Appendix — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1984
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FILED
R3-1345 FEB 14 1984
No. &3-
a IN THE ae
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,
MONSANTO COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE,
AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
7 Petitioners,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,
AND BUSINESSMEN FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC.,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
CHARLES F. LETTOW
(Attorney of Record)
DouGLas E. KLIEVER
MICHAEL A. WIEGARD
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &
HAMILTON
1752 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 728-2748
Counsel for Petitioners
Union Carbide Corporation,
FMC Corporation, Monsanto
February 14, 1984 Company and Ezxzon Corporation
[Additional Counsel listed on inside cover]
WILSON - Eras Printing Co. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
DouGLas E. MCALLISTER
1920 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Petitioner
American Mining Congress
RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ
Davip P. HACKETT
COLLIER, SHANNON, RL & Scott
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
Counsel for Petitioner
American Iron and Steel Institute
STARK RITCHIE
JAMES K. JACKSON
1220 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Counsel for Petitioner
American Petroleum Institute
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix A Page
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718
. 1a
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636
e ee ee 45a
NRDC v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084
i Fi. SR EERE ney ead ee kore 108a
NRDC Vv. Gorsuch, 17 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2018
rr 117
NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833
rr Tebiiet Ooeidewontaiincanpiagii 121
NRDC v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120
SORE Seger Poet See rene 149a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
/ 195a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
Order on Petition for Rehearing ...............0000....... 203a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
Order on Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc ..... 205a
Appendix B
Constitution of the United States (excerpts) ) 1b
Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
| REE a Mm WORD ONCE 8b
Appendix C
List of non-wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates
Be I PPP lc
.
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 82-1365
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT
DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK
V.
ANNE GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
2a
No. 82-1366
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
V.
JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
No, 82-1367
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.
Vv.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CorRPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appeliants
8a
No. 82-1368
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.
v.
ANNE M. GoRSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
No. 82-1673
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.
V.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
4a
No. 82-1674
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
V.
JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
No. 82-1675
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.
V.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. pu Pont DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
5a
No. 82-1676
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.
V
ANNE M. GoksUch, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants
No. 82-1770
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
INC., ET AL.
V.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Appellants
No. 82-1771
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
INC., ET AL.
v.
JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.
ALABAMA PowER COMPANY, ET A.,
Appellants
6a
No. 82-1772
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.
v.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Appellants
No. 82-1773
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.
V.
ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Appellants
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 75-01698, 75-01267,
73-02153 & 75-00172)
Argued March 1, 1983
Decided October 4, 1983
Charles L. Lettow, with whom Douglas F. Kliever,
Michael A. Wiegard, Douglas F. McAllister, Richard F.
Schwartz, Stark Ritchie, James XK. Jackson, Arnold 8.
Block, Michael B. Barr and Scott Slaughter were on the
brief, for appellants.
7a
Barry S. Neuman, Attorney, Department of Justice,
with whom Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Nancy B. Firestone,
Attorneys, Department of Justice, Michael Brown, Dep-
uty General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency,
Bruce M. Diamond, Acting Associate General Counsel,
and Susan G. Lepow, Assistant General Counsel, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, were on the brief, for
appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al. Donald W. Stever,
Attorney, Department of Justice, also entered an ap-
pearance for appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al.
Ronald J. Wilson, with whom J. Taylor Banks was on
the brief, for appellees, Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., et al.
William Scott Ferguson, entered an appearance for
appellees, Olin Corporation in 82-1365, 82-1366, 82-1367
and 82-1368.
Before: WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and Box-
SAL,“ Senior District Judge for the Southern
District of New York.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge
BONSAL.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
BONSAL, District Judge: The intervenors in these con-
solidated cases, several corporations and trade associa-
tions (collectively the Companies), appeal from orders
of the United States District Court, Flannery, J., (1)
denying their motion to vacate or, alternatively, to revise
a settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) previously
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
1 These include the American Iron and Steel Institute, Union
Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow Chemical Co., Celanese Co., E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., Exxon Corp., Monsanto Corp., the Ameri-
enn Petroleum Institute, the American Mining Congress, and numer-
ous utility companies.
approved by the district court, and (2) denying the cross-
motion of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”
or “the Agency”) and its Administrator to modify the
Agreement due to changed circumstances. The issue pre-
sented by this appeal, as formulated in our earlier opin-
ion, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
1229, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is whether the “settlement
agreement impermissibly infringes on the discretion Con-
gress committed to the Administrator to make certain
decisions under the [Clean Water Act].” For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we hold that the Agreement does not
impermissibly infringe on the Administrator’s discretion
and accordingly we affirm the orders of the district court.
BACKGROUND
The facts are set forth in some detail in our prior
decision, 636 F.2d at 1234-38, familiarity with which is
assumed. Briefly, the Agreement was entered into by the
original parties“ to these consolidated cases in settlement
of the plaintiffs’ claims that EPA had failed to carry out
its statutory duty to implement certain provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et seg. (1976), known in its amended form as the Clean
Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”).* Following negotia-
tions between the parties, the proposed settlement agree-
ment was submitted to the district court, which held
2 Other aspects of these cases were addressed in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the National Audubon So-
ciety, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., and Business
and Professional People for the Public Interest, Inc. (collectively
“NRDC”). The defendants are William Ruckelshaus, Administrator
of EPA, and the Agency itself.
The provisions involved are sections 801-304, 306, 307 and 402,
codified at 83 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1814, 1816, 1817, and 1842.
9a
hearings and received comments from the intervenor
Companies, which opposed it. The Agreement was au-
thorized and executed for the government by both EPA
and the Department of Justice. After making some
changes in the agreement, on June 9, 1976 the court
entered a “Final Order and Decree” (“the Decree”)
approving it as a “just, fair, and equitable resolution of
the issues raised.” Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122
(D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from the Decree.
Therefore, the issue of whether, in a general sense, the
district court acted properly in entering the June 9,
1976 Decree is not now before us.“
The Agreement contains a detailed program for de-
veloping regulations to deal with the discharge of toxic
pollutants under the CWA. It required EPA to promul-
gate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge
by 21 industries of 65 specified pollutants. It also man-
dated the use of certain scientific methodologies and
decision-making criteria by EPA in determining whether
additional regulations should be issued and whether other
pollutants should be included in the regulatory scheme.
It did not specify the substantive result of any regula-
tions EPA was to propose and only required EPA to
initiate “regulatory action” for other pollutants identi-
fied through the research program. The regulations en-
visaged by the Agreement were, after full notice and
comment, to be promulgated in phases by December 31,
1979 and the industries affected were to comply with
them by June 30, 1983.
Had the Companies appealed from the Decree, the scope of our
review would have been narrow. “The district court’s approval of a
proposed settlement by consent decree should be reversed only if its
approval is an abuse of the district court’s discretion.” United
States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d 486, 442 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (plurality opinion) ; accord Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1015
(7th Cir. 1980) ; Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union,
614 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
10a
The district court explained in its Decree that the
Companies would be free to influence the content of the
proposed regulations by participating in the rulemaking
proceedings and then could attack the legality of any
final regulations in court. 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. at 2121. The
court also emphasized that EPA and NRDC had modified
the Agreement to make clear that the court would not
review EPA’s “substantive judgments” under it. Id.
When EPA’s implementation of the Agreement failed
to meet the deadlines imposed therein, NRDC moved to
have the Administrator held in contempt. Soon after, the
Companies moved to vacate the Decree on the grounds
that the 1977 Amendments to what became known as
the CWA had superseded the Decree and rendered it
moot, and that the Decree violated the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice and comment provisions. EPA
and NRDC then jointly moved for an order modifying
the Decree in settlement of NRDC’s contempt motion.
On March 9, 1979 the district court modified the Decree
according to EPA’s and NRDC’s request and denied the
Companies’ motion to vacate the Decree. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). In general, the modifi-
cations granted EPA more time and flexibility to imple-
ment the requirements of the Decree in exchange for re-
quiring EPA to provide NRDC more detailed information
regarding implementation. Several of the Companies
appealed the District court’s decision, which we affirmed.
We found that Congress did not intend the 1977 Amend-
ments to supersede the Decree, that the district court con-
tinued to have the power to enforce the Decree, and that
the modifications in the Decree were not “rules” within
the meaning of the APA for which EPA had to provide
notice and comment. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Costle, supra, 636 F.2d at 1244, 1251, 1255-56. How-
ever, we remanded the case for the district court to con-
sider whether the settlement agreement impermissibly
infringes on the discretion Congress committed to the
lla
EPA Administrator to make certain decisions under the
CWA. Id. at 1258-59.
On remand, the Companies filed a motion to vacate or,
alternatively, to revise the Decree on the ground that it
impermissibly infringed upon the Administrator’s discre-
tion under the CWA. EPA filed a cross-motion to modify
the Decree in light of changed circumstances, seeking to
extend certain deadlines and to delete from the Decree
those provisions compelling the performance of “discre-
tionary” actions by the Agency.
In a memorandum opinion filed February 5, 1982, the
district court found that the Agreement “does not im-
permissibly infringe upon the discretion accorded to the
EPA Administrator by Congress.” Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2084, 2090 (D.D.C. 1982). Accordingly, it en-
tered an order on the same date denying the Companies’
motion. The district court based its decision on five fac-
tors. First, it stressed the breadth of a district court’s
equitable power to give effect to remedial statutes. Sec-
ond, it concluded that the Decree was “process” rather
than “result” oriented. Third, it pointed out that the
parties had participated extensively in formulating the
Decree. Fourth, it noted that it had taken a flexible ap-
proach to fashioning the Decree, modifying it a number
of times in response to objections raised by the parties.
Finally, it found that Congress had the Decree in mind
when it enacted the 1977 Amendments to the CWA and
“clearly approved of its procedures.” Id. at 2087-89.
On May 7, 1982 the district court issued a second
order, denying EPA’s cross-motion and directing the
Agency to submit proposed schedules for promulgating
within one year all those regulations envisaged by the
Agreement which had not yet been promulgated.* The
On June 21, 1982 EPA moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (b)
for an order modifying the district court’s May 7 order so as to give
2
S
12a
Companies have appealed from the district court’s first
order and from that part of the second order which de-
nied EPA’s request to delete those portions of the Decree
allegedly involving matters entrusted to the Administra-
tor’s discretion under the CWA. EPA has not appealed
the denial of that request.
DISCUSSION
The February 5, 1982 Order
The Companies’ principal contentions on appeal are
that: (1) the district court had no power to approve the
provisions of the Agreement which direct EPA to take
actions not required to remedy specific violations of the
CWA; and (2) these provisions impermissibly infringe
on the EPA Administrator’s statutory discretion by pre-
cluding him from taking action otherwise open to him
under the CWA.
L
Underlying both these contentions is the distinction
drawn by the Companies between “statutory” and “non-
statutory” provisions in the Agreement. They maintain
that certain provisions in the Agreement flow directly
from specific requirements in the Act and hence are
“statutory.” As to the presence of these provisions in
the Decree, the Companies raise no objection.’ However,
the Agency more time to promulgate the required regulations. On
August 25, 1982 the district court issued an order indicating its
willingness to grant EPA's motion if this court were to remand for
that purpose, which it did on September 10, 1982. The district court
then entered the order on October 26, 1982.
Following oral argument of this appeal, EPA and NRDC jointly
moved for an order modifying paragraph 10(b) of the Decree. In
an order dated June 10, 1988 the district court found the requested
modification consistent with § 807 (b) of the CWA, and on July 18,
1988 we remanded to the district court for entry of an order grant-
ing the joint motion.
7 The Companies identify only Paragraphs 7 and 18 as belonging
in this category. In their view, these provisions impose deadlines on
18a
they assert that other provisions, which they refer to as
“non-statutory,” are not mandated by the Act and thus
should have been excluded from the Decree by the dis-
trict court. The Companies admit that the “non-statu-
tory” provisions could have been included in the Agree-
ment—but not in the Decree.
Amongst the so-called “non-statutory” provisions are
ones which “impose criteria not prescribed in the statute
for EPA’s regulations.” Br. for Appellants at 17. Here
the Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 8 of the Decree,
which sets forth criteria for EPA’s decision to exclude
“specific pollutants” or “point source categories” from
proposed regulations.“ Under the CWA, EPA is required
EPA for the promulgation of regulations explicitly required by the
CWA, and therefore do not impermissibly restrict EPA’s statutory
discretion. Br. for Appellants at 16-17.
8. (a) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-
lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts,
for a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to
publication of proposed regulations for such point source cate-
gory, the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the
effluent limitations and guidelines, standards of performance,
and/or pretreatment standards contemplated by this Agreement
for such category a specific pollutant for any of the following
reasons, based upon information available to him:
(i) Equally or more stringent protection is already
provided by an effluent, new source performance, or pretreat-
ment standard or by an effluent limitation and guideline pro-
mulgated pursuant to Section(s) 301, 804, 306, 807 (a), 807(b)
or 807 (e) of the Act.
