Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Skevin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey
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FEB
JOSEPH
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1986
o
JOHN M. SKEVIN,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.
co)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
°
*Nem Mvutuin
Smita, Muuurw & Kiernan
100 Executive Drive
Suite 340
West Orange, NJ 07052
(201) 736-7033
Attorney for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
Supreme Court, U.S, T
FILED
11 1987
F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING (CO.. (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831
ww
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a state Supreme Court, consistently with Due
Process, may automatically disbar an attorney without
regard for or inquiry into his current character and
fitness to practice law where said attorney is found
to have knowingly misappropriated client funds under
a greatly reduced standard of knowledge?
Whether a State Supreme Court, consistently with
Due Process, may conclusively presume that an attor-
ney is guilty of knowing misappropriation of client
funds on the basis of a record showing no intent to de-
fraud or steal but simply revealing shortages in the
attorney’s trust account at certain moments in time?
Whether a State Supreme Court, consistently with Due
Process, may disbar an attorney where, prior to that
Court’s order, its agents cause or permit extensive
breaches of confidentiality in the disciplinary process
thereby triggering pervasive, statewide adverse pub-
licity and where the Court concedes that in sentencing
attorneys convicted of disciplinary violations the
Court deems determinative its institutional need to
maintain a good public image?
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
OPINIONS BELOW 1
JURISDICTION 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS INVOLVED ....... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
REASONS FOR. GRANTING THE WRIT oA
I. This case squarely presents the grave constitu-
tional infirmities of /n Re Wilson, 81 N.J. 461
(1979), a case being explicitly adopted by high
state courts throughout the nation. 0 12
II. This case presents a substantial, novel, and un-
decided issue of federal constitutional law that
must be decided in order to preserve the integ-
rity of state bar disciplinary proceedings. ................... 18
III. The foregoing issues of Due Process were pre-
sented to the Court below but were ignored. ........... 20
CONCLUSION Ba olehoe ee 22
APPENDIX A .App. 1
APPENDIX B....... \scsascicineeieteassesiierieaitamea nea App. 17
APPENDIX C sinha acdaindigiahentsylecemneae App. 18
APPENDIX D ; Aaa See |
APPENDIX E cikent oes App. 29
APPENDIX F App. _ 32
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CaSES
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1979) 13
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) . 14, 20
Erdmann v, Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972)
I 20
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) 0... 16
Florida Bar v. Rubin, 362 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1978) .......... 19
In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 482 (1975) 20
In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034 (D.C. App. 1983) ....... 15
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) 17, 21
In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 (1979) passim
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
AGES 17
Matter of Discipline of Okerman, 310 N.W.2d 568
(Minn. 1981) 17
Matter of Dondi, 63 N.Y.2d 331, 472 N.E.2d 281,
482 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1984) 19
Matter of Marks, 72 A.D.2d 399, 424 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1980) 1S LCS ee ee 17
Matter of Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 (1986) 14,19
Matter of Skevin, 104 N.J. 476 (1986) ........ 1
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) 0. 4, 21
Mortssette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) 200. 16, 20
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 16
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) 0... 18
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) oo. 6
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mezx-
ve of Se) penn aoe ere 13, 16, 21
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 335 (1966) 20. 18, 21
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) 2 Paths 17
State, ex rel., Oklahoma Bar Association v. Ras-
kin, 642 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1982) 17
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422 (1978) 16
Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) . 14, 17
CoNSTITUTIONAL AND Statutory Provisions LNvoLvep
56 Ue Be Se oid 2
ab ee: OE (eins 11
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution WW. 17
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, United
States Constitution 2, 13, 14,18
MISCELLANEOUS
Johnson, Lawyer, Thou Shall Not Steal, 36 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 454 (1984) I MERLE, eR 17
Discieliaery Gale S100 A) 3
des es a atk cates onmenccacaiad 2,3
as en es I orci bce 3
No.
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1986
JOHN M. SKEVIN,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
| Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is
reported ai Matter of Skevin, 104 N.J. 476 (1986). [The
Opinion appears as Appendix A.}
°
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court dis-
barring the petitioner, John M. Skevin, was entered on
November 14, 1986. [The Order of disbarment appears
as Appendix B.] This petition for certiorari has been
filed in this Court within 90 days of that date. This
Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section
1257 (3).
ty
Vv
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, United
States Constitution provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-6 provides in pertinent part:
Every attorney who practices in this state shall main-
tain in a financial institution in New Jersey * * *:
(1) a trustee account or accounts, separate
from any business and personal accounts, and from any
fiduciary accounts * * *, into which trustee account
or account funds entrusted to the attorney’s care
shall be deposited ; and
3
(2) a business account into which all funds re-
ceived for professional services shall be deposited.
Other than fiduciary accounts * * *, all trustee
accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all
deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, shall be
prominently designated as an ‘‘Attorney Trust Ac-
count.’’
(The full text of N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-6 appears as Appendix C]
Disciplinary Rule (‘*DR’’) 9-102(A) provides:
All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm,
other than advances for costs and expenses, and all
escrow funds, shall be deposited in one or more identi-
fiable bank accounts maintained in this State, and
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be
be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges
may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client, a portion
of which the lawyer or law firm will be entitled
to receive for his own use must be deposited
therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer
or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless
the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it
is disputed by the client, in which event the dis-
puted portion shall not be withdrawn until the
dispute is finally resolved.
N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-10(a). Confidentiality provides as follows:
(a) All proceedings conducted and records made
pursuant to R. 1:20 shall be confidential and shall not
be disclosed to or attended by anyone except as
authorized by these rules or as provided by the Su-
preme Court and as follows: e
(1) on the scheduling of oral argument for final
discipline by the Supreme Court, in which event
the recommendation of the Board that is the
4
subject thereof, together with any briefs filed
pursuant to an order of the Court shall be made
public ; or
(2) at the request of or with the consent of the
respondent and upon the ultimate determination
of any disciplinary proceeding; or
(3) on the entry of final orders of the Supreme
Court in respect of disciplinary matters; or
(4) upon the order of the Supreme Court.
Ly
Vw
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from the disbarment of petitioner,
John M. Skevin, by the New Jersey Supreme Court. On
December 23, 1986, the United States Supreme Court per
Justice William Brennan, Jr. issued a stay of the lower
__court’s disbarment order, following submission of briefs
by petitioner and the respondent. Justice Brennan’s stay
is in effect pending adjudication of this petition for cer-
tiorari. Justice Brennan’s Orders appear herein as Ap-
pendix D.
1. The Nature of the Ethics Charges Against
John Skevin.
On March 29, 1983, the Bergen County District Ethics
Committee’ [hereinafter the ‘‘Committee’’], served a com.
‘In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State
Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), this Court had occasion to
describe New Jersey's attorney ethics system. In that opinion,
the Court accurately observed that the system is three-tiered:
(Continued on following page)
plaint upon John Skevin, the petitioner, initiating ethics
proceedings against him. That complaint was instigated
by Mr. Skevin’s former client, Marie L. Dodd.
Soon after filing the Dodd complaint, the committee
filed an amended complaint charging, inter alia, various
ethics violations at the instigation of several other former
clients.
On November 14, 1986, the New Jersey Supreme Court
dismissed all of the charges brought against Mr. Skevin
by his clients or declared them to be so de minimus as to
require only a private reprimand.”
In the course of investigating these minor client
matters, the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics [here-
inafter the ‘‘OAE’’} decided to audit John Skevin’s law
firm financial records. That audit revealed, and indeed
petitioner has candidly admitted throughout the proceed-
ings below, that from 1981 through 1983, Mr. Skevin de-
(Continued fiom previous page)
The lowest level is the District Ethics Committee, a countywide
body that initiates investigations on behalf of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. The intermediate level is the Disciplinary
Review Board, a statewide body that adopts, modifies or re-
jects the Committee’s findings and makes a recommendation
for discipline to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The upper
level is the state Supreme Court itself, the body that,- relying
upon the factual findings of the lower bodies, see id., 457 U.S.
at 434 n. 13, issues a judgment imposing discipline.
2The Dodd matter did “not .. . warrant . . . disciplinary
action.” in the Matter of Skevin, (Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, D-2-86, decided, November 14, 1986, submitted herewith
as Appendix A) at 3; the Schrader matter amounted to “con-
duct for which a private reprimand would constitute adequate
discipline,” id. at 5; the Onello matter was outright dismissed,
id. at 6; and the Santana matter was deemed to warrant a pri-
vate reprimand, id. at 7.
6
posited in the trust account he maintained for his clients
large sums of his own money earned in various real estate
transactions he handled pro se. Although none of Mr.
Skevin’s clients claimed that he had deprived them of trusi
funds held in escrow—indeed it is undisputed that all of
Mr. Skevin’s clients received their due from the trust ac-
count—the OAE audit revealed that at certain points in
time during the years 1982 and 1983, the balance in the trust
fund was less than the amount of trust monies Mr. Skevin
was responsible for as reflected in his trust account ledger
sheets.
On the basis of the OAE audit, the Committee itself
charged Mr. Skevin with various offenses including the
\
knowing misappropriation of client trust funds.
2. The Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey not
to temporarily suspend Mr. Skevin and his good
standing as an attorney during the two years this
ethics matter was processed.
In March of 1984, the OAE moved before the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, for an order temporarily suspend-
ing Mr. Skevin pending proceedings against him. The
Supreme Court denied that motion on July 12, 1984. The
Court permitted Mr. Skevin to continue to practice law
under the supervision of another New Jersey attorney,
Raymond L. Flood.
No ethics complaints were filed against Mr. Skevin
arising out of matters during the years 1984, 1985 and
1986. Indeed, in connection with proceedings before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey against Mr. Skevin, his
court-appointed proctor filed an affidavit declaring, inter
alia, that ‘*In the course of the past year that I have served
as Mr. Skevin’s proctor, | have observed him profession-
“I
ally and personally. Mr. Skevin appears to be a competent
professional, providing good quality services to his clients.
Mr. Skevin’s legal files appear to be well organized and he
obtains good results for his clients which primarily involve
negligence actions.’? That affidavit was uncontroverted
and appears herein as Appendia E.
3. Prejudicial publicity against Mr. Skevin during the
pendency of this ethics matter and violations of con-
fidentiality rules by the New Jersey ethics system.
As noted above, the initial ethies complaint in this
matter was served on March 29, 1983, and the matter was
tried before a special master, retired Judge Ward J. Her-
bert, on July 10, 12, 15 and 16, 1985. The special master’s
report was submitted under date of March 12, 1986.
Under New Jersey Court Rules, ethics proceedings
are to be kept strictly confidential. That rule was grossly
breached in these proceedings.
On June 8, 1984, an article appeared in The Star-
Ledger, a statewide New Jersey daily, titled ‘‘“SUSPEN-
SION OF ATTORNEY ASKED PENDING ETHICS
HEARINGS” and sub-titled ‘‘EX-LEGISLATOR AC-
CUSED OF MISUSING CLIENT TRUST FUNDS.’’
| Newspaper articles cited herein appear as Appendix F.|
That article, although not in violation of confidentiality
rules, because it was based upon a public hearing before
the Supreme Court on the issue of temporary suspension,
was nevertheless the first of a series of highly prejudicial
press stories.
On August 26, 1984, an article appeared in the New
York Times titled *““EX-STATE SENATOR FACES
8
ETHICS INQUIRY.’’ The article cites statements by
Thomas McCormick, Chief Hearing Officer of the OAK
and David Johnson, OAE Director, that ‘‘Mr. Skevin is
charged with misappropriating $150,000.00 in client
funds.’’ The article referred at length to details of the
Schrader case and documentary evidence involved in that
matter.
On August 13, 1985, shortly after hearings before the
special master, but prior to the issuance of his decision,
The Bergen Record featured an article entitled ‘ETHICS
UNIT MAY SEEK DISBARMENT OF SKEVIN.”’ The
article quoted OAE staff: ‘‘The State office of Attorney
Ethics may seek to have Hackensack attorney John M.
Skevin disbarred, said an official who recently prosecuted
Skevin for misconduct. ‘I want this guy to get what he
deserves, at least in my opinion,’ said [Thomas J.] Me-
Cormick who presented the case against Skevin at the
hearing . . . ‘We believe Skevin was using the trust ac-
count as his personal bank,’ said McCormick. . .”’
On September 3, 1985, special master Ward Herbert
issued a letter to the OAE and Mr. Skevin’s counsel say-
ing, ‘‘I hardly need to tell you that I was shocked by the
newspaper article of August 13th [1985]. It is the sort
of thing that eliminates much, if not all, of the meaning
out of Rule 1:20-5(d).’’ On May 6, 1986, shortly after
the special master issued his findings and conclusions,
Herb Jaffe, a leading columnist for The Star-Ledger pub-
lished a column complaining about the delays in the ethics
system and calling for Skevin’s disbarment. Mr. Jaffe
quoted extensively from the confidential report of the
special master, which obviously had been leaked to him
9
from within the ethics system. Mr. Jaffe concluded his
article by complaining about the delay in disbarring Mr.
