Appendix — Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co.

Supreme Court brief1987

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,

PETITIONERS,

V.

THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al

RESPONDENTS.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

J. Gusty Yearout*

Attorney for Petitioners

YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.

2700 SouthTrust Tower

Birmingham, AL 35203

(205) 326-6111

*Counsel of Record

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,

PETITIONERS,

Ve

THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al

RESPONDENTS.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

J. Gusty Yearout*

Attorney for Petitioners

YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.

2700 SouthTrust Tower

Birmingham, AL 35203

.205) 326-6111

*Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Phillips v. Amoco Oil Comany,

793 F.2G 1464 (ilth Cir. 1986) ... 175

Phillips v. Amoco Oil Company,

6i9, F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Alia. 1985) . 1

BP Wemece § 2060 4-6 es oe « st ee 8 280

a eS ee Se ee ee ee ae a ee ee yy

nae, Goce § 692-3 (1978S) «es « «© «231

Ram. Coage § G-2-39 (1975). . « « « «#31

Denial on

Petition for Rehearing . .173

619 F. Supp. 694

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

AMOCO OIL COMPANY, a

corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. CV80-L-1416-S

United States District Court For The

Northern District of Alabama,

Southern Division

June 18, 1985

This is an action seeking the

recovery of specified employee benefits,

together with compensatory and punitive

damages. It stems from the sale of a

liquid propane gas operation py defendant

Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco") to defendant

Northern Propane Gas Company ("Norgas").

The plaintiffs have cast their net wide,

BEBERERBRERBEUULEESE

alleging that the sale violated no less

than eight sections of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.

Moreover, in apparent recognition of the

fact that such a wide net is bound to

develop a few holes, the plaintiffs have

tacked on certain state law claims as

well. The jurisdiction of the Court is

invoked under 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and the

doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.+

After numerous pleading amendments

and our ckece of extensive discovery, the

legal sufficiency of these claims may now

be tested. Both Amoco’ and Norgas may

have moved for summary judgment based

upon the pleadings, affidavits,

depositions, stipulations and other

documents now on file.? Upon careful

review of the record as it now stands,

the Court is convinced that all

defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on each and every claim

asserted by the plaintiffs.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed.

In the years before 1979, Amoco operated

a business, in Alabama and elsewhere in

the southeastern United States, which

sold liquid propane gas ("LPG"). Each of

the plaintiffs in this action was an

employee of Amoco working in the LPG

Operation in Alabama. As employees of

Amoco, the plaintiffs were eligible to

participate in the employee Retirement

Plan of Standard Oil Company and

Participating Companies (hereinafter

referred to as “the Standard Plan" or

"the Amoco Plan"). Prior to May, 1979,

Amoco began to seek a purchaser for its

Southeastern LPG operations. On May 4,

1979, defendant Norgas submitted an offer

to purchase Amoco's LPG facilities in the

southeastern United States, contingent

upon approval of the Board of Directors

of its parent company. In that offer,

Norgas specifically noted that retirement

benefits for LPG employees who became

employees of Norgas would be based on

their years of service with Norgas. In

other words, Norgas' initial offer to

purchase the Amoco operation

7)

contemplated that, although years of

service with Amoco would be recognized by

Norgas for certain employee benefit

purposes, those prior years of service

would not be recognized for benefit

accrual purposes under the Nogegas

retirement plan.

By a letter dated May 10, 1979, Amoco

accepted Norgas’ offer. Amoco and Norgas

then exchanged information and negotiated

|r }

the definitive agreement. The parties

signed the final sale contract on July

34, 1979 4 Section 2.5 of the sale

contract provided in part:

Buyer [Norgas] agrees

to offer employment to each

regular full-time employee

of Seller [Amoco] presently

assigned to the business

represented by the various

assets subject to this

Contract, except employees

on long-term and/or

permanent disability...upon

-

~

}

ES ESE SESE SS SBS SBS SF SB SSS SA

the following conditions:

current salary and

appropriate salary

administration plan will be

recognized; ... retirement

benefits under the Buyer's

Retirement Income

Protection Plan will be

based on years with Buyer

except that continuous

years of service with

Seller immediately prior to

the transfer date shall be

credited by Buyer for

vesting purposes....

The saie of Amoco's LPG operations to

Norgas was closed effective 12:01 A.M. on

September 4, 1979. The former Amoco

employees, including p'aintiffs, began

their employment with Norgas on that date.

Immediately after the sale of Amoco's LPG

Operations to Norgas, each plaintiff had

the same job responsibilities and was

compensated at the same rate of pay as he

had enjoyed at Amoco. Exactly one year

later, on September 4, 1980, this action

ensued.

in this action, plaintiffs have spun

a tangled web of arguable related and

intertwined claims, portions of which are

intended to trap Amoco alone, and other

portions of which are intended to ensnare

4 The substance

both Amoco and Norgas.

of these claims ranges from the honestly

debatable to the utterly amorphous. The

plaintiffs' failure to filter out the

latter has rendered this litigation far

more burdensome and unwieldly for the

parties and the Court than it might

otherwise have been.

First, the plaintiffs allege a number

of state law claims. Thus, plaintiffs

claim that at various times Amoco made

misrepresentations regarding plaintiffs'

future job security, the security of

their employee benefits, and the

existence of plans by Amoco to divest

itself of the LPG operation, thereby

inducing plaintiffs to remain “in place"

sO aS to enhance the value of Amoco's LPG

operation as a salable "going concern."

(Pretrial Order at 10-ll). Moreover,

plaintiffs allege that they had contracts

for lifetime employment with Amoco, which

Amoco breached when it sold the going LPG

operation to Norgas and terminated

plaintiffs' association with Amoco.

Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amoco

and Norgas conspired to misrepresent

certain facts regarding the Amoco-Norgas

sale--specifically, the fact that

plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco

would not ve credited by Norgas for

Purposes of calculating retirement

benefits under the Norgas retirement plan.

(Pretrial Order at 12).

Plaintiffs contend that the terms of

the Amoco-Norgas sale and the manner in

which it was negotiated an effectuated

violated at least eight sections of

ERISA: 29 U.S.C. § 1022, § 1024, § 1056,

§ 1060, § 1104, § 1106, § 1140, and §

1141.

In the face of these allegations, the

defendants contend that based upon an

extensive record developed through four

years of ample discovery, defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to each of the plaintiffs'

claims. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court must agree with the defendants.

DISCUSSION

Ee The State Law Claims

A. Lifetime Employment Contract

The Court will first address the

State law claims, which may be disposed

of without reaching the merits. The

first of these claims concerns an alleged

"lifetime employment contract" between

plaintiffs and Amoco. Amoco has

fervently denied entering into any

lifetime employment contracts with the

plaintiffs. However, assuming for

purposes of this motion that such

contracts existed, it is apparent as a

10

matter of law that they were not breached

on the undisputed facts of this case.

Although lifetime employment

contracts are relatively rare in industry

today, they do exist and they have been

recognized by several states to be valid

and binding. Generally, of course, the

typical employment contracts which

contain no fixed period of employment are

construed as terminable at will by either

party. See Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina

Chepicai €o65; 2241) Ala. 660; 136.431

(1930). Under certain circumstances,

however, employment contracts which

purport to be terminable only at the will

of the employee will be held to create a

valid and binding contract of "permanent"

or "lifetime" employment in favor of the

ll

employee. See Alabama Mills, Inc. v.

Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939).

Nevertheless, Alabama law on this

question follows that of most other

states which recognize lifetime

employment contracts, and holds that

there are certain limitations implied by

law with regard to such contracts.

Specifically, even where a lifetime

employment contract is legally

enforceable, the law implies the

condition that the contract lasts only so

long as the employer remains in the

business for which the employee was hired

and needs the particular services the

employee was hired to perform. Alabama

Wat3e, 266 So. at FOE; FOZ. Accord,

Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418

12

So. 20 903, 906 (Ala. 1982)3 United

Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281

Ala. 264, 201 So. 2d 853, 854-55 (1967);

Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423

So. 2d 896, 898-99 (Ala. App. 1982).

In the present case, it is undisputed

that Amoco se14 i883. EOtest bee

business to Norgas, and abandoned the

retail LPG business in Alabama. Prior to

the sale, the various plaintiffs had held

positions as salesmen, sales office

Supervisors, and sales and service

representatives in various retail sales

branches of Amoco's LPG operations. °

After the sale, it is untontroverted on

the record that Amoco no longer engaged

in the retail sales of liquid propane,

and no longer needed the services the

13

6

plaintiffs had been hired to perform.

This being so, the above-cited

authorities make it clear as a matter of

law that Amoco is entitled to summary

Judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for

breach of lifetime employment contracts.

Even assuming that such contracts were

made, they were not breached, since they

terminated as a matter of law when Amoco

left the retail LPG business in Alabama.

Cf. Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc.,

423 So. 2d at 897-99.

The plaintiffs attempt in vain to

escape the burden of the long line of

precedents mandating this result. First,

the plaintiffs argue that Amoco still

does some business in Alabama, and that

even after leaving the business of retail

14

sales of liquid propane, Amoco was under

a contractual duty to transfer the

plaintiffs to some other type of work in

some other division of Amoco's operations.

Alabama Mills and its progeny are

inapplicable, they argue, because in

those cases the employer no longer had

work of any kind for the terminated

employees to perform.

The plaintiffs labor against the

current. Under Alabama law, a lifetime

employment contract lasts only so long as

the employer remains in the particular

business for which the particular

employee was hired. Thus, in Alabama

Mills, the court stated:

15

A leading case upon

[the] subject [of lifetime

employment contracts] is

Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass.

544, 46 N.E. 117...-It was

said that what they meant

by a permanent employment

was so long as defendant

was engaged in the same

nature of business and

needed the service of such

an employee, and plaintiff

was able and willing to do

it satisfactorily and gave

no cause for his discharge.

If [the employee] has

purchased a contract by

which his employer leaves

the period of duration to

him, it resembles the

purchase of other sorts of

Option rights, subject to

the limitation impiedly

included THAT the employer

shall continue in such

business and need the

things to be done, which

the employee is to do. In

other words, such employee

must have a preference over

others in doing that sort

of work.

Alabama Mills, 186 So. at 701,

(emphasis supplied).

16

702

Thus, in order for the principle of

Alabama Mills to apply, it is not

necessary that the employer go out of

business totally. Rather, it is

sufficient that the employer is no longer

engaged in the business for which the

particular employee is hired, and thus no

longer in need of the particular services

the employee was hired to perform. This

is further confirmed by the decision of

the Alabama Supreme Court in Bates v. Jim

Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903

(1982). There, the plaintiff alleged

that he had entered into a contract of

lifetime employment with the defendant.

In reliance on this alleged contract, the

plaintiff had resigned from another job.

Before she reported for work with the

17

defendant, however, “economic conditions

caused [the defendant] to institute an

austerity program, which included a

hiring freeze." 418 So. 2d at 904.

Pursuant to this program, the plaintiff

was terminated. In the plaintiff's

subsequent suit for breach of a lifetime

employment contract, the Alabama Supreme

Court affirmed the trial court's grant of

Summary judgment based upon proof that

the employer no longer needed the

services for which the plaintiff had

initially been hired, ” even though the

employer had not gone out of business

altogether. After quoting Alabama Mills,

the Court stated:

18

Thus, according to the

above definition, n

implicit term of the

employment contract wa

that the employee woul

remain employed only if

employer had need f

employee's services. |

trial court correctly f oe

that Bates was terminat:

because [the defendant

not need Bates’ services

the services of other new

employees at that time.

418 So. 2d at 906.

In the instant case, then, it 1s

legally immaterial that Amoco continued

to engage in some types of business in

Alabama following the sale of its LPG

Operations to Norgas. The salient point

is whether Amoco continued to engage in

the business for which the plaintiffs

were hired and continued to need the

services which plaintiffs were hired to

perform. As to that point, there is no

19

dispute of material fact in the record.

Following the Amoco-Norgas transaction,

Amoco was no longer in the retail LPG

business, and no longer needed*’the

plaintiffs' services as LPG retail sales

personnel. 8

Similarly flawed are the plaintiffs'

attempts to sidestep the plain import of

Alabama Mills and its progeny by claiming

that they were never told "that they

would have a job with Amoco [only] until

Amoco decided to sell its facilities."

(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,

p. 5). Under Alabama law, all lifetime

contracts terminate as a matter of law

when the employer ceases to engage in the

business for which the employee is hired.

There is no requirement that the employee

be notified of this possibility in

advance or that the term be expressed in

the contract itself? --rather, the term

is implied by law into every contract of

lifetime employment governed by Alabama

law.

The plaintiffs have adduced no

evidence tending to establish chat Amoco

continues to engage in the business for

which they were hired, and no evidence

that Amoco continues to need the services

which plaintiffs were hired to perform.

Thus, based on the record before the

Court, it is clear that there exists no

genuine issue of material fact with

regard to the plaintiffs' claims for

breach of lifetime employment contracts.

21

The Court concludes that defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to these claims.

B. The Fraud Claims

The plaintiffs next allege two

discrete claims of fraud--one against

Amoco alone and the other against both

Amoco and Norgas. First, the plaintiffs

allege fraud with respect to their

continued employment by Amoco. In

substance the plaintiffs contend that

Amoco falsely represented that the LPG

Operation would not be sold, that

plaintiffs' jobs and benefits were

secure, and that benefits would only be

lost if plaintiffs voluntarily terminated

their employment with Amoco or if

plaintiffs failed to properly perform

22

their jobs. (Pretrial Order at

10-12), 10 Second, plaintiffs allege

that Amoco and Norgas conspired to

defraud the plaintiffs by misrepresenting

material facts concerning the terms of

the Amoco-Norgas sale (Pretrial Order at

ib ge Specifically, plaintiffs claim that

defendants conspired to misrepresent the

fact that plaintiffs' years of service

with Amoco would not be credited by

Norgas in calculating plaintiffs'

retirement benefits under the Norgas

retirement plan. As will be

demonstrated, both of these fraud claims

are legally deficient.

ls Fraud Concerning Continued

Employment with Amoco.

23

Turning first to the claim of fraud

with respect to plaintiffs' continued

employment with Amoco, it is apparent

from the record that these claims are

barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. Fraud actions are governed

by a one-year statute of limitations

under the law of Alabama. Ala. Code

¥

(1975) § 6-2-39. See also Papastefan v.

B & L Construction Co. of Mobile, 385 So.

2d 966 (Ala. 1980). However,

[iJn actions seeking

relief on the ground of

fraud where the statute has

created a bar, the claim

must not be considered as

having accrued until the

discovery by the aggrieved

Seaentee OF the = Fe:

constituting the fraud,

after which he must have

one year within which to

prosecute his action.

24

Ala. Code (1975) § 6-2-3.

In applying this "savings

statute"

f°} 2s oe eng <

constituting the fraud' is

deemed to have been

discovered when it ought to

have been discovered; that

ig, @€ the: tie: of - the

discovery of facts which

would provoke inquiry by a

person of ordinary prudence

and which, if followed up,

would have led to the

discovery of the fraud.

Moore v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 434

So. 24 751, 7354 (Aiea. - £903} ¢ GNOt ing

Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co.,

inc.,., 3853 S060. 2@ 986 (aAi@. i999).

Accord, Pines v. Warnaco, Inc., 706 F.2d

1173 (llth Cir. 1983); Sexton v. Liberty

National Life Ine. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 21

(Ala. 1981); Seybold v. Magnolia Land

Co., 376 SO. 24@ 1083, 1087 {Bias £3793).

In other words, the statute of

y

Ce one 2 ee o£ fraud and

misrepresentation effectively begins to

run when the plaintiff "has either actual

knowledge of the violation or notice of

facts which, in the exercise of due

diligence, would have led to actual

knowledge thereof." Cf. First Federal

Savings and Loan Ass'n of Miami v.

Mortgage Corp. of the South, 650 F.2d

£376, A378 (A5CR Cit. Unit B i862).

hecoerte, Wittevutt vv. Union O11 Co. of

California, 432 So. 2d 1217 (Ala. 1983);

Moulder v. Chambers, 390 So. 2d 1044 (Ala.