14
to analyze various factors in the course of developing
toxic pollutant regulations. Section 307 (a) (1) of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a) (1), provides that:
limitation for such pollutant pursuant to the requirements of
Section 307; or
(iii) the specific pollutant is either not present in the
discharge or in the effluent which is introduced into treatment
works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly
owned or is present only in trace amounts and is neither caus-
ing, nor likely to cause, toxic effects with respect to any iden-
tifiable organisms affected or likely to be affected by such dis-
charge or effluent.
Such exclusions may also be made following proposal or pro-
mulgation of standards whenever information comes to the at-
tention of the Administrator indicating that exclusion for any
of the foregoing reasons is warranted.
(b) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-
lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts, for
a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to pub-
lication of proposed regulations for such point source category,
the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the pre-
treatment standards contemplated by this Agreement all point
sources within a point source category or point source subcate-
gory:
(i) if 95 percent or more of all point sources in the
point source category or subcategory introduce into treatment
works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly
owned only pollutants which are susceptible to treatment by
such treatment works and which do not interfere with, do not
pass through, or are not otherwise incompatible with such treat-
ment works, or
15a
The Administrator in publishing any revised list [of
toxic pollutants subject to regulation] shall take into
account toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, de-
gradability, the usual or potential presence of the
affected organisms in any waters, the importance of
the affected organisms, and the nature and extent of
the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms.
The Companies contend that because the criteria specified
in Paragraph 8 of the Decree are more extensive than
those set out in section 307(a) (1) of the Act, the criteria
should not be incorporated in the Decree.
Also alleged to be “non-statutory” are provisions which
“create programs, not found in the statute, which EPA
must now undertake.” Br. for Appellants at 18. Here the
Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 4(c) of the Decree,
which requires EPA to “identify and study” additional
pollutants (aside from the 65 listed ones) for which pre-
treatment standards may be necessary. Paragraph 4(c)
describes in detail how EPA is to fulfill this requirement
by implementing a study program to identify other pol-
lutants for which EPA should initiate “regulatory
to this section of this Agreement, he shall promptly serve upon
the parties to the captioned cases, or their designated repre-
sentative or attorney, a statement under oath designating the
point source category or subcategory or specific pollutant to be
eacluded together with the reasons therefore. Such statement
shall detail the reasons for the Administrator's exclusion, and
shall set forth the data and information forming the basis for
the exclusion. Proposed regulations for each point source cate-
gory or subeategory shall identify each such exclusion, shall
summarize the Administrator's statement, and shall invite pub-
16a
action.”* Paragraph 4(c) appears to leave the scope,
substance and particulars of “regulatory action” to EPA’s
discretion, as subject to the rulemaking process. Section
4(c) The Administrator shall establish and implement a pro-
gram to identify and study other pollutants which are intro-
duced into such treatment works and which are not susceptible
to treatment by such works or which interfere with, pass
through, or are otherwise incompatible with such works. The
program shall, at a minimum, address those pollutants listed in
Appendix C identifiable by computer-based mass spectra search
programs (“computer matching”), and shall consist of steps
to: tentatively identify by computer matching pollutants dis-
charged by point source categories listed in Appendix B; de-
termine frequencies of occurrence and order-of-magnitude con-
centrations for the tentatively identified pollutants; analyti-
cally confirm the computed identification of those pollutants
found with significant frequency in at least one subcategory
and in high concentrations (the term “high” to be based on
comparison with the concentrations of other pollutants found or
known to be in the discharge and, where possible, on readily
available information with respect to toxicity of the pollutants) ;
determine for those pollutants analytically confirmed, based
laboratory test data and/or field studies, or other appropriate
17a
307 (b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (b), which discusses
pretreatment standards, states only that EPA must
promulgate such standards “[n]ot later than ninety days
after . . publication [of proposed regulations], and
after opportunity for public hearing... The Com-
panies complain that the program called for in Paragraph
40e) “is [not] mentioned in, much less required by, the
Act.“ Br. for Appellants at 19.
NRDC and EPA do not dispute that such provisions as
Paragraphs 4(c) and 8 in the Decree are not mandated
by the CWA. However, they contend that the programs
and criteria specified in the Decree are consistent with
the Act and do not bind the Agency to any particular sub-
stantive outcome. Instead, the programs and criteria es-
tablish analytic processes that EPA must employ in for-
mulating proposed standards. NRDC and EPA both be-
lieve that there is a sufficient nexus between the Decree
and the Act, even if every provision in the Decree is not
derived from a particular requirement of the CWA.
II.
The Companies' first contention, regarding the distriet
court’s power to approve the “non-statutory” provisions
of the Decree, requires a brief discussion of the principles
of law government consent decrees. In United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1971), the Supreme
Court provided the following analysis:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to
litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save
themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of
litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally
embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving
of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give
up something they might have won had they pro-
18a
ceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself can-
not be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have
purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the
resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing
purposes as the respective parties have the bargain-
ing power and skill to achieve.
(Footnote omitted). Elsewhere the Supreme Court has
stated that
{cJonsent decrees and orders have attributes both of
contracts and of judicial decrees or, in this case, ad-
ministrative orders. While they are arrived at by
negotiation between the parties and often admit no
violation of law, they are motivated by threatened
or pending litigation and must be approved by the
court or administrative agency.
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 US.
223, 236 n.10 (1975). While construction of a consent
decree is essentially a matter of contract law, see United
States v. Armour & Co., supra; Sportmart, Inc. v. Wol-
verine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.
1979), the decree itself must be treated “as a judicial
act.” United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115
(1932). Finally, a district court’s “authority to adopt a
consent decree comes only from the statute which the de-
cree is intended to enforce.” System Federation No. 91,
Railway Employees’ Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright,
364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961).
The district court referred to the Agreement as a
“classic settlement.” 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2122.
The Agreement certainly follows the principles laid down
in United States v. Armour and United States v. ITT
Continental Baking, supra. By its terms, EPA achieved
its objective of basing the regulation of toxic discharges
on a technology-based, industry-by-industry approach in-
stead of a health-based, pollutant-by-pollutant method.
19a
As we have previously noted, the technology-based ap-
proach “marked a change in EPA’s regulatory strategy”
and “offered substantial advantages over the old” one.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 636
F.2d at 1235-36. In addition, as the district court stated,
the Agreement represents a compromise for NRDC insofar
as it accepted that EPA could regulate toxic pollutants
under section 304 of the Act rather than under the health-
based effluent standards called for by section 307, as
NRDC’s complaint had alleged. 8 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 2122. At the same time, NRDC also bene-
fited from the Agreement, which bound EPA to promul-
gate regulations without specifying the exact substance
of those regulations according to a fixed timetable for a
specified list of pollutants.
Nevertheless, the Companies contend that, while EPA
was free to dispose of this litigation by entering into the
Agreement with NRDC, the district court had no author-
ity to enforce those parts of it which “go beyond statutory
requirements.” Br. for Appellants at 26. They assert
that since, under System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,
supra, the court’s authority to approve the Agreement
“comes only” from the CWA, each provision in the
Agreement must be necessary to remedy a specific viola-
tion of the Act. In other words, the district court was
permitted only to remedy those wrongs which it could
specifically identify.
We think that this view of a court’s power to adopt a
consent decree is unduly narrow. The rule contended for
by the Companies depends on an overly literal reading of
System Federation No. 91 v. Wright. The statement that
a district court’s “authority to adopt a consent decree
comes only from the statute which the decree is intended
to enforce,” 364 U.S. at 651, means only that the focus
of the court’s attention in assessing the agreement should
be the purposes which the statute is intended to serve,
rather than the interests of each party to the settlement.
nt el a ede oy
15
Before approving the settlement in this case, the district
court held hearings and solicited comments, and concluded
that the Agreement was “a just, fair, and equitable reso-
lution of the issues raised” in these cases, 8 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 2122, and that it was “consistent with
Congress’ intent that water pollution be curbed by 1983.“
Id. The fact that certain provisions in the Decree track
the language of the Act more closely than others is irrele-
vant, so long as all are consistent with it. The Com-
panies’ suggested approach would require the court to
undertake a close examination of each part of the Decree
in order to establish that it was responsive to a specific
violation of the Act. This would require, in turn, detailed
findings that the Act had been violated in various ways.
However, the long-standing rule is that a district court
has power to enter a consent decree without first deter-
mining that a statutory violation has occurred. Swift &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928). % The
© As Justice Brandeis stated in Swift:
It is contended that the consent decree was without jurisdic-
tion because it was entered without the support of facts. The
argument is that jurisdiction under the Anti-Trust Acts cannot
be conferred by consent; that jurisdiction can exist only if the
laws is not sufficient; that the facts must also be established
according to the regular course of chancery procedure; that this
2la
court’s duty when passing upon a settlement agreement
is fundamentally different from its duty in trying a case
on the merits. As we have previously held, “prior to ap-
proving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of
the settlement’s overall fairness to beneficiaries and con-
sistency with the public interest“ United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 318, 317 (D.C. Cir.
1977), quoting United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus-
tries, 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975). In a more
recent case, the Seventh Circuit has explained the nature
of the inquiry to be undertaken by the district court:
The trial court in approving a settlement need not
inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor
reach and resolve the merits of the claims or con-
troversy, but need only determine that the settlement
is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under
the particular facts and that there has been valid
consent by the concerned parties.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980);
accord United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d
435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Franks v. Kroger
Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1224 (6th Cir. 1981); Patterson v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York, 514
F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430
F.Supp. 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977); see also Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n. 14 (1981);
Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Com-
promise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1814, 1816
(1959).
an error is waived by the consent to the decree. Clearly it does
not go to the power of the court to adjudicate between the
parties.
276 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted).
22a
Furthermore, it is precisely the desire to avoid a pro-
tracted examination of the parties’ legal rights which
underlies consent decrees. Not only the parties, but the
general public as well, benefit from the saving of time
and money that results from the voluntary settlement of
litigation. Thus, “[vJoluntary settlement of civil con-
troversies is in high judicial favor.“ Autera v. Robinson,
419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In light of these settled principles governing judicial
approval of settlement agreements, we see no merit to the
distinction drawn by the Companies between “statutory”
and “non-statutory” provisions of the Decree. The dis-
trict court’s findings that the Agreement was consistent
with the purpose of the CWA and that it fairly resolved
the controversy demonstrate that it conscientiously per-
formed the duty of a court when asked to approve a set-
tlement agreement. The focus of the court’s inquiry
throughout was the Act itself, as System Federation No.
91 requires. As the court determined, and as EPA itself
now urges, the Decree as a whole provides an effective
means of carrying out EPA’s obligations under the Act,
and one that is acceptable to both sides in this dispute.
It therefore was clearly within the district court’s power
to enter the Decree.
The Companies wanted the district court to do more
than test whether the Decree complied with the purpose
of the Act. The Companies in effect wanted the district
court to circumscribe EPA’s discretion to implement the
CWA by stating that EPA could not enter into this De-
cree to settle a lawsuit attacking EPA’s actions under the
Act. If the court had done so, the practical effect would
have been to limit EPA’s discretion to move forward with
its preferred CWA toxic regulation program, which the
Decree promoted and protected. We believe the court’s
role should be more restrained.”
11 It would be especially unfortunate if a lack of judicial restraint
stified the evolution of less adversarial approaches to developing
3 = >). r
28a
III.
The Companies’ second contention is that the Decree
impermissibly infringes on EPA’s discretion by dictating
the approach to be taken by the Agency in promulgating
regulations under the CWA. They claim that “the estab-
lishment of criteria and the development of programs
within the confines of its regulatory obligations are funda-
mental aspects of the Agency’s discretion under the Act.
In the absence of the Decree, EPA could in the exercise
of this discretion choose whether or not to establish the
criteria and programs which the Decree mandates.”
Reply Br. for Appellants at 21.
The Companies rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978), as support for their argument. In particular,
they cite the following passage as evidence that a court
has no power to specify the procedures to be utilized by
an agency: “The court should . . . not stray beyond the
judicial province to explore the procedural format or to
impose upon the agency its own notion of which proce-
dures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, un-
defined public good.” Id. at 549. The Companies argue
that both the Supreme Court and this court have re-
peatedly emphasized their intention to prohibit interfer-
ence by the judiciary with procedural matters committed
by statute to an agency’s discretion. See, e. g., Steadman
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981); Chrysler Corp v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979); Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural
regulations. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for Malaise, 71 Geo. LJ. 1 (1982) (describing the costs and fre-
plemental procedure); see also Note, Rethinking Regulation: Ne-
gotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1871 (1981). -
24a
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
EPA and NRDC advance the same reasons for affirm-
ing the district court’s decision that were relied on by the
district court itself. Conceding that the decree infringes
to some extent on EPA’s discretion under the CWA, they
contend that on the facts of this case the level of in-
fringement is permissible. First, they assert that the
Decree, far from prescribing any substantive outcome,
merely sets forth procedures designed to remedy the
Agency’s prior allegedly unlawful actions. Second, they
argue that EPA was a “prime formulator” of the Decree
and that its judgment is entitled to great deference.
