Appendix — Kustina v. City of Seattle

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PPENDTL}

APP x FER 8 = yQa7

Opinions of the Courts Be lowe@ssen & sean ie

Ae King Cy Super Lor ct d d 6/1441 kK Pion:

Be ‘’ta Ct of Appeals dtd 4/9//3 niall

C. Fed Dist Ct Order dtd 8/11/80

be 9th Cir Order dtd 12/14/83

E. Fed Dist Ct Order dtd 4/25/86

F. 9th Cir Order dtd 1/14/87

mr

Uther Appended Materials

Ae Portion of Seattle Ord. 105462

Be Portion of Nat'l Historic Pres-

ervation Act of 1966(16 USC 470)

C. Portion of Seattle Lept of Com-

munity Cevelopment :‘Jemorandum

Ctc Al 2s 1976 which appears

as CR 1O Exhibit A in Excerpt

of Record to 9th Cir in(IF)above

14-4 Crt. a

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+ A Dis GE hin ak | hah A. bic a tole iin ce SUL ea Lene Oe On ee Pe

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR

HARD COPY AT THE TIME OF FILMING.

IF AND WHEN A BETTER COPY CAN BE

OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE WILL BE

ISSUED.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON FOR: KING COUNTY

UNDER CR 12(b) and

CR 56(b)

FRANK KU37INA, )

Plaintiff, ) NO. 833 228

)

VSe ) JUSGMENT OF DISMISSAL

)

)

HISTORIC SEATTLE

PRESERVATION AND

TEVELOPMENT AUTH-

O2LITY, a public

corporation; THE

CITY OF SEATTL?,

2 municipal corp-

oration; (et al

omitted )

vefendants.

att wat

Nee” Cage? Nee” Nee? Nee See” Nee

This matter having come on regularly

for hearing before the undersigned Judge

of the above-entitled court upon the

motions of defendants for juwignent dis-

missing plaintiff's complaint with pre-

judice pursuant to CR 12(b) and CR 56(b);

the court having reviewed the pleadings,

motions, affidavits, memoranda and other

documents on file herein end having

heard areavment from counsel anc from

and it appearing to the court

IA

thet plaintiff's complaint fails to set

forth any claim upon which relief could

be granted, thet there is no genuine

Hs

ssvue oO

defendants! motions should be sranted

a eal ee mae 9 o -o4m

was brought beyonda the 20 day time

recuired by Law, end is at any rate

har dA hy nrincini - ton 1 and

y»arred by principles of estoppel and

laches, for the reason that pla-*riiftfi

has not alleced, identified or sustzined

A Nt? a 71 "1 s119°C?7 a ee . ’ oe

ony Legal injury, 1s not aggrievee anc

Ar ata . ~ 7 = +. + _ o y +hHaAt

lacks standing, anc tor the eason that

herein establish that plaintiff's claims

redicated upon Seattle Ordinance 105462

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the court, failed to set forth a viable

claim upon which relief could be granted?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Historic Seattle is a public auth-

ority chartered by the City of Seattle,

pursuant to RC’ 35.21.725 and Seattle City

Ordinence 193387, Historic Seattle's

charter states that the public authority's

purnose is to preserve and enhence the

historic heritage of the City of Seattle

for the mutual pride and enjoyment of

Seattle's citizens and for the creation

of a more Livable environment within the

historic areas of the City.

On October 15, 1976, the Ballard

\venue Landmark District (seattle Wwdi-

nance 105462) was created to preserve,

protect, enhance, and perpetuate those

elements of the district's cultural,

social, economic, architectural, historic

or other heritage. The ordinance

prohibited certain changes in the build-

ings, structures and other visible

property therein without a certificate

of approval. The ordinance further

established a board consisting of 5-7

members to be elected, which would

administer and enforce the ordinance.

Upon application for a certificate of

approval, the ordinance provided that

the board act to review the application

and grant or deny the same within 30 days.

