Opposition Brief — Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.

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- Supreme Court, U.S.

"ELLED

APR ZO {S87

No. 86-1562 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

GLEbS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

PAWTUXET COVE MARINA, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs

CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

DOUGLAS E. KLIEVER

| KATHERINE L. RHYNE

(Counsel of Record)

JOHN M. BREDEHOFT

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN

& HAMILTON

1752 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 728-2700

Counsel for Respondent

CIBA-GEIGY Corporation

April 20, 1987

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED *

1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to relitigate in this

Court their view of the factual circumstances of their

purported tort claims and federal claim, where that

view was repeatedly rejected by the courts below as

wholly unsupported.

2. Whether a citizen suit under Section 505 of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, will lie against a

former industrial discharger where the former discharger

is not and cannot be alleged to be “in violation” of an

effluent standard or limitation contained in a permit that

is “in effect” under the Clean Water Act.

* These questions have been restated from those set out in the

Petition.

(i)

ii

PARTIES BELOW

Petitioners, who were plaintiffs in the District Court

and appellants in the Court of Appeals, are Russell Hunt,

Beverley Hunt, and Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Incorpo-

rated. Respondent, who was defendant in the District

Court and appellee in the Court of Appeals, is CIBA-

GEIGY Corporation.*

* The following information is provided for purposes of Rule 28.1.

The parent company of CIBA-GEIGY Corporation is CIBA-GEIGY

International, Limited. CIBA-GEIGY Corporatien’s only subsidi-

ary or affiliate (other than wholly-owned subsidiaries) is CIBA-

Corning Diagnostics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........000000000000000- 2020...

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .............

A. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Entitled to Relitigate

B.

in This Court Their View of The Factual Cir-

cumstances of The Case, Where That View Was

Repeatedly Rejected by the Courts Below as

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2. The State Common Law Claims .....................

Citizen-plaintiffs May Not Maintain an Action

Under Section 505 of the Clean Water Act

Where, As Here, the Former Discharger Is Not

and Cannot Be Alleged To Be “in violation” of

an Effluent Standard or Limitation Contained in

a Permit That Is “in effect’? Under the Clean

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(iii)

Page

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) ..................... 9

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, —— U.S. ——, 106 S. Ct.

TRIE SEED ick ik ss saicncecovigseeshednnsiainaaasanioemmnpenentces 8

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. American Re-

covery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985) ............ 19

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986),

cert. granted, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 872

§.- 2 SRRER ORRIN « 202 ELD Cmne eID BODEN pln ara 10-11

Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air

Products Co., 386 U.S. 271 (1949) ..................-.--- 9

Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756

fp ¢ 8 Be Sy — ; peeReheee cee eee 10

National Labor Relations Board v. Hendricks

County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454

ee SIE sia cac dictates mentacoachoonsccsaunsteeieaes 9

Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA- GEIGY

Corp., No. 85-1940 (1st Cir. 1985) ....................... 3

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) ..................... 9

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) ............ 9

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ...... 6

Statutes and Rules:

Clean Water Act, Section 311, 33 U.S.C. $ 1321...... 7

Clean Water Act, Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365......passim

I I er eats tak 7

NING Wi Mec Ws cetiece cations piivadiesiacntanaennabiaomedemniie 8

‘

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1562

PAWTUXET COVE MARINA, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

Respondent CIBA-GEIGY Corporation (“CIBA-

GEIGY”) opposes the Petition for a Writ of Certioran

to the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., a defunct

Rhode Island corporation, and Beverley and Russell Hunt,

two of its former shareholders (“plaintiffs”), were the

owners and operators of commercial marina properties

on Pawtuxet Cove in Cranston, Rhode Island. For ap-

proximately three decades prior to the commencement of

2

this action, respondent CIBA-GEIGY, a New York cor-

poration, operated a specialty chemical manufacturing

facility in Cranston, Rhode Island. The plant discharged

treated process wastewater into the Pawtuxet River pur-

suant to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-

tem (“NPDES”) permit No. RI-0001171.

