Appendix — Palandjian v. Pahlavi
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In the
Supreme Court of the United States.
OCTOBER TERM, 1986.
PETROS A. PALANDIJIAN,
PETITIONER,
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
RESPONDENT.
Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.
MATTHEW BROWN
M. FREDERICK PRITZKER
ELIZABETH A. RITVO
JOHN J. WELTMAN
BROWN, RUDNICK, FREED & GESMER
One Federal Street,
Boston, Massachusetts 02110.
(617) 542-3000
Attorneys for Petitioner
BATEMAN & SLADE. INC BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
plo fi I.
en ee le
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Appendix I
Appendix J
Appendix K
Appendix L
Appendix M
Appendix N
Appendix O
Appendix P
Appendix Q
Table of Contents.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
56, Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Petros A. Palandjian in
opposition to defendant’s motion to
dismiss
Affidavit of plaintiff Petros Palandjian
in opposition to defendant’s motion
for summary judgment
Deposition of Grigor Nazarian
Deposition of Grigor Nazarian
Deposition of Grigor Palandjian
Deposition of Ronald Koven
Amended complaint
Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment
Docket entries
Motion for reconsideration
Motion for reconsideration with allow-
ance thereon from the Court
Order
Per Curiam order of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Supplemental memorandum and order
Opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts
Opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
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Appendix A.
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion
for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought may, at any time, move with or without support-
ing affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppos-
ing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be re-
ndered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
iScaw aS to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
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the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including
the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Re-
quired. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading; but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shail forthwith order
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
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of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits
caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
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Appendix B.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff AFFIDAVIT OF PETROS A.
PALANDIJIAN IN OPPOSI-
v. TION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
ASHRAF PAHLAVI
Defendant C.A. No. 83-2199-C
I, Petros A. Palandjian, being first duly sworn, do hereby
State and depose:
1. I reside at 22 Wellesley Road, Belmont, Massachusetts.
2. I was born in Iran and in 1966 was a dual national!
American/Iranian citizen in 1966. In 1966, I was the president
of a construction company then located at 56 North Beacon
Street, Watertown, Massachusetts.
3. My brother Leon Palandjian and my parents resided in
Tehran, Iran in 1966. My father, Grigor Palandjian, owned
Yekan Construction Co., Inc. a construction company with its
offices in Tehran, Iran.
4. In June 1966, I first met with the Defendant, Ashraf
Pahlavi. We had several meetings at my office in Watertown,
Massachusetts and at my home in Belmont, Massachusetts.
Ms. Pahlavi also visited the current construction projects of
my company.
5. At these meetings, Ms. Pahlavi discussed with me Iran's
need for trained people such as myself who had extensive
experience in the development and construction of large real
estate projects.
6. During the course of these meetings in Massachusetts,
Ms. Pahlavi and I entered into a contract whereby we agreed
to develop into a holiday resort certain property located on the
Caspian Sea (“the Property”) in Iran. The development was
ultimately known as Kazar Shahr.
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7. The terms of the oral contract between Ms. Pahlavi and
myself were as follows:
(a) Ms. Pahlavi was to purchase the property at an
estimated cost of two million ($2,000,000.00) dollars.
(b) I was to invest up to two million ($2,000,000)
dollars in time, equipment, and personnel;
(c) My brother Leon and I were to form a company
for the purpose of developing and constructing the Caspian
Sea project;
(d) I agreed that the markup on the construction work
performed on the project would be calculated based on
costs plus 15%;
(e) If more than four million ($4,000,000.00) dollars
were needed to fund the project, Ms. Pahlavi agreed to
borrow funds from a bank up to the amount of five hundred
thousand ($500,000.00) dollars;
(f) As lots in the development were sold, any funds
borrowed from a bank would be paid first;
(g) After any bank debt had been paid, Ms. Pahlavi
and I would each be paid for our initial investments, on
a proportional basis, out of any sales generated;
(h) After the payment out of all the above-described
amounts, Ms. Pahlavi and I would split any profits on a
50-50 basis;
(i) | agreed to oversee the development of the Caspian
Sea project from my business office in Watertown, Mas-
sachusetts; I also agreed to visit the project site in Iran
when such visits were necessary. |
8. My brother and I thereafter formed a company named
Abadani Jazayer. Following the formation of this company,
Ms. Pahlavi arranged for title to one million square meters of
ocean front property on the Caspian Sea in Babolsar, Iran to
be transferred to Abadani Jazayer.
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9. My brother became the President of Abadani Jazayer;
my brother and father, both residents in Iran, had signature
rights for the company and held 100% of the shares in bearer
form on the following basis: 50% for myself and 50% for the
benefit of Ms. Pahlavi.
10. In June 1966, during the meetings held in Massachusetts,
and described above in paragraph 4, my family and I discussed
with Ms. Pahlavi obtaining the rights to an exclusive dis-
tributorship of Cessna Aircraft in Iran. Subsequently, my fam-
ily obtained the Cessna distributorship in the name of Hoorase-
man Corp. Ms. Pahlavi had a 15% interest in this distributor-
ship.
11. Construction on the Caspian Sea project, known as
Kazar Shahr, began in approximately 1968.
12. From 1966 through July, 1969, I supervised the construc-
tion and development of Kazar Shahr, both visiting the site
and performing work at my Watertown office.
13. In 1970, the Kazar Shahr project was ready for market-
ing.
14. From 1966-1971, I received numerous telephone calls
from Ms. Pahlavi at my home in Belmont and my office in
Watertown. In these calls, we discussed the Kazar Shahr proj-
ect and the work I was performing on the project.
15. Architect Peter Dimeo performed work on the Kazar
Shahr project, at my direction, at his office in Stoneham,
Massachusetts.
16. On information and belief, in late 1970 or early 1971,
Ms. Pahlavi appointed her cousin Shahrair Dadsetan to run
the Cessna distributorship owned by Hooraseman.
17. In 1971, I was visited at my lawyer’s office in Water-
town, Massachusetts by the Mr. Dadsetan, Ms. Pahlavi’s
cousin. Dadsetan, acting on behalf of Ms. Pahlavi, stated that
Ms. Pahlavi wanted the Cessna distributorship for her son
Shahram Pahlavi and that, if I did not release his rights to the
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Cessna distributorship, “The Princess would be very upset”.
Fearing the threat expressed to me by Mr. Dadsetan, I signed
papers provided by Dadsetan which effectively turned over
my rights to Cessna distributorship held by Hooraseman. |
signed these papers in Watertown, Massachusetts.
18. In 1972, I received a telephone call at my Belmont
home from Ms. Pahlavi wherein she strongly suggested to me
that my father agree to sell the Hooraseman office building to
her. On information and belief, my father, Grigor Palandjian,
who had also been visited by Ms. Pahlavi’s representative
concerning the sale of the Hooraseman building, subsequently
signed over title to the Hooraseman office building te Ms.
Pahlavi’s agents. He never received payment from the Ms.
Pahlavi for said building.
19. I was never paid by Ms. Pahlavi for any of the monies
due and owing to me from the Kazar Shahr project, for my
interest in Hooraseman, the holder of the Cessna Aircraft dis-
tributorship, and for the value of the Hooraseman building.
20. On August 22, 1983, my father Grigor Palandjian as-
signed to me aii his claims against Ms. Pahlavi or her agents,
employees, servants, representatives, assignees or transferees.
A copy of said Assignment to me is here attached as Exhibit
a. ae
21. On information and belief, Ms. Pahlavi has two resi-
dences in New York: one in 625 Park Avenue and one at 29
Beekman Place. When she visits New York, which she does
on a regular basis, she resides at either of these residences;
Ms. Pahlavi also conduc‘s business from 29 Beekman Place.
Since the mid-1970s, I have visited Ms. Pahlavi numerous
times at both of these dwellings in New York.
Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury.
/s/Petros A. Palandjian
Petros A. Palandjian
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Suffolk, ss. November 30, 1983
Then appeared before me the aforesaid Petros A. Palandjian
who swore that the above statements are true to the best of
his belief and that his execution of this Affidavit is his free
act and deed.
/s/Kenneth A. Korb
Notary Public Kenneth A. Korb
My Commission Expires: 12/20/85
20,74(62)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Elizabeth A. Ritvo, hereby certify that I have this day
served a copy of the within Affidavit of Petros A. Palandjian
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss by hand de-
livery to Harvey Weiner, Esq., Peabody & Arnold, One
Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108.
/s/Elizabeth A. Ritvo
Elizabeth A. Ritvo
Dated: November 30, 1983
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EXHIBIT “A”
AGREEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
AGREEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT made at 38 Wellesley
Rd, Belmont, Massachusetts this 22 day of August, 1983 by
and between GRIGOR PALANDIJIAN, Assignor, and PET-
ROS PALANDIIAN, Assignee.
It is understood and agreed that the Assignor, for one ($1.00)
dollar and for other valuable consideration, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, had assigned and transferred to the
Assignee all claims and rights which the Assignor now has or
ever has had against Princess Ashraf Pahlavi or her agents,
employees, servants, representatives, assignees or transferees.
Witness:
/s/
Notary Public Grigor Palandjian, Assignor
Seal: G.Palandjian
Witness:
/s/ /s/
Notary Public Petros Palandjian, Assignee
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Appendix C.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF
PETROS PALANDIJIAN IN
Vv. OPPOSITION TO DEFEND-
ANT’S MOTION FOR SUM-
ASHRAF PAHLAVI MARY JUDGMENT
Defendant
Civil Action No. 83-2199-C
I, Petros A. Palandjian, being first duly sworn, do hereby
State and depose:
1). [reside at 22 Wellesley Road, Belmont, Massachusetts.
2). I am a dual national Iranian/American citizen and have
resided in the United States since 1963. My parents lived in
Tehran, Iran until their departure for the United States in 1978.
Members of my family still live in Iran.
3) Until 1976, the Palandjian family operated Yekan Con-
struction, one of the largest construction companies in Iran.
4) Immediately following the June 1966 visit of the Defend-
ant and my brother Leon Palandjian (hereinafter “Leon”) to
my home in Belmont, Massachusetts, as described in para-
graphs 4-7 and 10 of my Affidavit dated November 30, 1983,
I travelled to Tehran, Iran with Leon and the Defendant Ashraf
Pahlavi (hereinafter Pahlavi’). While in Iran, I obtained ad-
ditional information on the Kazar Shahr development.
5) It was my understanding and belief that Pahlavi wanted
me, rather than Leon, to be her partner in Kazar Shahr and
Cessna so that Leon would have more tim® to attend to
Pahlavi’s other business affairs and travels.
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6) I did not ask or insist that Pahlavi enter into a written
agreement with me concerning Kazar Shahr and Cessna be-
cause I feared the request would insult and offend Pahlavi as
a member of Iran’s royal family.
7) In 1967 or 1968, Leon and I were appointed individually
as Cessan Aircraft’s exclusive representatives in Iran. We to-
gether caused the formation of Hooraseman (also known as
“Sky Hoor’’) to operate the Cessna distributorship. From 1966-
1970, I incurred debts exceeding $300,000 to build a hangar
and offices for Hooraseman.
8) Leon was named President of both Abadani Jazayer and
Hooraseman because he was more often resident in Iran that
I was.
9) From 1967 or 1968 to 1971, my father Grigor Palandjian
(hereinafter “Grigor”) had possession of the Hooraseman
shares in his safe in Tehran, Iran in addition to the Abadani
Jazayer shares described in paragraph 9 of my Affidavit of
November 30, 1984.
10) In July 1969, Leon died in an airplane crash in Iran.
11) Following Leon’s death, Pahlavi asked me to assume
the title of President of Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman and
to move to Tehran to supervise the operations of both com-
panies. | move to Iran in September 1969 and remained there,
with the exception of several visits to the United States, until
late December 1970. During this time, I spoke with Pahlavi
on almost a dairly basis.
12) During 1969-1970, Pahlavi’s secretary Nora frequently
visited the Abadani Jazayer office to keep apprised of the
developments. It was my understanding that Nora reported to
* Pahlavi on the progress of the development.
13) Appended as Attachment “A” is a letter I received from
Nora and a translation of the letter. Said letter in part describes
the on-going work of Abadani Jazayer.
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14) The cost of the construction work which I had performed
at Kazar Shahr until February 1971 was valued at $1.7 million.
15) In December of 1970, I had a dispute with Pahlavi
concerning, among other things, the amount of time I spent
in Iran. Also, I informed Pahlavi of two offers to buy Abadani
Jazayer which I had received, one for $10 million and one for
$16 million and of an offer to purchase Hooraseman for $1
million. This dispute and subsequent discussion took place
over several days.
16) My suggestion to Pahlavi that we sell Abadani Jazayer
and Hooraseman angered her. When this topic was discussed
with Pahlavi in Juan les Pins, France, I received a writing
from Pahlavi directing me “never to set foot in Iran as long
as Pahlavi was alive. Appended as Attachment “B” is a copy
of said writing and a translation.
17) Following the dispute with Pahlavi described above in
paragraphs 15 and 16 and my receipt of Pahlavi’s writing
described above in paragraph 16, I did not return to [ran as |
feared for my safety if I did so. I then returned to my home
in Belmont, Massachusetts and continued my supervision of
the Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman activities from there.
18) In early 1971, I learned that Pahlavi wanted to gain
possession of the Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman shares
being held by my father in Tehran. I received a telephone call
to my house in Belmont, Massachusetts from my father. He
said that Izadi, Pahlavi’s top assistant, had visited him, de-
manding the shares and threatening him. I told my father not
to do anyth:ng until I spoke with Pahlavi.
19) I spoke with Pahlavi at least twice about her intent to
gain possession of the shares. Pahlavi stated to me that, as |
had held the shares for her, she would now hold the shares
for me.
20) Not wanting any harm to come to my father and relying
on Pahlavi’s statement that she would hold the Abadani Jazayer
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and Hooraseman shares for my benefit, I advised my father
to relinquish the shares to Izadi which he did.
21) Also in 1971, I was vis'ted at my home in Belmont and
my office in Watertown by Dadsetan, Pahlavi’s cousin. As
set forth in paragraph 17 of my November 30, 1983 affidavit
and in supplementation thereof, Dadsetan told me that I either
had to return to Iran at Pahlavi’s request or I had to relinquish
my rights to the Cessna distributorship. I still feared Pahlavi’s
previous threats and was unwilling to agree to return to Iran.
Dadsetan became more belligerent, stating “She wants Cessna
Aircraft. She wants you to give up Cessna if you’re not coming
back” and “I’m sure you won’t want to take a chance and have
something unpleasant happen to your mom, to your dad. They
have a pleasant life’. I called Pahlavi to determine why Dadse-
tan had come to Massachusetts to threaten me. Pahlavi said
that Dadsetan was her representative and that Palandjian was
to do what he said, adding “You don’t have to if you don’t
want to. That’s up to you. You decide”. Pahlavi also said
“Don’t worry about the money. You will get paid.” Following
this conversation and also discussions with my lawyer Robert
Mardirosian, I -igned papers which relinquished my rights to
the Cessna distributorship. I signed these papers out of fear
of the consequences to me and my family if I did not do as
Pahlavi directed.
22) From 1971 through 1982, I remained in contact with
Pahlavi, speaking with her by phone and periodically meeting
with her in Geneva and New York. During these calls and
meetings, I raised the issue of the monies she owed me from
Hooraseman and Abadani Jazayer; she acknowledged her debts
to me and said I would be paid.
23) In 1972, I met Pahlavi in Geneva. I again asked her for
payment. Pahlavi stated she had instructed Izadi to pay me
$1.7 million for the unpaid construction work I performed for
the Kazar Shahr development and I told her I had not received
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any payment from Izadi. To convince me of my error in recom-
mending the sale referred to in paragraph 15, she told me that
the Kazar Shahr project had already made $25 million and
would make in excess of $50 million. She assured me I would
be paid for my construction costs and my share of the profits.