Skevin and noting sarcastically ‘‘And they say the lawyer
ethics system instills the public with confidence.’’
On May 6, 1986, Special Master Herbert wrote to the
Director of the OAE complaining about the leak of his
confidential report to The Star-Ledger and noting that he
had forwarded copies of the report only to ethics system
personnel and Mr. Skevin’s counsel.
On May 31, 1986, The Star-Ledger headlined ‘‘DIS-
BARMENT ASKED FOR FORMER LEGISLATOR,”
and quoted extensively from the report of the Disciplinary
Review Board [hereinafter *‘DRB’’], the intermediate
disciplinary body that received Judge Herbert’s report
and in turn made recommendations to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in its own confidential report.
On June 1, 1986, The Record headlined ‘‘SKEVIN:
FROM CLOUT TO LIKELY DISBARMENT,”’ and like-
wise quoted extensively from the DRB report.
On June 22, 1986, The Star-Ledger ran another Herb
Jaffe article on the front page of its Opinion/Business
section entitled ‘‘NO EXCUSES FOR LAWYERS WHO
VIOLATE CLIENT TRUST.”’ The article praised re-
cent disbarments and referred to the Supreme Court’s
scheduled argument on the Skevin matter. Again, the
newspaper quoted at length from the DRB Report.
4. Proceedings against Mr. Skevin by the Committee,
the DRB and the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
During the hearing before Judge Herbert, Mr. Skevin
admitted that he had permitted some of the earnings from
10
his pro se real estate transactions to pass through and mix
with his trust account funds. He coneeded that from time
to time he advanced to himself and his clients payments due
himself and his clients prior to actual receipt of settlement
proceeds. Mr. Skevin testified that he believed that such
advances were being funded by the large personal deposits
he had placed in his trust account. He did not believe that
such advances invaded the trust monies held on account of
other clients.
Judge Herbert struggled with the question of whether
or not Mr. Skevin had knowingly invaded client trust
funds and concluded that there were at least two occasions
on which the trust account balance was sufficiently low
to have alerted Mr. Skevin to the fact that he had ex-
hausted his personal funds and that therefore client trust
funds were at risk. On that basis, Judge Herbert con-
cluded that Mr. Skevin had knowingly misappropriated
client trust funds.
In his Report and Presentment to the Disciplinary
Review Board, [hereinafter the ‘‘DRB’’], Judge Herbert
did not recommend disbarment. He ruled only that he
found Mr. Skevin guilty of unethical conduct ‘‘for which
a private reprimand does not constitute adequate disci-
pline.’’
The DRB, a body consisting of laypersons and attor-
neys, substantially adopted Judge Herbert’s factual find-
ings. They recognized that the ‘‘erucial issue [in the
case] is respondent’s mental state at the time of the mis-
appropriation.’’ They disregarded Mr. Skevin’s substan-
tial claims that the invasion of trust funds was an unin-
tentional product of poor accounting and further disre-
garded Mr. Skevin’s claim that his financial neglect was
11
the result of severe medical crises suffered by him and
his immediate family during the time period in question.
The DRB did not even consider the question of whether
the petitioner was, at the time of the DRB decision, May
23, 1986, morally and professionally fit to practice law in
the State of New Jersey. They concluded that because
Mr. Skevin had, in their view, knowingly misappropriated
client trust funds in 1982 and 1983, therefore, disbarment
was automatically required.
In reviewing the DRB decision, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey relied upon and adopted the factual find-
ings of Judge Herbert and the DRB. [See Appendix A]
In its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court, for the
first time adopted a definition of ‘‘knowledge’’ from the
New Jersey criminal code, N.J.S.A. ZC :2-2b(2), where true
knowledge is not required but rather, ‘‘a party is aware
of the highly probable existence of a material fact but does
not satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist.’’ Apply-
ing that newly reduced standard to petitioner, the Court
coneluded that Mr. Skevin’s advances to himself and his
client ‘‘posed an at least realistic likelihood of invading the
accounts of another client ...’’ and found, therefore that
Mr. Skevin had knowingly misappropriated client funds.
[App. 12]
The Court conceded that Mr. Skevin had eredibly dem-
onstrated ‘‘extraordinary [personal] suffering’? during
the period in which the trust accounting problems arose.
The Court noted, however, that in cases of knowing mis-
appropriation, it has an ‘‘inflexible’’ rule mandating dis-
barment. | App. 15]
te
In ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated
that it was ‘‘deeply troubled’’ by the ‘‘apparently delib-
erate breach of the confidentiality of the disciplinary pro-
ceedings.’’ The Court noted that ‘‘if only private parties
were involved, dismissal might be appropriate; but the fact
that there was a public interest involved tipped the balance
so as to preclude dismissal.’’ | App. 13-14]
The Court made no determinations whatsoever about
Mr. Skevin’s present moral or professional fitness to prac-
tice law. Although the issue of violations of federal due
process was briefed by petitioner’s counsel below, in its
opinion, the Court ignored all such issues and implicity
overruled them. |See generally Appendix A |
v--
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. This case squarely presents the grave constitu-
tional infirmities of In Re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451
(1979), a case being explicitly adopted by high
state courts throughout the nation.
This case presents this Court with an opportunity to
stem a nationwide multiplication of constitutional error
that is following in the wake of Jn Re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451
-(1979). That case compelled the automatic disbarment of
the petitioner despite his uncontroverted current moral and
professional fitness to practice law. It compelled also the
conclusive presumption that simply because petitioner’s
trust account showed deficient funds at certain points in
time, and because petitioner inferentially was aware of one
such moment of deficiency, therefore, petitioner knowingly
misappropriated, i.e. stole, trust funds.
13
In re Wilson, supra, holds that where an attorney
‘‘knowingly use[s] his clients’ money as if it were his own
... disbarment is the only appropriate diseipline.’’ /d., 81
N.J. at 453.
John M. Skevin, the petitioner, was automatically dis-
barred under the Wilson rule, following determination that
he had knowingly misappropriated client funds. By auto-
matically stripping Mr. Skevin of property protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e. his license to practice law,
see Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1979) (Brennan,
J. concurring), the New Jersey Supreme Court ran afoul
of long-standing precedent in this Court.
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mev-
ico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), this Court held that a person
may not be excluded from bar admission unless he lacks
good character, or is professionally unfit. Ignoring such
traits in evaluating qualifications for bar membership, the
Court held, amounts to a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There, this Court,
having granted certiorari to review a state judgment ex-
cluding a person from bar membership, found no evidence
of ‘‘moral turpitude’’, 7d. at 242, and found that ‘‘[i]n the
light of petitioner’s forceful showing of good moral char-
acter, the evidence upon which the State relies . .. cannot
be said to raise substantial doubts about his present and
good moral character,’’ id. at 246. Finding ‘‘no evidence
in the record which rationally justifies a finding that [peti-
tioner] was morally unfit to practice law,’’ id. at 246-47,
this Court reversed and remanded the matter.
Under Wilson, supra, the constitutionally compelled in-
quiry of Schware into an aeccused’s character and fitness is
14
held to be irrelevant. In Matter of Noonan, 102 N.J.
157 (1986), a case decided just months prior to the New
Jersey Court’s ruling against the petitioner, the Court in-
terpreted Jn re Wilson, supra, to mean that any invasion of
trust funds for virtually any reason will mean automatic
disbarment. It ‘‘is not so’’ the Court ruled ‘‘that some
kind of intent to defraud ...is required... The presence
of ‘good character and fitness,’ the absence of ‘dishon-
esty, venality, or wmmorality’—all are irrelevant,’’ the
Court declared, id. at 160. (Emphasis supplied)
In other contexts, this Court has always held against
judicially ordered forfeiture of property or liberty unless
a court first finds some degree of fault or venality by the
person to be punished.
For example, in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court including
four justices now sitting, reviewed, on certiorari, a Georgia
motor vehicle procedure whereby uninsured motorists suf-
fered temporary suspension of their licenses if they were
involved in an accident, unless they posted a bond equal to
the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in
accident reports. Just as the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey has declared fault to be irrelevant or presumed, once
an invasion of trust funds is established, so the Georgia
system held that ‘‘ ‘fault’ or ‘innocence’ are completely ir-
relevant factors’’, id. at 537, in decisions to suspend li-
censes. Citing the bar admission case, Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), Justice Brennan
wrote that ‘‘we look to substance, not to bare form, to de-
termine whether constitutional minimums have been hon-
ored,’’ id. at 541, and found the Georgia system to have
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
SRW
15
ment because it granted no real hearing on the issue of
the motorist’s fault.
In effect, by automatically disbarring an attorney upon
his or her conviction for knowing misappropriation, the
New Jersey Supreme Court conclusively, i.e. irrebuttably,
presumes moral and professional unfitness to practice law
on that basis of that conviction alone. Moreover, the New
Jersey Court, under Jn re Wilson, supra, conclusively pre-
sumes that if an audit reveals that an attorney is ‘‘out of
trust’’ at some point in time, then the attorney has ‘‘know-
ingly’’ misappropriated, i.e. stolen, client funds. In In re
Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034 (D.C. App. 1983) the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, adopting Jn re Wilson’s con-
clusive presumption of corrupt ‘‘knowledge’’ (although de-
clining Wilson’s automatic disbarment) wrote that New
Jersey’s
‘‘definition [of knowing misappropriation] makes
clear that improper intent is not an element to be con-
sidered in determining whether there has been a mis-
appropriation. This is consistent with the language of
DR9-102 which, unlike other discipinary rules, does not
require scienter; rather it is essentially a per se of-
fense. Consequently, once the running balance of [the
attorney’s] office account fell below the amount held
in trust for [the client], misappropriation had oe-
eurred.”’
In re Harrison, supra, 461 A.2d at 1036.
Here, too, because petitioner’s trust account fell ‘‘out
of trust’’ he was conclusively presumed to have misappro-
priated clients’ funds. Such conclusive presumptions of
both unfitness to practice law and ‘‘knowledge’’ have al-
ways been condemned by this Court as violative of Due
Process.
16
In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) this
Court condemned precisely the kind of reasoning that has
emerged from Jn re Wilson, supra. There, the Court
forbade the presumption of criminal intent from the
mere fact that a person was found in possession of govern-
ment property. Here, too, the mere fact that trust funds
were, at points in time, unaccounted for cannot give rise to
a presumption of corrupt ‘‘knowledge.’’ Nor can a eon-
viction of knowing misappropriation, itself moored upon a
fatally flawed determination of knowledge, give rise to a
presumption that one is unfit to practice law.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), this
Court, following Morissette, supra, prohibited the con-
clusive presumption of ‘‘knowing’’ or ‘‘deliberate’’ homi-
cide from the simple fact that a person killed another. The
Court ruled such a preswuption constitutionally defective
just as it ruled analogous presumptions constitutionally de
fective in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422 (1978) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. G84
(1975).
Under all the foregoing cases, the New Jersey Court’s
presumption that petitioner acted with corrupt knowledge
and its presumption that he is unfit to practice law were no
substitute for a constitutionally mandated evaluation of his
current character and fitness, Schware, supra, and his
actual state of mind at the time he was out of trust, Worts
settle, supra
3cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866)
condemning the automatic defrocking of a priest for aiding the
confederacy and Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)
condemning the ex post facto disbarment of attorneys who had
supported the confederacy.
17
Unfortunately, the automatic approach of In Re Wil-
son is spreading throughout the nation. We have already
noted the partial adoption of that case in the District of
Columbia. Also, the Court should take note of Matter of
Marks, 72 A.D.2d 399, 424 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1980) citing Wil-
son at 424 N.Y.S.2d at 230; State, ex rel., Oklahoma Bar
Association v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1982) citing Wil-
son at 267-68; Matter of Discipline of Okerman, 310 N.W.2d
568 (Minn. 1981) citing Wilson at 571. Wilson has been
cited in unpublished decisions in Maine, Texas and the Dis-
trict of Columbia: See, Johnson, Lawyer, Thou Shall Not
Steal, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 454 (1984) at 486.
This Court has not hesitated to grant certiorari to cor-
rect substantial constitutional errors in the context of at-
torney admission and discipline. See AKorigsherg v. State
Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (reversing state de-
nial of bar admission where the lower court failed to prove
that petitioner was ‘‘morally unfit to practice law,”’ id. at
273); See, also, Willner wv. Committee on Character, 373
U.S. 96 (1963) (on certiorari to the New York Court of Ap-
peals reversing state denial of bar admission where peti
tioner was deprived of fair opportunity to prove his char
acter and fitness); Spevack v. Klemm, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)
(on certiorari to the New York Court of Appeals reversing
disbarment of attorney because he had asserted the Fifth
Amendment) ; Jn re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
Certiorari should be granted in order to stein a nation-
wide violation of attorney Due Process rights. This case
is an excellent vehicle for righting the errors below because
here, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s character and
fitness at the time of his disbarment was good. See
the Affidavit of Raymond Flood, Esq., petitioner’s Court-
18
appointed proctor, Appendix E. Thus the constitutional
deficiencies associated with automatic disbarment are
sharply presented.