1981); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Griffin,

357 So. 26 sae) 1esa. i973}: Jennson Vv.

Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 389,

281 So. 24 636 (1973): State Security

Life Ine. CO. Ve Benson, 288 Ala. 497;

26

262 So. 264 745 (287235 See also Moss v.

Davitt, 244 Ala. S13; S32 fa. 2a S25

(233 27. More specifically, where (as

here) the alleged misrepresentations

related to future actions or conduct of

the defendant, the Alabama Supreme Court

has neld tnat the limitations period will

be deemed to have commenced at the time

"{wlhen Plaintiff first learned that

Defendant did not intend to perform as

represented." Retail, Wholesale and

Department Store Employees Union, Local

453 v. McGriff, 398 So. 2d 249, 252, (Ala.

1981). Accord, Fuqua v. Barbe, 376 So.

2d 202, 203-04 (Bid. CiVa Bee

cert. denied 376 806. 22 25. (2...

1979),21

27

In the case sub judice, Amoco's

alleged representations that the LPG

operations would not be sold, and that

plaintiffs' jobs and benefits would not

be lost or terminated, were clearly

representations concerning future actions

or conduct of the defendant. Since it is

undisputed that all plaintiffs had actual

knowledge that Amoco did not intend to

perform as represented--no later than

August 21, 1979,!% the statute of

limitations on these claims expired, at

the latest, on August 21, 1980. McGriff,

aoe: S66 24 at 252. Fuqua v. Barbe, 376

So. 2d at 203-04. Since this lawsuit was

not filed until September 4, 1980, these

claims of fraud concerning job and

benefit security with Amoco are clearly

28

time-barred under Ala. Code (1975) §§

6-2-39 and 6-2-3.

Plaintiffs insist, however, that

their causes of action for fraud relating

to their continued employment with Amoco

did not accrue until September 4, 1980,

when the sale was officially closed and

they ceased to be employed by Amoco.

Although the plaintiffs did not allege

that these representations induced them

to accept employment with Amoco in the

first place, they do assert that they

relied on Amoco's representations

concerning their continued employment by

Staying "in place" in their jobs. Even

though they were aware of the

Amoco-Norgas sale by August 21, 1979, the

plaintiffs insist that they suffered no

29

legal injury as a result of their

previous reliance on Amoco's

misrepresentations until they were

actually taken off the Amoco payroll.

It is generally true, as plaintiffs

assert, that damage is an essential

element of a fraud action. "In equity,

as at law, with the exception of special

cases in some jurisdictions, fraud will

not be relieved against unless it is

shown that injury resulted or will result

to the complainants as a consequence of

said fraud." Smith v. Smith, 94 So. 2d

863, 868 (Ala. 1957) (emphasis supplied).

However, as McGriff and Fuqua make clear,

where the fraud alleged involves

representations of intended future action

or conduct by the defendant, the statute

30

of limitations begins to run when

the plaintiff first learns that the

defendant does not intend to perform as

represented, regardless of whether the

plaintiff's injury has already resulted

or whether it is only substantially

certain to result at a specified time in

the future. Thus, in McGriff, the

plaintiff claimed that he was told by his

plant manager and his union steward that

he would receive a pension benefit at age

55 if he “stayed on the payroll" for 15

years and joined the union, and that in

1959 in reliance of those

representations, he accepted employment

with the defendant company and joined the

defendant union. In 1970, plaintiff was

injured during the course of his

31

employment. Thereafter, he was paid

workmen's compensation benefits for

approximately six years by his employer's

workmen's compensation carrier, but

remained on the payroll and received one

annual vacation pay check for each of the

years 1971 through 1975. In 1973,

plaintiff learned that the employer had

ceased making payments into the pension

fund on his behalf in 1970. In 1978, the

plaintiff sued the employer and the union

for breach of contract and fraud.

However, despite the obvious fact that

McGriff would not have been eligible to

receive pension benefits until sometime

after 1975, the Supreme Court of Alabama

held unequivocally that his cause of

action for fraud accrued in 1973, when it

32

became clear that he would not be paid a

pension in the future as promised:

When Plaintiff first

learned that Defendant did

not intend to perform as

represented, the statute

began to run. Fugua (sic)

v. Barbe, 376 So 2d 202

(Ala. Civ. App. 1979),

cert. denied 376 So. 2d 205

(Ala. 1979). Consequently.

appellee's cause of actio”

First accrued when he

received the letters above

set forth, representing

Appellant's position

Vis-a-vis Appellee's right

to a pension. From that

Gate, January 24, 1973,

Plaintiff had one year

within which to file his

cause of action bottomed on

allegations of fraud by

a 8 Pp @a 2 @ 42 8 * B

officers....-Plaintiff's

complaint, to which the

fraud claim was added by

amendment was filed in

April 1978, far beyond the

one year after discovery

period allowed by § 6-2-3.

33

McGriff, 398 So. 2d at 252.

The same rule was stated in Fuqua v.

Barbe. There, plaintiff alleged fraud as

to a promise to repair defective

construction. The plaintiff had given no

consideration in exchange for this

promise, and had not altered his position

to his detriment. The court held that

defendant was entitled to judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, because

plaintiff's fraud claim was untimely.

The court stated:

The fraud of defendant claimed

by plaintiff is not the extent

of an original defective

performance in construction,

but is the making of a

commitment to repair such

defects which he did not intend

to perform. When plaintiff

first learned that defendant

did not intend to perform as

represented, the statute began

to run.

34

376 So.2d at 203-04 (footnote omitted;

emphasis supplied).

These cases control as to the fraud

allegations relating to continued

employment of the plaintiffs by Amoco and

the receipt of Amoco employee benefits.

the alleged misrepresentations related to

future performance by Amoco. Even if the

representations were made as alleged by

plaintiffs, all of the plaintiffs knew by

August 21, 1979, that Amoco did not

intend to live up to the representations.

They knew then that Amoco had sold the

LPG operation to Norgas, and they knew

that they would be terminated by Amoco.

Therefore, the statute of limitations on

this fraud claim began to run no later

than that date.13 The present lawsuit

was filed on September 4, 1980, and this

35

fraud claim is therefore untimely as a

matter of law.

Even if the date of injury is the

relevant date, however, the plaintiffs'

claims are still barred. It must be

remembered that the claim we are

concerned with here is a fraud claim, not

a breach of contract claim.}4

The damage

which is essential to a fraud action is

damage "proximately resulting from

[plaintiff's] reliance." First Virginia

Bankshares of Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1313

(Sth Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S.

952 (1978)(emphasis supplied); Ellis v.

Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151, 1157-59 (N.D.

Ala. 1976), affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th

Cie. BEtt hs In the case at hand, the

only reliance alleged by plaintiffs is

36

that they remained "in place." (Pretrial

Order at 11-12; Transcript of February

25, 1985 Hearing at 21). However, the

plaintiffs have consistently failed to

identify any damage they might have

suffered which could fairly be said to

have proximately resulted from this “act"

of reliance. Certainly the loss of Amoco

employment and benefits did not result

from their staying "in place." Indeed,

if the plaintiffs had not stayed “in

place," they would still have lost their

Amoco benefits and their status as Amoco

employees. Therefore, even if the

plaintiffs are correct - that even where

the fraud alleged concerns assurances of

Future action by the defendant, the

statute of limitations does not begin to

37

run until the plaintiff suffers damage as

a proximate result of his reliance on the

misrepresentations-their claims are

barred. The loss of their jobs did not

proximately result from plaintiffs'

reliance on the defendant's period. To

the extent that staying "in place" did

constitute damage or result in damage of

some other kind to the plaintiffs-for

instance, the deprivation of an

Opportunity to negotiate the terms of the

Sale or to seek other employment? -

that damage must have occurred prior to

August 21, 1979, when the plaintiffs

learned of the sale. After that time,

the plaintiffs could not have acted or

failed to act in justifiable reliance

upon any representations by Amoco

38

concerning the security of their jobs and

benefits or the existence of plans to

sell the LPG operation. It seems, then,

that the plaintiffs are posed a conundrum

of sorts. Either the fraud allegedly

perpetrated upon them did not proximately

result in damage to them at all, in which

case their claims fail for lack of an

essential element, or the plaintiffs

suffered damage prior to August 21, 1979,

and their claims are time-barred.!®

Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs

suffered some damage as a proximate

result of their reliance upon the alleged

misrepresentations concerning future

employment with Amoco, the Court

concludes that Amoco is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law with respect

39

to this fraud claim based upon the

Statute of limitations.

2. Fraud Concerning the Terms

of the Amoco-Norgas Sale.

With regard to the common law claims

for fraud and conspiracy to defraud made

against both Amoco and Norgas, the

plaintiffs allege that Amoco "did

fraudulently misrepresent ... that years

of service would be accumulated toward

retirement, [and] that retirement

benefits and the right to early

retirement would be protected."

(Pretrial Order at 10). Plaintiffs also

allege that Amoco and Norgas conspired to

misrepresent material facts about the

terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale in order

to “deceive the employees about the fact

40

that years of service for retirement and

pension purposes would not transfer to

Norgas." (Amended Complaint of June 25,

1982, at par. 6; see also Pretrial Order

ae 227. In other words, the thrust of

these claims is that Amoco and Norgas

misrepresented of failed to disclosel/

the true terms of the Norgas benefit plan

and the plaintiffs' rights under that

plan.

Viewed in this light, it becomes

plain that no recovery may be had upon

these state law fraud claims unless the

right to such recovery arises under ERISA.

Section 514 o£ S82isSs. 2.22

1144(a), preempts all state laws that

"relate to" any employee benefit plan:

41

Bzcept as provided in

subsection (b) of this section,

the“ erevisions of this

subchapter and subchapter III

of this chapter shall supersede

any and all state laws insofar

as they may now or hereafter

relate to any employee benefit

plan described in § 1003(a) of

this title and not exempt under

§ 1003(b) of this title.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis supplied).

The only state laws expressly exempted

from ERISA's broad preemptive sweep are

those laws regulating insurance, banking

and securities, and criminal laws of

general application. 239 @.9.Cs. §

1144(b).

_—_ een: Of €£his. e2zpftess

Congressional declaration of preemptive

intent, the Court need not determine

whether and to what extent state law

fraud and misrepresentation principles

might conflict with or alter the

42

requirements of ERISA. See Brown v.

Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders

International Union Local 54, U.S. ;

82 L.Ed.2d 373, 382-83 (1984); Fidelity

Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. De La

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). The

import of the statutory language cannot

be mistaken. As the Supreme Court

Stated in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,

Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), ERISA was

"Meant to establish pension plan

administration as exclusively a federal

concern."

Recently, in Shaw v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 463 0.8. 83, (i983), the

Supreme Court confirmed ERISA's broad

preemptive sweep and further confirmed

that the term "relate to" as used in the

43

Act was to be given a liberal and broad

interpretation. As noted by the Court,

it was the intent of Congress to

eliminate all possibility of conflict

with state law principles and to make the

field of employee benefit plans

exclusively federal in nature. 463 U.S.

at 99-100, 105. Indeed, Congress

considered and rejected a proposal to

limit the preemptive scope of the statue

to the specific areas and issues

concerning employee benefit plans

directly regulated by ERISA's express

provisions, reasoning that "[s]Juch a

formulation raised the possibility of

endless litigation over the validity of

State action that might impinge on the

federal regulatory scheme." Shaw v.

44

Delita Air Lines, Ine., 463 U.S. at

99-100, n.20 (9183), quoting 120 Cong.

Rec. 29942. See also Hewlett-Packard Co.

v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-1300

(N.D. Cal. 1977), affirmed 571 F.2d 502

(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.

831 (1978); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust

Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1130-31, n.4

(E.D. Pa. 1977), affirmed 582 F.2d 1273

raee CiGs 2278) ¢ thus, the settled

construction of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) is

that it preempts not only state laws

dealing with subject matters directly

covered be ERISA, but also any state laws

which “relate” either directly or

indirectly to an employee benefit plan.

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. at

98-100; Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten,

45

Inc., 451 U.S. at 525. Accord, Wadsworth

v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1977),

cert. denied 435 U.S. 980 (1978)3

District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row

Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.

N.Y. 1983). See generally American

Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. of

New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784 (2d

Cir. 1983); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept. of

Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 599

F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied

444 U.S. 1031 (1980).

In the instant case, it is clear

that the state law claims of fraud and

conspiracy to defraud relating to the

terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale are

preempted. As noted above, the trust of

these claims is the failure to accurately

46

report or disclose the terms of the

Norgas benefit plan and the plaintiffs’

benefit rights following the sale. Thus,

it can hardly be disputed that, insofar

as state law fraud principles are

relevant here, they relate to the

administration of an employee benefit

plan governed by ERISA and are thus

preempted./® See Justice v. Bankers

8Q@itai FP. Supp.

(CV-83-L-5188-NE)(N.D. Ala. April 19,

1985)(state law claims of fraud based

upon suppression of material facts

relating to employee benefit plan

preempted by ERISA); District 65, UAW v.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 576 F.

Supp. at 1487 (state common law claims of

fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and

47

tortuous interference with contact

preempted by ERISA); Ogden v. Michigan

Bell Telephone Co., 571 S. Supp. 520,

(E.D. Mich. 1983) (state common law fraud

claim dismissed as preempted by ERISA);

Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp.

745 (N.D. Ga. 1983)(state law

misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary

duty claims preempted by ERISA); Ziskind

v. Retail Clerks International

Association, 3 E.B.C. 1012, 1014-1015

(E.D. Cal. 1982)(state cause of action

for negligent misrepresentation preempted

by ERISA). f. Russell v. Massachusetts

Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.

1983), cert. granted U.S. oe}

L.Ed.2d 29 (October 2, 1984) 1? (state

law tort claims for negligent and

48

intentional infliction of emotional

distress preempted by ERISA); Dependahl

v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208

(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S.

968 (1981)(state common law tortuous

interference with contract claim

preempted by ERISA); Kelly v. IBM, 573 F.

Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affirmed 746

F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1984)(state law

wrongful discharge claim preempted by

ERISA); UAW v. Dyneer Corp., 4 E.B.C.

1486, 1488 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affirmed 747

F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1984)(various state

law claims, including tort claim for

conversion, preempted by ERISA); Shaw v.

Association of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653

(C.D. Cal. 1983)(state common law breach

49

of contract claim preempted by ERISA).

Indeed, in the present case, it is

important to note that the plaintiffs’

claims of misrepresentation and

conspiracy to misrepresent deal with an

area already specifically regulated by

ERISA-namely, reporting and disclosure of

plan terms, provision of information to

participants, the content of plan

descriptions, and so on. See e.g., 29

U.S.C. §§ 1021 through 1030. To allow

plaintiffs to pursue the present common

law claims of misrepresentation would

bring to pass the very result which

Congress intended to prohibit - the

possibility of inconsistent state law

regulation of matters relating to the

administration of employee benefit plans.

50

For these reasons, the Court finds

that plaintiffs' state law claims of

fraud and conspiracy to defraud relating

to misrepresentation or nondisclosure of

material facts about the crediting of

Amoco service under Norgas ERISA plans

are indeed preempted. Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to these claims.29

= or née 223732. © ieee

Having thus disposed of the

plaintiffs state law claims, we now come

to the core of this lawsuit. Although

the sale of Amoco's LPG facilities had

all the earmarks of a routine business

transaction, plaintiffs insist that

insofar as their employee benefits were

concerned, the terms of the sale and the

51

manner in which it was accomplished

violated several provisions of the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et

seq. The primary theme of these ERISA

claims is that Amoco and Norgas violated

a supposed duty under ieRISA to effect the

LPG sale on terms that would ensure that

years of service with Amoco would be

credited in calculating benefits under

Norgas benefit plans.

ERISA is a comprehensive and

reticulated statute designed to prescribe

minimum vesting and accrual standards for

Gualifying employee retirement benefit

plans; to establish minimum rules for

employee participation and plan funding;

to delineate fiduciary standards for pla"

52

managers; and to otherwise ensure that

legitimate +=mployee pension expectations

are not @a@aeteeted. As ¢ oes Vy

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,

S11 (1981). For purposes of the issues

presented here, the pertinent portion of

ERISA is Subchapter I of the Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144.