24) The Shah of Iran was deposed in 1978. He died in 1980.
25) Like many other Iranians residing outside Iran, I believed
that the Shah’s family would return to power eventually and
that the royal family through its agents would exercise power
and control while out of power and outside of Iran. In 1983,
I came to believe that the Pahlavis would not be returned to
their former power in Iran and that I could safely commence
litigation of my claims against Pahlavi.
26) In response to Pahlavi’s Requests for Documents, I have
produced to her counsel several hundred documents, including
the distributorship agreements between Cessna Aircraft and
myself, receipts indicating the transfer of the Hooraseman and
Abadani Jazayer shares from my father to Pahlavi’s agent,
corporate documents naming me as president of Abadani
Jazayer and extensive itemizations, made in 1971, of construc-
tion work which had been completed on the Kazar Shahr pro}-
ect.
Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury.
Petros A. Palandjian
lSa
STATE OF FLORIDA
, 2. December , 1984
The above-named Petros A. Palandjian appeared before me
and affirmed that the aforesaid is his free act and deed and
that the facts set forth in this affidavit are true to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
20,74(9)
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Appendix D.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
VS.
NO. 93-2199-C
ASHRAF PAHLAVI
DEPOSITION OF GRIGOR NAZARIAN, taken pursuant
to Notice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before
IRMA WIDOMSKI, a Notary Public and Registered Profes-
sional Reporter, in and for the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, at the Offices of Peabody & Arnold, | Beacon
Street, Boston, Massachusetts, commencing at 11:15 a.m.,
Friday, November 2, 1984.
APPEARANCES:
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer
M. Frederick Pritzker, Esq.
One Federal Street
Boston, MA. 02110
For the plaintiff;
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Q. When did you last do work on that project?
A. Till then.
Q. That is the beginning of 1971?
A. Yes.
Q. In the beginning of 1971, what had been done on the
project?
A. Most of the site work was done.
Q. By site work, what are you referring to?
A. Earth work, sewers, and lighting, electricity,. Even the
poles.
Q. Were the roads in?
A. Water. Yes. I finished that. The water then the roads, even
all the base course of the asphalt was there.
Now even I remember the central street, which was the
widest street and all that square which was in the middle of
the town was finally asphalt. It had finished course.
Q. Were any of the houses built at that time?
A. No.
Q. Why did you stop work on the project in the beginning of
1971?
A. Because Mr. Sanatizadeh who was introducing
I am interested in who paid you?
Yekan Construction Company.
Only Yekan Construction Company?
As I remember it.
. During the 15 months, what was your title during this 15
months relative to the project?
A. I was the project manager, the head of the design office.
May I add something?
Q. Sure.
A. When you said you finished, how much it was finished,
I forgot to mention that water towers, reservoirs and the wells
QO>O>L
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and even all the trees. Most of the trees were installed on the
Site.
Q. The trees?
A. Trees.
Q. Landscaping?
A. Landscaping. Because it was an important factor who was
going to keep the trees alive and so on.
Q. Did you have anything to do with the financial arrange-
ments for the work that was being done?
A. Sometimes, Yekan Company was discussing that
19a
Appendix E.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
VS.
NO. 93-2199-C
ASHRAF PAHLAVI
DEPOSITION OF GRIGOR NAZARIAN, taken pursuant
to Notice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before
IRMA WIDOMSKI, a Notary Public and Registered Profes-
sional Reporter, in and for the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, at the Offices of Peabody & Amold, | Beacon
Street, Boston, Massachusetts, commencing at 11:15 a.m.,
Friday, November 2, 1984.
APPEARANCES:
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer
M. Frederick Pritzker, Esq.
One Federal Street
Boston, MA. 02110
For the plaintiff;
20a
Q. When did you last do work on that project?
A. Till then.
Q. That is the beginning of 1971?
A. Yes.
Q. In the beginning of 1971, what had been done on the
project?
A. Most of the site work was done.
Q. By site work, what are you referring to?
A. Earth work, sewers, and lighting, electricity,. Even the
poles.
Q. Were the roads in?
A. Water. Yes. I finished that. The water then the roads, even
all the base course of the asphalt was there.
Now even I remember the central street, which was the
widest street and all that square which was in the middle of
the town was finally asphalt. It had finished course.
Q. Were any of the houses built at that time?
A. No.
Q. Why did you stop work on the project in the beginning of
1971?
A. Because Mr. Sanatizadeh who was introducing himself as
the new manager, the new director of the project, he asked
me to give him all the plans and all the information of what
I had on documents.
Q. Did you do that?
A. In the beginning I said you can’t ask me. You have to ask
at least Grigor Palandjian, Bob’s father.
Then I talked to Grigor Palandjian. I called Bob who was
here. I told him what to do. He was threatening us.
Then Bob told me whatever they ask, you have to give them.
Q. Did he tell you why?
A. No. He said it’s an order and do it. Because really, that,
we should do that because it was an order. We had some kind
of respect to the Shar’s family, I say.
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Q. What did you do?
A. I went to Mr. Sanatizadeh’s office, I took all the plans,
all the documents, all the models. I gave it to him. That was
the end.
Q. Did you do any further work on the project thereafter?
A. Yes.
Q. When you and Yekan no longer had anything to do with
the project, Kazar Sharh?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. How did you first hear that you and/or the Company would
no longer be involved in the project?
A. It was my worst day, believe me, of my life when Mr.
Sanatizadeh called me to his office and asked me to stop the
project and bring over whatever I had.
Q. What was your understanding as to who he was?
A. Just I knew he is a representative from, in court, I didn’t
know that he his working for Ashraf because I knew his brother
had some kind of involvement with Shah’s family, the royal
family. That was why I knew he is a representative from them.
But | said I can do nothing. Just I am working and you have
to discuss this matter with Bob Palandjian or his father.
Q. What did Mr. Sanatizadeh say to you?
A. He was threatening me. He was asking me, you have to
bring it over. This is an order which I am personally giving
you. You have to obey.
Q. Did you bring it over?
A. No. I went back to the office and I talked to Mr. Grigor
Palandjian and later I called Bob here.
Q. When you say Bob here, you mean Bol in the United
States?
A. Yes. He told me you do whatever you can. You can't,
what you call it? You can’t oppose them. You can’t keep the
project. If they want, you have to give them.
22a
Q. What else did he say?
A. Nothing. Really I was very embarrassed and very unhappy.
I was embarrassed and unhappy. And he said you can start
other projects which we have. I like still work with you.
Q. What did you and Grigor Palandjian say relative to this
matter?
A. Just I asked what to do. And in the beginning he said no,
he was not really happy of that condition. Then when I talked
to Bob, I wentsto back to him, he agreed.
Q. What did you then do”?
23a
Appendix F.
Volume |
Pages 107
Exhibits 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff
VS. DOCKET NO. 83-2199-C
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant
DEPOSITION OF GRIGOR PALANDIJIAN, through In-
terpreter, Enoch Lachinian, before Caroline T. Renault, Notary
Public and Certified Shorthand Reporter, pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, held at the offices of Peabody
& Arnold, One Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, on
Thursday, September 13, 1984, commencing at 10:30 a.m.
APPEARANCES:
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer (By M. Frederick Pritzker,
Esq. and Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Atty.), One Federal Street,
Boston, Massachusetts, for the Plaintiff.
Peabody & Arnold (By Harvey Weiner, Esq.), One Beacon
Street, Boston, Massachusetts, for the Defendant.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (By William E. Jackson,
Esq.), | Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10005,
for the Defendant.
ALSO PRESENT: Petros Palandjian and Ellen Loeb, Atty.
24a
MR. PRITZKER: Tell him to please answer the question.
Listen to the question.
Q. I would like you to translate what he said first and then
tell him what Mr. Pritzker said.
A. Your question is what did he say?
Q. He was saying something when Mr. Pritzker interrupted,
and what I would like is the translation of what he was saying
and then a translation of what Mr. Pritzker said.
A. Let me translate up to that point. He delayed, procras-
tinated, and — okay. He wanted to delay and Izzadi insisted
and threatened him saying that, “Don’t you want to live here,”
and he threatened his life, whereupon he called his son, tele-
phoned his son.
Q. Now, do you have a memory of this conversation?
A. Well, that’s what I said. He came to me and that’s —
as I said, he came to me and those were his statements that
had — that would have an effect on anyone.
Q. Do you know what year this was?
A. These last years, last few years, I
A. “Don’t you want to live in this country?”
Q. Those are the first words he said to you?
A. Yes. When I explained it, I had no involvement in that,
it was my son’s thing, not my thing, it was thereafter that he
threatened my life and said that, “We will have you killed.”
Q. Did Mr. Izzadi have an appointment with you?
A. They don’t need an appointment. All — they come and
break down the door and come in.
Q. Did he have an appointment with you?
A. As I said,-when they come, they can come.
MR. PRITZF ER: Would you tell him to answer the question
that is asked?
A. I don’t recall about the appointment. He knew that |
was always there.
25a
Q. But you don’t recall whether or not he had an appoint-
ment?
A. It may be that he had called and came.
Q. Now, what was the first thing that you recall that he
said to you? Did he say “hello”?
Q. Was he there longer than five minutes?
A. Five, maybe. I don’t recall the minutes.
Q. Well, was it more than an hour?
A. No, no, it certainly was not. For that purpose you don’t
need hours. It was a very official visit. He came and went.
He came and left.
Q. What were his exact words?
A. I just told you.
Q. Well, I appreciate if you would tell me again.
A. He said he came and he said, “Give me the Abadani
Jazayer stocks,” and I asked him, “Why should I give them
to you?”
Q. And?
A. And I said, “Those belong to Petros, and he gave them
to me.”
Q. And did Mr. Izzadi tell you why he wanted the shares
of stock?
A. He just said, “Give me the stocks. That’s all I want. If
you and your son and family want to live here without any
danger, give me the stocks.”
26a
Appendix G.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff
VS. Civil Action No. 83-2199-C
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant
Washington, D. C.
Friday, October 26, 1984
Deposition of
RONALD KOVEN
a witness in the above-entitled matter, called for examination
by counsel for the plaintiff, pursuant to notice, taken in the
law offices of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, Interna-
tional Square, 1825 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., begin-
ning at 5:35 p.m., before Karen Hinnenkamp, a Notary Public
in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on
behalf of the respective parties:
‘She said it was her ‘only revenue source’ and that she had
taken the profits to buy residential and industrial real estate in
Europe. She said she had also held some stocks but had con-
tributed them — $1 million worth — to the Ashraf Pahlavi
Foundation to underwrite scholarships and book publishing.”
Q Do these paragraphs which you have just read accurately
describe the statements made by Ashraf Pahlavi in her interview
with you?
MR. HALLE: Objection as to form.
27a
BY MS. RITVO:
Q. You may answer the question.
A. I don’t know what to do.
Q. That is just a lawyer’s objection for the record. You can
answer the question.
A. Yes:
Q. Did she state to you that her personal fortune was ex-
clusively based on extensive lands she inherited from her
father, Reza Shah, on the shore of the Caspian Sea in Iran?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she state to you that these lands were worth little
when she got them but became extremely valuable after the
oil-sparked real estate boom?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she state to you that her real estate and construction
companies sold 1,400 vacation homes in her development in
Kezer Char?
A. Yes.
Q. How did the topic of Kezer Char come up in your inter-
view?
A. I believe she raised it.
Q. Was there any context that the Princess raised?
A. Yes. The context was to scoff at the reports of a fortune
of incredible proportions and to try to, from her point of view,
bring it down to a reasonable proportion and scale. It seemed
to be an important point to her.
MR. HALLE: I object to the answer. It goes beyond the
queston.
MS. RITVO: I believe it was within the scope of the ques-
tion. But that is an objection for the record, Mr. Koven.
THE WITNESS: Hey, I have nothing. I am not getting a
thing out of this. Let’s not —
28a
BY MS. RITVO:
Q. Did she state to you that her development of Kezer Char
was her only revenue source and that she had taken the profits
to buy residential and industrial real estate in Europe?
A. Yes.
Q. After the article which has been marked Exhibit | ap-
peared in the Globe, did you have any further contact with
Ashraf Pahlavi?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that?
A. Of two kinds. One was that I was informed by her lawyer
that there were people in her entourage who had objected —
MR. HALLE: I object to the answer. It goes beyond the
question. It is not responsive to the question.
BY MS. RITVO: ‘
Q. To satisfy Mr. Halle’s objection —
A. I don’t need this.
Q. — just yes or no, did you have any further contact with
Ashraf Pahlavi after the article appeared in The Boston Globe?
A. Yes.
29a
Princess Ashraf challenges CIA
on corruption, immorality claims
By Ronald Koven
Special to The Globe
PARIS — Princess Ashraf, the late shah of Iran’s tough-
minded twin sister, has challenged the CIA to produce its
evidence — if it has any — of the claims in its classified
reports, now public, of her financial corruption and immorality.
The reports appeared in the 13 volumes of secret Tehran
papers published by the Islamic students who took over’the
US Embassy: the material on Princess Ashraf was printed in
the Jan. 31 edition of The Globe.
In an interview at her sumptuously decorated Paris apartment
overlooking a small park, Iran’s petite Dragon Lady, now 62,
expressed her belief that the CIA had sided with Ayatollah
Ruholah Khomeini against her late brother in an attempt to
“Islamize” the countries of the region against Soviet-inspired
communism.
“These reports show the CIA surely plotted- against my
brother,” she said. “Before seeing them, I would never have
thought so. But,” she alleged, “the CIA made contact with
Khomeini as early as 1977. The West thought that by Islamiz-
ing that whole region — Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan — it
would serve as a barrier against communism. They feared that
if my brother stayed in power, the country would wind up
going communist because so many people were being edu-
cated.”
The CIA knows better than to accuse her of corruption,
Ashraf said, because she refused a blank check from the US
intelligence agency in 1952 to finance support activities for
her brother’s comeback after he was forced into exile by then
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.
30a
“IT tore it up: I said, ‘I’m not your agent,’” she recalled,
even though her financial situation during that period of exile
was “precarious” since Mossadegh had frozen her assets. She
said she accepted US and British Intelligence proposals to
work for her brother’s return “because I wanted to end the
Mossadegh dictatorship.”
“The CIA,” she said, “should know whether I was corrupt.
If | were corrupt, I would have accepted their money.”
She said she did not recall the names of the agents involved
in the offer but there must be British and American intelligence
officials of the time who can testify to its veracity.
“A woman with the reputation the CIA wants to give me,”
she said, “could never have attained the status I did,” referring
to her brother’s appointment of her to head the Iranian delega-
tion to the United Nations and her important positions in various
UN women’s and human right’s commissions.
Friends of Ashraf say she has been deeply hurt by the CIA
reports, which she was shown for the first time by The Globe
a week ago.
Ashraf read the CIA reports with tight lips and then said,
“I can’t sue the CIA: They are too strong for me.” Five days
later, she called this reporter back in to say that “if the CIA
has the proof, they should absolutely produce it. They surely
don’t have any.”
What embitters her, the friends say, is that she was in close
contact with CIA representatives over the years, and she as-
sumed that they were friendly to her.
After all, the royal family had accepted a former director
of the CIA, Richard Helms, as ambassador to Iran and was
close to Kermit Roosevelt, who as a young CIA operative was
instrumental in putting the Shah back on the throne in 1953.