II. This case presents a substantial, novel, and un-
decided issue of federal constitutional law that
must be decided in order to preserve the integ-
rity of state bar disciplinary proceedings.
Another reason for granting certiorari in this matter
is because a novel and substantial issue of procedural due
process has been implicated by the proceedings below. This
Court has already ruled that where a criminal jury trial is
infected with excessive pre-trial and trial publicity, due
process requires vacation of the conviction and retrial.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). This Court has
recognized also that judges as well as jurors may be in-
fluenced and pressured by excessive press coverage of
court proceedings. In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) Justice Frankfurter (concurring) wrote that ‘*To
deny that bludgeoning or poisonous comment has power to
influence, or at least to disturb, the task of judging is to
play make-believe and to assume that men in gowns are
angels. ... ‘Trial by newspaper,’ like all catchphrases, may
be loosely used but it summarizes an evil influence upon the
administration oT criminal justice in this country.’’ /d. at
359.
This case poses the unanswered question of whether
‘*trial by newspaper’’ violates the integrity of state bar
disciplinary proceedings in a manner contravening the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Here, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey conceded that it was *‘deeply troubled’’ by the *‘ap-
ee
19
parently deliberate breach of the confidentiality’’ of the
proceedings against Mr. Skevin. In Wilson, supra, the
Court frankly admitted that it sought harsh penalties for
misappropriation in order to preserve its public image and
to maintain ‘‘publie confidence.’’ id. at 81 N.J. 456.4 Given
the press clamor for Skevin’s disbarment, the Court had
no choice but to disbar him. In Matter of Dondi, 63 N.Y.2d
331, 472 N.E.2d 281, 482 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1984), New York’s
highest Court found a confidentiality breach in rouglily
analogous circumstances to violate federal due process.
This Court should find likewise. See also, Florida Bar v.
Rubin, 362 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1978).
‘it is indeed apparent that the New Jersey Supreme Court
must have been influenced by the confidentiality breaches and
resultant publicity in this case. Just seven months prior to the
disbarment of petitioner, an attorney was found guilty of the
following ethics violations: improper use of a trust account by
—— a miscellaneous account and a tax reserve account
as part of his clients’ trust account; misuse of funds in this trust
account in five specific cases; two counts of failing to maintain
his financial books and records as required by Court Rules; ten
counts of engaging in conduct that adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law; and ten counts of not properly preserv-
ing the identity of funds of a client. To say the least, the gross
neglect of the attorney at issue prejudiced his clients. Some
examples of his negligent representation include: failing to per-
fect a criminal appeal; failing to file suit and thereby exceeding
the statute of limitations; and failing to properly administer two
estates.
In the face of such overwhelming evidence of misconduct
that severely prejudiced his clients, and such abundant evi-
dence of unfitness to practice law, the New jersey Supreme
Court found that a temporary suspension for less than five (5)
years was sufficient discipline. Matter of Noonan, 102 N.J. 157
(1986). Only the Court's sensitivity to press coverage of the
Skevin matter can explain why he received disbarment while
Mr. Noonan received only suspension.
20
III. The foregoing issues of Due Process were pre-
sented to the Court below.
_ Prior to issuance of the New Jersey Supreme Court
decision in this matter, petitioner’s counsel showed a
prescient concern with the Due Process implications of In
re Wilson. Citing two Due Process eases, In re Arndt, 67
N.J. 432 (1975), a case that adopts Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 585 (1971), and Erdman v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205
(2d Cir. 1972) cert. den. 409 U.S. 889, petitioner’s counsel
analogized disbarment to imposition of a criminal penalty
and argued that such a penalty could be justified only by
a finding of professional unfitness or substantial evil-
mindedness. [Petitioner’s Brief below at 34, 35 and 42].
‘Tf the reasoning of the DRB is followed,’’ petitioner’s
counsel wrote, ‘‘it will represent a substantial departure
from current law, and a reckless disregard for the due
process rights of attorneys who come before them for
discipline.’’ [Id. at 42]. Paralleling the reasoning of
Morissette, supra, petitioner’s counsel condemned ‘‘a pre-
sumption of guilt’? by the disciplinary system and _ re-
minded the Court that an ‘‘attorney is innocent until
proven guilty.’’ Petitioner’s counsel called upon the New
Jersey Court to carefully evaluate petitioner’s state of
mind, rather than to presume it, noting that ‘‘Anglo-
Saxon Jurisprudence has long reeognized gross negli-
gence as a distinct standard ... and New Jersey Courts
have recognized the distinction between gross negligence
and willful, knowing conduct.’’ T/d.
Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, the state
Court in Skevin simply presumed that Mr. Skevin acted
with corrupt intent and presumed he was unfit to practice
law.
date Nats tots
a il NTR Gl PUES ANG ON," at il ER i We Eo tN pg din olla? Si head sd
ra
nit 08 ti
The federal constitutional implications of the New
Jersey Court’s breach of confidentiality also was carefully
raised below. ‘‘[T]he attorney facing disbarment is
entitled as a matter of right to procedural due process,”’
petitioner’s counsel wrote in the brief below citing
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). ‘*This requires
that principles of basie fairness be observed. These rights
are guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.’’
Petitioner’s brief went on to condemn the New Jersey
disciplinary system’s breach of confidentiality as a viola-
tion of Mr. Skevin’s ‘‘right to privacy’’ and, citing Shep-
pard v. Maswell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), eontended that ad-
verse publicity ‘‘made it impossible for Mr. Skevin to re-
”?
eeive a fair determination.’’ |Petitioner’s Brief below at
52 and 60].
While admitting that it was ‘‘deeply troubled’? [App.
15] by the breaches of confidentiality, the Court below de-
clined to dismiss the charges against Mr. Skevin.
Finally. it should be noted that on December 14, 1986,
petitioner moved in the New Jersey Supreme Court for a
stay of its disbarment Order and in support of that motion
presented that Court with a near-final draft of petitioner’s
motion for a stay in this Court. The draft included
citation and full discussion of Schware v. Board of Bar
Evaminers of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 282 (1957). Although
the New Jersey Court had the power at that point sua
sponte to rule on those constitutional issues, ef., e.g. MWid-
dlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar As-
sociation, 457 U.S. 423, 480-31 (1982), it merely issued a
three-day stay. |
22
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully
requests that this petition for writ of certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
*Nem Mvutuin
Smiru, Muuur & Krernan
100 Executive Drive
Suite 340
West Orange, NJ 07052
(201) 736-7033
Attorney for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
et wah stats nate tyne
App. 1
APPENDIX A
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-2. September Term 1986
IN THE MATTER OF
JOHN M. SKEVIN,
An Attorney at Law.
Argued September 8, 1986—Decided November
14, 1986
On an order to show cause why respondent should
not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
Thomas J. McCormick, Assistant Ethies Counsel,
argued the cause for Office of Attorney Ethics.
Leon J. Sokol argued the cause for respondent
(Greenstone & Sokol, attorneys; Michael C.
Ureiuoli and Frank A. Campana, on the brief).
PER CURIAM.
This ease arises from a report and recommendation
of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) that respondent
be disbarred. The Board’s report follows the finding of
a Special Master appointed to make a factual record with
respect to certain charges of ethical misconduct that had
been made against respondent. We find, as did both bodies,
that the record demonstrates by the required standard of
clear and convincing proof, that violation of the tenets of
In re Wilson, 81 NJ. 451 (1979), has been shown and that
under those principles the conduct must result in disbar-
ment.
I.
Because of the paramount importance of the Wilson
issue, we shall but briefly detail the other ethical matters
App. 2
that were heard, since the findings on none would have
merited disbarment. We shall refer to the matters by the
count numbers in the Second Amended Complaint that
formed the basis of the hearing below.
Count One, the Dodd matter, involved a dispute re-
garding the handling of a real estate matter by Mr. Skevin.
He represented the Dodds as purchasers in a substantial
commercial transaction. Since certain title problems re-
mained at the closing, he held a $35,000 escrow. He re-
leased $20,000 to the sellers approximately two weeks after
the closing. He was deficient in recording the deed and
mortgage, apparently due to a breakdown in his office
management. A purchase money mortgage was not re-
corded for almost two months after the closing. He did not
properly resolve the various tax and title problems that
caused the escrow to be set up.
As a result of these various delays, when his client
sought to ‘‘flip’’ the property through quick resale, title
problems arose that oceasioned delay and caused the Dodds’
attorney on the resale to set up a $10,000 escrow to clear
the matters. The client ecompiained that Mr. Skevin turned
over the $20,000 from the escrow to the seller without sat-
isfactory clearance from the title company. But the Special
Master found, and we agree, that the disbursements to the
seller, as well as additional disbursements to the Internal
Revenue Service, the municipal tax office, and the State
of New Jersey Division of Taxation, were appropriate pay-
ments to be made from the escrow account. After these
disbursements, however, Mr. Skevin was still responsible
for a balance of at least $7.654 from the $35,000 escrow
account. Examination of his accounts disclosed that during
the requisite period between the closing and the satisfac-
ite ee
App. 3
tion of the escrow items, there was a shortage in Mr.
Skevin’s trust account. As late as June 8, 1982, the trust
account balance was $4,367, an amount less than the $7,654
necessary to cover the balance of the escrow. It is this
latter point that we shall address in the consideration of
the Wilson violations.
But as to the other claims, we agree with the finding
of the Master that the failure to record the deed and pur-
chase money mortgage promptly was a matter of profes-
sional neglect that would not have warranted a disciplinary
action. The payments made by Mr. Skevin from the ac-
count were justified. The requirement of a $10,000 escrow
account was something for which Mr. Skevin was not di-
rectly responsible and the proofs are lacking that any im-
proper conduct of Mr. Skevin caused his chent to partici-
pate in the $10,000 escrow on the resale.
Count Two of the complaint dealt with the Schrader
matter, the complaint that appears to have generated the
most controversy. The case involved a personal injury
matter that Mr. Skevin handled on behalf of his client, John
Schrader. Schrader had suffered multiple injuries and one
of his legs had to be amputated below the knee. Mr. Skevin
had done considerable legal work for the parents and was
retained to represent John. Suit was brought and on No-
vember 1, 1982, the ease was settled for a total of $250,500
with several defendants contributing to the settlement.
Payments came in at various intervals, beginning in No-
vember of 1982 and ending with final payment on January
25, 1983. The total fee allowable to Mr. Skevin was $57,094.
The ethics complaint grew out of a dispute between
the Schrader family and Mr. Skevin as to what his fair
App. 4
charges should have been. The Schraders had asked for an
accounting before the March 1, 1983 filing of the ethics
complaint. Eventually. the Schraders obtained their own
attorney, and as a result of those communications a formal
accounting was rendered on April 20, 1983. The key ethical
allegations here are that Mr. Skevin delaved the account-
ing, wrongfully withheld funds due his clients, improperly
made advances both to himself and his client prior to the
receipt of the settlement funds, sought unlawfully to ex-
tract payments from the clients out of the settlement pro-
ceeds, and illegally endorsed one of the settlement checks
in the matter.
On the substantive contentions, the Master found
that Mr. Skevin had at least an arguable claim to a portion
of the proceeds that were due to him from other matters
of the Schraders. Some amounts of this claim were even-
tually determined through arbitration between — the
Schrader parents and Mr. Skevin, others through release.
The Master further found that the evidence was inconcla-
sive with respect to whether there was oral authorization
by John Schrader to sign the settlement check. The Mas-
ter stated that the delay caused in settling this matter
was not caused by any fraudulent claim by Mr. Skevin
and concluded, ‘‘[hje thought, rightly or wrongly, that
he had a claim to be so compensated. HMvents subsequent
to the accounting of April 20, 1983 should be treated as
a business dispute, rather than a question of Disciplinary
Rule violation.”’
Of course, the Master found that the advances to
Mr. Schrader prior to the receipt of the settlement funds
were inappropriate and unauthorized. But the Master
said:
App. 5
The conclusion is that the loans [made to the client
and the withdrawal of fees and disbursements before
receipt of the settlements funds] represent a misuse
of funds held in trust for clients other than Schrader,
or use of personal funds that should not have been
commingled with clients’ trust monies or a combina-
tion of the two * * * * [but] that the unethical conduct
represented by the loans made to the client is con-
duet for which a private reprimand would constitute
adequate discipline.
