Opposition — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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Office - Supreme Court, WS,

FILED ,

APR 16 Re

No, 83-1345

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IN THE an

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1983

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ef al.

Petitioners,

V,

WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS

As ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ef ai.

Respondents,

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al., INOPPOSITION

J. TAYLOR BANKS

(Attorney of Record)

RONALD J. WILSON

Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(282) 223-8210

Counsel for Respondents

Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., et al.

April 16, 1984

A A A

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether some, but not all, of the provisions of a Consent

Decree, voluntarily negotiated by the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency and subsequently endorsed by Congress, im-

properly limit the discretion of the Agency.

2. Whether Congress, in endorsing the strategy of the

Consent Decree and codifying certain of its provisions, in-

tended to supplant the Decree.

3. Whether some portions of the four causes of action

underlying the Consent Decree were rendered moot by sub-

sequent legislation and administrative actions.

e. or a

Ce ee ee ee eee eee Tem he eens re ss

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. .......0ccccccccccsces

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1. The Complaints and the Consent Decree ......

2. Court of Appeals Consideration of the Consent

ND cobs ves dadee nadbsrebinenessicenveeds

3. EPA’s Implementation of the Consent Decree. .

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION.......

1. The Petition should be denied because the Con-

. sent Decree has little remaining vitality........

2. Review of the broad separation of power issue

proffered by the Petition is unnecessary because

the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act

approved the Decree ..........ccccccccccsees

3. Review of the District Court’s power to enter the

Consent Decree will yield an extremely narrow

decision even if the Court reaches the issues

proffered by petitioners ...................05.

4. The Circuit Court’s 1980 ruling should not be

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APPENDIX

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) 11

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

BE SO oa esccncqntcdesaip ghee tasoeheueenens il

NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977)...... 4

System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642

CIOGEE ntiie ¢ ccnswsdddixstancstudbateuvede Sauakbe 12,13

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) ... 13

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

U.S. 519 (1978)...... Sale duke odes ebe hanes Meunvaee 12,13

STATUTES AND RULES:

Clean Water Act

Section 307(a), 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) § 1317(a) ...

Section 307(b)\(1), 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) §

SRR 0 ain o's o eae beearekEE Mead de tboweses

48 Fed. Reg. 51407 (November 8, 1983) .............

49 Fed. Reg. 5831 (February 15, 1984) ..............

49 Fed. Reg. 10357 (March 20, 1984)................

N

Annwn

MISCELLANEOUS:

A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977,

Cong. Research Service, Comm. Print No. 14, 95th

Cane. 26 Bean. COTE) occ cccveccucovasssdsccncven 9,10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1345

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CorRPORATION,

MONSANTO COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE,

AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

Petitioners,

Vv.

WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS

As ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY,

CiT1ZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,

AND BUSINESSMEN For THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC.,

Respondents,

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals dated October 4,

1983 (Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 718 F.2d 1117. The

corresponding opinions of the district court dated February

2

5, 1982 and May 7, 1982 (Pet. App. 103a, 117a) were unofficially

reported at 16 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084 and 17 Env’t Rep.

Cas. (BNA) 2013, respectively. The opinion of the court of

appeals dated September 16, 1980 (Pet. App. 45a) is reported

at 636 F.2d 1229. The corresponding opinion of the district

court dated March 9, 1979 (Pet. App. 121a) was unofficially

reported at 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

duties for regulating toxic and other pollutants; and also the

manner in which the Agency exercised its discretion under

the Act. For example, Section 307(a) of the Act required EPA

to issue a list of toxic pollutants based on rather detailed

criteria.' Among other things, NRDC’s complaint

ignoring

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EPA had failed to regulate all pollutants required by these

statutory criteria.

Accordingly, the Consent Decree as negotiated by the

parties’ and entered by the District Court addressed not only

the mandatory duties that EPA had ignored, such as strict

deadlines, but also EPA's failure to apply properly the criteria

set forth in Sections 307(a) and 307(b) of the Act. The Decree

first established the deadlines by which EPA was required to

promulgate the mandated regulations.‘ In order to resolve the

dispute over EPA's application of criteria, the parties agreed

to procedures and studies’ that would assist the Agency in

applying the statutory criteria without abusing its discretion.