The CIA described her as having “‘a greedy nature and nym-
phomaniac tendencies” and described her business activities
as “verging on if not completely illega).” It accused her of in-
3la
fluence-peddling: arranging major business or government ad-
vantages for each of her three husbands; covering up her son
Shahram’s questionable dealings, including the sale of Iranian
national art treasures; and placing her younger lovers in high
positions. One of the CIA reports speaks of “allegations” that
she was involved in drug smuggling, adding that the evidence
was “of course, scanty.”
But, it said, “She has never hesitated to use her influence
to obtain government contracts for her friends and acquain-
tances willing to pay her a fee.” The reports accused her of
having successfully intrigued against each of the shah’s three
wives and suggested, should the shah die unexpectedly, that
she might be a rival for the throne.
Her personal fortune, Ashraf said, was exclusively based
on extensive lands she inherited from her father, Reza Shah,
on the shore of the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. They were
worth little when she got them, she said, but became extremely
valuable after the oil-sparked real-estate boom. She said her
real estate and construction companies sold 1400 vacation
homes in her development of Kezer Char.
She said it was her “only revenue source” and that she had
taken the profits to buy residential and industrial real estate in
Europe. She said she had also held some stocks but had con-
tributed them — $1 million worth — to the Ashraf Pahlavi
Foundation to underwrite scholarships and book publishing.
She now has, she said, “enough to live on, neither more
nor less.” Ashraf maintains staffed households in New York,
Los Angeles, Paris and the French Riviera.
Compared to European royal families, she said, Iran’s
Pahlevi family members are “poor people. All those astronom-
ical numbers that we’re accused of stealing are pure lies. Such
sums are not possible. How do you accumulate such money?”
The Islamic revolutionary government has evaluated the
fortune of the shah’s family abroad at $10 billion.
32a
Ashraf said the only specific accusation against her was that
she had transferred $700,000 to Europe, which she conceded
was true. The money came from the Caspian development,
she said.
She dismissed as “absurd” the “thousands” of stories that
circulated in Tehran about her, such as the allegation that she
had to be paid every time a trucking company made a shipment;
that she held a monopoly on the sale of Kents, once the most
popular cigarette in Iran; that she controlled the sale of heroin
in the country.
If such stories had been true, she said, the current Iranian
government would have produced the evidence.
Aside from denying the allegations about her personal life
in general terms, she said she did not want to go into that. As
for her relations with the shah’s wives, she said. “All three of
them are still alive, thank God. You should ask them what
they think of me. Farah Dibah [the shah’s widow] is still my
sister-in-law and I love her very much. She is really a great
friend.”
She expressed doubt about the allegations concerning her
son Shahram’s dealings, but she said she was too busy to
follow them in detail.
The CIA, she said, had obviously been influenced by her
“legend” stemming from her work “24 hours a day to reinforce
the monarchy when it was so fragile.”” How can a major intel-
ligence agency spend its time listening to such “gossip”? She
said that neither the CIA nor the Israeli intelligence agency,
Mossad, which was highly involved with the shah’s own secret
vervice, SAVAK, had done their work properly in Iran. “They
never warned us that there were so many Moslem fundamen-
talists. They never described the danger to us frem the mullahs.
“How could the CIA not know who the real drug traffickers
were?” she asked. “No one around me was involved in that.
I even used to hate cigarettes. There was never anything like
33a
heroin or opium in my family. No one had a habit.” She said
it was only the things she has been through that induced her
to smoke cigarettes, which she did heavily during the interview.
During both meetings, she was elegantly attired, but com-
pletely in black, apparently in mourning for her brother, who
died July 27, 1980, in Egypt and was buried there. She was
perfectly coiffed with a single gray hair apparent.
Her apartment, in a fashionable section of Paris, has been
decorated in burled wood and gold, with matching furniture.
There is heavy security; her personal bodyguard is a well-dres-
sed burly Korean. There have been attempts on her life, most
recently in September 1977 on the French Riviera, and one of
her sons, a naval captain under the shah, was assassinated in
Paris in 1979.
Ashraf conceded that it had perhaps been a mistake to try
to develop Iran so fast as a Westernized country. “We should
have planned to do it in in 40 years instead of 20.” But, she
recalled, the early years of her brother’s rule were politically
chaotic, and he tried to make up for lost time when “he took
power for himself in the 1960s and could make giant steps.
“If we weren't appreciated,” she said, “it’s not my fault,
but my peopile’s fault, who didn’t understand very well.” Iran
was on the way to becoming “a second Japan,” she said, and
the neighboring Arab countries and the West did not want to
see Iran become so powerful or develop into a major industrial
competitor. “The West was against us; the reds, the blacks
and the whites joined hands to overthrow my brother.
“The Americans are the real culprits,” she said. “They didn’t
support my brother in the difficult moments. If Reagan had
been President instead of Carter, this wouldn’t have happened.
He wouldn’t have sent Gen. Huyser to stop the Army from
expressing itself.”
US Gen. Robert Huyser, the deputy commander of NATO,
was sent to Iran by the Carter Administration to stabilize the
34a
Iranian armed forces during the revolutions and try to consoli-
date them behind Shapour Bakhtiar, the prime minister the
shah designated before he fled Iran.
Carter’s pressure for more civil rights in Iran had caused
“great harm,” Ashraf said. “You can’t grant freedom and demo-
cracy all at once. It’s like opening a dam. Everything gets
swept away by the water. You have to do it gradually.
“The people took advantage to demonstrate in the streets.
It snowballed. The Americans didn’t know it would end like
that. Under Khomeini, all the rights that Carter pressured for
will be completely destroyed.”
Defending her brother’s concentration of resources on the
armed forces, Ashraf said that was the only reason that “what's
left of our Army has been able to defend itself against Iraq.
The victories against Iraq are thanks to my brother.”
She insisted that there had been only 3400 political prisoners
in Iran in the shah’s time. But there were many re-education
and rehabilitation camps for young people who had gone astray,
she said, as there are for delinquents in any country. The
people in those camps were not prisoners, she said, adding
that she did not know how many people were in them. Her
own foundation ran a charitable facility for 900 poor orphan
boys to receive vocational training, she said.
She said that she is now completely out of politics and plays
no role of any kind in the activities of the Iranian political
exiles against the Islamic regime. They all agree on one thing,
she said — the overthrow of Khomeini.
After that, there should be a constitutional monarchy headed
by her nephew, and “I hope to be able to return to my country,
but it won't be very soon. [t won’t even be very soon if the
Opposition groups win on the basis of a constitutional monar-
chy.
“Even after that, I don’t think I would return to Iran for
several years. It would be another atmosphere. I have no place
35a
there. I did what I could; | worked for 50 years for the progress
of my country.
“But now I’m retired. My era has passed. We couldn’t have
done more than we did. I live because I must live until the
day my heart gives out. It will be very hard for whoever returns
to make things normal again. It may take 20, 30 years.”
36a
Appendix H.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff
Vv. AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil Action
ASHRAF PAHLAVI No. 83-2199-C
Defendant
PARTIES
1. The Plaintiff Petros A. Palandjian is an individual resid-
ing at 22 Wellesley Road, Belmont, MA. The Plaintiff brings
this claim on his own behalf and as assignee of the rights of
his father, Grigor Palandjian, as more specifically set forth
below.
2. The Defendant Princess Ashraf Pahlavi is an individual
with a residence either at 29 Beekman Place, New York City,
New York or 625 Park Avenue, New York City, New York.
She is the twin sister of the late Shah of Iran who was deposed
in 1978.
JURISDICTION
3. The District Court has jurisdiction in the above-captioned
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1332, the parties being from
different states and the amount in controversy greatly exceeding
$10,000.00. Personal jurisdiction is based on an agreement
for a contract to be partially performed in Massachusetts and
on tortious acts committed in Massachusetts.
37a
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
4. The Plaintiff, born in Iran, was a dual national American/
Iranian citizen in 1966. He was the president of a construction
company then located at 56 North Beacon Street, Watertown,
MA.
5. The Plaintiff's brother Leon and his parents resided in
Tehran, Iran in 1966. The father, Grigor Palandjian, owned
Yekan Construction Co., Inc. a construction company with its
offices in Tehran, Iran.
6. In June 1966, the Plaintiff first met with the Defendant;
several meetings occurred at the Plaintiff's office in Water-
town, Massachusetts and at his home in Belmont, Massachu-
setts. The Defendant also visited the current construction proj-
ects of the Plaintiff.
7. At these meetings, the Defendant stressed Iran’s need
for trained people such as the Plaintiff who had extensive
experience in the development and construction of large real
estate projects.
8. During the course of these meetings in Massachusetts,
the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a contract whereby
they agreed to develop into a holiday resort property located
on the Caspian Sea (“the Property”’) in Iran. The development
was ultimately known as Kazar Shahr.
9. The terms of the contract between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant were as follows:
(a) The Defendant was to purchase the property at an
estimated cost of two million ($2,000,000.00) dollars.
(b) The Plaintiff was to invest up to two million
($2,000,000) dollars in time, equipment, and personnel;
(c) The Plaintiff and his brother Leon Palandjian were
to form a company for the purposes of developing and
constructing the Caspian Sea project;
(d) The Plaintiff agreed that the markup on the construc-
tion work performed on the project would be calculated
based on costs plus 15%;
38a
(e) If more than four million ($4,000,000.00) dollars
were needed to fund the project, the Plaintiff agreed to
borrow funds from a bank up to the amount of five hundred
thousand ($500,000.00) dollars;
(f) As lots in the development were sold, any funds
borrowed from a bank would be paid first;
(g) After any bank debt had been paid, the Plaintiff
and the Defendant would be paid for their initial invest-
ments, On a proportional basis, out of any profits gener-
ated;
(h) After the payment out of all the above-described
amounts, the Plaintiff and the Defendant would split any
profits on a 50-50 basis;
(i) The Plaintiff agreed to oversee the development of
the Caspian Sea project from his business office in Water-
town, Massachusetts; he also agreed to visit the project
site in Iran when such visits were necessary.
10. The Plaintiff and his brother thereafter formed a com-
pany named Abadani Jazayer. Following the information of
this company, the Defendant arranged for title to one million
square meters of ocean front property on the Caspian Sea in
Babolsar, Iran; to be transferred to Abadani Jazayer.
11. The Plaintiff's brother became the President of Abadani
Jazayer; the Plaintiff's brother and father, both residents in
Iran, had signature rights for the company and held 100% of
the shares in bearer form on the following basis: 50% for the
Plaintiff and 50% for the benefit of the Defendant.
12. In June 1966, during the meetings held in Massachu-
setts, and described above in paragraph 6, the Plaintiff and
his family discussed with the Defendant obtaining the rights
to an exclusive distributorship of Cessna Aircraft in Iran. Sub-
sequently, the Plaintiff's family obtained-the Cessna dis-
tributorship in the name of Hooraseman Corp. The Defendant
had a 15% interest in this distributorship.
39a
13. Construction on the Caspian Sea project, known as
Kazar Shahr, began in approximately 1968.
14. From 1966 through July, 1969, the Plaintiff supervised
the construction and development of Kazar Shahr, both visiting
the site and performing work in his Watertown office.
15. In July 1969, the Plaintiff's brother, who had been
assisting in the development of Kazar Shahr and in running
Cessna Aircraft, died in an airplane crash.
16. At the request and insistence of the Defendant, the
Plaintiff in late 1969 moved to Iran to assume his brother’s
responsibilities and to perform on-site supervision of the Kazar
Shahr project. At that time, the Plaintiff became president of
Abadani Jazayer and of Hooraseman. The Plaintiff also came
to hold the bearer shares of Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman.
17. During the course of the Kazar Shahr project’s construc-
tion, the Plaintiff experienced firsthand the Defendant’s inde-
pendent power within Iran. In late 1969, following a dispute
with the Defendant, the Plaintiff found his lines of credit neces-
sary to the performance of construction on the project cut off
overnight; the Minister of Roads and Finance refused to pay
the Plaintiff for over one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars of
completed construction work. With a resolution of his dispute
with the Defendant, the Plaintiff was paid and his line of credit
was restored.
18. In 1970, the Kazar Shahr project was ready for market-
ing.
19. In late 1970, the Plaintiff met with the Defendant and
stated that he had received substantia! offers to buy Abadani
Jazayer and Hooraseman. The Defendant refused to consider
these offers and, because of this and other disputes, instructed
the Plaintiff never to return to Iran. Fearing for his own safety
and that of family members still residing in Iran and fearing
economic injury to his family’s other business dealings in Iran,
the Plaintiff acceded to the Defendant’s instruction and did
not return to Iran.
40a.
20. Thereafter, the Defendant appointed a replacement for
the Plaintiff to complete the development and marketing of
the Kazar Shahr project. She also appointed her cousin Shahrair
Dadsetan to run the Cessna distributorship owned by Hoorase-
man.
21. Subsequently and following demands from the Defend-
ant’s agents, Grigor Palandjian released the bearer shares of
Abadani Jazayer to the Defendant’s agents.
22. In 1971, the Plaintiff was visited at his lawyer’s office
in Watertown, Massachusetts by the Defendant’s cousin
Dadsetan. Dadsetan, acting as agent for the Defendant, stated
that the Defendant wanted the Cessna distributorship for her
son Shahram Pahlavi and that, if the Plaintiff did not release
his rights to the Cessna distributorship, “The Princess would
be very upset”. Fearing the threat expressed to him by Dadse-
tan, the Plaintiff signed papers provided by Dadsetan which
effectively turned over the Plaintiff's rights to Cessna dis-
tributorship held by Hooraseman. The Plaintiff received no
payment from the Defendant for the Cessna distributorship
which had value in excess of five million ($5,000,000.00)
dollars.
23. In approximately 1972, the Plaintiff and the Defendant
met in Geneva, Switzerland. Although the Defendant had
barred the Plaintiff from returning to Iran and thereby had
prevented his running his business interests personally, the
Defendant assured the Plaintiff that he would be paid for the
construction work done on the Kazar Shahr project and also
for his share of the profits generated by the sale of lots and/or
houses in the project. The Defendant stated that she had in-
structed her chief of operations, Alli Izadi, to pay the Plaintiff
one million seven hundred thousand ($1,700,000) dollars
which sum represented the unpaid portion of construction work
performed on the project by the Plaintiff. She also stated that
the house lots in the development were selling for four to five
o———————~—
4la
times the amount anticipated that the project had already made
twenty-five million ($25,000,000.00) dollars in profits, and
that the profits to be shared would be in excess of fifty million
($50,000,000) dollars. When the Plaintiff requested his share
of the profits, the Defendant stated that he would be paid. The
Defendant also stated that, just as his family once held her
shares in Abadani Jazayer for her benefit, she now held the
Plaintiff's shares for his benefit.
24. Subsequently, the Plaintiff spoke with the Defendant
several times to request that she pay him the monies owed
him from the Kazar Shahr project. :
25. In approximately 1972, Grigor Palandjian was ap-
proached by the Defendant’s agent, Alli Izadi, her chief of
operations. Izadi stated that the Defendant wanted to buy the
building in Tehran, Iran located at 43 Damagan Street in which
the Hooraseman offices were located. The agent also stated
“You are an old man who has already lost one son. You have
a peaceful life with a healthy son left. Your family will be
taken care of. Don’t push your luck.” Thereafter, the Plaintiff
received a telephone call from the Defendant wherein she
stated “You will get paid. Don’t push me.” The Defendant
also suggested to the Plaintiff that his father agree to sell the
Hooraseman office building to her.
26. The Plaintiff Grigor Palandjian signed over title to the
Hooraseman office building to the Defendant’s agents. He
never received payment from the Defendant for said building
valued in excess of one million four hundred thousand
($1,400,000.00) dollars.
27. The Plaintiff, fearing for the life and safety of himself
and his family and also for his and his family’s investments
in Iran, refrained from commencing litigation to enforce his
rights to payment.
28. In 1978, the Defendant’s brother, the Shah of Iran, was
deposed from power and took up residence in Cairo, Egypt.