Finally, they stress that Congress implicitly determined,
by means of the 1977 Amendments to the Act, that the
limits placed by the Decree on EPA's discretion were
appropriate.
We begin by noting that the infringement of agency
discretion issue normally arises in the context of a judi-
cial order disposing of a case on its merits.” The issue is
framed somewhat differently here because the Decree was
entered by the district court with EPA’s consent. It may
well be, as the Companies argue, that “a court has a duty
to determine that any consent judgment rendered is
within the bounds of its judicial power, notwithstanding
However, in a recent case this Court identified the issue in a
different context, that of a pretrial stipulation staying the proceed-
ings. National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 301
(D.C. Cir. 1981), a decision which features prominently in the ap-
25a
the parties’ consent.” Br. for Appellants at 40. Neverthe-
less, as the discussion in Part II above indicates, a court
fulfills its responsibility in this respect simply by deter-
mining that the settlement is consistent with the statute
the consent judgment is to enforce and fairly and reason-
ably resolves the controversy in a manner consistent with
the public interest. Thus, the Companies’ claim that a
court does not have power to fashion consent decrees
based upon its perception of the public interest misses
the point. The Decree here was largely the work of EPA
and the other parties to these suits, not the district
court; manifestly, the requirements imposed by the De-
cree do not represent judicial intrusion into the Agency’s
affairs to the same extent they would if the Decree were
“a creature of judicial cloth.” Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139,
141 (1981).
For this reason, the district court’s decision to enter
the Decree does not run afoul of the holding in Vermont
Yankee. As we stated in Association of National Adver-
tisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 619 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1979):
The Court [in Vermont Yankee] held that absent
extraordinary circumstances the federal courts can-
not upset the products of agency rulemaking on the
ground that the agency abused its discretion in fail-
ing to provide procedures that the courts rather than
Congress or the agency believed necessary. Thus the
case restricts the ability of courts to refashion nor-
ma] rulemaking procedures with judicially-conceived
notions of administrative fair play.
In Vermont Yankee it was undisputed that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission had fully complied with the pro-
cedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. The issue was whether a court could order that
agency to afford more procedural rights to license appli-
cants than the APA provided. Here, by contrast, EPA
failed to comply with the statutory directive that the
Agency promulgate various regulations. The ultimate
26a
issue raised by NRDC’s suit, therefore, was what action
EPA should be required to take in order to correct that
deficiency. Since the solution arrived at was to a consid-
erable extent the work of the Agency itself, and since the
district court’s role was confined to approving the fair-
ness of the consent decree which incorporates it and en-
suring the consistency of the Decree with the Act, Ver-
mont Yankee’s concern for “judicially-conceived notions
of administrative fair play” is inapposite here.
None of the other cases cited by the Companies satisfy
us that the Decree impermissibly infringes on the EPA
Administrator’s statutory discretion. First, none of them
involve consent decrees. Second, they do not support the
Companies’ position in this case. For example, our state-
ment in Public Service Commission of New York v. Fed-
eral Power Commission, 543 F.2d 757, 833 n.42 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), that “a court may not compel an administra-
tive agency to pursue a particular course of action when
another is open to it” is quoted out of context by the
Companies. As a reading of the rest of the opinion makes
clear, “a particular course of action” refers to the
agency’s final decision on the merits of the question be-
fore it. See Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power
Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) (holding that this Court had
“usurped an administrative function” in deciding that a
license should be issued by the FPC without the conditions
attached to it by the agency). The Decree here does not
prescribe the content of the regulations that EPA must
promulgate. Nor does the Decree direct the Agency to
enforce the regulations in any particular way.
In National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United
States Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we
27a
sonable.“ The court's error lay in its failure to recognize
the Postal Service’s broad discretion over “internal man-
agement matters.” Id. at 432. In Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975), another case involving the federal government’s
efforts to curb water pollution, we reversed in part a dis-
trict court order requiring EPA to publish by a fixed
date all effluent limitations guidelines mandated by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (1) (A). We held that the
district court had erred in setting a deadline for publi-
cation of guidelines covering categories of “point sources”
not listed in the statute, as Congress had clearly intended
to leave such matters to the Agency’s discretion. Here
We are reviewing an order approving a settlement agree-
ment that EPA voluntarily entered into, rather than an
order requiring EPA to take action against its will.
Hence our admonition in Train concerning the limits of
a court’s role in effectuating regulatory legislation“ is
not applicable. Indeed, in this case the Companies want
the court to narrow EPA’s discretion to settle litigation
in a manner that permits EPA to implement the CWA
through EPA’s preferred approach.
Our decision in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) supports the district court’s
holding. In Adams we affirmed a district court order re-
quiring the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to take various steps to end segregation in public schools
pursuant to Title VI. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
that HEW had adopted a general policy of seeking volun-
tary compliance with the statute which amounted to an
abdication of its statutory duty. In its appeal, HEW con-
18 “Where there has been no violation of a statutory duty, we
think the proper course is to confine ourselves to a declaration of
the intent of Congress and to give the Administrator latitude to
exercise his discretion in shaping the implementation of the Act.”
610 F.2d at 711-12.
28a
tended that “although enforcement is required, the means
of enforcement is a matter of absolute agency discretion
... Id. at 1162. We rejected this argument and con-
cluded that, in light of the unequivocal duty imposed on
the agency by Title VI, the district court acted properly
in directing it to pursue an affirmative enforcement pol-
icy. We think our observation in Adams v. Richardson,
to which we recently referred in Adams v. Bell, No.
81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24, 9 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 1983) (en
banc) is equally applicable to this case: [Ol ur purpose,
and the purpose of the District Court order as we under-
stand it, is not to resolve particular questions of compli-
ance or noncompliance. It is, rather, to assure that the
agency properly construes its statutory obligations, and
that the policies it adopts and implements are consistent
with those duties and not a negation of them.” 480 F.2d
at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted).
Finally, we think that the argument, advanced by EPA
and NRDC, that Congress implicitly sanctioned the lim-
ited infringement on the Agency’s discretion which the
Decree entails is well taken. As set out in our prior
opinion, 636 F.2d at 1238-45, the legislative history of
the 1977 Amendments contains numerous references to
the Decree which suggest that “Congress expected the
settlement agreement to continue in effect.” Id. at 1244.
We pause to emphasize just one of many: Senator Mus-
kie, chairman of the Senate subcommittee that reviewed
14 We also noted in Adams v. Richardson that [f lar from dictat-
ing the final result with regard to any of these [school] districts,
the order merely requires initiation of a process which, excepting
contemptuous conduct, will then pass beyond the District Court’s
continuing control and supervision.” 480 F.2d at 1168 n.5, quoted
in Adams v. Bell, No. 81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24 (D. C. Cir. June 10,
1988) (en banc). The same may be said of the Decree in this case:
it requires EPA to begin the process of formulating regulations in
compliance with the Act and describes a methodology to be followed
by the Agency, but it leaves the outcome of the process (the sub-
stantive regulations) to the Agency’s discretion.
29a
EPA’s implementation of the Act and floor manager of
the Conference Report in the Senate, explained to his col-
leagues that [t] he conference agreement was specifically
designed to codify the so-called ‘Flannery decision,’ [a
consent decree that] ... EPA has been implementing.”
123 Cong. Rec. 39, 181 (1977), quoted in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 686 F.2d at 1243.
Had Congress felt that the Decree infringed too much on
the discretion it had given EPA’s Administrator, that
sentiment would likely have appeared in the legislative
history. The Companies cannot identify any evidence of
it, and all we have found is evidence to the contrary.
The May 7, 1982 Order
The Companies also appeal from part of the district
court’s order of May 7, 1982, denying EPA’s cross-motion
to modify the Decree in certain respects. EPA itself does
not. appeal from that decision. The Companies’ argu-
ments with respect to this order are similar to the ones
they make with respect to the first order. In essence,
they contend that the district court erred in declining to
exclude from the Decree those provisions which the Com-
panies deem “non-statutory.” For the reasons stated
above in our review of the February 5 order, we find no
error in the district court’s order of May 7, 1982.
We note in passing that the Companies’ concern that
the district court has imposed a “high hurdle to modifi-
cation of the Decree,” Br. for Appellants at 56, appears
misplaced. The district court’s own assessment of the
flexibility with which it has administered the Decree, 16
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2089, is borne out by the
record. For example, while this appeal was pending, the
district court twice considered Rule 60(b) motions by
EPA and NRDC to extend certain deadlines for the
promulgation of regulations and for compliance by the
Companies therewith, and in each case decided to grant
the motion. See note 6 supra.
30a
CONCLUSION
The settlement agreement between EPA and NRDC
does not impermissibly infringe on the EPA Administra-
tor’s discretion under the Clean Water Act. Therefore,
the district court properly entered the Decree and its
orders denying the motions to vacate, revise, or modify
the Decree are affirmed.
31
WILKEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This case comes
before this Court again on one issue: does the consent
decree impermissibly restrict the discretion of the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency?
I conclude that it does, and so would modify the decree
“to restore the agency’s discretion.
I. THE Lntrrs IMPOSED ON THE
ADMINISTRATOR’S DISCRETION
The consent decree at issue in this case is a judicial
act.“ It is not a contractual settlement agreement? or
a tentative projection of agency policy. The court shaped
it, scrutinizing and even altering its terms.* The court
will be called upon to enforce it, should the agency have
a change of heart.‘
1 Pope v. United States, 823 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1982).
2 This court has already faced a case which raised similar issues
in a contractual context. See National Audubon Society, Inc. v.
Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although the court in that
In undertaking this, or any other, judicial act, the
court must heed the limits on the power of an Article
III court.“ The court’s power to adopt a consent decree
is limited by the terms of the statute it seeks to enforce.*
The court cannot prescribe rules of procedure to an ad-
ministrative agency,’ nor may it enlarge upon the stat-
ute’s substantive requirements.* In short, the court can
only enter as a consent decree such relief as would have
been within its jurisdictional power had the case gone to
trial.“
The case law makes perfectly clear that one sort of
judicial relief commanding the Executive Branch to
exercise its administrative discretion in a particular
way—exceeds the reach of the federal court. Case after
federal case has established that federal courts may not
tell the Executive or Legislative Branches how to exer-
cise their diseretion.“ As one court has explained the
doctrine :
5 System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652-58
(1961).
Id.
1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 U.S. 519
(1978).
® National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United States
Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arling-
ton Heights, 469 F.Supp. 836, 865 (N. D. III. 1979), af d, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
1 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 US.
228, 227-28 (1980) (a reviewing court “cannot ‘interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the
action to be taken.); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 881-84 (1976) (setting aside court order ro-
r oho ade cae
Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1962) (reversing court order which modified
This self-imposed limitation on judicial power stems
from the doctrine of separation of powers; courts
cannot invade the jurisdiction of the other depart-
ments of government in matters of policy, and for a
court to substitute its judgment or discretion for
that of a member of the executive branch would
amount to such an invasion."
The consent decree at issue here cannot be recon-
ciled with this principle. All parties agree on the dis-
positive issue: the decree does restrict the discretion of
the Administrator of the EPA.“ The consent decree con-
strains the agency in two basic ways. It requires the
agency to apply criteria and standards not found in the
Clean Water Act, and it requires the agency to under-
take programs that are not required by the statute.
These constraints are not de minimis. This is obvious,
of course, from the fact that the legitimacy of these re-
straints is worth litigating. They impose duties on the
Administrator that differ in kind as well as in scope
from those duties imposed by the Act.
A. Paragraph 4(c)
Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, for example, re-
quires the agency to “identify and study” additional pol-
lutants to be subject to future pretreatment standards.”
The decree specifies with great particularity the meth-
ity in which FCC should consider license applications); National
Assoc. of Postal Supervisors v. United States Postal Service, 602
F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (setting aside court ordered pay in-
crease).
u Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 382 F.2d 38, 45
(8rd Cir. 1967).
1 Brief for Appellants at 16; Brief for Federal Appellees [here-
inafter EPA Brief) at 23; Brief for Appellees NRDC [herein-
after NRDC Brief) at 24.
Joint Appendix (JA) at 160.
34a
ods by which the Administrator must identify a list of
pollutants that are “candidates for national regulation,”
the grounds upon which he may then remove pollutants
from this list of “candidates,” and then concludes by
requiring the Administrator to “undertake regulatory
action for those pollutants remaining on the list.”
