally required by the courts (T.1878,

1897).

From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded that

Mr. Davis did not have sufficient background information

about Mr. Tontarski’s techniques to render a competent opin-

ion as to whether there was gasoline in the samples. That

Mr. Davis did not have sufficient information to offer a valid

opinion is supported by his post-trial testimony which showed

both that he never looked at Mr. Tontarski’s manual prior to

trial (M.4, D.6), and that he made incorrect assumptions

App. I34

about Mr. Tontarski’s sampling technique (M.7-8, 26, 40-43;

D.15, 14-19). Moreover, from Mr. Davis’ in-court comparison

of the sample chromatograms with the wrong gasoline stan-

dard, the jurors may have reasonably inferred that Mr. Davis

was attempting to confuse or mislead them. Thus, the jury

could reasonably have both accepted Mr. Tontarski’s opinion

and rejected Mr. Davis’ opinion pertaining to the presence of

gasoline. Since the defense never challenged Mr. Tontarski’s

credentials as an expert at trial, the jury’s acceptance of Mr.

Tontarski’s opinion should not be disregarded by this court.

(2) The Jury Could Have Reasonably Credited the Testi-

mony by the State’s Arson Experts That the Physical

Evidence at the Scene was Consistent with a Gasoline

Fire and Inconsistent with an Accidental Fire.

Jerry Pedlar, Fire Marshal for the Brooklyn Center Fire

Department, personally observed the arson scene and con-

cluded that the “fire was started as a result of flammable

liquids” (T.783). Two independent arson consultants, James

Carlson and Sharadchandra Bhatt, reviewed the reports, photos

and videotapes in this case (T.930, 1076-76). Both consultants

agreed that the evidence was consistent with a gasoline fire

and was inconsistent with either a cigarette or electrical fire

(T.944-45, 1076, 1093, 1095). These expert opinions were

based upon the following physical evidence:

(a) Numerous suspicious low burns that could not be

explained by the presence of a combustible in the area or

by the dropping down of items (T.363-65, 372-75, 387,

393, 397, 400-01, 752-53, 755), especially the deep scarring

and rutting in the living room area (T.372-74).

(b) The presence of “trailers” on both the ground

level including the stairway which were sixty feet in

App. I35

length with widths from three to six inches to two feet

(T.775-76).

(c) The unusual burn on and under the kitchen table

that was consistent with the presence of a liquid accel-

erant (T.388-90).

(d) The burning of the fire through the tread on the

stairs which could only be explained by the seeping of a

flammable liquid through the carpet and down into the

stair treads (T.388-89).

(e) The presence of gasoline in the front door entry-

way (T.548, 765), on the kitchen windowsill (T.391-92,

546-47), in the living room by the sofa (T.408, 549), on

the stairway (T.388-89, 549-50) and by the door to the

bedroom where two of the boys were trapped (T.551,

752).

(f) The determination that none of the electrical ap-

pliances, outlets or wiring could have been the cause of

the fire (T.422).

(g) The inability to find any other accidental cause

for the fire (T.423).

(h) The observations by the policemen, firemen and

neighbors showing that the fire spread through the house

at an extremely rapid rate (T.58, 59, 60-61, 70, 90-91,

106, 136, 164, 185, 186, 210-211, 214, 248, 245, 249, 256,

259, 275-76, 283, 312) and the firemen’s observations that

App. 136

this was the worst residential fire that they have ever

seen (T.114, 139-40, 149, 155, 172, 730).°¢

Although defense expert Shelby Gallien testified that the

physical evidence was consistent with an accidental fire and

was not consistent with a gasoline fire, the record demon-

strates that considerable evidence cast doubt upon the cred.

ibility of Mr. Gallien’s expert opinion:

(a) Mr. Gallien testified that the flammability range

for gasoline was 1-3/4% to 4% (T.1430-31). The correct

figure is 14% to 7.6% (7.1435, 1858). The defense’s

other expert, Mr. Davis, testified that Mr. Gallien’s testi-

mony on the flammability range constituted a “50 per-

cent” error which in his opinion was a “gross error”

(T.1858-59).

(b) Despite the fact that Mr. Gallien had copies of

the reports in this case for over six months prior to trial,

he was unable to reach any conclusion as to the cause of

the fire until a few days before he testified (T.1466-67,

1471).