42a
29. The Plaintiff, like many Iranians residing outside of
Iran, believed that the Shah’s family would return to power
eventually and continued to believe that the Shah’s family
exercised power and control through their agents now outside
of Iran.
30. In 1979, the Plaintiff with his lawyer met with the
Defendant. She asked the Plaintiff to give her additional time
to pay him for the debts owed to him.
31. In July 1980, the Defendant called the Plaintiff at his
Brookline office, stating that her brother, the Shah, was dying
and that as soon as she camesto New York, she would pay
him the monies owed to him. She stated that she would be
arriving in the United States soon.
32. The Defendant has never paid the Plaintiff for any of
the monies due and owing to him from the Kazar Shahr project,
has never paid the Plaintiff for his interest in Hooraseman, the
holder of the Cessna Aircraft distributorship, and has never
paid the Plaintiff or his father for the Hooraseman building.
The Plaintiff believes his damages are in excess of thirty million
($30,000,000.00) dollars.
Count I (Breach of Contract)
33. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained above
in paragraphs | through 32 as though herein set forth.
34. By her failure to pay the Plaintiff for his profits in the
Kazar Shahr development and for the construction work per-
formed on said project, and by preventing the Plaintif’ from
returning to Iran to complete the project, the Defendant has
breached the terms of the agreement set forth above in para-
graph %. f
43a
COUNT II (Conversion)
35. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained above
in paragraphs | - 32 as though herein set forth.
36. The Defendant through her agent has converted the
Plaintiff's property rights in the Cessna Aircraft distributorship
in Iran, his interest in the Kazar Shahr project, and his father’s
ownership of the Hooraseman office building.
COUNT III (Unjust Enrichment)
37. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained above
in paragraphs | through 32 as though herein set forth.
38. The Defendant has obtained rights and title to the Plain-
tiff’s property, as described above, through the exercise of
duress, and has been unjustly enriched by her actions.
39. In equity, the Defendant holds the Plaintiff's shares and
interests in the Kazar Shahr project and the Plaintiff’s interest
in Hooraseman, owner of the Cessna dealership, in a construc-
tive trust for the benefit of the Plaintiff.
COUNT IV (Quantum Meruit)
40. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained above
in paragraphs 1-21, 23, and 27-32 as though herein set forth.
41. The Plaintiff performed construction work on the Kazar
Shahr project.
42. The fair and reasonable value of said construction work
performed by the Plaintiff, including labor and materials, is
one million seven hundred thousand ($1 ,700,000.00) dollars.
43. The Plaintiff performed said construction work on the
Kazar Shahr project on the reasonable expectation that he
would be paid.
44a
44. The Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's reasonable expec-
tation that he would be paid for the value of his construction
work prior to her receiving any profits and she permitted the
Plaintiff to perform said construction work without objection
by her.
45. On information and belief, the Defendant has received
profits from the Kazar Shahr project in excess of fifty million
($50,000,000.00) dollars.
46. The Defendant owes the Plaintiff one million seven
hundred thousand ($1,700,000.00) dollars for the fair and
reasonable value of the construction work he performed on
the Kazar Shahr project.
COUNT V (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
47. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained above
in paragraphs 1-24 and 27-32 as though herein set forth.
48. The Defendant has breached her fiduciary duties to the
Plaintiff arising from the contract entered into between the
Plaintiff and Defendant as described above in paragraph 9 and
arising from her holding of the Plaintiff's shares in Abadani
Jazayer and Hooraseman Corp. since at least 1971.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demands judgment as follows:
1. Under Count I for breach of contract, one million seven
hundred thousand ($1,700,000) dollars for the Piaintiff’s in-
vestment of time, labor and materials on the Kazar Shahr
project and a sum unspecified in amount for his one-half share
of the profits generated by said development.
2. Under Count II for conversion, a sum unspecified in
amount but exceeding thirty million ($30,000,000) dollars.
3. Under Count III for unjust enrichment; an accounting of
the Plaintiff's rights and profits as described above, and an
order by this Court requiring the Defendant to pay to the Plain-
45a
tiff sums which she shall be deemed to have held for his benefit
in a constructive trust since late 1970. In the alternative, the
Plaintiff demands money damages in an amount unspecified
but exceeding thirty million ($30,000,000) dollars.
4. Under Count IV for quantum meruit, one milion seven
hundred thousand ($1 ,700,000.00) dollars for construction per-
formed by the Plaintiff on the Kazar Shahr project.
5. Under Count V for breach of fiduciary duty, a sum un-
specified but exceeding thirty million ($30,000,000) dollars.
Respectfully submitted,
M. Frederick Pritzker
Elizabeth A. Ritvo
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 542-3000
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Dated: July 19, 1984
20-74(145)
46a
Appendix I.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff
VS. C.A. NO. 83-2199-C
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Ashraf Pahlavi moves, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56, for summary judgment on the ground that there is no
genuine issue as to material fact and that she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff's claims are
barred both by the statute of limitations and by the statute of
frauds.
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
By her Attorneys,
Harvey Weiner
PEABODY & ARNOLD
One Beacon Street
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 523-2100
47a
Appendix J.
Docket No. 83-2199
Filing Date: 7/28/83 7 ON APPEAL
PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN ASHRAF PAHLAVI
CAUSE
CONTRACT — Diversity
Attorneys
M. Frederick Pritzker, Esq. Harvey Weiner, Esq.
Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Esq. Peabody and Arnold
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer One Beacon Street
One Federal St. Boston, MA 02108
Boston, MA 02110 §23-2100
542-3000
07 9
12
Nov. 15 10
48a
PROCEEDINGS
Complaint FILED. Summons issued.
P’s notice of taking deposition of deft on 10-26-83
FILED. cs.
Ltr from Wm. E. Jackson to p’s counsel dtd 08-25-
83 re service on defendant FILED.
P’s motion for appt of special process server AL-
LOWED & FILED. cc/c
Affidavit of service on defendant wso 09-13-83
FILED.
D’s motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
D’s motion for leave to extend time to file brief in
support of motion to dismiss, up to & including | 1-
14-83 FILED. cs.
CAFFREY, CH.J.. re: #7 MOTION AL-
LOWED. cc/cl. .
P’s opposition to motion to extend time FILED.
cs.
Pitff’s motion to reconsider re:#7 FILED. cs.
CAFFREY, CH.J.. re:#9 MOTION DENIED.
cc/cl.
D’s memorandum in support of motion to dismiss
FILED. cs.
D’s affidavit in support of motion to dismiss
FILED. cs.
D’s notice of taking depo of pitff on 11-23-83
FILED. cs.
P’s motion to compel FILED. cs.
P’s motion for protective order and for sequencing
of discovery FILED. cs.
P’s memorandum in support of motion for protec-
tive order and for sequencing and motion to com-
pel FILED. cs.
—
49a
PROCEEDINGS
DATE NR
22 16 P’s motion for extension of time to file a reply
memo to d’s motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
29 17 D?’s opposition to p’s motion for a protective order
FILED. cs.
"18 D’s opposition to p’s motion to compel FILED. cs.
"19 D’s memorandum in opposition to p’s motions to
compel and for a protective order and sequencing
FILED. cs.
: CAFFREY, CH.J., re:# 13 & #14 MOTIONS
DENIED. cc/cl.
30 20 Affidavit of Petros A. Palandjian in opposition to
deft’s motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
"21. Affidavit of Robert M. Mardirosian in opposition
to deft’s motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
Dec. 2 CAFFREY, CH.J. Case called for hearing on all
pending motions; Hearing on deft’s motion to dis-
miss; arguments; Motion taken under advisement.
DecQ1l 22 Pitffs motion to file late FILED. cs.
"23 Pitff’s memorandum in opposition to deft’s motion
to dismiss FILED.
02 24 Deft’s motion to strike part of the affidavit of Rob-
ert Mardirosian submitted by pltff in opposition to
d’s motion to dismiss FILED.
"25 Deft’s motion to strike parts of the affidavit of the
pitff subnuitted by the pltff in opposition to d’s mo-
tion to dismiss FILED.
"26 Deft’s notice of taking depo of pitff on 12-13-83
FILED. cs.
07 27 P’s opposition to deft’s motion to strike affidavit
FILED. cs.
09 28 Ltr to Chief Judge Caffrey dtd 12-08-83 from Atty
Ritvo re: service of s&c on deft FILED.
|
DATE NR
Dec 20 29
” 30
” 3]
y( ee
1984
Jan06 33
a
is 35
Feb O1 36
08 37
16 38
27
50a
PROCEEDINGS
Affidavit of Dominique Pollet (In French) FILED.
Translation of Affidavit of D. Pollet FILED.
Affidavit of Jacques Sales with one page attach-
ment FILED.
D’s notice of taking depo of Robert Mardirosian on
01-04-84 FILED. cs.
Ltr to clerk dtd 01-04-84 from Atty Weiner re:
service in France is insufficient FILED.
Pitff’s response to deft’s request for docu, filed. c/s
P’s notice of taking depo of Ashraf Pahlavi on Jan.
27, 1984 at 11:00 am., FILED. c/s
Ltr to Judge Caffrey from Attys Pritzker & Ritvo
dtd 01-31-84 re: requesting the Court to defer final
consideration on d’s motion to dismiss until p has
filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to
motion to dismiss FILED.
D’s Ist request for production of documents
FILED. cs.
P’s motion for permission to file supplemental
memorandum FILED. cs. (Supplemental memo
attached)
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#38 MOTION ALLOWED.
cc/cl.
Mar 08 39 Deft’s motion for permission to file supplementz!
”
memorandum FILED. cs.
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#39 MOTION ALLOWED.
cc/cl. |
Deft’s supplemental memorandum in support of
motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
Affidavit of Harvey Weiner, with attachments,
FILED.
DATE NR
Sla
PROCEEDINGS
Mar !* 42 Pitff’s response to deft’s supplemental memoran-
19 43
22 44
29 45
Apr02 46
”
May 10 47
May 25 48
Jun 04 49
dum in support of motion to dismiss FILED. cs.
Pitf’s response to deft’s first request for prod of
docu, filed. c/s
P’s notice of deposition of Ashraf Pahlavi at 10:00
a.m. on April 11, 1984, filed. c/s
Deft’s motion for a protective order and memoran-
dum in support of motion attached and FILED. cs.
Plitff’s opposition to deft’s motion for a protective
order FILED. cs
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#45 MOTION ALLOWED.
cc/cl.
CAFFREY, CH.J..MEMORANDUM AND OR-
DER ENTERED .. . 1) Deft’s motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied as to
Counts I and [V. 2) The motion to dismiss is al-
lowed as to those portions of Counts II and III
which relate to the Hooraseman Office Bldg and
denied as to the remainder of Counts II and Iil.
3) Deft’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
service is denied. 4) Deft’s motions to strike are
denied. cc/cl, West, Bureau of National Affairs,
NCAI, CCH, MLW, MS, etc.
Deft’s second request for production of documents
FILED. cs.
Stipulation extending time for deft to answer com-
plaint up to and including 06-01-84 FILED. As-
sented to.
Answer of defendant to pltff’'s complaint FILED, cs.
Notice of scheduling conference sent to all coun-
sel. Conference scheduled for June 21, 1984 at
10:00 AM.
DATE NR
Jun 12 51
21
Jul 17 52
18
52a
PROCEEDINGS
Pitff’s demand for jury trial FILED, cs.
CAFFREY, CH.J. Case called for Rule 16(b)
scheduling conference; Short form scheduling or-
der attached with Court’s rulings; Pltff to file mo-
tion for summary judgment and supporting memo
by Sept. 21, 1984; Deft. to file opposition and
supporting memo by Oct. 5, 1984. Hearing on
summary judgment motion scheduled'for Oct. 29,
1984 at 11:00AM. Court orders all discovery to
be complete by Oct. 1, 1984.
Joint motion to continue various discovery dates
FILED. Assented to
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#52 MOTION ALLOWED
BY THE COURT. cc/cl. (Depo of Princess -10-
18-84; motion for summary judgment -1 1-05-84;
‘memo in opposition to s/j-1 1-20-84; hearing on
motion for s/j-12-14-84; discovery deadline-i 1-
15-84.) :
20 53 P’s motion to amend complaint FILED. cs.
: 54
; be
26 56
30 57
Aug 03 58
(Amended complaint attached)
P’s first request for production of documents
FILED. cs.
P’s response to deft’s second request for produc-
tion of docs FILED. cs.
Deft’s opposition to p’s motion to amend com-
plaint FILED. cs.
D’s notice of taking depo of pltff on 08-15-84
FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Grigor Palandjian
on 09-13-84 FILED. cs.
Bina. «
DATE NR
53a
PROCEEDINGS
Aug 14 59 CAFFREY, CH.J.. MEMORANDUM AND
18 62
24 63
Oct 22 64
23 65
25 66
67
68
69
ORDER ENTERED . . . re:p’s motion to amend
complaint. Pitff’s motion-to amend is hereby AL-
LOWED. AND ALL REFERENCES TO THE
HOORASEMAN OFFICE BUILDING SHOULD
BE AND HEREBY ARE STRICKEN FROM
PLTFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT. cc/cl.
Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, NCAI, CCH, MLW, etc.
Stipulation extending time to 09-19-84 for deft
to answer p’s request for production of documents
FILED. Assented to.
Deft’s answer to pitff's amended complaint FILED.
cs.
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#60 STIPULATION AP-
PROVED. cc/cl. .
Deft’s response to pltff’s 1st request for production
of documents FILED. cs.
Pitff’s interrogatories to the defendant FILED. cs.
Notice of Depo of Ronald Koven, 10-26-84 at
5PM. c/s .
Deft’s answers to pltff’s interrogatories FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Martin Panos on
11-01-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Ellis Chouinard on
11-01-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Peter Dimeo on
1 1-02-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Grigor Nazarian on
1 1-02-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Boris Kanieff on
1 1-02-84 FILED, cs.
DATE NR
NovOl 71
”
02 72
19 76
26 79
29 82
54a
PROCEEDINGS
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Ronald Koven on
1 1-05-84 FILED. cs.
Joint motion to continue various discovery dates
FILED. Assented to.
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:# 72 MOTION ALLOWED
BY THECOURT. cc/cl.
Deft’s motion for summary judgment and memo-
randum in support of summary judgment attached
and FILED. cs.
Affidavit of Harvey Weiner in support of motion
for s/j) FILED.
Affidavit of Ashraf Pahlavi in support of motion
for s/j FILED.
Pitff’s motion to compel answers to interroga-
tories and memorandum in support of motion
attached and FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Robert Mardiro-
sian on | 1-27-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Patricia Pino on
1 1-27-84 FILED. cs.
Deft’s notice of taking depo of Ali Izadi on 12-04-
84 FILED. cs.
Joint motion to continue final discovery date
FILED. Assented to.
Deft’s motion to extend time to 12-17-84 within
which to correct and sign deposition transcript
FILED. CS.
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:'#80 MOTION ALLOWED
BY THE COURT; re:#81 MOTION ALLOWED
BY THECOURT. cc/cl.
Deft’s opposition to pltff’s motion to compel ans-
wers to interrogatories and memorandum in sup-
port of opposition attached and FILED cs.
al ——
5Sa
PROCEEDINGS
DATE NR
Dec. 03 83 Deft’s notice of taking depo of Nancy Spolinza on
Dec. 10, 1984 FILED. cs.
04 CAFFREY, CH.J., re:'#76 MOTION DENIED,
cc/cl.
24 84 Plitff’s opposition to deft’s motion for summary
judgment FILED. cs.
" = Pitff’s affidavit in opposition to deft’s motion for
summary judgment FILED. (UNSIGNED)
‘ 86 Appendix to pltff’s opposition to deft’s motion for
summary judgment FILED.