If the board failed to act within the

30-day Limit, the application would be

deemed approved and the director of the

Department of Community Development

would thereafter issue a certificate of

approval.

In May of 1976, Historic Seattle

accuired two of Seattle's oldest resi-

dential houses, the "Pioneer Houses."

The Pioneer Houses were in danger of

of being demolished as the result of

commercial development in Seattle's

International District, and Historic

Seattle acauired the houses for the

purpose of relocating and renovating

them in order to preserve an important

part of Seattle's heritage,

Earl Layman of Historic Seattle

stated in his affidavit in reference to

the two Pioneer Houses as follows:

The (ploneer )houses are among

the oldest structures still existing

in the city. Modest single-family

structures of this type once

existed in considerable numbers

along Ballard Avenue in what is

now the Landmark District ...

(The pioneer houses) preserve and

enhance the District's cultural,

istoric and architectural heritage

by providing a unidue example of a

type of structure that once was

common on Ballard Avenue.

Historic Seattle thereafter sovght

to relocate the houses to the Ballard

Avenue Lendmark District, created in April

of 1976, pursuant to Ordinance 105462,

On May 26, 1976, pursuant to Ordinance

105462, Historic Seattle applied for a

certificate of approval of Historic

Seattle's proposal to relocate the

Pioneer Houses to the Ballard Avenue

Landmark District. At that time the

Ballard Avenue Landmark District Board

created by Ordinence 105462 had not yet

been elected. That board's members were

not elected until July of 1976,

“ INC cr 4

Section 5 (d ) or ‘rdinence LOS4E

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nd

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reduires that the direc

unilaterally act upon an application for

a certificate of approval if the Rallard

\yvenue Landmark District Board does not

act upon that application within 30 days

from the date the ad lication is s1.11tted.

Recause the Ballard Avenue Landmark

application for a certificate of approval

within 30 days from Historic Seattle's

submission of that application, the

director of Seattle's Department of

Community Development, acting under the

requirements of the ordinance, issued

Historic Seattle a certificate of

approval on June 3, 1976. In August of

1976, the City of Seattle issued a

building permit to Historic Seattl

pursuant to Historic Seattle's July 21,

1976 application for such a building

: i - ao _ | ats : tn se

LLO’W Che FTeLtocation © -i1e

permit to a

Pioneer Houses to the Ballard Avenue

Landmerk District. Historic Seattle

moved the Pioneer Houses to the 3allard

Avenue Landmark District on September

27, 1976.

Althoush Historic Seattle's plan to

relocate the Pioneer Houses had been

publications prior to September 27, 1976

and even though the plaintiff was well

plans well before

,

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aware of the re

the relocation of the Pioneer Houses. he

took no action whatsoever to contest

listoric Seattle's relocation of the

rear arter tne rioneer ouses Nné

actuallv been relocated in Bal

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7 law, 4 r y» T ry

Dailiialrc AVN enue |e. a6." ici &™&

en & ade = . . —_ _— . .

trict soard naa elected anc appointe

e various members or thelr oard, the

7 : tata —

mnicn was completed atrter

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fistoric Seattle had recelivec

nermit to relocate the Pioneer Houses,

ouses before tne Wve

5 ° rs 5 ‘

to their present Ball site.

7 ~- . - ; > 7 “ay . ~+

it ’ ; a e Learne

storic Seattle's plan to reé cate the

claiming to be "aggrieved" by administra-

tive or judicial action. Jones v. Jones,

68 tn, 2d 413, 415, 413 P. 2d 338(1966»

The courts have consistently held that

in order to be "asgrieved" for purposes

of standing to challenge administrative

actions, a plaintiff "must allege and

prove that he has suffered some special

damages not common to other property

owners similarly situated."' See linger

v. Forest Homes T.P., 237 N.“. 2d 582,

584(Mich. Appe 1975), where the court

held that plaintiff lacked standing to

‘ace an amendment to a municipality's

zoning ordinance because the plaintiff

rs.