Count Three, the Onello matter, involved a complaint
of unethical conduct by Joseph Onello, at former business
partner and client of Mr. Skevin. He complained of Mr.
Skevin’s handling of a real estate transaction in which
Mr. Skevin acted as an attorney for the joint venture with
Onello. The complaint was primarily based upon Mr.
Skevin’s failure to get the sellers’ taxes assessed and paid
promptly and on his failure to record the deed and mort-
gage promptly. This closing also involved a_ $10,000
escrow account to be held in Mr. Skevin’s trust account
pending clearance by the sellers of certain tax liens cloud-
ing the title. Shortly after the closing, Mr. Onello bought
out Mr. Skevin’s interest in the property. On June 1,
1983, Mr. Onello attempted to withdraw his complaint;
the District Ethics Committee nevertheless chose to pur-
sue the matter.
There were difficulties with respect to the transac-
tion. It was not until October 10, 1983, some 19 months
after the closing, that Mr. Skevin was permitted by the
seller’s attorney to release the funds. On this matter, the
Master recommended dismissal of_the substantive charges
subject to his observation that although it was clear that
Mr. Skevin was to maintain a $10,000 escrow account, the
entire balance in the trust account fell below $10,000 dur-
App. 6
ing a number of intervals in the fall of 1983 between the
closing date and the paying out of the $10,000. Money
that should have been kept in the trust account to serve
as the $10,000 eserow fund was used for purposes not re-
lated to the joint venture.
Count Seven, the Santana matter, involved an inap-
propriate advancement of settlement proceeds to an indi-
gent client. The making of loans while the case was pend-
ing was a violation of DR 5-103(B) (now RDC 1.8(e)),
but the Master believed the matter could have called for
a private reprimand.
Count Eight of the complaint referred to a number
of matters dealing with failure to obtain fee agreements,
failure to advise of alternate fees, or miscalculation of
contingent fees. All of these were dismissed by the Mas-
ter. Count Nine of the complaint dealt primarily with
overdrafts in Mr. Skevin’s business and personal accounts,
matters that were characterized by the presenter as ‘‘de
minimis’? and would not have warranted disbarment.
There was, however, an admitted allegation with respect
to a trust fund check being dishonored for insufficient
funds but which respondent reissued with adequate funds
available.
Il.
Our central focus must be on Counts Four, Five and
Six of the superseding complaint that the Office of At-
torney Ethics served upon the respondent. These counts
charge that respondent knowingly misused client trust
funds, did not maintain separate accounts for trust and
business records, did not maintain contemporaneous trust
App. 7
account records as required by Rule 1:21-6 for 1982 and
1983, and extensively commingled clients’ funds with his
own. For the purpose of simplicity, Counts Four, Five
and Six will not be treated separately given the similarity
of the allegations and ethical misconduct. The background
to these charges is that in investigating the complaints of
Dodd, Schrader and Onello, the Office of Attorney Iithies
caused an audit to be made of the respondent’s financial
affairs. During the course of that audit it was learned
that respondent had for several years commingled per-
sonal and client funds in his attorney trust account.
This practice clearly violates Rule 1:21-6, which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Every attorney who practices in this state shaJl main-
tain in a financial institution in New Jersey * ** :
(1) a trustee account or accounts, separate from
any business and personal and from any fiduciary ac-
counts * * *, into which trustee account or accounts
funds entrusted to the attorney’s care shall be de-
posited; and
(2) a business account into which all funds re-
ceived from professional services shall be deposited.
Other than fiduciary accounts * * *, all trustee ac-
counts, whether general or specific, as well as all de-
posit slips and checks drawn thereon, shall be promi-
nently designated as an ‘‘ Attorney Trust Account.’’
The conduct also violated Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A), in
force during the relevant years, which stated that escrow
funds of clients paid to the lawyer had to be maintained in
identifiable accounts separate from the attorney’s business.
account. Present Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a)
essentially restates this mandate. I'urther investigation
App. 8
disclosed that respondent's accounts were apparently ‘‘out
of trust’’ over an extended period of time in 1982 and part
of 1983.
Because of concern for clients’ funds, the Office of At
torney Ethies (OAE) petitioned for immediate temporary
suspension of respondent pursuant to Rule 1:20 d(x) in
March 1984. In support of that application the OAK sub-
mitted the investigation and audit of its accountant, Louis
Brief, which disclosed that in addition to the lack of co:
temporary trust account records, the reconstructed records
showed substantial deficits in respondent’s trust balances,
ranging from $12,469 in June 1982 to $133,476 in December
1982. Specifically, the evidence contained in Exhibit C-105
‘showed that respondent was out of trust as follows:
June 1, 1982 $ 12,469.09
July 1, 1982 70,267.31
August 1, 1982 72,252.18
September 1, 1982 60,618.20
October 1, 1982 92,502.27
November 1, 1982 114,704.29
December 1, 1982 133,476.40
The respondent denied that he had knowingly misused
clients’ funds, noting that he had deposited close io $1 mil
lion of personal funds in the account during the relevant
periods of time, which would have, he thought, been sufti-
cient to cover any personal withdrawals from the account.
His accountant factually disputed the contentions of the
OAE’s accountant that there was a deficit in his account
in excess of $133,000 as of December 1982. At this point,
respondent’s accountant said that the deficit was far less
App. 9
and was the result of mere inadvertence in handling the
account. With the central matter of knowing misappro-
priation being in dispute and believing that the public in-
terest could be protected by permitting the proofs to be
resolved before terminating respondent’s practice, the
Court denied the petition so long as the accounts were
supervised under proctorship to be regularly reviewed in
the disciplinary process.
Resolution of the disputed issues required a fuller
examination of respondent’s books of account and extended
study of the many transactions that occasioned the charge
of misuse of trust funds. A broadly experienced retired
trial judge was selected as Master to conduct that factual
hearing. At the hearing, respondent stipulated to many of
the basic underlying facts, particularly the basie facts con-
eerning the Dodd, Schrader and Onello matters. Some
concern has been raised that certain claimants in tose mat-
ters were precluded from offering personal testimony with
respect to the matters in issue after apparently receiving
subpoenas to testify. We believe that oral proof would not
have aided the Master in resolution of the disputed issues
and we are satisfied that the proofs would not have been
dispositive as to the ullimate proceedings. Further proof
as ta the allegedly unauthorized signature to the settle-
ment check would not have altered the result ‘significantly
since the question turns not on the receipt of the funds but
the ultimate disposition of the funds, a matter disclosed by
the record. We regret the misunderstanding that ocea-
sioned the clients to believe that their evidence was wrong-
ly withheld; perhaps more care should be taken to explain
the meaning of stipulations to the aggrieved parties.
lor the reasons that we shall later state in more detail.
respondent has conceded that there were undoubtedly oe-
App. 10
‘asions when clients’ funds had been used because the out
standing balances in the trust account were insufficient to
cover the amounts that were admittedly due to clients. The
exhibits and testimony before the Master clearly and con
vineingly demonstrate the basic facts with respect to the
commingling of clients’ funds with personal funds, the lack
of required recordkeeping on respondent’s part, and the
existence of actual deficits inf the trust account. The re-
spondent’s expert eventually recognized that the shortfall
in December 1982 had to be at least $105,000. Specifically,
as noted, the Dodd deficit was $3,287 on June 8, 1982.
The key issue that the Master and the DRB had to re
solve was whether the shortages were the result of knowing
misuse or were the product of inadvertent error or neglect
in the handling of funds. In our decisions, we have not ex-
tended the Wilson sanction to such instances of limited, in-
advertent and unintentional misuse of clients’ funds. In re
Hennessy, 93 N.J. 358, 361 (1985) (‘no intentional use of
funds belonging to others’’ warrants public reprimand) ;
In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 (1986) (gross negligence insuf
ficient to warrant disbarment where attorneys did not
know client’s money misappropriated).
The Master concluded that this case did not fall into
the pattern of those cases. The marshalled evidence that
distineuishes this ease from those was that respondent
clearly knew that he was withdrawing clients’ funds from
commingled accounts on each occasion when he drew his on
fees or disbursements in advance of receiving settlement
checks. Exhibit C-101 before the Master disclosed specific
instances of plaintiff’s personal injury practice in which re-
spondent reimbursed himself for fees and eosts by with
App. 11
drawing funds from his trust account before settlement pro
ceeds were received. The time periods were sometimes
substantial, as long as months between the advance to him
self and the receipt of the settlement checks. ‘The amounts
were also substantial, ranging from hundreds of dollars to
thousands. These two facts lead to the unavoidable infer-
ence that respondents knew that he was endangering other
clients’ funds that were in the commingled account. The
sume exhibit, C-101, also disclosed that respondent rarely
distributed funds to clients before settlements proceeds
were received. But when it happened, he had to know that
an unauthorized withdrawal from a commingled account
Was occurring.
Both of these practices were highlighted in the
Schrader case. Respondent, although knowing that he had
not yet received the settlement proceeds, undertook to
draw on the uncollected and, indeed, unreceived funds ad
mittedly for the client but also for his own account. In
doing so, he knew that he was invading the trust account
that by his own admission contained both clients’ funds
and personal funds. Had respondent maintained a sep
arate, personal account for such purposes, his position
might be defensible. But respondent candidly admitted he
just assumed there was enough money in the trust account
to handle the trust disbursements. It is also undisputed
that he did not maintain an accounting or running balanee
of his own funds in the trust account. Hence, it follows
that each such advance posed an at least realistic likelihood
of invading the accounts of another client sinee respondent
had no way of knowing what tie balances were. Cf. In re
Fleischer, supra, 102 NJ. at 447 (while poor accounting
does not establish a knowing misappropriation, poor ac
App. 12
counting is not a Wilson defense if evidence indicates know-
ing misappropriation).
While such evidence might not sustain a finding of
criminal intent to deprive others of their funds, the evi-
dence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that defendant
knew the invasion was a likely result of his conduct, a state
of mind consistent with the definition of knowledge in our
statute law. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). The concept arises in a
situation where the party is aware of the highly probable
existence of a materiai fact but does not satisfy himself
that it does not in fact exist. ‘‘Such cases should be viewed
as acting knowingly and not merely as recklessly. The
proposition that willful blindness satisfies for a require-
ment of knowledge is established in our cases.’ 2 Final
Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Com-
mission, The New Jersey Penal Code, 44 (1971) (com-
mentary) (citing State v. Jusiak, 16 N.J. Super. 177, 181
(App. Div. 1951); State v. Loomis, 89 N.J.L. 8 (Sup. Ct.
1916); accord Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Otfi-
cial Draft and Revised Comments) § 2.02(7), 248 (com-
ment) (1985).
l'urther confirmation for the finding, as set forth by
the Master, is in his analysis of the 1983 deficits related to
the Dodd, Schrader and Onello matters. It is undisputed
that the respondent had to make a $25,000 loan to the trust
account on March 16, 1983, for the purpose of paying
Schrader an additional $25,000 on his award. Respondent
was thus personally aware on that date that his handling otf
the trust account had produced the deficit result. Notwith-
standing that knowledge, respondent continued to withdraw
funds and the account remained in a deficit state in 1985
in that the $10,000 due to Onello did not remain intaet in
App. 13
the account. Ezhibit C-93, statement dated 2-31-83. As
noted, the Onello closing took place on March 5, 1982, but
the final disposition of trust proceeds did not take place
until October 10, 1983. Respondent admitted that he was
the only person with any real authority over or supervision
of the account. Although some administrative duties were
entrusted to his secretary, she was not asked to balance the
account, nor did she see the trust account bank statements.
Hence, we must concur with the Master that
[t]he finding is that he knew in 1982 and 1983 of the
deficit condition of his trust account and knew that the
condition had been produced, and was being continued,
by writing checks against trust accounts that should
have remained untouched uniil used for the purposes
for which they had been entrusted to him,
But again, respondent’s prior handling of the trust account,
even without this additional evidence, would have been
sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence a
knowing misappropriation.
IIl.
Although we have concluded that the Wi/son sanction
must be invoked here, there is an aspect to this case that
deeply troubles us. Respondent moved before the Master
to dismiss the proceedings in whole or in part because of
the apparently deliberate breach of the confidentiality of
the disciplinary proceedings. he Master ruled that if only
individual parties were involved, dismissal might be ap-
propriate; but the fact that there was a public interest in-
volved tipped the balance so as to preclude dismissal. We
agree.
We have taken extraordinary steps to protect the
public interest in ethics disciplinary proceedings by afford-
App. 14
ing to litigants who respect its confidentiality an immunity
from suit for malicious prosecution. R. 1:20-11(b); In re
Hearing on Immunity For Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J.
