Opposition Brief — City of Angoon v. Hodel
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Supreme Court, U.S, .
= : FILED
No. 86-1627
JUN 19 1987
In the Supreme Court of the
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
City OF ANGOON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
VY.
DONALD HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor. Generai
F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
DAVID C. SHILTON
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Corps of Engineers’ grant of a permit
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
1344) for the construction of a breakwater in navigable
waters is a disposition of a property interest of the United
States that requires the preparation of a subsistence
evaluation under Section 810 of the Alaska National In-
terest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA), Pub.
L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2427.
2. Whether Section 503(d) of ANILCA (94 Stat.
2400), which prohibits the sale or harvesting of timber
within the Admiralty Island National Monument in
Alaska, applies to the privately owned land of respondent
Shee Atika, an Alaska Native Corporation.
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in directing the
entry of summary judgment for respondents on peti-
tioners’ claim under the National Environmental Policy
Act, based on a determination that there were no remain-
ing issues of material fact.
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
’ Page
EE ES ee ee ee ee |
ee Sar gid Wee b wcevavechdesses |
ee are EL Ta ha Sos shes b Gases escesesss 2
i a Seah sh skeen os ke kes evegebeesececs 7
ek senor geese ceennrens 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIiES
Cases:
Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, No. 85-1239 (Mar.
ere 8, 9, 10, 12-13
Bettin v. Nelson, 744 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1984) ........... 16
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. _USPS, 648 F.2d 97 (2d
EOS Oe 16-17
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ..... 16
First Nat’l Bank vy. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253
ee ee SUL eS ca bk bees ses cccrecces 16
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949) ................ 17
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) ...... 8
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S.
ee eee beer hb xs ch cs esnsesves 17
Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d
772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984) . 16
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
Es Tr 13
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593
ee 5 usc chek be wadavenees 17
National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 496 F.
Supp. 716 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.
Ne eg bie bo eb sic necvees 14
SEC v. Spence & Green, 612 F.2d 896 (Sth Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981) .................. 16
Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) .......... 17
Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134 (ist Cir. 1984) ........ 16
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978) ......... 9
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53
OU A &
IV
Cases — Continued: Page
United States v. Cherokee Nation, No. 85-1940 (Mar. 31,
Ne FS Uis oak ake aera uae ee een 11
United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945) .. 8
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222
SES neue athe sae Sad eee ee ek Lek ee kk eae ed 8
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.
SS xa WeLcckecdled st wadesl ee aun Se mTt & 8
Upper Westfork River Watershed Ass’n v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. W.Va. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010
Cs op bac s sh suis bo eee see eee ees. 14
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
RT Re ee rery ei Pun a 16
Viger v. Commercial Insurance Co., 707 F.2d 769 (3d
a ks ube ic ba Fick hic SEAS oR a ees 17
VISA Int'l Service v. Bankcard Holders, 784 F.2d 1472
Sg aw uk a eh ea Kee Rh ccae rea ek weae 16
Constitution, statutes and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) .........4.... 11
Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2(Property Clause) .............. 1]
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 16 U.S.C. 3101 ef
$eq.:
© 602, SO Bit. 2575 COG US. PAGE) . oe vee ees 8
§ 102(1), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(1)) ......... 8
§ 102(2), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(2)) ......... 8
§ 102(3), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(3)) ......... 10, 12
§ 103(c), 94 Stat. 2377 (16 U.S.C. 3103(c)) ......... 1]
Se ssp a's we Sew cee da Re aoe 13
Se ee ss ys va vs beans wee alew oS 2.4,
© Se es Us oie cv aliceevai ees 4, 6, 11, 12, 13
Se I os ki ba eke ena cad eeee eae’ pe
& $10, 96 iat. 2427 (16 U.S.C. 312)... wc, Vs
9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601
gE TET TC Oe Ne PEE TP OTe Peer eT Sere
Po ea RS ome |,
re a, Os gio os ook ba ns eee a eee seas
ee ORE BE gl) re ee
V
Constitution, statutes and rules — Continued: Page
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m),
ck <P ROEPrr rs ye er erey rT Terre era ee 9
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, Pub. L.