had failed to establish that he hac

ge nnd a aaawrata P oer =

of the change in the use or zoning--

different from tnat succes 4»;

i bed, toy 1.3) thitney

‘heater Co. ve Zoning Board of Appeals,

(Conn. 1963), where

court held that a plaintiff in an

action

cipal zoning board

to

ase

decision of a muni-

ad the burden of

Ff to establish

and injuriously

iaece: - aarae } 5 ~—e oe

rty risrnts or otner

, appellant has

1 damage resulting

actions thet per-

-le to relocate the

attle'ts Internation-

- Appellant has

is the ormer of

challenge the certificate of approval

and building permit issued to Historic

Seattle for the relocation of the Pioneer

\opeat untimely.

The trial court's ruling must be

affirmed for the additional reason that

the plaintiff's a»ypeal was not timely.

Petitions for writs of certiorari to

review administrative actions must be

filed within 20 days from the contested

administrative action just as appeals to

Superior Court from decisions of courts

of Limited jurisdiction must be filed

“Sin 20 dayas

In the present case, no statute or

ordinance gave appellant the right to

challenge the administrative actions at

issue here. Appellant's complaint is

necessarily one seeking a writ of

mIenytaete ~ 4 °F

LEME StL ak ir

certiorari to review a

yetions, “ecause anvellant's complaint

was brought one vear from the administra-

tive actions of which he complains, and

properly dismissed that complaint

pursuant to Vance v. Seattle, 18 ‘n. App.

418, 569 P. 24 1194(1977). Moceover,

even if Ordinance 105462 had authorized

appellant's appeal, which it does not,

that ordinance requires that such appeals

be taken within 29 days. “ius, whether

appellant's action is one for a writ of

certiorari or one taken pursuant to

Seattle City Ordinance 105462, the Lower

court properly ruled that appellant's

action was time-barred,

ISSUE 3: Plaintiff's cause of action

°

<“raANy nN Aas ia . on

Pye Bee | Be pe 4a igi BE gl ares} Se 7 Se *

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plaintiff's claim, such claims are

oe mi Res 7

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that once the board's elections were

held and the board became operationeal,

and reviewed tle project in question,

they unanimously endorsed it and

approved the issuance of the certificate

of approval. Such ratification cvred

any defect in the prior decision.

Ovings v,. Olympia, 88 '!iash. 289, 152 P.

Lay 9

LOL9O(LIOL5S).

Affirmed.

/s/

_ore

, Fred Je

ha} /s/

. we Swanson, Je

the United States Supreme Court. In

any event, the Court has reviewec the

prior rulings of the state courts and

is in agreement with those rulings.

3. None of the remaining claims

implicate the Historic seattle Preserva-

tion and Development Authority in eny

waye To the extent that those claims

attempt to impose liability upon the

Authority, they do not state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

Accordingly, the motion of defendants

is GRANTED in pert and DUNISD in pert.

The Uistoric Seattle Preservation

Board end Mevelopment Authority is

dismissed as a party defendant. ‘he

First eleven claims acteinst defendant

City of Seattle ere JIS Issey © Ith

PREJIUDICe.

The wlerk cf this Court is instrvct-

ed to send uncertified copies of this

oO "lorlte ehall mre AYO 4 111d omen

Lic Ls repe¢ 4 G c judement

of dismissal with prejudice with respect

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANK KUSTINA, No. 82-3603

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. NO. CV 80-

VSe 229. JGCT

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Nefendant -Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

) MEMORANDUM

)

)

Before:

Appeal for the United States

District Court for the Western

District of "Jashington (Seattle)

Honorable John C. Coughenour,

Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 9, 1983

SNEED, NELSON, and REINHARDT,

Circuit Judges

Plaintiff Frank Kustina filed an

action

a2 UsSe

under *’

against the City of Seattle under

C. sec. 1983(Supp. V 1981) and

ashington state law. The district

court held that the doctrine of res

judicata precluded litigation of twelve

of the

fifteen claims. In addition, the

district court dismissed another cause

of action for failure to state a claim

ZL

upon ‘which relief can be granted and

granted summary judgment for the City of

Seattle on the merits of two state law

T

claims. ‘“e affirm in part and reverse

in part.