The Clean Water Act, by way of contrast, requires no
such precisely delineated regulatory program. Section
307 (b) of the Act requires only that the EPA promul-
gate standards for incompatible pollutants within a speci-
fied time period after the enactment of the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 and “from
time to time thereafter.” "*
B. Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8 of the decree similarly sets forth require-
ments and criteria for removing substances from the list
of toxic pollutants."* The statutory provision “ requires
the EPA to take into account “toxicity of the pollutant,
its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential pres-
ence of the organisms in any waters, the importance of
the affected organisms, and the nature and effect of the
toxic pollutant on such organisms.” So long as the Ad-
ministrator does not act arbitrarily and capriciously, the
court cannot vacate his decision. Even if his action is
“arbitrary and capricious,” the court’s power is limited
by statute to ordering a redetermination."
Paragraph 8 of the consent decree sets forth a differ-
ent set of criteria for the Administrator to follow. The
court decree replaces the “considerations” set forth by
the statute with specifically defined circumstances under
4 838 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (Supp. V 1981).
* JA at 161-1638.
1 83 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
7 Id.
35a
which the Administrator may choose not to regulate
specific pollutants. The Administrator must regulate the
pollutants unless they fit within the alternative categories
decreed by the court.
C. Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12 requires the EPA to establish “a spe-
cific and substantial program” to determine if “more
stringent” effluent standards are necessary to protect
water quality.“ The decree defines the required program
with precision: the Administrator must identify navi-
gable waters which are seriously contaminated by toxic
pollutants, identify toxic pollutants for which more
stringent limitations may be necessary, and publish a
strategy for reducing or eliminating discharges of such
pollutants. No such program can be found anywhere in
the Act.”
In at least these provisions, the judicial decree imposes
duties on the Administrator which are not imposed by
the Act itself. The decree thus differs not in degree but
in kind from the decree the court might have issued if
the case had been tried. At most, the court could have
declared that the agency’s actions were inconsistent with
the statute; at most, the court could have required the
agency to perform those functions mandated by the
statute. In no circumstances could the court have obliged
the agency to take discretionary action which differed
from that required by the statute.
JA at 161-168.
9 JA at 164-165.
The agency argues that this paragraph is meant to
grate” Sections 302, 308 and 807(a) of the Clean Water Act.
for Federal Appellees at 23.
However, none of these provisions contains any requirements for
establishment of a program and publication of a strategy.
36a
The duties imposed by the court’s decree may not be
inconsistent with the Act; each action taken by the Ad-
ministrator under the decree might also conform with the
Act. But the Administrator’s discretion clearly is fet-
tered—under the Act alone, he could choose to switch to
another equally reasonable mode of compliance with the
Act; under the consent decree he may not swerve from his
judicially appointed course without risking contempt of
court charges.
II. THE “PERMISSIBILITY” OF LIMITING THE
ADMINISTRATOR'S DISCRETION
The court’s decree clearly intruded upon the province
of the executive. The court went far beyond merely deter-
mining whether the EPA has acted lawfully in imple
menting the Clean Water Act. It imposed a consent de-
cree consisting in large part of provisions which are
neither mandated by the Clean Water Act nor necessary
to ensure that the EPA performs its statutory duties.
The trial court and the appellees argue that these con-
straints on the agency are somehow “permissible.” ™
While some of the arguments advanced in this regard are
frivolous,” others raise serious constitutional and pru-
dential issues.“
21 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 18838 (D.D.C.); EPA Brief at 32-89; NRDC
Brief at 21-88. The majority finds that the decree does not “im-
permissibly infringe” on the Administrator's discretion, Majority
Opinion at 80, but fails to specify whether it holds that the decree
does not infringe upon the Administrator's discretion at all—
Nothing in the concept of “executive discretion” gives an agency
87a
A. Process or Result
The majority argues that those cases forbidding courts
to intrude upon an agency’s discretion speak only to situa-
tions where the court would make “the agency’s final deci-
sion on the merits of the question before it.“ This claim
has two flaws. First, it is not supported by the case law.
The prior cases limiting a court’s power to intrude upon
an agency’s discretion dealt with issues as far removed
from “final determination on the merits” as the order in
which applications should be considered by the agency,”
and the agency’s method of gathering evidence.“
More subtly, the argument overstates the distinction
between “merits” and “procedural” determinations.
Where, as here, the “process” oriented decree requires the
creation of new programs the court’s decree always will
affect substantive agency actions. The consent decree com-
mits the EPA Administrator to certain choices—choices
as to priorities, choices as to methods, choices as to alloca-
tion of resources. Such choices are not free. By choosing
to follow the course of action outlined in the consent de-
cree, the EPA necessarily has incurred certain costs.
Some of those costs relate to the balancing of conflicting
goals—here, the EPA is committed to a certain level of
environmental protection, even though that level of pro-
concluded only that the 1977 amendments to the Act did not super-
sede the decree. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 686
F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980). We are content to accept the silence
of the Act on the validity of this decree for what it is—silence.
To the extent that the majority argues that Congress has im-
plicitly approved all consent decrees of this type, it fails to avoid
the underlying issue: whether either Congress or the courts can
delegate executive functions to the judicial branch without violating
separation of powers principles.
„Majority Opinion at 26.
* FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184 (1940).
* FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 428 U.S. 326,
888 (1976).
38a
tection might ultimately generate uneconomic costs for the
public. Still other costs relate to the EPA’s allocation of
its own resources. By committing some of its all-too-
scarce resources to the programs mandated by the consent
decree, the EPA necessarily foregoes developing or en-
forcing other priorities.
The court, by confining the Administrator’s discretion,
thus involves itself—subtly but nonetheless inevitably—
in issues of agency policy. The EPA, in its unsuccessful
bid to be released from the strictures of the decree, made
much the same argument to an unsympathetic district
court: “Extra obligations not required by statute neces-
sarily infringe on EPA’s ability to allocate its limited
resources in the way it finds best. As the Supreme
Court’s experience with the “outcome determinative” test
in the context of applying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins * goes to show, the line between those acts that de-
cide the merits and those that do not is one the existence
of which can be postulated, but not proved.
B. The Administrator's Consent
A more superficially appealing argument claims that
the agreement does not intrude upon the Administrator’s
discretion because he has agreed to its terms.” But,
a decree of this type binds not only those present Adminis-
trators who may welcome it, but also their successors who
may vehemently oppose it. For reasons that ultimately
have to do with preserving the democratic nature of our
Republic, American courts have never allowed an agency
A at 319.
8304 U.S. 88 (1988). For a general discussion of the waxing
and waning of the “outcome determinative” test between Guaranty
Trust of New York v. York, 826 U.S. 99 (1945) and Hanna v.
Plumer, 880 U.S. 460 (1965), see C. Waicnt, A. Mum & E.
Coorem, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PmocepuRE: JURISDICTION § 4504
(1982).
Majority Opinion at 25.
ee.
8 nas
39a
chief to bind his successor in the exercise of his discre-
tion.” Today’s majority decision effectively undercuts that
line of authority by allowing an Administrator to waive
his successor’s power of discretion—so long as a court is
willing to play accomplice.
C. The Equitable Powers of the Federal Courts
The most profoundly troubling of the arguments for the
consent decree holds that the court may, as an exercise of
its equity powers, take virtually any remedial action it
chooses.“ Only a rough equity balancing of all the facts of
the case would tell whether the court’s order was a “per-
missible” extension of its equity jurisdiction. Here, the
argument goes, the court’s action was justified as a prac-
tical way to resolve vexatious litigation.
This argument fails here for two reasons. First, appel-
lees err in contending that the equity power of the federal
courts knows no bounds but necessity.“ Appellees cor-
rectly note that in many cases federal courts have exer-
cised broad remedial powers in correcting Constitutional
violations. Courts have used their equitable powers to as-
See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206
(1980) (agency position on whether certain children were entitled
to interest payments from a statutorily created fund); West v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929) (agency determination as
to whether land contained minerals). See also National Audubon
Society, ine. ©. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 805 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
40a
sume administrative and legislative roles, supervising in
a highly active and intrusive manner prisons, school sys-
tems, mental hospitals and electoral apportionment.”
In those cases, however the court invariably acts
against state governments or individual citizens. Those
decisions in which the court seizes the broadest powers are
also those in which it declares that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers does not apply “vertically” when courts act
under the Supremacy Clause.“ In the case at issue, the
court acts against a coordinate and co-equal branch of
government. The court cannot take refuge in the Su-
premacy Clause. The court must face head-on the separa-
tion of powers issue.
The court’s infringement on the agency’s discretion
resolves that issue. The court here acts as an Administra-
tor. It acts without any statutory or constitutional man-
date; the contested provisions of the decree admittedly
exceed what could be required by the statute. To permit
the court’s equity powers to extend so far would abolish
the principle of separation of powers.
The argument also fails because even if the court’s
equity power might conceivably support the decree at
* See, ¢.g., James v. Wallace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 915, judgment
reversed in part, Alabama v. Pugh, 498 U.S. 781 (1978); United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Bducation, 872 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1969), modified per curiam on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d
885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 840 (1967). See generally,
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yate LJ. 685 (1982); Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change
in Public Institutions, 66 Va. I. Rev. 48 (1979).
rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 847, 852 (1976) (“[T)he separation-
of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no
applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States.)
See generally, Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Fed-
eral Equitable Remedies, 80 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978).
4la
issue, the court still should ask whether its exercise of
power is prudent. In this case of first impression, that
prudential inquiry must necessarily ask whether this new
device for agency administration will prove wise over
time. A look at this procedural innovation suffices to show
that government by consent decree is not only unconstitu-
tional but unwise.
First, any legitimate purpose served by the decree could
have been accomplished by other means. The agency did
not need a consent decree in order to take the actions
mandated by the decree. Since those actions were within
its discretion it could have pursued a course of action
precisely identical to that called for by the court order.
Nor did the agency need a consent decree to lend some
stability to its position. The agency could have, by under-
taking proper notice and comment rulemaking, issued the
substance of the consent decree as regulations.“ Such a
course of action would give all parties affected by the pro-
posed programs a chance to be heard, as well as bind the
agency not to change course “arbitrarily and capri-
cicusly.” *
The flaws with government by consent decree run
deeper than the superfluity of the device. The device in-
vites abuse—intentional or unintentional. Today’s action
may seem desirable to some because it requires a some-
times recalcitrant agency operating under a relatively
42a
mum of regulation “ or which enable regulated industries
to evade prosecution. Nor is the device limited to the
EPA. Under the typical broad and imprecise administra-
tive statute, almost any agency action would pass the
majority’s vague test that the decree somehow be “con-
sistent” with the law. An inattentive or unprincipled
court could thus bind successive administrations to a non-
statutory, limiting “process” of regulatory action.
The abuses to which this device can be put are limited
only by the almost inexhaustible imaginations of liti-
gants. The same sorts of “procedural” agreements that
the majority finds so innocuous could be used to limit the
manner in which an agency goes about seeking evidence
or to constrain the investigative practices of federal agen-
cies. EPA and OSHA, for example, could consent not to
conduct on site inspections without first rendering 60
days notice. Such a “procedural” agreement would be
fully acceptable under the majority’s approach; in prac-
tice, it would limit the effectiveness of the agencies.
The greatest evil of government by consent decree,
however, comes from its potential to freeze the regula-
tory processes of representative democracy. At best, even
with the most principled and fair-minded courts, the de-
vice adds friction.
wee. Se eae Se eS ae ee
48a
rule would. An agency can abandon a rule so long as the
change in policy is not arbitrary and capricious;* an
agency cannot escape a consent decree without the active
participation and approval of the court.
The commitment that occurs through a consent decree
takes place, however, without recourse to the public notice
requirements of notice and comment rulemaking. Those
third parties who wish to know of such consent decrees
would be faced with the nearly impossible task of moni-
toring all of the nation’s district courts. Even then, if
the filing of the suit and the consent decree coincide
closely in time, notice would amount only to learning that
the binding decree is a fait accompli.
Second, government by consent decree inhibits Con-
gressional influence on agency policy. No longer could an
agency freely and voluntarily respond to Congressional
concerns; action would be impossible without prior ap-
proval of the court. The informal give-and-take between
Congress and the agencies that characterizes modern ad-
ministrative practice would be squeezed out by the court’s
assumption of control.
Third, Executive Branch control over agency policy
would be hindered. So long as a consent decree remained
in force, no new policy spurred by a change in adminis-
trations (or prompted by a desire to avoid a change in
administrations) could take effect without the prior
blessing of the court. Conversely, the consent decree pro-
vides the executive with a vehicle for avoiding respon-
sibility for its programs.
This weakening of democratic control over agency pol-
icy accompanies an increase in the power of two non-
democratic groups. Government by consent decree en-
shrines at its very center those special interest groups
who are party to the decree. They stand in a strong tac-
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co., 108 8. Ct. 2856, 2865 (1988).