No. 5-005, 6G, Fo Time. TOGO. on ccc ccc sccrsveces 13
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1151 ef seq.:
eM BF ae Serre Sree ere 3, 5
ee RS oe eee eee 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11
Interior Appropriations Act for 1983, Pub. L. No.
97-306, 6 315, SGM. TGS... 0c cece eccwe esses. 3
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C),
Pg ih Vad: lo Deere ere er 3
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301 ef seq. ... 9, 10
© Mad, GPUS. 19MM) 0.6 ccc ccs ecnescens 9
eR Le Pa) err rr re 9
6 Oi, S01 E. ISOM) og cece ccs esccevioveas 9
TEER Catt” rear ree warren rnc rye 12
Se nt eso bo ed eee ee Ree 14, 18
Fed. R. Civ. P.:
es aca d 6G aKa e he DA ADRES EES 6
UR nn gichk do Siaa Ve ORS ORAD EO SAR RY CUED 15
hos oh hae Oth seas eee ee hae ae 15, 16
Miscellaneous:
125 Comm, Rac. FIGS CISTI) oo ioc ns ces cece recede sees 12
128 Cong. Rec. $14303 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1982) ......... 3
6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice (2d
Oe i, ee ro Prone on errs rere ot 15-16, 17
10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil 2d (2d ed. 1983) ..........ccccccces 17
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
No. 86-1627
CiTy OF ANGOON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DONALD HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A25)
is reported at 803 F.2d 1016. A prior opinion of the court
of appeals is reported at 749 F.2d 1413 (1985). The opin-
ions of the district court (Pet. App. D1-D16, E1-E16, ~-
F1-F5) are unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. B1)
was entered on October 31, 1986, and a timely petition for
rehearing was denied on December 1, 1986 (Pet. App. Cl).
By orders dated February 18, March 17, and March 27,
1987, Justice O’Connor extended the time within which to
file the petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
April 10, 1987. The petition was filed on that date. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
(1)
STATEMENT
1. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. 1601 ef seq.,
to settle the aboriginal claims of Alaskan Natives.
“ANCSA authorized the payment of almost $1 billion cash
and the conveyance of approximately 40 million acres of
land to Alaskan Natives as compensation for extinguish-
ment of their claims and to assist them in achieving finan-
cial independence and self- sufficiency.” City of Angoen v.
Marsh, 749 F.2d 1413, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (Angoon I).
Respondent Shee Atika, Inc., is an Alaska Native Cor-
poration established to receive and administer the ANCSA
benefits of the Natives of Sitka, Alaska. The only benefit
Shee Atika received under ANCSA was the right to the
surface estate in up to 23,040 acres of land. 43 U.S.C.
1613(h)(3). In 1975, Shee Atika selected land on the
southwest portion of Admiralty Island, near the com-
munity of Angoon. The Sierra Club and Kootznoowoo,
Inc., a Native Corporation representing the Natives of
Angoon, immediately filed suit to challenge this selection
(Pet. App. A4).
Congress sought to resolve this controversy by enacting
Section 506(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act of 1980 (ANILCA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2409. Section 506(c) provided that the Secretary of
the Interior, upon passage of ANILCA, “shall convey” to
Shee Atika equivalent acreage on the northwest portion of
Admiralty Island, adjacent to Cube Cove, in satisfaction
of Shee Atika’s rights under ANCSA. Shee Atika in turn
was required to release its claim to the lands it had selected
on the southwest portion of the Island. 94 Stat. 2411. The
Cube Cove lands are farther from Angoon and less en-
vironmentally sensitive than Shee Atika’s original selection
(Pet. App. A4). In ANILCA, Congress also designated
most of the rest of Admiralty Island as the Admiralty
Island National Monument. See § 503(b), 94 Stat. 2399.
a seinen
3
Despite Congress’s directive, petitioners challenged the
Secretary’s conveyance of the land adjacent to Cube Cove
(Pet. App. AS). The Sierra Club also filed a notice of /is
pendens in the Alaska land records, which prevented Shee
Atika from obtaining financing for its timber development
plans at the new site (ibid.). Congress responded to this
renewed challenged to Shee Atika’s plans by enacting Sec-
tion 315 of the Interior Appropriations Act for 1983, Pub.
