Opposition — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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FILED

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Iu the Supreme Court of the 2

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

REX E. LEE

Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT, II

Assistant Attorney General

DaviD SHILTON

Barry S. NEUMAN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court erred in denying mo-

tions to vacate or modify a consent decree originally

entered into by the Environmental Protection Agency

eight years ago.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions below ..................

Jurisdiction

Statement Rare biiicialiniicd abiabeaescerie -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Gardner V. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167 ............

re Ca Se IG Th eicaicchncecthgenlidacedbecnecees

Marbury V. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) area

Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality

GID Feats EE eniternictinsirne sacicnlcceichaitntbiccemsebint

National Audubon Society v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299...

Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization v.

Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114

Rizzo Vv. Goode, 428 U.S. 362 .......

Simon Vv. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,

426 U.S. 26 ..

Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education,

611 F.2d 1239, on remand from 427 U.S. 424 ......

eA GD ick. cad onsirnlenib banaabiocanacemetite tea dibeie eae

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. RT a

United States v. United Shoe Machinery san 891

NE I des ct haieniciciiedeaink ce

Constitution and stutute:

U.S. Const. Art. III ........

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ..................

Section 301 (b) (1) (A), 38 U.S.C. 1811(b) (1)

(A)

Section 301 (b) (2) (A), 88 U.S.C. 1811 (b) (2)

(A)

(mm)

IV

Constitution and statute—Continued : Page

Section 806, 88 U.S.C. 1816 .....................ceeceeeee 8

Section 307 (a), 88 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1817(a).. 2, 3,4

Section 807 (a) (1), 88 U.S.C. 1817(a) (1) ...... 4

Section 307 (b), 88 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1817(b).. 2,8

Section 307 (c), 838 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1817 (c).. 8

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1345

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals dated October

4, 1983 (Pet. App. la-44a), is reported at 718 F.2d

1117. The corresponding opinions of the district

court (Pet. App. 103a-ll4a and 117a-120a) are re-

ported unofficially at 16 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA)

2084, and 17 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2013, respec-

tively. The opinion of the court of appeals dated

September 16, 1980 (46a-100a), is reported at 636

F.2d 1229. The corresponding opinion of the district

court, dated March 9, 1979 (Pet. App. 121a-138a), is

reported unofficially at 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA)

1833.

(1)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on October 4, 1983 (Pet. App. 195a-202a). A peti-

tion for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en

bane was denied on November 18, 1983 (Pet. App.

203a-204a, 205a-206a). The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. This case involves a consent decree originally

approved and entered by the district court in 1976

in settlement of four lawsuits brought by the Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. (NRDC)

against various officials of the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (EPA). The suits concerned EPA’s

alleged failure to implement Sections 307(a) and

3807(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

as then in effect, 33 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1317(a) and

1317(b). As enacted in 1972, Section 307(a) di-

rected the Administrator of EPA, within 90 days

after enactment, to publish a list of toxic pollutants

based upon several criteria, including toxicity, per-

sistence, and degradability of the pollutant. Within

180 days thereafter, he was directed to propose ef-

fluent standards for each pollutant based upon the

same factors, and within six months thereafter, he

was to promulgate final effluent standards. Section

307(b) of the Act required the Administrator, within

180 days after enactment, to propose pretreatment

standards “for introduction of pollutants into [pub-

licly-owned treatment works] * * * for those pol-

lutants which are determined not to be susceptible to

treatment by such treatment works or which would

interfere with the operation of such treatment

works.” Within 90 days after proposal, he was di-

rected to promulgate final pretreatment standards for

such pollutants. /bid. These pretreatment standards

were to apply to industrial categories. 33 U.S.C.

(1976 ed.) 1317(c).