RES JUJICATA

‘hen a section 1983 action is based

on the same wrong that was the subject of

a state court action between the same

parties and the preclusion rules of the

state in question would bar litigation

of those issues the doctrine 2f res

judicata precludes a federal court from

deciding whether other leval theories

-7y114d alloy for recovery. See Allen v.

MeCurrv, 449 U.3. 90, 96 (1980); Heath

v. Cleary, 798 F. 2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.

1983); ‘fiofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F

24d 332, 336 (Sth Cir. 1983); Scoggin v.

’ a. ——

scnrunk, §22 F. 2d 436, 4

‘ e } ; 5 - > \ * 7 ee F * - >

cert, denied, 423 U.s.- LUOSOCLI/O); see

also 28 U.S.C. sec. 1738(1976) (requiring

federal courts to give full faith and

credit to state court judgments). In

short,

where the federal constitutional claim

is based on the same asserted wrong as

was the subject of the state action,

and where the parties are the same,

an - 9 2 An KA a % 4 ’ am tie A Bs -? om]

Pes Met LOnGc ‘Fu. as 6 6G 6 LSS AL

constitutional claim whether it was

asserted in state court or not, for

the reason thet the state judgment

on the merits serves not only to bar

every claim that was raised in the

—— no oe

assertion of every legal theory or

ground for recovery that might have

been raised in support of the granting

of the desired relief.

Scoggin, 522 F. 2d at 437 (emphasis a

added). 1/

Under “’ashington Law, all possible

challenses to a common nucleus of opera-

tive facts are treatel as if they had

been decided in - finni judemment whether

or not the theories actucll, ser*2 727324

“ie veo x-edings. see Seattle-First

Nationel sank v. Kawachi, 91 ash. 2d

‘

, :

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1981) (citations o

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cloin would have been improper. see

‘arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499(1975)).

To the extent that the twelfth claim

raised state law issues, those parts of

the claim should have been dismissed

without prejudice after dismissal of

tic federal claims. see ppe infra.

Accordingly, we hold that the dist~ict

covrt properly dismissed the claim.

S“ATE LAT CLATS

The district covrt exercised pendent

jurisiietion over the state issves raised

in claims thirteen and fourteen. In cases

in vhich a federal court exercises

sender: jurisdiction over state claims,

"if the federal cleims are vismissed

before trial .« e » the state claims

should be cismissec as vell." Imited

‘tine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 VU... 715,

25(1966) (emphasis added). Here, the

district court, rather thar. crenting

summery judement on the merits, shovld

heve dismissed withovt prejudice the

complex state law claims after the

federal claims were dismissed. see

Brandwein v. California Board of

Jsteopathic Examiners, 708 F. 2d 1466,

1475 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United

Mine ‘‘orkers v. Gibbs); Townsend v.

solumbie Qperations, 667 F. 2d 844, 850

:

(Sth Cir. 1982). ‘“‘e therefore reverse

the cistrict court's summary judgment

on the state law issues raised in

claims thirteen ami fourteen and remand

he case with instructions to dismiss

the claims without prejudice.

ie wa >rxckT T 3 “A ‘> ‘T POAT Gt J TIT <7 - > 18 8

AFFI ~~ a! & i 2. -ig OIG casi Lal T ‘ PALS L

1/ In deciding whether the doc rine

of res judicata precluces litigation of

a claim, a federal court generally woul:

consider

(lL) whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment

would be destroved or impaired by

‘rosecutien of the second action;

(2) wheter substantially the same

evidence is presented in the two

actions; (3) whether the two svits

involve infringement of the same

right; and (4) whether the two

suits arise out of the same

transactional nucleus of facts.