ERISA divides employee benefits

covered by the Act into two categories:

(1) pension benefits (referred to herein

as "retirement" benefits); and (2) all

other benefits (including, for example,

medical and disability). 23 UGC. §

1002(1)-(2). The Act terms the second

category "welfare" benefits. For both

categories of benefits, retirement and

welfare, ERISA imposes certain

53

disclosure and reporting requirements

(Subchapter I, Part 4, set forth at 29

0.8.¢C. $§ 2101-1114). Sethete most

importantly, ERISA requires that employer

plans providing both categories of

benefits be established and maintained in

writing, 29 0.8.C. § 1102(a), and that

the rights conferred by the terms of such

written plans are enforceable by the

participants as a matter of federal law.

29 U.S.C. § 1132.

In addition, for certain but not all

retirement benefits, ERISA imposes

minimum requirements for the

participation in and the vesting of

benefits under retirement plans

(Subchapter I, Part 2, set forth at 29

U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061) and for the funding

54

of plans to ensure that assets are

available to pay the retirement benefits

when the time comes (Subchapter I, Part

3, set forth at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086).

These participation, vesting, and funding

requirements are not applicable to

welfare benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§

10S i, ASS ct eats The vesting

requirements for retirement benefits

apply to what the particular plan

establishes as the "normal retirement

benefit" that will be paid at the "normal

retirement age". 29 UsS.C."§ 105344}.

With whatever "normal retirement benefit"

the particular plan establishes as the

reference, ERISA sets minimum benefit be

attributed to the employee as a function

of his years of participation in the plan

55

(which, for present purposes, may be

considered to be his years of service

with the employer). 29 U.S.C. § 1054.

ERISA's minimum vesting standards require

that after a number of years of service,

an employee's "right" to whatever accrued

benefit he has earned to that time cannot

be forfeited even though his service with

the employer terminates before he reaches

what the particular plan defines as the

"normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C. §

1053.

A retirement benefit that is vested

may still be “contingent" in several

important respects. 29 U.S.C §

1053(a)(3)(A)-(D). In particular, a plan

may permissibly provide that vested

benefits are not payable until normal

56

retirement age and, if the employee dies

before that time, his benefit, while

vested, generally need not be paid. See,

e.g., Hernandez v. Southern Nevada

Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust,

662 F.2d 617, 619-620 (9th Cir. 1981).

On the other hand, welfare benefits and

the so-called “ancillary"™ retirement

benefits, including early retirement

benefits such as plaintiffs complain of

in this case, may be "contingent" in a

much more persuasive sense -- ERISA

does not require that such benefits be

vested and nonforfeitable. Sutton v.

Weirton Steel Division of National Steel

Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, > - » £4 2.GEs

2387 (1984); Petrella v. NL Industries,

57

Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1364-1366 (D.

N.J. 1982). Accordingly, an employee's

"rights" to such benefits may be

forfeited entirely if his service with

the employer is terminated before he

becomes eligible under the plan's terms

for payment of such benefits. Petrella

v. NL Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. at

1364-65.

It is equally important to note that

ERISA does not require that employers

provide employee benefits at all; does

not confer a general right to continued

employment in order to earn vested

retirement benefits or to become eligible

for other benefits; and does not mandate

the level or amount of such benefits.

58

([A]n employer has no

affirmative duty to provide

employees with a pension plan.

H.Rep. No. 93-807, 93rd Cong.,

2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in

U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News,

4670, 4677. In enacting

ERISA, Congress continued its

reliance on voluntary action

by employers by granting

substantial tax advantages for

the creation of qualified

retirement programs. Id.

Neither Congress nor the

courts are involved in either

the decision to establish a

plan or in the decision

concerning which benefits a

plan should provide. In

particular, courts have no

authority to decide which

benefits employers must confer

upon their employees; these

are decisions which are more

appropriately influenced by

forces in the marketplace and,

when appropriate, by federal

legislation.

Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement

Program, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir.

1984

S.Ct.

), cert. denied U.S

’

105

786 (1985)(emphasis in original).

59

Accord Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahnattan,

Inc., 451 U.S. at S511, 512-14.

A claim of wrongful denial or

deprivation of employee benefits under

ERISA involved a two-pronged inquiry:

(1) is the action or conduct complained

of contrary to the terms of the plan

itself? (2) are the terms of the plan or

the conduct complained of independently

violative of ERISA's substantive

requirements?

In this case, the answer to the

first question is undisputed. The

Standard Plan itself did not confer upon

plaintiffs a right to guaranteed or

continued employment with Amoco in order

to earn retirement benefits. Rather, the

Plan expressly provided that:

Nothing contained in this

Plan shall be construed as a

contract of employment between

an employer and any employee,

Or as a right of any employee

to be continued in the

employment of an employer.

(Webb Affidavit, Ex. A at § 14.07,

Appendix in Support of Amoco's Motion for

Summary Judgment at A354). Nor did the

terms of that plan require that Amoco

arrange for plaintiffs' years of service

with Amoco to be credited for all

purposes under the retirement plan cf any

future purchaser of the LPG operation.

Nor do plaintiffs contend that there was

a forfeiture of any vested retirement

benefit to which they were entitled under

the Standard Plan. Rather, those

plaintiffs who were vested under the

Standard Plan at the time of the sale of

the LPG operation to Norgas are

61

receiving, at their option under that

plan, an annuity based upon their length

of service with Amoco. (Pretrial Order

at 9). 21 Finally, plaintiffs have never

even alleged that the terms of any other

benefit plan available to employees of

Amoco were violated by the Amoco-Norgas

sale.

Accordingly, despite plaintiffs'

generic allegations that the Amoco-Norgas

transaction deprived them of “benefit

rights," their claim that the

Amoco-Norgas agreement could have been

more generous in its benefit provisions,

standing alone, has no force in law.

Because nothing in the plans available to

Amoco employees required otherwise,

plaintiffs' complaints that their years

62

of service with Amoco are not credited

for all purposes under Norgas' retirement

plan and their related complaints about

the effect of the sale on their pension

rights are legally immaterial unless

ERISA forbids the arrangement agreed upon

by Amoco and Norgas. Apart from the

specific restrictions set forth in the

Statute, "ERISA permits the total benefit

levels and formulas for determining their

accrual before completion of 15 years of

service to vary from plan to plan."

Alessi, 451 U.S at 513-14. Thus, because

there is no allegation of breach of the

terms of any plan available to them as

Amoco employees (or for that matter, any

Norgas plans), plaintiffs' claims fail as

a matter of law unless the Amoco-Norgas

63

ae ee & &

7

> =

sale violated one or more of ERISA's

specific restrictions.

The plaintiffs claim that several

ERISA's specific substantive provisions

have in fact been violated on the facts

of this case:

(2?) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

and Norgas violated or conspired to

violate 29 U.S.C. § 1060(b)(2) by failing

to credit plaintiffs' prior years of

service with Amoco for purposes of

benefit accrual under the Norgas

retirement plan.

(2) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

and Norgas violated or conspired to

violate 29 U.S.C. § 1056 by interfering

with plaintiffs' possible future

64

attainment of early retirement benefits

under the Amoco plan.

(3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

(acting in concert with Norgas) violated

a fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104

to act solely on behalf of the plan

participants in negotiating the terms of

the sale insofar s those terms affected

the plaintiffs' benefits under the Amoco

plan.

(4) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

(acting in concert with Norgas) violated

29 U.S.C. § 1106 by engaging in a

transaction involving the plan on behalf

of parties whose interests were adverse

to the interests of plan participants,

and by dealing with the assets of the

plan in their own interests.

65

3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

and Norgas violated or conspired to

violate 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140 and 1141 by

interfering with rights or the attainment

of rights to which plaintiffs might have

become entitled under the Amoco plan.

(6) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

(but not Norgas) violated the reporting

and disclosure requirements of 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1022 and 1024 by failing to disclose

the circumstances and modifications which

might result in disqualification,

ineligibility, denial or loss of benefit

under the Amoco plan.

In short, the plaintiffs have

invoked every section of ERISA which is

even colorably applicable to the facts of

this case. As will be seen, however

66

these ERISA violations are more easily

pleaded than proved. Although ERISA's

substantive provisions have been

systematically invoked and clothed in

verbiage and allegations which carefully

track the tent of the Act, in each

instance the plaintiffs proceed from

faulty premises and inadequate

foundations of fact. Consequently, each

of their claims under ERISA fails as a

matter of law. 22 We will proceed to

address each claim separately.

A. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1060

The plaintiffs insist that by

failing to credit their prior years of

service with Amoco in calculating the

accrual of benefits under the Norgas

plan, Amoco and Norgas violated 29 U.S.C.

67

§ 1060. That section provides in

pertinent part:

(bo) For purposes of this part

and part 3 -~

e2 in any case in which

the employer maintains a plan

of a predecessor employer,

service for such predecessor

shall be treated as service

for the employee, and

(2) in any case in which

the employer maintains a plan

which is not the plan

maintained by a predecessor

employer, service for such

predecessor shall, to the

extent provided in regulations

prescribed by the Secretary of

68

the Treasury, be treated as

service for the employer.

29 U.S.C. § 1060{b).

This provision forms a crux of this

entire controversy, for the heart of the

plaintiffs' case is and always has been

their claim that they should receive

Credit for their years of service with

Amoco for purposes of computing benefits

under the Norgas retirement plan.?23

Plaintiffs allege that defendants

Violated this provision of ERISA by

failfing] to maintain the

predecessor plan so that

years of service would be

treated as years with

Nersg9eeés o£ ion the

alternative to maintain a

Separate plan from the

predecessor plan but to

have years of service in

69

ye

the predecessor corporation

(Amoco) treated as years of

service for the employer

(Norgas) ({29 U.S.C. §]

1060).

(Pretrial Order at 14).

The allegaticn "in the alternative"

notwithstanding, subsection (b)(1) is

irrelevant to this case. i ae

undisputed that Norgas and its employees

were part of a pre-existing plan. Apart

from the fact that about 400 people (out

of a total of approximately 56,000) left

the Standard Plan due to the Norgas sale,

the sale had no effect on the Standard

Plan. Nothing in the words of §

1060(b)(1) requires that the plan of a

predecessor employer actually be

maintained by a successor employer,

either "in the alternative" to the

70

requirements of subsection (b)(2) or

otherwise. Rather, the plain words of

Subsection (b)(1) provide only that

Service with a predecessor employer

"Shall be treated as service" with a

Successor employer if the successor

elects to maintain the plan of the

predecessor. Moreover, that plain

meaning is confirmed by the legislative

history. See House Conference Rep. No.

93-1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code

Cong.& Ad.News 5038, 5047 ("[sJlervice

with a predecessor employer must be

counted for purposes of the plan if the

Successor employer continues to maintain

the plan of the predecessor employer...")

(emphasis supplied). Where, as here, a

predecessor plan is not maintained by a

71

successor employer, § 1060(b)(1) is

4

simply inapplicable. -

Nor is Section 1060(b)(2) the oasis

that plaintiffs would like it to be. The

language of subsection (b)(2) requires a

successor employer to credit an

employee's years of service with a

predecessor employer for purposes of

determining that employer's retirement

benefits only if and to the extent the

Secretary of Treasury issues regulations

requiring such service to be credited.

Since the Secretary of Treasury has never

required, by regulation or otherwise,

that such service be credited, it is

clear from the statutory language that,

for now at least, such service need not

be credited by a successor employer.

72

Whether the failure to promulgate

regulations requiring successor employers

to credit service with a predecessor

employer has been a conscious policy

decision in the part of the Secretary or

not, the plain import of § 1060(b)(2) is

that Congress chose to vest the Secretary

with the discretionary authority to

decide if and to what extent such service

should be credited. Unless and until the

Secretary requires otherwise, Congress

obviously chose as a matter of policy not

to require prior service with a

predecessor employer to be taken into

account in calculati:.g benefits under the

Successor employer's separate retirement

plan.

73

Plaintiffs' claim under § 1060(b)(2)

in essence asks this Court to construe §

1060(b)(2) as if it read: “service for

such predecessor shall be treated as

service for the employer except as

regulations prescribed by the Secretary

of the Treasury otherwise allow." While

Congress could easily have drafted the

subsection that way, it chose not to do

so. Rather, it provided that service

with a predecessor shall be treated as

service with a successor only "to the

extent provided" by any affirmative

regulations the Secretary of Treasury

might choose to promulgate. This Court

is bound by the Congressional directive

embodied in the clear language of the

statute, absent a clearly expressed

74

legislative intention to the contrary.

See Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,

Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); American

Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463

U.S. 855, 77 L.Ed.2d 1072, 1078 (1983);

North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S.

300, 312 (1983); Consumer Product Safety

Commission v. GET Sylvania, Inc., 44/7

U.S. 102, 108 (1980); United States v.

640.00 Acres of Land in Dade County,

Florida, — F.2d (No. 82-5510)

(llth Cir. April 3, 1985); Scarborough v.-

OPM, 723 F.2d 801, 812 (llth Cir. 1984).

There is nothing in ERISA" sS

legislative history to cast doubt upon

the plain meaning of the statute, much

less anything amounting to “a clearly

expressed legislative intention to the

75

contrary." American Bank & Trust Co. Vv.

Dallas County, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1078. The

House Conference Report declares quite

simply that except where the successor

employer maintains the plan of a

predecessor employer, the question of

whether service with the predecessor is

to be credited is left entirely to the

determination of the Secretary of

Treasury:

Service with a predecessor

must be counted for

purposes of the plan if the

successor employer

continues to maintain the

plan of the predecessor

employer.... The question

of the extent to which such

service must be counted in

other circumstances is to

be determined under

regulations.

House Conference Report No. 93-1280,

76

reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News at 5038, 5047, 5052. Other portions

of the legislative history make it even

clearer that § 1060(b), standing alone,

does not require the crediting of prior

service with a predecessor employer:

[W]here the employee moves

from one employer to

another the ancillary

benefits (which are

usually on a contingency

basis) would often be

provided by the new

employer, whereas the new

employer would not provide

pension benefits based on

years with the old

employer.

House Report No. 93-807, reprinted in

1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4670,

4726.

Apparently, only one court has

addressed the issue of a successor

employer's obligation to credit prior

years of service with a predecessor

employer for retirement benefit purposes.

In Vorpahl v. Union Oil Co. Retirement

Plan, 4 E.B.C. 2565 (D. Minn. 1983),

affirmed F.2d (No. 83 2528 (8th

Cir. December 14, 1984), the court

analyzed the issue and concluded that a

successor employer is not required to

credit an employee's years of service

with a predecessor employer for purposes

of determining that employer's benefits

under the successor employer's pension

plan. However, rather than focusing its

inquiry on Section 1060(b)(2), the

Vorpahl court looked to Department of

Labor regulations defining "year of

78

service." This regulation states in

pertinent part:

§ 2530.204-l. Year of

Participation for Benefit

Accrual

kkk

(6b) Service Which May be

Disregarded for Purposes

Of Benefit Accrual. (1)

In calculating an

employee's period of

service for purposes of

benefit accrual under a

defined benefit pension

Plan, § 204(b)(3) [29

U.S.C. § 1054(b)(3)] of

the Act and § 411(b)(3)

of the [Internal Revenue]

Code permit the following

S09 5 6.6 ts be

disregarded: service

before an employee first

becomes a participant in

the plan;

29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1(b) (1976). Thus,

not only has the Secretary of Treasury

chosen not to issue regulations requiring

79

an employee's service with a predecessor

employer to be credited in calculating

retirement benefits under the successor's

own plan, but the Department of Labor

regulation defining "year of service"

expressly permits an employer to

disregard an employee's service before he

becomes a participant in its pension plan.

See Vorpahl, 4 EBC at 2575. Therefore,

since plaintiffs were not participants in

the Norgas retirement plan during their

prior years with Amoco, Norgas is under

no statutory obligation to credit their

years of service with Amoco for purposes

of calculating their Norgas retirement

benefits.

Finally, in response to plaintiffs'

apparent argument that this Court should

80

fashion such a requirement, it is

important to note the very real dangers

involved in such an endeavor. In the

first place, judicial exercise of the

authority delegated to the Secretary of

Treasury would contravene the language of

the statute and the principles of

Statutory construction discussed above,

as well as the clearly expressed

legislative intent of Congress that the

"question of the extent to which such

service must be counted. ..is to be

determined under regulations." House

Conference Report No. 93-1280, 1974 U.S.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 5038, 5047, 5052.

Furthermore, settled legal principles

dictate that courts may not exercise the

authority to promulgate legislative rules

81

that a statute delegates to an

administrative agency or other rulemaking

body. See, @.0@., Sierra Club v.

Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d

1165, Tis CTtn Cif. 2993). See also

Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of

Engineers, U.S. Army, 356 F. Supp. 14, 18

(S.D. N.Y. 1973) (“where Congressional

action has provided an administrative

process for the resolution of particular

subjects, great respect must be paid to

the presumptive exclusivity of that

process").

From a more practical viewpoint, the

creation of crediting requirements by a

court under § 1060(b)(2) would involve

numerous questions of policy, the

resolution of which would have

82

consequences far beyond the case at hand.

Requiring a successor employer to credit

an employee's years of service with a

predecessor employer could frustrate the

very purpose of ERISA. In large part,

ERISA was enacted to protect and secure

the viability and desirability of

employer-established retirement programs

for employees. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 4639; S. Rep. No.

383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974

U-~S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4890.

However, requiring a successor employer

to credit an employee's years of service

with a predecessor employer for

retirement purposes would dramatically

increase an employer's cost of operating

83

a retirement benefit plan for its

employees, since the successor would be

required to immediately fund a retirement

plan much more heavily whenever it adds

employees previously covered umder a

predecessor employer's plan. Faced with

this dilemma, many employers might choose

not to establish or continue a retirement

plan rather than incur the significant

cost of funding an employee's years of

service with a predecessor employer.

Alternatively, the employer may simply

choose not to hire the employees of the

predecessor .29 In either event, the

employees in question would be adversely

affected--i.e., they would either lose

their retirement plan or lose their jobs.

Surely Congress could not have intended

such a severe result. Thus, it may not

be altogether surprising that the

Secretary of Treasury has chosen not to

issue regulations imposing such a credit

requirement. © This Court is hardly

competent to second-guess such decisions

of Congress and its delegates on

difficult questions of legislative policy.

The function of this Court is to apply

the statutes, not to rewrite them.

In short, unless and until the

Secretary of Treasury prescribed

Otherwise, Section 1060(b)(2) does not

require a successor employer to credit an

employee's service with a predecessor

employer?/

in calculating the employee's

retirement benefits under the successor's

separate retirement plan. Accordingly,

85

the defendants are entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law with respect to the

Section 1060(b) claims.2®

B. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1056

Plaintiffs next contend that by

entering into the Amoco-Norgas sale

defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1056,

inasmuch as they interfered "with the

rights of the plaintiffs in the

attainment of service requirements

necessary to obtain early retirement

peietiees* (Plainti€tis* Brief in

Opposition to Defendants' Motions for

Summary Judgment at 37). This claim is

specious. This section of ERISA is quite

limited in scope and effect. It provides

in pertinent part:

86

a Each pension

plan shall provide that

unless the participant

Otherwise elects, the

payment of benefits under

the plan to the participant

Shall begin not later than

the 60th day after the

latest of the close of the

plan year in which--

(1) the date on which

the participant

attains the earlier of

age 65 or the normal

retirement age

specified under the

plan,

(2) occurs on the 10th

anniversary of the

year in which the

participant commenced

participation in the

plan, or

(3)the participant

terminates his service

with the employer.

In the case of a plan

which provides for the

payment of an early

retirement benefit,

Such plan shall

provide Saat a

87

participant who

: satisfied the service

requirements for such

early retirement

1 benefit, but separated

from the service (with

any nonforfeitable

4 right to an accrued

benefit) before

satisfying the age

requirement for such

‘ early retirement

benefit, is entitled

upon satisfaction of

: such age requirement

to receive a benefit

not less than the

| benefit to which he

would be entitled at

the normal retirement

age, actuarially

q reduced under

regulations prescribed

by the Secretary of

7 the Treasury.

29 U.S.C. § 1056(a). In short, § 1056

7 merely requires that if a plan provides

; early retirement benefits, an employee

who has satisfied plan requirements as

to years of service shall be entitled to

88

receive an actuarially reduced benefit

upon reaching the early retirement age

specified in the plan, even if that

employee leaves the employer's service

prior to attaining early retirement age.

It is important to recognize that

neither ERISA in general nor § 1056 in

particular require a plan to provide

early retirement benefits at all.

Moreover, even if an employer does

provide early retirement benefits, §

1056 itself does not confer upon plan

participants any substantive right to

continued employment in order to meet

service requirements and qualify for

early retirement benefits under the

terms of the particular plan.

89

In the present case, it is undisputed

that the terms of the Amoco plan go well

beyond the minimum requirements of §

1056 by giving terminated employees the

option to receive actuarially reduced

benefits immediately upon their

termination rather than requiring that

the terminated employees attain the

early retirement age specified in the

plan before receiving vested early

retirement benefits. It is also

undisputed that all plaintiffs who were

vested under the Amoco plan elected that

option and are currently receiving such

payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).

With this in mind, it is piain that the

claim of a violation of § 1056 has no

Support whatsoever on this record. The

90

plaintiffs are apparently laboring under

the misapprehension that ERISA in

general and § 1056 in particular provide

comprehensive protection of the inchoate

interests of employees in such unfunded,

contingent benefits. Such is not the

case. Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 724

F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied

U.S. » 104 S.Ct. 2387

(1984).

Because Section 1056 confers no

substantive right to continued

employment in order to earn vested

rights to early retirement benefits, the

defendants are entitled to judgment on

the Section 1056 claims as a matter of

law.2?

91

C. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C.§ 1104

Plaintiffs next contend that Amoco

and Norgas violated their fiduciary

duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104. That

provision of ERISA provides in pertinent

part:

Subject to sections

1103(c) and (d), 1342, and

42344 .@£ <6 £44304 «a

fiduciary shall discharge

his duties with respect to

a plan solely in the

interest of tre

pat &i@ 4-364 te and

beneficiaries and... for

the exclusive purpose of:

(i) providing benefits

to participants and

their beneficiaries;

and

( 2,43 defraying

reasonable expenses of

administering the plan

92

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). PlaintiffS base

their claims of a violation of this

section upon the following allegations:

Amoco dealt with the

plan and the assets of the

plan in its own interests

and not in the interests of

the plan participants in

that it received more money

for the facilities by not

transferring years of

service and/or the

accumulated benefits of the

participants in the plan to

Norgas and further were

allowed to keep and

maintain the additional

Sums of money in the plan

for the use of other

participants, including

itself, to the damage of

plaintiffs.

(Pretrial Order at 16). In other words,

plaintiffs' theory with respect to their

§ 1104 claims is quite similar to the

Substance of their § 1060 claims: they

claim that in negotiating the terms of

93

the sale of its LPG operation, Amoco was

under a fiduciary duty to ensure that

plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco

would be credited for all purposes undec

the Norgas retirement plan, and that

Amoco's failure to arrange a sale

transaction meeting these standards

violates the statute. Furthermore,

although plaintiffs admit that Norgas was

not a fiduciary with respect to the Amoco

plan and hence owed no direct fiduciary

duties to olaintiffs as beneficiaries of

that plan, 29.5 they contend that Norgas

is liable for assisting Amoco in the

commission of a breach of Amoco's

fiduciary duties. Cf. Donovan v.

Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 411 (S.D.

Ala. 1982) (holding that nonfiduciaries

94

may be accountable under ERISA for

breaches of fiduciary duty which they

help promote). 30

Plaintiffs' claim under § 1104 is

without merit. The fiduciary duty

provisions of ERISA are not implicated

in the sale of a business or a portion of

a business merely because the terms of

the sale will affect the terms and

conditions of contingent future

retirement benefits.

This is lucidly illustrated by the

related cases of Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 567 F.

Supp. 1184 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), and Dhayer

. Weirton Steel Division of National

Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. W.Va.

1983), both of which were affirmed in

Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied i P

104 6.Ctsc 2387 (1984). In Sutton and

Dhayer, plaintiffs included both union

and non-union employees of National

Steel's Weirton Steel Division. There,

as here, the plaintiffs challenged the

sale of a division of their employer's

business and the terms of the underlying

transaction on the grounds that, as a

result of ‘the sale, their non-vested

retirement and early retirement benefits

and other contingent benefits would be

adversely affected. Specifically, the

terms of the sale provided that the

seller's existing benefit plan would be

amendec so that the sale itself would not

96

trigger entitlements to different types

of early retirement and severance pay

benefits. See Sutton, 724 F.2d at 409.

As in the present case, the plaintiffs

were to become employees of the successor

employer, and their eligibility for early

retirement benefits was to be more

limited than under the predecessor

employer's plan. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at

1190; Dhayer, S71 fF. Gene. St 32.

There, as here, the employees alleged

that avoidance of pension and welfare

benefit obligations was the employer's

motive in agreeing to the sale and its

terms. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1198;

Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.

Because the cases were being decided

On summary judgment, the district court

specifically assumed as true "that

avoiding future pension obligations was

the sole motivation of [the

employer-seller]." Sutton, 567 F. Supp.

at 1198; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.

Nevertheless, the court squarely rejected

the plaintiffs' claim that, under § 1104,

National Steel h§8d a fiduciary obligation

to act solely in the interest of

beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of

the sale. In so holding, the court noted

that ERISA simply does not prohibit a

company from eliminating previously

offered benefits which are neither vested

nor accrued. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at

1196, 1200; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 324,

328-29. Accord Petrella v. Nels

Industries, 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1365-66

98

iD. BiJa 1382) « Likewise, the court

held, there is no requirement that

day-to-day corporate business

transactions, which may have a collateral

effect on prospective, contingent

employee benefits, be performed solely in

the interest of plan participants:

When acting on behalf of

the pension fund, there is

no doubt that [an employer

who is also a fiduciary

with respect to a plan]

must act solely to benefit

part ieipaents2 aad

beneficiaries. However, it

is the Court's opinion here

that when a corporate

employer negotiates the

terms of the sale of a

division, whose employees

are participants in a

pension plan, the

negotiations that affect

the terms and conditions of

future benefits (at least

EROS (FRA are, aot

protected by ERISA'sS

ie oer Sat ole tee ee and

99

neon Cette Caset ait

provisions), do not

implicate fiduciary duties

as to the pension fund.

Such negotiations are

distinct from actually

administering a plan and

conducting transactions

affecting the monies and

property of the plan's fund.

In other words, the mere

fact that a company has

named itself as pension

plan administrator or

trustee does not restrict

it from pursuing reasonable

business behavior in

negotiations concerning

pension benefits not

otherwise affected by the

requirements of ERISA. See

NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453

Ges SOLs S22 Bede wee

(1981).

Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer,

571 F. Supp. at 328-29. Accordingly, the

district court granted summary judgment

in favor of the employer-seller.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit

affirmed. After noting the district

100

court's assumption that National Steel's

sole motivation for the sale was avoiding

future pension obligations, the appellate

court held first that ERISA does not

require the vesting and nonforfeitability

of early retirement and other ancillary

benefits. The court further held that

ERISA does not impose any fiduciary

obligations on an employer to maintain

and protect future contingent benefit

rights in negotiating the sale of a

division:

Congress ... has not

prohibited an employer who

is also a fiduciary from

exercising the right

accorded other employers to

renegotiate or amend, as

the case may be, unfunded

contingent benefits payable

before the normal

retirement age. The

changes, accomplished in

101

this matter, are not to be

reviewed by fiduciary

standards.

724 F.2d at 410-411.

Considering the Weirton Steel

decisions in the context of the present

case, it is clear that plaintiffs' claims

under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 are without merit.

As noted in the previous discussion of 29

U.S.C. § 1060, infra, ERISA presently

imposes no requirement that service with

a predecessor employer be credited in

calculating benefits under the

successor-employer's plan. Thus, neither

Norgas nor Amoco violated ERISA in their

capacity as employers by failing to

include such a provision in the sale

agreement. Moreover, despite the fact

that the sale obviously had certain

102

effects upon plaintiffs' benefits under

the Amoco plan, clearly neither Amoco nor

Norgas had any fiduciary duty under ERISA

to act solely in the plaintiffs'

interests in negotiating the terms upon

which the LPG operations were to be sold.

A contrary holding would mean that every

corporate business decision which had any

possible collateral effect on pension

benefits would have to be made "solely in

the interests of pension plan

beneficiaries and participants." Cf.

Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200; Dhayer, 571

F. Supp. at 328. At least insofar as

contingent future benefit rights are

concerned, Congress clearly could not

have intended such a pernicious result.

103

The Court finds the Weirton Steel

cases persuasive and controlling, and

agrees that "when a corporate employer

negotiates the sale of a division, whose

employees are participants in a pension

plan, the negotiations that affect the

terms and conditions of [non-vestecd

future pension benefits ... do n

implicate fiduciary duties as to tne

pension fund." Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at

1201; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 328.

Plaintiffs have cited no contrary

authority even arguably on point.

If Congress explicitly considered

the question of whether successor

employers must credit service with a

predecessor employer, and left the

question to be determined under Treasury

Regulations, it would seem clear that

Congress could not have intended § 1104

to implicitly require such crediting in

any event. The plaintiffs' theory under

§ 1104 would seem to render § 1060(b)

essentially redundant, even under their

Own reading of the latter provision.

Based upon the foregoing discussion,

then, the Cou es Finds that

defendants?!

are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law with respect to the

Claims made under 29 U.S.C. § 1104.

D. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1106

Plaintiffs next allege that Amoco and

Norgas violated 29 U.S.C. § 1106, which

provides, inter alia:

(a) ss

105

(i) A fiduciary with

respect to a plan shall not

cause the plan to engage in

a transaction, if he knows

or should know that such a

transaction constitutes a

direct or indirect --

(A) sale or exchange, or

leasing, of any property

between the plan and a

party in interest;

(D) transfer to, or use by

or for the benefit of, a

party in interest, of any

assets of the plan;

(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan

shall not --

(1) deal with the assets of

the plan in his own

interest or for his own

account,

(2) in his individual or in

any other capacity act in

any transaction involving

the plan on behalf of a

party (or represent a

party) whose interests are

adverse to the interests of

the plan or the interests

106

of its participants or

beneficiaries, or receive

any consideration for his

Own personal account from

any party dealing with such

plan in connection with a

transaction involving the

assets cf the plan.

29 U.S.C. § i106.

Plaintiffs contend that Amoco was a

fiduciary with respect to the Amoco Plan

and that by selling the LPG operations

without ensuring that service with Amoco

would be credited for all purposes under

the Norgas retirement plans, Amoco acted

in a "transaction involving the plan" on

behalf of parties whose interests were

adverse to the interests of plan

participants and beneficiaries; dealt

with the assets of the plan in its own

interests; and caused the plan to emerge

107

in a transaction which indirectly

aan nee 8 penefkit"™ to a

party-in-interest -- namely Amoco. This,

say the plaintiffs, constitutes a

prohibited transaction under §1106.22

Although the plaintiffs have

attempted to couch their allegations in

the language of the statute itself, it is

DBliain that § 1106 applies only to

transactions to which the plan itself is

a party or in which the monies, property

or fiscal assets of the plan are

involved, and it has been construed

accordingly. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 567

F.Supp. 1184, 1199 (N.D. W.Va. 1983);

Dhayer v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316,

108

327 (N.D. W.Va., 1983) [both affirmed in

Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied 0.8, >

L046 8. Ct. 2387 (1984)i. Accord, Donovan

v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).

Congress did not intend an expansive

interpretation of Section 1106. Evans v.

Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1500 n.3 (llth

Cit. 1963).

In the present case, the

evidence stands uncontroverted that the

Standard Plan was not a party to the

Amoco-Norgas transaction (See Affidavit

of William C. Jackson). Nor did the LPG

facilities involve any transfer of the

109

funds or assets held by the Standard Plan.

(Id).

Plaintiffs' only effort to

establish evidentiary support for the §

1106 claim is their contention that

"Amoco did receive more money for the

[LPG] participants in the plan to Norgas."

(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

at 41; see also Pretrial Order at 15-16).

However, the evidence is undisputed that

no funds or property held by the plan

were transferred, and plaintiffs were not

deprived of any benefit required to be

vested and nonforfeitable by ERISA.

