Appendix — Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co.
Supreme Court brief1987
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,
PETITIONERS,
V.
THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
J. Gusty Yearout*
Attorney for Petitioners
YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.
2700 SouthTrust Tower
Birmingham, AL 35203
(205) 326-6111
*Counsel of Record
NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,
PETITIONERS,
Ve
THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
J. Gusty Yearout*
Attorney for Petitioners
YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.
2700 SouthTrust Tower
Birmingham, AL 35203
.205) 326-6111
*Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Comany,
793 F.2G 1464 (ilth Cir. 1986) ... 175
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Company,
6i9, F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Alia. 1985) . 1
BP Wemece § 2060 4-6 es oe « st ee 8 280
a eS ee Se ee ee ee ae a ee ee yy
nae, Goce § 692-3 (1978S) «es « «© «231
Ram. Coage § G-2-39 (1975). . « « « «#31
Denial on
Petition for Rehearing . .173
619 F. Supp. 694
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
AMOCO OIL COMPANY, a
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV80-L-1416-S
United States District Court For The
Northern District of Alabama,
Southern Division
June 18, 1985
This is an action seeking the
recovery of specified employee benefits,
together with compensatory and punitive
damages. It stems from the sale of a
liquid propane gas operation py defendant
Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco") to defendant
Northern Propane Gas Company ("Norgas").
The plaintiffs have cast their net wide,
BEBERERBRERBEUULEESE
alleging that the sale violated no less
than eight sections of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.
Moreover, in apparent recognition of the
fact that such a wide net is bound to
develop a few holes, the plaintiffs have
tacked on certain state law claims as
well. The jurisdiction of the Court is
invoked under 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.+
After numerous pleading amendments
and our ckece of extensive discovery, the
legal sufficiency of these claims may now
be tested. Both Amoco’ and Norgas may
have moved for summary judgment based
upon the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, stipulations and other
documents now on file.? Upon careful
review of the record as it now stands,
the Court is convinced that all
defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on each and every claim
asserted by the plaintiffs.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed.
In the years before 1979, Amoco operated
a business, in Alabama and elsewhere in
the southeastern United States, which
sold liquid propane gas ("LPG"). Each of
the plaintiffs in this action was an
employee of Amoco working in the LPG
Operation in Alabama. As employees of
Amoco, the plaintiffs were eligible to
participate in the employee Retirement
Plan of Standard Oil Company and
Participating Companies (hereinafter
referred to as “the Standard Plan" or
"the Amoco Plan"). Prior to May, 1979,
Amoco began to seek a purchaser for its
Southeastern LPG operations. On May 4,
1979, defendant Norgas submitted an offer
to purchase Amoco's LPG facilities in the
southeastern United States, contingent
upon approval of the Board of Directors
of its parent company. In that offer,
Norgas specifically noted that retirement
benefits for LPG employees who became
employees of Norgas would be based on
their years of service with Norgas. In
other words, Norgas' initial offer to
purchase the Amoco operation
7)
contemplated that, although years of
service with Amoco would be recognized by
Norgas for certain employee benefit
purposes, those prior years of service
would not be recognized for benefit
accrual purposes under the Nogegas
retirement plan.
By a letter dated May 10, 1979, Amoco
accepted Norgas’ offer. Amoco and Norgas
then exchanged information and negotiated
|r }
the definitive agreement. The parties
signed the final sale contract on July
34, 1979 4 Section 2.5 of the sale
contract provided in part:
Buyer [Norgas] agrees
to offer employment to each
regular full-time employee
of Seller [Amoco] presently
assigned to the business
represented by the various
assets subject to this
Contract, except employees
on long-term and/or
permanent disability...upon
-
~
}
ES ESE SESE SS SBS SBS SF SB SSS SA
the following conditions:
current salary and
appropriate salary
administration plan will be
recognized; ... retirement
benefits under the Buyer's
Retirement Income
Protection Plan will be
based on years with Buyer
except that continuous
years of service with
Seller immediately prior to
the transfer date shall be
credited by Buyer for
vesting purposes....
The saie of Amoco's LPG operations to
Norgas was closed effective 12:01 A.M. on
September 4, 1979. The former Amoco
employees, including p'aintiffs, began
their employment with Norgas on that date.
Immediately after the sale of Amoco's LPG
Operations to Norgas, each plaintiff had
the same job responsibilities and was
compensated at the same rate of pay as he
had enjoyed at Amoco. Exactly one year
later, on September 4, 1980, this action
ensued.
in this action, plaintiffs have spun
a tangled web of arguable related and
intertwined claims, portions of which are
intended to trap Amoco alone, and other
portions of which are intended to ensnare
4 The substance
both Amoco and Norgas.
of these claims ranges from the honestly
debatable to the utterly amorphous. The
plaintiffs' failure to filter out the
latter has rendered this litigation far
more burdensome and unwieldly for the
parties and the Court than it might
otherwise have been.
First, the plaintiffs allege a number
of state law claims. Thus, plaintiffs
claim that at various times Amoco made
misrepresentations regarding plaintiffs'
future job security, the security of
their employee benefits, and the
existence of plans by Amoco to divest
itself of the LPG operation, thereby
inducing plaintiffs to remain “in place"
sO aS to enhance the value of Amoco's LPG
operation as a salable "going concern."
(Pretrial Order at 10-ll). Moreover,
plaintiffs allege that they had contracts
for lifetime employment with Amoco, which
Amoco breached when it sold the going LPG
operation to Norgas and terminated
plaintiffs' association with Amoco.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amoco
and Norgas conspired to misrepresent
certain facts regarding the Amoco-Norgas
sale--specifically, the fact that
plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco
would not ve credited by Norgas for
Purposes of calculating retirement
benefits under the Norgas retirement plan.
(Pretrial Order at 12).
Plaintiffs contend that the terms of
the Amoco-Norgas sale and the manner in
which it was negotiated an effectuated
violated at least eight sections of
ERISA: 29 U.S.C. § 1022, § 1024, § 1056,
§ 1060, § 1104, § 1106, § 1140, and §
1141.
In the face of these allegations, the
defendants contend that based upon an
extensive record developed through four
years of ample discovery, defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to each of the plaintiffs'
claims. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court must agree with the defendants.
DISCUSSION
Ee The State Law Claims
A. Lifetime Employment Contract
The Court will first address the
State law claims, which may be disposed
of without reaching the merits. The
first of these claims concerns an alleged
"lifetime employment contract" between
plaintiffs and Amoco. Amoco has
fervently denied entering into any
lifetime employment contracts with the
plaintiffs. However, assuming for
purposes of this motion that such
contracts existed, it is apparent as a
10
matter of law that they were not breached
on the undisputed facts of this case.
Although lifetime employment
contracts are relatively rare in industry
today, they do exist and they have been
recognized by several states to be valid
and binding. Generally, of course, the
typical employment contracts which
contain no fixed period of employment are
construed as terminable at will by either
party. See Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina
Chepicai €o65; 2241) Ala. 660; 136.431
(1930). Under certain circumstances,
however, employment contracts which
purport to be terminable only at the will
of the employee will be held to create a
valid and binding contract of "permanent"
or "lifetime" employment in favor of the
ll
employee. See Alabama Mills, Inc. v.
Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939).
Nevertheless, Alabama law on this
question follows that of most other
states which recognize lifetime
employment contracts, and holds that
there are certain limitations implied by
law with regard to such contracts.
Specifically, even where a lifetime
employment contract is legally
enforceable, the law implies the
condition that the contract lasts only so
long as the employer remains in the
business for which the employee was hired
and needs the particular services the
employee was hired to perform. Alabama
Wat3e, 266 So. at FOE; FOZ. Accord,
Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418
12
So. 20 903, 906 (Ala. 1982)3 United
Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281
Ala. 264, 201 So. 2d 853, 854-55 (1967);
Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423
So. 2d 896, 898-99 (Ala. App. 1982).
In the present case, it is undisputed
that Amoco se14 i883. EOtest bee
business to Norgas, and abandoned the
retail LPG business in Alabama. Prior to
the sale, the various plaintiffs had held
positions as salesmen, sales office
Supervisors, and sales and service
representatives in various retail sales
branches of Amoco's LPG operations. °
After the sale, it is untontroverted on
the record that Amoco no longer engaged
in the retail sales of liquid propane,
and no longer needed the services the
13
6
plaintiffs had been hired to perform.
This being so, the above-cited
authorities make it clear as a matter of
law that Amoco is entitled to summary
Judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for
breach of lifetime employment contracts.
Even assuming that such contracts were
made, they were not breached, since they
terminated as a matter of law when Amoco
left the retail LPG business in Alabama.
Cf. Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc.,
423 So. 2d at 897-99.
The plaintiffs attempt in vain to
escape the burden of the long line of
precedents mandating this result. First,
the plaintiffs argue that Amoco still
does some business in Alabama, and that
even after leaving the business of retail
14
sales of liquid propane, Amoco was under
a contractual duty to transfer the
plaintiffs to some other type of work in
some other division of Amoco's operations.
Alabama Mills and its progeny are
inapplicable, they argue, because in
those cases the employer no longer had
work of any kind for the terminated
employees to perform.
The plaintiffs labor against the
current. Under Alabama law, a lifetime
employment contract lasts only so long as
the employer remains in the particular
business for which the particular
employee was hired. Thus, in Alabama
Mills, the court stated:
15
A leading case upon
[the] subject [of lifetime
employment contracts] is
Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass.
544, 46 N.E. 117...-It was
said that what they meant
by a permanent employment
was so long as defendant
was engaged in the same
nature of business and
needed the service of such
an employee, and plaintiff
was able and willing to do
it satisfactorily and gave
no cause for his discharge.
If [the employee] has
purchased a contract by
which his employer leaves
the period of duration to
him, it resembles the
purchase of other sorts of
Option rights, subject to
the limitation impiedly
included THAT the employer
shall continue in such
business and need the
things to be done, which
the employee is to do. In
other words, such employee
must have a preference over
others in doing that sort
of work.
Alabama Mills, 186 So. at 701,
(emphasis supplied).
16
702
Thus, in order for the principle of
Alabama Mills to apply, it is not
necessary that the employer go out of
business totally. Rather, it is
sufficient that the employer is no longer
engaged in the business for which the
particular employee is hired, and thus no
longer in need of the particular services
the employee was hired to perform. This
is further confirmed by the decision of
the Alabama Supreme Court in Bates v. Jim
Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903
(1982). There, the plaintiff alleged
that he had entered into a contract of
lifetime employment with the defendant.
In reliance on this alleged contract, the
plaintiff had resigned from another job.
Before she reported for work with the
17
defendant, however, “economic conditions
caused [the defendant] to institute an
austerity program, which included a
hiring freeze." 418 So. 2d at 904.
Pursuant to this program, the plaintiff
was terminated. In the plaintiff's
subsequent suit for breach of a lifetime
employment contract, the Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's grant of
Summary judgment based upon proof that
the employer no longer needed the
services for which the plaintiff had
initially been hired, ” even though the
employer had not gone out of business
altogether. After quoting Alabama Mills,
the Court stated:
18
Thus, according to the
above definition, n
implicit term of the
employment contract wa
that the employee woul
remain employed only if
employer had need f
employee's services. |
trial court correctly f oe
that Bates was terminat:
because [the defendant
not need Bates’ services
the services of other new
employees at that time.
418 So. 2d at 906.
In the instant case, then, it 1s
legally immaterial that Amoco continued
to engage in some types of business in
Alabama following the sale of its LPG
Operations to Norgas. The salient point
is whether Amoco continued to engage in
the business for which the plaintiffs
were hired and continued to need the
services which plaintiffs were hired to
perform. As to that point, there is no
19
dispute of material fact in the record.
Following the Amoco-Norgas transaction,
Amoco was no longer in the retail LPG
business, and no longer needed*’the
plaintiffs' services as LPG retail sales
personnel. 8
Similarly flawed are the plaintiffs'
attempts to sidestep the plain import of
Alabama Mills and its progeny by claiming
that they were never told "that they
would have a job with Amoco [only] until
Amoco decided to sell its facilities."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,
p. 5). Under Alabama law, all lifetime
contracts terminate as a matter of law
when the employer ceases to engage in the
business for which the employee is hired.
There is no requirement that the employee
be notified of this possibility in
advance or that the term be expressed in
the contract itself? --rather, the term
is implied by law into every contract of
lifetime employment governed by Alabama
law.
The plaintiffs have adduced no
evidence tending to establish chat Amoco
continues to engage in the business for
which they were hired, and no evidence
that Amoco continues to need the services
which plaintiffs were hired to perform.
Thus, based on the record before the
Court, it is clear that there exists no
genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the plaintiffs' claims for
breach of lifetime employment contracts.
21
The Court concludes that defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims.
B. The Fraud Claims
The plaintiffs next allege two
discrete claims of fraud--one against
Amoco alone and the other against both
Amoco and Norgas. First, the plaintiffs
allege fraud with respect to their
continued employment by Amoco. In
substance the plaintiffs contend that
Amoco falsely represented that the LPG
Operation would not be sold, that
plaintiffs' jobs and benefits were
secure, and that benefits would only be
lost if plaintiffs voluntarily terminated
their employment with Amoco or if
plaintiffs failed to properly perform
22
their jobs. (Pretrial Order at
10-12), 10 Second, plaintiffs allege
that Amoco and Norgas conspired to
defraud the plaintiffs by misrepresenting
material facts concerning the terms of
the Amoco-Norgas sale (Pretrial Order at
ib ge Specifically, plaintiffs claim that
defendants conspired to misrepresent the
fact that plaintiffs' years of service
with Amoco would not be credited by
Norgas in calculating plaintiffs'
retirement benefits under the Norgas
retirement plan. As will be
demonstrated, both of these fraud claims
are legally deficient.
ls Fraud Concerning Continued
Employment with Amoco.
23
Turning first to the claim of fraud
with respect to plaintiffs' continued
employment with Amoco, it is apparent
from the record that these claims are
barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Fraud actions are governed
by a one-year statute of limitations
under the law of Alabama. Ala. Code
¥
(1975) § 6-2-39. See also Papastefan v.
B & L Construction Co. of Mobile, 385 So.
2d 966 (Ala. 1980). However,
[iJn actions seeking
relief on the ground of
fraud where the statute has
created a bar, the claim
must not be considered as
having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved
Seaentee OF the = Fe:
constituting the fraud,
after which he must have
one year within which to
prosecute his action.
24
Ala. Code (1975) § 6-2-3.
In applying this "savings
statute"
f°} 2s oe eng <
constituting the fraud' is
deemed to have been
discovered when it ought to
have been discovered; that
ig, @€ the: tie: of - the
discovery of facts which
would provoke inquiry by a
person of ordinary prudence
and which, if followed up,
would have led to the
discovery of the fraud.
Moore v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 434
So. 24 751, 7354 (Aiea. - £903} ¢ GNOt ing
Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co.,
inc.,., 3853 S060. 2@ 986 (aAi@. i999).
Accord, Pines v. Warnaco, Inc., 706 F.2d
1173 (llth Cir. 1983); Sexton v. Liberty
National Life Ine. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 21
(Ala. 1981); Seybold v. Magnolia Land
Co., 376 SO. 24@ 1083, 1087 {Bias £3793).
In other words, the statute of
y
Ce one 2 ee o£ fraud and
misrepresentation effectively begins to
run when the plaintiff "has either actual
knowledge of the violation or notice of
facts which, in the exercise of due
diligence, would have led to actual
knowledge thereof." Cf. First Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n of Miami v.
Mortgage Corp. of the South, 650 F.2d
£376, A378 (A5CR Cit. Unit B i862).
hecoerte, Wittevutt vv. Union O11 Co. of
California, 432 So. 2d 1217 (Ala. 1983);
Moulder v. Chambers, 390 So. 2d 1044 (Ala.
