Appendix — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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FILED

R3-1345 FEB 14 1984

No. &3-

a IN THE ae

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CoRPORATION,

MONSANTO COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE,

AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

7 Petitioners,

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,

AND BUSINESSMEN FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC.,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CHARLES F. LETTOW

(Attorney of Record)

DouGLas E. KLIEVER

MICHAEL A. WIEGARD

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &

HAMILTON

1752 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 728-2748

Counsel for Petitioners

Union Carbide Corporation,

FMC Corporation, Monsanto

February 14, 1984 Company and Ezxzon Corporation

[Additional Counsel listed on inside cover]

WILSON - Eras Printing Co. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

DouGLas E. MCALLISTER

1920 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioner

American Mining Congress

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

Davip P. HACKETT

COLLIER, SHANNON, RL & Scott

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20007

Counsel for Petitioner

American Iron and Steel Institute

STARK RITCHIE

JAMES K. JACKSON

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Petitioner

American Petroleum Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Page

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718

. 1a

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636

e ee ee 45a

NRDC v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084

i Fi. SR EERE ney ead ee kore 108a

NRDC Vv. Gorsuch, 17 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2018

rr 117

NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833

rr Tebiiet Ooeidewontaiincanpiagii 121

NRDC v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120

SORE Seger Poet See rene 149a

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,

/ 195a

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,

Order on Petition for Rehearing ...............0000....... 203a

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,

Order on Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc ..... 205a

Appendix B

Constitution of the United States (excerpts) ) 1b

Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-

| REE a Mm WORD ONCE 8b

Appendix C

List of non-wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates

Be I PPP lc

.

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 82-1365

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK

V.

ANNE GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

2a

No. 82-1366

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,

V.

JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

No, 82-1367

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

Vv.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CorRPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appeliants

8a

No. 82-1368

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

v.

ANNE M. GoRSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CoRPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

No. 82-1673

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

4a

No. 82-1674

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

V.

JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

No. 82-1675

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. pu Pont DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

5a

No. 82-1676

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.

V

ANNE M. GoksUch, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

FMC CoRPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,

CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,

MONSANTO CORPORATION,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

No. 82-1770

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

INC., ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants

No. 82-1771

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

INC., ET AL.

v.

JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA PowER COMPANY, ET A.,

Appellants

6a

No. 82-1772

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.

v.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants

No. 82-1773

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 75-01698, 75-01267,

73-02153 & 75-00172)

Argued March 1, 1983

Decided October 4, 1983

Charles L. Lettow, with whom Douglas F. Kliever,

Michael A. Wiegard, Douglas F. McAllister, Richard F.

Schwartz, Stark Ritchie, James XK. Jackson, Arnold 8.

Block, Michael B. Barr and Scott Slaughter were on the

brief, for appellants.

7a

Barry S. Neuman, Attorney, Department of Justice,

with whom Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Nancy B. Firestone,

Attorneys, Department of Justice, Michael Brown, Dep-

uty General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency,

Bruce M. Diamond, Acting Associate General Counsel,

and Susan G. Lepow, Assistant General Counsel, Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency, were on the brief, for

appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al. Donald W. Stever,

Attorney, Department of Justice, also entered an ap-

pearance for appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al.

Ronald J. Wilson, with whom J. Taylor Banks was on

the brief, for appellees, Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., et al.

William Scott Ferguson, entered an appearance for

appellees, Olin Corporation in 82-1365, 82-1366, 82-1367

and 82-1368.

Before: WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and Box-

SAL,“ Senior District Judge for the Southern

District of New York.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge

BONSAL.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.

BONSAL, District Judge: The intervenors in these con-

solidated cases, several corporations and trade associa-

tions (collectively the Companies), appeal from orders

of the United States District Court, Flannery, J., (1)

denying their motion to vacate or, alternatively, to revise

a settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) previously

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).

1 These include the American Iron and Steel Institute, Union

Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow Chemical Co., Celanese Co., E. I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., Exxon Corp., Monsanto Corp., the Ameri-

enn Petroleum Institute, the American Mining Congress, and numer-

ous utility companies.

approved by the district court, and (2) denying the cross-

motion of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”

or “the Agency”) and its Administrator to modify the

Agreement due to changed circumstances. The issue pre-

sented by this appeal, as formulated in our earlier opin-

ion, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d

1229, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is whether the “settlement

agreement impermissibly infringes on the discretion Con-

gress committed to the Administrator to make certain

decisions under the [Clean Water Act].” For the reasons

hereinafter stated, we hold that the Agreement does not

impermissibly infringe on the Administrator’s discretion

and accordingly we affirm the orders of the district court.

BACKGROUND

The facts are set forth in some detail in our prior

decision, 636 F.2d at 1234-38, familiarity with which is

assumed. Briefly, the Agreement was entered into by the

original parties“ to these consolidated cases in settlement

of the plaintiffs’ claims that EPA had failed to carry out

its statutory duty to implement certain provisions of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251

et seg. (1976), known in its amended form as the Clean

Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”).* Following negotia-

tions between the parties, the proposed settlement agree-

ment was submitted to the district court, which held

2 Other aspects of these cases were addressed in Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir.

1977).

The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the National Audubon So-

ciety, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., and Business

and Professional People for the Public Interest, Inc. (collectively

“NRDC”). The defendants are William Ruckelshaus, Administrator

of EPA, and the Agency itself.

The provisions involved are sections 801-304, 306, 307 and 402,

codified at 83 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1814, 1816, 1817, and 1842.

9a

hearings and received comments from the intervenor

Companies, which opposed it. The Agreement was au-

thorized and executed for the government by both EPA

and the Department of Justice. After making some

changes in the agreement, on June 9, 1976 the court

entered a “Final Order and Decree” (“the Decree”)

approving it as a “just, fair, and equitable resolution of

the issues raised.” Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122

(D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from the Decree.

Therefore, the issue of whether, in a general sense, the

district court acted properly in entering the June 9,

1976 Decree is not now before us.“

The Agreement contains a detailed program for de-

veloping regulations to deal with the discharge of toxic

pollutants under the CWA. It required EPA to promul-

gate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge

by 21 industries of 65 specified pollutants. It also man-

dated the use of certain scientific methodologies and

decision-making criteria by EPA in determining whether

additional regulations should be issued and whether other

pollutants should be included in the regulatory scheme.

It did not specify the substantive result of any regula-

tions EPA was to propose and only required EPA to

initiate “regulatory action” for other pollutants identi-

fied through the research program. The regulations en-

visaged by the Agreement were, after full notice and

comment, to be promulgated in phases by December 31,

1979 and the industries affected were to comply with

them by June 30, 1983.

Had the Companies appealed from the Decree, the scope of our

review would have been narrow. “The district court’s approval of a

proposed settlement by consent decree should be reversed only if its

approval is an abuse of the district court’s discretion.” United

States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d 486, 442 (5th Cir. 1981)

(en banc) (plurality opinion) ; accord Metropolitan Housing Devel-

opment Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1015

(7th Cir. 1980) ; Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union,

614 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).

10a

The district court explained in its Decree that the

Companies would be free to influence the content of the

proposed regulations by participating in the rulemaking

proceedings and then could attack the legality of any

final regulations in court. 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. at 2121. The

court also emphasized that EPA and NRDC had modified

the Agreement to make clear that the court would not

review EPA’s “substantive judgments” under it. Id.

When EPA’s implementation of the Agreement failed

to meet the deadlines imposed therein, NRDC moved to

have the Administrator held in contempt. Soon after, the

Companies moved to vacate the Decree on the grounds

that the 1977 Amendments to what became known as

the CWA had superseded the Decree and rendered it

moot, and that the Decree violated the Administrative

Procedure Act’s notice and comment provisions. EPA

and NRDC then jointly moved for an order modifying

the Decree in settlement of NRDC’s contempt motion.

On March 9, 1979 the district court modified the Decree

according to EPA’s and NRDC’s request and denied the

Companies’ motion to vacate the Decree. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep.

Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). In general, the modifi-

cations granted EPA more time and flexibility to imple-

ment the requirements of the Decree in exchange for re-

quiring EPA to provide NRDC more detailed information

regarding implementation. Several of the Companies

appealed the District court’s decision, which we affirmed.

We found that Congress did not intend the 1977 Amend-

ments to supersede the Decree, that the district court con-

tinued to have the power to enforce the Decree, and that

the modifications in the Decree were not “rules” within

the meaning of the APA for which EPA had to provide

notice and comment. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.

v. Costle, supra, 636 F.2d at 1244, 1251, 1255-56. How-

ever, we remanded the case for the district court to con-

sider whether the settlement agreement impermissibly

infringes on the discretion Congress committed to the

lla

EPA Administrator to make certain decisions under the

CWA. Id. at 1258-59.

On remand, the Companies filed a motion to vacate or,

alternatively, to revise the Decree on the ground that it

impermissibly infringed upon the Administrator’s discre-

tion under the CWA. EPA filed a cross-motion to modify

the Decree in light of changed circumstances, seeking to

extend certain deadlines and to delete from the Decree

those provisions compelling the performance of “discre-

tionary” actions by the Agency.

In a memorandum opinion filed February 5, 1982, the

district court found that the Agreement “does not im-

permissibly infringe upon the discretion accorded to the

EPA Administrator by Congress.” Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 2084, 2090 (D.D.C. 1982). Accordingly, it en-

tered an order on the same date denying the Companies’

motion. The district court based its decision on five fac-

tors. First, it stressed the breadth of a district court’s

equitable power to give effect to remedial statutes. Sec-

ond, it concluded that the Decree was “process” rather

than “result” oriented. Third, it pointed out that the

parties had participated extensively in formulating the

Decree. Fourth, it noted that it had taken a flexible ap-

proach to fashioning the Decree, modifying it a number

of times in response to objections raised by the parties.

Finally, it found that Congress had the Decree in mind

when it enacted the 1977 Amendments to the CWA and

“clearly approved of its procedures.” Id. at 2087-89.

On May 7, 1982 the district court issued a second

order, denying EPA’s cross-motion and directing the

Agency to submit proposed schedules for promulgating

within one year all those regulations envisaged by the

Agreement which had not yet been promulgated.* The

On June 21, 1982 EPA moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (b)

for an order modifying the district court’s May 7 order so as to give

2

S

12a

Companies have appealed from the district court’s first

order and from that part of the second order which de-

nied EPA’s request to delete those portions of the Decree

allegedly involving matters entrusted to the Administra-

tor’s discretion under the CWA. EPA has not appealed

the denial of that request.

DISCUSSION

The February 5, 1982 Order

The Companies’ principal contentions on appeal are

that: (1) the district court had no power to approve the

provisions of the Agreement which direct EPA to take

actions not required to remedy specific violations of the

CWA; and (2) these provisions impermissibly infringe

on the EPA Administrator’s statutory discretion by pre-

cluding him from taking action otherwise open to him

under the CWA.

L

Underlying both these contentions is the distinction

drawn by the Companies between “statutory” and “non-

statutory” provisions in the Agreement. They maintain

that certain provisions in the Agreement flow directly

from specific requirements in the Act and hence are

“statutory.” As to the presence of these provisions in

the Decree, the Companies raise no objection.’ However,

the Agency more time to promulgate the required regulations. On

August 25, 1982 the district court issued an order indicating its

willingness to grant EPA's motion if this court were to remand for

that purpose, which it did on September 10, 1982. The district court

then entered the order on October 26, 1982.

Following oral argument of this appeal, EPA and NRDC jointly

moved for an order modifying paragraph 10(b) of the Decree. In

an order dated June 10, 1988 the district court found the requested

modification consistent with § 807 (b) of the CWA, and on July 18,

1988 we remanded to the district court for entry of an order grant-

ing the joint motion.

7 The Companies identify only Paragraphs 7 and 18 as belonging

in this category. In their view, these provisions impose deadlines on

18a

they assert that other provisions, which they refer to as

“non-statutory,” are not mandated by the Act and thus

should have been excluded from the Decree by the dis-

trict court. The Companies admit that the “non-statu-

tory” provisions could have been included in the Agree-

ment—but not in the Decree.

Amongst the so-called “non-statutory” provisions are

ones which “impose criteria not prescribed in the statute

for EPA’s regulations.” Br. for Appellants at 17. Here

the Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 8 of the Decree,

which sets forth criteria for EPA’s decision to exclude

“specific pollutants” or “point source categories” from

proposed regulations.“ Under the CWA, EPA is required

EPA for the promulgation of regulations explicitly required by the

CWA, and therefore do not impermissibly restrict EPA’s statutory

discretion. Br. for Appellants at 16-17.

8. (a) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-

lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts,

for a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to

publication of proposed regulations for such point source cate-

gory, the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the

effluent limitations and guidelines, standards of performance,

and/or pretreatment standards contemplated by this Agreement

for such category a specific pollutant for any of the following

reasons, based upon information available to him:

(i) Equally or more stringent protection is already

provided by an effluent, new source performance, or pretreat-

ment standard or by an effluent limitation and guideline pro-

mulgated pursuant to Section(s) 301, 804, 306, 807 (a), 807(b)

or 807 (e) of the Act.

14

to analyze various factors in the course of developing

toxic pollutant regulations. Section 307 (a) (1) of the

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a) (1), provides that:

limitation for such pollutant pursuant to the requirements of

Section 307; or

(iii) the specific pollutant is either not present in the

discharge or in the effluent which is introduced into treatment

works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly

owned or is present only in trace amounts and is neither caus-

ing, nor likely to cause, toxic effects with respect to any iden-

tifiable organisms affected or likely to be affected by such dis-

charge or effluent.

Such exclusions may also be made following proposal or pro-

mulgation of standards whenever information comes to the at-

tention of the Administrator indicating that exclusion for any

of the foregoing reasons is warranted.

(b) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-

lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts, for

a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to pub-

lication of proposed regulations for such point source category,

the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the pre-

treatment standards contemplated by this Agreement all point

sources within a point source category or point source subcate-

gory:

(i) if 95 percent or more of all point sources in the

point source category or subcategory introduce into treatment

works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly

owned only pollutants which are susceptible to treatment by

such treatment works and which do not interfere with, do not

pass through, or are not otherwise incompatible with such treat-

ment works, or

15a

The Administrator in publishing any revised list [of

toxic pollutants subject to regulation] shall take into

account toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, de-

gradability, the usual or potential presence of the

affected organisms in any waters, the importance of

the affected organisms, and the nature and extent of

the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms.

The Companies contend that because the criteria specified

in Paragraph 8 of the Decree are more extensive than

those set out in section 307(a) (1) of the Act, the criteria

should not be incorporated in the Decree.