Indeed, plaintiffs admittedly received

all benefits to which they had already

become entitled under the terms of the

110

Standard Plan by the time of the sale and

their consequent termination of

employment with Amoco. As a matter of

law, Amoco's contingent future liability

for non-vested benefits -- i.e.,

plaintiffs' inchoate interest in their

"years of service" with Amoco for

purposes of the putative benefits to

which they might have become entitled had

they continued to work for Amoco -- did

not itself constitute an "asset" of the

plan for purposes of § 1106, so as to

prohibit Amoco from dealing with those

contingent liabilities in its own

interest or in ways adverse to the

interests of plan participants and

beneficiaries. See Sutton v. Weirton

Steel Division of National Steel Corp.,

111

724 F.2d at 411-412. As noted above, the

mere fact that an employer also acts as a

plan fiduciary does not restrict it from

pursuing reasonable business behavior in

negotiating the sale of a division, even

though the terms ultimately agreed upon

modify or eliminate the contingent rights

of transferred employees to benefits

under the seller's ERISA plan which are

neither vested nor accrued. Sutton, 567

F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer 571 F. Supp.

at 328-29. See also Sutton, 724 F.2d at

41l.

Because there is no evidence

that the Standard Plan was a party to the

Amoco-Norgas sale or that fiscal assets

of the Standard Plan were involved in the

transaction, there exists no genuine

112

issue of material fact as to plaintiff fs'

Claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1106.

Therefore, as to these matters,

defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter ot law.

E. The Claim Under 29 U.S.C. § 1140

The next arrow in the plaintiffs'

crowded quiver is 29 U.S.C. § 1140:

It shall be unlawful for any

person to discharge, fine, Suspend,

expel, discipline, or discriminate

against a participant or beneficiary

for exercising any right to which he

is entitled under the provisions of

an employee benefit plan [or] this

titie. . . or for the purpose of

interfering with the attainment of

any right to which such participant

may become entitled under the plan

[or this title]...

The plaintiffs contend that by agreeing

to the sale of the LPG operation on terms

that did not assure the crediting of

service with Amoco for all purposes under

the Norgas retirement plan, Amoco and

Norgas unlawfully “discriminated against

the plaintiffs for the purpose of

interfering with the attainment of the

rights to which the plaintiffs might

[have] become entitled under the [Amoco]

Plan." (Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition

to Defendants' Motions for Summary

Judgment at 25-26).

The plaintiffs misapprehend the

purpose of Section 1140. That provision

is not intended to prohibit the sale of

114

going businesses or to require a

Successor employer to credit service with

a predecessor employer -- indeed, any

such construction would render 29 U.S.C.

§ 1060 rather meaningless. Nor is

Section 1140 intended to impose a

fiduciary duty on employers to act solely

in the interests of plan participants and

beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of

sale of a business or division. Such

matters are the province of Sections 1104

and 1106, which as discussed above, do

not impose such a duty. See Sutton v.

Weirton Steel Division, 724 F.2d 406, 410

(4th Cir. 1983) cert. denied i ’

104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984). Rather, Section

1140 is intended simply to prohibit

discriminatory harassment or adverse

115

treatment of a particular employee which

amounts to or threatens “constructive

discharge," and which is carried out for

the purpose cf interfering with the

employee's attainment of future benefits

or punishing the employee for the

exercise of protected rights. West v.

Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).

This meaning is confirmed by the

legislative history of the provision:

Most collective bargaining

agreements protect employees against

discharge without good cause and

provide effective enforcement

machinery in arbitration proceedings

whose results are enforceable under

section 301 of the Labor-Management

Relations Act. But roughly half of

116

all pension participants ere not

unionized and so they lack

protection. Especially vulnerable

are managers and executives whose

Substantial pension potentialities

provide an incentive to their

discharge before vesting. The

managers of the bill ought to think

twice too. Discipline and

discrimination can be so unpleasant

as to amount to constructive

discharge, a term used by the

National Labor Relations Board.

That can be the type of harassment

which does not say that one is

fired, but makes living such a hell

that a person wishes he did not have

to hang on and endure.

117

In recognition of the problem,

section 610 of S.4 as originally

reported -- made it illegal to

"discharge, fine, suspend, expell

[sic], discipline or discriminate"

against plan participants to defeat

rights under the act or a plan. The

language parallels section 8(a)(3)

of the National Labor Relations Act

and should do the trick -- but only

if an adequate enforcement machinery

exists.

119 Cong. Rec. 30374 (views of Senator

Hartke, speaking on behalf of his

proposal that the Secretary of Labor be

direct to establish administrative

procedures for enforcing the provision

that became 1140)(emphasis supplied).

118

See also West v. Butler, 621 F.2d at 245;

Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons,

anc., 680 F.2d 911, $16-)9 cae .Cie.

1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1039 (1982)

("this section is designed to prevent

unscrupulous employers from discharging

Or harassing plan participants in order

to keep them from realizing their vested

pension rights").

The undisputed facts of this case

establish that there was no harassment or

discriminatory treatment of the

plaintiffs amounting to the kind of

"constructive di schartrge* or

"discrimination" prohibited oy 22. Bi hC.

§ 1140. Indeed, the only evidence of

"discrimination" relied upon by the

plaintiff in this connection is the mere

119

:

4

|

;

;

fact that as a consequence of the sale,

they were "prevented from attaining [the

benefit] rights toward which they had

been working as employees of Amoco."

(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

at. 283-0 However, that consequence is

part of nearly every sale or termination

of a going business or division. ERISA

simply does not require that every

purchaser of a going concern credit

service with a predecessor employer for

purposes of the successor's separate

plan, nor does it require that a

successor's plan be identical in every

respect to the predecessor's. Certainly

Section 1140 contains no such

requirement, express Or implied. Here,

120

as in Aronson v. Servus Rubber Division

of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12 (lst Cir.

1984), cert. denied, U.S. , -e2

S. Ct. 431 (1984), the plaintiffs' claim

is grounded upon

a misreading of a section which

relates to discriminatory conduct

directed against individuals, not to

actions involving the plan in

general. The problem is with the

word "discriminate." An overly

literal interpretation of this

section would make illegal any

partial termination, since such

terminations obviously interfere

with the attainment of benefits by

the terminated group, and, indeed,

are expressly intended so to

121

interfere. Such cannot be the

intent of the section, where the

Statute expressly recognizes partial

terminations. ag

1343(b)(4)( incorporating Tax Code

Geeemaceome, 26 UsS.C. § 411(d)(3)).

This is not to say that a plan could

not be discriminatorily modified,

intentionally benefiting, or

injuring, certain identified

employees or a certain group of

employees, but a partial termination

cannot constitute discrimination per

se. A termination that cuts along

independently established lines --

here separate divisions -- and that

has a readily apparent business

justification, demonstrates no

122

invidious intent. . . Nor can

Plaintiffs claia they were

discriminated against with respect

to participants in defendants'

[other] operations that [were] not

being [sold]. . . We cannot regard

it as discriminatory for defendant

to make voluntary contributions to

continuing employees to maintain

their morale, but not to make such

to departing employees of the

admittedly profitless, wound-up

branch of its business.

Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.

In the present case, the

uncontroverted evidence adduced by the

defendants establishes that the sale was

motivated by legitimate business concerns.

The evidence on this point reveals that,

prior to the sale, Amoco conducted

profitability studies of the LPG

operation. This study revealed that the

LPG operation was not sufficiently

profitable, and would be even less

profitable in the future. This was

primarily because, as a major refiner,

Amoco was subject to Department of Energy

regulations that limited the price it

could charge for liquid propane.

(Exhibits 265-289, Appendix in Support of

Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at

Al169-A183). The price limitations did

not apply to non-refiners, and for that

reason, the LPG operation would be more

valuable and profitable if owned by a

non-refiner. (Exhibit 834, Appendix in

124

Support of Amoco's Motion for Summary

Judgment at A198). The approval of sale

by Amoco's parent, Standard Oil Company

(Indiana), was based upon these facts.

(Exhibit 265, Appendix at A169; Exhibit

267, Appendix at Al7l).

The plaintiffs do not attempt

to controvert these facts. Indeed, the

plaintiffs have stipulated that Amoco

sought to sell the LPG operation for

business reasons. (Pretrial Order at 5).

However, the plaintiffs contend that

because Amoco received offers from other

prospective purchasers which were lower

than the Norgas offer but included an

offer to credit years of service with

Amoco for all purposes under the buyers'

retirement plans, Amoco must have

125

accepted the Norgas offer "for the

purpose of interfering" with the

plaintiffs' attainment of future benefit

rights in violation of Section 1149.

Moreover, say the plaintiffs, since

Berges was a@ patty to & his

"discrimination," Norgas is also liable.

The plaintiffs' theory distorts

the plain meaning of Section 1140.

Indeed, if the plaintiffs' theory were

accepted, Section 1060(b) would be little

more than a redundant appendage in the

text of ERISA, since Section 1140 would

generally have the effect of requiring

employers to sell their businesses on

terms that protect employees' inchoate

interests in non-vested benefits under

the seller's plan. Neither the express

26

language of Section 1140 nor its

legislative history reveals any such

Congressional intent.34 The plain fact is

that neither ERISA in general nor Section

1140 in particular was intended to outlaw

the termination of contingent future

liabilities such as those involved here

pursuant to the sale of the entire

division or operation of the employer's

business. see Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.

Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division, 567

FP. Supp. 1134, 1198 (N.D. W.Va. 1983)

(even assuming that avoiding future

pension obligations was the employer's

sole motivation for selling a division of

its operations in a manner which

adversely affected contingent employee

benefits, the sale did not violate

ERISA); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division,

724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied U.S. » 2064 S.Ct. 2287

(1984) (making same assumption in

affirming summary judgment). Moreover,

the fact that the LPG employees were

terminated when the LPG operation was

sold, whereas employees in other Amoco

divisions or operations which were not

sold were retained and continued as

participants in the Amoco plan, simply

does not establish the kind of

discrimination prohibited by Section 1140.

Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16. The termination

of plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was

merely an incidental result of an

entirely legitimate business transaction

128

which ERISA was not designed to regulate

Or prohibit.

Because there is no evidence on

the record of any discrimination or

adverse treatment within the prohibitions

of Section 1140, the defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to these claims?>

F. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1141

Proceeding directly in the face

of all existing precedent as well as the

plain language of the statute itself,

plaintiffs next claim a right to recover

under 29 U.S.C. § 1141, which provides,

inter alia:

ft shall be unlawful for any person

through the use of fraud, force,

violence, or threat of the use of

Id.

force or violence, to restrain,

coerce, intimidate or attempt to

restrain, coerce or intimiaate any

participant or beneficiary for the

purpose of interfering with or

preventing the exercise of any right

to which he is or may become

entitled under the plan [or] this

title. . . Any person who willfully

violates this section shall be fined

$10,000 or imprisoned for not more

than one year, or both.

This section of ERISA is clearly a

criminal statute designed to supplement

1140 by giving law enforcement officials

the right to prosecute individuals who

fraudulently or coercively interfere with

an employee's rights under a pension plan.

As every court which has addressed the

question has concluded, Section 1141

provides no private right of action

whatsoever, but simply allows for

Criminal prosecution of certain egregious

forms of conduct already prohibited by

Section 1140. See, e.g., West v. Butler,

621 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980);

Maxfield v. Central States, Southeast and

Southwest Areas Health, Welfare and

Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D.

Tll. 1982). Thus, plaintiffs' Section

1141 claim is devoid of legal merit and

is due to be dismissed. Enforcement of

Section 1141 is the exclusive prerogative

of the Attorney General. See, West v.

Butler, 621 F.2d at 244.

G. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1022

131

Section 1022 of ERISA requires that

a “summary plan description" be filed

with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C.

1022(a). The plan description and

summary plan description are required to

contain, among other things,

The name and type of administration

of the plan;. . . the plan's

requirements respecting eligibility

for participation and benefits; a

description of the provisions

providing for nonforfeitable pension

benefits; [and] the circumstances

which may result ion

disqualification, ineligibility or

denial or loss of benefits.

29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Plaintiffs contend

that by failing to disclose in the plan

132

the description the circumstances which

might result in their loss of employment

of the possibility that the LPG Operation

might be sold, Amoco violated the duty

imposed by Section 1022 to disclose "the

circumstances which may result in

disqualification, ineligibility, or

denial or loss of benefits."

The plaintiffs have no viable

Claim under Section 1022. That section

requires only a description of the plan

itself, a..d what general circumstances

would cause a loss of eligibility for

benefits under the terms of the plan.

see generally 29 <2 6% §

2530.102-3(4)-(1) (Department of Labor

regulations implementing § 1022). The

Summary plan description provided by

133

Amoco more than adequately satisfied

those requirements. It repeatedly refers

to the fact that eligibility for benefits

will be lost if employment is terminated,

and describes the various rights the

employee will have under the different

benefit plans if that occurs. Thus, the

description of the "Retirement Plan"

States that “all regular, full-time

employees of the company are covered."

(Exhibit 1 at 30, Appendix in Support of

Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at

Al62). If further states that

In order to enjoy the full benefits

of this plan, you must "retire" from

the company. You are retired or not

retired depending on your status

when you leave the company. You are

134

"retired" if you leave the company

-- at age 65; or

~~ at any time beginning at age 55;

when your age plus years of service

add up to 75; or

-- at any time for approved

disability or with company consent

Py geeeting certain, Se

requirements.

(Id). Immediately following the

foregoing, it states in bold-face type

that:

If you have not satisfied any one of

these requirements when you leave

the company, you will be a

"terminated employee" and not

135

BHEREeHEHhhe es &

EU iT le Ee a

entitled tc full benefits of the

plan.

(Id). The description goes on to state

that "[i]f you leave the company before

you have satisfied the requirements for

retirement, you will be entitled only to

the benefits of a terminated employee --

with these benefits based on your years

of company service." (Exhibit 1 at 33,

Appendix at Al63). It then describes in

detail the retirement benefits to which a

terminated employee is entitled.

(Exhibit 1 at 33-34, Appendix at

Al63-Al164).

In view of the foregoing, there

clearly was no breach by Amoco of its

duty under § 1022 to describe

"circumstances which may result in

136

disqualification, ineligibility, or

denial or loss of benefits." The summary

plan description clearly indicates the

possibility that employment could be

terminated, and that termination prior to

the satisfaction of specific requirements

would result in the loss of eligibility

or denial of benefits in specific

respects. Section 1022 imposes no duty

for a summary plan description -- which,

again, is designed to summarize the terms

of the plan -- to go further anc

enumerate all imaginable future external

events which could cause the termination

of employment, be it the employee's poor

job performance of insubordination, the

company's poor economic condition caused

by increased competition or a declining

demand for the company's product, a

decision to abolish a particular job, or,

as here, a decision to sell the business

to another company.

There being no genuine dispute

of material fact as to the 1022 claims,

the Court concludes that defendants Amoco

and Bearden are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.36

H. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1024

Finally, the plaintiffs claim

that Amoco's decision to sell the LPG

facilities was a plan "modification or

change which Amoco should have reported

to the Secretary under the requirements

ot. .029. Uchetuch) 6 t084-" (Plaintiffs'

Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment at 36). Again, this

138

claim is utterly specious. The

undisputed evidence establishes that LPG

Sale did not involve any change,

amendment or modification of the terms of

any of Amoco's benefit plans. Rather,

plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was

Simply terminated at the time of the sale.

Plaintiffs received all benefits to which

they were entitled at the time under the

terms of the existing plan, and

non-terminated employees had the same

rights under the plan as before the sale.

In short, the sale effected no

modification in the terms of the Amoco

plan or the conditions for eligibility

under the plan; it simply effected a

termination of the employment of the

plaintiffs and other LPG employees, 37

139

Consequently, Amoco was not obligated to

report the sale as a modification in the

terms of the plan under Section 1024.°8

For these reasons, defendant Amoco

is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law with respect to the claims made under

29 U.S.C. § 1024.39

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing

analysis, the Court concludes that as to

each and every one of the plaintiffs’

claims, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact, and that defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The plaintiffs' attempts to convert a

routine business transaction into a

series of state and federal wrongs are

based upon severely strained

140

interpretations of law to which this

Court cannot accede. An appropriate

order will be entered.

DONE this 18th day of June,

1985.

14]

FOOTNOTES

1. The defendants have also

asserted diversity jurisdiction under 28

0.82C« 8 1332, 2d the sdeetrive of

fraudulent joinder jurisdiction.

2. Joe D. Bearden, a resident of

Alabama and a former employee of Amoco,

is also named as a defendant in this

action. Bearden has joined in Amoco's

motion for summary judgment. The

plaintiffs have not attempted to

distinguish between Amoco and Bearden for

purposes of this motion, nor will the

Court do so.