L. No. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1998, which confirmed “in all
respects” the title conveyed by the Secretary pursuant to
Section 506(c) of ANILCA. The Explanatory Statement
prepared by the Senate Committee on Appropriations
stated (128 Cong. Rec. $14303 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1982)):
By section 506(c) of [ANILCA], Congress directed
title to certain lands be conveyed to Shee Atika, Inc.
Congress intended to settle pending litigation con-
cerning the validity of certain withdrawals pursuant
to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. It was
noted that Shee Atika received no funds under the
Settlement Act, because of the lawsuit [it] had not yet
received its land entitlement[,] and without a
legislative solution Shee Atika could go bankrupt (S.
Rept. No. 96-413, pp. 214-215). * * *
* * * The purpose of this provision is to make clear
that the title conveyed pursuant to section 506(c) is
valid, conveyed pursuant to the Settlement Act and
that the land is to be developed by Shee Atika for its
economic growth and stability.
2.a. Notwithstanding Congress’s action, petitioners
filed yet another challenge to Shee Atika’s plans, alleging
that the proposed development of its land violated, inter
alia, Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C); the
subsistence protection provisions of Section 810 of
ANILCA, 94 Stat. 2427, 16 U.S.C. 3120; Sections 402 and
404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342 and 1344; and
4
federal trust responsibilities to the Natives of Angoon.
Petitioners’ primary claim under NEPA was that an en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS) was required for the
permit issued by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, for a log-transfer facility on Cube
Cove. This facility will be used by Shee Atika to place
harvested timber into the waters of the Cove, where it then
can be bundled into rafts and towed away. A permit is re-
quired because the log-transfer facility includes a
breakwater that extends into navigable waters. Pet. App.
AS.
b. The federal defendants agreed to suspend the Sec-
tion 404 permit and prepare an EIS. Shee Atika proceeded
to harvest timber by other means that did not require plac-
ing a Structure in navigable waters. Angoon then obtained
a preliminary injunction barring even that activity. The in-
junction was based on the theory that Section 503(d) of
ANILCA, 94 Stat. 2400, which prohibits the Secretary of
Agriculture from permitting the sale or harvesting of
timber “[w]ithin the Monument[],” applies to private
lands as well as public lands that fall within the outer
boundaries of the Admiralty Island National Monument.
The court of appeals reversed the preliminary injunction.
Angoon I, supra. It reasoned that Section 503(b) of
ANILCA specifies that the Admiralty Island National
Monument shall consist of “approximately 921,000 acres
of public lands” (94 Stat. 2399 (emphasis added)), and
therefore does not include private lands (749 F.2d at
1416). In the court’s view, the text and legislative history
of other provisions of ANILCA likewise made it “clear
that Congress intended that the private status of the lands
conveyed to Shee Atika is to remain unaffected by their in-
clusion within the exterior boundaries of the conservation
system unit on Admiralty Island” (Angoon I, 749 F.2d at
5
1418). The court also found it “inconceivable that Con-
gress would have extinguished [Shee Atika’s] aboriginal
claims and insured their economic well being by forbid-
ding the only real economic use of the lands so conveyed”
(ibid.).
c. On remand, petitioners filed a consolidated com-
plaint challenging the legality of the conveyance to Shee
Atika, the permits for the log-transfer facility, and Shee
Atika’s timber operations. The federal defendants moved
for summary judgment on all claims at issue here (E.R.
111-112'), and Shee Atika moved for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment on all claims (E.R. 113). Petitioners
moved for summary judgment.on the bulk of their claims
(E.R. 108-109, 114-117). With respect to NEPA, peti-
tioners maintained that the EIS did not adequately con-
sider alternatives to the log-transfer facility (E.R.
115-117). Although petitioners alleged that they had other
grounds for challenging the EIS that would require
discovery (see page 15, infra), they did not identify those
other grounds.
The district court granted partial summary judgment to
petitioners on their claim that the Section 404 permit for
the log-transfer facility was invalid under NEPA, on the
ground that the EIS did not study the alternative of having
Shee Atika exchange its Admiralty Island tract for land
located elsewhere in Alaska (Pet. App. D8-D15). The
court dismissed or granted summary judgment tn favor of
' “E.R.” refers to the Excerpts of Record filed in the court of ap-
peals. The federal defendants’ summary judgment motion did not ap-
ply to claims relating to the issuance of a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit for the log-transfer facility, pur-
suant to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342. Those
claims have been stayed pending resolution of an administrative ap-
peal that is still pending before the Environmental Protection Agency.