Also alleged to be “non-statutory” are provisions which

“create programs, not found in the statute, which EPA

must now undertake.” Br. for Appellants at 18. Here the

Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 4(c) of the Decree,

which requires EPA to “identify and study” additional

pollutants (aside from the 65 listed ones) for which pre-

treatment standards may be necessary. Paragraph 4(c)

describes in detail how EPA is to fulfill this requirement

by implementing a study program to identify other pol-

lutants for which EPA should initiate “regulatory

to this section of this Agreement, he shall promptly serve upon

the parties to the captioned cases, or their designated repre-

sentative or attorney, a statement under oath designating the

point source category or subcategory or specific pollutant to be

eacluded together with the reasons therefore. Such statement

shall detail the reasons for the Administrator's exclusion, and

shall set forth the data and information forming the basis for

the exclusion. Proposed regulations for each point source cate-

gory or subeategory shall identify each such exclusion, shall

summarize the Administrator's statement, and shall invite pub-

16a

action.”* Paragraph 4(c) appears to leave the scope,

substance and particulars of “regulatory action” to EPA’s

discretion, as subject to the rulemaking process. Section

4(c) The Administrator shall establish and implement a pro-

gram to identify and study other pollutants which are intro-

duced into such treatment works and which are not susceptible

to treatment by such works or which interfere with, pass

through, or are otherwise incompatible with such works. The

program shall, at a minimum, address those pollutants listed in

Appendix C identifiable by computer-based mass spectra search

programs (“computer matching”), and shall consist of steps

to: tentatively identify by computer matching pollutants dis-

charged by point source categories listed in Appendix B; de-

termine frequencies of occurrence and order-of-magnitude con-

centrations for the tentatively identified pollutants; analyti-

cally confirm the computed identification of those pollutants

found with significant frequency in at least one subcategory

and in high concentrations (the term “high” to be based on

comparison with the concentrations of other pollutants found or

known to be in the discharge and, where possible, on readily

available information with respect to toxicity of the pollutants) ;

determine for those pollutants analytically confirmed, based

laboratory test data and/or field studies, or other appropriate

17a

307 (b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (b), which discusses

pretreatment standards, states only that EPA must

promulgate such standards “[n]ot later than ninety days

after . . publication [of proposed regulations], and

after opportunity for public hearing... The Com-

panies complain that the program called for in Paragraph

40e) “is [not] mentioned in, much less required by, the

Act.“ Br. for Appellants at 19.

NRDC and EPA do not dispute that such provisions as

Paragraphs 4(c) and 8 in the Decree are not mandated

by the CWA. However, they contend that the programs

and criteria specified in the Decree are consistent with

the Act and do not bind the Agency to any particular sub-

stantive outcome. Instead, the programs and criteria es-

tablish analytic processes that EPA must employ in for-

mulating proposed standards. NRDC and EPA both be-

lieve that there is a sufficient nexus between the Decree

and the Act, even if every provision in the Decree is not

derived from a particular requirement of the CWA.

II.

The Companies' first contention, regarding the distriet

court’s power to approve the “non-statutory” provisions

of the Decree, requires a brief discussion of the principles

of law government consent decrees. In United States v.

Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1971), the Supreme

Court provided the following analysis:

Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case

after careful negotiation has produced agreement on

their precise terms. The parties waive their right to

litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save

themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of

litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally

embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving

of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give

up something they might have won had they pro-

18a

ceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself can-

not be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have

purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the

resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing

purposes as the respective parties have the bargain-

ing power and skill to achieve.

(Footnote omitted). Elsewhere the Supreme Court has

stated that

{cJonsent decrees and orders have attributes both of

contracts and of judicial decrees or, in this case, ad-

ministrative orders. While they are arrived at by

negotiation between the parties and often admit no

violation of law, they are motivated by threatened

or pending litigation and must be approved by the

court or administrative agency.

United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 US.

223, 236 n.10 (1975). While construction of a consent

decree is essentially a matter of contract law, see United

States v. Armour & Co., supra; Sportmart, Inc. v. Wol-

verine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.

1979), the decree itself must be treated “as a judicial

act.” United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115

(1932). Finally, a district court’s “authority to adopt a

consent decree comes only from the statute which the de-

cree is intended to enforce.” System Federation No. 91,

Railway Employees’ Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright,

364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961).

The district court referred to the Agreement as a

“classic settlement.” 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2122.

The Agreement certainly follows the principles laid down

in United States v. Armour and United States v. ITT

Continental Baking, supra. By its terms, EPA achieved

its objective of basing the regulation of toxic discharges

on a technology-based, industry-by-industry approach in-

stead of a health-based, pollutant-by-pollutant method.

19a

As we have previously noted, the technology-based ap-

proach “marked a change in EPA’s regulatory strategy”

and “offered substantial advantages over the old” one.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 636

F.2d at 1235-36. In addition, as the district court stated,

the Agreement represents a compromise for NRDC insofar

as it accepted that EPA could regulate toxic pollutants

under section 304 of the Act rather than under the health-

based effluent standards called for by section 307, as

NRDC’s complaint had alleged. 8 Env't Rep. Cas.

(BNA) at 2122. At the same time, NRDC also bene-

fited from the Agreement, which bound EPA to promul-

gate regulations without specifying the exact substance

of those regulations according to a fixed timetable for a

specified list of pollutants.

Nevertheless, the Companies contend that, while EPA

was free to dispose of this litigation by entering into the

Agreement with NRDC, the district court had no author-

ity to enforce those parts of it which “go beyond statutory

requirements.” Br. for Appellants at 26. They assert

that since, under System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,

supra, the court’s authority to approve the Agreement

“comes only” from the CWA, each provision in the

Agreement must be necessary to remedy a specific viola-

tion of the Act. In other words, the district court was

permitted only to remedy those wrongs which it could

specifically identify.

We think that this view of a court’s power to adopt a

consent decree is unduly narrow. The rule contended for

by the Companies depends on an overly literal reading of

System Federation No. 91 v. Wright. The statement that

a district court’s “authority to adopt a consent decree

comes only from the statute which the decree is intended

to enforce,” 364 U.S. at 651, means only that the focus

of the court’s attention in assessing the agreement should

be the purposes which the statute is intended to serve,

rather than the interests of each party to the settlement.

nt el a ede oy

15

Before approving the settlement in this case, the district

court held hearings and solicited comments, and concluded

that the Agreement was “a just, fair, and equitable reso-

lution of the issues raised” in these cases, 8 Env’t Rep.

Cas. (BNA) at 2122, and that it was “consistent with

Congress’ intent that water pollution be curbed by 1983.“

Id. The fact that certain provisions in the Decree track

the language of the Act more closely than others is irrele-

vant, so long as all are consistent with it. The Com-

panies’ suggested approach would require the court to

undertake a close examination of each part of the Decree

in order to establish that it was responsive to a specific

violation of the Act. This would require, in turn, detailed

findings that the Act had been violated in various ways.

However, the long-standing rule is that a district court

has power to enter a consent decree without first deter-

mining that a statutory violation has occurred. Swift &

Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928). % The

© As Justice Brandeis stated in Swift:

It is contended that the consent decree was without jurisdic-

tion because it was entered without the support of facts. The

argument is that jurisdiction under the Anti-Trust Acts cannot

be conferred by consent; that jurisdiction can exist only if the

laws is not sufficient; that the facts must also be established

according to the regular course of chancery procedure; that this

2la

court’s duty when passing upon a settlement agreement

is fundamentally different from its duty in trying a case

on the merits. As we have previously held, “prior to ap-

proving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of

the settlement’s overall fairness to beneficiaries and con-

sistency with the public interest“ United States v.

Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 318, 317 (D.C. Cir.

1977), quoting United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus-

tries, 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975). In a more

recent case, the Seventh Circuit has explained the nature

of the inquiry to be undertaken by the district court:

The trial court in approving a settlement need not

inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor

reach and resolve the merits of the claims or con-

troversy, but need only determine that the settlement

is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under

the particular facts and that there has been valid

consent by the concerned parties.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of

Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980);

accord United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d

435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Franks v. Kroger

Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1224 (6th Cir. 1981); Patterson v.

Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York, 514

F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911

(1976); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430

F.Supp. 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977); see also Carson v.

American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n. 14 (1981);

Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Com-

promise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1814, 1816

(1959).

an error is waived by the consent to the decree. Clearly it does

not go to the power of the court to adjudicate between the

parties.

276 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted).

22a

Furthermore, it is precisely the desire to avoid a pro-

tracted examination of the parties’ legal rights which

underlies consent decrees. Not only the parties, but the

general public as well, benefit from the saving of time

and money that results from the voluntary settlement of

litigation. Thus, “[vJoluntary settlement of civil con-

troversies is in high judicial favor.“ Autera v. Robinson,

419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

In light of these settled principles governing judicial

approval of settlement agreements, we see no merit to the

distinction drawn by the Companies between “statutory”

and “non-statutory” provisions of the Decree. The dis-

trict court’s findings that the Agreement was consistent

with the purpose of the CWA and that it fairly resolved

the controversy demonstrate that it conscientiously per-

formed the duty of a court when asked to approve a set-

tlement agreement. The focus of the court’s inquiry

throughout was the Act itself, as System Federation No.

91 requires. As the court determined, and as EPA itself

now urges, the Decree as a whole provides an effective

means of carrying out EPA’s obligations under the Act,

and one that is acceptable to both sides in this dispute.

It therefore was clearly within the district court’s power

to enter the Decree.

The Companies wanted the district court to do more

than test whether the Decree complied with the purpose

of the Act. The Companies in effect wanted the district

court to circumscribe EPA’s discretion to implement the

CWA by stating that EPA could not enter into this De-

cree to settle a lawsuit attacking EPA’s actions under the

Act. If the court had done so, the practical effect would

have been to limit EPA’s discretion to move forward with

its preferred CWA toxic regulation program, which the

Decree promoted and protected. We believe the court’s

role should be more restrained.”

11 It would be especially unfortunate if a lack of judicial restraint

stified the evolution of less adversarial approaches to developing

3 = >). r

28a

III.

The Companies’ second contention is that the Decree

impermissibly infringes on EPA’s discretion by dictating

the approach to be taken by the Agency in promulgating

regulations under the CWA. They claim that “the estab-

lishment of criteria and the development of programs

within the confines of its regulatory obligations are funda-

mental aspects of the Agency’s discretion under the Act.

In the absence of the Decree, EPA could in the exercise

of this discretion choose whether or not to establish the

criteria and programs which the Decree mandates.”

Reply Br. for Appellants at 21.

The Companies rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s

decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519

(1978), as support for their argument. In particular,

they cite the following passage as evidence that a court

has no power to specify the procedures to be utilized by

an agency: “The court should . . . not stray beyond the

judicial province to explore the procedural format or to

impose upon the agency its own notion of which proce-

dures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, un-

defined public good.” Id. at 549. The Companies argue

that both the Supreme Court and this court have re-

peatedly emphasized their intention to prohibit interfer-

ence by the judiciary with procedural matters committed

by statute to an agency’s discretion. See, e. g., Steadman

v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981); Chrysler Corp v.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979); Sierra Club v.

Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural

regulations. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure

for Malaise, 71 Geo. LJ. 1 (1982) (describing the costs and fre-

plemental procedure); see also Note, Rethinking Regulation: Ne-

gotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 Harv. L.

Rev. 1871 (1981). -

24a

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,

711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

EPA and NRDC advance the same reasons for affirm-

ing the district court’s decision that were relied on by the

district court itself. Conceding that the decree infringes

to some extent on EPA’s discretion under the CWA, they

contend that on the facts of this case the level of in-

fringement is permissible. First, they assert that the

Decree, far from prescribing any substantive outcome,

merely sets forth procedures designed to remedy the

Agency’s prior allegedly unlawful actions. Second, they

argue that EPA was a “prime formulator” of the Decree

and that its judgment is entitled to great deference.

Finally, they stress that Congress implicitly determined,

by means of the 1977 Amendments to the Act, that the

limits placed by the Decree on EPA's discretion were

appropriate.

We begin by noting that the infringement of agency

discretion issue normally arises in the context of a judi-

cial order disposing of a case on its merits.” The issue is

framed somewhat differently here because the Decree was

entered by the district court with EPA’s consent. It may

well be, as the Companies argue, that “a court has a duty

to determine that any consent judgment rendered is

within the bounds of its judicial power, notwithstanding

However, in a recent case this Court identified the issue in a

different context, that of a pretrial stipulation staying the proceed-

ings. National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 301

(D.C. Cir. 1981), a decision which features prominently in the ap-

25a

the parties’ consent.” Br. for Appellants at 40. Neverthe-

less, as the discussion in Part II above indicates, a court

fulfills its responsibility in this respect simply by deter-

mining that the settlement is consistent with the statute

the consent judgment is to enforce and fairly and reason-

ably resolves the controversy in a manner consistent with

the public interest. Thus, the Companies’ claim that a

court does not have power to fashion consent decrees

based upon its perception of the public interest misses

the point. The Decree here was largely the work of EPA

and the other parties to these suits, not the district

court; manifestly, the requirements imposed by the De-

cree do not represent judicial intrusion into the Agency’s

affairs to the same extent they would if the Decree were

“a creature of judicial cloth.” Weinberger v. Catholic

Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139,

141 (1981).

For this reason, the district court’s decision to enter

the Decree does not run afoul of the holding in Vermont

Yankee. As we stated in Association of National Adver-

tisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 619 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1979):

The Court [in Vermont Yankee] held that absent

extraordinary circumstances the federal courts can-

not upset the products of agency rulemaking on the

ground that the agency abused its discretion in fail-

ing to provide procedures that the courts rather than

Congress or the agency believed necessary. Thus the

case restricts the ability of courts to refashion nor-

ma] rulemaking procedures with judicially-conceived

notions of administrative fair play.

In Vermont Yankee it was undisputed that the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission had fully complied with the pro-

cedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure

Act. The issue was whether a court could order that

agency to afford more procedural rights to license appli-

cants than the APA provided. Here, by contrast, EPA

failed to comply with the statutory directive that the

Agency promulgate various regulations. The ultimate

26a

issue raised by NRDC’s suit, therefore, was what action

EPA should be required to take in order to correct that

deficiency. Since the solution arrived at was to a consid-

erable extent the work of the Agency itself, and since the

district court’s role was confined to approving the fair-

ness of the consent decree which incorporates it and en-

suring the consistency of the Decree with the Act, Ver-

mont Yankee’s concern for “judicially-conceived notions

of administrative fair play” is inapposite here.

None of the other cases cited by the Companies satisfy

us that the Decree impermissibly infringes on the EPA

Administrator’s statutory discretion. First, none of them

involve consent decrees. Second, they do not support the

Companies’ position in this case. For example, our state-

ment in Public Service Commission of New York v. Fed-

eral Power Commission, 543 F.2d 757, 833 n.42 (D.C.

Cir. 1974), that “a court may not compel an administra-

tive agency to pursue a particular course of action when

another is open to it” is quoted out of context by the

Companies. As a reading of the rest of the opinion makes

clear, “a particular course of action” refers to the

agency’s final decision on the merits of the question be-

fore it. See Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power

Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) (holding that this Court had

“usurped an administrative function” in deciding that a

license should be issued by the FPC without the conditions

attached to it by the agency). The Decree here does not

prescribe the content of the regulations that EPA must

promulgate. Nor does the Decree direct the Agency to

enforce the regulations in any particular way.