And the parties also agreed that if the appropriate criteria

were applied correctly, a specific list of toxic pollutants,

discharged by specific industries, would be subject to regu-

lation.®

Because the original complaints focused on the correct

statutory criteria and on how the Agency exercised its dis-

cretion in applying those criteria, no party, including the

Industry petitioners here, objected to the Decree as imper-

missibly infringing the Agency's discretion. Like Petitioners,

the District Court was not concerned that the Decree included

criteria, as well as related studies to assist in their application,

since this was the core of the dispute. The Court was concerned

that certain provisions of the proposed settlement might

require it to review decisions clearly within the Agency’s

allowable zone of discretion, and therefore required a modi-

fication to the Decree so that it would not ‘*be put in a position

» The impetus for a negotiated settlement came from EPA on the basis

* Original Consent Decree, 19 7, 13, 14. Pet. App. 1640, 171a-172a).

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of supervising the discretionary actions of the [Administrator]

of the EPA’’ because ‘‘I don’t think it is a proper judicial

role.’’ Tr. of Status Conference, 3-4 (April 30, 1976). (Appen-

dix, infra).

After the District Court entered the Consent Decree over

objections from Industry (which did not include the imper-

missible infringement issue), Industry did not appeal the merits

of the Decree.’ Thereafter, EPA began to carry out its

responsibilities, but by 1978 the Agency was in clear violation

of the Decree’s specific, objective provisions. It had fallen

behind most of the deadlines imposed by the Decree, and had

taken absolutely no steps toward creating the procedures and

studies which would enable it to exercise its discretion in

accordance with the criteria set forth in the Decree. EPA also

had concluded by then that some aspects of the Decree,

particularly Paragraph 8, were difficult to administer.

The parties resolved these problems by negotiating rea-

sonable modifications to the settlement and submitting a

revised Decree to the Court. For the most part, these modi-

fications eased the requirements of the Decree. EPA obtained

substantial extensions of the deadlines in Paragraph 7, and a

relaxation of the criteria under Paragraph 8 for removing

pollutants and segments of industry from regulation. EPA

also received substantial extentions of its deadlines for com-

5

Rather, the Decree was attacked as moot, as invalid rule-

making by the Agency, and as superseded by the 1977

amendments to the Clean Water Act. The District Court

rejected these arguments. (Pet. App. 123a-138a).

2. Court of Appeals Consideration of the Consent Decree.

Once again, Industry appealed, but only on the grounds

raised in District Court. The Court of Appeals upheld the

District Court with respect to all arguments directly raised.

636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Pet. App. 45a). Specifically,

in ruling that the Decree had not been superseded by the 1977

amendments, the Court noted the strong Congressional sen-

timent that the Decree be retained to provide any missing

elements necessary for a comprehensive toxic pollution con-

trol program. The Court's opinion referenced key legislative

history which ‘‘approves and endorses this strategy’’ embod-

ied in the Decree, and indicates that the 1977 amendments”

were ‘‘specifically designed to codify the so-called ‘Flannery

decision’ .’’ 636 F.2d at 1243-1245 (Pet. App. 65a-71a).

However, at oral argument the Court of Appeals sua

sponte raised the question of impermissible infringement, and

After full briefing, the District Court ruled that the Decree

did not impermissibly infringe the Agency's discretion. The

Court noted that the relief granted was responsive

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Industry appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court agreed that ‘‘Congress implicitly sanctioned the

limited infringement on the Agency's discretion which the

Decree entails.’ 718 F.2d at 1129 (Pet. App. 28a). The Court

also ruled that a ‘‘court’s duty when passing on a settlement

agreement is fundamentally different from its duty in trying a

case on the merits."’ 718 F.2d at 1126 (Pet. App. 20a-21a).

Thus, the trial court must determine that the decree is

responsive to the violations alleged, consistent with the

statute, fair, reasonable, and in the public interest. Additional

inquiry could require a full-scale hearing on the merits. Jd.