Pet. App. D7.
6
the defendants on all other claims. The court then entered
a partial final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See
Pet. App. F1-FS.
d. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
order insofar as it declared the Section 404 permit void on
NEPA grounds, observing that the Corps of Engineers
had spent 19 months preparing an EIS that was “tech-
nically sophisticated and analytically rigorous” (Pet. App.
A8-A9). In particular, thé court of appeals sustained the
Corps’ reasons for not giving more extensive considera-
tions to the alternative of a possible exchange of Shee
Atika’s current holding. The court explained (i) that the
exchange alternative would not satisfy the specific purpose
for which the Section 404 permit was sought, viz.,
facilitating timber harvesting on Shee Atika’s present land;
(ii) that the exchange alternative was speculative because it
was dependent upon action by Congress, which had only
recently directed and then ratified the conveyance of that
land to Shee Atika; and (iii) that the Corps was justifiably
reluctant to deny a Section 404 permit merely to force Shee
Atika to agree to exchange its present holding for land
elsewhere (Pet. App. A9-Al11). Finding no remaining
issues Of material fact regarding the validity of the EIS,
the court of appeals directed summary judgment for the
defendants on the question of the validity of the log-
transfer facility permit under Section 404 (Pet. App. Al2).
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order
in all other respects (Pet. App. A1l3-A25). First, the court
reaffirmed its holding in Angoon IJ that Section 503(d) of
ANILCA prohibits timber harvesting only on the public
lands that constitute the National Monument, noting that
“reading section 503(d) to prohibit logging on [Shee
Atika’s] Cube Cove inholding would forbid the land’s only
real economic use and defeat the purpose of section 506(c)’s
conveyance of the land” (Pet. App. A15-A16). Second, the
court rejected petitioners’ claims under Section 810 of
ANILCA, 94 Stat. 2427, which requires a subsistence
evaluation if a federal agency proposes to “withdraw,
reserve, lease, or otherwise permit the use, occupancy, or
disposition of public lands.” The court held that Section
810 is inapplicable because Shee Atika’s land is privately
owned and because the United States has no ownership in-
terest in the waters of Cube Cove, in which the breakwater
for the log-transfer facility would be constructed (Pet.
App. A22 n.6).?
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or of another
court of appeals. In fact, petitioners do not seek review on
the principal issue they raised in the courts below —that
the Corps of Engineers, in preparing the EIS, should have
considered the alternative of exchanging Shee Atika’s cur-
rent tract for land elsewhere in Alaska. Furthermore, the
decision below arises in unique circumstances that have
been repeatedly addressed by Congress for the specific
purpose of resolving objections to Shee Atika’s acquisition
and development of its land on Admiralty Island. Review
by this Court therefore is not warranted.
1. Petitioners first contend (Pet. 7-15) that Section 810
of ANILCA applies to the Corps’ grant of a permit under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Section 810 requires
the federal agency having “primary jurisdiction” over
public lands that are proposed for disposition to evaluate
the subsistence effects of the disposition. However, Section
810 by its terms applies only to “public lands,” which term
2 The court also rejected petitioners’ claim, not renewed here, that
Shee Atika’s timber harvesting is barred by time limitations in Section
22(k) of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. 1621(k) (Pet. App. Al7-A21). Peti-
tioners’ petition for rehearing was denied on December 1, 1986, in an
order directing the mandate to issue forthwith (Pet. App. Cl).
8
is defined in Section 102 of ANILCA to mean “land{s]
situated in Alaska which * * * are Federal lands” (94 Stat.
2375, 16 U.S.C. 3102). “Federal land” is defined to mean
“lands the title to which is in the United States,” and the
term “lands” includes “lands, waters, and interest therein.”
94 Stat. 2375, 16 U.S.C. 3102(2) and (1). See Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. Gambell, No. 85-1239 (Mar. 24, 1987), slip
op. 14. Petitioners’ theory is that the navigational ser-
vitude in the waters of Cube Cove is in the nature of a pro-
prietary “interest” in water, the title to which is in the
United States, thereby rendering the servitude itself
“public lands” for purposes of ANILCA. See Pet. 15. The
court of appeals correctly rejected this novel proposition
(Pet. App. A22 n.6).