In National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United

States Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we

27a

sonable.“ The court's error lay in its failure to recognize

the Postal Service’s broad discretion over “internal man-

agement matters.” Id. at 432. In Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.

1975), another case involving the federal government’s

efforts to curb water pollution, we reversed in part a dis-

trict court order requiring EPA to publish by a fixed

date all effluent limitations guidelines mandated by the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (1) (A). We held that the

district court had erred in setting a deadline for publi-

cation of guidelines covering categories of “point sources”

not listed in the statute, as Congress had clearly intended

to leave such matters to the Agency’s discretion. Here

We are reviewing an order approving a settlement agree-

ment that EPA voluntarily entered into, rather than an

order requiring EPA to take action against its will.

Hence our admonition in Train concerning the limits of

a court’s role in effectuating regulatory legislation“ is

not applicable. Indeed, in this case the Companies want

the court to narrow EPA’s discretion to settle litigation

in a manner that permits EPA to implement the CWA

through EPA’s preferred approach.

Our decision in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159

(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) supports the district court’s

holding. In Adams we affirmed a district court order re-

quiring the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

to take various steps to end segregation in public schools

pursuant to Title VI. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged

that HEW had adopted a general policy of seeking volun-

tary compliance with the statute which amounted to an

abdication of its statutory duty. In its appeal, HEW con-

18 “Where there has been no violation of a statutory duty, we

think the proper course is to confine ourselves to a declaration of

the intent of Congress and to give the Administrator latitude to

exercise his discretion in shaping the implementation of the Act.”

610 F.2d at 711-12.

28a

tended that “although enforcement is required, the means

of enforcement is a matter of absolute agency discretion

... Id. at 1162. We rejected this argument and con-

cluded that, in light of the unequivocal duty imposed on

the agency by Title VI, the district court acted properly

in directing it to pursue an affirmative enforcement pol-

icy. We think our observation in Adams v. Richardson,

to which we recently referred in Adams v. Bell, No.

81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24, 9 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 1983) (en

banc) is equally applicable to this case: [Ol ur purpose,

and the purpose of the District Court order as we under-

stand it, is not to resolve particular questions of compli-

ance or noncompliance. It is, rather, to assure that the

agency properly construes its statutory obligations, and

that the policies it adopts and implements are consistent

with those duties and not a negation of them.” 480 F.2d

at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted).

Finally, we think that the argument, advanced by EPA

and NRDC, that Congress implicitly sanctioned the lim-

ited infringement on the Agency’s discretion which the

Decree entails is well taken. As set out in our prior

opinion, 636 F.2d at 1238-45, the legislative history of

the 1977 Amendments contains numerous references to

the Decree which suggest that “Congress expected the

settlement agreement to continue in effect.” Id. at 1244.

We pause to emphasize just one of many: Senator Mus-

kie, chairman of the Senate subcommittee that reviewed

14 We also noted in Adams v. Richardson that [f lar from dictat-

ing the final result with regard to any of these [school] districts,

the order merely requires initiation of a process which, excepting

contemptuous conduct, will then pass beyond the District Court’s

continuing control and supervision.” 480 F.2d at 1168 n.5, quoted

in Adams v. Bell, No. 81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24 (D. C. Cir. June 10,

1988) (en banc). The same may be said of the Decree in this case:

it requires EPA to begin the process of formulating regulations in

compliance with the Act and describes a methodology to be followed

by the Agency, but it leaves the outcome of the process (the sub-

stantive regulations) to the Agency’s discretion.

29a

EPA’s implementation of the Act and floor manager of

the Conference Report in the Senate, explained to his col-

leagues that [t] he conference agreement was specifically

designed to codify the so-called ‘Flannery decision,’ [a

consent decree that] ... EPA has been implementing.”

123 Cong. Rec. 39, 181 (1977), quoted in Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 686 F.2d at 1243.

Had Congress felt that the Decree infringed too much on

the discretion it had given EPA’s Administrator, that

sentiment would likely have appeared in the legislative

history. The Companies cannot identify any evidence of

it, and all we have found is evidence to the contrary.

The May 7, 1982 Order

The Companies also appeal from part of the district

court’s order of May 7, 1982, denying EPA’s cross-motion

to modify the Decree in certain respects. EPA itself does

not. appeal from that decision. The Companies’ argu-

ments with respect to this order are similar to the ones

they make with respect to the first order. In essence,

they contend that the district court erred in declining to

exclude from the Decree those provisions which the Com-

panies deem “non-statutory.” For the reasons stated

above in our review of the February 5 order, we find no

error in the district court’s order of May 7, 1982.

We note in passing that the Companies’ concern that

the district court has imposed a “high hurdle to modifi-

cation of the Decree,” Br. for Appellants at 56, appears

misplaced. The district court’s own assessment of the

flexibility with which it has administered the Decree, 16

Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2089, is borne out by the

record. For example, while this appeal was pending, the

district court twice considered Rule 60(b) motions by

EPA and NRDC to extend certain deadlines for the

promulgation of regulations and for compliance by the

Companies therewith, and in each case decided to grant

the motion. See note 6 supra.

30a

CONCLUSION

The settlement agreement between EPA and NRDC

does not impermissibly infringe on the EPA Administra-

tor’s discretion under the Clean Water Act. Therefore,

the district court properly entered the Decree and its

orders denying the motions to vacate, revise, or modify

the Decree are affirmed.

31

WILKEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This case comes

before this Court again on one issue: does the consent

decree impermissibly restrict the discretion of the Ad-

ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency?

I conclude that it does, and so would modify the decree

“to restore the agency’s discretion.

I. THE Lntrrs IMPOSED ON THE

ADMINISTRATOR’S DISCRETION

The consent decree at issue in this case is a judicial

act.“ It is not a contractual settlement agreement? or

a tentative projection of agency policy. The court shaped

it, scrutinizing and even altering its terms.* The court

will be called upon to enforce it, should the agency have

a change of heart.‘

1 Pope v. United States, 823 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); United States v.

Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1982).

2 This court has already faced a case which raised similar issues

in a contractual context. See National Audubon Society, Inc. v.

Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although the court in that

In undertaking this, or any other, judicial act, the

court must heed the limits on the power of an Article

III court.“ The court’s power to adopt a consent decree

is limited by the terms of the statute it seeks to enforce.*

The court cannot prescribe rules of procedure to an ad-

ministrative agency,’ nor may it enlarge upon the stat-

ute’s substantive requirements.* In short, the court can

only enter as a consent decree such relief as would have

been within its jurisdictional power had the case gone to

trial.“

The case law makes perfectly clear that one sort of

judicial relief commanding the Executive Branch to

exercise its administrative discretion in a particular

way—exceeds the reach of the federal court. Case after

federal case has established that federal courts may not

tell the Executive or Legislative Branches how to exer-

cise their diseretion.“ As one court has explained the

doctrine :

5 System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652-58

(1961).

Id.

1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 U.S. 519

(1978).

® National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United States

Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arling-

ton Heights, 469 F.Supp. 836, 865 (N. D. III. 1979), af d, 616 F.2d

1006 (7th Cir. 1980).

1 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 US.

228, 227-28 (1980) (a reviewing court “cannot ‘interject itself

within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the

action to be taken.); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 881-84 (1976) (setting aside court order ro-

r oho ade cae

Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1962) (reversing court order which modified

This self-imposed limitation on judicial power stems

from the doctrine of separation of powers; courts

cannot invade the jurisdiction of the other depart-

ments of government in matters of policy, and for a

court to substitute its judgment or discretion for

that of a member of the executive branch would

amount to such an invasion."

The consent decree at issue here cannot be recon-

ciled with this principle. All parties agree on the dis-

positive issue: the decree does restrict the discretion of

the Administrator of the EPA.“ The consent decree con-

strains the agency in two basic ways. It requires the

agency to apply criteria and standards not found in the

Clean Water Act, and it requires the agency to under-

take programs that are not required by the statute.

These constraints are not de minimis. This is obvious,

of course, from the fact that the legitimacy of these re-

straints is worth litigating. They impose duties on the

Administrator that differ in kind as well as in scope

from those duties imposed by the Act.

A. Paragraph 4(c)

Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, for example, re-

quires the agency to “identify and study” additional pol-

lutants to be subject to future pretreatment standards.”

The decree specifies with great particularity the meth-

ity in which FCC should consider license applications); National

Assoc. of Postal Supervisors v. United States Postal Service, 602

F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (setting aside court ordered pay in-

crease).

u Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 382 F.2d 38, 45

(8rd Cir. 1967).

1 Brief for Appellants at 16; Brief for Federal Appellees [here-

inafter EPA Brief) at 23; Brief for Appellees NRDC [herein-

after NRDC Brief) at 24.

Joint Appendix (JA) at 160.

34a

ods by which the Administrator must identify a list of

pollutants that are “candidates for national regulation,”

the grounds upon which he may then remove pollutants

from this list of “candidates,” and then concludes by

requiring the Administrator to “undertake regulatory

action for those pollutants remaining on the list.”

The Clean Water Act, by way of contrast, requires no

such precisely delineated regulatory program. Section

307 (b) of the Act requires only that the EPA promul-

gate standards for incompatible pollutants within a speci-

fied time period after the enactment of the Federal Wa-

ter Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 and “from

time to time thereafter.” "*

B. Paragraph 8

Paragraph 8 of the decree similarly sets forth require-

ments and criteria for removing substances from the list

of toxic pollutants."* The statutory provision “ requires

the EPA to take into account “toxicity of the pollutant,

its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential pres-

ence of the organisms in any waters, the importance of

the affected organisms, and the nature and effect of the

toxic pollutant on such organisms.” So long as the Ad-

ministrator does not act arbitrarily and capriciously, the

court cannot vacate his decision. Even if his action is

“arbitrary and capricious,” the court’s power is limited

by statute to ordering a redetermination."

Paragraph 8 of the consent decree sets forth a differ-

ent set of criteria for the Administrator to follow. The

court decree replaces the “considerations” set forth by

the statute with specifically defined circumstances under

4 838 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (Supp. V 1981).

* JA at 161-1638.

1 83 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).

7 Id.

35a

which the Administrator may choose not to regulate

specific pollutants. The Administrator must regulate the

pollutants unless they fit within the alternative categories

decreed by the court.

C. Paragraph 12

Paragraph 12 requires the EPA to establish “a spe-

cific and substantial program” to determine if “more

stringent” effluent standards are necessary to protect

water quality.“ The decree defines the required program

with precision: the Administrator must identify navi-

gable waters which are seriously contaminated by toxic

pollutants, identify toxic pollutants for which more

stringent limitations may be necessary, and publish a

strategy for reducing or eliminating discharges of such

pollutants. No such program can be found anywhere in

the Act.”

In at least these provisions, the judicial decree imposes

duties on the Administrator which are not imposed by

the Act itself. The decree thus differs not in degree but

in kind from the decree the court might have issued if

the case had been tried. At most, the court could have

declared that the agency’s actions were inconsistent with

the statute; at most, the court could have required the

agency to perform those functions mandated by the

statute. In no circumstances could the court have obliged

the agency to take discretionary action which differed

from that required by the statute.

JA at 161-168.

9 JA at 164-165.

The agency argues that this paragraph is meant to

grate” Sections 302, 308 and 807(a) of the Clean Water Act.

for Federal Appellees at 23.

However, none of these provisions contains any requirements for

establishment of a program and publication of a strategy.

36a

The duties imposed by the court’s decree may not be

inconsistent with the Act; each action taken by the Ad-

ministrator under the decree might also conform with the

Act. But the Administrator’s discretion clearly is fet-

tered—under the Act alone, he could choose to switch to

another equally reasonable mode of compliance with the

Act; under the consent decree he may not swerve from his

judicially appointed course without risking contempt of

court charges.

II. THE “PERMISSIBILITY” OF LIMITING THE

ADMINISTRATOR'S DISCRETION

The court’s decree clearly intruded upon the province

of the executive. The court went far beyond merely deter-

mining whether the EPA has acted lawfully in imple

menting the Clean Water Act. It imposed a consent de-

cree consisting in large part of provisions which are

neither mandated by the Clean Water Act nor necessary

to ensure that the EPA performs its statutory duties.

The trial court and the appellees argue that these con-

straints on the agency are somehow “permissible.” ™

While some of the arguments advanced in this regard are

frivolous,” others raise serious constitutional and pru-

dential issues.“

21 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't

Rep. Cas. (BNA) 18838 (D.D.C.); EPA Brief at 32-89; NRDC

Brief at 21-88. The majority finds that the decree does not “im-

permissibly infringe” on the Administrator's discretion, Majority

Opinion at 80, but fails to specify whether it holds that the decree

does not infringe upon the Administrator's discretion at all—

Nothing in the concept of “executive discretion” gives an agency

87a

A. Process or Result

The majority argues that those cases forbidding courts

to intrude upon an agency’s discretion speak only to situa-

tions where the court would make “the agency’s final deci-

sion on the merits of the question before it.“ This claim

has two flaws. First, it is not supported by the case law.

The prior cases limiting a court’s power to intrude upon

an agency’s discretion dealt with issues as far removed

from “final determination on the merits” as the order in

which applications should be considered by the agency,”

and the agency’s method of gathering evidence.“

More subtly, the argument overstates the distinction

between “merits” and “procedural” determinations.

Where, as here, the “process” oriented decree requires the

creation of new programs the court’s decree always will

affect substantive agency actions. The consent decree com-

mits the EPA Administrator to certain choices—choices

as to priorities, choices as to methods, choices as to alloca-

tion of resources. Such choices are not free. By choosing

to follow the course of action outlined in the consent de-

cree, the EPA necessarily has incurred certain costs.

Some of those costs relate to the balancing of conflicting

goals—here, the EPA is committed to a certain level of

environmental protection, even though that level of pro-

concluded only that the 1977 amendments to the Act did not super-

sede the decree. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 686

F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980). We are content to accept the silence

of the Act on the validity of this decree for what it is—silence.

To the extent that the majority argues that Congress has im-

plicitly approved all consent decrees of this type, it fails to avoid

the underlying issue: whether either Congress or the courts can

delegate executive functions to the judicial branch without violating

separation of powers principles.

„Majority Opinion at 26.

* FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184 (1940).

* FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 428 U.S. 326,

888 (1976).

38a

tection might ultimately generate uneconomic costs for the

public. Still other costs relate to the EPA’s allocation of

its own resources. By committing some of its all-too-

scarce resources to the programs mandated by the consent

decree, the EPA necessarily foregoes developing or en-

forcing other priorities.

The court, by confining the Administrator’s discretion,

thus involves itself—subtly but nonetheless inevitably—

in issues of agency policy. The EPA, in its unsuccessful

bid to be released from the strictures of the decree, made

much the same argument to an unsympathetic district

court: “Extra obligations not required by statute neces-

sarily infringe on EPA’s ability to allocate its limited

resources in the way it finds best. As the Supreme

Court’s experience with the “outcome determinative” test

in the context of applying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-

kins * goes to show, the line between those acts that de-

cide the merits and those that do not is one the existence

of which can be postulated, but not proved.