1 42

3 This action was Oriyinally

brought by the named plaintiffs as a

Class action. However, to date, no class

has been certified. At the request of

counsel, and with their mutual assent,

the Court has proceeded to address the

Summary judgment motions at this time.

4. None of plaintiffs' claims are

made against Norgas alone.

- - See Pretrial Order at 6,8.

6. See Affidavit of Larry J. Boyd.

7. This was one of two alternative

bases for the Supreme Court's affirmance,

the other being that no lifetime contract

existed in any event. See Bates, 418 So.

2d at 906.

8. Plaintiffs have alleged that

Amoco did in fact transfer some

managerial employees formerly employed in

the LPG operation to other Amoco

divisions and operations in Alabama.

This is of little relevance to the legal

issue at hand. For our purposes, Amoco

was under no contractual duty to transfer

particular employees to new positions

unrelated to the work for which they were

initially hired. See Alabama Mills;

Bates. However, nothing in Alabama Mills

or its progeny prohibits an employer from

voluntarily transferring and retaining

employees where it is feasible to do so.

9. The rule of Alabama Mills should

not be confused with the defense of

“impossibility of performance." As noted

in City of Albertville v. United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F.2d 594

144

(Sth Cir. 1959), Alabama law has

traditionally refused to recognize the

"impossibility of performance" as a

defense to a contract action, subject to

certain limited exceptions. See also

Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620 (Ala.

1979); Capital Fertilizer Co. v.

Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co., 202 Ala. 92, 79

So. 464, 487 (1918). In the case at

hana, however, Amoco does not rely on an

"impossidility of performance" defense.

Rather, Amoco relies on the fact that the

contracts, if they exist at all,

terminated by virtue of their own terms

(albeit terms implied by law) when the

LPG operation was sold.

10. In addition to this claim for

fraud against Amoco as an entity,

plaintiffs have also claimed that "[t]he

defendant Amoco Oil Company by and

through its agents, servants, and

employees and executives conspired to

defraud the plaintiffs" with respect to

the security of their jobs and benefits.

(Pretrial Order at 12). This allegation

fails as a matter of law. Under the law

of conspiracy in general, the law of

Alabama in particular, a civil conspiracy

to commit a tort requires a combination

of two or more persons and cannot exist

between a corporation and its agents or

employees, since the acts of agents and

employees acting within the line and

scope of their employment are considered

the acts of the corporation itself. See

Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,

1 46

Inc., 200 F.2d 91l, 914 (5th Cir. 1952),

cert. denied 345 U.S. 925 (1952) ;

Tuskegee Institute vy. May Refrigeration

COo., Inc., 57 Ala. App. 344, 328 So. 24

598 (1976), affirmed in part, reversed in

part on other grounds 344 So. 2d 156 (Ala.

1977). Accord, Girard vy. 94th St. &

Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2¢@ Cit.

1976), cert. denied 425 U.S. 974 (1976);

Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,

332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.

denied 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Zelmger vy.

Uvalde Rock Asphalt COe, 316 F424 47

(lOth Cir. 1963); Jewel Foliage Co. v.

Univlora Overseas Florida, iIne., 497. .P.

Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980). This is only

logical, since a corporation is a

fictional entity and Capable of acting

1 47

only th ough its agents and employees.

Thus; insofar as the plaintiffs seek

recovery for a conspiracy between Amoco

and its agents and employees, the claim

is legally precluded, and Amoco is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

ll. Misrepresentations as to future

acts and events are actionable under

Alabama law in certain circumstances.

See Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510, 262

So. 20d 756 (1972); Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F.

Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 1976),

affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).

Ze On August 2l, 1979, Amoco and

Norgas held a meeting with Amoco LPG

employees in BoaZ, Alabama, to discuss

the terms of the Amoco~-Norgas sale

contract and its effect on their jobs and

148

benefics. It is entirely undisputed that

no later than August 21, 1979, every

plaintiff had actual as well as

constructive knowledge of the fact that

Amoco's LPG operations were being sold,

that plaintiffs were being terminated by

Amoco, and that each of the plaintiffs

would nasal an employee of Norgas and be

covered by Norgas benefit plans when the

‘sale was completed. (See Deposition of

Davis at 31-33; Deposition of Fennell at

15, 35, 37-38, 43; Deposition of Gardner

at 22-23; Deposition of Gurley at 26,

29-30; Deposition of Jones at 37-39;

Deposition of Lovell at 35-38; Deposition

of McClendon at 38-40, 51; Deposition of

Moore at 34, 38-39; Deposition of

Murphree at 35-36; Deposition of Owens at

149

39-40; Deposition of Phillips at 69-70,

73-74, 77-78; Deposition of Pinyan at

51-54; Deposition of Shaneyfelt at 24-46;

Deposition of Shrader at 42-43, 48;

Deposition of Sims at 27-28; Deposition

of Weaver at 30-33.

R32 Plaintiffs' knowledge of the

sale by August 21, 1979, not only

constituted actual knowledge of the fact

that Amoco did not then intend to perform

Seoeemnresented, but it also put

plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the

possibility that Amoco's representations

concerning the plaintiffs' job security

were made with a contemporaneous

intention to deceive and not to perform

as promised. See Moore v. Merchants &

Planters Bank, 434 So. 2d at 754 (fact

150

constituting the fraud deemed discovered

at the time of discovery of facts which

would provoke inquiry by a person of

Ordinary prudence and which, if followed

up, would have led to the discovery of

fraud). Ci, MeGei tt, 2398 86. 24-252

(fraud with respect to future acts or

events deemed discovered when plaintiff

first learns that defendant does not

intend to perform as represented).

Compare Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510,

262 So. 2d 756 (1972) (fraud with respect

to future actions or events requires

contemporaneous intent to deceive or not

to perform as promised).

B4, The piaintiftts’ breach of

contract claims are separate and distinct

and have been dealt with Supra.

151

iS. At oral argument on these

motions, counsel for plaintiffs argued

that the deprivation of an opportunity to

take concerted job action or participate

in negotiations concerning the terms of

the sale constituted damage suffered by

the plaintiffs in reliance on Amoco's

misrepresentations. (Tranecriot at

February 25, 1985 Hearing at 22-23).

16. Even where the date of injury

is relevant, it is well-established that

a cause of action in tort accrues (and

the limitations period begins to run) as

soon as the plaintiff suffers any damage

as a result of fraud, regardless of

whether additional damages are incurred

later which were not apparent at or fixed

at the time of first legal injury. See,

152

e.-g-, Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle,

inc., 291 Ala. 601, 285 So. 2d 468, 473

(1973). Since the plaintiffs have argued

that the damage they suffered included

the deprivation of an opportunity to take

concerted job action, seek iother

employment, or participate in the

negotiations concerning the sale, see n.

eo Supra, and since that damage

necessarily occurred prior to August 21,

1979, when plaintiffs learned of the

Amoco-Norgas sale, it is plain that the

Statute of limitations precludes the

fraud claims at issue here.

17. It appears that the plaintiffs'

claims of fraud with respect to the

crediting of service are actually based

upon nondisclosure of information rather

Roa

than affirmative misrepresentation. (See

Amended Complaint of June 25, 1982, at

pgh. 56). Thus, several plaintiffs

repeatedly testified that they were never

told that Amoco service would be credited

under the Norgas retirement plan. (Davis

Deposition at 41; Fennell Deposition at

58-59; Gurley Deposition at 39-40; Jones

Deposition at 65; McClendon Deposition at

§i-53). Of course, four of the

plaintiffs admitted that they were

told the truth concerning credit for

Amoco service under the Norgas plan --

i.e., that such service would not be

credited. (Gardner Deposition at 22;

Lovell Deposition at 37-38; Shaneyfelt

Deposition at 26; Weaver Deposition at

35).

154

18. Indeed, the plaintiffs

themselves implicitly recognize that

these fraud claims "relate to" an

employee benefit plan, since the only

compensatory damages specifically sought

by the plaintiffs for these fraud claims

are “compensatory damages in the form of

loss of employee benefits, including but

not limited to, the value of the

following benefits: early retirement,

retirement, life and health insurance,

vacation, and savings plan benefits...."

(Pretrial Order at 17).

19. The grant of certiorari in

Russell is apparently limited to whether

a fiduciary may be liable for "punitive

damages or extracontractual compensatory

155

damages" under ERISA. 52 U.S.L.W. 3203

(October 2, 1984).

20. Defendants also contend that

these claims are barred by the statute of

limitations and that plaintiffs suffered

no damage as a proximate result of their

reliance on any misrepresentations

concerning the terms of the sale. These

contentions have substantial support in

the record. However, because the Court

finds these fraud claims preempted, there

is no need to reach these other

contentions made by the defendants. The

Court does note, however, that the record

is entirely devoid of any evidence of any

agreement or conspiracy between Amoco and

Norgas to commit a civil wrong. In the

absence of such evidence, the conspiracy

156

to defraud claim fails as a matter of law.

See Purcell Co., Inc. y. Spriggs

Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515 (Ala.

1983) (negotiation of business sale alone

is insufficient to establish that parties

agreed or conspired to perpetrate a tort).

The Court specifically notes this as an

alternative basis for the dismissal of

the fraud claims predicated upon

conspiracy.

21. As noted above, ERISA does not

require a retirement plan to provide for

such immediate payments of vested

benefits. See, @.g., Hernandez vy.

Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders

Pension Trust, 662 F.2d 617, 619-20 (9th

Bons) £982 3.2 Under the terms of the

Standard Plan, however, a vested

Sa @&eeeeg@eeegQeeeéegerEent = =

participant whose employment terminates

before he is eligible for retirement may

elect to receive at that time an annuity

equivalent to the present actuarial value

of the vested benefits. (See Webb

Affidavit, Ex. A. at 9.05(c)). In

this case, each of the vested plaintiff.

elected to receive an annuity immediately

under this provision of the Standard

Plan, and is currently receiving those

payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).

22. In addition to the substantive

ERISA violations enumerated above,

plaintiffs have alleged a separate claim

for a general conspiracy to violate ERISA.

(Pretrial Order at 13). It would appear

that this general "conspiracy to violate

ERISA" claim fails to state a claim under

158

ERISA, the provisions of which focus on

the underlying wrong rather than any

conspiracy to commit the wrong. In any

event, considering all evidence and

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,

the Court finds no evidence in this

record tending to establish that Amoco

and Norgas agreed to violate ERISA. See

and compare note 19, Supra. Moreover,

Since the Court finds no substancive

violations of ERISA on the facts of this

case, the general “conspiracy to violate

ERISA“ claim must likewise fail.

23. As set forth in the

Amoco-Norgas sale agreement, service with

Amoco is credited for purposes of vesting

under the Norgas retirement plan.

(Pretrial Order at 7). Amoco service is

159

s

credited under the other Norgas plans, as

well. (Bx. A to Aff. of John Churchhill).

Although their damage allegations are

somewhat ambiguous on this point

(Pretrial Order at 17-18), plaintiffs

have not adduced evidence of any loss

caused by the alleged ERISA violations

apart from the failure to credit Amoco

service in calculating Norgas retirement

benefits.

24. A contrary construction would

not only flout 1060(b) (l1)'s express

language and the legislative history, but

would also contravene the rule that,

under ERISA, “[nleither Congress nor the

Courts are involved in either the

decision to establish a plan or in the

decision concerning which benefits a plan

160

should provide." Moore v. Reynolds

Metals Co. Retirement Program, 740 F.2d

454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied

U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985).

25. Plaintiffs do not (and cannot)

contend that the termination of all

employees of a particular business or

division in connection with the sale of

that operation would constitute a per se

violation of any provision of ERISA. Cf.

Sutton v. Weirton Steel, 567 F. Supp.

1164 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d

406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S.

, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).

26. If and when the Secretary of

Treasury does promulgate regulations

imposing a crediting requirement, the

validity of those regulations will of

16]

course be determined under settled

principles of administrative law. oh

Rowan Companies Inc. v. United States,

452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (court's inquiry

generally limited to whether the

regulation is within the delegation of

authority).

27. For present purposes, the Court

has assumed without deciding that this is

the type of “predecessor employer"

situation that would fall within the

ambit of § 1060(b).

28. In analagous situations where a

federal statute delegates authority to

promulgate regulations to an

administrative agency and does no more

than adopt these regulations by advance

reference, the federal courts have

162

consistently held that where the

administrative agency fails or chooses

not to promulgate the described

regulations, there is no substantive law

for the court to apply and the court

therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain

a claim alleging a violation of the Act.

See, e.g. Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita

Associates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.

, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1034 (1974);

Wuillamy v. Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237,

240 n.2 (D. N.J. 1973). Cf. Sierra Club

v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716

F.2d at 1154; Citizens for Clean Air,

Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army,

356 F. Supp. at 18.

29. In any event, the plaintiffs

have not stated a proper claim against

163

Norgas under § 1056. Norgas clearly was

not the employer, administrator or

fiduciary responsible for complying with

the requirements of § 1056 vis-a-vis the

Amoco plan, and no evidence has been

adduced to demonstrate that Norgas

promoted or participated in any such

violation by Amoco within the meaning of

Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390,

411 (S.D. Ala. 1982).

29.5 See Plaintiffs' Brief in

Opposition to Defendants' Motions for

Summary Judgment at 41.

30. For present purposes, it is not

necessary for this Court to adopt the

theory of Donovan nor express a view as

to its scope or validity.

164

31. Clearly, if Amoco breached no

fiduciary duties in negotiating the sale

of the LPG facilities, then Norgas, which

was not a fiduciary with respect to the

Amoco plan, cannot be held liable for

promoting or participating in any such

breach, Compare Donovan vy. Daugherty,

350 F. Supp 390, 411 (S.D. Ala. S962).

In any event, the Court is of the Opinion

that the mere purchase of a going

business from a fiduciary, without more,

would not render a nonfiduciary liable

under § 1104 for the seller's breaches of

fiduciary duty in connection with the

Sale, at least where no transfer of plan

assets is involved.

aes Plaintiffs admit that Norgas

was not a fiduciary with respect to the

Amoco plan and that § 1106 is by its

literal terms technically inapplicable to

Norgas. See Brief of Plaintiffs in

Opposition to Defendants' Motions for

Summary Judgment at 4l. However,

plaintiffs contend that Norgas is liable

for Amoco's violation of § 1106 because

Norgas "participated" in the violation by

Amoco. Cf. Donovan v. Daugherty, 550

F.Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982)(third party

who assists fiduciary in the breach of a

fiduciary duty is liable for losses

sustained by beneficiaries due to the

breach). As to this contention, see notes

30 and 3l, supra.

33. Amoco's parent, Standard Oil

Company, is the administrator and named

fiduciary of the "Amoco" plan. (See

166

Pretrial Order at 9, pgh. 21). However,

at least for purposes of the present

motion, Amoco has not denied that it is a

fiduciary with respect to the plan. See

generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).

34. As far as Norgas is concerned,

the failure to credit prior years of

service with Amoco in calculating accrued

benefits under the Norgas plan certainly

cannot be considered discriminatory,

particularly since neither ERISA nor the

Norgas retirement plan requires such

treatment. In fact, the granting of such

credit would arguably constitute

favorable discrimination with regard to

plaintiffs and a breach of fiduciary duty

as to the Norgas plan and its incumbent

participants. Cf. Winpinsinger v. Aurora

Corp. of Illinois, Precision Castings

Division, 456 F.Supp. 559, 566, 569 (N.D.

Ohio 1978)(requirement that fiduciary

discharge his duties with respect to a

plan solely in the interest of the

participants and beneficiaries prohibits

fiduciary from granting preference as

between plan's participants or as between

plan's beneficiaries).

35. Plaintiffs argue that questions

of intent or motive are rarely

appropriate for summary judgment, citing

Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National

Bank and Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th

Cir. 1983). While this proposition is

not without support, it has little

application where, as here, the

underlying facts are not disputed and the

168

central question to be determined is

whether, as a matter of Liaw, the

discrimination alleged is the kind of

"discrimination" that falls within the

Proscription of a statute narrowly

tailored to serve specific purposes. In

any event, to the extent that the court

must draw inferences from the undisputed

evidentiary facts to determine whether

there has been prohibited discrimination,

the court in a nonjury case is entitled

to draw such inferences and conclusions

on motion for summary judgment if a bench

trial would not enhance its ability to

draw those inferences and conclusions.

See Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d

1506, 1509-10 (llth Cir. 1985); Nunez v.

Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24

169

(Sth Cir. 1978). The ERISA claims made

by the plaintiffs in this case are not

triable to a jury, see Calamia v. Spivey,

632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), and it

does not appear that any further

probative evidence on point would likely

be presented at trial. Based on all of

the evidence before the Court at this

time, then, the Court finds that the

plaintiffs have not suffered

discrimination or other adverse treatment

within the prohibitions of Section 1140.

36. No claim has been made under

Section 1022 against Norgas, which

obviously had no duty of reporting or

disclosure with respect to the Amoco

plan.

170

CP Even where the terms of a

proposed sale of a business do involve

amendments of existing plans, neither

Section 1022 nor Section 1024 requires an

employer to supply information regarding

amendments before the amendments are

effected. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division, 567 F.Supp. 1184, 1196 (N.D. wW.

Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S. ;

104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984).

38. In any event, the Court is of

the opinion that Section 1024 provides no

Private cause of ac’ ‘on for failure to

report modifications to the Secretary (as

Opposed to the failure to comply with the

duties of reporting and disclosure owed

to participants and beneficiaries).

Etim

Therefore, even assuming that the sale

did constitute a "modification" of the

plan within the meaning of Section 1024,

the plaintiffs would have no right to

recover the damages they seek based upon

Amoco's failure to properly report the

modification to the Secretary.

39. Plaintiffs have made no claim

against Norgas under Section 1024.

172

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-7623

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,

Plaintiffs-

Appellants,

versus

— an ar ry atu = a» %

AMOCO OIL COMI ANY, etce, et Giles

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Jlorthern District of Alabama

IN PETITIONS(S) FOR REHEARING

(October 28, 1986)

BEFORE: RONEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges,

and DOYLE*, Senior District

Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The petition(s) for rehearing filed

by appellants is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/‘s/ THOMAS A. CLARK

United States Circuit Judge

* Honorable James E. Doyle, Senior U.S.

District Judge for the Western District

of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

174

799 F.2d 1464

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et ai.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv

AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-7623

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit

September 22, 1986

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, CLARK,

Circuit Judge, and DOYLE, Senior District

Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Former employees of Amoco Oil

Company's Alabama retail liquid propane

175

gas ("LPG") business appeal from the

district court's decision to grant

Summary judgment in favor of Amoco Oil

Company ("Amoco"), Joe D. Bearden, and

Norgas Propane Gas Company ("Norgas") on

claims of breach of contract, state

common-law fraud and Employee Retirement

Income Security Act ("ERISA") violations

arising in the context of the sale of

Amoco's Alabama LPG operations to Norgas.

We affirm.

I. FACTS

Appellants (the "employees") were

formerly employed by Amoco in its LPG

operations in Alabama. All participated

in the Employee Retirement Plan of

Standard Oil Company and Participating

Companies (the "Standard Plan").

In May of 1979, Amoco agreed to sell

its LPG operations in the southeastern

United States to Norgas. The sales

contract was signed on July 31, 1979 and

the sale closed on September 4, 1979.

Upon seiling its Alabama LPG operations,

haeco completely left the retail LPG

business in Alabama and therefore had no

work in that area for any of the

employees.

The sales contract provided that

Norgas would offer employment to each

regular full-time employee at his or her

Current salary. It further provided that

retirement benefits under Norgas'

retirement plan would be based on years

177

of service with Norgas, except that

continuous years of service with Amoco

would be credited by Norgas for vesting

purposes. Thus years of service with

Amoco would not be credited for the

purpose of calculating benefits or

determining eligibility for early

retirement. Each of the employees with

vested benefits under the Standard Plan,

including those who have not yet reached

the age of sixty-five, opted to receive

and is currently receiving an annuity

from the Standard Plan.

A meeting for the Amoco employees

was held on August 21, 1979 at Boaz,

Alabama to explain the various Norgas

benefits that would be available to the

employees after the sale (the "Boaz

178

meeting"). At the meeting, the employees

were informed of the sale of Amoco's LPG

Operations to Norgas. They were also

told that:

On every other plan we

recognize your service with

Amoco. For the Retirement

Plan, you must treat the day

you begin work with Northern

Propane Gas Company as your

first day of service.

While the parties dispute whether all the

employees understood that their years of

service would not be credited by Norgas

for all purposes, there is no dispute

that they were told at the Boaz meeting

that Norgas would not credit years of

service with Amoco under its retirement

179

plan. There is also no dispute that in

August, 1979, the employees were given

copies of a Norgas summary plan

description stating that the retirement

benefits they would receive would depend

on service and pay with Norgas. The

employees began employment with Norgas on

September 4, 1979, the closing date of

the sale to Norgas.

On September 4, 1980, the employees

filed suit against Amoco, Bearden and

Norgas in an Alabama state court. The

case was eventually removed to federal

district court. After eight amendments,

the employees' complaint finally

contained state breach of contract

claims, state fraud and conspiracy to

180

>»

defraud claims, and various ERISA claims

against Amoco and Norgas.

Norgas and Amoco filed separate

motions for summary judgment. On

February 25, 1985, the district court

heard oral argument on the motions and,

at the close of argument, orally ruled

that it was granting Norgas' motion and

taking Amoco's motion under advisement.

On June 18, 1985, 614 F. Supp. 1094, the

district court issued its memorandum

Opinion granting all motions for summary

judgment in favor of Amoco and Norgas.!

On June 28, 1985, the employees

filed a motion to reconsider or vacate

the judgment and for recusal of District

Judge Seybourn H. Lynne under 28 U.S.C.

455(a). The employees claimed that an

181

appearance of impropriety arose when the

law clerk who had drafted Judge Lynne's

memorandum opinion accepted employment

with the firm representing Norgas in this

litigation prior to drafting the opinion.

There is no dispute that the employees'

attorneys were informed of the fact that

Judge Lynne's sole law clerk had accepted

employment with the law firm representing

Norgas in January of 1985, seven months

before they requested recusal. Judge

Lynne denied the recusal motion on the

ground it was not timely and that the

employees had not been denied due process

of law. The employees appeal from the

Summary judgments in favor of Amoco and

Norgas and from the denial of their

recusal motion.

182

II. ISSUES

The employees make the following

arguments with respect to their state law

claims on appeal: (1) that Amoco breached

lifetime employment contracts with its

employees when it sold its Alabama LPG

Operations to Norgas; (2) that their

claim that Amoco fraudulently assured

them of lifetime employment with Amoco

even while negotiating the sale of the

business is not barred by an Alabama

Statute of limitations; (3) that their

claim that Amoco and Norgas fraudulently

concealed the effect of the sale on

credit for years of service toward

retirement benefits is not preempted by

183

ERISA. The employees also argue that

Amoco and Norgas bargained away credit

for years of service with Amoco when they

negotiated the sales contract, thereby

violating the following provisions of

ERISA: (1) the provision that years of

service with predecessor employer be

credited by successor employer (29 U.S.C.

§ 1060(b)(2); (2) the provision setting

forth a fiduciary duty to act solely for

the benefit of plan beneficiaries (29

Gs Gata § 1104) 3 i t he

anti-discrimination provision (29 U.S.C.

§ 1104); (4) the prohibited transactions

provision (29 U.S.C. § 1106); (5) the

provision governing early retirement

benefits (29 U.S.C. § 1056); (6) the

criminal fraud provision (29 U.S.C. §

184

1141); and (7) the disclosure provisions

(29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024). Finally, the

employees argue that Judge Lynne abused

his discretion in failing to vacate

summary judgment in favor of Norgas and

to recuse himself in light of the

relationship between his law clerk and

Norgas' attorneys.

III. ANALYSIS

The district court's opinion in this

case is comprehensive, thorough and well

reasoned. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614

F.Sujs. 694 (N.D.Ala.1985). Where, as

here, a litigant adopts what might be

called a “shot gun" approach and invokes

ever possible cause of action, no matter

185

how tangentially related to the

particular context of the case, a few

claims are bound to be so obviously

inappropriate that little discussion is

warranted to dispose of them. The

district court's opinion treats even

these claims carefully and exhaustively.

This court has benefitted from that

effort.

Unfortunately, the employees have

not narrowed their arguments for appeal

as they might have. Rather than pointing

out the error in the reasoning that led

the district court to reject their

positions, they have restated the

arguments they made to the district court

in the first place. Thus it happens

that, with respect to many of the

arguments presented on appeal, we have

little, if anything, to add by way of

explanation of our decision that has not

been stated by the district court. For

that reason, although we have carefully

and independently considered the

employees’ legal arguments, we will not

duplicate the district court's efforts by

explaining our decision with the same

thoroughness and detail. We write

briefly to address various arguments made

On appeal and to make clear our

understanding of the scope of the

district court's reasoning.

i. Breach of Life-time Employment

Contracts

The employees argue that their

life-time employment contracts with Amoco

were breached when Amoco sold its

business to Norgas. However, even where

a life-time employment contract is

legally enforceable, Alabama law provides

that the contract remains in effect only

as long as the employer remains in the

business for which the employee was hired

and needs the particular services the

employee was hired to perform. See,

e.g.,Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc.,

418 So.2d 903, 906 (Ala.1982). It is

undisputed that Amoco completely

abandoned the retail LPG business in

188

Alabama when it sold its operations to

Norgas. The employees present no

argument on appeal that was not

persuasively rejected by the district

court. In fact, they conceded at oral

argument that they have no breach of

contract claim that is not identical, at

bottom, to the fraud claim addressed in

the ngxt section. The district court

correctly granted summary judgment in

favor of Amoco on this claim.

2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation With

Respect to Continued Employment with

Amoco ,

189

The employees allege that Amoco

continued to represent to them that they

would be employed for life with Amoco's

Alabama LPG operations even as Amoco

negotiated the sale of the business to

Norgas. They believe that Amoco

fraudulently induced them to remain

employed with Amoco in order to make the

business a more attractive going-concern

to Norgas. The district court granted

summary judgment with respect to this

claim on the ground it was barred by a

one-year statute of limitations, holding

that the employees' cause of action

accrued when they learned that Amoco

would sell the business and terminate

their employment contracts in August,

1979.

190

The issue on appeal is whether the

district court correctly determined that

the employees' cause of action accrued,

and the period of limitations began to

run, when they learned that Amoco was to

sell the business. There is no dispute

that all the employees learned that the

LPG operations would be sold no later

than August 21, 1979. They did not file

their suit until September 4, 1980. They

insist that their cause of action did not

accrue until their employment with Amoco

was actually terminated on September 4,

1979, but have cited no case that

Supports this statement of law.

The employees’ attorney insisted

repeatedly at oral argument that the

injury associated with this type of claim

occurs upon actual termination and that

the cause of action does not therefore

accrue until that point, relying on

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &

Enginemen v. Hammett, 273 Ala. 397, 140

So.2d 832 (1962). That case, however,

was not a fraud case but involved

malicious interference with employment, a

cause of action that obviously does not

arise until the actual interference or

termination occurs.

In contrast, the employees' cause of

action sounds in fraud and their injury

was by definition the detrimental

reliance that occurred prior to their

discovery that they had been victims of

misrepresentation. According to Alabama

law, a fraud case of action accrues, «-nd

192

the one year statute of limitations

begins to run, at the discovery of the

facts constituting the fraud. Such

discovery occurs when the plaintiff

Should have discovered facts that would

provoke a person of ordinary prudence to

inquiry. Colafrancesco v. Crown

Pontiac=-GNC, iInc., #488 $6,284 1131

(Ala.1986). In this case, discovery took

place no later than August 21, 1979.

That the employment contracts did

not actually terminate until September 4,

1979, makes no difference. The statute

of limitations begins to run when the

plaintiff knows or should know that the

employer does not intend to perform as

promised. Retail, Wholesale and

Department Store Employees Union, Local

193

483 v. NMeGriftt, 398 So.2d 249, 252

(Ala.1981). McGriff involved, as does

the instant case, the claim that the

employees was induced to work for the

employer by a promise of pension benefits

upon having remained on the payroll for a

certain number of years. The Alabama

Supreme Court held that the employee's

fraud case of action arose when he knew

or should have known that the employer

did not intend to provide the promised

benefits, not at the point he was

actually denied the benefits. The

district court correctly granted summary

judgment in favor of Amoco on the ground

that this particular fraud claim is

barred by the statute of limitations.

194

a6 Fraudulent Failure to Disclose

Effect of Sale on Retirement

Benefits

The employees claim that Amoco and

Norgas deprived them of an opportunity to

negotiate with Norgas to credit their

years of service with Amoco for the

purposes of calculating retirement

benefits and induced them to remain

employed with Amoco by failing to

disclose the disadvantageous terms of the

sale. The district court held that this

State common law fraud claim was

preempted by ERISA.

ERISA expressly provides that it

"shall supersede any and all State laws

insofar as they may now or hereafter

195

|

|

|

|

|

|

relate to any employee benefit plan"

covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

The employees argue that ERISA does not

preempt state common law fraud actions

involving pension plans. Without

expressing any opinion as to whether

ERISA preempts other fraud claims arising

under state common law, we hold that

ERISA preempts Alabama's common law fraud

cause of action insofar as it recognized

the particular type of claim raised by

the employees in this case.

The Supreme Court has addressed the

scope of ERISA preemption in two cases.

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.

8S, 103 $.Ct. 2890, 77 L.~Bd.2d 4930

(1983); Alessi v. Raybestos~Manhattan,

Tne., 451 U.S. 504, 191 $.Ct. 1895, 66

196

L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). In neither case did

the Supreme Court address the question

whether ERISA preempts state common law

causes of action. However, the opinions

are helpful for their general discussions

of the scope of ERISA preemption.

The Supreme Court in Shaw explained

that Congress used the words "relate to"

in their broad sense. Shaw 463 U.S. at

tae sen 2B Ck. Be. 2908, Thus, ERISA

preemption is not limited to those state

laws specifically designed to affect

employee benefit plans. Nor does it

preempt only state laws dealing with the

particular subject matters covered by

ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure and

fiduciary responsibility. Id. Most

importantly, for the purposes of this

197

case, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) expressly

explains that the term "state law" in the

preemption provisions includes "all laws,

decisions, rules, regulations, or other

State action having the effect of law, of

any State." It is clear, then, that

ERISA preempts state common law causes of

actions as they relate to employee

benefit plans. *

We agree with the district court

that the particular fraud claim raised by

the employees in this case is preempted

by ERISA. The action alleged by the

employees to have been fraudulent was the

failure to disclose the terms of the

Norgas benefit plan. The claim depends

on the existence of a duty to disclose,

which necessarily depends on an

198

interpretation of the fiduciary duties

imposed by ERISA. The claim also runs

directly into ERISA's disclosure

provisions. The compensatory damages

specifically sought by the employees for

the fraud claim are “compensatory damages

in the form of loss of employee benefits,

including but no limited to, the value of

the following benefits: early

retirement, retirement, life and health

insurance, vacation, and saving plan

benefits ...." Pretrial Order at 17.

This request for damages demonstrates

that the employees’ fraud claim not only

"relates to" an employee benefit plan but

is at its core an ERISA claim.

The employees protest that to hold

that ERISA preempts this fraud claim,

199

while also holding that ERISA does not

prohibit the wrong the employees feel

they have suffered, leaves a “gap" in the

law. That is exactly the result that

obtains when Congress determines that

federal law should govern a broad area to

the exclusion of state regulation and

chooses not to prohibit actions formerly

prohibited by state law. It is the very

conflict between the federal scheme and

state law that is to be avoided through

preemption. To argue that Congress has

created a "gap" in the law does not

undermine the reasoning on which a

finding of preemption is based. We turn

now to the employees’ ERISA Claims.

B. ERISA Claims

200

—)

>

Statutory Requirement that Years of

service With Predecessor Employer be

Credited by Successor Employer

rovides in relevant

Tr

part:

(1) in any case in which the employer

maintains a plan of a predecessor

employer, service for such predecessors

Shall be treated as service for the

employer, and

(<éj lr any -asSe in wnicn the employer

maintains a plan which is not the plan

maintained by a predecesso ployer,

service for such predecessor shall, to

the extent provided in regulations

prescribed by the Secretary of the

Treasury, be treated as service for the

employer.