6 The decision notes that “[t]he time lapse between the alarm and

the response of the fire fighters is in dispute.” Berndt, slip op. at 3,

n. 3. It is respectfully submitted that consideration of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict compels a finding that

the police arrived on the scene at 2:56 a.m., five minutes after the

fire was reported (T.106, 134-35, 151, 169, 110, 170-71). It was rationai

for the jury to make this finding since State’s Exhibit No. 1 shows

that the fire station was only one block from the townhouse

(T.168-69) and the first firemen on the scene lived within a block

of the fire station (T.168-69, 100, 152, 170-71). Also, although the

neighbors stated that it took the fire department a long time to

arrive, their presence at the fire could have easily altered their

perception of time (T.216, 1098). More importantly, the police of-

ficers and firemen who testified that the firemen arrived within

a short period of time were in constant contact with the dispatch-

er, Whose job it was to correctly record times of arrival (T.65, 92,

110, 152, 171).

App. 137

(c) Mr. Gallien testified on direct examination that

this was a slow starting fire which could have been

started by either a short in an electrical circuit, grease

burning in the frying pan or a cigarette smoldering on

the rug (T.1399-1401). When the prosecutor on cross

examination pointed out that the fire scene reports con-

tained information ruling out both an electrical or grease

fire, Mr. Gallien abruptly repudiated two of his three

theories concerning the fire’s possible origin (T.1632-33,

1657-63).

(d) Mr. Gallien’s only remaining theory concerning

the fire’s origin—that of a flashback fire caused by a

smoldering cigarette—was contradicted by the following

evidence:

(i) Buildup of gases for a flashback fire cannot

occur when windows are open (T.1958-59, 2111). Tes-

timony at trial showed that several windows in the

townhouse were open at the time of trial (T.337) ; and

(ii) Buildup of sufficient gasses on the first floor

to cause a flashback fire would have caused persons

present on the first floor to die of carbon monoxide

poisoning before the fire could ignite (T.1095, 2112).

But Appellant, who claims he was present on the first

floor of the townhouse, survived the fire. Also, Brenda

died from breathing superheated air and not from car-

bon monoxide poisoning (T.898, 903, 906).

(e) Mr. Gallien’s theory of an accidental fire was

‘based upon the belief that there was no gasoline present

in the townhouse (T.1348-49, 1357, 1367, 1369-70, 1392,

1422, 1644). But other evidence at trial showed that five

fire scene samples contained gasoline (T.391-92, 408, 546-

47, 548, 549-51).

App. I38

The above demonstrates that the jurors, who actually ob-

served the witnesses testify, could have rationally accepted

the opinions of the State’s experts. Moreover, the jury could

have reasonably rejected any contrary opinions by Mr. Gallien

since his testimony demonstrated both that he was not fully

familiar with all the fire scene evidence when he reached his

conclusions and that he was not fully acquainted with all the

properties of gasoline. Since the jury had a rational basis

upon which to reject Mr. Gallien’s opinion, it is respectfully

submitted that the requirement that evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict does not per-

mit reliance upon Mr. Gallien’s rejected theories as justifica-

tion for a finding of insufficiency.

(3) The Jury Could Have Reasonably Concluded that Ap-

pellant’s Story of Escape was not Credible.

The defense’s accidental fire theory was premised upon

Appellant’s testimony that when he woke up, he saw a limited

fire and ran through the house before the fire could spread.

But the following physical evidence in the record casts doubt

upon the credibility of this testimony:

(a) The findings of gasoline and the experts’ opinions

show that there could not have been a limited fire in the

townhouse for any period of time (T.717, 794, 934-35,

1070-71).

(b) Appellant did not suffer significant injuries. The

findings of gasoline and the experts’ opinions show that

Appellant could not have escaped the house in the manner

he claims he did without suffering severe bodily harm

(T.782-84, 1077).

(c) Appellant’s testimony that he saw a limited fire

in the portion of the dining room near the kitchen and

then came out of the house at the same time his neighbor

App. I39

Charlie Catron came out of his townhouse (T.335, 970,

1129-30, 1132-33) is inconsistent with Mr. Catron’s testi-

mony. At the same time Appellant allegedly saw a limited

fire, Mr. Catron and Linda Kavai looked out their bed-

room window and saw the fire (T.242-43, 247, 253).