27 87 P’s notice of taking depo of D.R. Edwards on 01-
08-84 FILED. cs.
88 Pltff’s affidavit in opposition to deft’s motion for
summary judgment FILED.
Jan 10 89 D’s motion for leave to file reply memo to oppo-
sition of pltff FILED. (reply attached) cs.
11 CAFFREY, CH.J., re:'#89 MOTION ALLOWED.
cc/cl.
i 90 Reply memorandum in support of deft’s motion
for summary judgment FILED. cs.
Feb. 01 Notice of motion hearing sent to all counsel. Hear-
ing scheduled for 03/21/85 at 12:15PM.
Feb. 04 91 Pitff's motion for permission to file response to
defts’ reply memorandum FILED. cs. (Response
attached).
7 CAFFREY, CH.J., re:'#91 MOTION ALLOWED
BY THE COURT. cc/cl.
92 Pltff's response to deft’s reply memorandum
FILED. cs.
22 93 P’s motion for continuance of summary judgment
hearing FILED. cs.
DATE NR
Feb 27
Mar 26
Apr 12 94
16
May 20
May 22
Jun 19
Aug 16 95
19 96
21 97
21 98
21 99
S6a
~ PROCEEDINGS
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#93 MOTION ALLOWED:
MOTION HEARING RESCHEDULED TO
~MARCH 19, 1985 AT 10:00AM. cc/cl.
Notice of motion hearing sent to all counsel. Hear-
ing scheduled for 04-22-85 at 10:30AM.
Deft’s motion for continuance of summary judg-
ment hearing FILED. Assented to.
CAFFREY, CH.J., re:#94 MOTION ALLOWED.
HEARING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 16, 1985,
AT 11:00AM. cc/cl.
Case transferred to Judge Young. Counsel & court
ran notified.
YOUNG,D.J.: Hearing on Deft’s mtn for S/J re-
scheduled to 6/19/85 at 2:00PM. Counsel noti-
fied by telephone.
YOUNG MOTION SESSION: Motion for S/J
under advisement.
YOUNG, DJ: MEMORANDUM & ORDER.
Motion for S.J. DENIED. cc/cl Deft has 10 days to
apply to Court of Appeals for permission to pro-
ceed with an appeal.
Letter to Judge from Ps counsel re: Memo & Order
8-16-85.
Ps Motion for clarification of 8-16-85 Memo &
Order, c/s
Ds Motion for stay of order dated 8-16-85, cs
Ds Motion for reconsideration of Memo & Order
dated 8-16-85, cs
21 100Ds Memo in support of M/reconsider memo &
order, c/s
57a
PROCEEDINGS
DATE NR
Aug 23 YOUNG, DJ: Hearing on Ps motion for recon-
sideration, stay of entry of order, and for clarifica-
tion.
1) The motion for reconsideration is ALLOWED
to the extend of this hearing.
2) An order will enter as to Count One of the
complaint 8-23-85 or soon thereafter as prac-
ticable.
3) With respect to the time for perfecting an ap-
peal to the First Circuit of Appeals; the time
will run from the date of entry of the Supple-
mental Order.
4) the motion for clarification is ALLOWED to
the extent of this hearing, and otherwise DE-
NIED.
26 101 YOUNG, DJ: SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO &
ORDER. The Coart is not in a position to decide
at this stage of the case that estoppel cannot be
shown; the statute of frauds does not bar Paland-
jian’s contract claim. cc/cl
27 102 Transcript on Hearing on M/Reconsideration &
Clarification, 8-23-85.
Sept 17 103 Order of Court received from the Court of Appeals
entered . . . The petition for permission to appeal
is granted. F.F.Pd. 9/19/85
18 Certified copy of docket entries and original plead-
ings forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
58a
Appendix K.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff
Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-2199-Y
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendant Ashraf Pahlavi hereby moves this Court to recon-
sider the Memorandum and Order, dated August 16, 1985,
and to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment for
the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum.
DEFENDANT
ASHRAF PAHLAVI
By her Attorneys,
/s/
Harvey Weiuer
PEABODY & ARNOLD
One Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 523-2100
59a
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Ellen A. Loeb, hereby certify that I served the within
Motion for Reconsideration and accompa.:ying Memorandum
in support thereof on plaintiff by hand-delivering copies thereof
to:
February 6, 1986
M. Frederick Pritzker, Esq.
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
and
Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Esq.
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
/s/
Ellen A. Loeb
60a
Appendix L.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDIJIAN,
Plaintiff
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-2199-Y
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendant Ashraf Pahlavi hereby moves this Court to recon-
sider the Memorandum and Order, dated August 16, 1985,
and to grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment for
the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum.
DOCKETED February 24, 1986,
In light of the decision of the First Circuit in Palandjian v.
Pahlavi, No. 85-1718, this court reconsiders its earlier ruling
herein and, upon reconsideration, allows the defendants motion
for summary judgment. While circumstances may be imagined
where duress might toll a statute of limitations under the law
of Massachusetts, even a generous reading of the plaintiff's
affidavits and supporting materials does not upon the reasoning
expressed in this court’s original memorandum, justify the
application of a duress exception under Massachusetts law in
these circumstances judgment for the defendant.
/s/William G. Young
District Judge
DEFENDANT
ASHRAF PAHLAVI
By her Attorneys,
S
Harvey Weiner
PEABODY & ARNOLD
One Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 523-2100
6la
Appendix M.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1718.
PETROS A. PALANDIJIAN,
Respondent, Appellee,
Vv.
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Petitioner, Appellant.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered: January 30, 1986
The order of this Court of September 17, 1985 allowing an
interlocutory appeal is vacated in accordance with the opinion
filed this day.
No Costs.
By the Court:
FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO, CLERK
By: Richard W. Gordon
Chief Deputy Clerk
62a
Appendix N.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 85-1718.
PETROS A. PALANDIJIAN,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
{[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge}
Before
Bownes, Aldrich and Breyer,
Circuit Judges.
—___
Harvey Weiner with whom Ellen A. Loeb, Peabody & Ar-
nold, William E. Jackson, James E. Clapp, and Milbank
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy were on brief for appellant.
M. Frederick Pritzker with whom Elizabeth A. Ritvo and
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer were on brief for appellee.
January 30, 1986
ve
63a
Per Curiam. In this action for conversion of personal prop-
erty and breach of contract, plaintiff's only answer to the
defense of the statutes of limitations is that, by duress, for
fear of personal injury, he was prevented from bringing suit
any sooner. On defendant's motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff filed affidavits of the facts upon which he based his
claim. After reviewing the facts, the court expressed its views
as follows:
(1) “I completely agree that a duress exception
can theoretically toll the statutes of limitation [under
Massachusetts common law].”
(2) Another Massachusetts district judge has viewed
almost identical affidavits as presenting a question
of fact as to duress.
(3) | do not myself think so, but “appropriate
amenities [and] profound considerations of equality
in the treatment of litigants” call for “considerable
deference,” citing Wyzanski, “The Essential Qual-
ities of a Judge” (1956), reprinted in Handbook for
Judges 96 (American Judicature Society 1975).
(4) I will deny the motion for summary judgment
and certify for an interlocutory appeal because “[t|he
extent of the duress exception to the running of the
Massachusetts statutes of limitations is here ‘a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is a substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion.’”
This court (but not the judges presently sitting) permitted the
appeal.
The first argument presented by appellant is that Mas-
sachusetts would, under no circumstances, recognize duress
as tolling the statutes. The district court did not agree. Neither
does the Massachusetts Appeals Court: “It is possible to imagine
64a
circumstances in which duress might toll the statute.” Babco
Industries, Inc. v. New England Merchants National Bank, 6
Mass. App. 929, 380 N.E.2d 1327, 1328 (1978). Although
the merest dictum, defendant can find nothing to contradict
it, and thus presently we doubt there is “substantial ground
for a difference of opinion,” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), about the
bare existence of such an exception in some conceivable cir-
cumstances. See Adamowicz v. Town of Ipswich, 395 Mass.
757, 481 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 n.4 (1985).
Point 2 we take to be factually correct. However, as to point
3, we are less impressed. That a ruling by one district judge
should impose on nine others the duty to try a lengthy case,
or to make, say, a ruling they believe will result in reversal,
is an awesome suggestion. Nor does equality of treatment
justify the perpetuation of error. We can agree that a prior
ruling in the same case should not be reversed by a new judge
without grave conviction, although even here there is no neces-
sary “law of the case.” For collection of cases, see 1B J.
Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice
{ 0.404[4.-21 (2d ed. 1984). To continue a believed error made
in unrelated cases is a doubtful practice.
As to point 4, the question of whether Massachusetts would
recognize the principle of duress as tolling the statute would
be a good example of a “controlling question of law.” But the
question of the extent of such an exception is a classic example
of what is not to be raised by intermediate appeals. It resembles
a “sufficiency of the evidence” claim — the kind of claim
which an appellate court can better decide after the facts are
fully developed. The fact that appreciable trial time may be
saved is not determinative, for such would often be true of
interlocutory appeals. Rather, as we said in McGillicuddy v.
Clements, 746 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1984):
[I]nterlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) should be used sparingly and only in ex-
65a
ceptional circumstances, and where the proposed in-
termediate appeal presents one or more difficult and
pivotal questions of law not settled by controlling
authority. Jn re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887, 888-89
(Ist Cir. 1959) (Magruder, Ch. J.).
Id. at 76 n.1.
We consider our initial decision to hear this appeal improvi-
dent. See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398,
400 (2d Cir. 1974); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. Kasey,
279 F.2d 216, 217 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam). The district
court remains free to develop the facts further, to certify ques-
tions to the Supreme Judicial Court, see Mass. S.J.C. Rule
1:03, or to proceed to decide other issues, as it believes appro-
priate.
The order allowing an interlocutory appeal is
Vacated.
66a
Appendix O.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PETROS A. PALANDJIAN
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action
ASHRAF PAHLAVI, 83-2199-Y
Defendant.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YOUNG, D.J. August 26, 1985
On August 16, 1985, this court denied the motion of the
defendant Pahlavi for summary judgment, albeit with reserva-
tions, after analyzing whether the plaintiff Palandjian’s claim
of duress was adequate to toll the relevant statutes of limita-
tions. Both parties promptly sought reconsideration, Pahlavi’s
counsel correctly observing that, were Pahlavi not to prevail
on her statute of limitations argument, she is nevertheless
entitled to a ruling on her statute of frauds defense to Count
I — the contract count. After further hearing, this supplemental
memorandum addresses that issue.
The Statute of Frauds Defense
Pahlavi has argued that Palandjian’s breach of contract claim
is barred by the Massachusetts statute of frauds, which gener-
ally provides that no action shall be brought upon an agreement
that is not to be performed within one year unless that agree-
ment is in writing and signed by the party charged with a
breach. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 259, § 1. According to Pahlavi,
the Kazar Shahr development could not have been completed
within one year after the alleged oral contract was made, and
67a
therefore the contract claim is barred. Palandjian concedes that
the entire Kazar Shahr project could not have been completed
within one year, but argues that the obligations of the parties
under the alleged agreement could have been concluded within
that period. Palandjian further contends that Pahlavi is estopped
from asserting a statute of frauds defense. Because this court
holds that the estoppel doctrine may apply to this case, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the alleged contract could have
been performed within one year.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) sets forth
the circumstances under which a defendant may be estopped
from invoking a statute of frauds defense to a claim falling
within the scope of the statute:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable not-
withstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice
requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981). Section
139(2) lists several factors which are significant in determining
“whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”
The Massachusetts courts have held that the estoppel doc-
trine may apply in the statute of frauds context. See Cellucci
v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 728 (1974) (“[A]n
estoppel, if appropriately applied in this case, would also pre-
clude [the defendant] from asserting the affirmative defense
of the Statute of Frauds.”), aff'd, 368 Mass. 811 (1975). In
Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 671 (1982), the Appeals
68a
Court noted that “the earlier Massachusetts decisions laid down
somewhat strict requirements for an estoppel precluding the
assertion of the Statute of Frauds,” but looked to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts for a statement of the rule presently
“applicable in most jurisdictions in the United States.” Jd. 673
(applying the rule of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 129,
which is substantially similar to § 139(1), in a case involving
a contract for the sale of real estate); see Goeken v. Kay, 751
F.2d 469, 472, 474 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting the Restatement
§ 139(1), and affirming a decision of the district court which
“assumed for the sake of argument” that Massachusetts law
permitted recovery upon reasonable reliance on an oral prom-
ise, notwithstanding the statute of frauds).
The court in Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., supra, summarized
the “essential factors giving rise to an estoppel”:
(1.) A representation or conduct amounting to a rep-
resentation intended to induce a course of conduct
on the part of the person to whom the representation
is made. (2.) An act or omission resulting from the
representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the
person to whom the representation is made.
(3.) Detriment to such person as a consequence of
the act or omission.
2 Mass. App. Ct. at 728 (quoting /ndustrial Bankers of Mass.
Inc. v. Reid, Murdoch & Co., 297 Mass. 119, 124 (1937))
(citations omitted); see Loranger Construction Corp. v. E.F.
Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 154 (Keville, J.),
affd, 376 Mass. 757 (1978).
Pahlavi points out that neither Palandjian’s affidavits nor
indeed the allegations in his complaint suggest fraud in the
inducement or misrepresentation. This is not essential for es-
toppel to apply. “Recovery in these circumstances requires no
69a
more than a promise on which the promisee could reasonably
have placed reliance; and attention is to be focused upon the
reasonableness of that reliance.” Loranger Construction Corp.
v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 159, aff'd,
376 Mass. 757, 761 (1978) (Braucher, J.) (“When a promise
is enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance, it is a
‘contract, and it is enforceabie pursuant to a ‘traditional con-
tract Geory’ . ...°).'
Each of the factors necessary to show estoppel may be
present in this case. Palandjian has submitted cornpetent evi-
dence indicating that Pahlavi made specific representations
regarding the Kazar Shahr project which reasonably induced
Palandjian to invest substantial time, money, and other re-
sources toward development of the project. That evidence, if
believed, is certainly sufficient to show that Palandjian changed
‘Pahlavi attempts to distinguish Loranger on the basis that it involved a
“promissory estoppel” theory, a doctrine which typically applies where a court
is asked to “create” a contract in the absence of consideration. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). Although the traditional “promissory estop-
pei” doctrine differs from the type of estoppel at issue here, the principles
discussed in Loranger are nonetheless relevant to this case. See Loranger, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 152, 159 (“it is doubtful that the prohibitions of the Statute
of Frauds . . . are applicable where recovery is otherwise warranted on the
basis of promissory estoppel”) (dictum), affirmed without addressing this issue,
376 Mass. 757, 764 (1978).
If the equitable docirine of estoppel was applied in this case, the remedy
available to the plaintiff might be restricted, even though his action at law
survived. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 90, 139 (1981) (“The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”); see also
Chedd-Angier Production Co. v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930,
937 (ist Cir. 1985) (“Under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
adopted in its tentative form by the Massachusetts court in Loranger, damages
available under promissory estoppel range from full contract damages to reliance
or restitution damages.”). Where recovery rests solely upon the justified reliance
of the promisee, without any suggestion of fraud, it would seem equitable that
such recovery be measured by the extent of the reliance interest. i.e. restitution,
raiher than by conferring the benefit of the bargain. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 90 comment d, 139 comment d, 363 comment b (1981).
70a
his position to his substantial detriment. Whether the elements
necessary to create an estoppel exist is an issue of fact. Moran
v. Town of Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681 (1984);
Danieiczuk v. Ferioli, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 914 (1979) (“The
assertion of an estoppel raises factual questions of reliance and
reasonableness that should have been left for resolution at
trial.”). The court is not in a position to decide at this stage
of the case that estoppel cannot be shown.