1981); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Griffin,
357 So. 26 sae) 1esa. i973}: Jennson Vv.
Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 389,
281 So. 24 636 (1973): State Security
Life Ine. CO. Ve Benson, 288 Ala. 497;
26
262 So. 264 745 (287235 See also Moss v.
Davitt, 244 Ala. S13; S32 fa. 2a S25
(233 27. More specifically, where (as
here) the alleged misrepresentations
related to future actions or conduct of
the defendant, the Alabama Supreme Court
has neld tnat the limitations period will
be deemed to have commenced at the time
"{wlhen Plaintiff first learned that
Defendant did not intend to perform as
represented." Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Employees Union, Local
453 v. McGriff, 398 So. 2d 249, 252, (Ala.
1981). Accord, Fuqua v. Barbe, 376 So.
2d 202, 203-04 (Bid. CiVa Bee
cert. denied 376 806. 22 25. (2...
1979),21
27
In the case sub judice, Amoco's
alleged representations that the LPG
operations would not be sold, and that
plaintiffs' jobs and benefits would not
be lost or terminated, were clearly
representations concerning future actions
or conduct of the defendant. Since it is
undisputed that all plaintiffs had actual
knowledge that Amoco did not intend to
perform as represented--no later than
August 21, 1979,!% the statute of
limitations on these claims expired, at
the latest, on August 21, 1980. McGriff,
aoe: S66 24 at 252. Fuqua v. Barbe, 376
So. 2d at 203-04. Since this lawsuit was
not filed until September 4, 1980, these
claims of fraud concerning job and
benefit security with Amoco are clearly
28
time-barred under Ala. Code (1975) §§
6-2-39 and 6-2-3.
Plaintiffs insist, however, that
their causes of action for fraud relating
to their continued employment with Amoco
did not accrue until September 4, 1980,
when the sale was officially closed and
they ceased to be employed by Amoco.
Although the plaintiffs did not allege
that these representations induced them
to accept employment with Amoco in the
first place, they do assert that they
relied on Amoco's representations
concerning their continued employment by
Staying "in place" in their jobs. Even
though they were aware of the
Amoco-Norgas sale by August 21, 1979, the
plaintiffs insist that they suffered no
29
legal injury as a result of their
previous reliance on Amoco's
misrepresentations until they were
actually taken off the Amoco payroll.
It is generally true, as plaintiffs
assert, that damage is an essential
element of a fraud action. "In equity,
as at law, with the exception of special
cases in some jurisdictions, fraud will
not be relieved against unless it is
shown that injury resulted or will result
to the complainants as a consequence of
said fraud." Smith v. Smith, 94 So. 2d
863, 868 (Ala. 1957) (emphasis supplied).
However, as McGriff and Fuqua make clear,
where the fraud alleged involves
representations of intended future action
or conduct by the defendant, the statute
30
of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff first learns that the
defendant does not intend to perform as
represented, regardless of whether the
plaintiff's injury has already resulted
or whether it is only substantially
certain to result at a specified time in
the future. Thus, in McGriff, the
plaintiff claimed that he was told by his
plant manager and his union steward that
he would receive a pension benefit at age
55 if he “stayed on the payroll" for 15
years and joined the union, and that in
1959 in reliance of those
representations, he accepted employment
with the defendant company and joined the
defendant union. In 1970, plaintiff was
injured during the course of his
31
employment. Thereafter, he was paid
workmen's compensation benefits for
approximately six years by his employer's
workmen's compensation carrier, but
remained on the payroll and received one
annual vacation pay check for each of the
years 1971 through 1975. In 1973,
plaintiff learned that the employer had
ceased making payments into the pension
fund on his behalf in 1970. In 1978, the
plaintiff sued the employer and the union
for breach of contract and fraud.
However, despite the obvious fact that
McGriff would not have been eligible to
receive pension benefits until sometime
after 1975, the Supreme Court of Alabama
held unequivocally that his cause of
action for fraud accrued in 1973, when it
32
became clear that he would not be paid a
pension in the future as promised:
When Plaintiff first
learned that Defendant did
not intend to perform as
represented, the statute
began to run. Fugua (sic)
v. Barbe, 376 So 2d 202
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979),
cert. denied 376 So. 2d 205
(Ala. 1979). Consequently.
appellee's cause of actio”
First accrued when he
received the letters above
set forth, representing
Appellant's position
Vis-a-vis Appellee's right
to a pension. From that
Gate, January 24, 1973,
Plaintiff had one year
within which to file his
cause of action bottomed on
allegations of fraud by
a 8 Pp @a 2 @ 42 8 * B
officers....-Plaintiff's
complaint, to which the
fraud claim was added by
amendment was filed in
April 1978, far beyond the
one year after discovery
period allowed by § 6-2-3.
33
McGriff, 398 So. 2d at 252.
The same rule was stated in Fuqua v.
Barbe. There, plaintiff alleged fraud as
to a promise to repair defective
construction. The plaintiff had given no
consideration in exchange for this
promise, and had not altered his position
to his detriment. The court held that
defendant was entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, because
plaintiff's fraud claim was untimely.
The court stated:
The fraud of defendant claimed
by plaintiff is not the extent
of an original defective
performance in construction,
but is the making of a
commitment to repair such
defects which he did not intend
to perform. When plaintiff
first learned that defendant
did not intend to perform as
represented, the statute began
to run.
34
376 So.2d at 203-04 (footnote omitted;
emphasis supplied).
These cases control as to the fraud
allegations relating to continued
employment of the plaintiffs by Amoco and
the receipt of Amoco employee benefits.
the alleged misrepresentations related to
future performance by Amoco. Even if the
representations were made as alleged by
plaintiffs, all of the plaintiffs knew by
August 21, 1979, that Amoco did not
intend to live up to the representations.
They knew then that Amoco had sold the
LPG operation to Norgas, and they knew
that they would be terminated by Amoco.
Therefore, the statute of limitations on
this fraud claim began to run no later
than that date.13 The present lawsuit
was filed on September 4, 1980, and this
35
fraud claim is therefore untimely as a
matter of law.
Even if the date of injury is the
relevant date, however, the plaintiffs'
claims are still barred. It must be
remembered that the claim we are
concerned with here is a fraud claim, not
a breach of contract claim.}4
The damage
which is essential to a fraud action is
damage "proximately resulting from
[plaintiff's] reliance." First Virginia
Bankshares of Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1313
(Sth Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S.
952 (1978)(emphasis supplied); Ellis v.
Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151, 1157-59 (N.D.
Ala. 1976), affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th
Cie. BEtt hs In the case at hand, the
only reliance alleged by plaintiffs is
36
that they remained "in place." (Pretrial
Order at 11-12; Transcript of February
25, 1985 Hearing at 21). However, the
plaintiffs have consistently failed to
identify any damage they might have
suffered which could fairly be said to
have proximately resulted from this “act"
of reliance. Certainly the loss of Amoco
employment and benefits did not result
from their staying "in place." Indeed,
if the plaintiffs had not stayed “in
place," they would still have lost their
Amoco benefits and their status as Amoco
employees. Therefore, even if the
plaintiffs are correct - that even where
the fraud alleged concerns assurances of
Future action by the defendant, the
statute of limitations does not begin to
37
run until the plaintiff suffers damage as
a proximate result of his reliance on the
misrepresentations-their claims are
barred. The loss of their jobs did not
proximately result from plaintiffs'
reliance on the defendant's period. To
the extent that staying "in place" did
constitute damage or result in damage of
some other kind to the plaintiffs-for
instance, the deprivation of an
Opportunity to negotiate the terms of the
Sale or to seek other employment? -
that damage must have occurred prior to
August 21, 1979, when the plaintiffs
learned of the sale. After that time,
the plaintiffs could not have acted or
failed to act in justifiable reliance
upon any representations by Amoco
38
concerning the security of their jobs and
benefits or the existence of plans to
sell the LPG operation. It seems, then,
that the plaintiffs are posed a conundrum
of sorts. Either the fraud allegedly
perpetrated upon them did not proximately
result in damage to them at all, in which
case their claims fail for lack of an
essential element, or the plaintiffs
suffered damage prior to August 21, 1979,
and their claims are time-barred.!®
Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs
suffered some damage as a proximate
result of their reliance upon the alleged
misrepresentations concerning future
employment with Amoco, the Court
concludes that Amoco is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law with respect
39
to this fraud claim based upon the
Statute of limitations.
2. Fraud Concerning the Terms
of the Amoco-Norgas Sale.
With regard to the common law claims
for fraud and conspiracy to defraud made
against both Amoco and Norgas, the
plaintiffs allege that Amoco "did
fraudulently misrepresent ... that years
of service would be accumulated toward
retirement, [and] that retirement
benefits and the right to early
retirement would be protected."
(Pretrial Order at 10). Plaintiffs also
allege that Amoco and Norgas conspired to
misrepresent material facts about the
terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale in order
to “deceive the employees about the fact
40
that years of service for retirement and
pension purposes would not transfer to
Norgas." (Amended Complaint of June 25,
1982, at par. 6; see also Pretrial Order
ae 227. In other words, the thrust of
these claims is that Amoco and Norgas
misrepresented of failed to disclosel/
the true terms of the Norgas benefit plan
and the plaintiffs' rights under that
plan.
Viewed in this light, it becomes
plain that no recovery may be had upon
these state law fraud claims unless the
right to such recovery arises under ERISA.
Section 514 o£ S82isSs. 2.22
1144(a), preempts all state laws that
"relate to" any employee benefit plan:
41
Bzcept as provided in
subsection (b) of this section,
the“ erevisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit
plan described in § 1003(a) of
this title and not exempt under
§ 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis supplied).
The only state laws expressly exempted
from ERISA's broad preemptive sweep are
those laws regulating insurance, banking
and securities, and criminal laws of
general application. 239 @.9.Cs. §
1144(b).
_—_ een: Of €£his. e2zpftess
Congressional declaration of preemptive
intent, the Court need not determine
whether and to what extent state law
fraud and misrepresentation principles
might conflict with or alter the
42
requirements of ERISA. See Brown v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
International Union Local 54, U.S. ;
82 L.Ed.2d 373, 382-83 (1984); Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. De La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). The
import of the statutory language cannot
be mistaken. As the Supreme Court
Stated in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), ERISA was
"Meant to establish pension plan
administration as exclusively a federal
concern."
Recently, in Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 0.8. 83, (i983), the
Supreme Court confirmed ERISA's broad
preemptive sweep and further confirmed
that the term "relate to" as used in the
43
Act was to be given a liberal and broad
interpretation. As noted by the Court,
it was the intent of Congress to
eliminate all possibility of conflict
with state law principles and to make the
field of employee benefit plans
exclusively federal in nature. 463 U.S.
at 99-100, 105. Indeed, Congress
considered and rejected a proposal to
limit the preemptive scope of the statue
to the specific areas and issues
concerning employee benefit plans
directly regulated by ERISA's express
provisions, reasoning that "[s]Juch a
formulation raised the possibility of
endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on the
federal regulatory scheme." Shaw v.
44
Delita Air Lines, Ine., 463 U.S. at
99-100, n.20 (9183), quoting 120 Cong.
Rec. 29942. See also Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-1300
(N.D. Cal. 1977), affirmed 571 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.
831 (1978); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust
Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1130-31, n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affirmed 582 F.2d 1273
raee CiGs 2278) ¢ thus, the settled
construction of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) is
that it preempts not only state laws
dealing with subject matters directly
covered be ERISA, but also any state laws
which “relate” either directly or
indirectly to an employee benefit plan.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. at
98-100; Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten,
45
Inc., 451 U.S. at 525. Accord, Wadsworth
v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1977),
cert. denied 435 U.S. 980 (1978)3
District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983). See generally American
Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. of
New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784 (2d
Cir. 1983); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept. of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 599
F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
In the instant case, it is clear
that the state law claims of fraud and
conspiracy to defraud relating to the
terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale are
preempted. As noted above, the trust of
these claims is the failure to accurately
46
report or disclose the terms of the
Norgas benefit plan and the plaintiffs’
benefit rights following the sale. Thus,
it can hardly be disputed that, insofar
as state law fraud principles are
relevant here, they relate to the
administration of an employee benefit
plan governed by ERISA and are thus
preempted./® See Justice v. Bankers
8Q@itai FP. Supp.
(CV-83-L-5188-NE)(N.D. Ala. April 19,
1985)(state law claims of fraud based
upon suppression of material facts
relating to employee benefit plan
preempted by ERISA); District 65, UAW v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. at 1487 (state common law claims of
fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
47
tortuous interference with contact
preempted by ERISA); Ogden v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., 571 S. Supp. 520,
(E.D. Mich. 1983) (state common law fraud
claim dismissed as preempted by ERISA);
Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp.
745 (N.D. Ga. 1983)(state law
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary
duty claims preempted by ERISA); Ziskind
v. Retail Clerks International
Association, 3 E.B.C. 1012, 1014-1015
(E.D. Cal. 1982)(state cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation preempted
by ERISA). f. Russell v. Massachusetts
Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted U.S. oe}
L.Ed.2d 29 (October 2, 1984) 1? (state
law tort claims for negligent and
48
intentional infliction of emotional
distress preempted by ERISA); Dependahl
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S.
968 (1981)(state common law tortuous
interference with contract claim
preempted by ERISA); Kelly v. IBM, 573 F.
Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affirmed 746
F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1984)(state law
wrongful discharge claim preempted by
ERISA); UAW v. Dyneer Corp., 4 E.B.C.
1486, 1488 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affirmed 747
F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1984)(various state
law claims, including tort claim for
conversion, preempted by ERISA); Shaw v.
Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653
(C.D. Cal. 1983)(state common law breach
49
of contract claim preempted by ERISA).
Indeed, in the present case, it is
important to note that the plaintiffs’
claims of misrepresentation and
conspiracy to misrepresent deal with an
area already specifically regulated by
ERISA-namely, reporting and disclosure of
plan terms, provision of information to
participants, the content of plan
descriptions, and so on. See e.g., 29
U.S.C. §§ 1021 through 1030. To allow
plaintiffs to pursue the present common
law claims of misrepresentation would
bring to pass the very result which
Congress intended to prohibit - the
possibility of inconsistent state law
regulation of matters relating to the
administration of employee benefit plans.
50
For these reasons, the Court finds
that plaintiffs' state law claims of
fraud and conspiracy to defraud relating
to misrepresentation or nondisclosure of
material facts about the crediting of
Amoco service under Norgas ERISA plans
are indeed preempted. Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims.29
= or née 223732. © ieee
Having thus disposed of the
plaintiffs state law claims, we now come
to the core of this lawsuit. Although
the sale of Amoco's LPG facilities had
all the earmarks of a routine business
transaction, plaintiffs insist that
insofar as their employee benefits were
concerned, the terms of the sale and the
51
manner in which it was accomplished
violated several provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq. The primary theme of these ERISA
claims is that Amoco and Norgas violated
a supposed duty under ieRISA to effect the
LPG sale on terms that would ensure that
years of service with Amoco would be
credited in calculating benefits under
Norgas benefit plans.
ERISA is a comprehensive and
reticulated statute designed to prescribe
minimum vesting and accrual standards for
Gualifying employee retirement benefit
plans; to establish minimum rules for
employee participation and plan funding;
to delineate fiduciary standards for pla"
52
managers; and to otherwise ensure that
legitimate +=mployee pension expectations
are not @a@aeteeted. As ¢ oes Vy
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
S11 (1981). For purposes of the issues
presented here, the pertinent portion of
ERISA is Subchapter I of the Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144.