B. The Administrator's Consent

A more superficially appealing argument claims that

the agreement does not intrude upon the Administrator’s

discretion because he has agreed to its terms.” But,

a decree of this type binds not only those present Adminis-

trators who may welcome it, but also their successors who

may vehemently oppose it. For reasons that ultimately

have to do with preserving the democratic nature of our

Republic, American courts have never allowed an agency

A at 319.

8304 U.S. 88 (1988). For a general discussion of the waxing

and waning of the “outcome determinative” test between Guaranty

Trust of New York v. York, 826 U.S. 99 (1945) and Hanna v.

Plumer, 880 U.S. 460 (1965), see C. Waicnt, A. Mum & E.

Coorem, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PmocepuRE: JURISDICTION § 4504

(1982).

Majority Opinion at 25.

ee.

8 nas

39a

chief to bind his successor in the exercise of his discre-

tion.” Today’s majority decision effectively undercuts that

line of authority by allowing an Administrator to waive

his successor’s power of discretion—so long as a court is

willing to play accomplice.

C. The Equitable Powers of the Federal Courts

The most profoundly troubling of the arguments for the

consent decree holds that the court may, as an exercise of

its equity powers, take virtually any remedial action it

chooses.“ Only a rough equity balancing of all the facts of

the case would tell whether the court’s order was a “per-

missible” extension of its equity jurisdiction. Here, the

argument goes, the court’s action was justified as a prac-

tical way to resolve vexatious litigation.

This argument fails here for two reasons. First, appel-

lees err in contending that the equity power of the federal

courts knows no bounds but necessity.“ Appellees cor-

rectly note that in many cases federal courts have exer-

cised broad remedial powers in correcting Constitutional

violations. Courts have used their equitable powers to as-

See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206

(1980) (agency position on whether certain children were entitled

to interest payments from a statutorily created fund); West v.

Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929) (agency determination as

to whether land contained minerals). See also National Audubon

Society, ine. ©. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 805 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

40a

sume administrative and legislative roles, supervising in

a highly active and intrusive manner prisons, school sys-

tems, mental hospitals and electoral apportionment.”

In those cases, however the court invariably acts

against state governments or individual citizens. Those

decisions in which the court seizes the broadest powers are

also those in which it declares that the doctrine of separa-

tion of powers does not apply “vertically” when courts act

under the Supremacy Clause.“ In the case at issue, the

court acts against a coordinate and co-equal branch of

government. The court cannot take refuge in the Su-

premacy Clause. The court must face head-on the separa-

tion of powers issue.

The court’s infringement on the agency’s discretion

resolves that issue. The court here acts as an Administra-

tor. It acts without any statutory or constitutional man-

date; the contested provisions of the decree admittedly

exceed what could be required by the statute. To permit

the court’s equity powers to extend so far would abolish

the principle of separation of powers.

The argument also fails because even if the court’s

equity power might conceivably support the decree at

* See, ¢.g., James v. Wallace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),

aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559

F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 915, judgment

reversed in part, Alabama v. Pugh, 498 U.S. 781 (1978); United

States v. Jefferson County Board of Bducation, 872 F.2d 836 (5th

Cir. 1969), modified per curiam on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d

885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 840 (1967). See generally,

Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies

and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yate LJ. 685 (1982); Diver, The

Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change

in Public Institutions, 66 Va. I. Rev. 48 (1979).

rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 847, 852 (1976) (“[T)he separation-

of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no

applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States.)

See generally, Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Fed-

eral Equitable Remedies, 80 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978).

4la

issue, the court still should ask whether its exercise of

power is prudent. In this case of first impression, that

prudential inquiry must necessarily ask whether this new

device for agency administration will prove wise over

time. A look at this procedural innovation suffices to show

that government by consent decree is not only unconstitu-

tional but unwise.

First, any legitimate purpose served by the decree could

have been accomplished by other means. The agency did

not need a consent decree in order to take the actions

mandated by the decree. Since those actions were within

its discretion it could have pursued a course of action

precisely identical to that called for by the court order.

Nor did the agency need a consent decree to lend some

stability to its position. The agency could have, by under-

taking proper notice and comment rulemaking, issued the

substance of the consent decree as regulations.“ Such a

course of action would give all parties affected by the pro-

posed programs a chance to be heard, as well as bind the

agency not to change course “arbitrarily and capri-

cicusly.” *

The flaws with government by consent decree run

deeper than the superfluity of the device. The device in-

vites abuse—intentional or unintentional. Today’s action

may seem desirable to some because it requires a some-

times recalcitrant agency operating under a relatively

42a

mum of regulation “ or which enable regulated industries

to evade prosecution. Nor is the device limited to the

EPA. Under the typical broad and imprecise administra-

tive statute, almost any agency action would pass the

majority’s vague test that the decree somehow be “con-

sistent” with the law. An inattentive or unprincipled

court could thus bind successive administrations to a non-

statutory, limiting “process” of regulatory action.

The abuses to which this device can be put are limited

only by the almost inexhaustible imaginations of liti-

gants. The same sorts of “procedural” agreements that

the majority finds so innocuous could be used to limit the

manner in which an agency goes about seeking evidence

or to constrain the investigative practices of federal agen-

cies. EPA and OSHA, for example, could consent not to

conduct on site inspections without first rendering 60

days notice. Such a “procedural” agreement would be

fully acceptable under the majority’s approach; in prac-

tice, it would limit the effectiveness of the agencies.

The greatest evil of government by consent decree,

however, comes from its potential to freeze the regula-

tory processes of representative democracy. At best, even

with the most principled and fair-minded courts, the de-

vice adds friction.

wee. Se eae Se eS ae ee

48a

rule would. An agency can abandon a rule so long as the

change in policy is not arbitrary and capricious;* an

agency cannot escape a consent decree without the active

participation and approval of the court.

The commitment that occurs through a consent decree

takes place, however, without recourse to the public notice

requirements of notice and comment rulemaking. Those

third parties who wish to know of such consent decrees

would be faced with the nearly impossible task of moni-

toring all of the nation’s district courts. Even then, if

the filing of the suit and the consent decree coincide

closely in time, notice would amount only to learning that

the binding decree is a fait accompli.

Second, government by consent decree inhibits Con-

gressional influence on agency policy. No longer could an

agency freely and voluntarily respond to Congressional

concerns; action would be impossible without prior ap-

proval of the court. The informal give-and-take between

Congress and the agencies that characterizes modern ad-

ministrative practice would be squeezed out by the court’s

assumption of control.

Third, Executive Branch control over agency policy

would be hindered. So long as a consent decree remained

in force, no new policy spurred by a change in adminis-

trations (or prompted by a desire to avoid a change in

administrations) could take effect without the prior

blessing of the court. Conversely, the consent decree pro-

vides the executive with a vehicle for avoiding respon-

sibility for its programs.

This weakening of democratic control over agency pol-

icy accompanies an increase in the power of two non-

democratic groups. Government by consent decree en-

shrines at its very center those special interest groups

who are party to the decree. They stand in a strong tac-

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-

tual Automobile Insurance Co., 108 8. Ct. 2856, 2865 (1988).

44a

tical position to oppose changing the decree, and so likely

will enjoy material influence on proposed changes in

agency policy.

Standing guard over the whole process is the court, the

one branch of our government which is by design least

responsive to democratic pressures and least fit to accom-

modate the many and varied interests affected by the

decree. The court can neither effectively negotiate with

all the parties affected by the decree, nor ably balance

the political and technological trade-offs involved. Even

the best-intentioned and most vigilant court will prove

institutionally incompetent to oversee an agency’s discre-

tionary actions.

As a policy device, then, government by consent decree

serves no necessary end. It opens the door to unforesee-

able mischief; it degrades the institutions of representa-

tive democracy and augments the power of special inter-

est groups. it does all of this in a society that hardly

needs new devices that emasculate representative democ-

racy and strengthen the power of special interests.

I see no need and no warrant for countenancing this

raid on the powers of the Executive Branch. I respect-

fully dissent.

45a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 79-1473

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

a Nonprofit New York Corporation, et al.

V.

DOUGLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,

Appellants

No. 79-1474

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.

V.

DouGLAS M. CosTLe, as Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,

Appellants

No. 79-1475

NATURAL Resources Derense CouNcIL, INC.

V.

Jau I. Aczz, as Assistant Administrator

for Water and Hazardous Materials,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et ul.,

Appellants

No. 79-1476

CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT AND

DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK

*

DoucLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Actions Nos. 75-0172, 2153-78,

75-1267, and 75-1698)

Argued March 25, 1980

Decided September 16, 1980

Richard E. Schwartz, with whom Thomas L. Anderson

was on the brief, for appellant American Iron and Steel

Institute.

Charles F. Lettow for appellants Firestone Tire and

Rubber Company et al.

Douglas E. Kliever and Mary W. Ennis were on the

brief for appellants Union Carbide Corporation et al.

Jacqueline M. Warren entered an appearance for ap-

pellees Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. et al.

James T. Banks, with whom Ronald J. Wileon was on

47a

Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, and Jacques B.

Gelin and Michael A. McCord, Attorneys, Department of

Justice, were on the brief, for appellee Environmental

Protection Agency. E. J. Shawaker, Attorney, Depart-

ment of Justice, and Richard G. Stoll, Attorney, Environ-

mental Protection Agency, also entered appearances for

appellee Environmental! Protection Agency.

Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and SwyGEerRT* and

ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge WRIGHT.

WricuT, Chief Judge: A group of companies in the

chemical, petroleum, rubber, and steel industries and an

industry association? (collectively “the Companies”) ap-

peal from a District Court order denying their motion to

vacate a settlement agreement (the Agreement) pre-

viously adopted by the court,’ and granting a motion for

modification of the settlement agreement filed by the

signatories to the Agreement—five environmental groups

and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or

Agency). Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Costle, 12 ERC 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). The Companies

contend that the settlement agreement must be vacated

both because it has been superseded by legislation en-

*Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1976).

1 The companies are Union Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow

Chemical Co., E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Celanese Co., Olin

Corp., Monsanto Corp., Exxon Corp., Shell Oil Co., Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co., and B. F. Goodrich Co.

* The American Iron and Stee Institute.

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. b. Train, 8 ERC 2120

(D. D.C. 1976).

by because each of the law-

ts that were resolved by the Agreement is now moot

and must be dismissed. The Companies further contend

that in proposing the modifications to the settlement

agreement approved by the District Court EPA violated

rulemaking and public participation requirements of the

Administrative Procedure Act, the Clean Water Act, and

its own regulations, as well as requirements of consti-

tutional due process.

I.

Between 1978 and 1975 five environmental groups (col-

lectively “NRDC”) brought four separate lawsuits against

EPA to rectify the Agency’s alleged failure to imple

ment several provisions of the statute then known as the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 33

U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (1976). The first lawsuit chal-

lenged the criteria EPA was using to decide which pol-

lutants to include in a list of toxic pollutants the Agency

was required to compile by Section 307(a) of the

FWPCA, and also sought to expand EPA’s then existing

list of toxic pollutants (the toxic criteria case)“ The

second and third lawsuits were aimed at compelling EPA

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1972.

Pub. L. No. 92-600. As amended in 1977 the statute is now referred

to as the Clean Water Act. Pub. L. No. 96-217.

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action

No. 2158-78 (D. D.C.). Section 307 (a) of the FWPCA then pro-

vided in pertinent part:

49a

to promulgate effluent discharge standards for the sub-

stances already on the Agency’s list of toxic pollutants

(the deadlines cases)“ The fourth lawsuit sought an

order requiring EPA to promulgate pretreatment stand-

ards under Section 307 (b) of the FWPCA covering

approximately 35 industries and a wide variety of pol-

lutants (the pretreatment case)“

While these lawsuits were pending EPA officials con-

ducted a thorough review of the Agency’s strategy for

controlling toxic pollutant emissions. They concluded that

there was a need to replace the Agency’s then existing

approach with a new strategy calling for an integrated

program for controlling toxic pollutants. Furthermore,

EPA officials felt that development of the new approach

could provide a basis for resolving the controversies be-

tween the environmental groups and the Agency.’ After

the general outlines of the new program were developed

* Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action No.

76-0172 (D.D.C.), and Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc. v.

Train, Civil Action No. 75-1698 (D.D.C.). Under the statutory

when comments on the proposed standards revealed major flaws in

the Agency's analysis. See R. Hall, The Evolution and Imple-

mentation of EPA's Regulatory Program to Control the Discharge

of Torte Pollutants, 10 Nat. Rus. Law 607, 614-615 (1977).

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. . Agee, Civil Action

No. 76-1267 (D.D.C.). Under § 807 (b) of the FWPCA, EPA was

required to publish within nine months of October 18, 1972 “pro-

posed regulations establishing pretreatment standards for intro-

duction of pollutants into treatment works * * * which are publicly

owned for those pollutants which are determined not to be suscep-

tible to treatment by * * * or which would interfere with the

operation of such treatment works.” 88 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1)

(1976). Final pretreatment standards were to be promulgated

within 90 days of publishing proposed standards. /d.

* See BR. Hall, supra note 7, at 615-619.

50a

EPA and NRDC, joined by four industry intervenors in

one of the lawsuits,” began settlement negotiations. After

tentative agreement was reached between EPA and

NRDC a proposed settlement agreement was submitted

to the District Court." The District Court held several

hearings on the proposed agreement and allowed in-

terested parties to file comments on it. The Companies

intervened in the proceedings in the District Court and

filed comments vigorously opposing the proposed agree-

ment.” After requiring several modifications the District

Court approved the settlement agreement, finding it a

“just, fair, and equitable resolution of the issues raised.”

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 ERC

2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from

the court’s order adopting the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement outlined a comprehensive

strategy for regulation of toxic pollutant discharges under

the FWPCA, including details concerning the timing,

scope, and nature of the regulatory programs EPA

agreed to initiate. Insofar as is relevant to the instant

case, EPA proposed to regulate discharge of toxic pol-

lutants by developing effluent limitations, guidelines, and

% The American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petro-

leum Institute and member companies, the National Coal Associa-

5la

performance standards for new and existing emission

sources, as well as pretreatment standards regulating in-

troduction of pollutants into treatment works. These

limitations, guidelines, and standards were to cover 21

major industries and 65 specified pollutants or groups of

pollutants. In promulgating effluent limitations and

guidelines EPA agreed that it would employ technology-

based controls such as “best available technology” (BAT)

performance standards for existing emission sources, and

performance standards reflecting the “best available

demonstrated control technology” (BADCT) for new

sources.“ The pretreatment standards EPA undertook to

promulgate were to apply to any of the 65 pollutants

listed in the Agreement and any other pollutants that

proved to be “incompatible” with “publicly owned treat-

ment works” (POTWs).” Promulgation of the regula-

tions envisaged by the Agreement was to take place

according to a phased schedule running through Decem-

ber 31, 1979 and compliance with the regulations by

affected industries was to be achieved by June 30,

19838."*

% In addition to the technology-based program, NRDC insisted

on a provision in the agreement requiring EPA to promulgate

health-based standards for six highly toxic pollutants. See Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 8, 8 ERC at

2128-2129.