For these reasons, the court rules that, upon this record, the
statute of frauds does not bar Palandjian’s contract claim.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Tla
Appendix P.
Petros A. PALANDJIAN, Plaintiff,
v.
Ashraf PAHLAVI, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 83-2199-Y.
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Aug. 16, 1985.
Diversity action was brought against sister of the late Shah
of Iran for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment,
quantum meruit and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant moved
for summary judgment, asserting statute of limitations and
statute of frauds. The District Court, Young, J., held that: (1)
a duress exception can theoretically toll the statutes of limita-
tions; (2) summary judgment on limitations grounds would be
denied for reasons expressed by a court of the same district
in accepting duress exception in a closely related case involving
the same parties; (3) since plaintiff prevailed on claim of duress,
his claims based on alleged repudiation of a constructive trust
or fiduciary relationship would not be entertained; and (4)
statute of frauds did not bar the contract claim.
Motion denied.
See also, D.C., 586 F.Supp. 671.
M. Frederick Pritzker, Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Brown, Rudnick,
Freed & Gesmer, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Harvey Weiner, Peabody & Arnold, Boston, Mass., for
defendant.
72a
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YOUNG, District Judge.
The plaintiff in this action, Petros A. Palandjian (“Paland-
jian”), seeks damages in excess of $30 million on his claims
of breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, quantum
meruit, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendant, Ashraf
Pahlavi (“Pahlavi”), moves for summary judgment on all
counts, claiming that the action is barred both by the statute
of limitations and by the statute of frauds. For the reasons that
follow, Pahlavi’s motion is denied.
|. Background
Palandjian is a dual national Iranian-American citizen who
has been a resident of the United States since 1963. The defend-
ant Pahlavi is the twin sister of the late Shah of Iran and
currently is living in exile. Palandjian alleges the following
facts and this court, expressing no opinion thereon, assumes
them to be true for purposes of this motion only.
In 1966, Palandjian resided in Massachusetts and was the
president of a construction company located in Watertown,
Massachusetts. In June of 1966 he first met Pahlavi through
his brother Leon Palandjian (“Leon”), who worked for Pahlavi
in Iran. During the course of several meetings over a weeklong
period in various locations in Massachusetts, Pahlavi and
Paiandjian entered into an oral contract whereby they agreed
to develop a holiday resort, named “Kazar Shahr,” on the
Caspian Sea in Iran. By this agreement, Pahlavi would pur-
chase the necessary real estate. Palandjian would provide up
to $2 million as an initial investment, and he and his brother
Leon would form a new company to develop and construct
the project, all profits being divided equally between Pahlavi
and Palandjian. Palandjian agreed to oversee the development
73a
of the project from his office in Massachusetts and to visit the
site in Iran as necessary.
During the June 1966 meetings in Massachusetts, Pahlavi
and Palandjian also discussed the need and demand for aviation
development in Iran. They agreed to contact Cessna Aircraft
to seek the exclusive distributorship for Iran; if successful,
Palandjian was to have an 85% interest and Pahlavi a 15%
interest. Neither this agreement nor the agreement to develop
Kazar Shahr were put in writing — Palandjian did not ask
Pahlavi to sign a written contract for fear of insulting her.
Pursuant to these agreements, Palandjian and his brother
Leon formed a company, called Abadani jazayer, to develop
the Kazar Shahr project. Because he was a resident of Iran,
Leon was named president of the company. The shares of
Abadani Jazayer stock were given to the plaintiff's father,
Grigor Palandjian, to hold in his safe in Tehran on the basis
of 50% for the benefit of Palandjian and 50% for the benefit
of Pahlavi.
Palandjian also obtained the exclusive distributorship in [ran
for Cessna Aircraft. Palandjian and his brother formed a com-
pany named Hooraseman to sell aircraft and parts, and each
of the brothers was named individually as a Cessna represen-
tative. Leon was named president of Hooraseman and the
company shares were held by the plaintiff's father in Tehran.
From 1966 through July 1969, Palandjian supervised the
development of the Kazar Shahr project from his Watertown,
Massachusetts, office and from periodic site visits. During this
period he was in frequent telephone contact from his Mas-
sachusetts home and office with Pahlavi regarding the project.
In July 1969, Leon died, and Palandjian moved to Iran to
assume his brother’s responsibilities as president of both the
Abadani Jazayer and the Hooraseman companies. From July
1969 through December 1970 Palandjian resided in Tehran
except for several brief trips to Massachusetts to visit his family.
74a
Following extensive site development, the Kazar Shahr proj-
ect was ready for marketing in 1970. In December 1970,
Palandjian had a dispute with Pahlavi concerning the amount
of time he was spending in Iran. Palandjian proposed that they
sell the Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman companies, a sugges-
tion which angered Pahlavi. While discussing this matter in
France, Pahlavi sent the following written message to Paland-
jian:
| swear to my highest beliefs that you will never set foot
in Iran while I am alive. You are free to leave here
whenever you want even if you want to leave tonight.
P.S. You are free to go wherever you want.
Fearing for his safety, Palandjian did not return to Iran. He
moved back to his home in Massachusetts and, from there,
continued to supervise the activities of Abadani Jazayer and
Hooraseman.
In 1971, Pahlavi moved to wrest control of the two com-
panies from Palandjian. Early that year a representative of
Pahlavi went to the Abadani Jayazer offices in Tehran and
announced that he was taking over the company and that all
documents and models should be turned over to him. The staff
reluctantly complied with those demands. At approximately
the same time Pahlavi’s top assistant, Izadi, visited the plain-
tiff's father Grigor and demanded the shares of Abadani Jazayer
and Hooraseman held by Grigor. According to Grigor’s deposi-
tion testimony, Izadi stated: “We will have you killed,” and
“If you and your son and family want to live here without any
danger give me the stocks.”
Grigor contacted Palandjian about the threats from Izadi,
and Palandjian spoke with Pahlavi at least twice about her
intent to obtain possession of the shares. Pahlavi replied that
she would hold Palandjian’s shares for his benefit. Fearing for
iia
75a
Grigor’s safety and relying on Pahlavi’s statement that she
would hold the Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman shares for
his benefit, Palandjian advised his father to release the stock
of both companies to Izadi, which his father did.
Shortly thereafter, in 1971, Palandjian was visited in Mas-
sachusetts by Pahlavi’s cousin, Dadsetan. Dadsetan told
Palandjian that he either had to return to Iran at Pahlavi's
request or he had to relinquish his rights to the Cessna dis-
tributorship. Still fearing Pahlavi’s previous threats, Palandjian
was unwilling to return to Iran. Dadsetan became more belli-
gerant, stating “She wants Cessna Aircraft. She wants you to
give up Cessna if you're not coming back.” Dadsetan further
stated, “I’m sure you won't want to take a chance and have
something unpleasant happen to your mom, to your dad. They
have a pleasant life.” Palandjian called Pahlavi about Dadse-
tan’s threats and was told that Dadsetan was her representative
and that Palandjian was to do as he was told. Pahlavi added,
“You don’t have to if you don’t want to. That’s up to you.
You decide.” In response to a request for payment, Pahlavi
stated, “Don’t worry about the money. You will get paid.”
Fearing the possible consequences to him and his family,
Palandjian signed papers which relinquished his rights to the
Cessna distributorship.
From 1971 through 1982 Palandjian remained in contact
with Pahlavi, speaking with her by phone and periodically
meeting with her in Geneva or New York. During these con-
versations, Palandjian repeatedly raised the issue of monies
Pahlavi owed him from Hooraseman and Abadani Jazayer.
According to Palandjian, Pahlavi acknowledged her debts and
told him that he would be paid. Palandjian summarized the
circumstances of one meeting: In 1972 he met Pahlavi in
Geneva and again asked her for payment. Pahlavi stated that
she had instructed her assistant to pay Palandjian $1.7 million
for the unpaid construction work he had performed for the Kazar
76a
Shahr development; she also told him that Kazar Shahr had
already made $25 million and would make in excess of $50
million, and that he would be paid his share of the profits. In
response, Palandjian informed her that he had not received
any payment whatsoever.
The Shah of Iran was deposed in 1978 and died in 1980.
For some time after 1978 Palandjian believed that the Pahlavi
family would return to power eventually and that “the royal
family through its agents would exercise power and control
while out of power . . . outside of Iran.” In 1983 Palandjian
came to believe that the Pahlavi family would not return to
power in Iran and that he could safely litigate his claims against
Pahlavi. Palandjian commenced this suit on July 27, 1983.
ll. The Statute of Limitations Defense
[1] When a defense of statute of limitations is properly
raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that he has P
complied with the relevant statutes. Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook
& Co.. Inc., 528 F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.Mass. 1981). The Mas-
sachusetts statute of limitations applies in this diversity case.
Molinar v. Western Electric Co., 525 F.2d 521, 531 (ist Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978, 96 S.Ct. 1485, 47 L.Ed.2d
748 (1976). The statute of limitations for contract actions pro-
vides that such actions shall be commenced within six years
after the cause of action accrues. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260,
§ 2. For claims arising in tort, the Massachusetts statute pro-
vides a two-year limitations period for claims arising before
January |, 1974, and a three-year limitations period for claims
arising on or after that date. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260, § 2A;
Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 43, 337
N.E.2d 701 (1975).
a
77a
A. Counts I, ll, IV, and V
[2] A cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the
time of the breach. Campanella & Cardi Construction Co. v.
Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 184, 185, 217 N.E.2d 925 (1966).
Palandjian alleges in Count I that Pahlavi breached their oral
contract by “her failure to pay the plaintiff for his profits in
the Kazar Shahr development and for the construction work
performed on said project.” Amended Complaint § 34.
Palandjian’s own version of the facts confirms that this
alleged breach of contract occurred no later than 1971, when
Pahlavi forced him to relinquish control of his interest in the
Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman companies. Similarly,
Palandjian’s quantum meruit claim in Count IV is based on
Pahlavi’s failure to pay him the reasonable value of the con-
struction work on the Kazar Shahr project, work which was
completed by 1971. Thus, the limitations period on the breach
of contract claim (Count I) and the quantum meruit claim
(Count IV) ordinarily would have expired no later than 1977,
six years before this action was filed.
[3] A similar analysis applies to Palandjian’s claim for con-
version (Count II). A cause of action in tort accrues at the
time of injury to the plaintiff. Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978). Palandjian’s
conversion claim rests upon allegations that Pahlavi through
her agents converted (1) Palandjian’s property rights in the
Cessna Aircraft distributorship in Iran, and (2) Palandjian’s
interest in the Kazar Shahr project, Amended Complaint {| 36.
Because these events took place in 1970 and 1971, the limita-
tions period for the conversion claim ordinarily would have
expired no later than 1973.
Palandjian contends in Count V that Pahlavi breached her
fiduciary duty to him “arising from the contract entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant” and “arising from her holding
78a
of the Plaintiff's shares in Abadani Jazayer and Hooraseman
Corp. since at least 1971.” Amended Complaint {| 48. Assum-
ing that the parties did indeed stand in fiduciary relations to
one another, see Cann v. Berry, 293 Mass. 313, 316, 199
N.E. 905 (1936), there is nothing in the record to suggest that
this cause of action rests on any different footing than Paland-
jian’s other tort and contract claims. Indeed, as Palandjian has
himself characterized the claim, it arises from the 1971 breach
of contract and Pahlavi’s hoiding of shares “since at least
1971.” Accordingly, this court rules that the cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty accrued in 1971.
Palandjian concedes that under ordinary circumstances his
complaint would be untimely. However, he contends that the
applicable statutes of limitations for all counts of the amended
complaint have been tolled on the ground of “duress.”
B. Duress
Palandjian asserts that he was in fear of the defendant and
the Pahlavi family from 1970 until 1983, and not until 1983
did he come to believe that he could safely bring litigation to
enforce his rights against this defendant. He argues that as a
consequence of this continuous duress, the relevant limitations
periods did not begin to run until 1983, and that all of his
claims have therefore been brought in a timely manner.
Palandjian has presented substantial evidence that he was
subject to duress by Pahlavi when he relinquished his interests
in Abadani Jazayer, Hooraseman, and the Cessna distributor-
ship. According to his allegations, in 1970 Pahlavi told him
never to set foot in Iran while she was alive. In 1971, Pahlavi
and her agent forced Palandjian to give up his property by
threatening the safety of his family. Also in 1971, Pahlavi’s
agent made direct threats to Palandjian’s father in Iran.
79a
However, the issue is not whether Palandjian was under
duress in 1971. The situation here is considerably different
from more typical duress cases, in which a party seeks to avoid
an apparent legal obligation on the ground that he agreed to
such an obligation under duress. Thus, many of the authorities
cited by Palandjian are inapplicable. See, e.g., Omansky v.
Shain, 313 Mass. 129, 46 N.E.2d 524 (1943) (plaintiff not
entitled to collect on promissory note because he had coerced
the defendant into signing it). The question here is whether
the duress experienced by Palandjian should excuse the lengthy
delay in bringing this action.
An initial question is whether, under Massachusetts law, a
court may recognize a duress exception to the statutes of limi-
tations under any circumstances. The Massachusetts legislature
has specifically defined several circumstances under which the
statutes of limitations may be tolled, and duress is not one of
them. See Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260. Pahlavi makes a strong
argument that this court should not create a duress exception
in the absence of legislative direction. See 51 Am.Jur.2d,
Limitations of Actions § 138 at 708 (1970) (“While most courts
give recognition to certain implied exceptions arising from
necessity, it is now conceded that they will not, as a general
rule, read into statutes of limitation an exception which has
not been embodied therein, however reasonable such exception
may seem and even though the exception wouid be an equitable
one.”’).
In Babco Industries, Inc. v. New England Merchants Nat.
Bank, 6 Mass. App. 929, 380 N.E.2d 1327 (1978), the court
rejected the plaintiff's “duress exception” argument but stated
in dictum, “It is possible to imagine circumstances in which
duress might toll the statute.” Jd. at 930, 380 N.E.2d 1327.
Likewise, the “duress exception” appears to have been recog-
nized in this District in a closely related case. Pahlavi v.
Palandjian, No. 83-0437-Z, slip op. at 4-5 (D.Mass. May 30,
1985).
80a
Even where other courts have entertained the view that
duress might toll the running of the statute of limitations,
however, they have uniformly agreed with the Babco court
that such an exception would be available only under very
unusual circumstances. For example, in Cooper v. Fidelity-
Phila. Trust Co., 201 F.Supp. 168 (E.D.Pa. 1962), the plaintiff
claimed that the defendants threatened to have him committed
to a mental institution if he sought to enforce his iegal rights.
Noting that “[t]here is little authority for the proposition that
‘duress’ tolls the running of the statute of limitations,” the
court held that such threats would not constitute duress. /d. at
170; see Philco Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 186 F.Supp.
155, 162 (E.D.Pa. 1960) (court was “unable to discover a
single case which has recognized such a defense in this [anti-
trust] area of the law”). A New York appellate court recently
summarized the law in this area as follows:
While other jurisdictions have suggested or assumed the
possibility for the purpose of argument that duress might
toll the limitations period for causes of action not based
on duress, the ultimate resolution in each case was to
reject duress as a toll on the facts presented. Whether
reluctance to recognize duress as a toll lies in the undesira-
bility of a rule that turns on the reasonableness of reliance
upon threats of physical or economic harm, the ease of
fabrication of such threats, or simply in the judicial reluc-
tance to create an entirely new defense to the Statute of
Limitations, . . . we are not inclined in this case to attempt
overthrow of the old rule.
Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d
803, 807 (1983) (citations omitted).