ERISA divides employee benefits
covered by the Act into two categories:
(1) pension benefits (referred to herein
as "retirement" benefits); and (2) all
other benefits (including, for example,
medical and disability). 23 UGC. §
1002(1)-(2). The Act terms the second
category "welfare" benefits. For both
categories of benefits, retirement and
welfare, ERISA imposes certain
53
disclosure and reporting requirements
(Subchapter I, Part 4, set forth at 29
0.8.¢C. $§ 2101-1114). Sethete most
importantly, ERISA requires that employer
plans providing both categories of
benefits be established and maintained in
writing, 29 0.8.C. § 1102(a), and that
the rights conferred by the terms of such
written plans are enforceable by the
participants as a matter of federal law.
29 U.S.C. § 1132.
In addition, for certain but not all
retirement benefits, ERISA imposes
minimum requirements for the
participation in and the vesting of
benefits under retirement plans
(Subchapter I, Part 2, set forth at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061) and for the funding
54
of plans to ensure that assets are
available to pay the retirement benefits
when the time comes (Subchapter I, Part
3, set forth at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086).
These participation, vesting, and funding
requirements are not applicable to
welfare benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§
10S i, ASS ct eats The vesting
requirements for retirement benefits
apply to what the particular plan
establishes as the "normal retirement
benefit" that will be paid at the "normal
retirement age". 29 UsS.C."§ 105344}.
With whatever "normal retirement benefit"
the particular plan establishes as the
reference, ERISA sets minimum benefit be
attributed to the employee as a function
of his years of participation in the plan
55
(which, for present purposes, may be
considered to be his years of service
with the employer). 29 U.S.C. § 1054.
ERISA's minimum vesting standards require
that after a number of years of service,
an employee's "right" to whatever accrued
benefit he has earned to that time cannot
be forfeited even though his service with
the employer terminates before he reaches
what the particular plan defines as the
"normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C. §
1053.
A retirement benefit that is vested
may still be “contingent" in several
important respects. 29 U.S.C §
1053(a)(3)(A)-(D). In particular, a plan
may permissibly provide that vested
benefits are not payable until normal
56
retirement age and, if the employee dies
before that time, his benefit, while
vested, generally need not be paid. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. Southern Nevada
Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust,
662 F.2d 617, 619-620 (9th Cir. 1981).
On the other hand, welfare benefits and
the so-called “ancillary"™ retirement
benefits, including early retirement
benefits such as plaintiffs complain of
in this case, may be "contingent" in a
much more persuasive sense -- ERISA
does not require that such benefits be
vested and nonforfeitable. Sutton v.
Weirton Steel Division of National Steel
Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, > - » £4 2.GEs
2387 (1984); Petrella v. NL Industries,
57
Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1364-1366 (D.
N.J. 1982). Accordingly, an employee's
"rights" to such benefits may be
forfeited entirely if his service with
the employer is terminated before he
becomes eligible under the plan's terms
for payment of such benefits. Petrella
v. NL Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. at
1364-65.
It is equally important to note that
ERISA does not require that employers
provide employee benefits at all; does
not confer a general right to continued
employment in order to earn vested
retirement benefits or to become eligible
for other benefits; and does not mandate
the level or amount of such benefits.
58
([A]n employer has no
affirmative duty to provide
employees with a pension plan.
H.Rep. No. 93-807, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News,
4670, 4677. In enacting
ERISA, Congress continued its
reliance on voluntary action
by employers by granting
substantial tax advantages for
the creation of qualified
retirement programs. Id.
Neither Congress nor the
courts are involved in either
the decision to establish a
plan or in the decision
concerning which benefits a
plan should provide. In
particular, courts have no
authority to decide which
benefits employers must confer
upon their employees; these
are decisions which are more
appropriately influenced by
forces in the marketplace and,
when appropriate, by federal
legislation.
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement
Program, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir.
1984
S.Ct.
), cert. denied U.S
’
105
786 (1985)(emphasis in original).
59
Accord Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahnattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. at S511, 512-14.
A claim of wrongful denial or
deprivation of employee benefits under
ERISA involved a two-pronged inquiry:
(1) is the action or conduct complained
of contrary to the terms of the plan
itself? (2) are the terms of the plan or
the conduct complained of independently
violative of ERISA's substantive
requirements?
In this case, the answer to the
first question is undisputed. The
Standard Plan itself did not confer upon
plaintiffs a right to guaranteed or
continued employment with Amoco in order
to earn retirement benefits. Rather, the
Plan expressly provided that:
Nothing contained in this
Plan shall be construed as a
contract of employment between
an employer and any employee,
Or as a right of any employee
to be continued in the
employment of an employer.
(Webb Affidavit, Ex. A at § 14.07,
Appendix in Support of Amoco's Motion for
Summary Judgment at A354). Nor did the
terms of that plan require that Amoco
arrange for plaintiffs' years of service
with Amoco to be credited for all
purposes under the retirement plan cf any
future purchaser of the LPG operation.
Nor do plaintiffs contend that there was
a forfeiture of any vested retirement
benefit to which they were entitled under
the Standard Plan. Rather, those
plaintiffs who were vested under the
Standard Plan at the time of the sale of
the LPG operation to Norgas are
61
receiving, at their option under that
plan, an annuity based upon their length
of service with Amoco. (Pretrial Order
at 9). 21 Finally, plaintiffs have never
even alleged that the terms of any other
benefit plan available to employees of
Amoco were violated by the Amoco-Norgas
sale.
Accordingly, despite plaintiffs'
generic allegations that the Amoco-Norgas
transaction deprived them of “benefit
rights," their claim that the
Amoco-Norgas agreement could have been
more generous in its benefit provisions,
standing alone, has no force in law.
Because nothing in the plans available to
Amoco employees required otherwise,
plaintiffs' complaints that their years
62
of service with Amoco are not credited
for all purposes under Norgas' retirement
plan and their related complaints about
the effect of the sale on their pension
rights are legally immaterial unless
ERISA forbids the arrangement agreed upon
by Amoco and Norgas. Apart from the
specific restrictions set forth in the
Statute, "ERISA permits the total benefit
levels and formulas for determining their
accrual before completion of 15 years of
service to vary from plan to plan."
Alessi, 451 U.S at 513-14. Thus, because
there is no allegation of breach of the
terms of any plan available to them as
Amoco employees (or for that matter, any
Norgas plans), plaintiffs' claims fail as
a matter of law unless the Amoco-Norgas
63
ae ee & &
7
> =
sale violated one or more of ERISA's
specific restrictions.
The plaintiffs claim that several
ERISA's specific substantive provisions
have in fact been violated on the facts
of this case:
(2?) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. § 1060(b)(2) by failing
to credit plaintiffs' prior years of
service with Amoco for purposes of
benefit accrual under the Norgas
retirement plan.
(2) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. § 1056 by interfering
with plaintiffs' possible future
64
attainment of early retirement benefits
under the Amoco plan.
(3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(acting in concert with Norgas) violated
a fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104
to act solely on behalf of the plan
participants in negotiating the terms of
the sale insofar s those terms affected
the plaintiffs' benefits under the Amoco
plan.
(4) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(acting in concert with Norgas) violated
29 U.S.C. § 1106 by engaging in a
transaction involving the plan on behalf
of parties whose interests were adverse
to the interests of plan participants,
and by dealing with the assets of the
plan in their own interests.
65
3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140 and 1141 by
interfering with rights or the attainment
of rights to which plaintiffs might have
become entitled under the Amoco plan.
(6) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(but not Norgas) violated the reporting
and disclosure requirements of 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1022 and 1024 by failing to disclose
the circumstances and modifications which
might result in disqualification,
ineligibility, denial or loss of benefit
under the Amoco plan.
In short, the plaintiffs have
invoked every section of ERISA which is
even colorably applicable to the facts of
this case. As will be seen, however
66
these ERISA violations are more easily
pleaded than proved. Although ERISA's
substantive provisions have been
systematically invoked and clothed in
verbiage and allegations which carefully
track the tent of the Act, in each
instance the plaintiffs proceed from
faulty premises and inadequate
foundations of fact. Consequently, each
of their claims under ERISA fails as a
matter of law. 22 We will proceed to
address each claim separately.
A. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1060
The plaintiffs insist that by
failing to credit their prior years of
service with Amoco in calculating the
accrual of benefits under the Norgas
plan, Amoco and Norgas violated 29 U.S.C.
67
§ 1060. That section provides in
pertinent part:
(bo) For purposes of this part
and part 3 -~
e2 in any case in which
the employer maintains a plan
of a predecessor employer,
service for such predecessor
shall be treated as service
for the employee, and
(2) in any case in which
the employer maintains a plan
which is not the plan
maintained by a predecessor
employer, service for such
predecessor shall, to the
extent provided in regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of
68
the Treasury, be treated as
service for the employer.
29 U.S.C. § 1060{b).
This provision forms a crux of this
entire controversy, for the heart of the
plaintiffs' case is and always has been
their claim that they should receive
Credit for their years of service with
Amoco for purposes of computing benefits
under the Norgas retirement plan.?23
Plaintiffs allege that defendants
Violated this provision of ERISA by
failfing] to maintain the
predecessor plan so that
years of service would be
treated as years with
Nersg9eeés o£ ion the
alternative to maintain a
Separate plan from the
predecessor plan but to
have years of service in
69
ye
the predecessor corporation
(Amoco) treated as years of
service for the employer
(Norgas) ({29 U.S.C. §]
1060).
(Pretrial Order at 14).
The allegaticn "in the alternative"
notwithstanding, subsection (b)(1) is
irrelevant to this case. i ae
undisputed that Norgas and its employees
were part of a pre-existing plan. Apart
from the fact that about 400 people (out
of a total of approximately 56,000) left
the Standard Plan due to the Norgas sale,
the sale had no effect on the Standard
Plan. Nothing in the words of §
1060(b)(1) requires that the plan of a
predecessor employer actually be
maintained by a successor employer,
either "in the alternative" to the
70
requirements of subsection (b)(2) or
otherwise. Rather, the plain words of
Subsection (b)(1) provide only that
Service with a predecessor employer
"Shall be treated as service" with a
Successor employer if the successor
elects to maintain the plan of the
predecessor. Moreover, that plain
meaning is confirmed by the legislative
history. See House Conference Rep. No.
93-1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong.& Ad.News 5038, 5047 ("[sJlervice
with a predecessor employer must be
counted for purposes of the plan if the
Successor employer continues to maintain
the plan of the predecessor employer...")
(emphasis supplied). Where, as here, a
predecessor plan is not maintained by a
71
successor employer, § 1060(b)(1) is
4
simply inapplicable. -
Nor is Section 1060(b)(2) the oasis
that plaintiffs would like it to be. The
language of subsection (b)(2) requires a
successor employer to credit an
employee's years of service with a
predecessor employer for purposes of
determining that employer's retirement
benefits only if and to the extent the
Secretary of Treasury issues regulations
requiring such service to be credited.
Since the Secretary of Treasury has never
required, by regulation or otherwise,
that such service be credited, it is
clear from the statutory language that,
for now at least, such service need not
be credited by a successor employer.
72
Whether the failure to promulgate
regulations requiring successor employers
to credit service with a predecessor
employer has been a conscious policy
decision in the part of the Secretary or
not, the plain import of § 1060(b)(2) is
that Congress chose to vest the Secretary
with the discretionary authority to
decide if and to what extent such service
should be credited. Unless and until the
Secretary requires otherwise, Congress
obviously chose as a matter of policy not
to require prior service with a
predecessor employer to be taken into
account in calculati:.g benefits under the
Successor employer's separate retirement
plan.
73
Plaintiffs' claim under § 1060(b)(2)
in essence asks this Court to construe §
1060(b)(2) as if it read: “service for
such predecessor shall be treated as
service for the employer except as
regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury otherwise allow." While
Congress could easily have drafted the
subsection that way, it chose not to do
so. Rather, it provided that service
with a predecessor shall be treated as
service with a successor only "to the
extent provided" by any affirmative
regulations the Secretary of Treasury
might choose to promulgate. This Court
is bound by the Congressional directive
embodied in the clear language of the
statute, absent a clearly expressed
74
legislative intention to the contrary.
See Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,
Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463
U.S. 855, 77 L.Ed.2d 1072, 1078 (1983);
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S.
300, 312 (1983); Consumer Product Safety
Commission v. GET Sylvania, Inc., 44/7
U.S. 102, 108 (1980); United States v.
640.00 Acres of Land in Dade County,
Florida, — F.2d (No. 82-5510)
(llth Cir. April 3, 1985); Scarborough v.-
OPM, 723 F.2d 801, 812 (llth Cir. 1984).
There is nothing in ERISA" sS
legislative history to cast doubt upon
the plain meaning of the statute, much
less anything amounting to “a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the
75
contrary." American Bank & Trust Co. Vv.
Dallas County, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1078. The
House Conference Report declares quite
simply that except where the successor
employer maintains the plan of a
predecessor employer, the question of
whether service with the predecessor is
to be credited is left entirely to the
determination of the Secretary of
Treasury:
Service with a predecessor
must be counted for
purposes of the plan if the
successor employer
continues to maintain the
plan of the predecessor
employer.... The question
of the extent to which such
service must be counted in
other circumstances is to
be determined under
regulations.
House Conference Report No. 93-1280,
76
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.
News at 5038, 5047, 5052. Other portions
of the legislative history make it even
clearer that § 1060(b), standing alone,
does not require the crediting of prior
service with a predecessor employer:
[W]here the employee moves
from one employer to
another the ancillary
benefits (which are
usually on a contingency
basis) would often be
provided by the new
employer, whereas the new
employer would not provide
pension benefits based on
years with the old
employer.
House Report No. 93-807, reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4670,
4726.
Apparently, only one court has
addressed the issue of a successor
employer's obligation to credit prior
years of service with a predecessor
employer for retirement benefit purposes.
In Vorpahl v. Union Oil Co. Retirement
Plan, 4 E.B.C. 2565 (D. Minn. 1983),
affirmed F.2d (No. 83 2528 (8th
Cir. December 14, 1984), the court
analyzed the issue and concluded that a
successor employer is not required to
credit an employee's years of service
with a predecessor employer for purposes
of determining that employer's benefits
under the successor employer's pension
plan. However, rather than focusing its
inquiry on Section 1060(b)(2), the
Vorpahl court looked to Department of
Labor regulations defining "year of
78
service." This regulation states in
pertinent part:
§ 2530.204-l. Year of
Participation for Benefit
Accrual
kkk
(6b) Service Which May be
Disregarded for Purposes
Of Benefit Accrual. (1)
In calculating an
employee's period of
service for purposes of
benefit accrual under a
defined benefit pension
Plan, § 204(b)(3) [29
U.S.C. § 1054(b)(3)] of
the Act and § 411(b)(3)
of the [Internal Revenue]
Code permit the following
S09 5 6.6 ts be
disregarded: service
before an employee first
becomes a participant in
the plan;
29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1(b) (1976). Thus,
not only has the Secretary of Treasury
chosen not to issue regulations requiring
79
an employee's service with a predecessor
employer to be credited in calculating
retirement benefits under the successor's
own plan, but the Department of Labor
regulation defining "year of service"
expressly permits an employer to
disregard an employee's service before he
becomes a participant in its pension plan.
See Vorpahl, 4 EBC at 2575. Therefore,
since plaintiffs were not participants in
the Norgas retirement plan during their
prior years with Amoco, Norgas is under
no statutory obligation to credit their
years of service with Amoco for purposes
of calculating their Norgas retirement
benefits.
Finally, in response to plaintiffs'
apparent argument that this Court should
80
fashion such a requirement, it is
important to note the very real dangers
involved in such an endeavor. In the
first place, judicial exercise of the
authority delegated to the Secretary of
Treasury would contravene the language of
the statute and the principles of
Statutory construction discussed above,
as well as the clearly expressed
legislative intent of Congress that the
"question of the extent to which such
service must be counted. ..is to be
determined under regulations." House
Conference Report No. 93-1280, 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 5038, 5047, 5052.
