Opposition Brief — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

APR 24 987

No. 86-1548

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

>LERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GAnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT AIR LINE

PILOTS ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION

EUGENE B. GRANOF*

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

“Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

First Officer Larry W. Morrison was discharged by

Northwest Airlines for serving as co-pilot on a pas-

senger jet while under the influence of alcohol. A

System Board established pursuant to the Railway

Labor Act mitigated the penalty to a suspension, with

reinstatement explicitly made dependent upon Mr.

Morrison’s unconditional requalification to return to

duty by the Federal Aviation Administration. The

Board expressly based its award on the totality of

facts and circumstances, including findings that Mr.

Morrison’s misconduct was caused by alcoholism for

which he was subsequently treated and that he has

been successfully rehabilitated as evidenced by a con-

sistent pattern of recovery over an extended period

of time.

1. Whether the Federal Aviation Act deprived the

System Board of jurisdiction to overturn the carrier’s

determination that Mr. Morrison must be discharged?

2. Whether in any event the System Board’s award

is contrary to public policy and, therefore, judicially

unenforceable?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................sseecverecrseosers

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........cscescseseesesesseeees

ET winds atinxanasdancisasscssssanieciaiienniemonaae

1. BiowreEmen's DRGCIID cciscsscnncnssrcossnsinsssocesersnce

2. The System Board Award ........:ccccccccsesesseeeees

8. The District Court’s Decision ..............cccccccs0

4. The Decision of the Court of Appeals ..........

ARUIGUMEINT vcscccssssescsssnndaninccedssiciccasstanssanesnnbnunnnios

I.

Il.

III.

THE SYSTEM BOARD HAD JURISDIC-

TION TO DETERMINE WHETHER

THERE WAS JUST CAUSE FOR MOR-

RISON’S DISCHARGE AND, IF NOT,

WHAT SHOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE

PENALTY cscncssncsissssxsnassantacanensnintnasemahecasaces

THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS TO FIND A PUBLIC POLICY.

EXCEPTION TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE

BOARD’S AWARD IS WELL GROUNDED

IN THIS COURT’S DECISION IN W. R.

FRRAGID « scsntscesenexsrseacenersanemashimassconntaainiasiins

THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN MISCO

IS NOT ADEQUATE REASON TO GRANT

CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE ...................

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19

21

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

ALPA v. Capitol Airways, 88 LRRM 2169 (S.D.NY

I Ai ai aieinduadenabuundanibecsisrsadderssersesvscesns

ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 632 F.2d 1321 (5th

Te ais cas csi naseniadeeranadeneasens

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food

o, tan fame tae (6th Cir. 1968) ..................

American Postal Workers Union v. United States

Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

Association of Professional Flight Attendants v.

American Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 1331 (9th

SY ddvtacnateneies ainsi heddsaaledsvactindenstshcecsees

AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Work-

ore, _... U.5. —.,...., 106 §.Ct. 1415

ae ic sdikdncinsbasiausonntbnanbinsosocesses

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville

& Nashville R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963) ..........

Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks,

BEd Fee Bee COE Cir. 19TO) — .nccccccccccccscceseess

Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway,

MII II - sicvsnsasenocccsnessosesssenasconcesse

Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers, 416 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1969) _........

Hart v. Overseas WY {onal Airways, 94 LRRM 3133

I aida diaasanenedinsenabenestsseiornerves

Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 768

F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S.

essa dancensnstebananedbesecacssacdacee

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 373 F.2d 136

(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827

es cas esnobasnnacunadee

Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89

EEE SENG SS TER ROC OD ODE TOD

United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.

Se Ms PE EDOUD cccesccccccssesercssesseccnens

7,10,11

aaa

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf

Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)... 10,20

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel

and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) _ ............ 9,20

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union,

United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic

Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) — ........cccccsseeseees 8,15

Western Air Lines, v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400

ERUPT . ascinssesnstcssaiehihassanaatbakesinaamlanedeasnesnes 13

World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood

of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978) . 14

STATUTES:

Federal Aviation Act

Re ee Te EE bvkasinasuntiascinansnaxscaccees 11

49 U.S.C. § 1371(kX3) .................. susinihenimansiaks 12

BD Bes Ae ED, © esdcsaktasschenncesenrensntinnces 11

ee ID. chickecinsonbaccenndeinnnesanninnaie = ae

Railway Labor Act

is te 2) ee sii ahiaiadaniacanennnenisien 3

Ge TEs. BR Pe COD. wrncnctecscennnncsnsccacsnce 7

eis oe | ee ea 11

The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism

Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act

of 1970 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-1.(b\1) _............... 18

REGULATIONS:

14 C.F.R. § 67.13(dX1)iXc) (1986)... ee eee e eee 4

BA Gr ais BT Asernedobcanncnicnndsnnsinstcrinsvscssann =

MISCELLANEOUS:

FAA Notice of Nov. 10, 1976 Alcoholism And Air-

line Flight Crewmembers ....ccccccccssseeeeseeeeeeeees 17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1548

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

AIR LINE PILoTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

Respondent.