44a
tical position to oppose changing the decree, and so likely
will enjoy material influence on proposed changes in
agency policy.
Standing guard over the whole process is the court, the
one branch of our government which is by design least
responsive to democratic pressures and least fit to accom-
modate the many and varied interests affected by the
decree. The court can neither effectively negotiate with
all the parties affected by the decree, nor ably balance
the political and technological trade-offs involved. Even
the best-intentioned and most vigilant court will prove
institutionally incompetent to oversee an agency’s discre-
tionary actions.
As a policy device, then, government by consent decree
serves no necessary end. It opens the door to unforesee-
able mischief; it degrades the institutions of representa-
tive democracy and augments the power of special inter-
est groups. it does all of this in a society that hardly
needs new devices that emasculate representative democ-
racy and strengthen the power of special interests.
I see no need and no warrant for countenancing this
raid on the powers of the Executive Branch. I respect-
fully dissent.
45a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 79-1473
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
a Nonprofit New York Corporation, et al.
V.
DOUGLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,
Appellants
No. 79-1474
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.
V.
DouGLAS M. CosTLe, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,
Appellants
No. 79-1475
NATURAL Resources Derense CouNcIL, INC.
V.
Jau I. Aczz, as Assistant Administrator
for Water and Hazardous Materials,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et ul.,
Appellants
No. 79-1476
CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT AND
DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK
*
DoucLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,
Appellants
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(D.C. Civil Actions Nos. 75-0172, 2153-78,
75-1267, and 75-1698)
Argued March 25, 1980
Decided September 16, 1980
Richard E. Schwartz, with whom Thomas L. Anderson
was on the brief, for appellant American Iron and Steel
Institute.
Charles F. Lettow for appellants Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company et al.
Douglas E. Kliever and Mary W. Ennis were on the
brief for appellants Union Carbide Corporation et al.
Jacqueline M. Warren entered an appearance for ap-
pellees Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. et al.
James T. Banks, with whom Ronald J. Wileon was on
47a
Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, and Jacques B.
Gelin and Michael A. McCord, Attorneys, Department of
Justice, were on the brief, for appellee Environmental
Protection Agency. E. J. Shawaker, Attorney, Depart-
ment of Justice, and Richard G. Stoll, Attorney, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, also entered appearances for
appellee Environmental! Protection Agency.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and SwyGEerRT* and
ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge WRIGHT.
WricuT, Chief Judge: A group of companies in the
chemical, petroleum, rubber, and steel industries and an
industry association? (collectively “the Companies”) ap-
peal from a District Court order denying their motion to
vacate a settlement agreement (the Agreement) pre-
viously adopted by the court,’ and granting a motion for
modification of the settlement agreement filed by the
signatories to the Agreement—five environmental groups
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or
Agency). Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 12 ERC 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). The Companies
contend that the settlement agreement must be vacated
both because it has been superseded by legislation en-
*Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1976).
1 The companies are Union Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow
Chemical Co., E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Celanese Co., Olin
Corp., Monsanto Corp., Exxon Corp., Shell Oil Co., Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., and B. F. Goodrich Co.
* The American Iron and Stee Institute.
* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. b. Train, 8 ERC 2120
(D. D.C. 1976).
by because each of the law-
ts that were resolved by the Agreement is now moot
and must be dismissed. The Companies further contend
that in proposing the modifications to the settlement
agreement approved by the District Court EPA violated
rulemaking and public participation requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Clean Water Act, and
its own regulations, as well as requirements of consti-
tutional due process.
I.
Between 1978 and 1975 five environmental groups (col-
lectively “NRDC”) brought four separate lawsuits against
EPA to rectify the Agency’s alleged failure to imple
ment several provisions of the statute then known as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (1976). The first lawsuit chal-
lenged the criteria EPA was using to decide which pol-
lutants to include in a list of toxic pollutants the Agency
was required to compile by Section 307(a) of the
FWPCA, and also sought to expand EPA’s then existing
list of toxic pollutants (the toxic criteria case)“ The
second and third lawsuits were aimed at compelling EPA
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-600. As amended in 1977 the statute is now referred
to as the Clean Water Act. Pub. L. No. 96-217.
* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action
No. 2158-78 (D. D.C.). Section 307 (a) of the FWPCA then pro-
vided in pertinent part:
49a
to promulgate effluent discharge standards for the sub-
stances already on the Agency’s list of toxic pollutants
(the deadlines cases)“ The fourth lawsuit sought an
order requiring EPA to promulgate pretreatment stand-
ards under Section 307 (b) of the FWPCA covering
approximately 35 industries and a wide variety of pol-
lutants (the pretreatment case)“
While these lawsuits were pending EPA officials con-
ducted a thorough review of the Agency’s strategy for
controlling toxic pollutant emissions. They concluded that
there was a need to replace the Agency’s then existing
approach with a new strategy calling for an integrated
program for controlling toxic pollutants. Furthermore,
EPA officials felt that development of the new approach
could provide a basis for resolving the controversies be-
tween the environmental groups and the Agency.’ After
the general outlines of the new program were developed
* Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action No.
76-0172 (D.D.C.), and Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc. v.
Train, Civil Action No. 75-1698 (D.D.C.). Under the statutory
when comments on the proposed standards revealed major flaws in
the Agency's analysis. See R. Hall, The Evolution and Imple-
mentation of EPA's Regulatory Program to Control the Discharge
of Torte Pollutants, 10 Nat. Rus. Law 607, 614-615 (1977).
* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. . Agee, Civil Action
No. 76-1267 (D.D.C.). Under § 807 (b) of the FWPCA, EPA was
required to publish within nine months of October 18, 1972 “pro-
posed regulations establishing pretreatment standards for intro-
duction of pollutants into treatment works * * * which are publicly
owned for those pollutants which are determined not to be suscep-
tible to treatment by * * * or which would interfere with the
operation of such treatment works.” 88 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1)
(1976). Final pretreatment standards were to be promulgated
within 90 days of publishing proposed standards. /d.
* See BR. Hall, supra note 7, at 615-619.
50a
EPA and NRDC, joined by four industry intervenors in
one of the lawsuits,” began settlement negotiations. After
tentative agreement was reached between EPA and
NRDC a proposed settlement agreement was submitted
to the District Court." The District Court held several
hearings on the proposed agreement and allowed in-
terested parties to file comments on it. The Companies
intervened in the proceedings in the District Court and
filed comments vigorously opposing the proposed agree-
ment.” After requiring several modifications the District
Court approved the settlement agreement, finding it a
“just, fair, and equitable resolution of the issues raised.”
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 ERC
2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from
the court’s order adopting the settlement agreement.
The settlement agreement outlined a comprehensive
strategy for regulation of toxic pollutant discharges under
the FWPCA, including details concerning the timing,
scope, and nature of the regulatory programs EPA
agreed to initiate. Insofar as is relevant to the instant
case, EPA proposed to regulate discharge of toxic pol-
lutants by developing effluent limitations, guidelines, and
% The American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petro-
leum Institute and member companies, the National Coal Associa-
5la
performance standards for new and existing emission
sources, as well as pretreatment standards regulating in-
troduction of pollutants into treatment works. These
limitations, guidelines, and standards were to cover 21
major industries and 65 specified pollutants or groups of
pollutants. In promulgating effluent limitations and
guidelines EPA agreed that it would employ technology-
based controls such as “best available technology” (BAT)
performance standards for existing emission sources, and
performance standards reflecting the “best available
demonstrated control technology” (BADCT) for new
sources.“ The pretreatment standards EPA undertook to
promulgate were to apply to any of the 65 pollutants
listed in the Agreement and any other pollutants that
proved to be “incompatible” with “publicly owned treat-
ment works” (POTWs).” Promulgation of the regula-
tions envisaged by the Agreement was to take place
according to a phased schedule running through Decem-
ber 31, 1979 and compliance with the regulations by
affected industries was to be achieved by June 30,
19838."*
% In addition to the technology-based program, NRDC insisted
on a provision in the agreement requiring EPA to promulgate
health-based standards for six highly toxic pollutants. See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 8, 8 ERC at
2128-2129.
18 Pretreatment standards are similar to BAT effluent limitations,
BADCT performance standards, and other controls prescribed by
the statute in that they are “technology-based.” They differ from
these other controls principally in that they regulate “indirect” dis-
charges into sewers leading into municipal treatment plants rather
than “direct” discharges into receiving waters. The term “incom-
patible” was taken from the language of 807 (b), 33 U.S.C.
§1817(b) (1976).
1% The prescribed schedule for promulgation of regulations di-
vided the 21 industries covered into five groups. Final regulations
for the first two groups were to be promulgated by March 81, 1979,
for the third group by June 30, 1979, for the fourth group by
September 80, 1979, and for the final group by December $1, 1979.
See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 620.
52a
Adoption of the industry-by-industry, technology-based
approach, using statutory authority conferred by various
sections of the FWPCA," marked a change in EPA’s
regulatory strategy. Its previous efforts to control dis-
charge of toxic pollutants had relied on authority con-
ferred by Section 307 of the FWPCA in developing health-
based standards on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis.“ The
new strategy offered substantial advantages over the old.
First, it allowed EPA to cover far more substances and
emission sources than could have been handled under the
old approach.” Second, it allowed the Agency to develop
a single regulatory package which would apply to all of
the problem pollutants in the dis sarge of a particular in-
dustry, enabling the industry to predict the entire cost
of pollution control.” Third, the Agency could allow con-
siderations of cost and technology to enter into its
decisionmaking and industry was allowed a longer com-
pliance period.“ Finally, EPA also expected that the new
program would be easier to administer.”
After the Agreement was adopted by the District Court
Congress began a review of the FWPCA and EPA’s
progress toward implementing its provisions. Commit-
tees of both Houses of Congress held hearings at which
* The new regulatory prograsi relied on authority conferred by
801, 304, 306, and 3807 (b) & (e) of the FWPCA, 838 U.S.C.
$§ 1811, 1814, 1816, 1817(b) & (e) (1976).
18 See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 5616-517.
Id.
58a
various difficulties EPA was experiencing under the then
existing statutory scheme were discussed and the new
regulatory framework and strategy established by the
settlement agreement was explored. In testimony before
the congressional committees NRDC’s representatives
emphasized that the Agreement was working well,“ and
EPA’s spokesman, while acknowledging that the Agency
was having trouble meeting the deadlines set by the
Agreement, strongly supported the Agreement. The
outcome of these hearings was the enactment in December
1977 of several amendments to the FWPCA which was
renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA).* We shall dis-
cuss the nature and importance of those provisions of the
1977 Amendments that are pertinent to this case later.
At this point we simply note that the Companies and
NRDC disagree about the effect of the 1977 Amendments
on the settlement agreement.”
* See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1977: Hearings on Amendments to Pub. L. No. 95-200
before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Serial No. 96-H26,
Part 9, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977) (hereinafter “Senate Hear-
ings”); Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Review of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 96-32 (Comm. Pr. 1977) (hereinafter
“House Hearings”).
* See Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 71 (testimony of James
T. Banks); House Hearings, supra note 28, at 621 (statement of
James T. Banks and Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr.).
54a
Meanwhile, NRDC’s monitoring of EPA’s implementa-
tion of the Agreement’s provisions convinced it that the
Agency would not meet any of the deadlines for propos-
ing and promulgating regulations.“ Accordingly, on
September 26, 1978 NRDC moved for an order to show
cause why EPA should not be held in contempt of
the District Court’s order approving the settlement agree-
ment.” EPA responded on October 20, 1978 with a
motion to amend the Agreement to extend the deadlines
for promulgating regulations, to allow the Agency addi-
tional discretion to exclude certain pollutants and indus-
try categories from regulation, and to extend the dead-
line for compliance with the guidelines to June 30, 1984.”
In its accompanying opposition to NRDC’s motion EPA
explained why it had not been able to meet the original
deadlines specified by the Agreement. Also on October
20, 1978 the Companies filed a motion to vacate the settle-
ment agreement, arguing that Congress had intended the
1977 Amendments which produced the CWA to supplant
the settlement agreement, that the Agreement was in
conflict with the congressional program, and that con-
tinuation of the settlement agreement would inevitably
involve the court in questions of analytical chemistry.”
On October 30, 1978 NRDC served detailed interroga-
tories and requests for documents on EPA. Thereafter,
NRDC and EPA began discussions on a possible settle
ment of the controversy. On November 28, 1978 EPA
officials met with representatives of the Companies to
ing program that EPA had been implementing under the old statute
for nearly two years.” Brief for appellee NRDC at 34 (emphasis
in original).
™* See affidavit of James T. Banks in support of NRDC’s motion
c
* See Supp. App. 105.
* See Supp. App. 182.