18 Pretreatment standards are similar to BAT effluent limitations,

BADCT performance standards, and other controls prescribed by

the statute in that they are “technology-based.” They differ from

these other controls principally in that they regulate “indirect” dis-

charges into sewers leading into municipal treatment plants rather

than “direct” discharges into receiving waters. The term “incom-

patible” was taken from the language of 807 (b), 33 U.S.C.

§1817(b) (1976).

1% The prescribed schedule for promulgation of regulations di-

vided the 21 industries covered into five groups. Final regulations

for the first two groups were to be promulgated by March 81, 1979,

for the third group by June 30, 1979, for the fourth group by

September 80, 1979, and for the final group by December $1, 1979.

See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 620.

52a

Adoption of the industry-by-industry, technology-based

approach, using statutory authority conferred by various

sections of the FWPCA," marked a change in EPA’s

regulatory strategy. Its previous efforts to control dis-

charge of toxic pollutants had relied on authority con-

ferred by Section 307 of the FWPCA in developing health-

based standards on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis.“ The

new strategy offered substantial advantages over the old.

First, it allowed EPA to cover far more substances and

emission sources than could have been handled under the

old approach.” Second, it allowed the Agency to develop

a single regulatory package which would apply to all of

the problem pollutants in the dis sarge of a particular in-

dustry, enabling the industry to predict the entire cost

of pollution control.” Third, the Agency could allow con-

siderations of cost and technology to enter into its

decisionmaking and industry was allowed a longer com-

pliance period.“ Finally, EPA also expected that the new

program would be easier to administer.”

After the Agreement was adopted by the District Court

Congress began a review of the FWPCA and EPA’s

progress toward implementing its provisions. Commit-

tees of both Houses of Congress held hearings at which

* The new regulatory prograsi relied on authority conferred by

801, 304, 306, and 3807 (b) & (e) of the FWPCA, 838 U.S.C.

$§ 1811, 1814, 1816, 1817(b) & (e) (1976).

18 See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 5616-517.

Id.

58a

various difficulties EPA was experiencing under the then

existing statutory scheme were discussed and the new

regulatory framework and strategy established by the

settlement agreement was explored. In testimony before

the congressional committees NRDC’s representatives

emphasized that the Agreement was working well,“ and

EPA’s spokesman, while acknowledging that the Agency

was having trouble meeting the deadlines set by the

Agreement, strongly supported the Agreement. The

outcome of these hearings was the enactment in December

1977 of several amendments to the FWPCA which was

renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA).* We shall dis-

cuss the nature and importance of those provisions of the

1977 Amendments that are pertinent to this case later.

At this point we simply note that the Companies and

NRDC disagree about the effect of the 1977 Amendments

on the settlement agreement.”

* See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1977: Hearings on Amendments to Pub. L. No. 95-200

before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate

Committee on Environment and Public Works, Serial No. 96-H26,

Part 9, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977) (hereinafter “Senate Hear-

ings”); Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and

Review of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-

tion, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 96-32 (Comm. Pr. 1977) (hereinafter

“House Hearings”).

* See Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 71 (testimony of James

T. Banks); House Hearings, supra note 28, at 621 (statement of

James T. Banks and Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr.).

54a

Meanwhile, NRDC’s monitoring of EPA’s implementa-

tion of the Agreement’s provisions convinced it that the

Agency would not meet any of the deadlines for propos-

ing and promulgating regulations.“ Accordingly, on

September 26, 1978 NRDC moved for an order to show

cause why EPA should not be held in contempt of

the District Court’s order approving the settlement agree-

ment.” EPA responded on October 20, 1978 with a

motion to amend the Agreement to extend the deadlines

for promulgating regulations, to allow the Agency addi-

tional discretion to exclude certain pollutants and indus-

try categories from regulation, and to extend the dead-

line for compliance with the guidelines to June 30, 1984.”

In its accompanying opposition to NRDC’s motion EPA

explained why it had not been able to meet the original

deadlines specified by the Agreement. Also on October

20, 1978 the Companies filed a motion to vacate the settle-

ment agreement, arguing that Congress had intended the

1977 Amendments which produced the CWA to supplant

the settlement agreement, that the Agreement was in

conflict with the congressional program, and that con-

tinuation of the settlement agreement would inevitably

involve the court in questions of analytical chemistry.”

On October 30, 1978 NRDC served detailed interroga-

tories and requests for documents on EPA. Thereafter,

NRDC and EPA began discussions on a possible settle

ment of the controversy. On November 28, 1978 EPA

officials met with representatives of the Companies to

ing program that EPA had been implementing under the old statute

for nearly two years.” Brief for appellee NRDC at 34 (emphasis

in original).

™* See affidavit of James T. Banks in support of NRDC’s motion

c

* See Supp. App. 105.

* See Supp. App. 182.

* See Supp. App. 187.

55a

announce that a tentative agreement with NRDC had

been reached, and to distribute copies of a proposed joint

motion to modify the settlement agreement that EPA and

NRDC had agreed to. The Companies were given ten

days in which to submit written comments on the pro-

posal. NRDC and EPA considered the suggestions made

in the Companies’ comments and made some changes in

the proposed modifications to reflect these suggestions.“

EPA and NRDC filed their joint motion to modify the

settlement agreement on December 15, 1978.% At the

same time they withdrew all their pleadings relating to

the motion for a show cause order.* The Companies,

however, declined to withdraw their motion to vacate the

settlement agreement. By agreement of the parties the

Companies were given until January 5, 1979 to file with

the court any response or objections to the proposed

modifications. The Companies filed a memorandum op-

posing the motion to modify the Agreement. In addition

to repeating their contention that the Agreement must

be vacated because it had been superseded by the 1977

Amendments, the Companies raised two new arguments.

First, they argued that the Agreement also must be

vacated because each of the four cases which underlie

the Agreement had been mooted by the Amendments and

must be dismissed. Second, they maintained that the pro-

posed modification would violate public notice and com-

ment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations, and an

Executive Order, as well as constitutional requirements

of due process. The District Court heard oral argument

on both motions and permitted additional briefs on the

new issues raised by the Companies. On March 9, 1979

the District Court issued its order denying the Com-

The Companies maintain that the comments did not result

in any substantive revision of the tentative agreement.

%3 See Supp. App. 201-210.

* See Supp. App. 198, 199.

a

*

D

*

56a

panies’ motion to vacate the settlement agreement and

granting NRDC’s and EPA’s motion to modify the

Agreement.

In its memorandum opinion accompanying the order

the District Court addressed each of the Companies’

arguments. First, it rejected the Companies’ claim that

Congress intended the 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA

to supplant the Agreement. The court concluded that

neither the terms of the Amendments nor the legislative

history support this claim. Instead, it found that Con-

gress intended the Agreement “to remain in effect to

supply the missing details of a cohesive strategy for con-

trolling toxic water pollution.” Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836.

Second, the court ruled that two of the four cases that

were resolved by the settlement agreement were not

moot, and that these two cases provided an adequate

basis for continuing the Agreement. Id. at 1837, 1838.

Finally, the court dismissed the Companies’ statutory

and constitutional objections to the modifications to the

settlement agreement proposed by NRDC and EPA. The

court found that the modifications were not “rules”

within the meaning of the APA for which notice and

comment were required, and that appellants’ constitu-

tional rights to effective notice were not violated because

the modifications would have no direct or immediate

effect on them. Jd. at 1838-1840. These appeals followed.

II.

On appeal the Companies raise essentially the same

three arguments that they presented to the District Court.

We will examine these arguments separately.

A. The Effect of the 1977 Amendments

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in

rejecting their claim that Congress intended the 1977

Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement. Ap-

57a

pellants maintain that these Amendments were a direct

response to the problems EPA had faced in attempting to

implement the provisions of the FWPCA, the same prob-

lems that were responsible for the shortcomings in the

Agency’s fulfillment of its statutory obligations that

NRDC’s lawsuits were aimed at rectifying. The Com-

panies point out that Congress devoted a significant

amount of time to studying these problems.“ The out-

come of this detailed review, appellants contend, was a

congressional acknowledgement that EPA’s failure to ac-

complish much in terms of realizing the objectives and

goals of the FWPCA was largely a result of deficiencies

in both substantive and procedural provisions of the Act.

Appellants argue that the toxic pollutant provisions of

the 1977 Amendments were designed to replace the un-

workable provisions of the FWPCA with a comprehen-

sive and workable statutory framework for regulation of

toxic pollutants that would eliminate the need for con-

tinued court supervisior of the toxic pollutants programs.

In particular, Congress abandoned the requirement that

EPA develop health-based standards regulating discharge

of toxic pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, sub-

stituting in its place an industry-by-industry, technology-

based BAT approach to controlling emission sources. In

addition, Congress resolved the controversy over how

many pollutants should be included in EPA’s list of

toxic pollutants by specifying 65 pollutants that had to

be included in the list and granting EPA’s Adminis-

trator authority to add pollutants to or delete them from

this list. While acknowledging that these two changes

merely adopted the regulatory framework established by

the settlement agreement, appellants point to other pro-

* Appellants note that both Houses of Congress held hearings

on these problems and the staff of the House Subcommittee on

Investigations and Review prepared a report on their investiga-

tions into the problems of the toxics programs for the House Com-

mittee on Public Works and Transportation. See House Memo-

randum, 128 Cong. Rec. H12929-H12982 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)..

58a

visions in the Amendments which they contend show

that Congress did more than merely ratify the settle

ment agreement.“ In appellants’ view, the breadth and

detail of these other changes demonstrate that Congress

“went beyond mere ratification of the [settlement agree-

2 Specifically, appellants point to the following amendments:

—Section 301(1) specifies that neither the economic capa-

bility (301 (e)) nor the water quality (301(g)) waiver of

effluent limitations is applicable to toxic pollutant limitations;

—Section 307 (a) (2) (1) authorizes EPA to establish effiu-

ent standards for toxic pollutants which are “more stringent”

than the BAT-level effluent guidelines, if the BAT guidelines

are not sufficient to protect the public health or the environ-

ment; (2) establishes the procedure EPA must follow in estab-

lishing the standards; and (3) establishes its own timetable

for promulgating such standards;

—Section 307 (b) (1) provides that a source discharging

into a publicly owned treatment works (POTW) may have

the stringency of its effluent limitations reduced to reflect

the ability of the POTW to remove some or all of a toxic

pollutant provided certain conditions are met;

—Section 811 authorizes EPA to regulate the plant-site

runoff, spillage, waste disposal and drainage associated with

the use of toxic (section 307(a)) or hazardous (section 311)

pollutants ;

—Section 307 (b) (2) (C) specifies that effluent guidelines for

all the toxic pollutants specified by Congress (the list of sixty-

five) must be promulgated by EPA not later than July 1, 1980;

—Section 801(b) (2) (C) specifies that discharges must com-

ply with the effluent guidelines promulgated for the pollutants

designated by Congress not later tha[n] July 1, 1984 * * *;

—Section 307 (b) (2) [sic] [§ 301 (b) (2) (D) ] specifies that

for pollutants which EPA adds to the new section 307 (a) list,

compliance with the toxic pollutant guidelines is required not

later than three years after such guidelines are established ;

Section 307 (a) provides that the Administrator of EPA

may add to or delete pollutants from the section 307(a) list,

and that his decision shall be final except upon a judicial deter-

mination that it was arbitrary and capricious.

Brief for appellants at 19-20.

59a

ment] and tinkering with its toxics program and instead

devised a comprehensive program to control the discharge

of toxic pollutants to replace the old section 307(a) and

the [Agreement].” *’

Appellants find further support for their view that

Congress intended the Amendments to supersede the

settlement agreement in the legislative history of the

Amendments. In this the Companies largely rely on a

statement made by Congressman Roberts while explain-

ing the toxic pollutant provisions of the House-Senate

Conference Report to his colleagues. Congressman Roberts

said:

In summary, the revisions to the toxics regulatory

program contained in the conference report

simplify the procedures for identifying toxic pollu-

tants and promulgating regulations according to

their characteristics. The discretion exercised by

the Administrator is broadened, the procedures less

formally structured, and burdens of proof modified

to the point where the program may proceed in a

more rapid and orderly fashion without further

recourse to the courts.

Crisis-by-crisis reaction to the problem of toxics

must no longer be the norm, but must be replaced

by an orderly program for adding compounds to the

list, with the Administrator fully in charge. It,

therefore, would be entirely appropriate for the

United States to petition the courts to relinquish

jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control under Pub-

lic Law 92-500, now that the statutory basis has

been laid for a workable regulatory program the

lack whereof led to the litigation resulting in the

consent decree. This is particularly appropriate in

view of the large number of potentially toxic chem-

icals to be addressed by the program and the need

* Brief for appellants at 21.

60a

for administrative discretion within the revised reg-

ulatory framework to carry out the provisions of law

enacted herein.

This is the intent of this legislation, an outgrowth

of House initiatives by the House conferees.

123 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).

Appellants maintain that Congressman Roberts’ views

must be given significant weight, pointing out that he

was chairman of the House Subcommittee that drafted

the Amendments, chairman of the House conferees, vice-

chairman of the House-Senate Conference Committee, and

floor manager of the Conference Report in the House.

Appellants suggest that Congressman Roberts’ statement

takes on added significance because the toxic pollutant

provisions of the Amendments were drafted by the Con-

ference Committee and the Conference Report is silent

on the issue of congressional intent.“

Claiming to have demonstrated that Congress intended

the 1977 Amendments ta supplant the settlement agree-

ment, appellants then note that courts have vacated set-

tlement agreements where an intervening Act of Congress

has changed the relevant law in such a manner as to

eliminate the right which the settlement agreement was

designed to safeguard. The Companies find illustrations

of the operation of this principle in two Supreme Court

cases, System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 US.

642 (1961), and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont

Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). In Wheeling

& Belmont Bridge the Court examined the effect of sub-

sequent legislation on an outstanding injunction. The

State of Pennsylvania had earlier obtained an injunc-

tion barring the company from constructing or maintain-

0 Appellants note that Senator Muskie, who was the floor man-

ager of the Conference Report in the Senate, was absent from the

House-Senate Conference due to illness. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819636

(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).