In one suit, NRDC claimed that EPA’s criteria for

identifying toxic pollutants under Section 307(a) of

the Act were too restrictive, and that EPA had un-

lawfully failed to list some 25 pollutants.’ In two

other suits, NRDC alleged that EPA had failed to

perform a mandatory duty under Section 307(a) to

promulgate final health-based effluent standards

within the time required by the Act for nine pollu-

tants which the Agency had listed as toxic.? In the

fourth suit, NRDC alleged that EPA had failed to

promulgate pretreatment standards within the time

required by Section 307(b).*

NRDC and EPA ultimately negotiated a settlement

of these cases. The primary feature of this agree-

ment—paragraph 7 of the decree—allowed EPA to

regulate toxic pollutants and establish pretreatment

standards on an industry-by-industry basis, using the

technology-based criteria found in Sections 301(b)

(2) (A) and 306 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 13811(b) (2)

(A) and 1316.‘ EPA preferred this approach to the

health-based, pollutant-by-pollutant method appar-

* NRDC v. Train, No. 2158-78 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 7, 1978).

2 Environmental Defense Fund v. Train, No. 75-0172

(D.D.C. filed Feb. 6, 1975); Citizens for a Better Environ-

ment V. Train, No. 75-1698 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 15, 1975).

* NRDC v. Agee, No. 75-1267 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 1975).

* Section 301 (b) (2) (A) requires existing point source dis-

chargers to comply with “best available technology econom-

ically achievable” (BAT) by July 1, 1984. Section 306 re-

quires new point source dischargers to comply with “best

available demonstrated control technology” (BADT).

4

ently envisioned by Section 307(a). Paragraph 7 also

set forth a mutually acceptable timetable for promul-

gating these regulations (Pet. App. 164a). Appendix

A to the decree identified the pollutants, and Appen-

dix B identified the industrial categories, which were

to be the focus of EPA’s inquiry under paragraph 7

(Pet. App. 177a-194a).° However, under the cri-

teria set out in paragraph 8 of the decree,* EPA

could exclude from such regulations any listed pollut-

ant or industrial category (id. at 166a). The pro-

visions of paragraph 7, though the most important

at the time, are not challenged by petitioners here.

See Pet. App. 12a-13a n.7.

In addition, the decree included several provisions,

the principal subjects of the instant dispute, that

committed EPA to follow certain procedures and cri-

teria in deciding whether to undertake additional

regulatory measures. None of these provisions bound

the Agency to particular substantive outcomes; how-

ever, they have guided the Agency’s approach to the

development of regulations under the Act. Paragraph

4(a) requires EPA to set pretreatment standards for

certain pollutants, not listed in the decree, which meet

the statutory criteria for pretreatment regulation

(Pet. App. 162a-163a). Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c)’

direct the Agency to “identify” industrial categories

that discharge certain pollutants, as well as other

*In addition, under paragraph 13 of the decree (Pet. App.

17la), EPA was to promulgate pretreatment standards for

eight industrial categories according to the “best practicable

control technology currently available” (BPT), found in Sec-

tion 801(b) (1) (A) of the Act, 88 U.S.C. 1811(b) (1) (A).

* The criteria of paragraph 8 are more detailed and specific

than the statutory criteria of Section 807(a) (1), 88 U.S.C.

1817 (a) (1).

' Paragraph 4(c) was added to the decree in 1979.

5

pollutants warranting controls (Pet. App. 141a-142a,

163a). The process specified in paragraph 4(c) is

not explicitly required (though it is certainly per-

mitted) by the Act. Paragraph 4(c) also requires

that EPA undertake regulatory action at the com-

pletion of this “identification” process (Pet. App.

141a-142a). Paragraph 8 of the decree contains cri-

teria, not explicitly set out in the statute, for exclu-

sion of industrial categories and pollutants covered

by the decree from regulation (Pet. App. 166a-168a,

147a-148a). Paragraph 12 of the decree requires

EPA to establish a program under specified proce-

dures not required by the Act, to determine whether

regulations more stringent than the paragraph 7

technology-based regulations were necessary to en-

sure the maintenance of specified uses for receiving

waters (Pet. App. 170a).°

NRDC and EPA jointly presented the agreement

to the court for approval. After considering objec-

tions to the decree raised by several petitioners and

other industry-intervenors,’ the district court entered

an order on June 9, 1976, approving the agreement

and directing EPA to comply with its terms (Pet.