Furthermore, settled legal principles
dictate that courts may not exercise the
authority to promulgate legislative rules
81
that a statute delegates to an
administrative agency or other rulemaking
body. See, @.0@., Sierra Club v.
Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d
1165, Tis CTtn Cif. 2993). See also
Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers, U.S. Army, 356 F. Supp. 14, 18
(S.D. N.Y. 1973) (“where Congressional
action has provided an administrative
process for the resolution of particular
subjects, great respect must be paid to
the presumptive exclusivity of that
process").
From a more practical viewpoint, the
creation of crediting requirements by a
court under § 1060(b)(2) would involve
numerous questions of policy, the
resolution of which would have
82
consequences far beyond the case at hand.
Requiring a successor employer to credit
an employee's years of service with a
predecessor employer could frustrate the
very purpose of ERISA. In large part,
ERISA was enacted to protect and secure
the viability and desirability of
employer-established retirement programs
for employees. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 4639; S. Rep. No.
383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974
U-~S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4890.
However, requiring a successor employer
to credit an employee's years of service
with a predecessor employer for
retirement purposes would dramatically
increase an employer's cost of operating
83
a retirement benefit plan for its
employees, since the successor would be
required to immediately fund a retirement
plan much more heavily whenever it adds
employees previously covered umder a
predecessor employer's plan. Faced with
this dilemma, many employers might choose
not to establish or continue a retirement
plan rather than incur the significant
cost of funding an employee's years of
service with a predecessor employer.
Alternatively, the employer may simply
choose not to hire the employees of the
predecessor .29 In either event, the
employees in question would be adversely
affected--i.e., they would either lose
their retirement plan or lose their jobs.
Surely Congress could not have intended
such a severe result. Thus, it may not
be altogether surprising that the
Secretary of Treasury has chosen not to
issue regulations imposing such a credit
requirement. © This Court is hardly
competent to second-guess such decisions
of Congress and its delegates on
difficult questions of legislative policy.
The function of this Court is to apply
the statutes, not to rewrite them.
In short, unless and until the
Secretary of Treasury prescribed
Otherwise, Section 1060(b)(2) does not
require a successor employer to credit an
employee's service with a predecessor
employer?/
in calculating the employee's
retirement benefits under the successor's
separate retirement plan. Accordingly,
85
the defendants are entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law with respect to the
Section 1060(b) claims.2®
B. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1056
Plaintiffs next contend that by
entering into the Amoco-Norgas sale
defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1056,
inasmuch as they interfered "with the
rights of the plaintiffs in the
attainment of service requirements
necessary to obtain early retirement
peietiees* (Plainti€tis* Brief in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 37). This claim is
specious. This section of ERISA is quite
limited in scope and effect. It provides
in pertinent part:
86
a Each pension
plan shall provide that
unless the participant
Otherwise elects, the
payment of benefits under
the plan to the participant
Shall begin not later than
the 60th day after the
latest of the close of the
plan year in which--
(1) the date on which
the participant
attains the earlier of
age 65 or the normal
retirement age
specified under the
plan,
(2) occurs on the 10th
anniversary of the
year in which the
participant commenced
participation in the
plan, or
(3)the participant
terminates his service
with the employer.
In the case of a plan
which provides for the
payment of an early
retirement benefit,
Such plan shall
provide Saat a
87
participant who
: satisfied the service
requirements for such
early retirement
1 benefit, but separated
from the service (with
any nonforfeitable
4 right to an accrued
benefit) before
satisfying the age
requirement for such
‘ early retirement
benefit, is entitled
upon satisfaction of
: such age requirement
to receive a benefit
not less than the
| benefit to which he
would be entitled at
the normal retirement
age, actuarially
q reduced under
regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of
7 the Treasury.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(a). In short, § 1056
7 merely requires that if a plan provides
; early retirement benefits, an employee
who has satisfied plan requirements as
to years of service shall be entitled to
88
receive an actuarially reduced benefit
upon reaching the early retirement age
specified in the plan, even if that
employee leaves the employer's service
prior to attaining early retirement age.
It is important to recognize that
neither ERISA in general nor § 1056 in
particular require a plan to provide
early retirement benefits at all.
Moreover, even if an employer does
provide early retirement benefits, §
1056 itself does not confer upon plan
participants any substantive right to
continued employment in order to meet
service requirements and qualify for
early retirement benefits under the
terms of the particular plan.
89
In the present case, it is undisputed
that the terms of the Amoco plan go well
beyond the minimum requirements of §
1056 by giving terminated employees the
option to receive actuarially reduced
benefits immediately upon their
termination rather than requiring that
the terminated employees attain the
early retirement age specified in the
plan before receiving vested early
retirement benefits. It is also
undisputed that all plaintiffs who were
vested under the Amoco plan elected that
option and are currently receiving such
payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).
With this in mind, it is piain that the
claim of a violation of § 1056 has no
Support whatsoever on this record. The
90
plaintiffs are apparently laboring under
the misapprehension that ERISA in
general and § 1056 in particular provide
comprehensive protection of the inchoate
interests of employees in such unfunded,
contingent benefits. Such is not the
case. Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel
Division of National Steel Corp., 724
F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
U.S. » 104 S.Ct. 2387
(1984).
Because Section 1056 confers no
substantive right to continued
employment in order to earn vested
rights to early retirement benefits, the
defendants are entitled to judgment on
the Section 1056 claims as a matter of
law.2?
91
C. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C.§ 1104
Plaintiffs next contend that Amoco
and Norgas violated their fiduciary
duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104. That
provision of ERISA provides in pertinent
part:
Subject to sections
1103(c) and (d), 1342, and
42344 .@£ <6 £44304 «a
fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the
interest of tre
pat &i@ 4-364 te and
beneficiaries and... for
the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits
to participants and
their beneficiaries;
and
( 2,43 defraying
reasonable expenses of
administering the plan
92
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). PlaintiffS base
their claims of a violation of this
section upon the following allegations:
Amoco dealt with the
plan and the assets of the
plan in its own interests
and not in the interests of
the plan participants in
that it received more money
for the facilities by not
transferring years of
service and/or the
accumulated benefits of the
participants in the plan to
Norgas and further were
allowed to keep and
maintain the additional
Sums of money in the plan
for the use of other
participants, including
itself, to the damage of
plaintiffs.
(Pretrial Order at 16). In other words,
plaintiffs' theory with respect to their
§ 1104 claims is quite similar to the
Substance of their § 1060 claims: they
claim that in negotiating the terms of
93
the sale of its LPG operation, Amoco was
under a fiduciary duty to ensure that
plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco
would be credited for all purposes undec
the Norgas retirement plan, and that
Amoco's failure to arrange a sale
transaction meeting these standards
violates the statute. Furthermore,
although plaintiffs admit that Norgas was
not a fiduciary with respect to the Amoco
plan and hence owed no direct fiduciary
duties to olaintiffs as beneficiaries of
that plan, 29.5 they contend that Norgas
is liable for assisting Amoco in the
commission of a breach of Amoco's
fiduciary duties. Cf. Donovan v.
Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 411 (S.D.
Ala. 1982) (holding that nonfiduciaries
94
may be accountable under ERISA for
breaches of fiduciary duty which they
help promote). 30
Plaintiffs' claim under § 1104 is
without merit. The fiduciary duty
provisions of ERISA are not implicated
in the sale of a business or a portion of
a business merely because the terms of
the sale will affect the terms and
conditions of contingent future
retirement benefits.
This is lucidly illustrated by the
related cases of Sutton v. Weirton Steel
Division of National Steel Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 1184 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), and Dhayer
. Weirton Steel Division of National
Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. W.Va.
1983), both of which were affirmed in
Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of
National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied i P
104 6.Ctsc 2387 (1984). In Sutton and
Dhayer, plaintiffs included both union
and non-union employees of National
Steel's Weirton Steel Division. There,
as here, the plaintiffs challenged the
sale of a division of their employer's
business and the terms of the underlying
transaction on the grounds that, as a
result of ‘the sale, their non-vested
retirement and early retirement benefits
and other contingent benefits would be
adversely affected. Specifically, the
terms of the sale provided that the
seller's existing benefit plan would be
amendec so that the sale itself would not
96
trigger entitlements to different types
of early retirement and severance pay
benefits. See Sutton, 724 F.2d at 409.
As in the present case, the plaintiffs
were to become employees of the successor
employer, and their eligibility for early
retirement benefits was to be more
limited than under the predecessor
employer's plan. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at
1190; Dhayer, S71 fF. Gene. St 32.
There, as here, the employees alleged
that avoidance of pension and welfare
benefit obligations was the employer's
motive in agreeing to the sale and its
terms. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1198;
Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.
Because the cases were being decided
On summary judgment, the district court
specifically assumed as true "that
avoiding future pension obligations was
the sole motivation of [the
employer-seller]." Sutton, 567 F. Supp.
at 1198; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.
Nevertheless, the court squarely rejected
the plaintiffs' claim that, under § 1104,
National Steel h§8d a fiduciary obligation
to act solely in the interest of
beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of
the sale. In so holding, the court noted
that ERISA simply does not prohibit a
company from eliminating previously
offered benefits which are neither vested
nor accrued. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at
1196, 1200; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 324,
328-29. Accord Petrella v. Nels
Industries, 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1365-66
98
iD. BiJa 1382) « Likewise, the court
held, there is no requirement that
day-to-day corporate business
transactions, which may have a collateral
effect on prospective, contingent
employee benefits, be performed solely in
the interest of plan participants:
When acting on behalf of
the pension fund, there is
no doubt that [an employer
who is also a fiduciary
with respect to a plan]
must act solely to benefit
part ieipaents2 aad
beneficiaries. However, it
is the Court's opinion here
that when a corporate
employer negotiates the
terms of the sale of a
division, whose employees
are participants in a
pension plan, the
negotiations that affect
the terms and conditions of
future benefits (at least
EROS (FRA are, aot
protected by ERISA'sS
ie oer Sat ole tee ee and
99
neon Cette Caset ait
provisions), do not
implicate fiduciary duties
as to the pension fund.
Such negotiations are
distinct from actually
administering a plan and
conducting transactions
affecting the monies and
property of the plan's fund.
In other words, the mere
fact that a company has
named itself as pension
plan administrator or
trustee does not restrict
it from pursuing reasonable
business behavior in
negotiations concerning
pension benefits not
otherwise affected by the
requirements of ERISA. See
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
Ges SOLs S22 Bede wee
(1981).
Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer,
571 F. Supp. at 328-29. Accordingly, the
district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer-seller.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. After noting the district
100
court's assumption that National Steel's
sole motivation for the sale was avoiding
future pension obligations, the appellate
court held first that ERISA does not
require the vesting and nonforfeitability
of early retirement and other ancillary
benefits. The court further held that
ERISA does not impose any fiduciary
obligations on an employer to maintain
and protect future contingent benefit
rights in negotiating the sale of a
division:
Congress ... has not
prohibited an employer who
is also a fiduciary from
exercising the right
accorded other employers to
renegotiate or amend, as
the case may be, unfunded
contingent benefits payable
before the normal
retirement age. The
changes, accomplished in
101
this matter, are not to be
reviewed by fiduciary
standards.
724 F.2d at 410-411.
Considering the Weirton Steel
decisions in the context of the present
case, it is clear that plaintiffs' claims
under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 are without merit.
As noted in the previous discussion of 29
U.S.C. § 1060, infra, ERISA presently
imposes no requirement that service with
a predecessor employer be credited in
calculating benefits under the
successor-employer's plan. Thus, neither
Norgas nor Amoco violated ERISA in their
capacity as employers by failing to
include such a provision in the sale
agreement. Moreover, despite the fact
that the sale obviously had certain
102
effects upon plaintiffs' benefits under
the Amoco plan, clearly neither Amoco nor
Norgas had any fiduciary duty under ERISA
to act solely in the plaintiffs'
interests in negotiating the terms upon
which the LPG operations were to be sold.
A contrary holding would mean that every
corporate business decision which had any
possible collateral effect on pension
benefits would have to be made "solely in
the interests of pension plan
beneficiaries and participants." Cf.
Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200; Dhayer, 571
F. Supp. at 328. At least insofar as
contingent future benefit rights are
concerned, Congress clearly could not
have intended such a pernicious result.
103
The Court finds the Weirton Steel
cases persuasive and controlling, and
agrees that "when a corporate employer
negotiates the sale of a division, whose
employees are participants in a pension
plan, the negotiations that affect the
terms and conditions of [non-vestecd
future pension benefits ... do n
implicate fiduciary duties as to tne
pension fund." Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at
1201; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 328.
Plaintiffs have cited no contrary
authority even arguably on point.
If Congress explicitly considered
the question of whether successor
employers must credit service with a
predecessor employer, and left the
question to be determined under Treasury
Regulations, it would seem clear that
Congress could not have intended § 1104
to implicitly require such crediting in
any event. The plaintiffs' theory under
§ 1104 would seem to render § 1060(b)
essentially redundant, even under their
Own reading of the latter provision.
Based upon the foregoing discussion,
then, the Cou es Finds that
defendants?!
are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law with respect to the
Claims made under 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
D. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1106
Plaintiffs next allege that Amoco and
Norgas violated 29 U.S.C. § 1106, which
provides, inter alia:
(a) ss
105
(i) A fiduciary with
respect to a plan shall not
cause the plan to engage in
a transaction, if he knows
or should know that such a
transaction constitutes a
direct or indirect --
(A) sale or exchange, or
leasing, of any property
between the plan and a
party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by
or for the benefit of, a
party in interest, of any
assets of the plan;
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan
shall not --
(1) deal with the assets of
the plan in his own
interest or for his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in
any other capacity act in
any transaction involving
the plan on behalf of a
party (or represent a
party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of
the plan or the interests
106
of its participants or
beneficiaries, or receive
any consideration for his
Own personal account from
any party dealing with such
plan in connection with a
transaction involving the
assets cf the plan.
29 U.S.C. § i106.
Plaintiffs contend that Amoco was a
fiduciary with respect to the Amoco Plan
and that by selling the LPG operations
without ensuring that service with Amoco
would be credited for all purposes under
the Norgas retirement plans, Amoco acted
in a "transaction involving the plan" on
behalf of parties whose interests were
adverse to the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries; dealt
with the assets of the plan in its own
interests; and caused the plan to emerge
107
in a transaction which indirectly
aan nee 8 penefkit"™ to a
party-in-interest -- namely Amoco. This,
say the plaintiffs, constitutes a
prohibited transaction under §1106.22
Although the plaintiffs have
attempted to couch their allegations in
the language of the statute itself, it is
DBliain that § 1106 applies only to
transactions to which the plan itself is
a party or in which the monies, property
or fiscal assets of the plan are
involved, and it has been construed
accordingly. Sutton v. Weirton Steel
Division of National Steel Corp., 567
F.Supp. 1184, 1199 (N.D. W.Va. 1983);
Dhayer v. Weirton Steel Division of
National Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316,
108
327 (N.D. W.Va., 1983) [both affirmed in
Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of
National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 0.8, >
L046 8. Ct. 2387 (1984)i. Accord, Donovan
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
Congress did not intend an expansive
interpretation of Section 1106. Evans v.
Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1500 n.3 (llth
Cit. 1963).
In the present case, the
evidence stands uncontroverted that the
Standard Plan was not a party to the
Amoco-Norgas transaction (See Affidavit
of William C. Jackson). Nor did the LPG
facilities involve any transfer of the
109
funds or assets held by the Standard Plan.
(Id).