‘way

6la

ing a bridge across the Ohio River on the ground that

the bridge in question obstructed navigation in such a

manner as to be in conflict with certain Acts of Congress

regulating navigation. A subsequent statute declared the

bridge to be a lawful structure in its existing position

and elevation. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunc-

tion, pointing out that the later Act of Congress had

eliminated the public right the injunction had served to

protect by resolving the question whether the bridge was

an unlawful obstruction. In System Federation the Court

relied on Wheeling & Belmont Bridge in holding that a

District Court had abused its discretion in refusing to

modify a consent decree after an Act of Congress

changed the relevant law. The District Court had earlier

approved a consent decree resolving litigation brought by

non-union employees against a railroad and a number of

unions representing its employees. The plaintiffs had

charged the defendants with violating Section 2 of the

Railway Labor Act which forbade discrimination against

non-union employees. As part of the settlement agree-

ment the court enjoined the defendants from discrimi-

nating against non-union employees because of their re-

Court pointed out that “the District Court’s authority

to adopt the consent decree comes only from the statute

which the decree is intended to enforce” since [ilt was

the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties,

that the District Court served in entering the consent

decree.” System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364

U.S. at 651. The Court then noted that a “court must

when its provisions are amended” by “modify[ing] the

terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings

those

terms in conflict with statutory objectives.” Id.

62a

The Companies argue that since the terms and legisla-

tive history of the 1977 Amendments indicate that Con-

gress intended the toxic pollutant provisions of the

Amendments to supersede the framework established by

the settlement agreement, application of the settled

principles announced by the Supreme Court in Wheeling

& Belmont Bridge and System Federation requires that

the judgment of the District Court in the instant case

be reversed and the settlement agreement vacated.

The power of a District Court sitting as a court of

equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it

previously adopted cannot be drawn into question. See

System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at

642-647; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556

(1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106

(1932). The decision to grant or deny a request to

modify the terms of a consent decree rests with the dis-

cretion of the District Court. See System Federation No.

91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at 657; Chrysler Corp. v.

United States, supra, 316 U.S. at 562. However, sound

exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms of

a consent decree be modified when there has been a sig-

nificant change in the circumstances obtaining at the

time the consent decree was entered. This change in cir-

cumstances may result from a change in controlling law,

including changes brought about by subsequent legisla-

tion. See, e. g., System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,

supra; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,

supra; Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501

F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; McGrath v. Potash, 199

F.2d 166, 167-168 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Application of these

settled principles does not, however, provide a ready

answer to the case at bar. One of the issues we must

resolve is whether in fact Congress intended the 1977

Amendments to supplant the settlement agreement.

Our starting point, of course, is the language and pro-

visions of the Amendments. Clearly, the strongest evi-

68a

dence of a congressional intent to supersede the settle-

ment agreement would be an explicit declaration of such

an intention in the language of the Amendments. In the

instant case we do not understand appellants to be sug-

gesting that any such declaration of congressional intent

appears in the language of the 1977 Amendments. Nor

have we found any such statements. The silence of the

Amendments on the issue of Congress’ intent with regard

to the settlement agreement is not necessarily fatal to

appellants’ claim, however. As the District Court pointed

out,“ if a congressional intent to supplant the Agree-

ment is a “necessary implication” of the provisions of the

Amendments, we would have to find that appellants are

correct in arguing that the Agreement must be vacated.”

Alternatively, evidence of congressional intent may be

provided by clear statements in the legislative history.

After reviewing the changes made in the toxic pol-

lutant provisions of the FWPCA by the 1977 Amend-

ments, as well as the legislative history of the Amend-

ments, we are unable to accept appellants’ contention

that they show that Congress clearly intended the 1977

Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement.

First, this case does not present an instance of the type

of situation that confronted the Supreme Court in System

Federation and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge—a situation

in which there is a clear conflict between the terms of a

settlement agreement and the provisions of a subsequent

Act of Congress. As appellants concede,“ the two major

substantive changes in the toxic pollutant provisions of

0 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 ERC

1888, 1886 (D.D.C. 1979). *

% Thus in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642

(1961), the absence of an explicit declaration of congressional in-

tent to affect the terms of the injunction at issue in that case did

not prevent the Supreme Court from concluding that the District

Court should have amended its outstanding decree.

41 See brief for appellants at 18.

*

* e

— oo

.

64a

the FWPCA that were made by the 1977 Amendments

merely ratified the settlement agreement. Both Congress’

substitution of an industry-by-industry, technology-based

BAT approach for the pollutant-by-pollutant, health-

based approach required by Section 307 of the FWPCA,

and its decision to specify a list of 65 pollutants—the

same pollutants listed in the Agreement—that were to be

included in EPA’s revised list of toxic pollutants under

Section 307(a), amounted to little more than an “at-

tempt to conform the statute to the reality of [the] pro-

gram” EPA had been developing under the terms of the

settlement agreement. National Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836. See Hercules,

Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Only in two relatively minor aspects did the amended

statute depart from the framework established by the

settlement agreement. First, Section 307(a) of the Act

was amended to allow EPA’s Administrator to add to or

delete from the list of 65 toxic pollutants. Second, the

Agreement’s deadline for promulgation of BAT regula-

tions was extended to July 1, 1980.% These minor de-

partures from the terms of the settlement agreement can-

not be interpreted as evidence of a congressional rejec-

tion of the Agreement, or as signs of an intention to

supersede all its provisions. If instead of endorsing the

strategy and framework set out in the settlement agree-

ment the Amendments had required EPA to adopt a

different regulatory approach, we might be inclined to

agree with the Companies that a congressional intention

to supersede the Agreement is a “necessary implication.”

But as we have already indicated, this is not such a case.

Indeed, if any inferences are to be drawn from Congress’

actions, it would appear that the District Court’s con-

clusion that “Congress intended for the Agreement to

The District Court modified the settlement agreement to con-

form to the new deadline for promulgating BAT regulations estab-

lished by Congress.

65a

remain in effect to supply the missing details of a co-

hesive strategy for controlling toxic water pollution” “

is the more plausible inference.

We are also not persuaded by the Companies’ claim

that the legislative history of the Amendments offers

clear evidence of a congressional intent to supplant the

settlement agreement. First, we, like the District Court,

have some difficulty understanding why if, as appellants

maintain, Congress wanted to supplant the Agreement,

it did not bother to say so in any of the reports—House,

Senate, or Conference—that accompanied the legislation;

this in spite of the fact that it also failed to express this

intent in the Amendments themselves. The absence of

any indications of such congressional intent in the various

reports could not have been inadvertent since both House

and Senate Committees heard testimony from NRDC and

EPA about the terms of the settlement agreement.“

Moreover, the silence of the committee reports on this

issue of congressional intent stands in marked contrast

to the clarity with which these reports dealt with other

court decisions which Congress chose to supersede. For

example, in amending Sections 313 and 404 of the

FWPCA to make it clear that the dredging activities of

the Army Corps of Engineers are subject to state water

quality laws, the Senate Report explained that these

amendments were intended to overrule a contrary holding

by the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d

1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 977 (1977).

S. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 68 (1977).

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note

89, 12 ERC at 1836.

Ses notes 24 and 25 supra.

“ Similarly, in discussing a new provision dealing with compli-

ance orders under § 309 the Senate Report noted:

Under existing law there are no circumstances that justify a

time for compliance extending beyond July 1, 1977. The Ad-

66a

The only real support for their interpretation of con-

gressional intent the Companies have pointed to is the

statement by Congressman Roberts quoted above.“ It is,

of course, well established that courts give considerable

weight to the views of sponsors and floor managers of

legislation in determining congressional intent. See

NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousers,

Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1924); Schwegmann

Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 374, 394-395

(1954); United States v. United Mine Workers of

America, 330 U.S. 258, 278-284 (1947). However, not

even Congressman Roberts’ statement offers such clear

support for appellants’ claim. Congressman Roberts did

not suggest that it was Congress’ intention (as he under-

stood it) that the 1977 Amendments would automatically

supersede the Agreement. Rather, he merely indicated

that inasmuch as Congress had amended the procedural

provisions of the FWPCA that were responsible for

EPA’s difficulties with implementing the statute, EPA

should consider petition ling] the courts to relinquish

jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control * * *.”* Thus

the most that appellants can claim is that Congressman

Roberts thought it “entirely appropriate” for EPA to ask

the court to relinquish jurisdiction. This is not quite the

same as a suggestion that Congressman Roberts believed

that the Amendments would automatically supersede the

settlement agreement.

ministrator can only issue an enforcement order requiring

compliance within 30 days or initiate civil or criminal action.

Thus, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit in Republic Steel Corporation v. Train et al. and Wil-

liams, ——— F.2d ——., (6th Cir. 1977) was an incorrect inter-

pretation of existing law.

S. Rep. No. 95-870, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1977).

4% See —— F.2d at ——— (pp. 16-17) supra.

* 128 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (re-

marks of Representative Roberts).

67a

Moreover, there are other statements in the legislative

history of the Amendments, including a statement by

Congressman Roberts, which indicate a different view of

congressional intent from that suggested by appellants.

The Senate Report on the 1977 Amendments had this to

say about the regulatory framework established by the

settlement agreement:

During the course of its hearings the committee ex-

amined in detail EPA’s proposal and strategy for

controlling the discharge of toxic pollutants pri-

marily through the development of effluent guide-

lines for the best available technology economically

achievable under section 301(b)(2)(A) and the

subsequent reissuance of permits under section 402

to require the application of such technology by dis-

chargers by July 1, 1983. The Committee approves

of and endorses this strategy.

S. Rep. No. 95-370, supra, at 56 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in explaining the reasoning behind the toxic

pollutant provisions of the Conference Report to his

Senate colleagues Senator Muskie noted:

Another, and possibly more important, reason for

maintaining the BAT requirements is that the

Agency currently has a major program underway

of using BAT to control toxics. Technology-based

effluent limitations are being developed which will

place limits on toxic pollutants which pose or are

likely to pose human health and ecological hazards.

The conference agreement was specifically de-

siqned to codify the so-called “Flannery decision,”

tuhich set forth 65 families of pollutants which are

to be regulated by BAT, and EPA has been im-

plementing this consent decree. To take a different :

course for dealing with toxics at this point would re- |

quire a major reprogramming of EPA resources. :

Such a delay, whether it be to allow utilization of a

68a

different section of the act or in order to imple

ment this section, would only cause confusion and

add still more delay to efforts to solve the toxics

problem. The discharge of toxic pollutants should be

eliminated as soon as possible. Because EPA is al-

ready embarked upon a program to control toxics

using a proven mechanism, technology-based efflu-

ent limitations, and because of the urgency to con-

trol toxics, prudent public policy demands that the

strategy be maintained.

123 Cong. Rec. $19647-S19648 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)

(emphasis added). Inasmuch as Senator Muskie was

chairman of the Senate Subcommittee which reviewed

EPA’s implementation of the FWPCA, was a member

of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the 1977

Amendments, and served as floor manager of the Con-

ference Report in the Senate, his views are entitled to

significant weight in fathoming congressional intent.“

Nothing in Senator Muskie’s statement suggests that he

viewed the settlement agreement as being superseded by

the Amendments. If anything, his statement seems to

confirm the District Court’s conclusion that Congress in-

tended the settlement agreement to supply the details

of the toxics program. Further evidence that Congress

intended the settlement agreement to continue in force,

subject to modifications to conform it to the amended

statute, is provided by a statement made by Senator

Randolph in discussing the toxic pollutant provisions of

the Conference Report. He stated:

In the requirements for the control of toxic pollu-

tants adopted by the conferees, the measure before

us largely follows the strategy presently being used

48 Although it is true, as appellants point out, see note 88 supra,

that Senator Muskie was prevented from attending the conference

69a

by the Environmental Protection Agency under the

settlement agreement in the case of Natural Re-

sources Defense Council against Train. That im-

portant case required the development of a mini-

mum degree of control for a specified list of pollu-

tants to be achieved on a definite schedule. The

principal way in which the conference report modi-

fies the settlement agreement is to require the pub-

lication of effluent limitations based on best avail-

able technology at a minimum for the listed pol-

lutants by July 1, 1980, and to specify July 1, 1984,

as the latest date for compliance with those effluent

limitations.

123 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (empha-

sis added). Senator Randolph was chairman of the Sen-

ate Committee that drafted the 1977 Amendments and

a member of the House-Senate Conference Committee.

Insofar as Senator Randolph viewed the 1977 Amend-

ments as “modifying” the settlement agreement, it is

difficult to believe that he understood Congress’ intention

to be that the Agreement would be completely superseded

by the Amendments. «

Finally, as we have already indicated, a statement by

Congressman Roberts suggests that he too assumed that

EPA would continue to be bound by the terms of the

Agreement. In describing the BAT-toxic pollutants pro-

visions of the Conference Report to the House, Congress-

man Roberts said the following about the statutory pro-

vision authorizing EPA to add to or delete from the

list of 65 toxic pollutants specified by the statute:

[Tj)he Administrator, in his discretion, may deter-

mine that certain toxic pollutants—or subclasses of

pollutants—are not appropriate for regulation in

certain circumstances. For example, the Adminis-

trator may use his discretion when equal or more

effective protection is already provided with respect

to that pollutant by an effluent limitation and guide-

70a

line promulgated pursuant to other sections of the act

or, when the discharge of [a] specific pollutant re-

sults from its presence in intake water; or, where a

specific pollutant is present in either insignificant or

trace quantities and does not cause or is not likely

to cause toxic effects to identifiable organisms af-

fected by the discharge.

123 Cong. Rec. H12927 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977). How-

ever, Congressman Roberts did not describe decision-

making criteria contained in the statute. Rather, these

decisionmaking criteria are contained in paragraph 8 of

the settlement agreement. Section 307 (a) (1) merely di-

rects the Administrator to “take into account toxicity of

the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or

potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters,

the importance of the affected organisms, and the nature

and the extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on

such organisms.” Thus Congressman Roberts’ state-

ment seems to imply that he too expected that the settle-

ment agreement would continue in force to supply missing

details for the toxic pollutants program.“

These indications in the legislative history of the 1977

Amendments that Congress expected the settlement agree-

ment to continue in effect, and the ambiguity of such evi-

dence as the Companies are able to marshall in support

of their interpretation of congressional] intent, lead us to

conclude that the District Court properly rejected ap-

pellants’ statutory supersession argument. We therefore

turn to the Companies’ claim that the Agreement should

Senator Randolph described these same factors in explaining

the decisionmaking criteria to be used by EPA’s Administrator

in making listing decisions. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed.

Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Senator Randolph).

83 U.S.C. §1817(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).

51 See K. Hall, supra note 22, at 622 n.80.

71

be vacated because each of the four cases which provided

the basis for the Agreement is now moot and must be

dismissed.

B. Mootness

Appellants begin their discussion by pointing out that

Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement prevents

federal courts from issuing judgments in cases which are

moot. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Hall v. Beals,

896 U.S. 45 (1969), and Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S.

119 (1977), appellants further note that a case may

become moot if the statute upon which a claim is based

is amended in such a fashion that the facts set forth in

the complaint do not present a controversy under the new

law. Appellants contend that application of these con-

trolling legal precedents to the facts of the instant cases

requires vacation of the settlement agreement and dis-

missal of the four cases which underlie the Agreement.