669 (1984). In exchange, we Insist only that the parties
who invoke the disciplinary process respect its concept of
confidentiality until a finding is made. We do this be-
cause we believe that in balancing the interest in vindi-
cating clients’ rights with an attorney’s professional repu-
tation for integrity, we must recognize that even an un-
substantiated charge can, if misunderstood, do irreparable
damage to an attorney without any corresponding public
benefit. The record in this case demonstrates the result of
such unauthorized disclosures. The evidence testified to
by Mr. Skevin is that he suffered a serious decline in his
professional practice while these proceedings were pending.
With the exception of the ]i/son violations, almost all of
the matters complained of were resolved in a manner that
almost certainly would not have resulted in disbarment
or serious discipline. The circumstances thus demonstrate
how an attorney may be tried and convicted, before the
facts are known, through manipulation of events outside
the hearing room. In almost al] of the matters the clients
complained of, respondent’s deficiencies were either dis-
proven or were not of ethical gravity. We cannot expect
those not directly concerned with the administration of
justice to share our concern for a fundamental fairness
that would insist on respecting the peculiarly sensitive
nature of these proceedings; still, we should take steps to
guarantee that fairness against abuse.
Though it would be of no benefit to respondent now,
others may be protected from such unfairness by our in-
sistence upon respect for the confidentiality rules and a
App. 15
clear understanding by any participant in the process that
he will not only forfeit any immunity from just prosecution
for malicious abuse of the process, but that should he
violate the rules of the disciplinary process he should ex-
pect that the sanctions of the law would be invoked.
Finally, we must advert to the extraordinary suffering
that this individual respondent has incurred. We note the
ravaging diseases that afflicted his mother, his son, and
his sister, the consequences of which contributed to the
decline of his marriage, and the breakup of his family,
as well as his own personal health problems. They cannot
be ignored. There is a limit to the ability of any human
to cope with such adversity. This is a tragic end to the
only partially fulfilled promise of a public servant and
counsellor. In the matter most grievously complained of,
the Schrader matter, it appears that the respondent ob-
tained a significant award for this voung accident victim
in gaining the $250,500 settlement. It has been urged that
his advancement of the client’s funds was motivated by
a desire to help his client overcome the adversity that arose
from the client’s disagreement with his own family over a
marriage that resulted in the client being out of his house
with no place to live. The same motives apparently
prompted the handling of the Santana matter. This young
man was apparently alone and unaided in the community
and relied upon respondent for more than legal advice.
There is no venality in that conduct.
We recognize the human suffering occasioned by the
almost inflexible invocation of the Wilson standard. But
we have been unable to rationalize the qualitative differ-
ences that would excuse the violation in the case of one
App. 16
suffering disease or defeat, or one suffering from drugs
or other dependency from one suffering the anguish of
collapsing home life or marriage due to economic or other
strains. Consequently, we have chosen to resolve the
choice of professional discipline by maintaining our pri-
mary focus on the public interest. In doing so, we have
been compelled to apply the Wilson sanction to attorneys
of unblemished record whose misuse of funds had not in-
jured clients, In re Lennan, 102 N.J. 518 (1986), and to
attorneys who had devoted considerable amounts of their
practices and lives to helping needy litigants. In re Brown,
102 N.J. 512 (1986). We do so here.
The judgment is that respondent be disbarred.
Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O’Hern, Garibaldi
and Stein join in this opinion. Chief Justice Wilentz did
not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
No. D-2 September Term 1986
Disposition Disbar
IN THE MATTER OF
JOHN M. SKEVIN
An Attorney at Law.
Decided November 14, 1986
Order returnable
Opinion by PER CURIAM
App. 17
APPENDIX B
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-2 September Term 1986
IN THE MATTER OF
JOHN M. SKEVIN, ORDER
An Attorney at Law.
It is ORDERED that JOHN M. SKEVIN of HACK-
ENSACK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
1956, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the
roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and
it is further
ORDERED that JOHN M. SKEVIN be and hereby
is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing
law; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent comply with Administra-
tive Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics
dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethies Fi-
nancial Committee for appropriate administrative costs.
WITNESS, the Honorable Robert L. Clifford, Pre-
siding Justice, at Trenton, this 14th day of November, 1986.
/s/ Stephen Linuseurd
CLERK
App. 18
APPENDIX C
1:21-5. Counsellors; Masters Abolished
The titles of Counsellor-at-law of this State, Master
of the Superior Court, and Special Master, Commissioner
or Examiner of the Superior Court, are abolished.
Note: Source—R.R. 1:21-1, 1:21-2, 1:21-3.
1:21-6. Recordkeeping; Sharing of Fees; Examination of
Records
(a) Required Bank Accounts. Every attorney who
practices in this state shall maintain in a financial institu-
tion in New Jersey, in the attorney’s own name, or in the
name of a partnership of attorneys, or in the name of the
professional corporation of which the attorney is a mem-
ber, or in the name of the attorney or partnership of at-
torneys by whom employed:
(1) a trustee account or accounts, separate from any
business and personal accounts and from any fiduciary
accounts that the attorney may maintain as executor,
guardian, trustee, or receiver, or in any other fiduciary
capacity, into which trustee account or accounts funds en-
trusted to the attorney’s care shall be deposited; and
(2) a business account into which all funds received
for professional services shall be deposited.
Other than fiduciary accounts maintained by an at-
torney as executor, guardian, trustee, or receiver, or in
any other similar fiduciary capacity, all trustee accounts,
whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips
and checks drawn thereon, shall be prominently desig-
nated as an ‘‘Attorney Trust Account’’. Nothing herein
App. 19
shall prohibit any additional descriptive designation for
a specific trust account. All business accounts, as well as
all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, shall be
prominently designated as either an ‘‘Attorney Business
Account’’, an ‘‘Attorney Professional Account’? or an
‘*Attorney Office Account’’.
The names of institutions in which such accounts are
maintained and identification numbers of each account
shall be recorded on the annual registration form filed
with the annual payment, pursuant to R. 1:20-1(b) and
R. 1:28-2, to the Ethics Financial Committee and the
Clients’ Security Fund of the Bar of New Jersey. Such
information shall be available for use in accordance with
paragraph (g) of this rule.
An attorney trust account shall be maintained only
in New Jersey financial institutions approved by the Su-
preme Court which shall annually publish a list of such
approved institutions. An financial institution shall be
approved if it shall file with the Supreme Court an avree-
ment, in a form provided by the Court, to report to the
Office of Attorney Ethics in the event any properly pay-
able attorney trust account instrument is presented against
insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the
instrument is honored; any such agreement shall apply to
all branches of the financial institution and shall not be
cancelled except upon 30 days notice in writing to the
Office of Attorney Ethics. The agreement shall further
provide that all reports made by said financial institu-
tions shall be in the following format: (1) in the case of
a dishonored instrument, the report shall be identical to
the overdraft notice customarily forwarded to the de-
App. 20
positor; (2) in the case of instruments that are presented
against insufficient funds but which instruments are hon-
ored, the report shall identify the financial institution,
the attorney or law firm, the account number, the date of
presentation for payment and the date paid, as well as
the amount of the overdraft created thereby. Such re-
ports shall be made simultaneously with, and within the
time provided by law for, notice of dishonor, if any; if
an instrument presented against insufficient funds is hon-
ored, then the report shall be made within 5 banking days
of the date of presentation for payment against insuf-
ficient funds. In addition to the reports specitied above,
approved financial institutions shall agree to cooperate
fully with the Office of Attorney Ethics and to produce
any attorney trust account or attorney business account
records upon receipt of a subpoena therefor. Nothing
herein shall preclude a financial institution from charging
a particular attorney or law firm for the reasonable cost
of producing the reports and records required by this
rule. Every attorney or law firm in this state shall be
conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting
and production requirements mandated by this rule.
(b) Required Bookkeeping Records. Attorneys, part-
nerships of attorneys and professional corporations who
practice in this State shall maintain in a current status
and retain for at period of 7 years after the event which
they record:
(1) appropriate receipts and disbursements jour-
nals containing a record of all deposits in and withdrawals
from the accounts specified in paragraph (a) of this rule
and of any other bank account which concerns of affects
App. 21
their practice of law, specifically identifying the date,
source and description of each item deposited as well as
the date, payee and purpose of each disbursement. All
trust account receipts shall be deposited intact and the
duplicate deposit slip should be sufficiently detailed to
identify each item. All trust account withdrawals shall
be made only by authorized intrastate or interstate bank
transfer or by check payable to a named payee and not to
eash. Only an attorney admitted to practice law in this
state shall be an authorized signatory on an attorney trust
account; and
(2) an appropriate ledger book, having at least one
single page for each separate trust client, for all trustee
accounts, showing the source of all funds deposited in
such accounts, the names of all persons for whom the
funds are or were held, the amount of sch funds, the
description and amounts of charges or withdrawals from
such accounts, and the names of all persons to whom such
funds were disbursed. A regular trial balance of the
individual client trust ledgers shall be maintained. ‘The
total of the trial balance must agree with the control fig-
ure computed by taking the beginning balance, adding
the total of moneys received in trust for the client, and
deducting the total of all moneys disbursed; and
(3) copies of all retainer and compensation agree-
ments with clients; and
(4) copies of all statements to clients showing the
disbursement of funds to them or on their behalf; and
(5) copies of all bills rendered to clients; and
App. 22
(6) copies of all records showing payments to attor-
neys, investigators or other persons, not in their regular
employ, for services rendered or performed; and
(7) all cheeckbooks and check stubs, bank statements,
prenumbered cancelled checks and duplicate deposit slips ;
and
(8) copies of all records, showing that at least quar-
terly a reconciliation has been made of the cash balance
derived from the cash receipts and cash disbursement
journal totals, the checkbook balance, the bank statement
balance and the client trust ledger sheet balances; and
(9) copies of those portions of each client’s case file
reasonably necessary for a complete understanding of the
financial transactions pertaining thereto.
(c) Type and Avatlalility of Bookkeeping Records.
The financial books and other records required by para-
graphs (a) and (b) of this rule shall be maintained in
accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.
Bookkeeping records may be maintained by computer pro-
vided they otherwise comply with this rule and provided
further that printed copies can be made on demand in ae-
cordance with this section or section (g). They shall be
located at the principal New Jersey office of each attor-
ney, partnership or professional corporation and _ shall
be available for inspection, checks for compliance with
this Rule and copying at that location by a duly authorized
representative of the Office of Attorney Ethies. When
made available pursuant to this rule, all such books and
records shall remain confidential except for the purposes
thereof or by direction of the Supreme Court, and their
App. 23
contents shall not be disclosed by anyone in such a way
as to violate the attorney-client privilege.
(d) Dissolutions. Upon the dissolution of any part-
nership of attorneys or of any professional corporation,
the former partners or shareholders shall make approp-
riate arrangements for the maintenance by one of them
or by a successor firm of the records specified in para-
graph (b) of this rule.
(e) Members, Associates and Employees of Out of
State Firms. No attorney who priictices in this State who
is a member of a firm, or an associate or employee of a
firm or attorney, practicing outside this State:
(1) shall share with such firm or attorney any fee
for legal services rendered in this State if payment to such
firm or attorney is prohibited by R.P.C. 1.5(e) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct ; or
(2) shall fail to maintain and preserve for 7 years
separate records of the fees received and expenses incurred
in the attorney’s practice of law in this State.
(f) Attorneys Associated With Out of State Altor
news. An attorney who practices in this State shall main
tain and preserve for 7 years a record of all fees received
and expenses incurred in connection with any matter in
which the attorney was associated with an attorney of an-
other state.
(g) Availability of Records. Any of the records re-
quired to be kept by this rule shall be produced in response
to a subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with an
ethics investigation or hearing pursuant to R.1 :20-1 to 1-20.
A pp. 24
11, or shall be produced at the direction of the Disciplinary
Review Board or the Supreme Court. They shall be avail-
able upon request for review and audit by the Office of
Attorney Ethics. When so produced, all such records shall
remain confidential except for the purposes of the particu-
lar proceeding and their contents shall not be disclosed by
anyone in such a way as to violate the attorney-client priv-
ilege.
(h) Disciplinary Action. An attorney who fails to
comply with the requirements of this rule in respect of
the maintenance, availability and preservation of accounts
and records or who fails to produce such records as re-
quired shall be deemed to be in violation of R.C.P. 1:15(d).