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT AIR LINE PILOTS

ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT

1. Morrison’s Discharge

On August 6, 1982, First Officer Larry W. Mor-

rison was discharged by Northwest Airlines, Inc.

(““Northwest”’) for violating the Company’s rules pro-

hibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages within

24 hours of flight duty and for being under the in-

fluence of alcohol during a flight on which he served

as a crew member. (Pet. App. 3a-4a, 53a-54a) Until

then, Mr. Morrison had been a pilot with Northwest

for sixteen years with an unblemished disciplinary re-

cord. (Pet. App. 3a, 50a)

The circumstances that resulted in Mr. Morrison’s

dismissal were that he had been drinking during a

thirty-hour stopover in Las Vegas and became ill sev-

eral hours before his next scheduled flight. (Pet. App.

3a, 50a-51a) Although he asked to be replaced on the

flight, no replacement was available, and he was told

that the flight would have to be cancelled if he could

not fly. Hence, he agreed to perform his duties as

co-pilot for the first two legs of the flight, with the

understanding that a substitute would be found for

the final leg. (Pet. App. 3a, 51a) The flight proceeded

to its first stop at San Francisco without incident.

To the Captain (pilot-in-command), Mr. Morrison’s ap-

pearance was “perfectly normal’’ and he did ‘‘an ex-

cellent job.” (Pet. App. 51a) Nevertheless, alerted by

a station agent in Las Vegas whose suspicions were

triggered because Morrison was late for crew pick-

up, did not “look very well,’’ and was chewing tobacco

early in the morning,’ Northwest officials in San

Francisco ordered Morrison to submit to a blood test.

The test showed Morrison to have a blood alcohol

level of .13%.?

At a subsequent investigation conducted by North-

west, Mr. Morrison described a history of “drinking

‘In fact, Morrison, who had a farming and ranching back-

ground, ‘‘chewed tobacco almost constantly.”” (Pet. App. 52a,

n.2)

2 FAA regulations prohibit any person from serving as a crew

member with a blood alcohol level of .04% or more. 14 C.F.R.

§ 91.11(aX4) (1986). State law in California establishes a pre-

sumption of intoxication with respect to a person with a blood

alcohol content of .10% or more. (Pet. App. 3a-4a, 54a).

3

straight from the bottle for some 10 years,” to the

point where his tolerance for alcohol had become so

great “‘that if he had drunk a pint an hour before

the meeting, no one would have been able to detect

from his behavior that he had been drinking.’’ Al-

though it occurred to him that he might be an al-

coholic, he feared he would be fired by Northwest if

he sought treatment for his drinking problem. (Pet.

App. 4a, 52a-53a) During the course of Northwest’s

investigation, a representative of the Air Line Pilots

Association (““ALPA”’), the collective bargaining agent

for the Northwest pilots, suggested that the investi-

gation be extended to determine if Morrison was an

alcoholic because “‘[i]Jt would be a serious mistake. . .

to treat it as a straight misconduct case without in-

vestigating whether or not there is an underlying

medical problem.”’ (Pet. App. 53a) However, the Com-

pany declined and instead terminated Morrison.

2. The System Board Award

As required by § 204 of the Railway Labor Act

(““RLA’’), 45 U.S.C. § 184, the applicable collective

bargaining agreement between ALPA and Northwest

established a System Board of Adjustment to resolve

“disputes between any employee covered by the Pil-

ots’ Agreement and the Company growing out of

grievances or out of interpretation or application of

any of the terms of the Pilots’ Agreement.”’ (Pet.