Plaintiffs' only effort to
establish evidentiary support for the §
1106 claim is their contention that
"Amoco did receive more money for the
[LPG] participants in the plan to Norgas."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
at 41; see also Pretrial Order at 15-16).
However, the evidence is undisputed that
no funds or property held by the plan
were transferred, and plaintiffs were not
deprived of any benefit required to be
vested and nonforfeitable by ERISA.
Indeed, plaintiffs admittedly received
all benefits to which they had already
become entitled under the terms of the
110
Standard Plan by the time of the sale and
their consequent termination of
employment with Amoco. As a matter of
law, Amoco's contingent future liability
for non-vested benefits -- i.e.,
plaintiffs' inchoate interest in their
"years of service" with Amoco for
purposes of the putative benefits to
which they might have become entitled had
they continued to work for Amoco -- did
not itself constitute an "asset" of the
plan for purposes of § 1106, so as to
prohibit Amoco from dealing with those
contingent liabilities in its own
interest or in ways adverse to the
interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries. See Sutton v. Weirton
Steel Division of National Steel Corp.,
111
724 F.2d at 411-412. As noted above, the
mere fact that an employer also acts as a
plan fiduciary does not restrict it from
pursuing reasonable business behavior in
negotiating the sale of a division, even
though the terms ultimately agreed upon
modify or eliminate the contingent rights
of transferred employees to benefits
under the seller's ERISA plan which are
neither vested nor accrued. Sutton, 567
F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer 571 F. Supp.
at 328-29. See also Sutton, 724 F.2d at
41l.
Because there is no evidence
that the Standard Plan was a party to the
Amoco-Norgas sale or that fiscal assets
of the Standard Plan were involved in the
transaction, there exists no genuine
112
issue of material fact as to plaintiff fs'
Claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
Therefore, as to these matters,
defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter ot law.
E. The Claim Under 29 U.S.C. § 1140
The next arrow in the plaintiffs'
crowded quiver is 29 U.S.C. § 1140:
It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, Suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of
an employee benefit plan [or] this
titie. . . or for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of
any right to which such participant
may become entitled under the plan
[or this title]...
The plaintiffs contend that by agreeing
to the sale of the LPG operation on terms
that did not assure the crediting of
service with Amoco for all purposes under
the Norgas retirement plan, Amoco and
Norgas unlawfully “discriminated against
the plaintiffs for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of the
rights to which the plaintiffs might
[have] become entitled under the [Amoco]
Plan." (Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition
to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment at 25-26).
The plaintiffs misapprehend the
purpose of Section 1140. That provision
is not intended to prohibit the sale of
114
going businesses or to require a
Successor employer to credit service with
a predecessor employer -- indeed, any
such construction would render 29 U.S.C.
§ 1060 rather meaningless. Nor is
Section 1140 intended to impose a
fiduciary duty on employers to act solely
in the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of
sale of a business or division. Such
matters are the province of Sections 1104
and 1106, which as discussed above, do
not impose such a duty. See Sutton v.
Weirton Steel Division, 724 F.2d 406, 410
(4th Cir. 1983) cert. denied i ’
104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984). Rather, Section
1140 is intended simply to prohibit
discriminatory harassment or adverse
115
treatment of a particular employee which
amounts to or threatens “constructive
discharge," and which is carried out for
the purpose cf interfering with the
employee's attainment of future benefits
or punishing the employee for the
exercise of protected rights. West v.
Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
This meaning is confirmed by the
legislative history of the provision:
Most collective bargaining
agreements protect employees against
discharge without good cause and
provide effective enforcement
machinery in arbitration proceedings
whose results are enforceable under
section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act. But roughly half of
116
all pension participants ere not
unionized and so they lack
protection. Especially vulnerable
are managers and executives whose
Substantial pension potentialities
provide an incentive to their
discharge before vesting. The
managers of the bill ought to think
twice too. Discipline and
discrimination can be so unpleasant
as to amount to constructive
discharge, a term used by the
National Labor Relations Board.
That can be the type of harassment
which does not say that one is
fired, but makes living such a hell
that a person wishes he did not have
to hang on and endure.
117
In recognition of the problem,
section 610 of S.4 as originally
reported -- made it illegal to
"discharge, fine, suspend, expell
[sic], discipline or discriminate"
against plan participants to defeat
rights under the act or a plan. The
language parallels section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act
and should do the trick -- but only
if an adequate enforcement machinery
exists.
119 Cong. Rec. 30374 (views of Senator
Hartke, speaking on behalf of his
proposal that the Secretary of Labor be
direct to establish administrative
procedures for enforcing the provision
that became 1140)(emphasis supplied).
118
See also West v. Butler, 621 F.2d at 245;
Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons,
anc., 680 F.2d 911, $16-)9 cae .Cie.
1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1039 (1982)
("this section is designed to prevent
unscrupulous employers from discharging
Or harassing plan participants in order
to keep them from realizing their vested
pension rights").
The undisputed facts of this case
establish that there was no harassment or
discriminatory treatment of the
plaintiffs amounting to the kind of
"constructive di schartrge* or
"discrimination" prohibited oy 22. Bi hC.
§ 1140. Indeed, the only evidence of
"discrimination" relied upon by the
plaintiff in this connection is the mere
119
:
4
|
;
;
fact that as a consequence of the sale,
they were "prevented from attaining [the
benefit] rights toward which they had
been working as employees of Amoco."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
at. 283-0 However, that consequence is
part of nearly every sale or termination
of a going business or division. ERISA
simply does not require that every
purchaser of a going concern credit
service with a predecessor employer for
purposes of the successor's separate
plan, nor does it require that a
successor's plan be identical in every
respect to the predecessor's. Certainly
Section 1140 contains no such
requirement, express Or implied. Here,
120
as in Aronson v. Servus Rubber Division
of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12 (lst Cir.
1984), cert. denied, U.S. , -e2
S. Ct. 431 (1984), the plaintiffs' claim
is grounded upon
a misreading of a section which
relates to discriminatory conduct
directed against individuals, not to
actions involving the plan in
general. The problem is with the
word "discriminate." An overly
literal interpretation of this
section would make illegal any
partial termination, since such
terminations obviously interfere
with the attainment of benefits by
the terminated group, and, indeed,
are expressly intended so to
121
interfere. Such cannot be the
intent of the section, where the
Statute expressly recognizes partial
terminations. ag
1343(b)(4)( incorporating Tax Code
Geeemaceome, 26 UsS.C. § 411(d)(3)).
This is not to say that a plan could
not be discriminatorily modified,
intentionally benefiting, or
injuring, certain identified
employees or a certain group of
employees, but a partial termination
cannot constitute discrimination per
se. A termination that cuts along
independently established lines --
here separate divisions -- and that
has a readily apparent business
justification, demonstrates no
122
invidious intent. . . Nor can
Plaintiffs claia they were
discriminated against with respect
to participants in defendants'
[other] operations that [were] not
being [sold]. . . We cannot regard
it as discriminatory for defendant
to make voluntary contributions to
continuing employees to maintain
their morale, but not to make such
to departing employees of the
admittedly profitless, wound-up
branch of its business.
Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.
In the present case, the
uncontroverted evidence adduced by the
defendants establishes that the sale was
motivated by legitimate business concerns.
The evidence on this point reveals that,
prior to the sale, Amoco conducted
profitability studies of the LPG
operation. This study revealed that the
LPG operation was not sufficiently
profitable, and would be even less
profitable in the future. This was
primarily because, as a major refiner,
Amoco was subject to Department of Energy
regulations that limited the price it
could charge for liquid propane.
(Exhibits 265-289, Appendix in Support of
Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at
Al169-A183). The price limitations did
not apply to non-refiners, and for that
reason, the LPG operation would be more
valuable and profitable if owned by a
non-refiner. (Exhibit 834, Appendix in
124
Support of Amoco's Motion for Summary
Judgment at A198). The approval of sale
by Amoco's parent, Standard Oil Company
(Indiana), was based upon these facts.
(Exhibit 265, Appendix at A169; Exhibit
267, Appendix at Al7l).
The plaintiffs do not attempt
to controvert these facts. Indeed, the
plaintiffs have stipulated that Amoco
sought to sell the LPG operation for
business reasons. (Pretrial Order at 5).
However, the plaintiffs contend that
because Amoco received offers from other
prospective purchasers which were lower
than the Norgas offer but included an
offer to credit years of service with
Amoco for all purposes under the buyers'
retirement plans, Amoco must have
125
accepted the Norgas offer "for the
purpose of interfering" with the
plaintiffs' attainment of future benefit
rights in violation of Section 1149.
Moreover, say the plaintiffs, since
Berges was a@ patty to & his
"discrimination," Norgas is also liable.
The plaintiffs' theory distorts
the plain meaning of Section 1140.
Indeed, if the plaintiffs' theory were
accepted, Section 1060(b) would be little
more than a redundant appendage in the
text of ERISA, since Section 1140 would
generally have the effect of requiring
employers to sell their businesses on
terms that protect employees' inchoate
interests in non-vested benefits under
the seller's plan. Neither the express
26
language of Section 1140 nor its
legislative history reveals any such
Congressional intent.34 The plain fact is
that neither ERISA in general nor Section
1140 in particular was intended to outlaw
the termination of contingent future
liabilities such as those involved here
pursuant to the sale of the entire
division or operation of the employer's
business. see Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.
Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division, 567
FP. Supp. 1134, 1198 (N.D. W.Va. 1983)
(even assuming that avoiding future
pension obligations was the employer's
sole motivation for selling a division of
its operations in a manner which
adversely affected contingent employee
benefits, the sale did not violate
ERISA); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division,
724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied U.S. » 2064 S.Ct. 2287
(1984) (making same assumption in
affirming summary judgment). Moreover,
the fact that the LPG employees were
terminated when the LPG operation was
sold, whereas employees in other Amoco
divisions or operations which were not
sold were retained and continued as
participants in the Amoco plan, simply
does not establish the kind of
discrimination prohibited by Section 1140.
Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16. The termination
of plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was
merely an incidental result of an
entirely legitimate business transaction
128
which ERISA was not designed to regulate
Or prohibit.
Because there is no evidence on
the record of any discrimination or
adverse treatment within the prohibitions
of Section 1140, the defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims?>
F. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1141
Proceeding directly in the face
of all existing precedent as well as the
plain language of the statute itself,
plaintiffs next claim a right to recover
under 29 U.S.C. § 1141, which provides,
inter alia:
ft shall be unlawful for any person
through the use of fraud, force,
violence, or threat of the use of
Id.
force or violence, to restrain,
coerce, intimidate or attempt to
restrain, coerce or intimiaate any
participant or beneficiary for the
purpose of interfering with or
preventing the exercise of any right
to which he is or may become
entitled under the plan [or] this
title. . . Any person who willfully
violates this section shall be fined
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
This section of ERISA is clearly a
criminal statute designed to supplement
1140 by giving law enforcement officials
the right to prosecute individuals who
fraudulently or coercively interfere with
an employee's rights under a pension plan.
As every court which has addressed the
question has concluded, Section 1141
provides no private right of action
whatsoever, but simply allows for
Criminal prosecution of certain egregious
forms of conduct already prohibited by
Section 1140. See, e.g., West v. Butler,
621 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980);
Maxfield v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Health, Welfare and
Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D.
Tll. 1982). Thus, plaintiffs' Section
1141 claim is devoid of legal merit and
is due to be dismissed. Enforcement of
Section 1141 is the exclusive prerogative
of the Attorney General. See, West v.
Butler, 621 F.2d at 244.
G. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1022
131
Section 1022 of ERISA requires that
a “summary plan description" be filed
with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C.
1022(a). The plan description and
summary plan description are required to
contain, among other things,
The name and type of administration
of the plan;. . . the plan's
requirements respecting eligibility
for participation and benefits; a
description of the provisions
providing for nonforfeitable pension
benefits; [and] the circumstances
which may result ion
disqualification, ineligibility or
denial or loss of benefits.
29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Plaintiffs contend
that by failing to disclose in the plan
132
the description the circumstances which
might result in their loss of employment
of the possibility that the LPG Operation
might be sold, Amoco violated the duty
imposed by Section 1022 to disclose "the
circumstances which may result in
disqualification, ineligibility, or
denial or loss of benefits."
The plaintiffs have no viable
Claim under Section 1022. That section
requires only a description of the plan
itself, a..d what general circumstances
would cause a loss of eligibility for
benefits under the terms of the plan.
see generally 29 <2 6% §
2530.102-3(4)-(1) (Department of Labor
regulations implementing § 1022). The
Summary plan description provided by
133
Amoco more than adequately satisfied
those requirements. It repeatedly refers
to the fact that eligibility for benefits
will be lost if employment is terminated,
and describes the various rights the
employee will have under the different
benefit plans if that occurs. Thus, the
description of the "Retirement Plan"
States that “all regular, full-time
employees of the company are covered."
(Exhibit 1 at 30, Appendix in Support of
Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at
Al62). If further states that
In order to enjoy the full benefits
of this plan, you must "retire" from
the company. You are retired or not
retired depending on your status
when you leave the company. You are
134
"retired" if you leave the company
-- at age 65; or
~~ at any time beginning at age 55;
when your age plus years of service
add up to 75; or
-- at any time for approved
disability or with company consent
Py geeeting certain, Se
requirements.
(Id). Immediately following the
foregoing, it states in bold-face type
that:
If you have not satisfied any one of
these requirements when you leave
the company, you will be a
"terminated employee" and not
135
BHEREeHEHhhe es &
EU iT le Ee a
entitled tc full benefits of the
plan.
(Id). The description goes on to state
that "[i]f you leave the company before
you have satisfied the requirements for
retirement, you will be entitled only to
the benefits of a terminated employee --
with these benefits based on your years
of company service." (Exhibit 1 at 33,
Appendix at Al63). It then describes in
detail the retirement benefits to which a
terminated employee is entitled.
(Exhibit 1 at 33-34, Appendix at
Al63-Al164).
In view of the foregoing, there
clearly was no breach by Amoco of its
duty under § 1022 to describe
"circumstances which may result in
136
disqualification, ineligibility, or
denial or loss of benefits." The summary
plan description clearly indicates the
possibility that employment could be
terminated, and that termination prior to
the satisfaction of specific requirements
would result in the loss of eligibility
or denial of benefits in specific
respects. Section 1022 imposes no duty
for a summary plan description -- which,
again, is designed to summarize the terms
of the plan -- to go further anc
enumerate all imaginable future external
events which could cause the termination
of employment, be it the employee's poor
job performance of insubordination, the
company's poor economic condition caused
by increased competition or a declining
demand for the company's product, a
decision to abolish a particular job, or,
as here, a decision to sell the business
to another company.
There being no genuine dispute
of material fact as to the 1022 claims,
the Court concludes that defendants Amoco
and Bearden are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.36
H. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1024
Finally, the plaintiffs claim
that Amoco's decision to sell the LPG
facilities was a plan "modification or
change which Amoco should have reported
to the Secretary under the requirements
ot. .029. Uchetuch) 6 t084-" (Plaintiffs'
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 36). Again, this
138
claim is utterly specious. The
undisputed evidence establishes that LPG
Sale did not involve any change,
amendment or modification of the terms of
any of Amoco's benefit plans. Rather,
plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was
Simply terminated at the time of the sale.
Plaintiffs received all benefits to which
they were entitled at the time under the
terms of the existing plan, and
non-terminated employees had the same
rights under the plan as before the sale.