[4] To toll the running of the statute of limitations, the
alleged duress must be directed at preventing the plaintiff from
8la
filing suit or otherwise enforcing his legal rights. Jastrzebski
v. City of New York, 423 F.Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In particular, the plaintiff must allege facts of duress which
go “beyond those which comprise the alleged torts in suit.”
Id. As noted above, in this case Palandjian certainly has pre-
sented evidence of duress in 1971 — Pahlavi converted his
property to her own use by threatening him and his family.
As unconscionable as these alleged threats are, they do not
relate to the filing of any legal action. The record does not
contain any evidence of any threat or coercive act by the
defendant after 1972, despite the fact that Palandjian communi-
cated regularly with Pahlavi over the course of the next decade.
In particular, there is no evidence of any threat or act to deter
the filing of this lawsuit.
[S$] Palandjian argues that the fear induced by the Pahlavi’s
actions in the 1970-1972 period lasted continuously for more
than 10 years and remained sufficiently strong to dissuade him
from filing suit until 1983. Even assuming this fear was reason-
able, the plaintiff's subjective fear cannot by itself govern the
application of the statute of limitations. A similar argument
was rejected by the court in Jastrzebski v. City of New York,
423 F.Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1976):
Reduced to their essentials, plaintiff's allegations are that
he was so intimidated by the tortious acts of defendants
that, without any further actions on their parts, he was
deprived of a free will to institute his suit against them.
This argument, if accepted, would prove too much, for
any plaintiff — the victim of an assault, or a battery, or
a defamation, for instance — could argue that he was
subjectively so intimidated or traumatized by the tortious
conduct of his adversary that he was unable to bring suit
until some time well beyond the period established by
the legislature for the institution of such actions. If, in
82a
each instance, the trial court were forced to make an ad
hoc determination of the severity of the plaintiff's subjec-
tive fear in order to determine whether to waive the effect
of the statute of limitations, then obviously the courts
would be burdened by a plethora of preliminary inquiries
which could defeat the very purposes which the statutes
of limitations were designed to serve.
Id. at 674.
Here Palandjian would have a stronger case if Pahlavi or
her agents “had actually approached him at some point and
threatened him with dire consequences if he were to institute
his litigation.” Jd. As in Jastrzebski, Palandjian simply has
alleged that he was afraid Pahlavi might retaliate if he filed
suit. “[T]he mere fact that the plaintiff anticipated duress does
not establish it as a legal defense.” /d. (quoting Philco Corp.
v. Radio Corp. of America, 186 F.Supp. 155, 162 (E.D.Pa.
1960)) (emphasis in original).
Palandjian points out that another judge in this district, on
allegations virtually indistinguishable from those in the present
case and upon the authority of Ross v. United States, 574
F.Supp. 536, 542 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), has ruled that Palandjian’s
‘claim of duress has raised a sufficient issue of fact to withstand
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.” Pahlavi v. Paland-
jian, supra, at 1572. With respect, it seems to me that while
Ross does provide some authority for Palandjian’s duress argu-
ment, it is distinguishable from this case and thus the averments
of the affidavits opposing summary judgment fall short of
establishing any material issue of fact.
In Ross, the plaintiff was a former prison inmate who alleged
that the defendant prison officials mistreated him and wrong-
fully delayed in granting him parole. When the plaintiff was
finally released from prison — following three successful
habeas corpus petitions in federal court — he waited until he
83a
was no longer on parole (one year after the limitations period
ordinarily would have expired) before filing suit. He alleged
that he did not file the action earlier because he was still on
parole and he feared retaliation from the defendants, who still
had certain legal power over him. The court held that the
defendant’s alleged facts were sufficient to invoke a duress
defense, relying on the principle that a limitations period may
be tolled “when a paramount authority prevents a person from
exercising his legal rights.” Jd. at 542 (emphasis added); see
Davis v. Wilson, 349 F.Supp. 905, 906 (E.D. Tenn.) (statute
of limitations may be tolled a “reasonable time” where the
defendant sheriff allegedly took the plaintiff's legal papers
from his cell), affd, 471 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1972).
In this case, Palandjian has not alleged that Pahlavi had any
legal or paramount authority over him. According to Paland-
jian, he was a citizen of the United States and resided in this
country continuously after 1970. Although Palandjian has im-
plied that Pahlavi’s retaliatory power extended to the United
States from 1970 through 1982, he has offered no tangible
evidence of such power and this court is not in a position to
speculate on that matter. For these reasons, Ross does not
appear to be compelling authority for purposes of this case.
[6] The ruling by my colleague in Pahlavi v. Palandjian,
however, is entitled to considerable deference and much greater
weight. “If the precedent is from a sitting judge in one’s own
court and represents [her] mature reflection, the argument in
favor of following it rests not only on the appropriate amenities,
but also on profounder considerations of equality in the treat-
ment of litigants.” Wyzanski, “The Essential Qualities of a
Judge,” from The New Meaning of Justice (1956), reprinted
in Handbook for Judges 96 (American Judicature Society
1975). These considerations have especial force here where
Palandjian himself is a litigant in both cases, and I completely
agree that a duress exception can theoretically toll the statutes
84a
of limitations. My reservations flow only from the limited
scope I would afford to the reasoning in Ross and my own
reading of affidavits which are substantially similar in both
this case and Pahlavi v. Palandjian. Thus the question is
simply put: ought this court reject the proffered duress excep-
tion and dismiss the action notwithstanding Pahlavi v. Paland-
jian, or ought it follow the reasoning of that decision, deny
the motion for summary judgment, and order the case for trial?
The first course has the advantage of permitting a prompt
appeal to conclusively determine the iegai issue; the second
results in deciding like cases alike at the trial level.
Fortunately, the flexible provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
admit of an accommodation of both concerns. The extent of
the duress exception to the running of the Massachusetts stat-
utes of limitations is here “a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.”
Therefore, this court will deny the motion for summary judg-
ment upon the grounds expressed in Pahlavi v. Palandjian —
thus insuring that Palandjian is treated uniformly in each of
his two related lawsuits. In view of my reservations as to this
result, however, this court is of opinion “that an immediate
appeal from [this] order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accord-
ingly, Pahlavi has ten days after the entry of the denial of this
motion for summary judgment to apply to the Court of Appeals
for permission to proceed with an appeai therefrom. /d. In this
fashion, both uniform application of the law and prompt appeal
may be accomplished.
C. Count III (and Count V Revisited)
Palandjian contends in Count III that Pahlavi has been un-
justly enriched by her actions in obtaining “rights and title to
the Plaintiff's property” and asks the court to impose a construc-
85a
tive trust for his benefit. Amended Complaint {{ 38, 39. See
Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 342, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1955)
(a constructive trust may be employed in equity in order to
avoid the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of the
other where the legal title to the property was obtained by
fraud or in violation of a fiduciary relationship). Palandjian
further contends that the limitations period for this claim in
six years and that the cause of action accrued after 1982. In
response, Pahlavi argues that Count III is simply a restatement
of the conversion claim (Count II) and is therefore barred by
the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
[7-9] In Massachusetts, the statutes of limitations applicable
to law actions based on contract and tort are also applicable
to suits in equity. Desmond v. Moffie, 375 F.2d 742, 743 (Ist
Cir. 1967). The court must look to the “gist of the action” or
the essential nature of the plaintiff's claim in determining what
statute of limitations to apply. Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass.
83, 85, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974). Although Palandjian’s unjust
enrichment claim does rest in part on the circumstances of the
alleged conversion, it also arises from the breach of contract
allegations. “The usual form of action to recover from another
money which in equity and good conscience he is not entitled
to keep is in contract.” Kagan v. Levenson, 334 Mass. 100,
103, 134 N.E.2d 415 (1956). Therefore, the six-year statute
of limitations for actions of contract applies to Count III.
Brodeur v. American Rexoil Heating Fuel Co., 13 Mass.App.
939, 940, 430 N.E.2d 1243 (1982) (six-year limitations period
applies to action seeking the deciaration of a trust based on
an implied contract).
The six-year limitations period does not assist Palandjian,
however, unless the cause of action for unjust enrichment
accrued after July 1977. Palandjian reasons that his cause of
action accrued after 1982, because: while he was forced by
Pahlavi in 1971 to give up his shares in the Abadani Jazayer and
86a
Hooraseman companies and to relinquish his rights to the
Cessna distributorship, he was told by Pahlavi that she was
holding these shares and interests for his benefit. Between
1971 and 1982 he remained in contact with Pahlavi and, each
time he requested payment from her, she acknowledged her
debts and assured him that eventually he would be paid. Ac-
_ cording to Palandjian, it was not until after 1982 that he had
reason to know Pahlavi “was holding the shares adversely to
him.” Palandjian is essentially arguing that his cause of action
for unjust enrichment did not accrue until the implied trust
was “repudiated” or otherwise terminated to his knowledge.
See Brodeur v. American Rexoil Heating Fuel Co., 13
Mass.App. 939, 940, 430 N.E.2d 1243 (1982). Although he
points to no clear expression of repudiation by Pahlavi in 1982
or 1983, he alleges that it became clear after 1982 that Pahlavi
had no intention of paying him.
[10-12] It is true that in the case of express or resulting
trusts, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
trustee has repudiated the trust and knowledge of that repudi-
ation has come home to the beneficiary. Kearney v. Mechanics
Nat. Bank, 343 Mass. 699, 703, 180 N.E.2d 667 (1962); see
Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 394 F.2d 416,
419 (1st Cir. 1968); Hanrihan v. Hanrihan, 342 Mass. 559,
567, 174 N.E.2d 449 (1961). However, Palandjian’s claim is
not based on an express or resulting trust; instead, he seeks a
declaration that a constructive trust should be imposed to avoid
unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is not a substantive
device but merely an equitable remedy to compel a person not
justly entitled to property to transfer it to another. Davies v.
Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 714, 535 P.2d
1161, 1170 (1975). As a general rule, the “repudiation” re-
quirement does not apply to a constructive trust imposed as a
remedy by the court. Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 394 F.2d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1968); see Currier
v. Studley, 159 Mass. 17, 20, 33 N.E. 709 (1893).
87a -
Although there is no formal “repudiation” requirement for
constructive trusts, “the statute [of limitations] begins-to run
in favor of the [constructive trustee] against the [beneficiary]
. . . at the time when the holder of title begins to hold ad-
versely.” Currier v. Studley, 159 Mass. 17, 20, 33 N.E.709
(1893); Scott on Trusts § 481.1 (3d ed. 1967).
On this theory, then, the key legal question is when Pahlavi
began holding Palandjian’s property adversely to him. Given
the circumstances under which Palandjian says he was forced
to give up his interests in Abadani Jazayer, Hooraseman, and
the Cessna distributorship, he can hardly be heard to suggest
that Pahlavi acquired and continued to hold these interests on
his behalf. According to Palandjian himself, he relinquished
his rights unwillingly and only after threats of severe bodily
harm by Pahlavi and her representatives against his family and
himself.
True, Palandjian also asserts that, at the time Pahlavi forced
him to give up his stock, she told him that she would “hold
the shares for [him].”' But even if it is true that Pahlavi acknowl-
edged her debt and promised to pay it eventually, it does not
follow that she became his agent thereby. “In the ordinary
case a plaintiff’s discussions with a defendant do not postpone
the accrual of the cause of action until he is satisfied that the
defendant is going to do nothing for him.” Burns v. Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 394 F.2d 416, 417 (Ist Cir.
1968); see Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bell, 390 F.2d
612, 613-14 (1st Cir. 1968) (The rule “cannot be. . . that the
cause of action accrues only when the settlement talks break
down. This would make the policy limitation close to meaning-
less.”); see also Dolmetta v. Uintah Nat. Corp., 712 F.2d 15,
‘Palandjian properly does not assert that these and the related statements by
Pahlavi started the statute of limitations running afresh. Mass.Gen.Lawsc. 260,
§ 13. David v. Zilah, 325 Mass. 252, 255-56, 90 N.E.2d 343 (1950) (Spalding, J.).
88a
19 (2d Cir. 1983) (action for unjust enrichment due to defend-
ants’ fraudulent acquisition of stock accrued at the time defend-
ants acquired such stock).
[13] Of course, faced with Pahlavi’s motion for summary
judgment, Palandjian is entitled to have his affidavits in oppo-
sition read indulgently and this court must draw in his favor
such inferences as are reasonable to ascertain whether a genuine
issue in fact exists. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (Ist
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47
L.Ed.2d 754 (1976). Moreover, this court acknowledges that
on this record, it is a close question whether a reasonable jury
could wholly disregard the claim of duress (thus demolishing
all the other counts of the complaint — except, perhaps, Count
V) and nevertheless, based solely upon what remains, conclude
that Pahlavi was genuinely acting on Palandjian’s behalf and
only renounced her trust in 1982. Certainly, this court would
not so find.
[14] It is unnecessary, however, to determine the matter
upon the factual sufficiency of the opposing affidavits as a
more basic concern prevents a,ruling for Palandjian on the
theory advanced above. While Palandjian has every right to
plead -in the alternative, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), the time for the
maintenance of inconsistent factual positions has long since
passed when, as is the case here, the court is required to resolve
a motion for summary judgment mace after such extensive
discovery that neither party seeks to advance additional evi-
dence pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f).
Long and firmly established principles of common law
provide that . . . a man should not be permitted ‘to blow
hot and cold’ with reference to the same transaction, or
insist, at different times, on the truth of each of two
conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of
his private interests.
89a
Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims 119 (2d ed. 1850) (quot-
ing Lord Kenyon). This doctrine was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in David v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 15
S.Ct. 555, 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895), where the Court stated:
It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where
a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding,
and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not
thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prej-
udice of the party who has acquiesced in the position
formerly taken by him.
Id. at 689, 15 S.Ct. at 558.?
*In Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507, 73
S.Ct. 803, 97 L.Ed. 1206 (1953), the Callanan Road Improvement Co. had
applied to the I1.C.C. for the purchase of an amended certificate to operate
freight boats. The Commission authorized the transfer. After the transfer,
Callanan filed suit to set aside a modification of the certificate effected by the
Commission before the transfer. The Court held that Callanan was estopped
to deny the Commission's power to issue the certificate in its modified form,
stating:
The appellant cannot blow hot and cold and take now a position contrary
to that taken in the proceedings it invoked to obtain the Commission's
approval. If the appellant then had taken the position it seeks now, the
Commission might conceivably have refused its approval of the transfer.
The appellant accepted the transfer with the limitations contained in the
certificate.
345 U..S. at 513, 73 S.Ct. at 806.
Professor Moore has discussed the doctrine, sometimes referred to as “judicial
estoppel” or the doctrine of “preclusion against inconsistent positions,” as
follows:
Even where the facts will not permit the application of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the election rule against inconsistent remedies, a
party may be precluded by a prior position taken in litigation from later
90a
Since, for the reasons discussed above, Palandjian prevails
on the claim of duress, his claim based upon the alleged repu-
adopting an inconsistent position in the course of a judicial proceeding.
Though the preclusion doctrine is sometimes referred to as ‘judicial
estoppel’ or ‘estoppel by oath,’ and though it is frequently expressed in
language sounding of estoppel in pais, numerous cases illustrate the
existence of a doctrine forbidding inconsistent positions, usually as to
facts, which operates independently of equitable estoppel.
Many cases forbidding inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings
may be grouped conveniently into two classes: those where a party seeks
to contradict his own sworn statements made in prior litigation in which
he was a party or a witness; and those where the prior inconsistent
position was not taken under oath. In the first class of cases the rule
against self-contradiction is frequently said to rest upon a policy of
preserving the sanctity of the oath, while the other group of cases involves
a more general consideration of the orderly administration of justice and
regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. Both types of preclusion
seem to fall, generically, within a universal judicial reluctance to permit
litigants to ‘play fast and loose’ with courts of justice according to the
vicissitudes of self-interest.