Moreover, according to the Court, the context of the

Decree is important. The fact that the Decree was crafted

primarily by EPA, and that no substantive result was foreor-

dained, are factors which must be considered in evaluating

whether an Agency's discretion is impermissibly infringed.

programs that differ in kind as well as scope from the duties

imposed by the Act.’’ 718 F.2d at 1131 (Pet. App. 33a).

|

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20,

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By 1982, EPA had issued all but one of the water quality

criteria required by Paragraph 11. The final water quality

criterion was issued on February 2, 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 5831

(February 15, 1984)), completing EPA's obligations under

Paragraph 11.

As to Paragraph 12, on July 27, 1981, EPA completed

initial identification of water bodies in 34 metropolitan areas

that were believed to be seriously contaminated by discharges

of toxic pollutants, and on February 3, 1982, set forth a

strategy for developing additional controls to protect water

quality. U.S. EPA, Paragraph 12 Strategy (February 3, 1982).

NRDC initially was concerned that EPA's activities under

Paragraph 12 did not comply with the Decree because the

strategy only encouraged, but did not require, remedial ac-

tions. However, a subsequent EPA reguiatory action has

corrected this problem, so that the Agency now has completed

all its commitments under Paragraph 12. 48 Fed. Reg. 51407

(November 8, 1983).

Likewise, the Agency has all but completed its use of

the deletion criteria in Paragraph 8. EPA announces its

decisions to delete pollutants and industrial subcategories

pursuant to Paragraph 8 at the time it issues proposed

regulations under Paragraph 7. As noted above, only one

regulation remains to be proposed; EPA will complete this

task by the end of April, 1984. To date, the Agency has

deleted from regulation 10 entire industrial categories, over

100 subcategories, and dozens of pollutants. Not one of these

decisions has been challenged in the District Court as incon-

sistent with the requirements of Paragraph 8.

In sum, all that remains to be implemented is the issuance

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current effect.* EPA has fulfilled almost all its obligations

under the Decree, and those few that are outstanding probably

will be accomplished before the Court can complete its review

of the Court of Appeals decision.

Furthermore, the broad issues raised by the Petition

should not be reached by the Court, even if review were

granted, because 1977 Congressional action sanctioned the

controverted provisions of the Decree and the manner in

which EPA has been implementing them.

In any event, this case is not properly resolved by

expounding the broad principles advanced by the Petition and

set forth in Judge Wilkey's dissent. Rather, even if those

principles are correct, each specific provision of the Decree

must be measured against the allowable zone of discretion

permitted EPA under the Clean Water Act to determine if the

of the Clean Water Act and the Consent Decree in the context

of a settlement agreement resolving disputed allegations will

produce only narrow interpretations of the Act that have been

overtaken by the 1977 amendments and EPA's largely com-

pleted regulatory actions.

* Petitioners did not consider the discretion issue important enough to

raise until identified by the Court of Appeals four years after

was entered.

9

Consequently, if the petition were granted, the Court

would review a husk.

2. Review of the broad separation of power issue proffered

by the Petition is unnecessary because the 1977 amendments

to the Clean Water Act approved the Decree.

There is no danger that the Decree narrows the zone of

discretion Congress granted to EPA. Petitioners’ separation

of power argument is bottomed on the notion that the courts

may not constrain an agency's discretion beyond the limits

imposed by Congress. (Pet. 20). Here, Congress has examined

the Consent Decree, and has approved and codified it in the

1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act.

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals below

found support in Congress’ 1977 amendments for their view

that the Consent Decree did not limit EPA's discretion beyond

the limits intended by Congress. (Pet. App. 28a, 112a). In

amending the Clean Water Act in 1977, Congress shifted its

focus to the mounting problems posed by toxic pollutants.’

The Consent Decree itself had been a pivotal development

with respect to toxics between passage of the Act in 1972,

Congress quite simply adopted the strategy of the Consent

Decree. It amended Section 307(a) to require that EPA issue

Senator Muskie, the architect of the 1972 legislation and

the Senate Floor Manager of the Conference Report in 1977,

stressed that the amendments were ‘‘specifically designed to

codify the so-called ‘‘Flannery decision."’ 1977 Legis. Hist.,

supra at 455. The Senate Report stated that the “Committee

approves and endorses this strategy."’ Jd. at 689. Even

Congressman Roberts, who is cited by Petitioners for support

(Pet. 8-9), assumed during the floor debates that the Decree’s

Paragraph 8 criteria would remain in place. Jd. at 328.