In short, the sale effected no
modification in the terms of the Amoco
plan or the conditions for eligibility
under the plan; it simply effected a
termination of the employment of the
plaintiffs and other LPG employees, 37
139
Consequently, Amoco was not obligated to
report the sale as a modification in the
terms of the plan under Section 1024.°8
For these reasons, defendant Amoco
is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law with respect to the claims made under
29 U.S.C. § 1024.39
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing
analysis, the Court concludes that as to
each and every one of the plaintiffs’
claims, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact, and that defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiffs' attempts to convert a
routine business transaction into a
series of state and federal wrongs are
based upon severely strained
140
interpretations of law to which this
Court cannot accede. An appropriate
order will be entered.
DONE this 18th day of June,
1985.
14]
FOOTNOTES
1. The defendants have also
asserted diversity jurisdiction under 28
0.82C« 8 1332, 2d the sdeetrive of
fraudulent joinder jurisdiction.
2. Joe D. Bearden, a resident of
Alabama and a former employee of Amoco,
is also named as a defendant in this
action. Bearden has joined in Amoco's
motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs have not attempted to
distinguish between Amoco and Bearden for
purposes of this motion, nor will the
Court do so.
1 42
3 This action was Oriyinally
brought by the named plaintiffs as a
Class action. However, to date, no class
has been certified. At the request of
counsel, and with their mutual assent,
the Court has proceeded to address the
Summary judgment motions at this time.
4. None of plaintiffs' claims are
made against Norgas alone.
- - See Pretrial Order at 6,8.
6. See Affidavit of Larry J. Boyd.
7. This was one of two alternative
bases for the Supreme Court's affirmance,
the other being that no lifetime contract
existed in any event. See Bates, 418 So.
2d at 906.
8. Plaintiffs have alleged that
Amoco did in fact transfer some
managerial employees formerly employed in
the LPG operation to other Amoco
divisions and operations in Alabama.
This is of little relevance to the legal
issue at hand. For our purposes, Amoco
was under no contractual duty to transfer
particular employees to new positions
unrelated to the work for which they were
initially hired. See Alabama Mills;
Bates. However, nothing in Alabama Mills
or its progeny prohibits an employer from
voluntarily transferring and retaining
employees where it is feasible to do so.
9. The rule of Alabama Mills should
not be confused with the defense of
“impossibility of performance." As noted
in City of Albertville v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F.2d 594
144
(Sth Cir. 1959), Alabama law has
traditionally refused to recognize the
"impossibility of performance" as a
defense to a contract action, subject to
certain limited exceptions. See also
Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620 (Ala.
1979); Capital Fertilizer Co. v.
Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co., 202 Ala. 92, 79
So. 464, 487 (1918). In the case at
hana, however, Amoco does not rely on an
"impossidility of performance" defense.
Rather, Amoco relies on the fact that the
contracts, if they exist at all,
terminated by virtue of their own terms
(albeit terms implied by law) when the
LPG operation was sold.
10. In addition to this claim for
fraud against Amoco as an entity,
plaintiffs have also claimed that "[t]he
defendant Amoco Oil Company by and
through its agents, servants, and
employees and executives conspired to
defraud the plaintiffs" with respect to
the security of their jobs and benefits.
(Pretrial Order at 12). This allegation
fails as a matter of law. Under the law
of conspiracy in general, the law of
Alabama in particular, a civil conspiracy
to commit a tort requires a combination
of two or more persons and cannot exist
between a corporation and its agents or
employees, since the acts of agents and
employees acting within the line and
scope of their employment are considered
the acts of the corporation itself. See
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,
1 46
Inc., 200 F.2d 91l, 914 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied 345 U.S. 925 (1952) ;
Tuskegee Institute vy. May Refrigeration
COo., Inc., 57 Ala. App. 344, 328 So. 24
598 (1976), affirmed in part, reversed in
part on other grounds 344 So. 2d 156 (Ala.
1977). Accord, Girard vy. 94th St. &
Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2¢@ Cit.
1976), cert. denied 425 U.S. 974 (1976);
Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Zelmger vy.
Uvalde Rock Asphalt COe, 316 F424 47
(lOth Cir. 1963); Jewel Foliage Co. v.
Univlora Overseas Florida, iIne., 497. .P.
Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980). This is only
logical, since a corporation is a
fictional entity and Capable of acting
1 47
only th ough its agents and employees.
Thus; insofar as the plaintiffs seek
recovery for a conspiracy between Amoco
and its agents and employees, the claim
is legally precluded, and Amoco is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
ll. Misrepresentations as to future
acts and events are actionable under
Alabama law in certain circumstances.
See Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510, 262
So. 20d 756 (1972); Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F.
Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 1976),
affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).
Ze On August 2l, 1979, Amoco and
Norgas held a meeting with Amoco LPG
employees in BoaZ, Alabama, to discuss
the terms of the Amoco~-Norgas sale
contract and its effect on their jobs and
148
benefics. It is entirely undisputed that
no later than August 21, 1979, every
plaintiff had actual as well as
constructive knowledge of the fact that
Amoco's LPG operations were being sold,
that plaintiffs were being terminated by
Amoco, and that each of the plaintiffs
would nasal an employee of Norgas and be
covered by Norgas benefit plans when the
‘sale was completed. (See Deposition of
Davis at 31-33; Deposition of Fennell at
15, 35, 37-38, 43; Deposition of Gardner
at 22-23; Deposition of Gurley at 26,
29-30; Deposition of Jones at 37-39;
Deposition of Lovell at 35-38; Deposition
of McClendon at 38-40, 51; Deposition of
Moore at 34, 38-39; Deposition of
Murphree at 35-36; Deposition of Owens at
149
39-40; Deposition of Phillips at 69-70,
73-74, 77-78; Deposition of Pinyan at
51-54; Deposition of Shaneyfelt at 24-46;
Deposition of Shrader at 42-43, 48;
Deposition of Sims at 27-28; Deposition
of Weaver at 30-33.
R32 Plaintiffs' knowledge of the
sale by August 21, 1979, not only
constituted actual knowledge of the fact
that Amoco did not then intend to perform
Seoeemnresented, but it also put
plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the
possibility that Amoco's representations
concerning the plaintiffs' job security
were made with a contemporaneous
intention to deceive and not to perform
as promised. See Moore v. Merchants &
Planters Bank, 434 So. 2d at 754 (fact
150
constituting the fraud deemed discovered
at the time of discovery of facts which
would provoke inquiry by a person of
Ordinary prudence and which, if followed
up, would have led to the discovery of
fraud). Ci, MeGei tt, 2398 86. 24-252
(fraud with respect to future acts or
events deemed discovered when plaintiff
first learns that defendant does not
intend to perform as represented).
Compare Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510,
262 So. 2d 756 (1972) (fraud with respect
to future actions or events requires
contemporaneous intent to deceive or not
to perform as promised).
B4, The piaintiftts’ breach of
contract claims are separate and distinct
and have been dealt with Supra.
151
iS. At oral argument on these
motions, counsel for plaintiffs argued
that the deprivation of an opportunity to
take concerted job action or participate
in negotiations concerning the terms of
the sale constituted damage suffered by
the plaintiffs in reliance on Amoco's
misrepresentations. (Tranecriot at
February 25, 1985 Hearing at 22-23).
16. Even where the date of injury
is relevant, it is well-established that
a cause of action in tort accrues (and
the limitations period begins to run) as
soon as the plaintiff suffers any damage
as a result of fraud, regardless of
whether additional damages are incurred
later which were not apparent at or fixed
at the time of first legal injury. See,
152
e.-g-, Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle,
inc., 291 Ala. 601, 285 So. 2d 468, 473
(1973). Since the plaintiffs have argued
that the damage they suffered included
the deprivation of an opportunity to take
concerted job action, seek iother
employment, or participate in the
negotiations concerning the sale, see n.
eo Supra, and since that damage
necessarily occurred prior to August 21,
1979, when plaintiffs learned of the
Amoco-Norgas sale, it is plain that the
Statute of limitations precludes the
fraud claims at issue here.
17. It appears that the plaintiffs'
claims of fraud with respect to the
crediting of service are actually based
upon nondisclosure of information rather
Roa
than affirmative misrepresentation. (See
Amended Complaint of June 25, 1982, at
pgh. 56). Thus, several plaintiffs
repeatedly testified that they were never
told that Amoco service would be credited
under the Norgas retirement plan. (Davis
Deposition at 41; Fennell Deposition at
58-59; Gurley Deposition at 39-40; Jones
Deposition at 65; McClendon Deposition at
§i-53). Of course, four of the
plaintiffs admitted that they were
told the truth concerning credit for
Amoco service under the Norgas plan --
i.e., that such service would not be
credited. (Gardner Deposition at 22;
Lovell Deposition at 37-38; Shaneyfelt
Deposition at 26; Weaver Deposition at
35).
154
18. Indeed, the plaintiffs
themselves implicitly recognize that
these fraud claims "relate to" an
employee benefit plan, since the only
compensatory damages specifically sought
by the plaintiffs for these fraud claims
are “compensatory damages in the form of
loss of employee benefits, including but
not limited to, the value of the
following benefits: early retirement,
retirement, life and health insurance,
vacation, and savings plan benefits...."
(Pretrial Order at 17).
19. The grant of certiorari in
Russell is apparently limited to whether
a fiduciary may be liable for "punitive
damages or extracontractual compensatory
155
damages" under ERISA. 52 U.S.L.W. 3203
(October 2, 1984).
20. Defendants also contend that
these claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and that plaintiffs suffered
no damage as a proximate result of their
reliance on any misrepresentations
concerning the terms of the sale. These
contentions have substantial support in
the record. However, because the Court
finds these fraud claims preempted, there
is no need to reach these other
contentions made by the defendants. The
Court does note, however, that the record
is entirely devoid of any evidence of any
agreement or conspiracy between Amoco and
Norgas to commit a civil wrong. In the
absence of such evidence, the conspiracy
156
to defraud claim fails as a matter of law.
See Purcell Co., Inc. y. Spriggs
Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515 (Ala.
1983) (negotiation of business sale alone
is insufficient to establish that parties
agreed or conspired to perpetrate a tort).
The Court specifically notes this as an
alternative basis for the dismissal of
the fraud claims predicated upon
conspiracy.
21. As noted above, ERISA does not
require a retirement plan to provide for
such immediate payments of vested
benefits. See, @.g., Hernandez vy.
Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders
Pension Trust, 662 F.2d 617, 619-20 (9th
Bons) £982 3.2 Under the terms of the
Standard Plan, however, a vested
Sa @&eeeeg@eeegQeeeéegerEent = =
participant whose employment terminates
before he is eligible for retirement may
elect to receive at that time an annuity
equivalent to the present actuarial value
of the vested benefits. (See Webb
Affidavit, Ex. A. at 9.05(c)). In
this case, each of the vested plaintiff.
elected to receive an annuity immediately
under this provision of the Standard
Plan, and is currently receiving those
payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).
22. In addition to the substantive
ERISA violations enumerated above,
plaintiffs have alleged a separate claim
for a general conspiracy to violate ERISA.
(Pretrial Order at 13). It would appear
that this general "conspiracy to violate
ERISA" claim fails to state a claim under
158
ERISA, the provisions of which focus on
the underlying wrong rather than any
conspiracy to commit the wrong. In any
event, considering all evidence and
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,
the Court finds no evidence in this
record tending to establish that Amoco
and Norgas agreed to violate ERISA. See
and compare note 19, Supra. Moreover,
Since the Court finds no substancive
violations of ERISA on the facts of this
case, the general “conspiracy to violate
ERISA“ claim must likewise fail.
23. As set forth in the
Amoco-Norgas sale agreement, service with
Amoco is credited for purposes of vesting
under the Norgas retirement plan.
(Pretrial Order at 7). Amoco service is
159
s
credited under the other Norgas plans, as
well. (Bx. A to Aff. of John Churchhill).
Although their damage allegations are
somewhat ambiguous on this point
(Pretrial Order at 17-18), plaintiffs
have not adduced evidence of any loss
caused by the alleged ERISA violations
apart from the failure to credit Amoco
service in calculating Norgas retirement
benefits.
24. A contrary construction would
not only flout 1060(b) (l1)'s express
language and the legislative history, but
would also contravene the rule that,
under ERISA, “[nleither Congress nor the
Courts are involved in either the
decision to establish a plan or in the
decision concerning which benefits a plan
160
should provide." Moore v. Reynolds
Metals Co. Retirement Program, 740 F.2d
454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied
U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985).
25. Plaintiffs do not (and cannot)
contend that the termination of all
employees of a particular business or
division in connection with the sale of
that operation would constitute a per se
violation of any provision of ERISA. Cf.
Sutton v. Weirton Steel, 567 F. Supp.
1164 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d
406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S.
, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).
26. If and when the Secretary of
Treasury does promulgate regulations
imposing a crediting requirement, the
validity of those regulations will of
16]
course be determined under settled
principles of administrative law. oh
Rowan Companies Inc. v. United States,
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (court's inquiry
generally limited to whether the
regulation is within the delegation of
authority).
27. For present purposes, the Court
has assumed without deciding that this is
the type of “predecessor employer"
situation that would fall within the
ambit of § 1060(b).
28. In analagous situations where a
federal statute delegates authority to
promulgate regulations to an
administrative agency and does no more
than adopt these regulations by advance
reference, the federal courts have
162
consistently held that where the
administrative agency fails or chooses
not to promulgate the described
regulations, there is no substantive law
for the court to apply and the court
therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain
a claim alleging a violation of the Act.
See, e.g. Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita
Associates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.
, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1034 (1974);
Wuillamy v. Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237,
240 n.2 (D. N.J. 1973). Cf. Sierra Club
v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716
F.2d at 1154; Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army,
356 F. Supp. at 18.
29. In any event, the plaintiffs
have not stated a proper claim against
163
Norgas under § 1056. Norgas clearly was
not the employer, administrator or
fiduciary responsible for complying with
the requirements of § 1056 vis-a-vis the
Amoco plan, and no evidence has been
adduced to demonstrate that Norgas
promoted or participated in any such
violation by Amoco within the meaning of
Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390,
411 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
29.5 See Plaintiffs' Brief in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 41.
30. For present purposes, it is not
necessary for this Court to adopt the
theory of Donovan nor express a view as
to its scope or validity.
164
31. Clearly, if Amoco breached no
fiduciary duties in negotiating the sale
of the LPG facilities, then Norgas, which
was not a fiduciary with respect to the
Amoco plan, cannot be held liable for
promoting or participating in any such
breach, Compare Donovan vy. Daugherty,
350 F. Supp 390, 411 (S.D. Ala. S962).
In any event, the Court is of the Opinion
that the mere purchase of a going
business from a fiduciary, without more,
would not render a nonfiduciary liable
under § 1104 for the seller's breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with the
Sale, at least where no transfer of plan
assets is involved.
aes Plaintiffs admit that Norgas
was not a fiduciary with respect to the
Amoco plan and that § 1106 is by its
literal terms technically inapplicable to
Norgas. See Brief of Plaintiffs in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 4l. However,
plaintiffs contend that Norgas is liable
for Amoco's violation of § 1106 because
Norgas "participated" in the violation by
Amoco. Cf. Donovan v. Daugherty, 550
F.Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982)(third party
who assists fiduciary in the breach of a
fiduciary duty is liable for losses
sustained by beneficiaries due to the
breach). As to this contention, see notes
30 and 3l, supra.
33. Amoco's parent, Standard Oil
Company, is the administrator and named
fiduciary of the "Amoco" plan. (See
166
Pretrial Order at 9, pgh. 21). However,
at least for purposes of the present
motion, Amoco has not denied that it is a
fiduciary with respect to the plan. See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).
34. As far as Norgas is concerned,
the failure to credit prior years of
service with Amoco in calculating accrued
benefits under the Norgas plan certainly
cannot be considered discriminatory,
particularly since neither ERISA nor the
Norgas retirement plan requires such
treatment. In fact, the granting of such
credit would arguably constitute
favorable discrimination with regard to
plaintiffs and a breach of fiduciary duty
as to the Norgas plan and its incumbent
participants. Cf. Winpinsinger v. Aurora
Corp. of Illinois, Precision Castings
Division, 456 F.Supp. 559, 566, 569 (N.D.