In United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222,
224 (1956), this Court explained:
The interest of the United States in the flow of a
navigable stream originates in the Commerce Clause.
That Clause speaks in terms of power, not of prop-
erty.
See also United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624, 627-628 (1961), quoting United States v. Com-
modore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 390 (1945) (the navigational
servitude arises from the “power of the government to
control and regulate navigable waters in the interest of
commerce”). The United States of course may choose to
waive its power to regulate navigable waters or may permit
certain obstructions to navigation. Twin City Power, 350
U.S. at 228. But the United States clearly does not grant
title to an interest in property when it permits a party to
place a breakwater in navigable waters. “[T]hat the run-
ning water in a great navigable stream is capable of private
ownership is inconceivable.” United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913); see also Twin City
Power, 350 U.S. at 228; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
9
Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 12-15), the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.,
confirms that the navigational servitude is not a species of
property.* Section 3(a) of the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. 1311(a), vested in the States the “title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within
[their] boundaries * * * and the natural resources within
such lands and waters * * * .” Section 5(a), 43 U.S.C.
1313(a), excepted from this grant any lands and resources
the “title to which has been lawfully and expressly ac-
quired by the United States” or in which the United States
otherwise retained a property interest. See United States v.
California, 436 U.S. 32, 38 (1978). Significantly, however,
the navigational servitude was protected not by Section
5(a), but by Section 6(a) of the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. 1314(a), which reserved to the United States the
“navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regula-
tion and control of said lands and navigable waters for the
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national
defense, and international affairs.” Section 6(a) expressly
provided that this reservation shall not be deemed to in-
clude “proprietary rights of ownership * * *.” Thus, Con-
gress distinguished between the Federal Government’s
retention of property interests and its retention of
regulatory pow rs, and Congress placed the navigational
servitude in the latter category. See United States v.
California, 436 U.S. at 41 & n.18. This pre-existing
Statutory distir “tion reinforces the conclusion that the
navigational sei vitude likewise was not intended by Con-
- gress to be amon, the interests in property covered by Sec-
tion 810 of ANILCA.
> As the Court noted in Gambell, slip op. 14, the Submerged Lands
Act applies to Alaska by virtue of Section 6(m) of the Alaska
Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 343.
10
The decision in Gambell also supports this conclusion.
The Court there held that the grant of oil and gas leases on
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is not subject to Sec-
tion 810 of ANILCA because the OCS is not “in Alaska,”
as required by Section 102(3), 94 Stat. 2375, 16 U.S.C.
3102(3). Significantly, however, the Court also explained
that Congress could not have intended Section 810 to ap-
ply to the OCS for an additional reason (slip op. 19):
Section 810 places the duty to perform a subsistence
evaluation on “the head of the Federal agency having
primary jurisdiction over such lands.” Unlike onshore
lands, no federal agency has “primary jurisdiction”
over the OCS; agency jurisdiction turns on the par-
ticular activity at issue. See G. Coggins & C. Wilkin-
son, Federal Public Land and Resources Law 434
(1981).
As with the OCS, federal responsibility over waters in the
three-mile coastal zone is divided among various agencies:
navigation in coastal waters is subject to Coast Guard
regulation; fishery resources are regulated by the National
Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of Commerce
(and in some instances by the Fish and Wildlife Service of
the Department of the Interior); discharges of pollutants
are regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency;
and obstructions to navigable capacity must be approved
by the Corps of Engineers. None of these agencies has
“primary jurisdiction” over the coastal waters of Alaska.
Petitioners rely (Pet. 12) on the statement in Gambell
that “[t]he United States may not hold ‘title’ to the
submerged lands of the OCS, but we hesitate to conclude
that the United States does not have ‘title’ to any ‘interests
therein’ ” (slip op. 16 n.15). That passage, however, re-
ferred not to the navigational servitude, but to mineral in-
terests leased by the Untied States. The United States does
not have any mineral interests in the three-mile coastal
zone granted to the State by the Submerged Lands Act,
11
and no such interests would be implicated in any event by
the construction of the log-transfer facility for which Shee
Atika sought a permit under Section 404.