App. 9a) ALPA grieved Mr. Morrison’s discharge, and

in due course the grievance was submitted to the

Board, with the issue being whether the discharge

was for good cause, and, if not, what the appropriate

remedy should be. (Pet. App. 4a, 49a)

The Board, comprised of one member each ap-

pointed by ALPA and Northwest and a neutral Chair-

man, heard extensive and unrefuted evidence

concerning Mr. Morrison’s alcoholism and the pros-

pects for his rehabilitation. With the Northwest mem-

ber dissenting, the Board found that Morrison was

‘“‘an untreated alcoholic’’ when he flew as co-pilot on

August 1, 1982, and that his “uncontrolled drinking

and subsequent flying under the presumptive influ-

ence were medically related to and the result of his

affliction.”” (Pet. App. 66a) The Board further found

that Morrison had completed a comprehensive alcohol

treatment program, had remained abstinent since, and

had been successfully rehabilitated as evidenced by a

“consistent pattern of recovery over an extended pe-

riod of time.”’ (Pet. App. 4a, 56a, 72a) Additionally,

the Board determined that on January 10, 1984 the

FAA had declared Morrison eligible for ‘“‘a special

issuance” first-class medical certificate which would

permit him to pilot commercial aircraft again if ALPA

and Northwest would monitor and periodically report

on his continued abstinence. (Pet. App. 5a, 56a) The

Board further determined that Morrison would be el-

igible under FAA regulations* for unconditional first-

class medical certification—that is, without the mon-

itoring and reporting requirements—if and when the

clinical evidence, including not less than two years of

sustained total abstinence, satisfied the Federal Air

Surgeon as to his recovery.‘

Based ‘‘on all the facts and circumstances”’ before

it, the Board concluded that Morrison’s discharge was

°14 C.F.R. § 67.13(d\1\iXc) (1986).

* Subsequent to the F ard’s award, and after more than three

years of abstinence, Morrison did receive his unconditional first-

class medical certification from the Federal Air Surgeon. (Pet.

App. 5a)

————

without just cause, and that he should be offered

reinstatement, without back pay or benefits, if and

when the FAA issued him an unrestricted first-class

medical certificate. (Pet. App. 4a-5a, 7la-75a) The

Board acknowledged that Morrison’s misconduct was

“serious” and ‘“‘must weigh heavily against him”’ (Pet.

App. 72a), but that his alcoholism, rehabilitation, and

lengthy service were significant countervailing fac-

tors. (Pet. App. 66a, 72a-73a) The Board was careful

to state that it was not promulgating any general

rule “‘that the Company cannot, under its present

policy, terminate rule violators who are found to be

alcoholics;”’ rather, ‘‘[t]hose alcoholics who do not

come forward before breaking the rules are still sub-

ject, upon a full review of the facts and their medical

condition, to the severest of consequences, including

termination.”’” As the Board emphasized, “‘[a]ll that is

being said here is that on the facts as presented,

Morrison’s reinstatement, subject to unconditional

qualification by the Federal Air Surgeon, is justified,’’

and that ‘“‘[ojther facts may dictate other results.”’

(Pet. App. 6a, 74a-75a). As a final point, the Board

stated that ‘‘[iJnasmuch as the Federal Air Surgeon

has the statutory authority to make [medical fitness]

determinations and must do so with the highest re-

gard for air safety, ... the award hevein is consistent

with public policy and within the Board’s authority

to make.”’ (Pet. App. 6a, 75a)

3. The District Court’s Decision

As the District Court saw the issue before it, there

were two strong federal policies involved here: the

federal policy of furthering safe air travel and the

federal policy of resolving labor differences through

arbitration; hence, “the central question ... is

whether the balance between the two federal policies

lies sufficiently in favor of air safety to rule that the

arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction or ‘acted con-

trary to public policy’ in ordering Morrison’s rein-

statement.”’ (Pet. App. 37a) In the District Court’s

view, because application of the Company’s 24-hour

rule to Morrison’s situation is “‘a matter about which

the collective bargaining agreement is silent’’—that

is, it involves only a grievance rather than interpre-

tation of specific contract language—then, ‘‘[a]t best,

the subject matter of the dispute sits only on the

outer perimeter of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.’’ (Pet.

App. 38a, 45a) The District Court faulted the Board

for denying Northwest the ‘‘right”’ to enforce its own

safety rules, even though Northwest’s rules on alcohol

were not incorporated in the collective bargaining

agreement. (Pet. App. 38a-39a) As the Court put it,

““filf safety rules are listed as a legitimate subject for

arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement,

or if the rules are clear [sic, ‘“‘unclear’’?], judicial re-

view might well not be permissible.’’ (Pet. App. 42a)

However, in this case ‘‘no specific agreement was

reached to submit safety matters to arbitration,”’ and,

therefore, ‘‘the arbitration Board has exceeded its ju-

risdiction not because the Company retains exclusive

jurisdiction over safety matters under the FAA, but

because the Board’s decision substantially interferes

with air safety responsibilities entrusted to Northwest

without encroaching unduly on concerns underlying

federal arbitration policy.”’ (Pet. App. 39a, 42a-43a)