Harris v. Jacobs, 021 F. 2d 341, 343

(9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); see

Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, |

600 F, 24 1345, 1351 (oth cir. LO8L);

Gallegher v. Frye, 631 F. 2d 127, 128-29

(Sth Cir, 19S80).

2/ The plaintiff alleges that res

judicata should not bar litigation of

his claims because the defendants

perpetrated fraud upon the state courts.

"fe previously have reserved the question

whether there is - fraud exception to

the doctrine of res judicata. See

Costantini v. Trans ‘orld Airlines, 681

F.40 LEYS, L202 (tH Cire), Gert. Cenied,

103 3. Ct. 570 (1982). However, we have

emphasized that, even if such an

exception exists, a party must allege

fraud with particularity. 681 F. 2d at

1202-03. ‘“e hold that the plaintiff's

conclusory allegations of fraud are

insufficient to fall within a proposec

exception to the doctrine of res judicata.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

"TESTERN DISTRICT OF ‘“ASHINGT ON

TA7 73

_ eae

Al wierd id bes

FRANK KUSTINA, )

Plaintiff, ) NO. C86-99R

Ws

Dos oat ANS a |

THE CITY OF SZATTLE, iiLOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant.

ee ae ae a a

THIS MATTER comes before the court

on motions by plaintiff for declaratory

judgments to set aside judgment for want

of jurisdiction and for fraud upon the

court, and on a motion by defendant to

dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Having

reviewed the memoranda, exhibits and

affidavits submitted in support of end in

opposition to these motions, 2nd being

fully advised, the court finds and rules

as follows:

7.

Plaintiff's complaint purports to

set forth nine claims for rellef. For

the reasons set forth below, the court

concludes that defendant's motion to

dismiss should be granted and plaintitt's

complaint dismissed in its entirety.

1. Plaintiff's first claim concerns

the bell which was at one time mounted in

the tower of the former Ballard City Hall

and which plaintiff seeks to have returned

from its present Location on the grounds

of the Imited States Government hocks 1n

2allard to its historic site within the

3 + _ ] ‘ 4

allard Avenue Lancmeards strict.

slaintiff contends 1 t 7 3 court Ci

exercise subject matte! irisdict1o Ove!

exercise surjec ;

this cause ot actl< wsuant (

at+- nM e > 7 + ra c ¥ ( J on

ce LCi de 2 - ?

the location of the bell in itself is

not determinative of whether the court

can exercise subd ject matter jurisdictio

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the state courts. On the contrary,

plaintiff had ample opportunity to

litigate his contentions. His current

claims simply reflect his continuing

disagreement with the state court's

decision to reject those contentions.

3. Pleintiff's fourth claim is

that the “lashington state courts which

rendered decisions in his prior cases

and appeals lacked jurisdiction to do so

because the activities of defendant City

of jeattle which they ruled upon were

null end void. As defendant points out,

plaintiff is confusing the issue of

thether defendant's activities were legal

with the issue of the validity of jvdicial

decisions concerning the lawfulness of

those activities. A*ain, plaintiff has

Failed to state a cause of action on

which relief can be granted.

i 7

4. In his fifth clain, plaintiff

asks for explanations of prior rulings

by other courts. This court has no

jurisdiction over the matter.

5. Plaintiff's sixth claim is

simply a series of statements

complaining about defendant's assertion

of a counterclaim for frivolous prosecu-=

tion in state court and the nefarious

effect which plaintiff believes it had

on the court. Plaintiff does not state

any claim for which relief can be granted.