* See Supp. App. 187.
55a
announce that a tentative agreement with NRDC had
been reached, and to distribute copies of a proposed joint
motion to modify the settlement agreement that EPA and
NRDC had agreed to. The Companies were given ten
days in which to submit written comments on the pro-
posal. NRDC and EPA considered the suggestions made
in the Companies’ comments and made some changes in
the proposed modifications to reflect these suggestions.“
EPA and NRDC filed their joint motion to modify the
settlement agreement on December 15, 1978.% At the
same time they withdrew all their pleadings relating to
the motion for a show cause order.* The Companies,
however, declined to withdraw their motion to vacate the
settlement agreement. By agreement of the parties the
Companies were given until January 5, 1979 to file with
the court any response or objections to the proposed
modifications. The Companies filed a memorandum op-
posing the motion to modify the Agreement. In addition
to repeating their contention that the Agreement must
be vacated because it had been superseded by the 1977
Amendments, the Companies raised two new arguments.
First, they argued that the Agreement also must be
vacated because each of the four cases which underlie
the Agreement had been mooted by the Amendments and
must be dismissed. Second, they maintained that the pro-
posed modification would violate public notice and com-
ment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations, and an
Executive Order, as well as constitutional requirements
of due process. The District Court heard oral argument
on both motions and permitted additional briefs on the
new issues raised by the Companies. On March 9, 1979
the District Court issued its order denying the Com-
The Companies maintain that the comments did not result
in any substantive revision of the tentative agreement.
%3 See Supp. App. 201-210.
* See Supp. App. 198, 199.
a
*
D
*
56a
panies’ motion to vacate the settlement agreement and
granting NRDC’s and EPA’s motion to modify the
Agreement.
In its memorandum opinion accompanying the order
the District Court addressed each of the Companies’
arguments. First, it rejected the Companies’ claim that
Congress intended the 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA
to supplant the Agreement. The court concluded that
neither the terms of the Amendments nor the legislative
history support this claim. Instead, it found that Con-
gress intended the Agreement “to remain in effect to
supply the missing details of a cohesive strategy for con-
trolling toxic water pollution.” Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836.
Second, the court ruled that two of the four cases that
were resolved by the settlement agreement were not
moot, and that these two cases provided an adequate
basis for continuing the Agreement. Id. at 1837, 1838.
Finally, the court dismissed the Companies’ statutory
and constitutional objections to the modifications to the
settlement agreement proposed by NRDC and EPA. The
court found that the modifications were not “rules”
within the meaning of the APA for which notice and
comment were required, and that appellants’ constitu-
tional rights to effective notice were not violated because
the modifications would have no direct or immediate
effect on them. Jd. at 1838-1840. These appeals followed.
II.
On appeal the Companies raise essentially the same
three arguments that they presented to the District Court.
We will examine these arguments separately.
A. The Effect of the 1977 Amendments
Appellants contend that the District Court erred in
rejecting their claim that Congress intended the 1977
Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement. Ap-
57a
pellants maintain that these Amendments were a direct
response to the problems EPA had faced in attempting to
implement the provisions of the FWPCA, the same prob-
lems that were responsible for the shortcomings in the
Agency’s fulfillment of its statutory obligations that
NRDC’s lawsuits were aimed at rectifying. The Com-
panies point out that Congress devoted a significant
amount of time to studying these problems.“ The out-
come of this detailed review, appellants contend, was a
congressional acknowledgement that EPA’s failure to ac-
complish much in terms of realizing the objectives and
goals of the FWPCA was largely a result of deficiencies
in both substantive and procedural provisions of the Act.
Appellants argue that the toxic pollutant provisions of
the 1977 Amendments were designed to replace the un-
workable provisions of the FWPCA with a comprehen-
sive and workable statutory framework for regulation of
toxic pollutants that would eliminate the need for con-
tinued court supervisior of the toxic pollutants programs.
In particular, Congress abandoned the requirement that
EPA develop health-based standards regulating discharge
of toxic pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, sub-
stituting in its place an industry-by-industry, technology-
based BAT approach to controlling emission sources. In
addition, Congress resolved the controversy over how
many pollutants should be included in EPA’s list of
toxic pollutants by specifying 65 pollutants that had to
be included in the list and granting EPA’s Adminis-
trator authority to add pollutants to or delete them from
this list. While acknowledging that these two changes
merely adopted the regulatory framework established by
the settlement agreement, appellants point to other pro-
* Appellants note that both Houses of Congress held hearings
on these problems and the staff of the House Subcommittee on
Investigations and Review prepared a report on their investiga-
tions into the problems of the toxics programs for the House Com-
mittee on Public Works and Transportation. See House Memo-
randum, 128 Cong. Rec. H12929-H12982 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)..
58a
visions in the Amendments which they contend show
that Congress did more than merely ratify the settle
ment agreement.“ In appellants’ view, the breadth and
detail of these other changes demonstrate that Congress
“went beyond mere ratification of the [settlement agree-
2 Specifically, appellants point to the following amendments:
—Section 301(1) specifies that neither the economic capa-
bility (301 (e)) nor the water quality (301(g)) waiver of
effluent limitations is applicable to toxic pollutant limitations;
—Section 307 (a) (2) (1) authorizes EPA to establish effiu-
ent standards for toxic pollutants which are “more stringent”
than the BAT-level effluent guidelines, if the BAT guidelines
are not sufficient to protect the public health or the environ-
ment; (2) establishes the procedure EPA must follow in estab-
lishing the standards; and (3) establishes its own timetable
for promulgating such standards;
—Section 307 (b) (1) provides that a source discharging
into a publicly owned treatment works (POTW) may have
the stringency of its effluent limitations reduced to reflect
the ability of the POTW to remove some or all of a toxic
pollutant provided certain conditions are met;
—Section 811 authorizes EPA to regulate the plant-site
runoff, spillage, waste disposal and drainage associated with
the use of toxic (section 307(a)) or hazardous (section 311)
pollutants ;
—Section 307 (b) (2) (C) specifies that effluent guidelines for
all the toxic pollutants specified by Congress (the list of sixty-
five) must be promulgated by EPA not later than July 1, 1980;
—Section 801(b) (2) (C) specifies that discharges must com-
ply with the effluent guidelines promulgated for the pollutants
designated by Congress not later tha[n] July 1, 1984 * * *;
—Section 307 (b) (2) [sic] [§ 301 (b) (2) (D) ] specifies that
for pollutants which EPA adds to the new section 307 (a) list,
compliance with the toxic pollutant guidelines is required not
later than three years after such guidelines are established ;
Section 307 (a) provides that the Administrator of EPA
may add to or delete pollutants from the section 307(a) list,
and that his decision shall be final except upon a judicial deter-
mination that it was arbitrary and capricious.
Brief for appellants at 19-20.
59a
ment] and tinkering with its toxics program and instead
devised a comprehensive program to control the discharge
of toxic pollutants to replace the old section 307(a) and
the [Agreement].” *’
Appellants find further support for their view that
Congress intended the Amendments to supersede the
settlement agreement in the legislative history of the
Amendments. In this the Companies largely rely on a
statement made by Congressman Roberts while explain-
ing the toxic pollutant provisions of the House-Senate
Conference Report to his colleagues. Congressman Roberts
said:
In summary, the revisions to the toxics regulatory
program contained in the conference report
simplify the procedures for identifying toxic pollu-
tants and promulgating regulations according to
their characteristics. The discretion exercised by
the Administrator is broadened, the procedures less
formally structured, and burdens of proof modified
to the point where the program may proceed in a
more rapid and orderly fashion without further
recourse to the courts.
Crisis-by-crisis reaction to the problem of toxics
must no longer be the norm, but must be replaced
by an orderly program for adding compounds to the
list, with the Administrator fully in charge. It,
therefore, would be entirely appropriate for the
United States to petition the courts to relinquish
jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control under Pub-
lic Law 92-500, now that the statutory basis has
been laid for a workable regulatory program the
lack whereof led to the litigation resulting in the
consent decree. This is particularly appropriate in
view of the large number of potentially toxic chem-
icals to be addressed by the program and the need
* Brief for appellants at 21.
60a
for administrative discretion within the revised reg-
ulatory framework to carry out the provisions of law
enacted herein.
This is the intent of this legislation, an outgrowth
of House initiatives by the House conferees.
123 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
Appellants maintain that Congressman Roberts’ views
must be given significant weight, pointing out that he
was chairman of the House Subcommittee that drafted
the Amendments, chairman of the House conferees, vice-
chairman of the House-Senate Conference Committee, and
floor manager of the Conference Report in the House.
Appellants suggest that Congressman Roberts’ statement
takes on added significance because the toxic pollutant
provisions of the Amendments were drafted by the Con-
ference Committee and the Conference Report is silent
on the issue of congressional intent.“
Claiming to have demonstrated that Congress intended
the 1977 Amendments ta supplant the settlement agree-
ment, appellants then note that courts have vacated set-
tlement agreements where an intervening Act of Congress
has changed the relevant law in such a manner as to
eliminate the right which the settlement agreement was
designed to safeguard. The Companies find illustrations
of the operation of this principle in two Supreme Court
cases, System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 US.
642 (1961), and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). In Wheeling
& Belmont Bridge the Court examined the effect of sub-
sequent legislation on an outstanding injunction. The
State of Pennsylvania had earlier obtained an injunc-
tion barring the company from constructing or maintain-
0 Appellants note that Senator Muskie, who was the floor man-
ager of the Conference Report in the Senate, was absent from the
House-Senate Conference due to illness. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819636
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
‘way
6la
ing a bridge across the Ohio River on the ground that
the bridge in question obstructed navigation in such a
manner as to be in conflict with certain Acts of Congress
regulating navigation. A subsequent statute declared the
bridge to be a lawful structure in its existing position
and elevation. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunc-
tion, pointing out that the later Act of Congress had
eliminated the public right the injunction had served to
protect by resolving the question whether the bridge was
an unlawful obstruction. In System Federation the Court
relied on Wheeling & Belmont Bridge in holding that a
District Court had abused its discretion in refusing to
modify a consent decree after an Act of Congress
changed the relevant law. The District Court had earlier
approved a consent decree resolving litigation brought by
non-union employees against a railroad and a number of
unions representing its employees. The plaintiffs had
charged the defendants with violating Section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act which forbade discrimination against
non-union employees. As part of the settlement agree-
ment the court enjoined the defendants from discrimi-
nating against non-union employees because of their re-
Court pointed out that “the District Court’s authority
to adopt the consent decree comes only from the statute
which the decree is intended to enforce” since [ilt was
the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties,
that the District Court served in entering the consent
decree.” System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364
U.S. at 651. The Court then noted that a “court must
when its provisions are amended” by “modify[ing] the
terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings
those
terms in conflict with statutory objectives.” Id.
62a
The Companies argue that since the terms and legisla-
tive history of the 1977 Amendments indicate that Con-
gress intended the toxic pollutant provisions of the
Amendments to supersede the framework established by
the settlement agreement, application of the settled
principles announced by the Supreme Court in Wheeling
& Belmont Bridge and System Federation requires that
the judgment of the District Court in the instant case
be reversed and the settlement agreement vacated.
The power of a District Court sitting as a court of
equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it
previously adopted cannot be drawn into question. See
System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at
642-647; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556
(1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932). The decision to grant or deny a request to
modify the terms of a consent decree rests with the dis-
cretion of the District Court. See System Federation No.
91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at 657; Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, supra, 316 U.S. at 562. However, sound
exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms of
a consent decree be modified when there has been a sig-
nificant change in the circumstances obtaining at the
time the consent decree was entered. This change in cir-
cumstances may result from a change in controlling law,
including changes brought about by subsequent legisla-
tion. See, e. g., System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,
supra; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
supra; Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501
F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; McGrath v. Potash, 199
F.2d 166, 167-168 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Application of these
settled principles does not, however, provide a ready
answer to the case at bar. One of the issues we must
resolve is whether in fact Congress intended the 1977
Amendments to supplant the settlement agreement.
Our starting point, of course, is the language and pro-
visions of the Amendments. Clearly, the strongest evi-
68a
dence of a congressional intent to supersede the settle-
ment agreement would be an explicit declaration of such
an intention in the language of the Amendments. In the
instant case we do not understand appellants to be sug-
gesting that any such declaration of congressional intent
appears in the language of the 1977 Amendments. Nor
have we found any such statements. The silence of the
Amendments on the issue of Congress’ intent with regard
to the settlement agreement is not necessarily fatal to
appellants’ claim, however. As the District Court pointed
out,“ if a congressional intent to supplant the Agree-
ment is a “necessary implication” of the provisions of the
Amendments, we would have to find that appellants are
correct in arguing that the Agreement must be vacated.”
Alternatively, evidence of congressional intent may be
provided by clear statements in the legislative history.