App. 149a-156a). Prior to approving the decree, how-

ever, the court required changes in the agreement to

ensure that it would not be called upon to “review

substantive judgments made by the Administrator

* * * but will merely ensure good faith compliance

with the provisions of the agreement” (Pet. App.

* Paragraph 12 was substantially modified in 1979 to make

its requirements more specific and detailed. See Pet. App.

147a-148a.

* Although not all of the industry intervenors are currently

petitioners in this Court, we will refer to them collectively,

for convenience, as “petitioners.”

15la). The court found that the decree as so modi-

fied constituted a “classic settlement” of the parties’

disputes (Pet. App. 154a) and a “just, fair and equi-

table resolution of the issues raised * * *” (Pet. App.

156a). No appeal was taken from this order.

2. By 1976, EPA had encountered unforeseen dif-

ficulties in meeting some of the deadlines set forth in

the decree. NRDC therefore moved for an order hold-

ing EPA in contempt for failing to comply with the

decree. In response, EPA moved to modify the decree

by, inter alia, obtaining more time to promulgate

technology-based regulations under paragraph 7 of

the decree and expanding the criteria by which it

could exclude pollutants and industries from regula-

tion under paragraph 8. Petitioners moved to vacate

the decree on the grounds that: (1) the 1977 Amend-

ments to the Act supplanted the decree or rendered

the underlying litigation moot; and (2) the decree

circumvented applicable public notice and comment

requirements.

Thereafter, NRDC and EPA settled their pending

motions by agreeing to and proposing to the court

certain modifications of the original decree. The

primary modifications extended the deadlines for

promulgating paragraph 7 regulations, as requested

by EPA (Pet. App. 142a-148a); expanded the cri-

teria by which EPA could exclude pollutants and

industrial categories from regulations, as requested

by EPA (id. 143a-146a); and set forth a more de-

tailed procedure for the Agency to follow in deciding

whether to undertake additional rulemakings under

paragraphs 4 and 12 (id. 141a and 147a). On March

9, 1979, the district court entered an order modify-

ing the decree as requested by NRDC and EPA, and

denying petitioners’ motion to vacate (Pet. App.

121a).

7

8. Petitioners appealed that order to the court of

appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district

court judgment with respect to each of petitioners’

explicit contentions, but it remanded the case to the

district court to determine whether the consent de-

cree impermissibly infringed on the Administrator’s

discretion in implementing the Clean Water Act (Pet.

App. 99a-100a).

On remand, petitioners filed a motion to vacate or,

alternatively, to revise the decree on the “impermissi-

ble infringement” grounds suggested by the court of

appeals. Both EPA and NRDC opposed petitioners’

motion, contending that the decree did not impermissi-

bly constrain the Agency’s discretion. EPA also filed

a cross-motion to modify the decree, contending that

circumstances had changed sufficiently since the de-

cree was last modified that further modifications were

warranted. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposi-

tion to Intervenors’ Joint Motion to Vacate or, Al-

ternatively, to Revise the Decree and in Support of

Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Modify the Decree at 26

(hereinafter ‘Defendants’ Memorandum”). The

Agency sought (1) further extensions of the para-

graph 7 timetables for proposing and promulgating

technology-based regulations and (2) deletion of the

provisions of the decree that were not expressly man-

dated by the Act but were within the Agency’s dis-

cretion. NRDC opposed this motion.

Specifically, EPA, like petitioners, sought deletion

of paragraphs 4(b), 4(c), 6, 7(c), 11, 12, 13, and 14

of the decree, and amendments to paragraphs 4(a),

7(a), 7(d), and 10. The respects in which EPA’s

requested relief differed from that of petitioners were

that EPA would modify paragraph 8 to permit ex-

clusion for reasons other than those listed and to per-

mit Federal Register publications of exclusions under

the paragraph rather than affidavits, while petition-

ers would have deleted paragraph 8; and petitioners

would have deleted paragraph 19—which is essen-

tially a savings clause (Pet. App. 148a). See defend-

ants’ Memorandum at 32 n.24. Unlike petitioners,

however, EPA did not attack the legality of the de-

cree ab initio, but urged that changed circumstances

justified its proposed modifications.’