The Companies suggest that both parties agree (and the

District Court found) that two of the four cases are

moot. In these two cases—the deadline cases—NRDC

had alleged that EPA had violated Section 307(a) of the

FWPCA by failing to promulgate final toxic pollutant

effluent standards for nine substances within six months

of issuing proposed standards as required by the statute.

The complaint requested the court to order EPA to

promulgate final standards for the nine substances. The

Companies note that the 1977 Amendments repealed both

the six-month deadline and the requirement that EPA

promulgate toxic pollutant effluent standards, replacing

these provisions with a requirement that EPA promulgate

effluent guidelines for 65 specified pollutants on an

industry-by-industry basis by July 1, 1980 and thereby

mooting the deadlines cases. Appellants contend that the

mootness question in these cases involves the two remain-

ing cases—the toxic criteria case and the pretreatment

case.

72a

In the toxic criteria case NRDC alleged that EPA had

violated the statute in two respects. First, NRDC con-

tended that EPA had used unlawful and restrictive cri-

teria for selecting substances to include in the list of

toxic pollutants required by Section 307(a) of the

FWPCA. Second, NRDC alleged that because of its use

of these impermissible criteria EPA had illegally omitted

from the list 25 substances which the Agency would have

determined to be toxic pollutants had it used the proper

statutory criteria. In the pretreatment case NRDC

sought to compel EPA to promulgate pretreatment stand-

ards covering over 30 categories of point sources. NRDC

alleged that EPA had violated the statute by failing to

publish final pretreatment standards for approximately

31 categories of point sources within 90 days of publish-

ing proposed standards as required by the Act, and it

noted that proposed standards for 14 of these categories

had been pending for more than one year.

Appellants argue that NRDC’s claim in the toxic cri-

teria case was based on language in the old Section 307

which was repealed by the 1977 Amendments, noting that

the new Section 307(a) only requires EPA to publish a

list of 65 specified toxic pollutants, which EPA has done,

and further provides that EPA “may revise [this] list”

by adding pollutants to or deleting them from it. Appel-

lants maintain that the 1973 EPA decisions at issue in the

toxic criteria case are irrelevant to the Agency’s imple-

mentation of the new statutory provisions. Appellants

further argue that resolution of the issues raised in the

toxic criteria case would amount to the court’s rendering

an advisory opinion because the decision would not alter

either the existing Section 307(a) list or the manner in

which EPA has and will implement the new statutory

provisions. The Companies then turn to the District

Court’s finding that the toxic criteria case is not moot

because “[t]o date, EPA has not renounced the alleged

arbitrary and unauthorized criteria it used [to compile

73a

the list of toxic pollutants under the old Section 307 (a)

in 1973], nor has it published revised selection criteria.”

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra,

12 ERC at 1837.% The Companies maintain that the Dis-

trict Court failed to realize that the 1973 criteria have

been effectively repealed by EPA and have been made

irrelevant by the 1977 Amendments.” The Companies

add that when EPA published the list of toxic pollutants

in January 1978 as directed by the 1977 Amendments,

it omitted any mention of the 1978 criteria in discussing

its authority to revise the Section 307 list. Finally, the

Companies suggest that events transpiring after the Dis-

trict Court’s decision demonstrate that the 1978 criteria

are irrelevant and will no longer be applied by EPA. Ap-

pellants first note that on March 27, 1979 EPA pub-

lished a document entitled “Guidance on Factors to be

Addressed in Petitions to Revise” the Section 307 (a)

52 The District Court further noted:

Even if EPA were to renounce its selection criteria, the [toxic

criteria] case would not be moot if the court were to determine

that there was a sufficient threat of repetition of the allegedly

illegal action by the agency. See, e. g., United States v. Concen-

trated Phosphate Export Association, Inc., 398 U.S. 199, 208

(1968).

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note 89, 12

ERC at 1887 n.5.

The Companies note, for example, that under the old § 807

EPA was required to promulgate effluent standards for pollutants

on the § 307 list within one year of the date the pollutant was placed

on the list. Appellants argue that this deadline precluded the

Agency from undertaking any new scientific research about a pol-

lutant and forced EPA to rely on whatever scientific data was

available at the time the pollutant was listed, which in turn became

one of the 1978 criteria. Th: Companies contend that insofar as the

1977 Amendments eliminated the one-year time limit, EPA no

longer has any reason to consider whether under the 1978 criteria

adequate data are available to set standards for a particular

pollutant.

T4a

toxic pollutant list. 44 Fed. Reg. 18279 (March 27,

1979). Appellants maintain that the list of factors con-

tained in this document effectively repealed the 1973 cri-

teria. Second, appellants maintain that in denying two

petitions by Dow Chemical Company to remove two sub-

stances from the Section 307 list the Agency made no

mention of the 1978 criteria, thereby confirming that

the March 27, 1979 publication effectively repealed the

1973 criteria.

The Companies’ contention that the fourth case—the

pretreatment case—is moot is based on their interpreta-

tion of the provisions of the settlement agreement. They

contend that to settle the pretreatment case EPA and

NRDC agreed to paragraph 13 of the settlement agree-

ment pursuant to which EPA undertook to promulgate

pretreatment standards covering eight industry catego-

ries by May 15, 1977. Appellants point out that EPA

has issued regulations establishing pretreatment stand-

ards for the eight industrial categories listed in para-

graph 18, and they argue that EPA’s fulfillment of its

obligations has extinguished the controversy between the

parties and rendered the pretreatment case moot.

Finally, appellants contend that even if the District

Court was correct in finding that the pretreatment and

toxic criteria cases are not moot, it still erred by re-

fusing to vacate the Agreement. According to the Com-

panies, the proper procedure to be followed when a court

discovers that some of the cases which underlie a settle-

ment agreement have become moot is to vacate the agree-

ment and rehear the remaining cases to determine what,

if any, relief is appropriate in light of the issues which

remain live controversies. Appellants maintain that this

procedure is necessary to avoid adjudication of moot is-

sues, and is mandated by constitutional limitations on the

court’s power as well as by the Supreme Court’s de-

cision in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S.

259 (1936). In that case an action was brought by a

75a

utility to restrain the County from constructing a power

plant and from making contracts for that purpose. The

Federal Emergency Administrator for Public Works in-

tervened in the case, revealing that the federal govern-

ment had entered into a contract with the County to loan

it money for the project. The utility challenged the con-

stitutionality of the loan and was upheld by the District

Court which entered a final decree enjoining the contract.

While the appeal was pending the County and the Ad-

ministrator terminated the first contract and substituted

a new contract which they claimed did not contain the

objectionable provisions of the old one. The Court of

Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for re-

consideration in light of the new contract. Although the

pleadings in the District Court were not amended and

the court’s term had expired, the District Court never-

theless heard evidence regarding the new contract.

On appeal the Supreme Court ruled that the first de-

cree should have been vacated so as to revest the court

with jurisdiction over the case. The Court pointed out

that [where it appears upon appeal that [a] contro-

versy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the

appellate court to set aside the decree below and to re-

mand the cause with directions to dismiss. * * * If it

appears that supervening facts require a retrial in the

light of a changed situation, the appropriate action of

the appellate court is to vacate the decree which has

been entered and revest the court below with jurisdic-

tion of the cause to the end that the issues may be

properly framed and the retrial had.” Jd. at 267-268

(citations omitted).

Appellants contend that Duke Power requires a trial

court to vacate a settlement agreement to the extent

that it is based on mooted issues, arguing that the court

has no power to modify such an agreement without mak-

ing a preliminary determination that the issues, if any,

in the remaining “live” controversies will support the

76a

modified decree. Appellants claim that the District Court

refused to make such a determination in this case.“ The

Companies further argue that as a factual matter the

pretreatment and toxic criteria cases do not provide an

adequate basis for continuing the settlement agreement.

In their view, the remaining controversies in these two

cases, assuming that there are some, cannot support even

the original settlement agreement, let alone the modifica-

tions approved by the District Court.“

Addressing first the Companies’ claim that both the

pretreatment and toxic criteria cases are moot, we agree

with the District Court that these two cases remain live

controversies. With respect to the pretreatment case, we

In support of this claim the Companies quote the District

Court’s statement that:

Because it was the settlement as a whole that represented an

acceptable bargain to both sides, it cannot be said that each

portion of the Agreement is specifically responsive to a particu-

lar claim contained in one or more of the original complaints.

It would do violence to the settlement for the court to attempt

to separate aspects of the Agreement that rest on the argu-

ably moot causes of action from those that do not.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note 89,

12 ERC at 1838 (appellants’ emphasis).

58 NRDC argues that the mootness doctrine does not apply to this

case, maintaining that congressional action eliminating the case or

controversy between the parties can only moot inchoate liabilities.

It contends that once the liability has matured and has been reduced

to judgment a court’s original jurisdiction continues for purposes

of enforcing the liability, even where the defendant needs a sub-

stantial amount of time to meet its obligations. According to NRDC,

the proper analysis in cases such as this is to ascertain whether

Congress intended to affect pre-existing liabilities, which it must

do expressly or by necessary implication from the amending legisla-

tion. Applying this reasoning to the instant case, NRDC argues

that Congress did not intend to deprive NRDC of its remedy con-

tained in the Agreement or its right to enforce that remedy. Be-

cause we agree with the District Court that the pretreatment and

‘toxic criteria cases are not moot, we have no need to

NRDC's mootness argument. ‘

*

7a

are unable to agree with the Companies’ suggestion that

EPA’s compliance with the requirements of paragraph

13 of the settlement agreement has fulfilled all its obliga-

tions relating to that case and therefore eliminated the

controversy between NRDC and EPA. NRDC’s complaint

in the pretreatment case alleged violations and requested

relief pertaining to “all pollutants which are determined

not to be susceptible to treatment by [publicly owned

treatment works] or which would interfere with the

operation of such works.” * In addition, the complaint

specifically listed over 30 categories of point sources for

which EPA was required to promulgate pretreatment

standards.“ Paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement,

on the other hand, merely required EPA to promulgate

pretreatment standards covering eight industries.“ Given

the very broad scope of relief requested by NRDC’s com-

plaint in the pretreatment case and the relatively narrow

reach of paragraph 13, it is difficult to accept the Com-

panies’ claim that NRDC exchanged its pretreatment case

for the provisions in paragraph 18. Moreover, the Com-

panies’ suggestion that this is the deal that was struck

is unsupported by any evidence other than appellants’

bald allegation that this is what happened. As the Dis-

trict Court pointed out,“ other paragraphs of the settle-

5¢ See Supp. App. 91.

* See Supp. App. 85-86.

3 NRDC points out that the timetable for promulgating pre-

treatment standards for the eight industries listed in paragraph 18

was shorter than the timetable that applied to other industries for

which pretreatment standards were to be developed. NRDC ex-

plains that this expedited schedule was included because the eight

industries included a large number of indirect dischargers, see

brief for appellee NRDC at 57 n.33, and because these were the

only industries for which EPA could promulgate standards within

12 months. Id. See also R. Hall, supra note 7, at 522.

Natural Resources. Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note

89, 12 ERC at 1838.

78a

ment agreement outline other actions relating to pre-

treatment standards that EPA agreed to undertake and

which it has not yet done.” Thus even if we were to

accept the Companies’ implicit assumption that only those

provisions in the Agreement which deal with pretreat-

ment standards were exchanged for NRDC’s agreement

not to prosecute the pretreatment case, we would still

reject the suggestion that the case is moot. Finally, in-

asmuch as the settlement agreement was “a comprehen-

sive interrelated package, it is reasonable to assume

that other provisions of the Agreement, such as the BAT

limitations and guidelines, were also part of the quid

pro quo NRDC received in return for agreeing not to

litigate the pretreatment case.

As for the toxic criteria case, it should first be noted

that appellants are simply wrong in suggesting that

NRDC’s claim in that case was based on language in

the FWPCA which was repealed by the 1977 Amend-

ments. In fact the disagreement between NRDC and

EPA revolved around the latter’s interpretation of the

statutory criteria for making listing decisions. The 1977

Amendments did not change these criteria in any way.

While appellants may be correct in suggesting that the

Amendments changed what may have been the Admin-

istrator’s mandatory duty to list pollutants into a dis-

cretionary duty by explicitly leaving the decision to add

to, or delete from, the list specified by Congress to his

discretion, the nature of the Administrator’s duty was

not central to the controversy between NRDC and EPA.

In making the now discretionary listing decisions the

Administrator must still use the proper statutory decision-

making criteria. If in fact the EPA has continued to use

© See paragraphs 3, 4, and 7 of the settlement agreement. Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Freie, agre ave 6, 6 BEV

at 2124-2126.

n Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note

89, 12 ERC at 1838.

79a

the 1978 criteria (which NRDC alleges violate the stat-

ute), or at the very least has not renounced these criteria,

we can hardly conclude that the toxic criteria case is

moot. Thus appellants’ contention that the case is moot

must ultimately rest on their claim that EPA has

abandoned the 1973 criteria.

We agree with the District Court that there is no

clear evidence indicating that EPA has abandoned the

1973 criteria. Even the EPA publications on which the

Companies rely in arguing that EPA has abandoned the

1973 criteria demonstrate that this claim is inaccurate.

As NRDC points out, one of the factors listed in these

EPA publications as having been considered by the

Agency is a pollutant’s usual or potential presence in

water,“ a factor which, NRDC maintains, the statute

does not permit the Agency to consider and one of the

allegedly illegal criteria mentioned in NRDC’s complaint

in the toxic criteria case.“ We therefore conclude that

the District Court correctly found that the toxic criteria

case is not moot because there is no clear indication that

EPA has abandoned the 1973 criteria.

Having determined that the toxic criteria and pretreat-

ment cases are not moot, it remains for us w consider

* For example, this was one of the factors EPA considered in

denying petitions by Dow Chemical Company to remove certain

pollutants from the § 307(a) list. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18282 (Mar. 27,

1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 34691 (June 15, 1979). Moreover, EPA’s

March 27, 1979 list of factors to be considered by the Agency also

mentions the extent of point source discharges of the pollutant into

water and the annual production and “use patterns” of the pollut-

ants in the United States. 44 Fed. Reg. 18279 (Mar. 27, 1979).

NRDC contends that the statute only permits EPA to consider the

usual and potential presence of the affected organisms in water.

Brief for appellee NRDC at 58. Of course we do not need to resolve

the disagreement between EPA and NRDC about what factors may

properly be considered by the Agency in making listing decisions.

All we need do is acknowledge the existence of this controversy

which indicates that the toxic criteria case is not moot.

® See Deferred Joint Appendix (Def. App.) at 20.