After reviewing the changes made in the toxic pol-
lutant provisions of the FWPCA by the 1977 Amend-
ments, as well as the legislative history of the Amend-
ments, we are unable to accept appellants’ contention
that they show that Congress clearly intended the 1977
Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement.
First, this case does not present an instance of the type
of situation that confronted the Supreme Court in System
Federation and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge—a situation
in which there is a clear conflict between the terms of a
settlement agreement and the provisions of a subsequent
Act of Congress. As appellants concede,“ the two major
substantive changes in the toxic pollutant provisions of
0 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 ERC
1888, 1886 (D.D.C. 1979). *
% Thus in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642
(1961), the absence of an explicit declaration of congressional in-
tent to affect the terms of the injunction at issue in that case did
not prevent the Supreme Court from concluding that the District
Court should have amended its outstanding decree.
41 See brief for appellants at 18.
*
* e
— oo
.
64a
the FWPCA that were made by the 1977 Amendments
merely ratified the settlement agreement. Both Congress’
substitution of an industry-by-industry, technology-based
BAT approach for the pollutant-by-pollutant, health-
based approach required by Section 307 of the FWPCA,
and its decision to specify a list of 65 pollutants—the
same pollutants listed in the Agreement—that were to be
included in EPA’s revised list of toxic pollutants under
Section 307(a), amounted to little more than an “at-
tempt to conform the statute to the reality of [the] pro-
gram” EPA had been developing under the terms of the
settlement agreement. National Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836. See Hercules,
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Only in two relatively minor aspects did the amended
statute depart from the framework established by the
settlement agreement. First, Section 307(a) of the Act
was amended to allow EPA’s Administrator to add to or
delete from the list of 65 toxic pollutants. Second, the
Agreement’s deadline for promulgation of BAT regula-
tions was extended to July 1, 1980.% These minor de-
partures from the terms of the settlement agreement can-
not be interpreted as evidence of a congressional rejec-
tion of the Agreement, or as signs of an intention to
supersede all its provisions. If instead of endorsing the
strategy and framework set out in the settlement agree-
ment the Amendments had required EPA to adopt a
different regulatory approach, we might be inclined to
agree with the Companies that a congressional intention
to supersede the Agreement is a “necessary implication.”
But as we have already indicated, this is not such a case.
Indeed, if any inferences are to be drawn from Congress’
actions, it would appear that the District Court’s con-
clusion that “Congress intended for the Agreement to
The District Court modified the settlement agreement to con-
form to the new deadline for promulgating BAT regulations estab-
lished by Congress.
65a
remain in effect to supply the missing details of a co-
hesive strategy for controlling toxic water pollution” “
is the more plausible inference.
We are also not persuaded by the Companies’ claim
that the legislative history of the Amendments offers
clear evidence of a congressional intent to supplant the
settlement agreement. First, we, like the District Court,
have some difficulty understanding why if, as appellants
maintain, Congress wanted to supplant the Agreement,
it did not bother to say so in any of the reports—House,
Senate, or Conference—that accompanied the legislation;
this in spite of the fact that it also failed to express this
intent in the Amendments themselves. The absence of
any indications of such congressional intent in the various
reports could not have been inadvertent since both House
and Senate Committees heard testimony from NRDC and
EPA about the terms of the settlement agreement.“
Moreover, the silence of the committee reports on this
issue of congressional intent stands in marked contrast
to the clarity with which these reports dealt with other
court decisions which Congress chose to supersede. For
example, in amending Sections 313 and 404 of the
FWPCA to make it clear that the dredging activities of
the Army Corps of Engineers are subject to state water
quality laws, the Senate Report explained that these
amendments were intended to overrule a contrary holding
by the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d
1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 977 (1977).
S. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 68 (1977).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note
89, 12 ERC at 1836.
Ses notes 24 and 25 supra.
“ Similarly, in discussing a new provision dealing with compli-
ance orders under § 309 the Senate Report noted:
Under existing law there are no circumstances that justify a
time for compliance extending beyond July 1, 1977. The Ad-
66a
The only real support for their interpretation of con-
gressional intent the Companies have pointed to is the
statement by Congressman Roberts quoted above.“ It is,
of course, well established that courts give considerable
weight to the views of sponsors and floor managers of
legislation in determining congressional intent. See
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousers,
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1924); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 374, 394-395
(1954); United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 278-284 (1947). However, not
even Congressman Roberts’ statement offers such clear
support for appellants’ claim. Congressman Roberts did
not suggest that it was Congress’ intention (as he under-
stood it) that the 1977 Amendments would automatically
supersede the Agreement. Rather, he merely indicated
that inasmuch as Congress had amended the procedural
provisions of the FWPCA that were responsible for
EPA’s difficulties with implementing the statute, EPA
should consider petition ling] the courts to relinquish
jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control * * *.”* Thus
the most that appellants can claim is that Congressman
Roberts thought it “entirely appropriate” for EPA to ask
the court to relinquish jurisdiction. This is not quite the
same as a suggestion that Congressman Roberts believed
that the Amendments would automatically supersede the
settlement agreement.
ministrator can only issue an enforcement order requiring
compliance within 30 days or initiate civil or criminal action.
Thus, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Republic Steel Corporation v. Train et al. and Wil-
liams, ——— F.2d ——., (6th Cir. 1977) was an incorrect inter-
pretation of existing law.
S. Rep. No. 95-870, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1977).
4% See —— F.2d at ——— (pp. 16-17) supra.
* 128 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (re-
marks of Representative Roberts).
67a
Moreover, there are other statements in the legislative
history of the Amendments, including a statement by
Congressman Roberts, which indicate a different view of
congressional intent from that suggested by appellants.
The Senate Report on the 1977 Amendments had this to
say about the regulatory framework established by the
settlement agreement:
During the course of its hearings the committee ex-
amined in detail EPA’s proposal and strategy for
controlling the discharge of toxic pollutants pri-
marily through the development of effluent guide-
lines for the best available technology economically
achievable under section 301(b)(2)(A) and the
subsequent reissuance of permits under section 402
to require the application of such technology by dis-
chargers by July 1, 1983. The Committee approves
of and endorses this strategy.
S. Rep. No. 95-370, supra, at 56 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in explaining the reasoning behind the toxic
pollutant provisions of the Conference Report to his
Senate colleagues Senator Muskie noted:
Another, and possibly more important, reason for
maintaining the BAT requirements is that the
Agency currently has a major program underway
of using BAT to control toxics. Technology-based
effluent limitations are being developed which will
place limits on toxic pollutants which pose or are
likely to pose human health and ecological hazards.
The conference agreement was specifically de-
siqned to codify the so-called “Flannery decision,”
tuhich set forth 65 families of pollutants which are
to be regulated by BAT, and EPA has been im-
plementing this consent decree. To take a different :
course for dealing with toxics at this point would re- |
quire a major reprogramming of EPA resources. :
Such a delay, whether it be to allow utilization of a
68a
different section of the act or in order to imple
ment this section, would only cause confusion and
add still more delay to efforts to solve the toxics
problem. The discharge of toxic pollutants should be
eliminated as soon as possible. Because EPA is al-
ready embarked upon a program to control toxics
using a proven mechanism, technology-based efflu-
ent limitations, and because of the urgency to con-
trol toxics, prudent public policy demands that the
strategy be maintained.
123 Cong. Rec. $19647-S19648 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)
(emphasis added). Inasmuch as Senator Muskie was
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee which reviewed
EPA’s implementation of the FWPCA, was a member
of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the 1977
Amendments, and served as floor manager of the Con-
ference Report in the Senate, his views are entitled to
significant weight in fathoming congressional intent.“
Nothing in Senator Muskie’s statement suggests that he
viewed the settlement agreement as being superseded by
the Amendments. If anything, his statement seems to
confirm the District Court’s conclusion that Congress in-
tended the settlement agreement to supply the details
of the toxics program. Further evidence that Congress
intended the settlement agreement to continue in force,
subject to modifications to conform it to the amended
statute, is provided by a statement made by Senator
Randolph in discussing the toxic pollutant provisions of
the Conference Report. He stated:
In the requirements for the control of toxic pollu-
tants adopted by the conferees, the measure before
us largely follows the strategy presently being used
48 Although it is true, as appellants point out, see note 88 supra,
that Senator Muskie was prevented from attending the conference
69a
by the Environmental Protection Agency under the
settlement agreement in the case of Natural Re-
sources Defense Council against Train. That im-
portant case required the development of a mini-
mum degree of control for a specified list of pollu-
tants to be achieved on a definite schedule. The
principal way in which the conference report modi-
fies the settlement agreement is to require the pub-
lication of effluent limitations based on best avail-
able technology at a minimum for the listed pol-
lutants by July 1, 1980, and to specify July 1, 1984,
as the latest date for compliance with those effluent
limitations.
123 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (empha-
sis added). Senator Randolph was chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee that drafted the 1977 Amendments and
a member of the House-Senate Conference Committee.
Insofar as Senator Randolph viewed the 1977 Amend-
ments as “modifying” the settlement agreement, it is
difficult to believe that he understood Congress’ intention
to be that the Agreement would be completely superseded
by the Amendments. «
Finally, as we have already indicated, a statement by
Congressman Roberts suggests that he too assumed that
EPA would continue to be bound by the terms of the
Agreement. In describing the BAT-toxic pollutants pro-
visions of the Conference Report to the House, Congress-
man Roberts said the following about the statutory pro-
vision authorizing EPA to add to or delete from the
list of 65 toxic pollutants specified by the statute:
[Tj)he Administrator, in his discretion, may deter-
mine that certain toxic pollutants—or subclasses of
pollutants—are not appropriate for regulation in
certain circumstances. For example, the Adminis-
trator may use his discretion when equal or more
effective protection is already provided with respect
to that pollutant by an effluent limitation and guide-
70a
line promulgated pursuant to other sections of the act
or, when the discharge of [a] specific pollutant re-
sults from its presence in intake water; or, where a
specific pollutant is present in either insignificant or
trace quantities and does not cause or is not likely
to cause toxic effects to identifiable organisms af-
fected by the discharge.
123 Cong. Rec. H12927 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977). How-
ever, Congressman Roberts did not describe decision-
making criteria contained in the statute. Rather, these
decisionmaking criteria are contained in paragraph 8 of
the settlement agreement. Section 307 (a) (1) merely di-
rects the Administrator to “take into account toxicity of
the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or
potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters,
the importance of the affected organisms, and the nature
and the extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on
such organisms.” Thus Congressman Roberts’ state-
ment seems to imply that he too expected that the settle-
ment agreement would continue in force to supply missing
details for the toxic pollutants program.“
These indications in the legislative history of the 1977
Amendments that Congress expected the settlement agree-
ment to continue in effect, and the ambiguity of such evi-
dence as the Companies are able to marshall in support
of their interpretation of congressional] intent, lead us to
conclude that the District Court properly rejected ap-
pellants’ statutory supersession argument. We therefore
turn to the Companies’ claim that the Agreement should
Senator Randolph described these same factors in explaining
the decisionmaking criteria to be used by EPA’s Administrator
in making listing decisions. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
83 U.S.C. §1817(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
51 See K. Hall, supra note 22, at 622 n.80.
71
be vacated because each of the four cases which provided
the basis for the Agreement is now moot and must be
dismissed.
B. Mootness
Appellants begin their discussion by pointing out that
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement prevents
federal courts from issuing judgments in cases which are
moot. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Hall v. Beals,
896 U.S. 45 (1969), and Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S.
119 (1977), appellants further note that a case may
become moot if the statute upon which a claim is based
is amended in such a fashion that the facts set forth in
the complaint do not present a controversy under the new
law. Appellants contend that application of these con-
trolling legal precedents to the facts of the instant cases
requires vacation of the settlement agreement and dis-
missal of the four cases which underlie the Agreement.
The Companies suggest that both parties agree (and the
District Court found) that two of the four cases are
moot. In these two cases—the deadline cases—NRDC
had alleged that EPA had violated Section 307(a) of the
FWPCA by failing to promulgate final toxic pollutant
effluent standards for nine substances within six months
of issuing proposed standards as required by the statute.
The complaint requested the court to order EPA to
promulgate final standards for the nine substances. The
Companies note that the 1977 Amendments repealed both
the six-month deadline and the requirement that EPA
promulgate toxic pollutant effluent standards, replacing
these provisions with a requirement that EPA promulgate
effluent guidelines for 65 specified pollutants on an
industry-by-industry basis by July 1, 1980 and thereby
mooting the deadlines cases. Appellants contend that the
mootness question in these cases involves the two remain-
ing cases—the toxic criteria case and the pretreatment
case.