By order of February 5, 1982, the district court

denied petitioners’ motion to modify the decree, hold-

ing that the decree did not impermissibly constrain

the Agency’s discretion (Pet. App. 108a). On May 7,

1982, the court denied EPA’s cross-motion to modify,

concluding that EPA had presented insufficient

grounds for its request (Pet. App. 117a).

EPA subsequently filed a motion for reconsidera-

tion of the district court’s May 7 order insofar as it

denied EPA’s request for more time to propose and

promulgate technology-based regulations under para-

graph 7 of the decree. The Agency supported its re-

quest with more detailed and extensive evidence as to

% EPA argued that “[e]xtra obligations not required by

statute necessarily infringe on EPA’s ability to allocate its

limited resources in the way it finds best” (Defendants’ Memo-

randum at 80) and that, in light of changed circumstances, a

new Administrator, appointed after a change in presidential

administrations, was entitled to allocate resources and make

policy judgments within the discretion vested in the Adminis-

trator by statute (ibid.). During the period the cross-motion

was pending in district court, EPA continued to carry out the

terms of the decree.

11 The court’s May 7 order directed EPA to promulgate

regulations for all remaining categories within one year.

the need for additional time. By order dated October

26, 1982, the district court granted this motion.”

4. Petitioners appealed the district court’s denial

of their motion to vacate and the denial of EPA’s

cross-motion to modify. EPA did not appeal the May

7 order denying its cross-motion, but opposed peti-

tioners’ position in the court of appeals.

The court of appeals affirmed on a-divided vote

(Pet. App. la-44a). The court rejected petitioners’

contention that provisions not expressly mandated by

statute, but within the Agency’s discretion, could not

properly be included in the decree. The court relied

on United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-

682 (1971), and United States v. ITT Continental

Baking Co., 420 U.S, 228, 236 n.10 (1975). See Pet.

App. 17a-22a. The court also rejected petitioners’

claim that these “nonstatutory” provisions of the

decree impermissibly infringe on EPA’s discretion in

implementing the Act. The court noted that the de-

cree had not only been consented to, but largely for-

mulated by EPA, and that the provisions of the

decree challenged by petitioners did not compel EPA

to take any specific substantive action or prescribe

the content of any final rule. The court also re-

affirmed its earlier holding (Pet. App. 56a-7la),

based on legislative history regarding the 1977

Amendments to the Act, that “Congress implicitly ex-

pected the settlement agreement to continue in effect,”

and considered this to be further support for its view

that the decree does not impermissibly infringe on

EPA’s discretion under the Act (id. at 28a).

12Qn two subsequent occasions the district court has fur-

ther extended the paragraph 7 schedules on EPA’s request,

by orders dated August 2, 1983, and January 6, 1984.

10

In dissent, Judge Wilkey stated that an Article III

court cannot command an Executive Branch agency

“to exercise its administrative discretion in a partic-

ular way * * *,” and concluded that ihrough the pro-

visions of this consent decree, the court exceeded the

bounds of its Article III authority by requiring EPA

to apply decisionmaking criteria “not found in” the

statute and to “undertake programs that are not re-

quired by the statute” (Pet. App. 32a-33a).

ARGUMENT

Petitioners seek an order vacating or substantially

modifying a consent decree entered into by the Ad-

ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency

in 1976, establishing a “detailed program for de-

veloping regulations to deal with the discharge of

toxic pollutants” (Pet. App. 9a) under the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg. Petitioners contend

that certain provisions of the decree—those not ex-

plicitly mandated by the Act—exceed the power of an

Article III court by constricting the exercise of statu-

tory discretion by the Administrator. Petitioners thus

mount a broad-based challenge to the enforceability

of consent decrees that purport to bind an executive

branch official and his successors in office to exercise

their discretion in a particular manner.”