80a

appellants’ contention that the proper procedure for the

District Court to follow in these circumstances was to

vacate the settlement agreement and rehear the two

remaining cases. Appellants have not pointed to any

cases that have addressed this precise issue of the pro-

cedure to follow when some of the cases underlying a

settlement become moot. However, courts have on nu-

merous occasions dealt with the question whether a

change in circumstances which moots some of the issues

in a particular case thereby eliminates the court’s juris-

dition over the entire case. The usual practice in such

situations is for the court to determine whether any

remaining controversies in the case provide an adequate

basis for continued jurisdiction. An illustration of this

is the Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. McCormack,

895 U.S. 486 (1969). There, Representative Powell had

been denied his seat in the House by the 90th Congress,

but by the time the case was heard in the Supreme

Court he had been reelected and seated by the 91st Con-

gress. Without determining whether his claims for more

specific relief had become moot, the Court ruled that his

claim for damages on account of past salary required

disposition of the merits of the case. The Court pointed

out that [w] here one of the several issues presented be-

comes moot, the remaining live issues supply the con-

stitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Id. at

497.“

This disposition of partially moot cases suggests that

even under appellants’ mootness theory a court continues

to have jurisdiction over a settlement agreement where

some of the cases that underlie the agreement remain

live controversies. Thus the District Court had jurisdic-

tion over the Agreement because the pretreatment and

toxic criteria cases had not become moot. While it may

* See also, e.g., Liner v. Jafeo, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); United

Public Workers v. Mitchell, 3880 U.S. 75 (1947); Petersen v. Talis-

man Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1978).

8la

become necessary to modify the terms of a settlement

agreement because some of the cases which provided the

basis for it have become moot, we do not agree with

appellants’ suggestion that the court must first vacate the

settlement agreement and rehear the remaining live cases.

Nothing in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra,

suggests that this is the required procedure.“ And as we

have previously indicated, the decision whether to modify

a settlement agreement in light of changed circumstances

is ordinarily left to the discretion of the District Court.

As the Supreme Court noted in System Federation No.

91 v. Wright, supra, “A balance must * * * be struck

between the policies of res judicata and the right of the

court to apply modified measures to changed circum-

stances. Where there is such a balance of imponderables

there must be wide discretion in the District Court.” 324

U.S. at 647-648. We are of the view that the procedure

to follow in circumstances such as those presented by

this case is also best left to the discretion of the District

Court. Where it deems it appropriate the court may

choose to vacate the settlement and rehear the remaining

live controversies. Alternatively, the court may simply

decide whether modification of the agreement is necessary

or appropriate.

Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Duke

Power case suggests a different rule. Duke Power in-

volved a situation in which the action of the defendants

in terminating the contract that had been at issue in

the first proceeding before the District Court completely

In a sense Congress’ action in amending the Railway Labor Act

to permit union shops mooted the controversy between the employ-

ees and the railroad and the unions over whether the employees

could be discriminated against because of their failure to join a

union. The Supreme Court simply ruled in System Federation that

the District Court should have amended the consent decree to reflect

this change. The Court did not suggest that the proper procedure

for the court to follow in deciding this issue was to first vacate the

consent decree and then rehear the remaining controversies.

82a

eliminated the controversy in that case. As such the court

no longer had jurisdiction over the case. In order to vest

the court with jurisdiction over the new controversy

created by the existence of the new contract executed by

the County and the federal government, the District

Court’s decree in the first case had to be vacated and the

parties allowed to amend their pleadings in light of the

new factual and legal issues that were raised by the

second contract. Duke Power has been uniformly inter-

preted as indicating the procedure to be followed by an

appellate court asked to review a decision which has been

mooted by events that transpired after the lower court’s

decision was rendered. See, e.g., United States v. Mun-

singwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); Giumarra Vine-

yards Corp. v. Farrell, 431 F.2d 928, 925 (9th Cir.

1970); Knapp v. Baker, 509 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975) ;

Narrangansett Improvement Co. v. Local Union No. 251,

506 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1974); Welch v. Simon, 498 F.2d

1060, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As the Supreme Court ex-

plained, “Where it appears upon appeal that [a] con-

troversy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the

appellate court to set aside the decree below and to re-

mand the cause with directions to dismiss.” Duke Power

Co. v. Greenwood County, supra, 299 U.S. at 267. Thus

Duke Power does not purport to prescribe a rule to

govern situations such as the one in the instant case.

All we need to decide in this case, then, is whether the

District Court abused its discretion by refusing to follow

the procedure suggested by the Companies. As a prelimi-

nary matter, it should be noted that the Companies do

not appear to have urged this procedure on the District

Court with as much vigor as they press it on appeal.“

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the

* Apparently, the first time the Companies raised this issue was

in a Post-Hearing Brief filed on January 18, 1979, and this issue

was only mentioned in a footnote in the brief. See brief for appel-

lants at 44-45 n.50.

88a

court declined to follow this procedure. Be that as it

may, the District Court noted that the “Agreement rep-

resents a comprehensive, interrelated package of conces-

sions made by EPA in return for plaintiffs’ agreement

not to pursue the claims raised in the four lawsuits.”

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra,

12 ERC at 1838. It further noted that “it cannot be

said that each portion of the Agreement is specifically

responsive to a particular claim contained in one or more

of the original complaints.” Jd. Finally, the court pointed

out that “the [Companies] nowhere have suggested that

the two causes of action as to which controversies still

survive would not alone have provided a substantial basis

for the settlement approved by the court in 1976.“ Id.“

Plainly, the District Court found that these cases do in

fact provide an adequate basis for continuing the Agree-

ment. In these circumstances we do not believe that the

court abused its discretion by refusing to follow the pro-

cedure suggested by the Companies. The court’s conclu-

sion that the two non-moot cases provided an adequate

basis for continuing the Agreement obviated any need

to vacate the Agreement and rehear the cases.

Nor do we think that the District Court was required

to make a further determination that the toxic criteria

and pretreatment cases could provide an adequate basis

for the modifications to the settlement agreement that it

approved. Even assuming that the Companies are correct

in claiming that the modified settlement agreement

“places substantial new burdens and obligations

* The Companies contend that this suggestion by the District

Court ignored the footnote referred to in note 66 supra, in which

they had argued that the proper procedure for the District Court

to follow if it were to conclude that the pretreatment and toxic

criteria cases were not moot was to vacate the Agreement and

rehear these two cases. However, this argument about the proper

procedure to follow is not quite the same as a showing that the

settlement agreement could not be supported by the remaining live

controversies.

84a

upon EPA,“ a claim we will examine in due course,

we do not agree that the District Court had to find that

these “new burdens” could be supported by the two non-

moot cases. The modifications to the settlement agree-

ment were designed to resolve a new controversy that

had arisen over EPA’s non-compliance with the court’s

1976 order approving the Agreement. There can be no

question that the District Court had the power to enforce

the provisions of a settlement agreement it had approved

by requiring further action from the offending party.

C. Modifications to the Settlement Agreement

In contending that EPA contravened public notice and

comment requirements of the APA, the Clean Water Act,

EPA regulations, an Executive Order, and due process

rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in propos-

ing the modifications to the settlement agreement, the

Companies focus on two changes made by the modifica-

tions. The first is a new paragraph 4(c) which modifies

paragraph 4 of the origina] settlement agreement. Para-

graph 4 had required EPA to develop pretreatment stand-

ards for any of the 65 pollutants listed in the Agree-

ment which are not susceptible to treatment by, or are

otherwise incompatible with, publicly owned treatment

works. In addition, EPA was required to promulgate,

by December 31, 1979, pretreatment standards for all

other incompatible pollutants present in the emissions

from any of the 21 industries covered by the Agree-

ment.” New paragraph 4(c) requires EPA to initiate

a program “to identify and study” pollutants (other than

the 65 explicitly covered by the Agreement) which are

incompatible with POTWs, and it specifies certain in-

Brief for appellants at 47.

—

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 8,

8 ERC at 2124.

85a

vestigatory steps that the Agency is to follow.” Second,

the Companies focus on the modifications to paragraph

12 of the 1976 Agreement. That provision had required

7 Paragraph 4(c) provides that:

The Administrator shall establish and implement a program

to identify and study other pollutants which are introduced into

such treatment works and which are not susceptible to treat-

ment by such works or which interfere with, pass through, or

are otherwise incompatible with such works. The program

shall, at a minimum, address those pollutants listed in Ap-

pendix C identifiable by computer-based mass spectra search

programs (“computer matching’), and shall consist of steps

to: tentatively identify by computer matching pollutants dis-

charged by point source categories listed in Appendix B; de-

termine frequencies of occurrence and order-of-magnitude con-

centrations for the tentatively identified pollutants; analytically

confirm the computer identification of those pollutants found

with significant frequency in at least one subcategory and in

high concentrations (the term “high” to be based on compari-

son with the concentrations of other pollutants found or known

to be in the discharge and, where possible, on readily available

information with respect to toxicity of the pollutants); deter-

mine for those pollutants analytically confirmed, based upon a

comprehensive literature search of the latest scientific knowl-

edge, the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on aquatic

organisms and human health; develop from the above informa-

tion a list of pollutants that are candidates for national regula-

tion; determine, by molecular structure analysis and/or labora-

tory test data and/or field studies, or other appropriate means

where practicable, both the probable compatibility of the listed

pollutants with treatment works (as defined in Section 212 uf

the Act) which are publicly owned, and the probable extent to

which industrial technology designed to remove pollutants

cluded in Appendix A also will remove listed pollutants.

Administrator may remove pollutants from said pollutant

didate list that he deems to be compatible with publicly

treatment works or effectively controlled by

ogy upon which pretreatment standards

to § 307 (b) of the Act are based, or are present in

amounts and are neither

i

He

86a

EPA to set up an investigatory program to determine

when and if effluent limitations more stringent than the

technology-based limitations mandated by the Agreement

are necessary to protect human health or aquatic life.“

EPA agreed to establish “a specific and substantial pro-

gram” * for this purpose by June 30, 1978, and to de-

velop such more stringent limitations whenever the Ad-

ministrator determined that they were necessary.” The

modifications to paragraph 12 specify that this program

should include processes for identifying seriously con-

taminated navigable waters and pollutants for which

more stringent limitations are necessary, and a process

for developing the necessary strategies for limiting dis-

charge of these toxic pollutants. The modifications also

set deadlines for EPA to develop and announce these

strategies.”

The Companies and EPA disagree in their characteri-

zation of the changes made by these modifications. EPA

argues that they provide some fine-tuning of the Agree-

ment, incorporating lessons the Agency has learned in

over two years of implementing the Agreement and al-

lowing it greater flexibility and additional time to focus

on major environmental problems. In particular, EPA

contends that paragraph 4(c) actually increases its rule-

making discretion under the Agreement while merely

committing it to specific preliminary investigative ac-

™ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 3,

8 ERC at 2127-2128.

* Jd. at 2128.

* Id. at 2127-2128.

™ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note

89, 12 ERC at 1843-1844.

™ EPA ia to finish identifying the pollutants and polluted waters

by July 1, 1981, and is to publish its proposed strategies no later

than December 31, 1981.

87a

tion,”* and that the changes made in paragraph 12 do

not reduce the Agency’s discretion.” The Companies, on

the other hand, maintain that these new provisions re-

quire EPA to undertake a new series of programs leading

to further regulations that go beyond those mandated

by the original Agreement and the requirements of the

1977 Amendments. They argue that these modifications

mandate that “EPA undertake specified steps and puts

EPA in a straightjacket [sic] where, by contrast, Con-

gress had left the Agency’s discretion unfettered.” ™* The

Companies further argue that, because the modifications

place substantial new burdens and obligations on EPA

and the industries it regulates, the Agency is required

to provide notice and opportunity for public comment

prior to taking action of the sort it took in proposing

these modifications.

In developing this argument the Companies first con-

tend that EPA violated the notice and comment require-

ments of the APA’s rulemaking provisions.” Noting that

the APA defines a rule as “the whole or part of an

agency statement of general or particular applicability

™ EPA maintains that whereas paragraph 4 of the original

Agreement appeared to require the Agency to promulgate pretreat-

ment standards for all “incompatible” pollutants discharged by the

21 industries covered by the Agreement, paragraph 4(c) substan-

tially limits its obligations by only requiring the Agency to initiate

& program for investigating “incompatible” pollutants without spe-

cifying how many, and by allowing the Administrator to reduce the

number of pollutants being studied at various steps in the investiga-

tory process. In addition, the decision about which pollutants should

be regulated is left to the Administrator's discretion.

* EPA notes that while the modifications to paragraph 12 re-

quire the Agency to develop processes for identifying contaminated

waters and problem pollutants, no attempt is made to specify what

these processes shall be. Moreover, the determination of the need

for more stringent controls is left to the Administrator's judgment.

8 Brief for appellants at 50.

6 U.S.C. §658(b) & (e) (1976).

88a

and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or

prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,

procedure, or practice requirements of an agency,” ® ap-

pellants argue that the modified settlement agreement

amounts to a rule since “it has future effect and is de-

signed to mandate programs leading ultimately to regula-

tions and regulatory action * .“ u Appellants point

out that this court indicated in Pacific Gas & Electric

Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that the

APA’s definition of a rule “could be read literally to en-

compass virtually any utterance by an agency,” and

that Congress limited the breadth of this definition by

excepting certain specified categories of agency activity.

Appellants reason from this that unless the modifications

can fit within one of these exceptions they must fall

within the statutory definition of a rule to which the

notice and comment provisions apply, and they argue that

none of these exceptions applies to the modifications.

First, appellants contend that the modifications do

not fall within the statutory exemption for “general state-

ments of policy” ™ because they substantially affect the

rights of various members of the public by specifying

the manner in which EPA will carry out regulatory pro-

grams and take administrative actions under the Clean

Water Act.“ Appellants point out that this court ruled

0 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1976).

1 Brief for appellants at 53.

* 5 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1976).

Appellants pcint out that in Natural Resources Defense Coun-

eil v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977), this court acknowledged

89a

in Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d

1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that agency decisions that have

substantial effects on rights are not general policy state-

ments, and they argue that Pickus is a persuasive prece-

dent for this appeal. Second, appellants maintain that

the modifications cannot be said to constitute an “inter-

pretative rule“ exempt from APA notice and comment

requirements. The Companies note that the court indi-

cated in Pickus that this exception applies to “adminis-

trative construction of a statutory provision on a ques-

tion of law reviewable in the courts * * .“ Id. at 1113.

Third, the Companies contend that the modifications are

not exempt as a “rule of agency organization, procedure,

or practice” which was described in Pickus as applying

to technical regulation of the form of agency action and

proceedings.” Id. Finally, appellants argue that the last

statutory exemption—“ for good cause — also does not

apply to the modifications. The Companies conclude,

therefore, that the modifications to the settlement agree-

ment fit within the statutory definition of a rule since

none of the exceptions apply to them.™

Appellants next argue that by adopting the modifica-

tions EPA contravened public participation requirements

of the Clean Water Act and its own regulations. The

Companies note that the Act’s public participation provi-

sion states in pertinent part:

Public participation in the development, revision,

and enforcement of any regulation, standard, efflu-

the programs established by the modifications to the settlement

agreement which is equivalent . their interest in the programs set

up by the original Agreement.

„ Appellants argue that EPA would have benefitted substantially

if it had sought and obtained commen

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