(i) Unidentifiable and Unclaimed Trust Fund Accum-
ulations and Trust Funds Held tor Missing (Awners. When,
for a period in excess of 2 years, an attorney’s trust ac-
count contains trust funds which are either unidentifiable,
unclaimed, or which are held for missing owners, such
funds shall be so designated. A reasonable search shall
then be made by the attorney to determine the benefic'al
owner of any unidentifiable or unclaimed accumulation, or
the whereabouts of any missing owner. If the beneficial
owner of an unidentified or unclaimed accumulation is
determined, or if the missing beneficial owner is located,
the funds shall be delivered to the beneficial owner when
due. Trust funds which remain unidentifiable or un-
claimed, and funds which are held for missing owners, after
being designated as such, may, after the passage of 1 year
during which time a diligent search and inquiry fails to
identify the beneficial owner or the whereabouts of a miss-
ing owner, be paid to the Clerk of the Superior Court for
App. 25
deposit with the Superior Court Trust Fund. The Clerk
shall hold the same in trust for the beneficial owners or
for ultimate disposition as provided by order of the Su-
preme Court. All applications for payment to the Superior
Court Clerk under this section shall be supported by a de-
tailed affidavit setting forth specifically the facts and all
reasonable efforts of search, inquiry and notice. The Clerk
of the Superior Court may decline to accept funds where
the petition does not evidence diligent search and Inquiry
or otherwise fails to conform with this section.
Note: Source—R.R. 1:12-8A(a)(b)(e). Caption amended
and paragraph (d) adopted July 1, 1970 effective immedi-
ately; paragraph (¢) amended July 7, 1971 to be effective
September 13, 1971; paragraph (a) amended April 2, 1973
to be effective immediately ; paragraph (¢) amended .July
17, 1975 to be effective September &, 1975; caption and
paragraph (a) amended July 29, 1977 to be effective Sep-
tember 6, 1977. Paragraphs (a) and (b) amended, new
paragraph (¢) adopted and former paragraphs (¢), (d),
(e), (f) and (¢) redesignated and amended lebruary 23,
1978 to be effective April 1, 1978: paragraphs (b), (e) and
(h) amended November 22, 1978 to be effective January 1,
1979; paragraph (a) amended July 16, 1979 to be effective
September 10, 1979; paragraph (b) amended July 16, 1981
to be effective September 14, 1981: paragraphs (a), (b),
fe), (¢) and (h) amended January 31, 1984 to be effective
February 15, 1984 except that the amendments to para-
graph (a)(2) regarding designations to be placed in trust
and business accounts shall not be effective until! July 1,
1984; effective date of amendiment to paragraph (a)(2) de-
ferred on June 15, 1984 from July 1, 1984 to September 1,
1984; paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), (e)(1) and (h) amend-
ed July 26, 1984 to be effective September 10, 1984; para-
graphs (a), (e) and (f) amended November 1, 1984 to be
effective March 1, 1985; paragraphs (b) and (e) amended
and paragraph (i) adopted November 5, 1986 to be effee-
tive January 1, 1987.
App. 26
1:21-7. Contingent Fees
(a) As used in this rule the term ‘‘contingent fee
arrangement’? means an agreement for legal services of
an attorney or attorneys, including any associated or for-
warding counsel, under which compensation, contingent in
whole or in part upon the successful accomplishment or
disposition of the subject matter of the agreement, is to
be in an amount which either is fixed or is to be determined
under a formula.
(b) An attorney shall not enter into a contingent fee
arrangement without first having advised the client of the
right and afforded the client an opportunity to retain him
under an arrangement whereby he would be compensated
on the basis of the reasonable value of his services.
(c) In any matter where a client’s claim for dam-
ages is based upon the alleged tortious conduct of another,
including products liability claims, and the client is not a
subrogee, an attorney shall not contract for, charge, or
collect a contingent fee in excess of the following limits:
(1) 33140 on the first $250,000 recovered ;
(2) 259% on the next $250,000 recovered ;
(3) 20% on the next $500,000 recovered; and
(4) on all amounts recovered in excess of the above by
application for reasonable fee in accordance with the pro-
visions of paragraph (f) hereof; and
App. 27
APPENDIX D
Supreme Court of the United States
No. A-463
JOHN M. SKEVIN,
Applicant,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
ORDER
UPON FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the appli-
cation of counsel for the applicant, and the response filed
thereto,
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, case No. D-2086, entered December 16, 1986,
be and the same is hereby, continued pending the timely
filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the above-
entitled case, In the event the petition for a writ of
certiorari is so timely filed, this order is to remain in
effeet pending this Court’s action on the petition for a
writ of certiorari. Should the petition for a writ of certio-
rari be denied, this order is to terminate automatically.
If the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, this order
is to remain in effect pending the issuance of the mandate
of this Court.
/s/ William J. Brennan, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
Dated this 23rd day of December, 1986.
A true copy JOSEPH F, SPANIOL, JR.
Test:
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
By: Frances J. Carson
Chief Deputy
App. 28
Supreme Court of the United States
No. A-463
JOHN M. SKEVIN,
Applicant,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of
counsel for the applicant,
I'l’ IS ORDERED that the order of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, case No. D-2-86, entered December 16, 1986
be and the same is hereby continued, pending receipt of a
response due on or before December 22, 1986, at noon, and
further order of the undersigned or of the Court.
/s/ William J. Brennan, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
Dated this 17th day of December, 1986
A true copy JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
Test:
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
By: Francis J. Carson
Chief Deputy
App. 29
APPENDIX E
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
ss
COUNTY OF BERGEN
I, RAYMOND F. FLOOD, ESQ., upon my oath depose
and say:
1. I am an attorney licensed in the State of New
Jersey, with offices at 39 Hudson Street, Hackensack, New
Jersey.
2. On or about July 20, 1984, I was advised that I
had been appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
to serve as a proctor for John M. Skevin, Esq. As part
of my duties, I became a co-signator on his regular busi-
ness and trust account, and supervised the general financial
affairs of his practice.
3. To assist me in this matter, I engaged William
Morrison, a certified public accountant who has reviewed
Mr. Skevin’s accounts on a monthly basis and prepared
a monthly report which we have submitted to the Office
of Attorney Ethics.
4. I’ve been informed by Mr. Skevin that he has
given up his practice and has become of counsel to the
firm of John Paolella located at 479 Main Street. Hacken-
sack, New Jersey. As part of this arrangement, Mr.
Skevin will no longer be a signator on any business or
trust accounts. All of the fees he earns for legal services
rendered will be paid to Mr. Paolella’s firm, and then Mr.
Paolella will in turn pay Mr. Skevin in accordance with
a contractural arrangement.
App. 30
>. In view of the fact that Mr. Skevin no longer has
financial affairs to supervise, I have requested that the
Supreme Court relieve me of my proctor responsibilities.
6. In the course of the past year that I have served
as Mr. Skevin’s proctor, | have observed him professionally
and personally. Mr. Skevin appears to be a competent
professional, providing good quality Jegal services to his
clients. Mr. Skevin’s legal files appear to be well organized
and he obtains good results for his clients which primarily
involve negligence actions. I found his bookkeeping and
other record keeping to be disorganized, however.
7. I have also observed a steady deterioration in his
practice over the past year. It is my impression that be-
cause of the adverse publicity which has attended his ethics
proceedings, most of his clients have left him. Those who
have stayed have primarily been persons with whom he
has a personal relationship.
8. This deterioration in his practice has caused him
severe financial difficulty, and placed him under substan-
tial pressure. I note that as the practice has deteriorated,
Mr. Skevin has become increasingly anxious in his financial
affairs. He has sought to borrow money from friends, some
of whom are also clients, and in one instance I had to
question the propriety of his seeking a loan from a friend
for whom he had rendered legai services and obtained a
substantial judgment just a few weeks prior. It should be
noted that the amount of the loan was $60,000.00, which
represented a substantial portion of the net proceeds of
“the settlement. ($84,366.68 to the client). I called this to
App. 31
y to those
arranged to borrow it from another source.
Mr. Skevin’s attention and he returned the mone
persons and
/s/ Raymond F. Flood, Esq.
Sworn and subseribed to be
fore me this —— day of July,
1985.
App. 32
APPENDIX F
THE STAR-LEDGER, Friday, June 8, 1984
Suspension of attorney asked pending ethics hearings
By ROBERT G. SEIDENSTEIN
An attorney disciplinary official
yesterday urged the New Jersey Su-
preme Court to temporarily suspend
former state Sen. John Skevin of Ber-
gen County from the practice of law.
Thomas McCormick, chief of
hearings for the Office of Attorney Eth-
ics, told the.court that Skevin had used
client funds “as his own private bank”
and that an audit of his records showed
a $147,000 shortfall in funds supposedly
being held in trust for his clients.
McCormick also said that Skevin
had improperly comingled his own
money with the trust funds.
Skevin’s attorney, Leon Sokol,
said, on the other hand, that the matter
merely involved “sloppy bookkeeping.”
He added that there was “not an inten-
tional” misuse of client funds.
Sokol put the shortfall in trust
Ex-legislator accused of misusing client trust funds
funds at $32,000 as of the end of 1982
and noted that Skevin had taken cor-
rective steps regarding the funds.
Yesterday's hearing represented
the first public word that the former
legisiator was facing attorney ethics
charges. The court reserved decision on
whether to temporarily suspend Skevin
while the proceedings against him con-
tunue.
Trust funds are accounts lawvers
hold for the benefit of clients. Strict
disciplinary rules govern such ac-
counts.
During yesterday's hearing in
Trenton, Justice Robert Clifford noted
that there were “admittedly appalling
lapses of bookkeeping’ on Skevin’s
part.
Skevin, a Democrat, lost his state
Senate seat in the 1981 election. He
was elected to the Assembly in 1965
and first elected as a senator in 1973.
He practices law in Hackensack.
s 2 s
Sokol, in arguing against tem-
porary suspension of his client, admut-
ted that Skevin had comingled more
than $1 mullion in his own investment
money — garnered over several years—
with client trust funds. Even though he
could not “hold him up as a model of
bookkeeping,” Sokol said that Skevin
always had “well-represented” his cli-
ents.
Sokol added that as far as the
trust funds were concerned, the money
was “all restored” and that all claims
mace by clients “have been satisfied.”
Justice Clifford, however, noted
allegations regarding Skevin’s alleged
practice of “lending’ money from the
comingled account “to himself.” And
Justices Sidney Schreiber and Stewart
Pollock pressed Sokol as to why Skevin
had comingled accounts and used trust”
funds for his own purposes.
Sokol responded that Skevin had
been acting that way for years. He said
Skevin saw the comingling of his own
funds with client funds as a “safe-
guard” against bank overdrafts.
Skevin, who attended the court,
session, declined comment on the disci-
plinary action being taken against him.
McCormick predicted that disci-
plinary board hearings into the under-
lying-case against Skevin would be
completed within two months. Several
justices. however, were skeptical about
the matter being dealt with in such a
short period.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
has ultimate authority to discipline
lawyers in the state. It generally exer-
cises its authority by reviewing recom-
mendations regarding sanctions
against particular attorneys.
At the close of yesterday's session,
Sokol agreed to find someone to serve
as co-trustee of accounts held by Ske-
vin.
John Skevin
$147,000 shortfall
App. 33
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, AUGUST 26, 1984
F.x-State Senator Faces Ethics Inquiry
By ALBERT J. PARISI
HACKENSACK
OHN M. SKEVIN, once a
legislator and still a redoubt-
able figure in state and Ber-
gen County politics, is bat-
tling to retain his license to practice
law amid charges that he comingied
clients’ funds with his own and com-
plaints that are before the State Of-
fice of Attorney Ethics in Trenton.
Late in June, the State Supreme
Court ruled 4 to 2 not to suspend the
%-year-old lawyer’s license pending
the outcome of the ethics investiga-
tion. But it stipulated that he could
practice only under direct supervi-
sion of another lawyer, Raymond F.
Flood of Hackensack, a former Ber-
gen County assistant prosecutor, who
must report monthly directly to the
ethics office.
Mr. Skevin was a State Senator
from 1974 to 1982, serving on the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, which
oversaw and nominated judges and
county prosecutors, and an assembly-
man for two.
According to Thomas McCormick,
chief hearing officer of the Office of
Attorney Ethics, and David Johnson,
the office director, Mr. Skevin is
charged with misappropriating
$150,000 in client funds. The figures
were established by a state audit.
By law, lawyers may not intermin-
gie their own and clients’ funds. Mr.
McCormick said during a Supreme
Court hearing in June that Mr. Skevin
had violated that regulation for years
and that over a three-year period, he
had combined some $1 million of his
own money with clients’ funds and
used the comingled accounts as “his
own private bank’”’ for real-estate
ventures.
Leon Sokal, Mr. Skevin’s attorney,
called the reported mishandling of
funds no more than ‘“‘sloppy book-
keeping’”’ and said the shortfalls were
closer to $40,000.
The complaints before the ethics
panel specifically charge that Mr.
Skevin continues to owe clients
money as a result of overcharging of
fees set by the State Supreme Court
and of fees for services that were ei-
ther not rendered or improperly con-
ducted.
About 10 complaints are under re-
view. They are said to involve im-
proper comingling of funds, forgery,
misappropriation of client trust
funds, professional misconduct and
lack of diligence.
Mr. Skevin chose not to comment
and referred all questions to his attor-
ney, who. would neither confirm nor
deny the charges, citing the client-at-
torney privilege and saying that the
ethics investigation was still going
on.