Congress would not have endorsed the limits in the

Decree, and at the same time intended that EPA have

discretion to ignore them.

3. Review of the District Court’s power to enter the Consent

Decree will yield an extremely narrow decision even if the

Court reaches the issues proffered by petitioners. ‘

Petitioners do not attack the entire Consent Decree. On

appeal, petitioners conceded that the provisions of the Decree

which established deadlines and priorities for issuing regula-

tions called for by the Clean Water Act were a proper exercise

of the District Court's judicial power. 718 F.2d at 1122 (Pet.

App. 12a-13a). Rather, Petitioners seek a modification of those

parts of the Decree which they claim impermissibly infringe

EPA's discretion.

The problem posed for this Court in such a review is

plain from Petitioners’ formulation of the principles they

invoke. Petitioners contend that the Article III “case and

controversy”’ limitation ‘‘precludes a court from embodying

in a judicial decree a settlement agreement that goes beyond

the actual legal dispute between the parties,"’ and that “‘a

court’s power to adopt a consent decree derives from, and is

limited by, the terms of the statute that the decree seeks to

enforce." (Pet. 19-20). Further, Petitioners urge that the

Supremacy Clause prevents a court from telling the Executive

Branch how to exercise its discretion. (Pet. 21).

The application of these principles, of course, requires a

detailed analysis of the legal and factual disputes between the

parties in four separate lawsuits, as well as a close study of

—“ -.. = |

the criteria imposed by the statute and the zone within which

Congress intended EPA to exercise its discretion.'' This Court

has long taught that Congress rarely grants the Executive

Branch unfettered, unreviewable discretion, and that generally

there is law to apply in reviewing the exercise of discretion.

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967);

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402

(1972). The law to apply is derived from the governing statute,

and operates as a restraint on the exercise of administrative

discretion. 401 U.S. at 402.

Petitioners sidestep this problem by claiming that ‘‘ev-

eryone involved in this litigation has acknowledged that

substantial portions of the Consent Decree constrain the

statutorily-conferred regulatory discretion of an Administrator

of EPA.”’ (Pet. 18). But this is not the case. The catch phase

in the above quotation is ‘‘statutorily conferred.'’ An impor-

tant part of the underlying controversy involved just how

much discretion Congress actually conferred upon EPA in

the Clean Water Act.

The complaints in these consolidated cases charged that,

among other things, the Agency had abused its discretion and

wandered beyond the zone of allowable discretion by applying

unlawful criteria and by failing to apply required statutory

criteria. (See Complaint, No.2173 p. 13). Indeed, when NRDC

" The dissent's description of what the Act requires is too facile. 718

12

filed its first legal memorandum on the merits of the case, it

said: ‘The question of the Administrator's discretion is at the

heart of this case—where discretion does exist and where it

is circumscribed and hence reviewable.’*'?

In essence, NRDC claimed that EPA applied the wrong

statutory criteria and did not exercise its discretion properly.

EPA claimed the opposite. A classic settlement followed

where the parties agreed on the appropriate criteria and an

appropriate way to guide EPA's exercise of discretion within

the authority provided by the Act."

If a court had no power to enter such a settlement, it

would surely chill the judicial policy favoring settlement in

any case where the alleged law violations include an abuse

of discretion. Indeed, under Petitioners’ view, the District

Court must in every instance determine if the relief provided

in the settlement fits precisely with what Congress had in

mind, rather than make a more general finding that the

settlement is consistent with the objectives of the statute and

in the public interest.

Viewed in this light, the Court of Appeals decision is

entirely consistent with principles enumerated by this Court

in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.

519 (1978) and System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S.

642 (1961). In Vermont Yankee, this Court reversed a lower

court ruling which had imposed extra-statutory procedures

" NRDC v. Train, No. 2153-73, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or, in The Alternative, For

Summary Judgment, p. 16 (April 1, 1974).