6. Plaintiff's seventh and eighth

claims are clearly attempts to reliti-

gate the same issues which he has already

raised and which have been adjudicated

in both state and federal courts. As

such, these claims are barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. Insofar as

plaintiff's seventh claim raises new

issues which he has not Litigated before,

he fails to state a claim on which relief

ihe

can be granted because he hes not alleged

illegalities.

7. Finally, plaintiff alleges in

his ninth claim that defendant has

ected arbitrarily, capriciously and with

callous neglect regarding the Ballard

Avenue Landmark District contrary to

the National Historic Preservation Act

and Seattle municipal law. Plaintiff

further alleges interference with a

business expectancy and with his

constitutional rights regarding his real

oroperty. These allegations are so

vague and nonspecific that they utterly

fail to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

Pefendant 's motion to dismiss is

accordingly GRANTED. Plaintiff's motions

for declaratory judgments are DENIS) and

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

noted for May 2, 1986 is STRICKEN as

moot. This action is DISMISSED with

prejudice,

IT IS sO QkDERED.

The Clerk of the Court is directed

to forward copies of this Order to

counsel of record.

DATED at Seattle, ‘\’ashington this

25th day of April, 1966.

/s/ _

BAPDARA J. ROTHSTEIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANK KUSTINA, ) NO. 86-3882

) DC# CV-86-99-R

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MEMORANDUM AND

VSe ORD ER

THE CITY OF SEATTLE,

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendant-Appellee. )

)

Appeal from the United States

Nistrict Court for the ‘estern

histrict of ‘'ashincton

District Judge Barbara J. Rothstein,

Presiding

(Argued and Submitted January 8, 1987)

Before: KOZLSCH, “RIGHT, and BEEZER,

Circuit Judges.

At the request of plaintiff-appellant,

this appeal was expedited and set for

argument on the first available date.

“te now affirm the judgment of the district

court of April 25, 1986, and direct the

clerk to issue the mandate of this court

forthwith. No petition for rehearing

will be entertained.

a

-

eS a OS

“e find wholly without merit

Kustinats first claim for declarative

and injunctive relief. He sought an

order requiring the city to move an old

bell from the grounds of the federal

government locks to some site within the

Ballard Avenue Landmark District,

Plaintiff failed to allege, and this

court has not found, law sufficient to

support such an order. The district

court properly found that it had no

subject matter jurisdiction. There is

no substantiel federal auestion.

Equally without merit are appellant's

several claims attacking the validity of

a state court judgement of dismissal.

These were before this court in an earlier

appeal. In a Memorandum decision of

Lecember 14, 1983, we held that the

doctrine of res judicata precluded

further Litigation of such claims. See

Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F. 2d 436, 437

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 1.5. 1066

(1976). Appellant had full opportunity

to present his contentions to the

‘“fashington courts. “e refuse to consider

again his continuing disagreement with

the decisions of those coTtSe

The district court dismissed

Kustine's remaining claims for lack of

jurisdiction, failure to state = clain

oa wnicr cvelitet can be granted or

vasueness. The court properly denied

xustina's motion to amend his pleadings.

‘fe have considered all of the

appellant's contentions, find them

without merit and affirm the judgment.

ORDINANCE 105462

AN ORDINANCE creating the Ballard Avenue

Landmark Pistrict; . « «, prohibiting

certain changes in buildings, structures

and other visible property therein

without a Certificate of Approval, . ee

Section 4, Ballard Avenue Landmark

Board,

(6) The District Boerd shall elect

its om chairman and adopt in accordance

with the Administrative Cole \Ordine nee

1022.3) such rules of procedure es shall

be necessary in the conduct of its

business, including (i) a code of ethics,

(ii) rules for reasoneble notification

9° public hearings on epplications for

sertificates of Approval »nd »pplications

O

for permits requiring “er

Approval in accordance with Seciio. 3

27297, 11. (122) cules for reasonable

public hearings on

=

e)

pa

oO

rh

notificaet

development and design review cuilclines

ZA

and amendment thereof. A majority of the

currently qualified and acting members

of the histrict Board shall constitute

a quorum necessary for the purpose of

transacting business. All decisions

shall be made by majority vote of those

members present, and in case of a tie

vote, the motion shall be lost. The

Nistrict Board shall keep minutes of all

of its official meetings, which shall be

filed with the Director.