Ohio 1978)(requirement that fiduciary
discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries prohibits
fiduciary from granting preference as
between plan's participants or as between
plan's beneficiaries).
35. Plaintiffs argue that questions
of intent or motive are rarely
appropriate for summary judgment, citing
Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th
Cir. 1983). While this proposition is
not without support, it has little
application where, as here, the
underlying facts are not disputed and the
168
central question to be determined is
whether, as a matter of Liaw, the
discrimination alleged is the kind of
"discrimination" that falls within the
Proscription of a statute narrowly
tailored to serve specific purposes. In
any event, to the extent that the court
must draw inferences from the undisputed
evidentiary facts to determine whether
there has been prohibited discrimination,
the court in a nonjury case is entitled
to draw such inferences and conclusions
on motion for summary judgment if a bench
trial would not enhance its ability to
draw those inferences and conclusions.
See Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d
1506, 1509-10 (llth Cir. 1985); Nunez v.
Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24
169
(Sth Cir. 1978). The ERISA claims made
by the plaintiffs in this case are not
triable to a jury, see Calamia v. Spivey,
632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), and it
does not appear that any further
probative evidence on point would likely
be presented at trial. Based on all of
the evidence before the Court at this
time, then, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs have not suffered
discrimination or other adverse treatment
within the prohibitions of Section 1140.
36. No claim has been made under
Section 1022 against Norgas, which
obviously had no duty of reporting or
disclosure with respect to the Amoco
plan.
170
CP Even where the terms of a
proposed sale of a business do involve
amendments of existing plans, neither
Section 1022 nor Section 1024 requires an
employer to supply information regarding
amendments before the amendments are
effected. Sutton v. Weirton Steel
Division, 567 F.Supp. 1184, 1196 (N.D. wW.
Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d 406 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S. ;
104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984).
38. In any event, the Court is of
the opinion that Section 1024 provides no
Private cause of ac’ ‘on for failure to
report modifications to the Secretary (as
Opposed to the failure to comply with the
duties of reporting and disclosure owed
to participants and beneficiaries).
Etim
Therefore, even assuming that the sale
did constitute a "modification" of the
plan within the meaning of Section 1024,
the plaintiffs would have no right to
recover the damages they seek based upon
Amoco's failure to properly report the
modification to the Secretary.
39. Plaintiffs have made no claim
against Norgas under Section 1024.
172
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-7623
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
versus
— an ar ry atu = a» %
AMOCO OIL COMI ANY, etce, et Giles
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Jlorthern District of Alabama
IN PETITIONS(S) FOR REHEARING
(October 28, 1986)
BEFORE: RONEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges,
and DOYLE*, Senior District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The petition(s) for rehearing filed
by appellants is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
/‘s/ THOMAS A. CLARK
United States Circuit Judge
* Honorable James E. Doyle, Senior U.S.
District Judge for the Western District
of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
174
799 F.2d 1464
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et ai.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv
AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-7623
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit
September 22, 1986
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, CLARK,
Circuit Judge, and DOYLE, Senior District
Judge.
CLARK, Circuit Judge:
Former employees of Amoco Oil
Company's Alabama retail liquid propane
175
gas ("LPG") business appeal from the
district court's decision to grant
Summary judgment in favor of Amoco Oil
Company ("Amoco"), Joe D. Bearden, and
Norgas Propane Gas Company ("Norgas") on
claims of breach of contract, state
common-law fraud and Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") violations
arising in the context of the sale of
Amoco's Alabama LPG operations to Norgas.
We affirm.
I. FACTS
Appellants (the "employees") were
formerly employed by Amoco in its LPG
operations in Alabama. All participated
in the Employee Retirement Plan of
Standard Oil Company and Participating
Companies (the "Standard Plan").
In May of 1979, Amoco agreed to sell
its LPG operations in the southeastern
United States to Norgas. The sales
contract was signed on July 31, 1979 and
the sale closed on September 4, 1979.
Upon seiling its Alabama LPG operations,
haeco completely left the retail LPG
business in Alabama and therefore had no
work in that area for any of the
employees.
The sales contract provided that
Norgas would offer employment to each
regular full-time employee at his or her
Current salary. It further provided that
retirement benefits under Norgas'
retirement plan would be based on years
177
of service with Norgas, except that
continuous years of service with Amoco
would be credited by Norgas for vesting
purposes. Thus years of service with
Amoco would not be credited for the
purpose of calculating benefits or
determining eligibility for early
retirement. Each of the employees with
vested benefits under the Standard Plan,
including those who have not yet reached
the age of sixty-five, opted to receive
and is currently receiving an annuity
from the Standard Plan.
A meeting for the Amoco employees
was held on August 21, 1979 at Boaz,
Alabama to explain the various Norgas
benefits that would be available to the
employees after the sale (the "Boaz
178
meeting"). At the meeting, the employees
were informed of the sale of Amoco's LPG
Operations to Norgas. They were also
told that:
On every other plan we
recognize your service with
Amoco. For the Retirement
Plan, you must treat the day
you begin work with Northern
Propane Gas Company as your
first day of service.
While the parties dispute whether all the
employees understood that their years of
service would not be credited by Norgas
for all purposes, there is no dispute
that they were told at the Boaz meeting
that Norgas would not credit years of
service with Amoco under its retirement
179
plan. There is also no dispute that in
August, 1979, the employees were given
copies of a Norgas summary plan
description stating that the retirement
benefits they would receive would depend
on service and pay with Norgas. The
employees began employment with Norgas on
September 4, 1979, the closing date of
the sale to Norgas.
On September 4, 1980, the employees
filed suit against Amoco, Bearden and
Norgas in an Alabama state court. The
case was eventually removed to federal
district court. After eight amendments,
the employees' complaint finally
contained state breach of contract
claims, state fraud and conspiracy to
180
>»
defraud claims, and various ERISA claims
against Amoco and Norgas.
Norgas and Amoco filed separate
motions for summary judgment. On
February 25, 1985, the district court
heard oral argument on the motions and,
at the close of argument, orally ruled
that it was granting Norgas' motion and
taking Amoco's motion under advisement.
On June 18, 1985, 614 F. Supp. 1094, the
district court issued its memorandum
Opinion granting all motions for summary
judgment in favor of Amoco and Norgas.!
On June 28, 1985, the employees
filed a motion to reconsider or vacate
the judgment and for recusal of District
Judge Seybourn H. Lynne under 28 U.S.C.
455(a). The employees claimed that an
181
appearance of impropriety arose when the
law clerk who had drafted Judge Lynne's
memorandum opinion accepted employment
with the firm representing Norgas in this
litigation prior to drafting the opinion.
There is no dispute that the employees'
attorneys were informed of the fact that
Judge Lynne's sole law clerk had accepted
employment with the law firm representing
Norgas in January of 1985, seven months
before they requested recusal. Judge
Lynne denied the recusal motion on the
ground it was not timely and that the
employees had not been denied due process
of law. The employees appeal from the
Summary judgments in favor of Amoco and
Norgas and from the denial of their
recusal motion.
182
II. ISSUES
The employees make the following
arguments with respect to their state law
claims on appeal: (1) that Amoco breached
lifetime employment contracts with its
employees when it sold its Alabama LPG
Operations to Norgas; (2) that their
claim that Amoco fraudulently assured
them of lifetime employment with Amoco
even while negotiating the sale of the
business is not barred by an Alabama
Statute of limitations; (3) that their
claim that Amoco and Norgas fraudulently
concealed the effect of the sale on
credit for years of service toward
retirement benefits is not preempted by
183
ERISA. The employees also argue that
Amoco and Norgas bargained away credit
for years of service with Amoco when they
negotiated the sales contract, thereby
violating the following provisions of
ERISA: (1) the provision that years of
service with predecessor employer be
credited by successor employer (29 U.S.C.
§ 1060(b)(2); (2) the provision setting
forth a fiduciary duty to act solely for
the benefit of plan beneficiaries (29
Gs Gata § 1104) 3 i t he
anti-discrimination provision (29 U.S.C.
§ 1104); (4) the prohibited transactions
provision (29 U.S.C. § 1106); (5) the
provision governing early retirement
benefits (29 U.S.C. § 1056); (6) the
criminal fraud provision (29 U.S.C. §
184
1141); and (7) the disclosure provisions
(29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024). Finally, the
employees argue that Judge Lynne abused
his discretion in failing to vacate
summary judgment in favor of Norgas and
to recuse himself in light of the
relationship between his law clerk and
Norgas' attorneys.
III. ANALYSIS
The district court's opinion in this
case is comprehensive, thorough and well
reasoned. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614
F.Sujs. 694 (N.D.Ala.1985). Where, as
here, a litigant adopts what might be
called a “shot gun" approach and invokes
ever possible cause of action, no matter
185
how tangentially related to the
particular context of the case, a few
claims are bound to be so obviously
inappropriate that little discussion is
warranted to dispose of them. The
district court's opinion treats even
these claims carefully and exhaustively.
This court has benefitted from that
effort.
Unfortunately, the employees have
not narrowed their arguments for appeal
as they might have. Rather than pointing
out the error in the reasoning that led
the district court to reject their
positions, they have restated the
arguments they made to the district court
in the first place. Thus it happens
that, with respect to many of the
arguments presented on appeal, we have
little, if anything, to add by way of
explanation of our decision that has not
been stated by the district court. For
that reason, although we have carefully
and independently considered the
employees’ legal arguments, we will not
duplicate the district court's efforts by
explaining our decision with the same
thoroughness and detail. We write
briefly to address various arguments made
On appeal and to make clear our
understanding of the scope of the
district court's reasoning.
i. Breach of Life-time Employment
Contracts
The employees argue that their
life-time employment contracts with Amoco
were breached when Amoco sold its
business to Norgas. However, even where
a life-time employment contract is
legally enforceable, Alabama law provides
that the contract remains in effect only
as long as the employer remains in the
business for which the employee was hired
and needs the particular services the
employee was hired to perform. See,
e.g.,Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc.,
418 So.2d 903, 906 (Ala.1982). It is
undisputed that Amoco completely
abandoned the retail LPG business in
188
Alabama when it sold its operations to
Norgas. The employees present no
argument on appeal that was not
persuasively rejected by the district
court. In fact, they conceded at oral
argument that they have no breach of
contract claim that is not identical, at
bottom, to the fraud claim addressed in
the ngxt section. The district court
correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of Amoco on this claim.
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation With
Respect to Continued Employment with
Amoco ,
189
The employees allege that Amoco
continued to represent to them that they
would be employed for life with Amoco's
Alabama LPG operations even as Amoco
negotiated the sale of the business to
Norgas. They believe that Amoco
fraudulently induced them to remain
employed with Amoco in order to make the
business a more attractive going-concern
to Norgas. The district court granted
summary judgment with respect to this
claim on the ground it was barred by a
one-year statute of limitations, holding
that the employees' cause of action
accrued when they learned that Amoco
would sell the business and terminate
their employment contracts in August,
1979.
190
The issue on appeal is whether the
district court correctly determined that
the employees' cause of action accrued,
and the period of limitations began to
run, when they learned that Amoco was to
sell the business. There is no dispute
that all the employees learned that the
LPG operations would be sold no later
than August 21, 1979. They did not file
their suit until September 4, 1980. They
insist that their cause of action did not
accrue until their employment with Amoco
was actually terminated on September 4,
1979, but have cited no case that
Supports this statement of law.
The employees’ attorney insisted
repeatedly at oral argument that the
injury associated with this type of claim
occurs upon actual termination and that
the cause of action does not therefore
accrue until that point, relying on
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen v. Hammett, 273 Ala. 397, 140
So.2d 832 (1962). That case, however,
was not a fraud case but involved
malicious interference with employment, a
cause of action that obviously does not
arise until the actual interference or
termination occurs.
In contrast, the employees' cause of
action sounds in fraud and their injury
was by definition the detrimental
reliance that occurred prior to their
discovery that they had been victims of
misrepresentation. According to Alabama
law, a fraud case of action accrues, «-nd
192
the one year statute of limitations
begins to run, at the discovery of the
facts constituting the fraud. Such
discovery occurs when the plaintiff
Should have discovered facts that would
provoke a person of ordinary prudence to
inquiry. Colafrancesco v. Crown
Pontiac=-GNC, iInc., #488 $6,284 1131
(Ala.1986). In this case, discovery took
place no later than August 21, 1979.
That the employment contracts did
not actually terminate until September 4,
1979, makes no difference. The statute
of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff knows or should know that the
employer does not intend to perform as
promised. Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Employees Union, Local
193
483 v. NMeGriftt, 398 So.2d 249, 252
(Ala.1981). McGriff involved, as does
the instant case, the claim that the
employees was induced to work for the
employer by a promise of pension benefits
upon having remained on the payroll for a
certain number of years. The Alabama
Supreme Court held that the employee's
fraud case of action arose when he knew
or should have known that the employer
did not intend to provide the promised
benefits, not at the point he was
actually denied the benefits. The
district court correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of Amoco on the ground
that this particular fraud claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.
194
a6 Fraudulent Failure to Disclose
Effect of Sale on Retirement
Benefits
The employees claim that Amoco and
Norgas deprived them of an opportunity to
negotiate with Norgas to credit their
years of service with Amoco for the
purposes of calculating retirement
benefits and induced them to remain
employed with Amoco by failing to
disclose the disadvantageous terms of the
sale. The district court held that this
State common law fraud claim was
preempted by ERISA.
ERISA expressly provides that it
"shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter
195
|
|
|
|
|
|
relate to any employee benefit plan"
covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
The employees argue that ERISA does not
preempt state common law fraud actions
involving pension plans. Without
expressing any opinion as to whether
ERISA preempts other fraud claims arising
under state common law, we hold that
ERISA preempts Alabama's common law fraud
cause of action insofar as it recognized
the particular type of claim raised by
the employees in this case.
The Supreme Court has addressed the
scope of ERISA preemption in two cases.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
8S, 103 $.Ct. 2890, 77 L.~Bd.2d 4930
(1983); Alessi v. Raybestos~Manhattan,
Tne., 451 U.S. 504, 191 $.Ct. 1895, 66
196
L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). In neither case did
the Supreme Court address the question
whether ERISA preempts state common law
causes of action. However, the opinions
are helpful for their general discussions
of the scope of ERISA preemption.
The Supreme Court in Shaw explained
that Congress used the words "relate to"
in their broad sense. Shaw 463 U.S. at
tae sen 2B Ck. Be. 2908, Thus, ERISA
preemption is not limited to those state
laws specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans. Nor does it
preempt only state laws dealing with the
particular subject matters covered by
ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure and
fiduciary responsibility. Id. Most
importantly, for the purposes of this
197
case, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) expressly
explains that the term "state law" in the
preemption provisions includes "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of
any State." It is clear, then, that
ERISA preempts state common law causes of
actions as they relate to employee
benefit plans. *
We agree with the district court
that the particular fraud claim raised by
the employees in this case is preempted
by ERISA. The action alleged by the
employees to have been fraudulent was the
failure to disclose the terms of the
Norgas benefit plan. The claim depends
on the existence of a duty to disclose,
which necessarily depends on an
198
interpretation of the fiduciary duties
imposed by ERISA. The claim also runs
directly into ERISA's disclosure
provisions. The compensatory damages
specifically sought by the employees for
the fraud claim are “compensatory damages
in the form of loss of employee benefits,
including but no limited to, the value of
the following benefits: early
retirement, retirement, life and health
insurance, vacation, and saving plan
benefits ...." Pretrial Order at 17.