8 Petitioners also challenge the court of appeals’ 1980 hold-

ing (Pet. App. 56a-7la) that the 1977 Amendments to the

Act did not supersede the consent decree. We do not consider

this issue of sufficient importance to warrant this Court’s re-

view. It is essentially of importance to this lawsuit alone, was

addressed comprehensively and responsibly by the court of

appeals, and stands—for reasons discussed at pages 14-15,

infra—soon to become moot.

ll

The issue raised is of undoubted importance. See,

e.g., National Audubon Society v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299

(D.C. Cir. 1982); Ferrel v. Department of Housing

& Urban Development, appeal pending, No. 83-2038

(7th Cir.) ; Alliance to End Repression v. Department

of Justice, appeal pending en banc, No. 83-1853 (7th

Cir.); Adams v. Bell, appeal pending, No. 83-1590

(D.C. Cir.). At each extreme, the applicable prin-

ciples are more or less apparent. In circumstances

where an agency can obviate litigation (and a poten-

tial finding of liability) by committing itself to a

course of action that is substantively in accord with

the agency’s intentions and of relatively brief dura-

tion, the agency should be permitted to enter into,

and the court to enforce, an appropriate consent de-

cree.* At the other extreme, a consent decree can

extend so far in time, and constitute such an exten-

sive restriction on the discretion of an executive

branch official and his successors, that it would over-

step the official’s authority to enter. Similarly, an

order or decree that cuts so deeply into the discre-

tion of the executive branch may be beyond the au-

thority of the courts to enforce. See Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 378-379 (1976); Laird v. Tatum, 408

U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

Even an order or decree that is appropriate when

entered can become inappropriate if (through elec-

tions or otherwise) the policy of the agency changes

and the decree becomes an interference with the

ability of agency officials to exercise their discretion-

ary authority. Under traditional principles of equity,

Thus, if petitioners are contending that an agency lacks

the power to enter, and the court the power to enforce, any

decree that constrains the agency’s statutory or constitutional

discretion, no matter how briefly or modestly, we cannot agree.

12

and in deference to the congressional judgment that

certain decisions should be entrusted to agency dis-

cretion, there accordingly may come a time when an

order or decree should be vacated or substantially

modified, and the authority to execute the law in the

first instance restored to the executive branch. See

Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 611

F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979), on remand from 427 U.S.

424 (1976); Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organiza-

tion v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120 (8d Cir. 1979);

cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality

League, 415 U.S. 605, 622-623 (1974).™

Despite the importance of this issue, however, we

believe this is an inappropriate case for addressing

it, for the following reasons.

1. Most prominent among the factors counselling

against certiorari in this case is that the Administra-

tor, the scope of whose discretion is at stake, in fact

supports the consent decree here. Even assuming

48 Thus, if the court of appeals has concluded that govern-

ment consent decrees are identical to private consent decrees

with respect to the standards of United States v. ITT Conti-

nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 228, 286 n.10 (1975); United

States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248

(1968) ; and United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119

(1982), we cannot agree. If a private party agrees, on behalf

of himself, his heirs, successors, and assigns, to a decree that

constricts his options beyond the requirements of the law, he

has merely struck a bad bargain. If a government official does

the same, he is purporting to bargain away the right of the

people to a government run by their elected officials.

1¢In the district court, the Administrator opposed peti-

tioners’ motion to vacate or revise the decree, but made a cross-

motion to modify the decree. The Administrator’s cross-motion

was substantially similar to petitioners’ motion to revise the

decree. See pages 7-8, supra. However, the Administrator

18

the standing of petitioners to raise the issue,” the

separation of powers question they bring to this

Court is presented in an awkward and atypical con-

text, since the executive official whose powers have

purportedly been infringed has been aligned in the

litigation against his putative champions. It is also

significant that, unlike in the typical consent decree

controversy, Congress has implicitly sanctioned the

substantive terms of this decree. See Pet. App. 56a-

71a.

The agency itself is in the best position to assess

whether its discretion has been seriously curtailed,

as a practical and not merely an abstract matter, and

whether the consent decree entered into by a previous

Administrator now frustrates legitimate changes of

decided not to appeal the denial of the cross-motion, and

opposed petitioners’ position in the court of appeals. The cur-

rent intention of the Administrator is to fulfill the few re-

maining requirements of the decree. See pages 14-15, infra.