" By agreeing to Paragraphs 4(c) and 12, EPA undertook only to

13

on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission despite the fact that

there was ‘‘no doubt’’ NRC had complied with the only statute

governing its procedural obligations. 435 U.S. at 549. That

does not remotely resemble this case, where EPA resolved a

substantial dispute over the statutory criteria and the statutory

limits on its discretion by entering a settlement which set

forth appropriate criteria and limits.

While System Federation, unlike Vermont Yankee, in-

volved a consent decree, its principles also are consistent

with the holding below. There, Congress had eliminated the

statutory provision which had supported the requirement of

a consent decree, thereby making it necessary for the decree

to be modified. 364 U.S. at 644.“ Here, by contrast, there

has been no elimination of statutory provisions on which the

Decree was based. Instead, Congress has specifically ap-

proved and endorsed the provisions of the Decree. The

Consent Decree therefore not only conforms to the precept

in System Federation that a settlement must be ‘‘in furtherance

of the statutory objectives,’’ Jd. at 651, but also carries out

the specific intentions of Congress.

Thus, this Consent Decree cannot be overturned simply

by invoking the principles of Vermont Yankee and System

Federation. Rather, the Court must laboriously parse provi-

sions of the Clean Water Act and its history, the complaints

in the case, and the individual provisions of the Decree to

determine if the Administrator's discretion is in any way

constrained beyond what was intended by Congress. In the

context of this case, such a detailed review is more properly

left to the lower courts.

4. The Circuit Court’s 1980 ruling should not be reviewed.

Petitioners also seek review of the 1980 ruling of the

Court of Appeals. 636 F.2d 1229 (Pet. App. 45a). That decision

“ Decrees retain inherent flexibility, since Courts must be prepared to

modify them “‘as events shape the need.’ United States v. Swift & Co.,

286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). Here, the District Court has been receptive to

such events, twice modifying the Decree on EPA's request. 718 F.2d at

1130 (Pet. App. 29a).

14

held that the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act were

not intended by Congress to supersede the Consent Decree,

and that the Decree was not moot because parts of the original

proceedings remained live controversies.

Petitioners themselves do not take seriously their request

for review of the 1980 ruling. They devote a single paragraph

to a description of the 1980 decision, and conclude with the

totally unsupported assertion that ‘‘these rulings are erroneous

and deserve review by this Court because of the considerable

continuing effect of the decree on the Agency's regulatory

actions under the Clean Water Act."’ (Pet. 27).

For the reasons stated in Part I above, the Consent

Decree now has a small and diminishing effect on the Agency’s

implementation of the Clean Water Act. Petitioners do not

show the contrary. Moreover, the 1980 ruling has virtually

no ongoing significance in itself. That decision involved issues

relating only to the application of the 1977 amendments and

the mootness doctrine to this particular Consent Decree.

These narrow issues can never resurface.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

J. TAYLOR BANKS

(Attorney of Record)

Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.

1725 1 Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-8210

RONALD J. WILSON

810 18th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 628-3160

Counsel for Respondents

Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.

Environmental Defense Fund,

Inc.

Citizens for a Better

Environment

National Audubon Society

Businessmen for the Public

Interest, Inc.

April 16, 1984

IX

A-1

Transcript of Status Confercace Before United States District

Judge Thomas A. Flannery, April 30, 1976

Now, with respect to the proposed settlement agreement

I have carefully reviewed it and I have carefully read the

various comments and objections that have been filed by the

intervenor and other parties permitted to comment and this

Court is not prepared to approve the settlement in its present

form. ’

Specifically with reference to paragraph 8(c), page 12 of

the proposed Settlement Agreement, which provides that

whenever the administrator decides to exclude a point source

category or a specific pollutanf*from coverage pursuant to

this specific agreement he shall promptly file with the Court

and serve the parties to the captioned cases, designating the

point source category, sub-category or specific pollutant to

be excluded together with the reasons therefor. If the plaintiffs

file objections to the proposed exclusion, the Court shall

determine whether such exclusion shall be permitted under

the criteria previously enunciated in (a) and (b) of this

Now, that as I view it, would put the Court in a position

of supervising the discretionary actions of the director of the

EPA until conceivably 1983 or beyond. I don't intend to

undertake any such role, and I don't think it is a proper

And, therefore, I just won't approve of that.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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