CIBA-GEIGY’s permit expired by its own terms in

July of 1983, and by August 1, 1983, CIBA-GEIGY had

“tied in” its pretreated wastewater discharges to the

Cranston municipal wastewater treatment plant and com-

pletely ceased direct process wastewater discharges from

the Cranston plant.! During the pendency of this litiga-

tion, manufacturing operations at the Cranston plant

were discontinued.

Notwithstanding the cessation of process wastewater

discharges several months earlier, plaintiffs brought this

action in November 1983 in the United States District

Court for the District of Rhode Island. Plaintiffs alleged

that certain past discharges from CIBA-GEIGY’s Cran-

ston manufacturing facility upstream had affected Paw-

tuxet Cove, damaging plaintiffs’ marina business and

rendering CIBA-GEIGY liable to them pursuant to fed-

eral and Rhode Island common law under a variety of

theories including trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict

liability, and “res ipsa loquitor.” Plaintiffs also alleged

that past discharges had violated CIBA-GEIGYs NPDES

ermit, and sought the imposition of civil penalties under

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act (which penalties

plaintiffs erroneously contended would be payable to

themselves).

Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint was dismissed by the Dis-

trict Court, District Judge (now Circuit Judge) Bruce

1The Cranston plant continued to discharge relatively small

amounts of cooling water (tap water which did not come into con-

tact with any process materials), which is not at issue in this

action.

3

M. Selya presiding, on May 17, 1984, for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave was

given to file an amended complaint for “enforcement of

ongoing effluent standard violations (and civil penalties

ancillary thereto, payable to the United States)” and

for properly-pleaded state common law claims.’ Plain-

tiffs filed an Amended Complaint in June 1984 but, be-

cause CIBA-GEIGY did not discharge process waste-

water pursuant to an NPDES permit, plaintiffs remained

unable to allege ongoing violations. On September 10,

1984, the District Court again dismissed the citizen suit

count for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, but approved the finding of a magistrate

that the “bare essentials’ of state common law ciaims

had been alleged and permitted the action to go forward

based on the diverse citizenship of the parties.’

Following extensive discovery, CIBA-GEIGY filed a

motion for summary judgment as to the state common

law claims, based on the absence of any issue of material

2 May 17, 1984 Memorandum and Order of the District Court,

App. at 17. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under

federal common law, a determination which the plaintiffs have not

challenged.

3 Plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration of the two dismissals

of the citizen suit counts on January 24, 1985; the District Court

denied that motion on June 7, 1985. App. at 18-21. Yet another

motion to amend, this time with a complaint alleging unspecified

ongoing violations based on two spill incidents, was filed in August

of 1985. The District Court denied the motion to amend, on a

variety of grounds. App. at 31. See infra at 7. Plaintiffs filed

an objection to the ruling, which the District Court treated as

another request for reconsideration of the citizen suit claim and

denied on October 30, 1985. Plaintiffs then filed a premature

appeal on the citizen suit issue to the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit, Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA-

GEIGY Corp., No. 85-1940 (1st Cir. 1985), which was summarily

dismissed by the Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction on

December 10, 1985, approximately two months before trial of the

diversity claims commenced in the District Court.

4

fact respecting the role of CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges in

causing plaintiffs’ injuries. As the District Court char-

acterized it, the “gravamen of the plaintiffs’ main claim”

was that CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges entered Pawtuxet

Cove, thus adversely affecting public opinion regarding

the disposal of dredging spoil from the Cove and thereby

preventing dredging of the Cove.* The lack of dredging

was asserted to have injured financially the plaintiffs’

marina business, with attendant stress from the financial

harm allegedly causing various physical ailments of the

individual plaintiffs.

Judge Selya granted CIBA-GEIGY’s motion in part,

holding that “[{t]he voluminous record in this case is

entirely barren of any evidence (or even the hint of any

evidence) from which a rational factfinder could deduce

that pollution emanating from [CIBA-GEIGY’s] factory

proximately caused Pawtuxet Cove to remain un-

dredged.” * However, based on plaintiffs’ assurances

that the state common law claims had bases independent

of the lack of dredging of the Cove, Judge Selya per-

mitted plaintiffs to go to trial on the state law claims.