Reference to the location of Mr. Catron’s window in

State’s Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 5 demonstrates that neither

Mr. Catron nor Ms. Kavai could have possibly seen the

fire from this window had it been confined to the dining

room area by the kitchen. The fire clearly must have

already spread throughout the rear of the living room by

the time Mr. Catron and Ms. Kavai observed it.

(d) Appellant’s story about Brenda getting up and

running directly into the fire is inconsistent with the

physical evidence showing that she would have had to

run through and past a wall of fire in order to end up

where she did on the dining room floor. See State’s Ex-

hibit 18. The physical evidence also shows that it is not

rational to conclude that Brenda would get up and run

through a wall of fire to reach the dining room since the

boys were located in an opposite part of the house and

there was no exit through the dining room.

In addition to the fact that the physical evidence contradicted

Appellant’s story, other evidence at trial cast doubt upon

Appellant’s credibility. This evidence includes the following:

(a) After telling the police on both August 21 and 27,

1981, that Brenda was upstairs at the time of the fire,

(T.769, 1183), Appellant waited until six weeks after the

fire to tell the police that he now thought Brenda was

downstairs with him on the sofa (T.984, 1185).

(b) Although Appellant claimed his feet turned

brown after the fire, there was no evidence showing that

App. 140

he had his feet examined by a doctor (T.1144). Also, he

did not tell the police about his feet until after the brown

skin was gone (T.983-84).

(c) Appellant’s claim that he and Brenda had worked

out all their problems a year before the fire was rebutted

by evidence showing that he both physically accosted

another woman in Brenda’s presence a couple months

before the fire and discussed wife swapping with another

man shortly before the fire (T.632-35, 659, 1113-14, 1157-

59, 1263-65).

Although the decision appears to rely heavily upon Appel-

lant’s testimony in support of its holding that there was a

rational hypothesis consistent with Appellant’s innocence, the

verdict demonstrates that the jurv did not find his story of

escape to be rational or credible. The significant inconsis-

tencies in Appellant’s statement to the police alone gave the

jury “substantial grounds to doubt the veracity of [his]

story.” State v. Race, N.W.2d —— (Minn., filed March

21, 1986) (slip op. at 13) (citing State v. Langley, 354 N.W.

2d 389, 394 (Minn. 1984). Since the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict shows that Appel-

lant’s claim of escape was impossible, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that this court cannot base a holding of insufficiency

upon Appellant’s impossible claim that there was a limited

fire from which he was able to escape without serious injury.

V. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS TECHNICALLY

SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN TH! JURY’S VERDICTS,

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE EITHER

THAT THE VERDICTS BE REINSTATED OR THAT

THE CASE BE REMANDED FOR TRIAL.

Acceptance of the evidence showing that this was an arson

gasoline fire compels the conclusion that Appellant was the

arsonist. Thus, application for this court’s usual standard of

<x

App. 141

review requires reinstatement of the convictions upon this

rehearing. However, if this court declines to reinstate the

convictions, the State respectfully requests that this court

recognize that its reversal was based upon its re-evaluation of

the weight of the evidence as a “thirteenth juror” and remand

this case for retrial. See Tibbs v. United States, 457 U.S. 31

(1982).

A. Remanding this Case for Retrial is Permissible under

the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This court’s doubt of Appellant’s guilt could only be prem-

ised upon the rejection or questioning of both the State’s gas

chromatography expert’s findings and the arson experts’

opinion that a person could not run through a house ablazo

with ignited gasoline without suffering severe injury. Al-

though the State does not contest this court’s authority to

depart from its self-imposed review standard and act as a

“thirteenth juror,” it is respectfully submitted that this

court’s doubts about the arson experts’ testimony should not

result in Appellant receiving immunity for his crimes when

the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict. In-

stead, the interests of justice require that the case be remanded

for retrial so that a mew jury can evaluate the credibility of

the State’s expert witnesses. See generally Snyder v. Massa-

chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (“[b]ut justice, though due

to the accused, is due to the accuser also”’).