The District Court also concluded that “the Board’s

interference with Northwest’s enforcement of its 24-

hour rule was [not] entirely consistent with public

policy.”” (Pet. App. 44a) The Court reasoned that

“(t]he public policy against the use of alcohol and

flying is ‘well-defined and dominant,’ ”’ and “that na-

tional policy ... incorporates both the concept of de-

terrence (through rehabilitation and reinstatement),

and that of incapacitation (dismissal for violation of

a 24- or 8-hour rule).”’ (Pet. App. 48a, 44a)

4. The Derision of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed. Citing the RLA

provision which makes system board awards ‘“‘final

and binding’ (RLA § 3, First (m), 45 U.S.C. § 153,

First (m) (1982)) and the emphatic comment in Union

Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93 (1978) that

“this statutory language means just what it says,”

the Court addressed the issue of “‘whether the Board’s

decision falls within the scope of its jurisdiction.”’ (Pet.

App. 8a) The Court found it “‘absolutely clear’ from

the ‘“‘explicit terms’ of the ALPA/Northwest collec--

tive bargaining agreement ‘‘that an unresolved griev-

ance claiming the absence of ‘just cause’ with respect

to a disciplinary action taken against a pilot is a ‘dis-

pute’ within the jurisdiction of the Board.”’ (Pet. App.

9a) Indeed, ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the parties’ agree-

ment that even suggests that a disciplinary action

related to an alleged breach of a safety rule is ex-

cluded from arbitral review,’”’ nor is there any “‘con-

ceivable way to construe the parties’ agreement as

removing from the Board’s jurisdiction disciplinary

actions related to alleged breaches of the twenty-four

hour rule.” (Pet. App. 10a) Moreover, “‘in reviewing

the grievance, it is equally plain that the Board was

authorized to judge the legitimacy of the disciplinary

penalty imposed in the light of mitigating circum-

stances ... because ‘(a)rbitral determination ... of

the fitness of the punishment is routinely grist for

the arbitral mill,’ ”’ citing Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local

1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 202

n. 10 (5th Cir. 1969). (Pet. App. 9a)

The appellate court rejected as totally unsupported

“the District Court’s. imposition of a presumption

against arbitration of safety issues.’’ (Pet. App. 10a)

It held instead that the ‘fact that the arbitration

touches on issues related to airline safety is irrele-

vant.” In short, the Court said, ‘“‘{iJn all critical re-

spects, ... this case involves a_ straightforward

application of well-established law concerning the lim-

ited role of the courts in reviewing labor arbitration

awards ...’”’ (Pet. App. 9a, 11a)

The Court of Appeals likewise characterized as

‘“‘meritless’’ Northwest’s contention ‘‘that the Board’s

decision is somehow contrary to public policy.”’ (Pet.

App. 12a). Drawing the controlling principles from

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union,

United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers,

461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) and its own recent decision

in American Postal Workers Union v. United States

Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986)—72.e.,

that the public policy exception to enforcement of

arbitration awards “‘applies only when the public pol-

icy emanates from clear statutory or case law, ‘not

from general considerations of supposed public inter-

ests’’’—the Court saw nothing “unlawful’’ either in

the Board’s ‘‘determination that Morrison’s alcoholism

was an illness that could not support a finding of

‘just cause’ for dismissal in this case’’ or in the “‘pol-

icy of allowing reformed alcoholics to fly as pilots

...” (Pet. App. 12a-13a) Especially significant in the

Court’s view is that the ‘‘Board’s decision merely re-

quired Northwest to reinstate Morrison if and when

he was recertified by the FAA as fully fit and licensed

to fly.”” (Pet. App. 13a) For, as the Court put it, ‘‘[t]o

suggest that the Board’s award violates public policy

is to contend that the FAA was derelict in its re-

sponsibilities in considering Morrison for recertifi-

cation. .. .It would be the height of judicial chutzpah

for us to second-guess the present judgment of the

FAA recertifying Morrison for flight duty.’’ (Pet. App.

13a) In any event, the Court noted, ‘“‘this is not a

situation in which the Board has permitted a drunkard

to pilot an aircraft, nor did it treat lightly the fact

that Morrison had flown an aircraft while under the

influence of alcohol.” Instead, the ‘Board carefully

considered all safety issues and applied stringent pre-

requisites to allowing Morrison to fly again. (Pet. App.

14a, n. 33)

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals correctly evaluated this case

as one which involves nothing more than ‘a straight-

forward application of well established law’’ to judicial

review of Railway Labor Act system board awards.