Trial began on February 3, 1986. After empanelment

of a jury, a viewing of the marina and the CIBA-GEIGY

plant site, and one and one-half days of testimony,

plaintiffs admitted that all of the state common law

claims were predicated on the failure to dredge Paw-

tuxet Cove, the issue which had been resolved in CIBA-

GEIGY’s favor on summary judgment. Plaintiffs sub-

mitted a Second Amended Complaint, specifying that all

4September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District

Court, App. at 25. The plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint,

which delimits the common law issues, alleged that the “lack of

dredging . . . was the sole, direct and proximate cause of each

and all of the losses, damages, injuries, and harm of which the

plaintiffs complain in this action.” App. at 35.

5September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District

Court, App. at 26.

5

of the common law claims were based entirely on the

dredging theory.* Judge Selya discharged the jury and

entered complete summary judgment in favor of CIBA-

GEIGY on the common law claims.

Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the First Circuit, contesting both the entry of

summary judgment on the common law claims and the

repeated dismissals of the citizen suit. The Court of Ap-

peals, in an opinion delivered by Senior Circuit Judge

Aldrich, agreed with the District Court that: (i) “as a

matter of law on the overall record” CIBA-GEIGY’s dis-

charge “was an insignificant, and in no sense a ‘but for’

factor” in the failure to dredge Pawtuxet Cove, plain-

tiffs being left with “nothing but hope [which] was

clearly insufficient to make out a case against defend-

ant;’’* and (ii) a citizen suit under Section 505 “may

go forward if the citizen-plaintiff fairly alleges a con-

tinuing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined,

will again proceed to violate the Act.” Because “[u]t

the time plaintiffs brought suit ... the defendant had

ceased operating under [its] permit ... [and] there

was no reasonable likelihood that defendant’s alleged

infractions would continue,” the Court ef Appeals af-

firmed the District Court’s dismissal of the action.®

Plaintiffs subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ

of certiorari.

6 See App. at 35. The sole exception was plaintiffs’ trespass

claim, which on plaintiifs’ motion was dismissed with prejudice

after plaintiffs admitted they could not prove any trespass.

7 December 18, 1986 Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Pawtuzet

Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1091

(1st Cir. 1986) ; App. at 3.

8 December 18, 1986 Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 807 F.2d

at 1094; App. at 9-10. The Court of Appeals also held that there

was no abuse of discretion by the District Court when it denied

plaintiffs’ August 1985 motion to amend based on the spill inci-

dents. 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

A. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Entitled to Relitigate in This

Court Their View of the Factual Circumstances of The

Case, Where That View Was Repeatedly Rejected by

the Courts Below as Wholly Unsupported.

Plaintiffs base their Petition for Certiorari entirely on

supposed errors of fact made by the courts below, as to

both the citizen suit issue and the common law claims.

These assertions, even if colorable (and they are not),

do not suffice to support a Petition for Certiorari.

1. The Citizen Suit Claim.

The body of plaintiffs’ Petition does not appear to

challenge the legal conclusion of the courts below that

no aciion will lie under Section 505 unless it is one to

abate ongoing violations. As plaintiffs frame the citizen-

suit issue in their Petition for Certiorari, the “circuit

court ignored the fact there were ongoing violations” of

CIBA-GEIGY’s NPDES permit.*

It is settled practice that this Court does “not grant a

[writ of] certiorari to review evidence and discuss spe-

cific facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,

227 (1925).

Moreover, it is clear that the courts below correctly

found that plaintiffs did not—and could not—allege an

ongoing violation of CIBA-GEIGY’s NPDES permit at

the time the action was commenced (or thereafter).

The plaintiffs’ Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Sec-

ond Amended Complaint each failed to allege that CIBA-

GEIGY was “in violation” of an effluent standard or

limitation in a permit “‘in effect.”

Plaintiffs’ Petition for Certiorari, however, cites the

existence of violations “after the petitioners had filed

the requisite statutory notice,’ though not as of the time

® Petition for Certiorari at 7.