In 1979, the State Supreme Court
ruled that lawyers found to have mis-
appropriated client funds would be
disbarred in almost all instances.
In 1983, Mr. Johnson said, the Of-
fice of Attorney Ethics received
nearly 1,400 ethics-related com-
plaints. In 1982, he said, there were
1,325 complaints. Nearly half the
cases in which lawyers were disci-
plined by the State Supreme Court in-
volved client funds, he said.
Last year, he said, 31 lawyers were
disciplined by the court, with penal-
ties ranging from public reprimands
to disbarment. In 1982, 35 lawyers
were disciplined and in 1981, 23.
Some legal experts say privately
that once the ethics investigation is
completed and made public (it is ex-
pected to be completed in early Octo-
ber) a number of other ethics-related
complaints may arise from clients of
the former Senator who are awaiting
the outcoming of current charges.
One of the complaints before the Of-
fice of Attorney Ethics involves John
D. Schrader of Fort Lee.
In June 1979, Mr. Schrader, then 20
years old, was helping a tow-truck
operator change a flat tire on his car
in Little Ferry when another car
struck him. The driver, attempting to
flee, backed over him.
Today, after 25 operations and the
amputation of his left leg, Mr.
Schrader and his father, James, of
Teaneck, assert that the young man
was taken advantage of by Mr.
Skevin, whom they had retained.
According to documents provided
by the Schraders, Mr. Skevin, who
had previously represented the
family in legal matters, had informed
them that a $3 million settlement
could easily be obtained if the son
took the matter to court.
Mr. Schrader took his attorney’s
advice. In October 1982, after months
of legal preparation, the matter was
settled out of court for $250,500.
Of that amount, the elder Mr.
Schrader said, Mr. Skevin took some
$57,000 as a fee and $30,500 in fees on
related legal matters and for undocu-
mented disbursement costs, leaving
his son with $162,000.
Complicating the matter, the
Schraders say, is an insurance check,
part of the settlement, made out to
both Mr. Schrader and Mr. Skevin
and dated Jan. 7, 1983. The check was
signed and deposited to a client trust
account maintained by Mr. Skevin.
The youriger Mr. Schrader said that
he had not endorsed the check and
had not even found out about it until
two months after the funds were de-
posited.
“I was trying to piece my life back
together again at the time,”’ he said.
**The last thing on my mind was wor-
rying about the settlement. That’s
what I hired an attorney for.’
Mr. Skevin has produced an affida-
vit from a secretary, Jean Fostvedt
— who has since left his employ — as-
serting that Mr. Schrader signed all
checks made out to him. Mr.
Schrader denies this, adding that he
had never authorized the use of his
Signature to anyone on Mr. Skevin’s
law staff.
Soon after Mr. Schrader confronted
the attorney with his knowledge of the
check, Mr. Skevin issued two per-
sonal checks to the young man in the
amount of $40,000.
Mr. Schrader hired a handwriting
analyst, the Rev. Norman Werling of
Paramus, a Catholic priest. Father
Werling, in a notarized report, con-
tends that the Schrader signature on
the check was written by Mr. Skevin.
Mr. Schrader, currently unem-
ployed, also maintains that Mr.
Skevin still owes him some $15,000 on
the out-of-court settlement.
Mr. Sokal said that all claims had
been paid and that money Mr.
Schrader claims is due him went to
pay an outstanding debt owed to Mr.
Skevin by the elder Mr. Schrader.
Mr. Schrader maintains that he had
never agreed to pay for his father’s
debt out of funds earmarked for him
and that he was improperly charged
$5,500 for a malpractice proceeding
against Hackensack Hospital that
never materialized.
A copy of the contract between Mr.
Schrader and Mr. Skevin, drawn
nearly two years after the accident at
the younger Mr. Schrader’s insist-
ence, shows a fee breakdown that
does not follow prescribed percent-
ages.
According to the New Jersey Bar
Association in Trenton, fees for per-
sonal-injury cases prior to January
1984, applicable to the Schrader con-
tract, are as follows:
An attorney is permitted to charge
up to 50 percent of the first $1,000 in
the settlement; 40 percent of the next
$2,000, 3314 percent of the next
$47,000; 25 percent of the next $50,000;
20 percent of the next $150,000 and 10
percent of any amount exceeding
Mr. Schrader’s contract follows the
fee requirements along the first three
points ; however, instead of indicating
a breakdown of 25 percent of $50,000
and 20 percent of the following
$150,000, it states a 25 percent portion
of $150,000 followed by 10 percent of
amounts over $250,000 (creating the
$50,000 gap).
Mr. Schrader said that the attorney
also had taken 50 percent of a prop-
erty damage settlement of $500 in ex-
cess of $250,000, when he was entitled
to 10 percent, or $50.
A review of Mr. Skevin’s account-
ing of the Schrader settlement, ac-
cording to documents retained hy the
family, indicates a number of dis-
crepancies on fees due him.
In an overall accounting tabulation
issued to Mr. Schrader, Mr. Skevin.
seeks $59,716 as a fee for personal in-
jury and property settlement. In a
summary letter to an attorney hired
by Mr. Schrader to recover funds that
he claims are due him, Mr. Skevin
seeks $57,100 for personai and prop-
erty damage. *;
Mr. Schrader said that while he re-
ceived an itemized listing of Mr.
Skevin’s disbursements of $12,250 in
the case, he was shown receipts for.
only about $1,200.
Mr. Schrader has yet to be called to
testify before the ethics office. |
App. 34
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App. 35
Disbarment of Skevin sought for handling of client funds
FROM PAGE C-1
judge, Ward J. Herbert of Newark,
ruled that testimony by the
Schraders was unnecessary because
relevant evidence on their position
already was on the record.
The four-day hearing was held at
the law offices of McCarter & Eng-
lish in Newark, where Herbert prac-
tuces law. Herbert presided over the
Skevin bearing as a volunteer “spe-
cia! ethics master” appointed by the
state Supreme Court.
Herbert is expected to issue a re-
port of his findings to the state Disci-
plinary Review Board. a pane! that
makes recommendations to the
state Supreme Court on disciplining
attorneys. Herbert was on vacation
last week and could not be reached
for comment
In a 1979 ruling. the Supreme
Court stated that attorneys who are
found to have misappropriated cl-
ent funds should be disbarred in al-
mos: all instances.
Skevin, once a powerful Demo-
crat, served two years in the Assem-
bly and eight years in the state Sen-
ate before being defeated in his bid
for a third term in 1981.
Skevin's musconduct hearings in-
volved complaints by two other cli-
ents besides the Schraders and a
general charge that Skevin tam-
pered with money held in trust for
them and other clients.
“We believe Skevin was using the
trust account as his personal bank,”
said McCormick. “He was making
disbursements to himself, drawing
from his clients’ funds.”
Skevin maintains that his prob
lems stemmed from sloppy book-
keeping rather than any design to
musappropriate client money.
His attorney, Leon J. Sokoi of
Hackensack. has said Skevin found it
“convement” to mix persona! funds
he wished to invest with office finan-
cia) accounts. He said Skevin saw
such transactions as “loans from one
business entity to another.”
Sokol declined to discuss specific
complaints but emphasized that
Skevin has taken steps to pay clients
al) the money due them.
The Offce of Attorney Ethics an-
nounced the allegations in June
1964, when it sought unsuccessfully
to have Skevin suspended pending a
resolution of the case.
Instead of suspending Skevin, the
state Supreme Court appointed Ray-
mond F. Floo¢, a Hackensack attor-
ney and former first assistant Ber-
gen County prosecutor, to monitor
Skevin's law pracuce
John Schrader had hired Skevin to
file a lawsuit against a drunken driv-
er who struck him June 2, 1979, as he
Was standing in the Little Ferry
trafic circle while trying to move
his disabled car. Both of his legs
were severely crushed and broken.
His left leg had to be amputated be-
low the knee. He has undergone nuv-
merous operations to repair the
damage
Skevin filed a lawsuit on
Schrader’s behalf and arranged var-
1ous settlements amounting to
$250.500
Besides accusing Skevin of forg-
ing his Signature on the $59,000
check, one of severa! received in the
settlements. Schrader complained
that Skevin withheld the money
Schrader said he discovered that
Skevin had cashed the check and de-
posited it in his bank.
Schrader further complained that
Skevin, who took $57. 0u0 as a fee,
charged more than state .aw allows
He also alleged that Skevin billed
tim for about $10,000 in undocu-
mented expenses.
After Schrader filed a complaint
with the state Supreme Court's loca!
ethics commuttee. Skevin made fur-
ther payments to Schrader
Later, Schrader hired another at-
torney. Eugene Callahan of Hacken-
sack, who arranged a settlement in
which Skevin agreed to pay
Schrader an additional $14,000. As
part of the settlement, Schrader
agreed to drop al] monetary claims
against Skevin, including those in
the ethics cornplaint.
McCormick said that settlement
between John Schrader and Skevin
also played a part in Judge Her-
bert's refusal to allow the Schraders
to testify.
McCormick said the judge appar-
ently concluded that Schrader had
relinquished his right to pursue his
ethics complaint. However, rules
governing ethics complaints state
that they cannot be withdrawn.
Even if Schrader had waived his
rights, McCormick said, the Office
of Atttorney Ethics would take up
the complaint.
“It's like telling a prosecutor, I
want to dismiss a criminal com-
plaint; I've been satisfied in a civil
settlement,"’ McCormick said.
“There's a public interest that goes
beyond a persona! injury to the indi-
vidual.’
McCormick said he believes
Schraders have grounds to a
but that he believes his office
sented an adequate case.
“I sympathize with them,” be,
of the Schraders. “I would have
to have seen them have their
court. They could have gotten
viewpoint on the record, and at
vented their spleen.”
Sokol called the judge's ruling
rect.
Sokol said the other clients |
filed complaints against Skevin
did not testify.
App. 36
THE STAR LEDGER
Saturday, May 31, 1986
Disbarment asked
for former legislator
By ROBERT G. SEIDENSTEIN
An attorney disciplinary review
doard has recommended that former
State Sen. John Skevin be disbarred for
gnishandling funds he was holding in
crust for clients.
The recommendation, which was
made public yesterday, sets the stage
for a state Supreme hearing on
Skevin's future as an attorney. The
court has scheduled the hearing for
Sept. 8.
In the meantime, Skevin will be
permitted to continue practicing law
under the supervision of another attor-
ney. The supervision was imposed on
him by the high court in 1984.
Skevin practices law in Hacken-
Sack. He was elected to the Assembly in
1965 on the Democratic ticket and first
elected as a senator in 1973. He lost his
te seat in the 1981 election.
The disciplinary review board's
geport noted that Skevin “has admitted
that he consciously commingled his
rsonal funds with his trust account
unds, but that no client was injured as
@ result.”
The board, however, rejected Ske-
win's defense. “It is clear that he used
clients’ funds. His ‘unauthorized tem-
‘porary use’ for his own p , re-
gardiess of whether he derived any per-
sonal gain, is misappropriation. The
record demonstrates that... (his) trust
‘taccount had substantial deficit bal-
ances throughout 1982.”
The board added, “No attorney
can remain in perpetual, blissful igno-
rance of trust account shortages run-
ning over $100,000 unless he knowingly
chooses not to see.”
It noted, “The legal profession is
unique in that its practitioners are en-
trusted with millions of dollars of the
funds of others without the requirement
of bonding or other direct supervision.
The basis for this trust is the
tion that attorneys... will discharge
aap pone —— _ ethical-
responsibly. c is enti-
thed to no tes. Preteseed iquarence of
basic record-keeping will, in the future,
be viewed skeptically as an excuse for
— the integrity of client trust
The board said Skevin mishandled
the funds of a number of clients, includ-
ing a man who had his leg amputated
as a result of an accident. Skevin had
obtained a $250,000 settlement for the
accident victim. The victim later had to
hire another attorney to represent him
in his efforts to get all the money he
claimed he was due from Skevin.
At a hearing in 1984, Leon Sokol, -
Skevin'’s attorney, said the charges
against the former lawmaker involved
“sloppy bookkeeping.”
Thomas J. McCormick argued the
Skevin case to the disciplinary board on
behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.