The appellate court was equally correct in its appli-

cation of those principles to the particular facts and

circumstances of the case. Hence, the decision does

not warrant any further review by this Court.

I. THE SYSTEM BOARD HAD JURISDICTION TO DE-

TERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS JUST CAUSE

FOR MORRISON’S DISCHARGE AND, IF NOT, WHAT

SHOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY

It is well settled that a labor arbitration award

which “draws its essence from the collective bar-

gaining agreement’’ must be enforced. Steelworkers

v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597

ia aaa

10

(1960). The judicial role “‘is confined to ascertaining

whether the party seeking arbitration is making a

claim which on its face is governed by the contract,”’

and ‘(t]he courts, therefore, have no business weigh-

ing the merits of the grievance, considering whether

there is equity in a particular claim, or determining

whether there is particular language in the written

instrument which will support the claim.” Steelwork-

ers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).

Moreover, “‘[i]n the absence of any express provision

excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, .

only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to ex-

clude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’”’ AT&T

Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, U.S.

,__, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1419 (1986); Steelworkers v.

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-

838, 584-85 (1960).

The RLA establishes a “‘mandatory, exclusive and

comprehensive” scheme of grievance arbitration in the

airline industry by requiring that ‘“‘disputes between

an employee... and a carrier. . . growing out of griev-

ances...’ be submitted to System Boards of Adjust-

ment for ‘‘final and binding’’ resolution. 45 U.S.C. §§

153 First (m), 184; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-

neers v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 373 U.S. 33, 38

(1963): accord, Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439

U.S. 89 (1978). The range of judicial review of System

Board awards is ‘‘amongst the narrowest known to

law” (Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks,

421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970)), for the RLA ex-

plicitly limits such judicial review ‘‘to three specific

grounds: (1) failure of the... Board to comply with

the requirements of the... Act; (2) failure of the...

Board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within

———

11

the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corrup-

tion. 45 U.S.C. 153 First (q).” Sheehan, supra, 439

U.S. at 93.

Northwest argues that ‘‘this case presents the im-

portant, unresolved and recurring question of the in-

terplay between an air carrier’s safety obligations

under the Federal Aviation Act and the mandatory

arbitration of grievances under the Railway Labor

Act.” (Pet. 19) Contrary to Northwest, if there are

any legitimate questions concerning the interplay be-

tween the two Acts, none are presented by this case.

If anything, the case offers a textbook example of

intelligent accommodation: the System Board set aside

Morrison’s discharge and awarded him reinstatement

(without any back pay), but only if and when the

FAA, which has a statutory duty to “assure safety

in air commerce’”’ (49 U.S.C. § 1422(b1)), issues him

an unrestricted medical certification.

Northwest suggests that system Board jurisdiction

in this case is undercut by 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b), which

provides that “‘[i]n prescribing standards, rules, and

regulations, and in issuing certificates..., the Sec-

retary of Transportation shall give full consideration

to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their

services with the highest possible degree of safety in

the public interest. . .’’ This provision recognizes that

there is an implicit duty on air carriers—as, indeed,

there is on all other enterprises—to conduct their

business in a manner commensurate with the safety

risks involved. It is precisely because safety is such

a major concern in air travel that the Federal Avia-

tion Act mandates close government oversight, di-

rects the Secretary in 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) to ensure

that carriers comply with their safety responsibilities,

12

and gives him broad authority (49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-

1441) to see that they do so. The implication is not,

as Northwest would have it, that the Federal Aviation

Act creates a safety related exception to the normal

jurisdiction of RLA System Boards; it is rather that

safety is too important a matter to be entrusted to

the airlines alone. Moreover, the Federal Aviation Act

elsewhere makes clear that its provisions are not in-

tended to undermine the RLA’s statutory procedures:

49 U.S.C. § 1371(kX8) expressly states that ‘“‘[nJothing

herein contained shall be construed as restricting the

right of any. . . pilots or co-pilots, or other employees,

of any. . . air carrier to obtain by collective bargaining

higher rates of compensation or more favorable work-

ing conditions.” It is not consistent with § 1371(k\3)

to rely on the Federal Aviation Act to deprive a pilot

discharged for a safety violation—even a serious one—

of his right under a collective bargaining agreement

and the RLA to have a System Board determine

whether there is “just cause’’ for his discharge. If

the law were otherwise—that is, if carriers had dis-

cretion unfettered by System Board review to mete

out discipline for alleged or actual safety infractions—

then in an industry like air transportation, and par-

ticularly for pilots, a key aspect of the Railway Labor

Act would largely be nullified.