7

the action was commenced.’ This argument tracks

plaintiffs’ August 1985 motion to amend based on pur-

ported “ongoing violations,” which was rejected by the

District Court. The District Court held that “the fourth

attempt by the plaintiffs to inject the (phantom) on-

going violation issue into the case . . . comes too late

and clearly bears the hallmark of yet another exercise

in abject futility.” App. at 31. The Court of Appeals

agreed. 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

The plaintiffs now attempt to argue that the courts

below should have presumed that violations of CIBA-

GEIGY’s NPDES permit were ongoing and that plain-

tiffs would be able to prove a likelihood of continued vio-

lations." This position has no support in law, and is con-

trary to the facts as found by the courts below.

10The purported “violation” referred to in the Petition for

Certiorari, at 4, was a minor “spill” of pretreated wastewater

being transported between the CIBA-GEIGY plant and the Cran-

ston municipal wastewater works. The spill did not contain any

reportable quantity of any substance; was not a violation of any

NPDES permit which was in effect; and is separately regulated un-

der Section 311 of the Clean Water Act governing spills (and there-

fore not properly the subject of a citizen suit under Section 505).

In any event, it occured prior to the commencement of this

action with no likelihood of recurrence. See December 18, 1986

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

11 Plaintiffs also state, somewhat plaintively, that “[n]Jot doing

so, both courts should have allowed petitioners leave to amend

the complaint so as to allow them to conform to the court’s new

interpretations of the statute.” Petition for Certiorari at 8.

Though the court’s interpretation merely tracked the plain lan-

guage of the statute, the District Court did allow plaintiffs leave

to amend following its May 17, 1984 ruling. App. at 17. Plaintiffs

were unable, consistent with the District Court’s instruction that

any amendment “comply fully with the mandate of Fed. R. Civ. P.

11,” Jd., to amend the Complaint to allege ongoing violations. The

District Court again dismissed the Clean Water Act count on

September 10, 1984, and denied a motion for reconsideration on

June 7, 1985. As the Court of Appeals found, there was no abuse

8

2. i The State Common Law Claims.

As regards the granting of summary judgment on the

state common law issues, plaintiffs base the entirety of

their argument in this Court on an alleged misreading

of the evidence by the District Court and the Court of

Appeals. As the District Court noted, on motion for

summary judgment, CIBA-GEIGY presented “a pot-

pourri of materials” from the “voluminous record” in

the case negativing plaintiffs’ contentions of proximate

and actual causation; in response, plaintiffs “offered

nothing but the merest of vellieties: they eschew any

present tender of proof, but mouth empty assurances

that they will (somehow) prove the ‘but for’ connection

at a trial. Such generalized assurances are manifestly

insufficient to blunt the blade of a properly-honed Rule

56 axe.” Plaintiffs simply did not come forward with

any showing sufficient to resist CIBA-GEIGY’s properly-

supported motion for summary judgment."* The District

Court clearly evaluated plaintiffs’ claims in an appro-

priate light." So did the Court of Appeals.

of discretion when the District Court rejected yet another attempt

to introduce the issue in August of 1985. 807 F.2d at 1094; App.

at 11.

12 September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District

Court, App. at 26. At trial, plaintiffs admitted that they were un-

able to offer any additional evidence, beyond their assertions in

opposition to summary judgment, bearing on the causal connec-

tion between CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges and the lack of dredging

of Pawtuxet Cove. See the District Court’s order, App. 35.

13 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, —— U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2548

(1986). CIBA-GEIGY submitted with its motion a statement of

facts drawn from plaintiffs’ own allegations in their various plead-

ings, plaintiffs’ sworn deposition testimony, plaintiffs’ sworn an-

swers to interrogatories, plaintiffs’ documents provided in dis-

covery, and certified copies of official records of the United States

Army Corps of Engineers (the agency in charge of dredging

projects).

14“(T he plaintiffs have failed to offer a fact-based predicate,

sufficient, even when examined in the light most favorable to the

9

Plaintiffs’ Petition for Certiorari—as to both the citi-

zen suit claim and the state common law issues—pre-

sents primarily ‘a question of fact, which does not merit

Court review.” National Labor Relations Board v. Hen-

dricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454

U.S. 170, 176 n.8 (1981) (dismissing writ of certiorari

as improvidently granted). This Court consistently has

been unwilling to disturb such lower court determina-

tions, particularly where, as here, the District Court

and the Court of Appeals reach identical conclusions.”