Although the Sixth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause

precludes retrial when a reversal is based on insufficient evi-

dence, retrial is permissible when reversal is based on the

weight of the evidence. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 US. at

App. 142

46-47.’ The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to

prevent the State from having an attempt to prove its case

through successive prosecutions when it has failed to present

technically sufficient evidence in the first trial. See generally

Burks v. United States, 4837 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). But when a

reversal is based upon the weight of the evidence, the prosecu-

tion has already

presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and

has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply

affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a

favorable judgment.

Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43 (footnote omitted). Here, the State has

presented sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt and has

already persuaded one jury to convict. This court’s disagree-

ment with the jury’s assessment of the weight of the evidence

should not be deemed the equivalent of an acquittal since this

court re-evaluated the evidence without personally observing

the witnesses’ demeanor.

It is anticipated that Appellant will argue that a retrial

of the same evidence would be a waste of time since a success-

ful re-prosecution below would only result in this court again

re-weighing the same evidence again on appeal. However, the

United States Supreme Court noted that:

Although reversal of a first conviction based on sharply

conflicting testimony may serve the interests of justice,

reversal of a second conviction based on the same evi-

dence may not.

7It is anticipated that Appellant will argue that the rationale in

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) is inapplicable to this case be-

cause the Florida Supreme Court based its reversal on a state rule

that allows reversal and remand if the appellate court is convinced

that the weight of the evidence does not support the verdict. See

Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 36, n. 8. Although this court has never formally

enunciated a similar rule, it is respectfully submitted that since

the evidence was technically sufficient, this court has tacitly

adopted a similar rule in this case.

App. 143

Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43, n. 18. Here at a retrial, the defense will

have an opportunity to remedy its gas chromatography ex-

pert’s apparent lack of preparation ax the first trial. As noted

previously in Section IV(B)(1) of this Petition, Mr. Davis’

testimony demonstrated that he was unaware of either Mr.

Tontarski’s sampling technique or his method of analysis.

Consequently, the jury may well have discounted Mr. Davis’

opinion since he did not appear to have an adequate factual

background upon which to base his opinion. Conversely, upon

becoming fully informed about Mr. Tontarski’s technique, Mr.

Davis may well agree with Mr. Tontarski’s conclusion that the

samples contained gasoline.

Moreover, at a new trial “[i]t is possible that new evidence

. will make the State’s case even stronger during a second

trial than it was at the first.” Tibbs, 457 U.S. 43, n. 19. This

may be especially true in this case since new evidence has

come to light that if credited by a jury, would make the State’s

case even stronger. This new evidence includes the following:

(1) A fellow inmate of Appellant’s at Stillwater Pris-

on has reported that Appellant confessed to setting a

fire in a dwelling where children were present. See Affi-

davits and Statement reprinted in Petitioner’s Confi-

dential Appendix.* According to this inmate, he ard

Appellant were sharing a marijuana cigarette and watch-

ing a news program about another arson case involving

an arson of a dwelling with a child inside. In response

to this news report, Appellant told the inmate: “I did

the same thing.” Although this inmate is currently in-

* The name of this inmate is provided in the affidavits and state-

ment contained in Petitioner’s Confidential Appendix. To min’-

mize the risk that other inmates may take retaliatory actions

against this inmate, the State requests that this inmate’s identity

not be revealed to the public until a new trial is scheduled or until

this court determines that the dictates of justice require an earlier

release. A copy of Petitioner’s Confidential Appendix, however, is

being sent to Appellant’s counsel.

App. 144

carcerated, he has made no attempt to obtain any prom-

ises or deals from the prosecution in exchange for his

cooperation. Also, no threats or promises were made by

anyone to induce this inmate to provide this information.

The only consideration given to this inmate is the promise

that he will be transferred to a different Department of

Corrections Facility so that his safety would not be in

jeopardy from other inmates once it was revealed that

he has provided the prosecution with evidence against

Appellant. Because Appellant did not make this confes-

sion until April, 1985, it was not available as evidence

at Appellant’s initial trial.

(2) On August 16, 1985, a formal grievance complaint

against defense expert Shelby Gallien was filed with the

Ethical Practices and Grievance Committee of the Inter-

national Arson Investigators, Inc. See Letter of John R.