In view of the foregoing, it is scarcely surprising

that a number of court decisions have upheld System

Board awards which conflicted with carriers’ safety

determinations. E.g, Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona

Eastern Railway, 382 U.S. 257, 262-264 (1965) (train

engineer’s health and physical ability to operate an

engine); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 632 F.2d 1321

(5th Cir. 1980) (Board overturned discharge of pilot

13

who had failed to satisfy proficiency requirements);

Hart v. Overseas National Airways, 94 LRRM 3133

(E.D. PA, No. 73-2448, Feb. 17, 1977) (Board rejected

carrier’s determination on critical safety matter);

ALPA v. Capitol Airways, 83 LRRM 2169 (S.D. N.Y.,

No. 72 Civ. 3015, Apr. 2, 1973) (Board overruled

carrier’s determination regarding upgrade to Cap-

tain). Indeed, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA,

373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.

827 (1967)—a case which also involved the discharge

of pilots for violating Northwest’s rules governing the

use of alcoholic beverages—the Eighth Circuit explic-

itly sustained the trial court’s determination that a

System Board’s award of*reinstatement must be ac-

corded finality.

Moreover, this Court’s decision in Western Air

Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) further refutes

the novel contention that a System Board lacks ju-

risdiction to overrule an airline’s decision on employee

discipline where safety is implicated. Criswell fully

recognized and specifically took note of the public

interest in safety and the special need ‘“‘to err on the

side of caution’ in air transportation. 472 U.S. at

419-420. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that a jury

of lay persons could appropriately evaluate a carrier’s

contention that implementation of a particular safety

policy—in that case, a rule requiring flight engineers

to retire at age 60—is “‘reasonably necessary’’ to the

safe operation of its business. It would be incongruous

to permit a jury to make that evaluation, and yet to

hold that a System Board lacks jurisdiction under the

RLA to evaluate a carrier’s contention that nothing

less than the discharge of a pilot will suffice to satisfy

legitimate air safety concerns.

aaa ei ia aii

14

Northwest argues that the holding here conflicts

with that of the Ninth Circuit in World Airways, Inc.

v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d

800 (9th Cir. 1978). (Pet. 20-21) In World, an arbi-

trator directed that a pilot who had been demoted

for undisputed ‘‘judgmental deficiencies’ be offered

retraining and an opportunity to requalify as Pilot-

in-Command. The district court, however, specifically

found that these ‘‘judgmental deficiencies’’ rendered

the pilot unfit to serve as Pilot-in-Command, and could

not be cured through retraining. The appellate court

determined that the lower court’s findings were fully

warranted by the record (578 F.2d at 802). World

Airways will not support the expansive reading

Northwest seeks to give it in order to demonstrate

a conflict. In Association of Professional Flight At-

tendants v. American Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 1331

(9th Cir. 1985), the carrier, relying on World Air-

ways, asserted “that because beards raise safety con-

cerns, the issue of whether flight attendants should

be allowed to wear beards is not subject to arbitra-

tion.” 767 F.2d at 1334. Not only did the Ninth Cir-

cuit reject that contention, it also made clear that a

“less intrusive remedy”’ than complete reinstatement

to Pilot-in-Command ‘‘might well have fared differ-

ently” in World Airways. Ibid. In other words, it was

not that the arbitrator generally lacked jurisdiction

over the carrier’s determination in World Airways,

but rather that he lacked jurisdiction to order a rem-

edy which, so far as appears, did not involve the FAA

and which the court specifically found endangered

public safety because of the pilot’s unremediable de-

ficiencies. World Airways is thus factually distinguish-

able from this case in which the System Board

)

3

3

$

SET

15

awarded Morrison reinstatement only if and when the

FAA deems him fully safe to return to flight duty.

Il. THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO

FIND A PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO EN-

FORCEMENT OF THE BOARD’S AWARD IS WELL

GROUNDED IN THIS COURT’S DECISION IN W.R.

GRACE

As this Court plainly stated in W.R. Grace & Co.

v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union, United Rubber, Cork,

Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766

(1983), an arbitration award may not be set aside

based on “general considerations of supposed public

interest.”” To be deemed judicially unenforceable, the

award must be violative of “‘some explicit public pol-

icy” which “must be well defined and dominant, and

is to be ascertained by ‘reference to the laws and

legal precedents...’ ”’ .