B. Citizen-plaintiffs May Not Maintain an Action Under

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act Against a Former

Industrial Discharger Where, As Here, the Former

Discharger Is Not and Cannot Be Alleged To Be “in

violation” of an Effiuent Standard or Limitation Con-

tained in a Permit That Is “in effect” Under the Clean

Water Act.

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,

permits an action against any person “who is alleged to

be in violation of” an effluent standard or limitation,

which is defined to include a permit “which is in effect”

under the Act. Section 505(a)(1), (f) (6) (emphasis

added). Jurisdiction is conferred on the district courts

to enforce the effluent limitations in the permit and as

ancillary relief to apply “appropriate” civil penalties.

Section 505(a).

No allegation of continuing or recurring violations was

or could be made in this case; no permit for the discharge

plaintiffs, to support the conclusion that the Cove would have been

dredged but for [CIBA-GEIGY’s] shortcomings. In the absence

of any genuine issue of material fact on the issue, the defendant

is plainly entitled to brevis disposition as a matter of law.” Sep-

tember 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District Court, App.

at 26 (emphasis supplied).

1S See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) ;

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); Branti v. Finkel, 445

U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980); Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.

Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949).

10

of process wastewater was in effect, and no possibility of

continuing or indeed any future violation existed. The

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit undertook an ex-

tensive examination of the language, history, and pur-

pose of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water

Act, and correctly concluded that it did not reach the

conduct of CIBA-GEIGY in the case at hand.

Plaintiffs urge that certiorari should be granted in this

case because the decision below of the Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit conflicts with the decision of the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake

Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,

791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, U.S.

, 107, S.Ct. 872 (1987), pending before this Court

as No. 86-473.1° This Court is already addressing the

issue of statutory construction presented here in the

Gwaltney case, and need not review this case to resolve

the purely legal question.

Moreover, the defendant in Gwaltney and CIBA-

GEIGY in this case are in fundamentally different fac-

tual circumstances.'7 In Gwaltney, though the alleged

violations had ceased at the time the action was com-

menced, the defendant continued to discharge process

wastewater pursuant to an NPDES permit which was in

effect. In contrast, in this case: (i) no permit was “in

effect” at time of suit; (ii) no future violations of a

16 The decision below in this case is consistent with Hamker v.

Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).

In Hamker, no NPDES permit ever existed and the alleged “viola-

tion” was a one-time incident. In Pawtuxet Cove, all process waste-

water discharges pursuant to the NPDES permit had ceased prior

to suit, and there was no ongoing pollution to be abated.

17TIn a case more closely analogous to the present one, i.e., where

the discharger “has ceased or will shortly cease the operations at

issue here and will abandon its relevant discharge permits,” the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal of

a citizen suit under Section 505 as moot. Chesapeake Bay Founda-

tion v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209 (4th Cir. 1985).

11

permit were possible because process wastewater dis-

charges had ceased, and (iii) plaintiffs did not—and re-

peatedly remained unable to—allege any continuing vio-

lation.

The Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney did not have occasion

to examine the combined effect of Section 505(a) (1) and

Section 505(f) (6), since Gwaltney’s permit was still “in

effect” although not being violated at the time suit was

commenced. This Court’s decision in Gwaltney will neces-

sarily be limited to construction of the statutory term

“in violation” in Section 505(a)(1) and will not alter

the decision in this case where no permit is “in effect”

within the meaning of Section 505(f) (6). Thus, even

if this Court should decide in Gwaltney that civil penal-

ties are available under Section 505 for purely past vio-

lations by a discharger who continues to operate under

an NPDES permit, that decision would not necessarily

alter the outcome of this case against a former dis-

charger. Regardless of the outcome in Gwaltney, there

is no need for the Court to review the decision in this

case.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS E. KLIEVER

KATHERINE L. RHYNE

(Counsel of Record)

JOHN M. BREDEHOFT

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN

& HAMILTON

1752 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 728-2700

Counsel for Respondent

CIBA-GEIGY Corporation

April 20, 1987

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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