Lewis and Complaint reprinted at pp. 22-29 of Petition-

er’s Appendix. The complaint was based upon Mr. Gal-

lien’s alleged violations of ethical duties during his testi-

mony at Appellant’s trial. The complaint is still pending

because the Ethical Practices and Grievance Committee

has been unable to contact Mr. Gallien despite repeated

attempts to do so. The defense’s theory of accidental fire

was premised primarily upon Mr. Gallien’s expert opin-

ion. In qualifying himself as an expert at trial, Mr.

Gallien testified that he was a member of the Interna-

tional Association of Arson Investigators. At a retrial,

evidence of this ethical grievance would serve to impeach

both Mr. Gallien’s credentials as an expert and his expert

opinions.

It should be noted that the State is not requesting this court

to reinstate the convictions as a result of this new evidence

nor is it basing its request for a new trial on the ground that

=.

App. 145

it now has sufficient evidence to convict Appellant. The

State’s position is that the evidence at trial was technically

sufficient to sustain the convictions. See Section IV of Peti-

tion. This new evidence is noted solely for the purpose of

showing the court that if a jury credits this new evidence at

a retrial and Appellant is again convicted, the evidence on

appeal from a second successful prosecution may well resolve

any doubts this court now has about the weight of the evi-

dence.

B. Rehearing of this Case on Appeal is Permissible under

the Double Jeopardy Clause.

In Appellant’s Objection to Motion to Enlarge Time to File

Petition for Rehearing, Appellant claims that because th2

decision stated that the evidence was insufficient, a rehearing

of this case violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although

under Rurks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), an appellate

decision holding that as a matter of law that the evidence is

insufficient bars retrial, double jeopardy does not bar further

appellate proceedings in a case if the applicable rules allow

for such proceedings. In this case, both Minn.R.Civ.App.P.

136.02 and 140.03 provide that the filing of a Petition for Re-

hearing stays the entering of judgment in this case until dis-

position of the petition.

Appellant’s reliance upon State v. Abraham, 335 N.W.2d

745 (Minn. 1983) is inapplicable to this proceeding since, in

reversing the convictions of this case, this court acted as a

reviewing tribunal and not as the trier of fact. Although an

acquittal by either the jury or a trial court judge cannot be

appealed, an appellate court’s finding of insufficiency is still

subject to further appellate review. See e.g. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at

47 (Florida Supreme Court’s reversal indicating sufficiency

as reversal grounds did not bar reconsideration of this deci-

sion in a separate appellate proceeding).

App. 146

VI. CONCLUSION

Consideration of the material evidence that was overlooked

or misconceived demonstrates that the evidence of guilt was

sufficient as a matter of law. Thus, this court’s reversal was

based upon a re-weighing of the evidence rather than a find-

ing of sufficiency.

Therefore, the State maaan requests that its Petition

for Rehearing be granted and that this court either reinstate

the jury’s verdicts finding Appellant guilty of eight counts of

Murder in the First Degree or remand the case for a new trial

in the interests of justice.

Dated: April 10, 1986.

Respectfully submitted,

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III

Minnesota Attorney General

102 State Capitol

St. Paul, MN 55155

THOMAS L. JOHNSON

Hennepin County Attorney

VERNON E. BERGSTROM

Chief, Appellate Section

By: BEVERLY J. WOLFE

Assistant County Attorney

Atty. Lic. No. 131751

Phone: 348-8794

C-2000 Government Center

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Attorneys for Petitioner-

Respondent

ee ee

aia Sariene ee Soi

ch Fle Hd SR 4 BUN AL IS Rd ta CRS ce od Melk eb een

ie oe

App. Jl

APPENDIX J

Transcript Excerpts of Ward Mahlen’s Testimony

{[T.373] Mahlen—Direct

* * * has been overhauled and cleaned out.

Q. Dining room or living room?

A. Oh, I am sorry. I beg your pardon. The living room,

and, once again, it shows a hole in the floor where we cut out

a floor sample.

Q. And 9D, what does that show?

A. 9D is a closeup of some debris on the floor, which is

the area of the sofa directly-—-which was located directly

below the—if I have my directions right—south window of

the living room.

Q. This sofa here (indicating) ?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Which is located here (indicating) ?