Section 5. Approval of changes to

buildings, structures on: ter vist ote

property within Ballard Avenue Landmark

Jistrict.

(b) All applications for a

Certificate of Approval, en all

epplications for any permit requiring

uch a certificate of approval,

(hereinafter both included in the words

"such application’) shall be submitted

to the Ttistrict Board. Within thirty

(30) days after receipt of each such

application the District Board shall

hold a public hearing thereon and by

duly approved motion recommend that the

same be granted, denied or be referred

to the Landmarks Preservation Board.

“Githin thirty (30) days after such

referral of any such application, the

Landmarks Preservation Boerd shall hold

@€ public nearing thereon 211 recommend

iat the same be granted or denied,

NATICNAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT OF

1966, as amended

Section 1 (Purpose of the Act)

(b) The Congress finds and decl-res that--

(7) although the major burdens of

historic preservation have been borne

end major efforts initieted by private

agencies and individuals, and both should

continue to play a vital role, it is

nevertheless necessary end appropriate

for the Federal Government to accelerate

its lListoric preservation programs and

activities, to give maximum encourage-

ment to agencies and individuals

undertaking preservation by private

means, end to assist . .(emphasis added)

Section 2 (Declaration of policy)

It shall be the policy of the Federal

Government, in cooperation with other

nations and in partnership with the

stetes, local governments, Indian tribes,

and private organizations and

Ho

individuals(emphasis added) to--

(4) contribute to the preservation of

nonfederally owned prehistoric and

historic resowrces and give maximum

encouragement to organizations and

individuals undertaking preservation

by private means; (emphasis added)

Your Seattle Community bevelopment

Memorandum

BLD-15/76

August 5, 1976

To: Paul £.5. Schell & J. Peter Staten

From: Earl D. Layman, HPO

Subject: Ballard Avenue Landmark Pistrict

le. (omitted)

2. AS vou will recall the second meeting

of that afternoon was in essence a

community meeting called in response to

the petition which requested such a

meeting for the purpose of providing

community imput into the planning process

in the district and particularly for a

briefing on the pioneer houses.

Approximately 23 persons from the

community were in attendance, including

the five elected members of the Board,

In addition Folke Nyberg and Tom

Albright, consultants for the street

improvement project were there, Linda

ZC.

Aro from Neighborhood Improvement; Al

Elliott and Gary Miller of HSPDA: and

John Snyder and myself,

“e explained to the attendees the

reasons why the Board could not yet hold

a formel hearing, end also explained that

the Ballard Avenue Association had bowed

out aS sponsors of the meeting. ‘''e then

proceeded to summarize actions taken in

the last two months concerning the

pioneer houses, as well as to the

procedures involved in setting up the

election for the Board. te also read

the letter that we prepared for you

several weeks ago to Mrs. Kustina

concerning these matters, There was

extensive discussion on the part of the

attendees and most of them seemed

satisfied with our explanations. It was

evident thet many of the people who

signed the petition merely wanted more

detailed information as to what had been

happening. Four members of the Board

strongly supported the houses project,

as did the consultants and other people

present. It appeared to us very

positively that the only strong

objections came from Mrs. Helen Kustina

and Mr. and Mrs. Carr, who have always

been opposed to the establishment of the

district, and all three of who refused

to perticipate in the Board elections.

As a result of the above it is the

strong opinion both of this office and

of Historic Seattle thet there is no

reason why negotiations and other actions

should not continue on a timely basis for

the moving of the two houses into the

landmark district.

EDL:hg

cc: John‘. Snyder

Lawson A. Elliott

Peggy Corley