Ap} » 37
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38
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*WOYs JUNODIE 3sN41) Jo aouel10UaI
INJssifq ‘yenjedied ut urewias ues
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40} pal 3y) UI diam sjuNOdde ysnJ}
SIY MoUy UAVS pres paeog au
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yoe1}3e8 padjay Aljuaredde ynojo
[eotjtjod sty uaym shep ay} wi01y
yunays sey ssauisnq me] sty MoUs
494}ANJ Sp10d91 jn0g “Zurjasunos
alajeryoAsd = auogsapun sey jjas
~UITY UTAaYS pue ‘Ay1WWey ay} UT ssau
“II! SNotias useq sey aiay) ‘sieak
bZ 193Je papua aSelew SII} SIH
‘sea yuaded ul Sula]qoid |euois
-~Sajoid pue jeuosiad q jaseq uaaq
Sey ‘yoesuayoey ut 991jJO MET be
SeY OYM ‘UIAaNS pjo-1ead-¢ge¢ au
‘Aauoul ay} uIn}a1
‘yey Ul ‘pip Jo spunj ay} uinja
0} Pepuszur Aaus0yje ay} Jt UaAa
10 ‘s19ay}0 10 JahMe] ay) JO }IjJauaq
24} 40J ‘sasodind peq 40 pood 10;
Posn st Aauour ay) j1 JURAVIAII SI
1 pres yunoo ayy ‘UOISIDap 7eY) UT
‘sjua
“HO JO spuny aje1sdoiddesiw oum
SIBAMB] IOJ JUSULTeQsIp Woy advo
“$9 OU Al[eNzIIA 4Ja]_ uTeSe }41n09
ydty ay} ‘o#e syyuow Maj e AjUG
‘S10jndaso1d pue saZpnf
JO SUOT}BUIWIOU ay) PpamatAaz 7ey}
99}}1UNWO9 [NJ1aMod e Jo Jaquiau -
@ SBM puke ‘ajeuag ay) UI WYy3Ia pue
Alquiassy a}e}s 24} UI s1eak omy
juads oym ue ayy 40} yno 3utu
“und aq Aew aw ‘J9AIMOY ‘MON
‘uoIsuadsns 97}eIPSWUIWT JUBIIeEM
jaund soja Aq pajnis092rgq
WIADNS "Ww uyor
int
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Sundap Star-Ledger
June 22, 1986
39
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App.
$,JUdT]D BY} SI 31 ey} Burmouy ‘wiry 0} paysnsjua Asuow
S,Juato & Zurye) JaXmey e jo Ayduits sysisuod,, uoretsdoidde
“SIW JO} JUBULIEGSIP Sased Ie JSOW]E Ul Je} pajes 3]
, UOSTIM 31 Ul Japun yuew
-JegSIP MNeWO Ne JadsiI) [[1M ey) uOTeLIdosddestw ay},
palejap JayjINJ 32n0d ay} ‘uotuTdo UeUOONY ay} JapUy "Ue
-UOON 31 U],, payed uotutdo Azeutdiosip Jayjoue ui uoNeiid
-oiddestw SuImIUJajap 10} splepueys ay} pauapeoig pue
UOSTIM 21 Ul PaULIIJjea1 73ND ay} ‘IeaA sIy) Jae
,, WOIJaJaY} 1JauUeq JO UTes JeuosJed Aue saAtJap au j0U
Jo Jayjaym ‘asodind umo s.JoAmey ay} 10} asn Aresoduiay
pazioyjneun osje ynq ‘sulyeays Ajuo you Buipnyour ‘wry
0} paisn.jua spuny suelo Jo JaXmey ayy Aq asn pazisoyine
-un Aue,, sueaw Surfs ay} 0} ZuIpsodze yorum ‘uonetidoad
-desiwi 10} yortuljap & paysttqeysa uotutdo UosTIM ayy
"991Y} BY} PALIEQSIP 1.1NOD ay} ,,UOSTIMA
31 U],, Payyeo ‘spuny yuat[d jo uonetsdoiddestw aaoaut
JEY} S19}7eW JOj UOIUIdo yeUTYOUAQ GLE SI! BUNIID ,,spuny
MM YM}
LhMhsts lie
Swatpd dytdeds Jo UOTSeAUT Ue 0} B[QEINGIIIIe are JUNIE
4SN1} JI3y} Ul SadUeTeQ FJeIPJAAO,, Jey} pres uotutdo ayy
« SPUNJ JWTITJJNSUT 10J
pauINjal alam yey} SYI9YD 2301M Ady} SUOISEDD0 JeJBAaS
UO puke ‘sasuadXxe WIT} je9U 0} SJUNOISe ysNJ} pue Burjesado
34} papsurmos A]Zulmouy,, aay) ay} 3eYy} ,JeaTo Aynjured
Sayeul,, AUOWII}Sa} S.Jayasia[y ey} pappe uoturdo ay,
. WUNOIIe yueg ULI} aos
ay} SB JUNOIIE 3SN.} Jay} asn 0} ueZaq pue ‘JO}IPalD JUaW
-3pnf e Aq Aaa] e 0} Joalqns sem Yyory ‘junoIIe SuNeJedo
Jtayj Butsn pasead Aay} ‘sadiaap UMO IIay} 0} 3J2'J,,
‘Jadaayyoog Jay} Jo JuaWAO|dua ay} pajyeuTULIa} Asay} UayM
‘186 JO JOWIWINS a4) OJU! BdI}DeId ME] [eUTSIEW e YIM paz
“BNIYS PUL GLE] Ul WII ME] Jay} Paulos (a4) ay),,
"juno?
awaidng ay} jo uoturdo yuauLzegsIp ay) 0} SuIp10d0y
. SPUN} SyUaT[D payetudosddestw Ayyeuoruajul pey shou.1073e
24} JeY} BDUaPIAS BUTWIFaYMIBAO PUNO}, ‘juN0D aulaidns ay}
0} paiiajal aie Aay) aJ0jaq SeazjIWW0D sotyja Jo ssUIpUly
24} SMITAVI YOIYA ‘pleog MoaIAaYy AreuTdiosig ayy
« HUI UMO ITS} 10}
Spunj SjuaT]o pasn AjZutMouyY,, savy 0} JAWIMYIS “J Aer pue
Zynys Aqeg “] ‘Jayosia[y “] prempy punoj yun0D auiaidns
ay} ‘uotutdo | 0} 9 & UT ‘JaYyISIayy pue zyNYS Jo Way Ay
-UNOD YINOWUOW ay} JO SI9AME] BaIY) Jam QGT UI UOTJELId
iil i ee ee
~o1ddestwi 103 ene Apealye suosiad z] ay} 3uowy
‘suorjetidosddestuy 10} alam UTese ¢] YOIYA Jo SjuaU
“IEQSIP 97 31am Jaq} ‘bG1 UT ‘spuny jo uorjersdosddestus
JO} aJam §] YOIyM Jo ‘JeaX yse] pategsIp alem sAaul0}
“J8 7 JEU) ples FVYO 94} Jo jzoda1 yenuue yuavel ayy
‘uosuyor Aq paptaoid son
“ST}E}S 0} Suipsosoe ‘szeaf snotaaid ul wey) Jey snyy Jaysry
Ajqesaptsuod Sutuuns st syunosoe ysn.y JaXME] Ul play spunj
jo uorjetidosddestw ay} 10} sjuawegsIp jo Oe ayy
"Jano aulaidng ay) Jo We
[eloyndasoid pue aaNesyseaut ay} st YyO sy, ‘ssurpeso
-01d JUaULIeQsIp jN0d satueduiOIIe Yyotym AjatJ0}0U papued
-X9 JO adeISSIP JoyjINj ay) sploae Aljesaues yey) ainpeod
-01d & ‘suotjae ArejUNIOA paAfOAUt Jead Sty} paLIegsIp useq
SABY OYM FT AY} JO YI ey} pres “(|VO) somm}™ AaUI0;3y
JO 9d1JJO S,2}8}S BY} JO JOJIIIP “IP UOSUYOS “| plAeq
“‘Bulzeay Jaquiaydas
34} Jaqje yulod awos je auT[diostp sty saptoap 71 [NUN MET
391}9e1d 0} BNUT}UOD 0} ULAIYS paz}tuLed sey nod ay
"89}}IWIWOD SoTYy}a AJUNOD
ay} Aq Burputy Jepiuns e& pause 1n0d auleidns ajeIs
34} 0} UONEPUsWWOIEI JUaUIegSIP S,preog ay], ‘pseog
mataay Areutjdrasiq s,a3e3s ay} Aq JUaULIegstp 10} papuaul
~W6Ia1 Useq sey ‘sIeak %E JsoUTe J0j Burpuad ussq aaey
Saotjoeid jeoTyjauN jo sasreyo woym ysuTeSe ‘UIAaYS
‘spunj juat[o Jo uorelIdosddestu 103
paisegsip Ajie[us aq prnoys ‘ye120Wag AjuN0D uasieg
‘UIAGYS “W UYOL “Uasg 37B7$ JaUIIOJ JayJayM auTUIJajap
0} § 3dag UO ZulJeay & palNpeyos sey osye jINOD ayy
‘uonelidoiddesiu uey} 19430 suosead
40} PalIegsIp aJam SI@AMP] J9Y}O OM) ‘polsed yey) BuLIng
‘spunj juatja Sutsn AjJadosdut 10} me] JO 3d1j}0eId ay}
W0Jj SJBAME] Z] PAAOWAI Sey NOD ay} ‘AJenuer adUIS
‘SdTy}a JO Bpood
[ea] ay} aIeFOIA OYM SJaAMe] ButuTIdIOstp 10} a;qisuodsaz
SI JNO) swWaidng ay} ‘UOTINITIsUOD $,a}e;S ay} Japuy
‘931Y} JO ULI} MP] aITUa
ue BUIPNoUT ‘syaaM 9914} JSP] ay} UIYIIM UOISsajold 3y}
WOJJ suosiad dAl} paAowlal SPY 31NOD ay} ‘j[Nsal e SY
“jUaULIeQsTp
JOB} ISNU SPUN 3SNJ} WaT] Jtay) OWT dip oym sJaAMeT
yey} ‘ead sty} Jatjiea padsojutal pue 6/6] ul paydope 7
PJEpueys & 0} IS} BUIPfOY St 34N0D awasdns 33e1S ay],
{SNA {USI
S{R]OIA OUM
SISAMBP| JO}
SASNIX9 ON
(Continued on App. 40)
App. 40
‘uoISs
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suorjaues |e Jo yWaoJed 77 Buljuesaidal ‘puodas sem siaA
-ME] JO UOTJIIAUOD JUIUNIID ‘Ggg] Ul AdSJef MAN Ul suOTIOR
Aseurjdiosip saXmey [je jo yuaosed gg: Sunuasaida ,,‘autid
-l9sip dtjgnd jo Junowe 3sajyeaI8 ay} 10} afqisuodsal aq 0}
sanutjuod uonetdosddestu,, ‘110del ay} 0} SuIpPsoo0y
. Wuaosad "1 ‘ayeqod pue a3e}Sa pue ‘juadJed gy ‘Mey
Atwwiey quaosad ¢°z] ‘Aojdnsyueq pue uo0rjda][09 “juadsed $7
‘syjureyd ‘Aanfur yeuosied ‘yuaosad 6°57 ‘a}e3sa jeeY,,
‘Spjatj [eBay Burmoyjoy ay} ul BuloNoesd uaym suTeTO
BojIeIdeW JO SII jSa}ea13 ay} Boe] SJOAMP] Jey) puNoy
pue suiteyo aorjoesdjew JaAme] 98°91 Jo Apnis & pajonpuod
Ayjuades Jajuay e1eg aonoeidyjey [esa] yeuoneN s,uory
-BID0SSY Jeg UBIJAWY ay} jy) no payulod ByO ay]
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soijoeIdjew 10} ajqisuodsas se paztd Ajjuanbalj ysow
BJ YOTYM Spal} sUIeS ay} ale,, MET 9Y} Jo Seale auoId-aoUe
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‘suONejal dsawWOp uUsoJed J°G] ‘aouasT[Zau ‘UadIed F°9T
‘ayeysa Jeet ase Avy) ‘Aduanbalj 3sajea13 Jo Japio Uj,,
‘Buiureydxa ‘pappe 31 ,,‘payly ae
EY} SOURASIIZ ay} [Je Jo Siojenb-sasy} Isowe ajyeJaued
ME] BY} JO Seale XIS UI SadTJZeId yey} SMOYS SEG] IBAA
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‘yodal yenuue s,qyO eu}
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310UI JE ME] JO SBaIE UleyJad UI aotjaeId OYM SAaUI0}
“ye JY} punoy sey osye soTyIG ABUIO}Y Jo 3913jO FY
. S88] OU 0} pay}tjua St dT]Gnd ay,
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JO Ssajpiegaz ‘asodind umo sty 403 asn Aresoduia} paziio
“YNeUN SIH “SPUNJ S}UdT]O Pesn ay }eY} IPO SI j],,
‘pappe pseog ay} Aq Burpuly ayy,
., Spuny JUNOIIE 4SNI} STY YIM Spuny yeuosJad sty paysurwos
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uMoIg,, Je} ples yNOd ayy ,,Wetsyjap Apuanbay,, aq 0}
VO ay) Aq punoy sem yuNodIe YSN} asoymM ‘poomassuq jo
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