Obviously, there is a ‘“‘well defined and dominant”

public policy based on safety considerations that pilots

should not fly when intoxicated. But neither the policy

itself nor its effective administration precludes from

reinstatement a pilot who, although he flew while

“under the influence,” was suffering from alcoholism,

a medically recognized condition characterized by

compulsive out-of-control drinking; who, according to

the uncontroverted evidence, subsequently has been

successfully treated for alcoholism and rehabilitated;

and who is now entitled to reinstatement only because

the appropriate federal officials—7.e, those charged by

law with issuing airman certificates in a manner “‘nec-

essary to assure safety in air commerce’ (49 U.S.C.

§ 1421(b))—unconditionally recertified him based on

satisfactory evidence that he had been abstinent for

more than three years.

cca

16

Northwest asserts that ‘‘those involved in public

transportation who drink and jeopardize safety are

unworthy of the public trust.” (Pet. 12-13) A gen-

eralization of this nature, however, simply does not

translate into a concrete public policy that such in-

dividuals may never be reinstated to their former po-

sitions and presumably must forever be barred from

obtaining any similar positions with other carriers. To

be sure, common sense dictates that they not be per-

mitted to return to duty without due regard for

safety. And the cases cited by Northwest (Pet. 14

n.5) stand for just that limited proposition. For in-

stance, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great West-

ern Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983), an

appellate court refused to enforce an arbitration

award reinstating a truck driver who admitted to

drinking shortly before he overturned his eighteen

wheel rig on the highway. In that case, though, the

court was confronted with an arbitration decision

which returned the driver to his prior duties without

any meaningful rationale for doing so and especially

without much assurance he would not drink and drive

again (712 F.2d at 124). But that is a far cry from

this case, in which the safety conc* ns have been

fairly addressed by both the System Board and the

Court of Appeals (supra, pp. 5, 8-9). Once those con-

cerns have been satisfied, as they have here, there

is little logic to insisting that public policy demands

continued denial of the opportunity to fly again.

Northwest cites no precedent, nor have we discovered

any, for invoking the public policy exception in a sit- |

uation even remotely comparable to that of Mr. Mor- |

rison—that is, in which the award ordering

reinstatement recognized the serious nature of the

misconduct, but also took into account subsequent re-

-

17

habilitation, continued abstinence over an extended

period, and unconditional recertification by the FAA.

Northwest complains that the award treats volun-

tary intoxication as a defense to wrongful conduct,

and is thus at odds with civil and criminal law. (Pet.

14) The complaint is without substance. As shown

supra, p. 5, the Board went out of its way to make

clear that it did not consider alcoholism a defense and

that its decision should not be taken to mean that

Northwest could not “terminate rule violators who

are found to be alcoholics.’”’ What it said, instead, is

that “alcoholism is an illness and that, as another

Board said in... [a prior case involving ALPA and

Northwest], ‘the possibility of recovery from an illness

is an element which should be considered in deter-

mining the appropriate remedy.’ ’’ (Pet. App. 55a, 69a)

Northwest offers no persuasive showing that the lat-

ter position is in any way inconsistent with estab-

lished public policy within the meaning of W.R. Grace.

On the contrary, as the Board itself observed, “‘if the

public policy of a regulatory agency be the guide, the

FAA’s public policy is to recognize alcoholism as a

treatable disease and to encourage treatment and an

early return to productive employment.” (Pet. App.

68a)

5 Expert medical witnesses testifying before the Board ac-

cepted as valid the FAA’s definition of alcoholism, as contained

in an FAA notice dated November 10, 1976, titled Alcoholism

And Airline Flight Crewmembers, which was introduced as an

exhibit at the hearing. That definition reads: “Alcoholism. . . is

a diagrosable disease in those whose alcohol intake is great

enough to damage physical health, or personal or social func-

tioning (which includes occupational functioning,), or when it has

become a prerequisite to normal functioning.” (Pet. App. 56a-

18

Finally, Northwest contends that public policy em-

bodied in the Federal Aviation Act gives it inde-

pendent authority “‘to assure air safety by employing

only pilots that Northwest believes have the character

and judgment necessary to protect the safety of its

passengers.” (Pet. 17) Undoubtedly Northwest does

have a responsibility to employ competent pilots. But,

as shown supra, pp. 11-13, that does not mean it is

the sole judge of pilot qualifications and can terminate

employees at will without regard to the grievance/

arbitration provisions of the RLA. If Northwest could

discharge pilots for lack of proper character or judg-

ment without having to objectively justify its assess-

ment before a System Board, then RLA and

contractual protections would, indeed, be illusory.