This request for damages demonstrates
that the employees’ fraud claim not only
"relates to" an employee benefit plan but
is at its core an ERISA claim.
The employees protest that to hold
that ERISA preempts this fraud claim,
199
while also holding that ERISA does not
prohibit the wrong the employees feel
they have suffered, leaves a “gap" in the
law. That is exactly the result that
obtains when Congress determines that
federal law should govern a broad area to
the exclusion of state regulation and
chooses not to prohibit actions formerly
prohibited by state law. It is the very
conflict between the federal scheme and
state law that is to be avoided through
preemption. To argue that Congress has
created a "gap" in the law does not
undermine the reasoning on which a
finding of preemption is based. We turn
now to the employees’ ERISA Claims.
B. ERISA Claims
200
—)
>
Statutory Requirement that Years of
service With Predecessor Employer be
Credited by Successor Employer
rovides in relevant
Tr
part:
(1) in any case in which the employer
maintains a plan of a predecessor
employer, service for such predecessors
Shall be treated as service for the
employer, and
(<éj lr any -asSe in wnicn the employer
maintains a plan which is not the plan
maintained by a predecesso ployer,
service for such predecessor shall, to
the extent provided in regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, be treated as service for the
employer.
There is no dispute that §
1000(b)(2) is the section applicable in
this case; Norgas does not maintain the
plan of Amoco but maintains its own
retirement plan. Although the Secretary
of the Treasury has promulgated no
regulations requiring that a successor
employer give credit for years of service
with a predecessor employer, the
employees contend that § 1060(b)(2)
requires Norgas to credit their years of
service with Amoco for the purposes of
calculating benefits and determining
eligibility for early retirement.
The district court determined that
the statutory language and legislative
history of this section make clear that
Congress intended to leave the question
whether to require such credit to the
Secretary of the Treasury and that no
such credit would be required absent the
promulgation of regulations to that
effect. The employees make no effort to
shed light on any particular error
committed by the district court but
Simply reassert the arbument that the
phrase "to the extent .provided in
regulations prescribed by ,the Secretary
of the Treasury" should be read out of
the statute. This we cannot do.
203
We will not further belabor this
dispute. As set forth in the district
court's opinion, Phillips, 614 F.Supp. at
713-714, the legislative history of §
1060(b)(2), Department of Labor
regulations defining “years of service"
and the only case interpreting those
regulations all lead to the conclusion
that ERISA does not require a successor
employer to credit years of service with
the predecessor employer where the
Successor does not maintain the benefit
plan of the predecessor. Remaining
cautious about reading such a requirement
into any provision of the statutory
scheme in the face of Congressional
intent to leave this question of policy
to the Secretary of the Treasury, we
204
nonetheless go on to address the rest of
the employees' ERISA Claims.
2. Fiduciary Duty
29 U.S.C. § 1104 provides that "a
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries."
The employees argue that Amoco breached
its fiduciary duty in negotiating a
higher sale price for its LPG Operations
by bargaining away credit for their years
of service with Amoco. Norgas is argued
to be liable, although not a fiduciary,
for aiding a fiduciary to breach its duty
under ERISA,
The district court held that the
fiduciary provisions cf ERISA are not
implicated in the sale of a business
merely because the terms of the sale will
affect contingent and non-vested future
retirement benefits. This holding is
supported by the fact that ERISA simply
does not prohibit a company from
eliminating previously offered benefits
that are neither vested nor accrued.
Moreover, the ERISA scheme envisions that
employers will act in a dual capacity as
both fiduciary to the plan and as
employer. ERISA does not prohibit an
employer from acting in accordance with
its interests as employer when not
administering the plan or investing its
assets. See Sutton v. Weirton Steel
206
Division of National Steel Corp., 724
F.2d 406 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1205, 104 S.Ct. 2387, 81 L.Ed.2d
345 (1984), aff'g, Dhayer v. Weirton
Steel Division of National Steel Corp.,
>7i F.Supp. 316 (8.0.8. V¥e0.1083) aad
Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of
Bationa i Steel Cor 8. 4 56-7
F.Supp.1184(N.D.W.Va.1983). We emphasize
that the only "interests" at stake in
this case are contingent and non-vested
future retirement benefits. There is no
dispute that Amoco has fulfilled and
continues to fulfill its obligations with
respect to vested retirement benefits
earned under the Standard Plan.
:= Discrimination
207
29 U.S.C. § 1140 provides:
"Tt shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit
plan[covered by ERISA] .. . or for the
purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the
plan for ERISA}. . «. «"
The employees argue that Amoco and
Norgas unlawfully discriminated against
them for the purpose of interfering with
the attainment of rights to which they
208
may have become entitled under the
Standard Plan.
As the district court held, this
provision simply does not prohibit the
sale of a going business. Furthermore,
aS we noted above, the employer may
terminate previously offered contingent
non-vested benefits. Finally, as the
entire business was sold in this case,
there could not have been any
discrimination among employees.
4. Disclosure Requirements
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) requires that a
plan description containing the
circumstances that may result in
disqualification, ineligibility or denial
209
or loss of benefits be provided to plan
participants. The employees contend that
Amoco violated this section by failing to
disclose in its plan description the
possibility that sale of the business
might result in the loss of future
benefits. While the plan description
does not refer specifically to sale of
the business, it does notify employees
that a "terminated employee" will not be
entitled to full benefits. A terminated
employee is defined therein as one who
has not retired from the company. The
employees were thereby notified that any
event causing them to leave their employ
with Amoco prior to retirement would
result in receipt of less than full
benefits. As the description of the
210
Standard Plan adequately notified
employees that an event such as the sale
of a business would result in
termination, Amoco complied with the
disclosure requirem2nt.3
5. Miscellaneous Additional Claims
The employees raise several claims
under provisions of ERISA that are
patently inapplicable to the facts of
this case.
By its terms, 29 U.S.C. § 1106, the
"prohibited transactions" provision,
applies only to transactions to which the
plan itself is a party or in which the
monies, property or fiscal assets of the
plan are involved. Such is not the case
211
a
here. Section 1056 sets forth certain
requirements that must be met should a
plan provide for early retirement
benefits, but it does not confer upon
plan participants any substantive right
to continued employment in order to
qualify for early retirement benefits.
Section 1141 is a criminal statute that
provides no private right of action but
allows only for criminal prosecution by
the United States Attorney General.
Finally, § 1024 requires the plan
modification be reported to the Secretary
of the Treasury and is inapplicable in
this case because there was no
modification of the Standard Pan.
C. Appearance of Impropriety
212
The district court's denial of the
employees’ motion to reconsider or vacate
or for 'recusal is due to be affirmed for
several reasons. First, the employees'
attorneys knew about the law clerk's
employment with the firm representing
Norgas six to seven months before moving
for recusal. Counsel, Knowing the facts
claimed to support a § 455(a) recusal for
appearance of partiality may not lie in
wait, raising the recusal issue only
after learning the court's ruling on the
merits. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d
1093, 1094 (llth Cir.1983), cert denied,
464 U.S. 1050, 104 S.Ct. 729, 79 L.Ed.2d
189 (1984). The employees’ argument that
they were not aware of the facts
213
Supporting recusal until they realized
that the law clerk had drafted the
memorandum opinion explaining summary
judgment in favor of Norgas is
Gisingenuous. They were well aware that
the law clerk was actively involved with
the case and that he, as Judge Lynne's
only law clerk, could be the only person
who would work with the judge to draft
the opinion. Clearly the facts giving
rise to any appearance of impropriety
were kaown by the employees’ attorneys
long before the law clerk actually began
drafting the opinion.
Several factors lessen any
appearance of impropriety and ensure that
the due process rights of the employees
were not violated. The case had been
214
before the judge for many years and many
clerks had worked on it. By the time the
law clerk at issue was hired, the judge
had formed the conclusion that the
employees' claims were without merit.
Furthermore, the court granted Norgas'
motion for summary judgment at oral
argument, before the law clerk began work
on the opinion justifying the decision.
Additionally, the claims against Norgas
were meritless, if not frivolous.
Finally, because this case was decided on
Summary judgment motions, the court was
not called upon to resolve conflicts in
evidence, weigh the credibility of
witnesses or exercise judicial discretion.
The district court's decision has been
subjected to de novo review by this court.
215
Judge Lynne's decision not to vacate the
judgment and not to recuse himself was
well within his discretion.
For the forgoing reasons, the
summary judgments in favor of Amoco,
Bearden and Norgas are
AFFIRMED.
216
FOOTNOTES
= Claims against Bearden are not
discussed separately in the district
court's memorandum opinion or in the
parties" SrieEsw to this €6urt. As
Bearden is an agent of Amoco, our
discussion of the claims against Amoco
applies to the claims alleged against
Bearden. We will not further refer to
Bearden in this opinion.
2. We emphasize that ERISA preempts
such causes of action as only they relate
to employee benefit plans. Our holding
with respect to preemption is therefore
limited by the facts of this case.
Hence, while we note that other courts
have held ERISA to preempt state common
217
law causes of action, we acknowledge that
these opinions are useful only to the
extent they support the general
proposition that ERISA may preempt state
law causes of action. See e.g., Authier
v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799-802 (6th
Circ, 208, 86 L.86.24 17? (3983)3t BAau >
Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1356-57
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, U.8.
, 106 §.Ct. 183, 88 L.Ed.2d 152
(1985); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cif.),
cert.denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S.Ct. 512,
70 L«BG.20 364 (1981). For additional
cases see the district court's opinion,
Phillips, 614 F.Supp. at 708.
3. Moreover, it is not clear that §
1022(a) requires that a plan description
218
disclose the circumstances under which
inchoate, non-vested contingent interests
in future benefits might be cut off.
219
29 U.S.C. 1140
It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is
entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan, this subchapter,
oe eem £208 Of this title, or the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
[29° 0.S.C.A. 301 et seq.], or for the
Sueponpe Of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the
plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall
220
be unlawful for any person to discharge,
find, suspend, expel, or discriminate
against any person because he has given
information or has testified or is about
to testify in an inquiry or proceeding
relating to this chapter of the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. the
provisions of section 1132 of this title
shall be applicable in the enforcement of
this section.
29 U.S.C. tide
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of
this chapter shall supersede any and all
221
State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title and not exempt under section
LOQ03(b) of this titie. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application
(1) This section shall not apply
with respect to any cause of action which
arose, or any act or omission which
occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) Except as provided in
subparagrah (B), nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt
or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking,
or securities.
222
(b) Neither an employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this
title, which is not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in
the business of insurance or banking for
purpose of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit use by the
Secretary of services or facilities of a
223
State agency as permitted under section
1136 of this title.
(4) Subsection (a) of this section
shall not apply to any generally
applicable criminal law of a State.
(5)(A) Except as provided in
subparagrah (B), subsection (a) of this
section shall not apply to the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw.Rev. Stat.
§§ 393-1 through 393-51).
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A)
shall be construed to exempt from
subsection (a) of this section --
(i) any State tax law relating
to employee benefit plans, or
(34) any amendment of the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act enacted
after September 2, 1974, to the extent it
2 24
provides for more than the effective
administration of such Act as if effect
on sucn date.
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph
(A), parts 1 and 4 of this subtiile, and
the preceding sections of this part to
the extent they govern matters which are
governed by the provisions of such parts
l1 and 4, shall supersede the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act (as in effect on
or after January 14, 1983), but the
Secretary may enter into cooperative
arrangements under this paragraph and
section 1136 of this title with officials
of the State of Hawaii to assist them in
effectuating the policies of provisions
of such Act which are superseded by such
parts.
2 25
eel eEeCEllClC EeETCCOlClC ETTCOlClC ECC ETO OlClCU CUCU ETCOCUlClC CCClClC ECC ClClC ECC ECTClClCMETlC El
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section --
(1) in the case of an employee
welfare benefit plan which is a multiple
employer welfare arrangement and is fully
insured (or which is a multiple employer
welfare arrangement subject to an
exemption under subparagraph (B)), any
law of any State which regulates
insurance may apply to use arrangement to
the extent that such law provides --
(I) standards, requiring the
maintenance of specified levels of
contributions, which any such plan, or
any trust established under such a plan,
must meet in order to be considered under
such law able to pay benefits in full
when due, and
2 26
(II) provisions to enforce such
Standards, and
eee in the case of any other
employee welfare benefit plan which is a
multiple employer welfare arrangement, in
addition to this subchapter, any law of
any State which regulates insurance may
apply to the extent not inconsistent with
the preceding sections of this
subchapter.
(B) The Secretary may, under
regulations which may be prescribed by
the Secretary, exempt from subparagraph
(A)(iil), individually or by class,
multiple employer welfare arrangements
which are not fully insured. Any such
exemption may be granted with respect to
any arrangement or class of arrangements
only if such arrangement or each
arrangement which is a member of such
class meets the requirements of section
1002(1) and section 1003 of this title
necessary to be considered an employee
welfare benefit plan to which this
subchapter applies.
(Cc) Nothing in subparagraph (A)
shall affect the manner or extent to
which the provisions of this subchapter
apply to an employee welfare benefit plan
which is not a multiple employer welfare
arrangement and which is a plan, fund, or
program participating in, subscribing to,
or otherwise using a multiple employer
welfare arrangement to fund or administer
benefits to such plan's participants and
beneficiaries.
228
(D) For purposes of this paragraph,
a multiple employer welfare arrangement
shall be considered fully insured only if
the terms of the arrangement provide for
benefits the amount of all of which the
Secretary determines are guaranteed under
a contract, or policy of insurance,
issued by an insurance company, insurance
service, or insurance organization,
qualified to conduct business in a State.
(7) Subsection (a) shall not apply
to qualified domestic relations orders
(within the meaning of section
1056(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title).
(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) the term "State Law" includes
all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,
229
or other State action having the effect
of law, of any State. A law of the
United States applicable only to the
District of Columbia shall be treated as
a State law rather than a law of the
United States.
(2) The term "State" includes a
State, any political subdivisions
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality
of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms aad
conditions of employee benefit plans
covered by this subchapter.
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification,
invalidation, impairment, or supersedure
of any law of United States prohibited
Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to alter, amend, modify,
230
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
of the United States (except as provided
in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of this
title) or any regulation issued under any
such law.
6-2-3. Accrvel of claeiu +. Feaud.
In actions seeking relief on the
ground of fraud where the statute has
created a bar, the claim must not be
considered as having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the
fact constituting the fraud, after which
he must have one year within which to
prosecute his action.
6-2-39. Same -- One year.
(a) The following must be commenced
within one year.
231
a4 Actions for malicious
prosecution;
tay Actions for seduction;
(3) Actions qui tam or for a
penalty given by a statute to the party
aggrieved, unless the statute imposing it
prescribes a different limitation;
(4) Actiions of tibei of
slander; and
(5) Actions for any injury to
the person or rights of another not
arising from contract and not
specifically enumerated in this section;
and
(6) ALi aections tor tH0
recovery of wages, overtime, damages,
fees or penalties accruing under laws
232
respecting the payment of wages,
Overtime, damages, fee and penalties.
(7) All actions commenced to
recover damages for injury to the person
Or property of another wherein a
principal or master is ought to be held
liable for the act or conduct of his
agent, servant or employee under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.
(8) All actions commenced
under section 6-5-4111 to recover damages
for injury or damage to property of a
decedent.
(b) If any action 1s commenced
before the time limited has expired,
judgment is entered for the plaintiff and
such judgment is arrested or reversed on
appeal, the plaintiff or his legal
233
representative may commence an action
again within one year from the reversal
or arrest of such judgment though the
period limited may in the meantime have
expired; and in like manner, if more than
one judgment is arrested or reversed, an
action may be recommenced within one
year.
234
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.