1B Moore's Federal Practice 4 0.405(8}(2d ed. 1974) (emphasis added).
In the case Professor Moore cites for the last quoted sentence, Scarano v.
Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey, 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953), Scarano, a
raiiroad worker, had asserted in F.E.L.A. proceedings that he would be unable
to work because of injuries incurred on the job. A verdict for a sum of over
eleven times his annual salary was returned. The defendant moved for a new
trial but the case was settled before a decision on the motion was rendered for
a sum of approximately nine times Scarano’s annual salary. Subsequently,
Scarano sued for breach of his collective bargaining agreement because the
railroad refused to reinstate him. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action, stating:
The ‘estoppel’ of which, for want of a more precise word, we here
speak is but a particular limited application of what is sometimes said
to be a general rule that ‘a party to litigation will not be permitted to
assume inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions with respect to
the same matter in the same or a successive series of suits." II Freeman
on Judgments § 631 (Sth ed. 1925). Whether the correct doctrine is that
broad we do not decide. The rule we apply here need be and is no
broader than this. A plaintiff who has obtained relief from an adversar’; by
9la
diation of a constructive trust or fiduciary relationship ought
not be entertained. Indeed, even were the result different and
were the duress exception to prove unavailing, this court would
rule that the present record is insufficient to raise a genuine
issue concerning whether, after 1971, Pahlavi was other than
a party totally adverse to Palandjian’s interests.
For the reasons expressed above, however, this motion for
summary judgment must be denied.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
On August 16, 1985, this court denied the motion of the
defendant Pahlavi for summary judgment, albeit with reserva-
tions, after analyzing whether the plaintiff Palandjian’s claim
of duress was adequate to toll the relevant statutes of limita-
tions. Both parties promptly sought reconsideration, Pahlavi's
counsel correctly observing that were Pahlavi not to prevail
on her statute of limitations argument, she is nevertheless en-
asserting and offering proof to support one position may not be heard
later in the same court to contradict himself in an effort to establish
against the same adversary a second claim inconsistent with his earlier
contention. Such use of inconsistent positions would most flagrantly
exemplify that playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ which has been
emphasized as an evil the courts should not tolerate. See Stretch v.
Watson, 1949, 6 N.J. Super. 456, 469, 69 A.2d 596, 603, reversed in ;
part on other grounds, 5 N.J. 268, 74 A.2d 597. And this is more than
affront to judicial dignity. For intentional self-contradiction is being
used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for
suitors seeking justice.
203 F.2d at 512-13 (emphasis added).
See also Smith v. Montgomery Ward, 388 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 871, 89 S.Ct. 159, 21 L.Ed.2d 139 (1968); Smith v. Boston
Elevated Ry. Co., 184 F. 387 (ist Cir. 1911); Teamsters Local No. 25 v.
Penn. Transportation Corp., 359 F.Supp. 344 (D.Mass. 1973); Wood v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
92a
titled to a ruling on her statute of frauds defense to Count I
— the contract count. After further hearing, this supplemental
memorandum addresses that issue.
The Statute of Frauds Defense
Pahlavi has argued that Palandjian’s breach of contract claim
is barred by the Massachusetts statute of frauds, which gener-
ally provides that no action shall be brought upon an agreement
that is not to be performed within one year unless that agree-
ment is in writing and signed by the party charged with a
breach. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 259, § 1. According to Pahlavi,
the Kazar Shahr development could not have been completed
within one year after the alleged oral contract was made, and
therefore the contract claim is barred. Palandjian concedes that
the entire Kazar Shahr project could not have been completed
within one year, but argues that the obligations of the parties
under the alleged agreement could have been concluded within
that period. Palandjian further contends that Pahlavi is estopped
from.asserting a statute of frauds defense. Because this court
holds that the estoppel doctrine may apply to this case, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the alleged contract could have
been performed within one year.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139( 1) sets forth
the circumstances under which a defendant may be estopped
from invoking a statute of frauds defense to a claim falling
within the scope of the statute:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce the action or
forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be
limited as justice requires.
93a
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981). Section
139(2) lists several factors hich are significant in determining
“whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”
The Massachusetts courts have held that the estoppel doc-
trine may apply in the statute of frauds context. See Cellucci
vy. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722, 728, 320 N.E.2d 919
(1974) (“[A]n estoppel, if appropriately applied in this case,
would also preclude [the defendant] from asserting the affirma-
tive defense of the Statute of Frauds.”), aff'd, 368 Mass. 811,
331 N.E.2d 813 (1975). In Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.
671, 442 N.E.2d 37 (1982), the Appeals Court noted that “the
earlier Massachusetts decisions laid down somewhat strict re-
quirements for an estoppel precluding the assertion of the Stat-
ute of Frauds,” but looked to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts for a statement of the rule presently “applicable in
most jurisdictions in the United States.” /d. at 673, 442 N.E.2d
37 (applying the rule of Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 129, which is substantially similar to § 139(1), in a case
involving a contract for the sale of real estate); see Goeken v.
Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472, 474 (Ist Cir. 1985) (quoting the
Restatement § 139(1), and affirming a decision of the district
court which “assumed for the sake of argument” that Mas-
sachusetts law permitted recovery upon reasonable reliance on
an oral promise, notwithstanding the statute of frauds).
The court in Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., supra, summarized
the “essential factors giving rise to an estoppel”:
(1.) A representation or conduct amounting to a represen-
tation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part
of the person to whom the representation is made. (2.)
An act or omission resulting from the representation,
whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the
representation is made. (3.) Detriment to such person as
a consequence of the act or omission.
94a
2 Mass. App. at 728, 320 N.E.2d 919 (quoting /ndustrial
Bankers of Mass. Inc. v. Reid Murdoch & Co., 297 Mass.
119, 124, 8 N.E.2d 19 (1937)) (citations omitted); see Loranger
Construction Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App.
152, 154, 374 N.E.2d 306 (Keville, J.), aff d, 376 Mass. 757,
384 N.E.2d 176 (1978).
[15-17] Pahlavi points out that neither Palandjian’s affidavits
nor indeed the allegations in his complaint suggest fraud in
the inducement or misrepresentation. This is not essential for
estoppel to apply. “Recovery in these circumstances requires
no more than a promise on which the promisee could reasonably
have placed reliance; and attention is to be focused upon the
reasonableness of that reliance.” Loranger Construction Corp.
v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App. 152, 159, 374 N.E.2d
306, aff'd, 376 Mass. 757, 761, 384 N.E.2d 176 (1978)
(Braucher, J.) “When a promise is enforceable in whole or in
part by virtue of reliance, it is a ‘contract,’ and it is enforceable
pursuant to a ‘traditional contract theory’... .”).'
‘Pahlavi attempts to distinguish Loranger on the basis that it involved a
“promissory estoppel” theory, a doctrine which typically applies where a court
is asked to “create” a contract in the absence of consideration. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). Although the traditional “promissory estop-
pel” doctrine differs from the type of estoppel at issue here, the principles
discussed in Loranger are nonetheless relevant to this case. See Loranger, 6
Mass. App. 152, 159, 374 N.E.2d 306 (“it is doubtful that the prohibitions
of the Statute of Frauds . . . are applicable where recovery is otherwise war-
ranted on the basis of promissory estoppel”) (dictum), affirmed without addres-
sing this issue, 376 Mass. 757, 764, 384 N.E.2d 176 (1978).
If the equitable doctrine of estoppel was applied in this case, the remedy
available to the plaintiff might be restricted, even though his action at law
survived. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 90, 139 (1981) (“The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”); see also
Chedd-Angier Production Co. v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930,
937 (Ist Cir. 1985) (“Under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
adopted in its tentative form by the Massachusetts court in Loranger, damages
available under promissory estoppel range from full contract damages to reliance
or restitution damages.”). Where recovery rests solely upon the justified reliance
95a
[18, 19] Each of the factors necessary to show estoppel may
be present in this case. Palandjian has submitted competent
evidence indicating that Pahlavi made specific representations
regarding the Kazar Shahr project which reasonably induced
Palandjian to invest substantial time, money, and other re-
sources toward development of the project. That evidence, if
believed, is certainly sufficient to show that Palandjian changed
his position to his substantial detriment. Whether the elements
necessary to create an estoppel exist is an issue of fact. Moran
v. Town of Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. 679, 681, 461 N.E.2d
1231 (1984); Danielczuk v. Ferioli, 7 Mass. App. 914, 388
N.E.2d 724 (1979) (“The assertion of an estoppel raises factual
questions of reliance and reasonableness that should have been
left for resolution at trial.”). The court is not in a position to
decide at this stage of the case that estoppel cannot be shown.
For these reasons, the court rules that, upon this record, the
statute of frauds does not bar Palandjian’s contract claim.
of the promisee, without any suggestion of fraud, it would seem equitable that
such recovery be measured by the extent of the reliance interest, i.e. restitution,
rather than by conferring the benefit of the bargain. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 90 comment d. 139 comment d, 363 comment b (1981).
96a
Appendix Q.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 86-1269.
PETROS A. PALANDIJIAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ASHRAF PAHLAVI,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Coffin and Bownes, Circuit Judges.
M. Frederick Pritzker with whom Elizabeth A. Ritvo, and
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, were on brief for appeilant.
Harvey Weiner with whom Peabody & Arnold, William E.
Jackson, James E. Clapp and Milbank, Tweed. Hadley &
McCloy were on brief for appellee.
December 8, 1986
97a
COFFIN, Circuit Judge. The facts of this case are set forth
in detail in the district court’s opinion, Palandjian v. Pahlavi,
614 F. Supp. 1569, 1571-73 (D.C. Mass. 1985), and we
therefore recite them only in limited fashion as necessary for
our discussion. The primary question before us is whether
plaintiff’s allegations of duress are sufficient to avoid summary
judgment for defendant on her statute of limitations defense.
We conclude that they are not, and therefore affirm.
Appellant argues that he was prevented from filing suit for
more than a decade out of fear that doing so would result in
grave harm to himself and his family. He bases his alleged
fear on defendant’s threats and actions during the 1970-1972
period when defendant forced him to turn over to her the
Abadani Jazayer development company, the Hooraseman
Cessna distributorship and the stocks for those companies. For
example, appellant’s father, who held the stocks at his home,
testified in deposition that when defendant’s assistant de-
manded the shares, the assistant stated: “We will have you
killed,” and “If you and your son and family want to live here
without any danger give me the stocks.”
We make two assumptions for purposes of this case. The
first is that Massachusetts courts would recognize duress as
tolling the statute of limitations in at least certain situations.
See Babco Industries v. New England Merchants National
Bank, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 930, 380 N.E.2d 1327 (1978)
(“It is possible to imagine circumstances in which duress might
toll the statute... .”). But see 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of
Actions § 138 at 708 (1970) (‘“[Most courts] will not, as a
general rule, read into statutes of limitation an exception which
has not been embodied therein, however reasonable such ex-
ception may seem and even though the exception would be an
equitable one.”). Second, we assume that Massachusetts would
use a subjective standard for evaluating fear. See, e.g.,
Omansky v. Shain, 313 Mass. 129, 130 (1943) (“[T]he evidence
98a
warranted a finding that the plaintiff obtained the note by
threats that were in fact sufficient to overcome the will of the
defendant, in the condition in which he was, whether or not
they would have been sufficient to overcome the will of a
person of ordinary courage and firmness.”). See also Allen v.
Plymouth, 313 Mass. 356, 360 (1943).
Even with these assumptions, however, we can not fault
the district court’s conclusion that the facts taken in the light
most favorable to appellant are insufficient as a matter of law
to establish duress that would toll the statute of limitations.
Courts almost universally have rejected duress as a toll on the
statute of limitations when, as in this case, duress is not an
element of the underlying cause of action.' See 121 A.L.R.
1294, 1295 (1939); Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454,
464 N.Y.S.2d 803, 807 (1983). We have found only one case
in which a court tolled the limitations period in such cir-
cumstances. In Ross v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), the plaintiff was a former prison inmate
who alleged violations of his fifth and eighth amendment rights
while he was in prison. The plaintiff claimed that he did not
file the action within the statute of limitations period because
he was still on parole and feared retaliation. In support of his
fear, he cited various alleged constitutional deprivations while
he was in prison. The court, citing to precedent that “‘a limita-
tions period is tolled when a paramount authority prevents a
person from exercising his legal rights,” found these allegations
sufficient to survive dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.
Id. at 542.
Ross is helpful to appellant because it accepts tolling the
statute of limitations on the basis of duress even without an
‘ Appellant’s claims were for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrich-
ment, quantum meruit, and breach of fiduciary duty. His causes of action are
to be contrasted with cases in which parties seek to avoid apparent legal
obligations on the ground that they entered into the commitments under duress.
99a
explicit threat directed at preventing the plaintiff from filing
suit or otherwise enforcing his legal rights. Cf. Jastrzebski v.
City of New York, 423 F. Supp. 669, 673-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Nevertheless, we are convinced that Massachusetts courts
would reject appellant’s allegations as insufficient to establish
duress against the filing of a lawsuit. We reach that conclusion
because of the nature of appellant’s relationship with defendant
after 1971. Appellant had regular contact with defendant be-
tween 1971 and 1982, speaking with her by phone and period-
ically meeting with her in Geneva or New York, and during
these meetings, appellant asked about the money due him.
Appellant’s lawyer accompanied him to one of these meetings
in 1979. Thus, even though appellant repeatedly engaged in
adversary contact with defendant, raising the issue of the
money allegedly owed to him, he does not allege any threat
of harm aimed at curtailing his attempts to secure payment.
Rather, his complaint states that on two occasions, including
the meeting attended by his attorney, defendant asked for more
time to pay her debts. On neither occasion does appellant
allege that defendant threatened retaliation if he filed a lawsuit
instead of waiting for her payment.
Although the threats made between 1970 and 1972 might
otherwise suffice to establish duress against the filing of a
lawsuit, we conclude that Massachusetts would not give them
such significance in light of this subsequent history. Indeed,
it strains logic to rest a claim of duress against filing a lawsuit
on threats unconnected to appellant’s pursuit of his legal rights
when appellart in fact, repeatedly took actions similar in kind
to filing suit without provoking the slightest suggestion of a
threat. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant
would have reacted differently to the formality of filing a
lawsuit than she did to appellant’s demands for payment, in-
cluding one made while he was accompanied by a lawyer.
Even if appellant subjectively feared retaliation from defendant
100a
if he filed a lawsuit, we believe Massachusetts would rule that
he failed as a matter of law to establish that he was actually
under duress. Thus, the district court correctly granted sum-
mary judgment for defendant on this issue.
Appellant also questions the district court’s dismissal of his
claims for unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. We
conclude that the statute of limitations issue also is dispositive
of these claims because, in the district court’s words, “the
present record is insufficient to raise a genuine issue whether,
after 1971, Pahlavi was other than a party totally adverse to
Palandjian’s interest.”* Thus, these causes of action would
have arisen in 1971, and would have been time barred at the
time appellant filed his lawsuit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
*The district court did not specifically dismiss the unjust enrichment and
breach of fiduciary duty claims on statute of limitations grounds. The court
dismissed those claims on the theory that the factual basis for these claims
was inconsistent with appellant’s claim of duress. Appellant makes the argument
that it is not inconsistent to say that although property was taken by duress in
1971, Pahlavi did not unjustly enrich herself until 1982 or thereabouts when
she ceased to acknowledge that the property was his. It seems clear to us,
however, that in light of the duress involved in obtaining the property, appellant
had fully as much basis for imposing a constructive trust in 1971 as at any
time thereafter. In any event, the statute of limitations defense is a sufficient
basis for affirmance.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.