Nor does United States v. Cherokee Nation, No.
85-1940 (Mar. 31, 1987), suggest that the navigational ser-
vitude is a property interest for purposes of Section 810 of
ANILCA. As petitioners concede (Pet. 15), the Court in
Cherokee Nation found the source of the navigational ser-
vitude to be the Commerce Clause (see slip op. 4), not the
Property Clause. Petitioners therefore err in reading (Pet.
17) Cherokee Nation to hold that the navigational ser-
vitude is a property interest that could be conveyed to a
private party. Instead, the Court simply suggested that the
Cherokee Nation could have been (but was not) granted
“an exemption from the servitude,” through a “waiver of
sovereign authority” (slip op. 7). This language is fully
consistent with the character of the navigational servitude
as a regulatory power. ¥
2. The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners’
contention (Pet. 17-19) that Shee Atika’s private land on
Admiralty Island is governed by Section 503(d) of
ANILCA, which provides that “[w]ithin the Monuments,
the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall not permit the sale o[r]
harvesting of timber” (94 Stat. 2400). As the court of ap-
peals observed in Angoon I (749 F.2d at 1416), Section
503(b) defines the Admiralty Island National Monument
as consisting of “approximately 921,000 acres of public
lands” (emphasis added). Shee Atika’s lands are private,
not public, arid they therefore are not part of the National
Monument and are not subject to the prohibition against
timber harvesting “within the Monument{].” This inter-
pretation is supported by Section 103(c) of ANILCA, 94
Stat. 2377, 16 U.S.C. 3103(c), which states that “[o]nly
those lands within the boundaries of any conservation
system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined
in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of
12
such unit.” Furthermore, the legislative history makes
clear that “inclusion of these Native lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units is not intended to
* * * restrict use of such lands by the owning Corpora-
tions nor to subject the Native lands to regulations ap-
plicable to the public lands within the specific conserva-
tion system unit” (125 Cong. Rec. 9905 (1979) (remarks of
Rep. Udall) (quoted in Angoon I, 749 F.2d at 1417)). In-
deed, as the court of appeals observed (Pet. App.
A15-A16; Angoon I, 749 F.2d at 1418), application of the
timber-harvesting prohibition to Shee Atika’s land would
deprive that land of its only real economic use, and would
thereby frustrate Congress’s purpose of promoting
“economic growth” when it provided for and then ratified
the exchange of Shee Atika’s original ANSCA selection
for the tract at issue here. See page 3, supra.
Gambell does not support petitioners’ contention that
both public and private lands are subject to the timber-
harvesting prohibition in Section 503(d). In Gambell, the
Court concluded that the term “in Alaska,” as used in Sec-
tion 102(3) of ANILCA, does not include the OCS, which
by definition is outside Alaska. Slip op. 14. But the Court
did not suggest that Congress’s use of the phrase “in
Alaska” was intended to subject a// lands within the boun-
daries of the State, private as well as public, to the
subsistence-evaluation provisions of Section 810 of
ANILCA. To the contrary, the Court recognized (slip op.
+ Section 503(d) states that “the Secretary shall not permit” the sale
or harvesting of timber. This language does not impose a prohibition
directly on private parties with respect to their private affairs, but
rather imposes a duty on the Secretary with respect to matters under
his jurisdiction. As the court below recognized in Angoon I (749 F.2d
at 1416), the Secretary of Agriculture does not have jurisdiction to
manage private lands in general (see 16 U.S.C. 1609(a)) or the private
lands conveyed to a Native Corporation ir particular (see 43 U.S.C.
1621(i)).
13
13-14) that Section 810 applies only to “public lands” (94
Stat. 2399). Simiiarly, Section 503(a) of ANILCA defines
the Admiralty Island National Monument as consisting
only of “public lands.” The parallel reach of Section 810,
as construed in Gambell, therefore supports, rather than
undermines, the court of appeals’ interpretation of Section
503(d).5
3. Petitioners’ remaining contention (Pet. 19-25)—
that the court of appeals erred in directing entry of sum-
mary judgment for the respondents on the issue of the ade-
quacy of the EIS (Pet. App. A3)—likewise does not war-
rant review. Although the district court found the EIS
inadequate (and granted summary judgment for peti-
tioners) on the ground that the Corps had failed to con-
sider the alternative of exchanging Shee Atika’s current
holding for other land, the court of appeals reversed and
held that the Corps was not required to consider that alter-
native further. Petitioners expressly do not seek review on
that issue. See Pet. 7 n.4. Instead, petitioners object to the
court of appeals’ ruling insofar as it disposes of other
possible objections they might have had to the EIS. That
ruling, however, was entirely appropriate.