We submit the public policy issue raised by North-

west can best be placed in perspective in light of the

question asked by Judge Edwards during oral argu-

ment at the appellate level: could Northwest and

ALPA have entered into a collective bargaining

agreement which provided that a pilot who was guilty

of job-related misconduct attributable to alcoholism

would be reinstated after completion of a high quality

treatment program, recovery as indicated by at least

two years of continuous abstinence, and unconditional

recertification by the FAA? If the answer is “‘yes’’,

as it clearly should be, then it cannot be against public

policy for a System Board to make that determination

57a). See also, The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism

Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.

§ 290dd-1.(bX1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o

person may be denied or deprived of Federal civilian employment

or a Federal professional or other license or right solely on the

grounds of prior alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism.”’

19

when the contract itself is silent on the “‘just cause”

issue. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, if North-

west is uncomfortable with that result, it ‘‘is free to

negotiate with ALPA to remove the application of

safety rules from the jurisdiction of the Board or to

reduce the amount of discretion given to the Board

on such matters.’’ (Pet. App. 14a)

Ill. THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN MISCO IS NOT

ADEQUATE REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN

THIS CASE

Northwest urges that this case be heard in tandem

with Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union,

768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, __ U.S.

—__., 107 S. Ct. 871 (Jan. 12, 1987, No. 86-651). (Pet.

8-10) In Misco, the employer discharged an employee

for violating a company rule against possession of

marijuana on company property. An arbitrator rein-

stated the employee with full back pay and seniority

because he found the evidence did not establish the

employee had violated the rule. The Fifth Circuit,

affirming a district court’s refusal to enforce the

award, evaluated the evidence itself and concluded

that the employee was, indeed, a rule-violator and

that his dismissal was therefore justified on public

policy grounds. There are three reasons why this case

is different from Misco, and, accordingly why the

grant of certiorari in Misco does not warrant granting

certiorari in this case or holding it in abeyance pend-

ing a decision in Misco.

First, for the reasons set forth by Judge Tate in

his dissent (768 F.2d at 743-746), the decision in Misco

violates “‘settled principles by which judicial review

of arbitration awards is ‘sharply circumscribed.’ ”’

Specifically, Judge Tate found inconsistent with the

20

Steelworkers’ Trilogy® the majority’s reevaluation of

‘‘(a) the arbitrator’s factual evaluation of the evidence

as not proving that Cooper possessed or used mari-

juana on the plant premises, (b) the arbitrator’s inter-

pretation of the contractual provision as not providing

grounds for discharge if Cooper was in a vehicle

where someone else was smoking marijuana, or (c)

the arbitrator’s procedural ruling that evidence un-

known to the employer at the time of his discharge. . .

was not probative of the issue before the arbitra-

“tor...” (768 F.2d at 744). By contrast, the Court of

Appeals in the instant case followed the principles

laid down in the Trilogy cases, and enforced the Sys-

tem Board award; hence, there is no reason for this

Court to review the decision here.

Second, in Misco, having made its own finding that

the employee had brought marijuana on to the em-

ployer’s premises, the Court had no assurances that

he would not do so again if he were reinstated. As

the majority thus saw the issue, the employer could

not adequately protect the safety of the workplace

and of other employees if a confirmed drug user were

permitted to return to his job, which involved oper-

ating dangerous machinery (768 F.2d 742-743). In the

Court’s view, public policy precluded such a result.

But the majority opinion provides scant basis for be-

lieving that the outcome would have been the same

in the totally different context of the case at bar: 1.e,

a detailed and well reasoned System Board opinion

in which the Board did not minimize the seriousness

®* United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363

U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &

Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of

America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

t

21

of the misconduct and “‘carefully considered all safety

issues and applied stringent prerequisites to allowing

Morrison to fly again.” (Pet. App. 14a n.33) In short,

the public policy considerations which led the Fifth

Circuit to intervene in Misco are simply not present

here.

Third, in Misco there was no governmental agency

assigned to determine whether the employee’s rein-

statement was consistent with the public interest.

Here, of course, Morrison’s reinstatement was ex-

plicitly made contingent on his unconditional recer-

tification by the FAA. Unlike Misco, in which a far

broader public policy issue is present, this case pre-

sents only the narrow issue of whether a court is

compelled ‘‘under the guise of ‘public policy,’ to re-

verse an arbitration award that is expressly limited

by deference to the ultimate judgment of the agency

that is charged with the enforcement of the public

policy here at issue.”’ (Pet. App. 13a)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Air Line Pilots

Association requests that the petition for certiorari

be denied.

April 24, 1987

22

Respectfully Submitted,

EUGENE B. GRANOF*

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INT’L.

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

Counsel for Air Line Pilots Association

*Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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