17 Standing to sue under the Clean Water Act is, of course,

exceptionally broad. Here, petitioners suffer no injury from

continued implementation of the consent decree that would be

sufficient to satisfy ordinary principles of standing. Even if

the decree were vacated, the Administrator would remain free

to carry out its terms. Thus, any benefit to petitioners from a

judicial remedy in this litigation is purely speculative. See

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S.

26 (1976). Moreover, since the decree governs only the pre-

proposal stages of formulating regulations, there is no current

injury to petitioners, and may never be. Petitioners will have

a full opportunity to comment on any proposals that may

ensue, and, if necessary, to challenge any final rules in court.

The instant dispute therefore does not appear ripe for re-

view. See generally Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 887 U.S.

167 (1967).

a FF

14

policy and approach. Here, the Administrator has in-

dicated his willingness to abide by the terms of the

decree. That casts considerable doubt on petitioners’

proposition that the decree is an impermissible usur-

pation of his discretion.

Indeed, the separation of powers problems inherent

in the consent decree context will remain inchoate

until such time as the decree in fact prevents an Ad-

ministrator from choosing and effectuating his poli-

cies. So long as succeeding Administrators remain

content with the terms of a decree, it is difficult to

see why separation of powers concerns should enable

private parties to disturb the arrangement. In any

event, we can see no reason for this Court to address

the thorny problems raised by petitioners in this ab-

tract context.”*

2. Moreover, the controversy over this consent decree

has become largely academic. In February 1982, EPA

completed all tasks under paragraph 12 of the decree,

which required the Agency to identify all geographic

18Tt should also be noted that this consent decree is not

typical of the methods usually chosen by the Agency to com-

promise litigation. Normally, a consent decree simply recites

the Agency’s intention to propose taking whatever action is

agreed upon by the litigants. The lawsuit is stayed pending

final action on the proposed revisions contained in the settle-

ment agreement. If, after notice and comment, the Agency

adopts a final course that is at odds with the original proposal,

the other parties to the consent decree retain the right to

reinitiate the litigation or to file a new lawsuit. In this manner,

there is full opportunity for public participation, and the

Agency retains discretion over the content of the ultimate

rule. Moreover, future Administrators retain the ability to

change the Agency’s course or priorities through administra-

tive action, without being required to obtain leave of court.

15

areas and toxic pollutants for which additional con-

trols might be necessary after the technology-based

requirements are established under paragraph 7 of

the decree, and to publish its strategy for implement-

ing such controls. And on March 13, 1984, EPA com-

pleted the tasks set forth in paragraph 4(c) of the

decree, which required the Agency to identify addi-

tional pollutants, beyond the “priority” toxic pollut-

ants listed in Appendix A to the decree, which might

warrant pretreatment regulations under the Act.

Paragraph 8 of the consent decree has been sub-

stantially implemented. It sets forth the criteria by

which EPA may exclude pollutants or industries from

the technology-based regulations developed under par-

agraph 7. To date, EPA has promulgated paragraph

7 regulations for 20 of the 37 industrial categories

listed in paragraph 7. It has already excluded from

such regulation 10 entire categories and more than

100 subcategories of other categories based on the

paragraph 8 criteria. Regulations for the remaining

paragraph 7 industrial categories are scheduled to be

promulgated by no later than February 1985.

Moreover, upon completing the paragraph 7 tech-

nology-based regulations for all remaining industrial

categories, EPA will have discharged all of its obli-

gations under the decree and will then be entitled to

vacation of the decree and dismissal of the underlying

lawsuits. Thus, there is a significant possibility that

the issues petitioners tender for review will have be-

come moot by the time this Court could render a deci-

sion on the merits if the petition were granted.

16

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

REX E. LEE

Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT, II

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID SHILTON

Barry S. NEUMAN

Attorneys

May 1984

W 8. 6. covennmant pamrme corres, 1904 a

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