5 The decision below also does not conflict with Minnesota v.
Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1248 n.15 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982), cited by petitioners (Pet. 18-19). That case construed Sec-
tion 4 of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1650, which prohibits motorboats “within the
wilderness” created by the Act. The Eighth Circuit observed that this
prohibition must apply to waters under state jurisdiction in order for
the prohibition to have any meaning, “[iJnasmuch as all navigable
waters within the area fall under state jurisdiction.” 660 F.2d at 1248
n.15. The court also found that certain exemptions contained in Sec-
tion 4 of the Boundary Waters Act would make no sense unless all
waters within the area were covered by the prohibition (ibid.). These
considerations are not presented by Section 503(d) of ANILCA. To
the contrary, as noted above (see pages 11-12, supra), the language
and legislative history of ANILCA affirmatively demonstrate that
Shee Atika’s private holding was not intended to be subject to restric-
tions applicable to the Admiralty Island National Monument.
14
a. The court of appeals was presented with a con-
troversy that had been the subject of litigation for 12
years. That litigation had deprived Shee Atika of the com-
pensation Congress afforded it under ANSCA for the ex-
tinguishment of its aboriginal claims (Pet. App. A4),
despite Congress’s actions in 1980 and 1983 to ensure that
Shee Atika would realize the economic benefits of the very
tract at issue in this case. The court of appeals had
authority under 28 U.S.C: 2106 to direct the entry of a
judgment “as may be just under the circumstances.” In the
circumstances of this case, it clearly was “just” to resolve
the EIS adequacy issue in its entirety, rather than to re-
mand to the district court based on speculation that peti-
tioners might come up with new theories to attack the EIS,
and thereby further frustrate Shee Atika’s ability to make
economic use of its lands.
The 120-page EIS and all relevant parts of the ad-
ministrative record were before the court of appeals,
which reviewed the EIS and found it “technically
sophisticated and analytically rigorous” (Pet. App.
A8-A9).° Furthermore, petitioners had ample opportunity
to develop other challenges to the EIS, yet failed to do so.
A draft EIS concerning the log-transfer facility had been
distributed for public comment in March 1984, and after
public hearings, the final EIS was issued in October 1984
(E.R. 139, 293). Comments on the final EIS were accepted
until December 17, 1984 (E.R. 139). Petitioners filed their
consolidated complaint on April 29, 1985, more than four
months later (Pet. App. A6). That complaint alleged that
a EN AT mee tems ae
6 Jt has long been accepted practice to resolve EIS inadequacy
claims on summary judgment motions that attach the administrative
record. See, e.g., National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu,
496 F. Supp. 716, 737-738 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.
1980); Upper Westfork River Watershed Ass'n v. Corps of Engineers,
414 F. Supp. 908, 922 (N.D. W.Va. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 576 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).
SE, |
15
the Corps of Engineers issued an EIS on the log-transfer
facility “without studying the reasonable alternative of an
exchange of the Cube Cove lands for other timber lands
located off of Admiralty Island, and otherwise without
complying to the fullest extent possible with NEPA” (E.R.
14). But petitioners never specified in what respects the
EIS was “otherwise” defective under NEPA.
Both the federal defendants and Shee Atika moved for
summary judgment on petitioners’ entire NEPA claim. See
page 5, supra. Petitioners filed a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment on the NEPA claim insofar as it was based
on the exchange alternative, and they opposed respond-
ents’ motion for summary judgment on other aspects of
the NEPA claim. But in so doing, petitioners did not file
affidavits pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding
other possible defects in the EIS. The court of appeals
therefore did not have before it a record that either iden-
tified other specific defects in the EIS or demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact pertaining to
any such defect.