There is no dispute that §

1000(b)(2) is the section applicable in

this case; Norgas does not maintain the

plan of Amoco but maintains its own

retirement plan. Although the Secretary

of the Treasury has promulgated no

regulations requiring that a successor

employer give credit for years of service

with a predecessor employer, the

employees contend that § 1060(b)(2)

requires Norgas to credit their years of

service with Amoco for the purposes of

calculating benefits and determining

eligibility for early retirement.

The district court determined that

the statutory language and legislative

history of this section make clear that

Congress intended to leave the question

whether to require such credit to the

Secretary of the Treasury and that no

such credit would be required absent the

promulgation of regulations to that

effect. The employees make no effort to

shed light on any particular error

committed by the district court but

Simply reassert the arbument that the

phrase "to the extent .provided in

regulations prescribed by ,the Secretary

of the Treasury" should be read out of

the statute. This we cannot do.

203

We will not further belabor this

dispute. As set forth in the district

court's opinion, Phillips, 614 F.Supp. at

713-714, the legislative history of §

1060(b)(2), Department of Labor

regulations defining “years of service"

and the only case interpreting those

regulations all lead to the conclusion

that ERISA does not require a successor

employer to credit years of service with

the predecessor employer where the

Successor does not maintain the benefit

plan of the predecessor. Remaining

cautious about reading such a requirement

into any provision of the statutory

scheme in the face of Congressional

intent to leave this question of policy

to the Secretary of the Treasury, we

204

nonetheless go on to address the rest of

the employees' ERISA Claims.

2. Fiduciary Duty

29 U.S.C. § 1104 provides that "a

fiduciary shall discharge his duties with

respect to a plan solely in the interest

of the participants and beneficiaries."

The employees argue that Amoco breached

its fiduciary duty in negotiating a

higher sale price for its LPG Operations

by bargaining away credit for their years

of service with Amoco. Norgas is argued

to be liable, although not a fiduciary,

for aiding a fiduciary to breach its duty

under ERISA,

The district court held that the

fiduciary provisions cf ERISA are not

implicated in the sale of a business

merely because the terms of the sale will

affect contingent and non-vested future

retirement benefits. This holding is

supported by the fact that ERISA simply

does not prohibit a company from

eliminating previously offered benefits

that are neither vested nor accrued.

Moreover, the ERISA scheme envisions that

employers will act in a dual capacity as

both fiduciary to the plan and as

employer. ERISA does not prohibit an

employer from acting in accordance with

its interests as employer when not

administering the plan or investing its

assets. See Sutton v. Weirton Steel

206

Division of National Steel Corp., 724

F.2d 406 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied,

467 U.S. 1205, 104 S.Ct. 2387, 81 L.Ed.2d

345 (1984), aff'g, Dhayer v. Weirton

Steel Division of National Steel Corp.,

>7i F.Supp. 316 (8.0.8. V¥e0.1083) aad

Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of

Bationa i Steel Cor 8. 4 56-7

F.Supp.1184(N.D.W.Va.1983). We emphasize

that the only "interests" at stake in

this case are contingent and non-vested

future retirement benefits. There is no

dispute that Amoco has fulfilled and

continues to fulfill its obligations with

respect to vested retirement benefits

earned under the Standard Plan.

:= Discrimination

207

29 U.S.C. § 1140 provides:

"Tt shall be unlawful for any person

to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,

discipline, or discriminate against a

participant or beneficiary for exercising

any right to which he is entitled under

the provisions of an employee benefit

plan[covered by ERISA] .. . or for the

purpose of interfering with the

attainment of any right to which such

participant may become entitled under the

plan for ERISA}. . «. «"

The employees argue that Amoco and

Norgas unlawfully discriminated against

them for the purpose of interfering with

the attainment of rights to which they

208

may have become entitled under the

Standard Plan.

As the district court held, this

provision simply does not prohibit the

sale of a going business. Furthermore,

aS we noted above, the employer may

terminate previously offered contingent

non-vested benefits. Finally, as the

entire business was sold in this case,

there could not have been any

discrimination among employees.

4. Disclosure Requirements

29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) requires that a

plan description containing the

circumstances that may result in

disqualification, ineligibility or denial

209

or loss of benefits be provided to plan

participants. The employees contend that

Amoco violated this section by failing to

disclose in its plan description the

possibility that sale of the business

might result in the loss of future

benefits. While the plan description

does not refer specifically to sale of

the business, it does notify employees

that a "terminated employee" will not be

entitled to full benefits. A terminated

employee is defined therein as one who

has not retired from the company. The

employees were thereby notified that any

event causing them to leave their employ

with Amoco prior to retirement would

result in receipt of less than full

benefits. As the description of the

210

Standard Plan adequately notified

employees that an event such as the sale

of a business would result in

termination, Amoco complied with the

disclosure requirem2nt.3

5. Miscellaneous Additional Claims

The employees raise several claims

under provisions of ERISA that are

patently inapplicable to the facts of

this case.

By its terms, 29 U.S.C. § 1106, the

"prohibited transactions" provision,

applies only to transactions to which the

plan itself is a party or in which the

monies, property or fiscal assets of the

plan are involved. Such is not the case

211

a

here. Section 1056 sets forth certain

requirements that must be met should a

plan provide for early retirement

benefits, but it does not confer upon

plan participants any substantive right

to continued employment in order to

qualify for early retirement benefits.

Section 1141 is a criminal statute that

provides no private right of action but

allows only for criminal prosecution by

the United States Attorney General.

Finally, § 1024 requires the plan

modification be reported to the Secretary

of the Treasury and is inapplicable in

this case because there was no

modification of the Standard Pan.

C. Appearance of Impropriety

212

The district court's denial of the

employees’ motion to reconsider or vacate

or for 'recusal is due to be affirmed for

several reasons. First, the employees'

attorneys knew about the law clerk's

employment with the firm representing

Norgas six to seven months before moving

for recusal. Counsel, Knowing the facts

claimed to support a § 455(a) recusal for

appearance of partiality may not lie in

wait, raising the recusal issue only

after learning the court's ruling on the

merits. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d

1093, 1094 (llth Cir.1983), cert denied,

464 U.S. 1050, 104 S.Ct. 729, 79 L.Ed.2d

189 (1984). The employees’ argument that

they were not aware of the facts

213

Supporting recusal until they realized

that the law clerk had drafted the

memorandum opinion explaining summary

judgment in favor of Norgas is

Gisingenuous. They were well aware that

the law clerk was actively involved with

the case and that he, as Judge Lynne's

only law clerk, could be the only person

who would work with the judge to draft

the opinion. Clearly the facts giving

rise to any appearance of impropriety

were kaown by the employees’ attorneys

long before the law clerk actually began

drafting the opinion.

Several factors lessen any

appearance of impropriety and ensure that

the due process rights of the employees

were not violated. The case had been

214

before the judge for many years and many

clerks had worked on it. By the time the

law clerk at issue was hired, the judge

had formed the conclusion that the

employees' claims were without merit.

Furthermore, the court granted Norgas'

motion for summary judgment at oral

argument, before the law clerk began work

on the opinion justifying the decision.

Additionally, the claims against Norgas

were meritless, if not frivolous.

Finally, because this case was decided on

Summary judgment motions, the court was

not called upon to resolve conflicts in

evidence, weigh the credibility of

witnesses or exercise judicial discretion.

The district court's decision has been

subjected to de novo review by this court.

215

Judge Lynne's decision not to vacate the

judgment and not to recuse himself was

well within his discretion.

For the forgoing reasons, the

summary judgments in favor of Amoco,

Bearden and Norgas are

AFFIRMED.

216

FOOTNOTES

= Claims against Bearden are not

discussed separately in the district

court's memorandum opinion or in the

parties" SrieEsw to this €6urt. As

Bearden is an agent of Amoco, our

discussion of the claims against Amoco

applies to the claims alleged against

Bearden. We will not further refer to

Bearden in this opinion.

2. We emphasize that ERISA preempts

such causes of action as only they relate

to employee benefit plans. Our holding

with respect to preemption is therefore

limited by the facts of this case.

Hence, while we note that other courts

have held ERISA to preempt state common

217

law causes of action, we acknowledge that

these opinions are useful only to the

extent they support the general

proposition that ERISA may preempt state

law causes of action. See e.g., Authier

v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799-802 (6th

Circ, 208, 86 L.86.24 17? (3983)3t BAau >

Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1356-57

(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, U.8.

, 106 §.Ct. 183, 88 L.Ed.2d 152

(1985); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing

Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cif.),

cert.denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S.Ct. 512,

70 L«BG.20 364 (1981). For additional

cases see the district court's opinion,

Phillips, 614 F.Supp. at 708.

3. Moreover, it is not clear that §

1022(a) requires that a plan description

218

disclose the circumstances under which

inchoate, non-vested contingent interests

in future benefits might be cut off.

219

29 U.S.C. 1140

It shall be unlawful for any

person to discharge, fine, suspend,

expel, discipline, or discriminate

against a participant or beneficiary for

exercising any right to which he is

entitled under the provisions of an

employee benefit plan, this subchapter,

oe eem £208 Of this title, or the

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act

[29° 0.S.C.A. 301 et seq.], or for the

Sueponpe Of interfering with the

attainment of any right to which such

participant may become entitled under the

plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and

Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall

220

be unlawful for any person to discharge,

find, suspend, expel, or discriminate

against any person because he has given

information or has testified or is about

to testify in an inquiry or proceeding

relating to this chapter of the Welfare

and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. the

provisions of section 1132 of this title

shall be applicable in the enforcement of

this section.

29 U.S.C. tide

(a) Supersedure; effective date

Except as provided in subsection

(b) of this section, the provisions of

this subchapter and subchapter III of

this chapter shall supersede any and all

221

State laws insofar as they may now or

hereafter relate to any employee benefit

plan described in section 1003(a) of this

title and not exempt under section

LOQ03(b) of this titie. This section

shall take effect on January 1, 1975.

(b) Construction and application

(1) This section shall not apply

with respect to any cause of action which

arose, or any act or omission which

occurred, before January 1, 1975.

(2)(A) Except as provided in

subparagrah (B), nothing in this

subchapter shall be construed to exempt

or relieve any person from any law of any

State which regulates insurance, banking,

or securities.

222

(b) Neither an employee benefit plan

described in section 1003(a) of this

title, which is not exempt under section

1003(b) of this title (other than a plan

established primarily for the purpose of

providing death benefits), nor any trust

established under such a plan, shall be

deemed to be an insurance company or

other insurer, bank, trust company, or

investment company or to be engaged in

the business of insurance or banking for

purpose of any law of any State

purporting to regulate insurance

companies, insurance contracts, banks,

trust companies, or investment companies.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be

construed to prohibit use by the

Secretary of services or facilities of a

223

State agency as permitted under section

1136 of this title.

(4) Subsection (a) of this section

shall not apply to any generally

applicable criminal law of a State.

(5)(A) Except as provided in

subparagrah (B), subsection (a) of this

section shall not apply to the Hawaii

Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw.Rev. Stat.

§§ 393-1 through 393-51).

(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A)

shall be construed to exempt from

subsection (a) of this section --

(i) any State tax law relating

to employee benefit plans, or

(34) any amendment of the

Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act enacted

after September 2, 1974, to the extent it

2 24

provides for more than the effective

administration of such Act as if effect

on sucn date.

(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph

(A), parts 1 and 4 of this subtiile, and

the preceding sections of this part to

the extent they govern matters which are

governed by the provisions of such parts

l1 and 4, shall supersede the Hawaii

Prepaid Health Care Act (as in effect on

or after January 14, 1983), but the

Secretary may enter into cooperative

arrangements under this paragraph and

section 1136 of this title with officials

of the State of Hawaii to assist them in

effectuating the policies of provisions

of such Act which are superseded by such

parts.

2 25

eel eEeCEllClC EeETCCOlClC ETTCOlClC ECC ETO OlClCU CUCU ETCOCUlClC CCClClC ECC ClClC ECC ECTClClCMETlC El

(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other

provision of this section --

(1) in the case of an employee

welfare benefit plan which is a multiple

employer welfare arrangement and is fully

insured (or which is a multiple employer

welfare arrangement subject to an

exemption under subparagraph (B)), any

law of any State which regulates

insurance may apply to use arrangement to

the extent that such law provides --

(I) standards, requiring the

maintenance of specified levels of

contributions, which any such plan, or

any trust established under such a plan,

must meet in order to be considered under

such law able to pay benefits in full

when due, and

2 26

(II) provisions to enforce such

Standards, and

eee in the case of any other

employee welfare benefit plan which is a

multiple employer welfare arrangement, in

addition to this subchapter, any law of

any State which regulates insurance may

apply to the extent not inconsistent with

the preceding sections of this

subchapter.

(B) The Secretary may, under

regulations which may be prescribed by

the Secretary, exempt from subparagraph

(A)(iil), individually or by class,

multiple employer welfare arrangements

which are not fully insured. Any such

exemption may be granted with respect to

any arrangement or class of arrangements

only if such arrangement or each

arrangement which is a member of such

class meets the requirements of section

1002(1) and section 1003 of this title

necessary to be considered an employee

welfare benefit plan to which this

subchapter applies.

(Cc) Nothing in subparagraph (A)

shall affect the manner or extent to

which the provisions of this subchapter

apply to an employee welfare benefit plan

which is not a multiple employer welfare

arrangement and which is a plan, fund, or

program participating in, subscribing to,

or otherwise using a multiple employer

welfare arrangement to fund or administer

benefits to such plan's participants and

beneficiaries.

228

(D) For purposes of this paragraph,

a multiple employer welfare arrangement

shall be considered fully insured only if

the terms of the arrangement provide for

benefits the amount of all of which the

Secretary determines are guaranteed under

a contract, or policy of insurance,

issued by an insurance company, insurance

service, or insurance organization,

qualified to conduct business in a State.

(7) Subsection (a) shall not apply

to qualified domestic relations orders

(within the meaning of section

1056(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title).

(c) Definitions

For purposes of this section:

(1) the term "State Law" includes

all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,

229

or other State action having the effect

of law, of any State. A law of the

United States applicable only to the

District of Columbia shall be treated as

a State law rather than a law of the

United States.

(2) The term "State" includes a

State, any political subdivisions

thereof, or any agency or instrumentality

of either, which purports to regulate,

directly or indirectly, the terms aad

conditions of employee benefit plans

covered by this subchapter.

(d) Alteration, amendment, modification,

invalidation, impairment, or supersedure

of any law of United States prohibited

Nothing in this subchapter shall be

construed to alter, amend, modify,

230

invalidate, impair, or supersede any law

of the United States (except as provided

in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of this

title) or any regulation issued under any

such law.

6-2-3. Accrvel of claeiu +. Feaud.

In actions seeking relief on the

ground of fraud where the statute has

created a bar, the claim must not be

considered as having accrued until the

discovery by the aggrieved party of the

fact constituting the fraud, after which

he must have one year within which to

prosecute his action.

6-2-39. Same -- One year.

(a) The following must be commenced

within one year.

231

a4 Actions for malicious

prosecution;

tay Actions for seduction;

(3) Actions qui tam or for a

penalty given by a statute to the party

aggrieved, unless the statute imposing it

prescribes a different limitation;

(4) Actiions of tibei of

slander; and

(5) Actions for any injury to

the person or rights of another not

arising from contract and not

specifically enumerated in this section;

and

(6) ALi aections tor tH0

recovery of wages, overtime, damages,

fees or penalties accruing under laws

232

respecting the payment of wages,

Overtime, damages, fee and penalties.

(7) All actions commenced to

recover damages for injury to the person

Or property of another wherein a

principal or master is ought to be held

liable for the act or conduct of his

agent, servant or employee under the

doctrine of respondeat superior.

(8) All actions commenced

under section 6-5-4111 to recover damages

for injury or damage to property of a

decedent.

(b) If any action 1s commenced

before the time limited has expired,

judgment is entered for the plaintiff and

such judgment is arrested or reversed on

appeal, the plaintiff or his legal

233

representative may commence an action

again within one year from the reversal

or arrest of such judgment though the

period limited may in the meantime have

expired; and in like manner, if more than

one judgment is arrested or reversed, an

action may be recommenced within one

year.

234

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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