A. That is correct.

Q. Where, in relationship to that sofa, was that piece of

wood cut out of the floor?

A. Approximately 8 feet north of the sofa—north of the

wall, so 3 or 4 feet in front of the sofa.

Q. Why did you cut that piece of wood out of there?

A. After we cleaned the floor, we saw unusual burn pat-

terns on the floor. Patterns which we could’t explain nat-

urally through any other accidental or natural burn process.

The burn patterns were, had burned through the carpet,

through three-quarter-inch sheet of particle board, and down

into the plywood [T.374] subfloor and had formed a trail all

of the way through the living room area.

Once again, we selected the area of the burned pattern that

we felt was—gave us the best area that might have been

App. J2

protected and may get the best chance to get a good sample.

Q. Did you take some pictures of those burn areas in the

floor you described?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you have them blown up?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Would you take a look at what is marked here as State’s

Exhibits 15 and 16, they are a little bit out of order in reila-

tionship to the others. But, can you tell me if you recognize

those photos and what they are—not what they are—and

whether or not they are good shots?

A. Yes, they are accurate photographs of the scene.

MR. BYRNE: I am going to offer into evidence the State’s

Exhibits 15 and 16.

MR. CASCARANO: I have no objection.

THE COURT: There being no objection, State’s 15 and 16

are received. :

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. I wonder if you will take a look at 15, Deputy, and

[T.375] tell us what that is a picture of?

A. This is a picture of the deep scarring on the floor

showing a very distinct pattern or trail where, I believe,

accelerant had been poured. This is consistent with other—

with my experiences where I see—

MR. CASCARANO: Can we approach the Bench?

THE COURT: Yes, come along.

(Conversation at the Bench, not recorded.)

THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. It is scarring and rutting in the floor, right?

A. Yes, it is. It also took place in the center of the floor.

a want you to just for a moment stick with me and my

question and then we will show the crowd where they were.

App. J3

Why don’t you take a look at Exhibit 16; tell us what that

shows? )

A. There is a little wider angle of the same area showing

scarring or rutting through the particle board in the floor.

Q. Are they two different locations?

A. Yes, I believe they are.

Q. Could you then, with whatever index you have or

record [T.3876] of where the photographs came from, step to

the model and with the pointer show the jury where each of

the patterns was?

First of all we will refer to State’s Exhibit 15.

A. Okay. Maybe on this area here—

Q. Well, yes.

A. Okay. We found two trails that went—one went this

direction; another went down this direction; and the third

connected the two. This area here (indicating).

Q. Fifteen?

A. Fifteen is an area of a burned trail. It was approxi-

mately in this area here in front of where these chairs would

be.

THE COURT: For the record, would you describe what

area it is that you are pointing out on the diagram?

THE WITNESS: Okay. That would be approximately 3 or

4 feet from the south common wall in the living room, in the

approximate center of the room from east to west, 3 or 4 feet

out. It ran east to west in the approximate center area of the

room.

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. Then could you tell us where the rutting or scarring

that was visible in State’s Exhibit 16 is located?

Again referring to State’s Exhibit 4, the [T.3877] overhead

photograph.

App. J4

A. This photograph shows the rutting. This would be the

south end of the living room or—I beg your pardon, the west

end of the living room going toward the east end; would start

approximately in this area here and run almost all of the way

down to the hallway. We can also see another area coming

off here. This area was approximately—this area which con-

nected the two scars.

This would be a linear scarring running from east to west

on the north side of the living room.

Q. Extending off toward the dining room, is that correct?

A. Extending over to the dining room. :

Q. I wonder if you would like to take your seat.

MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I would like to offer these

photographs to the jury at this time?

THE COURT: All right, you may do that.

MR. BYRNE: Does the Court wish to see these?

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. Now, I want you to take a look at 10A through 10F.

Tell me if you recognize those photos and if they are good

pictures of what they show?

A. Yes. These areaphotos of the living room and ceiling.

And they are accurate photos.

MR. BYRNE: I offer them into evidence.

* * *

[T.387] * * * significance with the jury.

Referring first to 11F.

A. This is a photograph of the northwest corner of the

kitchen, showing the kitchen table and the floor area. We will

be able to see it better when this area is cleaned out. Before

we cleaned it out, you could still

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.