Counsel did file an affidavit in district court, pursuant
to Rule 56(f), stating that petitioners could not at that time
present facts essential to justify their opposition to peti-
tioner’s motion. Affidavit of Lewis F. Gordon, dated
6/18/85. Even then, however, counsel did not identify any
specific ground (other than the alleged failure to consider
the exchange alternative) on which their opposition to the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment might be
based. Counsel merely suggested in general terms that
there were disputed facts concerning the “environmental
and subsistence effect of the project” (id. at 3) and in-
dicated that petitioners would seek discovery of such facts.
Petitioners’ submission under Rule 56(f) was addressed to
the discretion of the court. See 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.24, at 56-1424 to 56-1425,
16
56-1437 to 56-1438 (2d ed. 1987); VISA Int’l Service v.
Bankcard Holders, 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986);
SEC v. Spence & Green, 612 F.2d 896, 901 (Sth Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981). For at least three
reasons, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion
by declining to accept counsel’s affidavit under Rule 56(f)
as a basis for still further proceedings and attendant delay.
First, when counsel executed the affidavit on June 18,
1985, petitioners already had had at least seven months
since the filing of the final EIS (and 14 months since the -
filing of the draft EIS) during which they could have
developed facts concerning other possible defects in the
EIS, through discovery or otherwise. Indeed, if petitioners
disagreed with the “methodology and data” in the EIS, as
they now vaguely claim (Pet. 21 n.20), they should have
raised that issue with the Corps of Engineers during the
comment period on the draft EIS. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-554
(1978). Second, petitioners have not initiated discovery
with respect to any other objections to the EIS since June
1985. Third, petitioners have not in any event identified a
specific legal question regarding the adequacy of the EIS
to which any facts that might be developed through
discovery would be material.
Against this background, it appears that the discovery
petitioners contemplate would be nothing more than a
fishing expedition, based on speculation that a basis for
some other objection to the EIS (and to the defendants’
motions for summary judgment) might surface. See First
Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 (1968);
Bettin v. Nelson, 744 F.2d 53, 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Taylor v.
Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (Ist Cir. 1984); Mid-South
Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 779-781
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120, 127-128 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. USPS, 648 F.2d 97,
17
106-107 (2d Cir. 1981). Petitioners might have preferred to
hold in reserve the possibility of mounting a different at-
tack on the EIS should their argument concerning the ex-
change alternative fail, so that they might further delay the
resolution of this case and the economic development of
Shee Atika’s land. But the court of appeals surely was not
required to countenance such a piecemeal attack on the
EIS.
b. Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 23-24),
this case is readily distinguishable from Fountain v.
Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949). There, the court of appeals
directed the entry of summary judgment “on a new issue as
to which the opposite party had no opportunity to present
a defense before the trial court” (id. at 683). Here, by con-
trast, the adequacy of the EIS as a whole was put in issue
by the respondents’ motions for summary judgment. Peti-
tioners could have defended against those motions by
developing their unspecified NEPA claims.
The decision below also is consistent with other cases in
which courts of appeals have found it appropriate to direct
the entry of summary judgment where the record disclosed
no genuine issue of material fact. See Viger v. Commercial
Insurance Co., 707 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir. 1983); Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593, 599-600 (7th
Cir. 1972); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.
1965); see also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra,
§ 56.27[1], at 56-1560; 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2716, at
660-662 (2d ed. 1983). Indeed, in Kern County Land Co.
v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 590-591 (1973), this
Court sanctioned the court of appeals’ direction of sum-
mary judgment for the appellant, despite the appellant’s
failure even to move for summary judgment in the district
court. 411 U.S. at 604 n.31; id. at 614 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). Petitioners conceded below that a court of appeals
18
has the power under 28 U.S.C. 2106 to direct the entry of
summary judgment in appropriate circumstances. See
Reh’g Pet. 6. They therefore merely argue that the court of
appeals should not have done so in the particular cir-
cumstances of this case. Moreover, as petitioners concede
(Pet. 22 n.21), the paragraph in the court of appeals’
opinion directing that summary judgment be entered for
respondents on the NEPA claim is not accompanied by
any discussion of the varrous issues petitioners discuss,
and it therefore is of little or no precedential value with
respect to them. Review by this Court therefore is par-
ticularly unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
DAVID C. SHILTON
Attorneys
JUNE 1987
S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986— 181-483/40394
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