72a
In the toxic criteria case NRDC alleged that EPA had
violated the statute in two respects. First, NRDC con-
tended that EPA had used unlawful and restrictive cri-
teria for selecting substances to include in the list of
toxic pollutants required by Section 307(a) of the
FWPCA. Second, NRDC alleged that because of its use
of these impermissible criteria EPA had illegally omitted
from the list 25 substances which the Agency would have
determined to be toxic pollutants had it used the proper
statutory criteria. In the pretreatment case NRDC
sought to compel EPA to promulgate pretreatment stand-
ards covering over 30 categories of point sources. NRDC
alleged that EPA had violated the statute by failing to
publish final pretreatment standards for approximately
31 categories of point sources within 90 days of publish-
ing proposed standards as required by the Act, and it
noted that proposed standards for 14 of these categories
had been pending for more than one year.
Appellants argue that NRDC’s claim in the toxic cri-
teria case was based on language in the old Section 307
which was repealed by the 1977 Amendments, noting that
the new Section 307(a) only requires EPA to publish a
list of 65 specified toxic pollutants, which EPA has done,
and further provides that EPA “may revise [this] list”
by adding pollutants to or deleting them from it. Appel-
lants maintain that the 1973 EPA decisions at issue in the
toxic criteria case are irrelevant to the Agency’s imple-
mentation of the new statutory provisions. Appellants
further argue that resolution of the issues raised in the
toxic criteria case would amount to the court’s rendering
an advisory opinion because the decision would not alter
either the existing Section 307(a) list or the manner in
which EPA has and will implement the new statutory
provisions. The Companies then turn to the District
Court’s finding that the toxic criteria case is not moot
because “[t]o date, EPA has not renounced the alleged
arbitrary and unauthorized criteria it used [to compile
73a
the list of toxic pollutants under the old Section 307 (a)
in 1973], nor has it published revised selection criteria.”
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra,
12 ERC at 1837.% The Companies maintain that the Dis-
trict Court failed to realize that the 1973 criteria have
been effectively repealed by EPA and have been made
irrelevant by the 1977 Amendments.” The Companies
add that when EPA published the list of toxic pollutants
in January 1978 as directed by the 1977 Amendments,
it omitted any mention of the 1978 criteria in discussing
its authority to revise the Section 307 list. Finally, the
Companies suggest that events transpiring after the Dis-
trict Court’s decision demonstrate that the 1978 criteria
are irrelevant and will no longer be applied by EPA. Ap-
pellants first note that on March 27, 1979 EPA pub-
lished a document entitled “Guidance on Factors to be
Addressed in Petitions to Revise” the Section 307 (a)
52 The District Court further noted:
Even if EPA were to renounce its selection criteria, the [toxic
criteria] case would not be moot if the court were to determine
that there was a sufficient threat of repetition of the allegedly
illegal action by the agency. See, e. g., United States v. Concen-
trated Phosphate Export Association, Inc., 398 U.S. 199, 208
(1968).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note 89, 12
ERC at 1887 n.5.
The Companies note, for example, that under the old § 807
EPA was required to promulgate effluent standards for pollutants
on the § 307 list within one year of the date the pollutant was placed
on the list. Appellants argue that this deadline precluded the
Agency from undertaking any new scientific research about a pol-
lutant and forced EPA to rely on whatever scientific data was
available at the time the pollutant was listed, which in turn became
one of the 1978 criteria. Th: Companies contend that insofar as the
1977 Amendments eliminated the one-year time limit, EPA no
longer has any reason to consider whether under the 1978 criteria
adequate data are available to set standards for a particular
pollutant.
T4a
toxic pollutant list. 44 Fed. Reg. 18279 (March 27,
1979). Appellants maintain that the list of factors con-
tained in this document effectively repealed the 1973 cri-
teria. Second, appellants maintain that in denying two
petitions by Dow Chemical Company to remove two sub-
stances from the Section 307 list the Agency made no
mention of the 1978 criteria, thereby confirming that
the March 27, 1979 publication effectively repealed the
1973 criteria.
The Companies’ contention that the fourth case—the
pretreatment case—is moot is based on their interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the settlement agreement. They
contend that to settle the pretreatment case EPA and
NRDC agreed to paragraph 13 of the settlement agree-
ment pursuant to which EPA undertook to promulgate
pretreatment standards covering eight industry catego-
ries by May 15, 1977. Appellants point out that EPA
has issued regulations establishing pretreatment stand-
ards for the eight industrial categories listed in para-
graph 18, and they argue that EPA’s fulfillment of its
obligations has extinguished the controversy between the
parties and rendered the pretreatment case moot.
Finally, appellants contend that even if the District
Court was correct in finding that the pretreatment and
toxic criteria cases are not moot, it still erred by re-
fusing to vacate the Agreement. According to the Com-
panies, the proper procedure to be followed when a court
discovers that some of the cases which underlie a settle-
ment agreement have become moot is to vacate the agree-
ment and rehear the remaining cases to determine what,
if any, relief is appropriate in light of the issues which
remain live controversies. Appellants maintain that this
procedure is necessary to avoid adjudication of moot is-
sues, and is mandated by constitutional limitations on the
court’s power as well as by the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S.
259 (1936). In that case an action was brought by a
75a
utility to restrain the County from constructing a power
plant and from making contracts for that purpose. The
Federal Emergency Administrator for Public Works in-
tervened in the case, revealing that the federal govern-
ment had entered into a contract with the County to loan
it money for the project. The utility challenged the con-
stitutionality of the loan and was upheld by the District
Court which entered a final decree enjoining the contract.
While the appeal was pending the County and the Ad-
ministrator terminated the first contract and substituted
a new contract which they claimed did not contain the
objectionable provisions of the old one. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for re-
consideration in light of the new contract. Although the
pleadings in the District Court were not amended and
the court’s term had expired, the District Court never-
theless heard evidence regarding the new contract.
On appeal the Supreme Court ruled that the first de-
cree should have been vacated so as to revest the court
with jurisdiction over the case. The Court pointed out
that [where it appears upon appeal that [a] contro-
versy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the
appellate court to set aside the decree below and to re-
mand the cause with directions to dismiss. * * * If it
appears that supervening facts require a retrial in the
light of a changed situation, the appropriate action of
the appellate court is to vacate the decree which has
been entered and revest the court below with jurisdic-
tion of the cause to the end that the issues may be
properly framed and the retrial had.” Jd. at 267-268
(citations omitted).
Appellants contend that Duke Power requires a trial
court to vacate a settlement agreement to the extent
that it is based on mooted issues, arguing that the court
has no power to modify such an agreement without mak-
ing a preliminary determination that the issues, if any,
in the remaining “live” controversies will support the
76a
modified decree. Appellants claim that the District Court
refused to make such a determination in this case.“ The
Companies further argue that as a factual matter the
pretreatment and toxic criteria cases do not provide an
adequate basis for continuing the settlement agreement.
In their view, the remaining controversies in these two
cases, assuming that there are some, cannot support even
the original settlement agreement, let alone the modifica-
tions approved by the District Court.“
Addressing first the Companies’ claim that both the
pretreatment and toxic criteria cases are moot, we agree
with the District Court that these two cases remain live
controversies. With respect to the pretreatment case, we
In support of this claim the Companies quote the District
Court’s statement that:
Because it was the settlement as a whole that represented an
acceptable bargain to both sides, it cannot be said that each
portion of the Agreement is specifically responsive to a particu-
lar claim contained in one or more of the original complaints.
It would do violence to the settlement for the court to attempt
to separate aspects of the Agreement that rest on the argu-
ably moot causes of action from those that do not.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note 89,
12 ERC at 1838 (appellants’ emphasis).
58 NRDC argues that the mootness doctrine does not apply to this
case, maintaining that congressional action eliminating the case or
controversy between the parties can only moot inchoate liabilities.
It contends that once the liability has matured and has been reduced
to judgment a court’s original jurisdiction continues for purposes
of enforcing the liability, even where the defendant needs a sub-
stantial amount of time to meet its obligations. According to NRDC,
the proper analysis in cases such as this is to ascertain whether
Congress intended to affect pre-existing liabilities, which it must
do expressly or by necessary implication from the amending legisla-
tion. Applying this reasoning to the instant case, NRDC argues
that Congress did not intend to deprive NRDC of its remedy con-
tained in the Agreement or its right to enforce that remedy. Be-
cause we agree with the District Court that the pretreatment and
‘toxic criteria cases are not moot, we have no need to
NRDC's mootness argument. ‘
*
7a
are unable to agree with the Companies’ suggestion that
EPA’s compliance with the requirements of paragraph
13 of the settlement agreement has fulfilled all its obliga-
tions relating to that case and therefore eliminated the
controversy between NRDC and EPA. NRDC’s complaint
in the pretreatment case alleged violations and requested
relief pertaining to “all pollutants which are determined
not to be susceptible to treatment by [publicly owned
treatment works] or which would interfere with the
operation of such works.” * In addition, the complaint
specifically listed over 30 categories of point sources for
which EPA was required to promulgate pretreatment
standards.“ Paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement,
on the other hand, merely required EPA to promulgate
pretreatment standards covering eight industries.“ Given
the very broad scope of relief requested by NRDC’s com-
plaint in the pretreatment case and the relatively narrow
reach of paragraph 13, it is difficult to accept the Com-
panies’ claim that NRDC exchanged its pretreatment case
for the provisions in paragraph 18. Moreover, the Com-
panies’ suggestion that this is the deal that was struck
is unsupported by any evidence other than appellants’
bald allegation that this is what happened. As the Dis-
trict Court pointed out,“ other paragraphs of the settle-
5¢ See Supp. App. 91.
* See Supp. App. 85-86.
3 NRDC points out that the timetable for promulgating pre-
treatment standards for the eight industries listed in paragraph 18
was shorter than the timetable that applied to other industries for
which pretreatment standards were to be developed. NRDC ex-
plains that this expedited schedule was included because the eight
industries included a large number of indirect dischargers, see
brief for appellee NRDC at 57 n.33, and because these were the
only industries for which EPA could promulgate standards within
12 months. Id. See also R. Hall, supra note 7, at 522.
Natural Resources. Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note
89, 12 ERC at 1838.
78a
ment agreement outline other actions relating to pre-
treatment standards that EPA agreed to undertake and
which it has not yet done.” Thus even if we were to
accept the Companies’ implicit assumption that only those
provisions in the Agreement which deal with pretreat-
ment standards were exchanged for NRDC’s agreement
not to prosecute the pretreatment case, we would still
reject the suggestion that the case is moot. Finally, in-
asmuch as the settlement agreement was “a comprehen-
sive interrelated package, it is reasonable to assume
that other provisions of the Agreement, such as the BAT
limitations and guidelines, were also part of the quid
pro quo NRDC received in return for agreeing not to
litigate the pretreatment case.
As for the toxic criteria case, it should first be noted
that appellants are simply wrong in suggesting that
NRDC’s claim in that case was based on language in
the FWPCA which was repealed by the 1977 Amend-
ments. In fact the disagreement between NRDC and
EPA revolved around the latter’s interpretation of the
statutory criteria for making listing decisions. The 1977
Amendments did not change these criteria in any way.
While appellants may be correct in suggesting that the
Amendments changed what may have been the Admin-
istrator’s mandatory duty to list pollutants into a dis-
cretionary duty by explicitly leaving the decision to add
to, or delete from, the list specified by Congress to his
discretion, the nature of the Administrator’s duty was
not central to the controversy between NRDC and EPA.
In making the now discretionary listing decisions the
Administrator must still use the proper statutory decision-
making criteria. If in fact the EPA has continued to use
© See paragraphs 3, 4, and 7 of the settlement agreement. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Freie, agre ave 6, 6 BEV
at 2124-2126.
n Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note
89, 12 ERC at 1838.
79a
the 1978 criteria (which NRDC alleges violate the stat-
ute), or at the very least has not renounced these criteria,
we can hardly conclude that the toxic criteria case is
moot. Thus appellants’ contention that the case is moot
must ultimately rest on their claim that EPA has
abandoned the 1973 criteria.
We agree with the District Court that there is no
clear evidence indicating that EPA has abandoned the
1973 criteria. Even the EPA publications on which the
Companies rely in arguing that EPA has abandoned the
1973 criteria demonstrate that this claim is inaccurate.
As NRDC points out, one of the factors listed in these
EPA publications as having been considered by the
Agency is a pollutant’s usual or potential presence in
water,“ a factor which, NRDC maintains, the statute
does not permit the Agency to consider and one of the
allegedly illegal criteria mentioned in NRDC’s complaint
in the toxic criteria case.“ We therefore conclude that
the District Court correctly found that the toxic criteria
case is not moot because there is no clear indication that
EPA has abandoned the 1973 criteria.
Having determined that the toxic criteria and pretreat-
ment cases are not moot, it remains for us w consider
* For example, this was one of the factors EPA considered in
denying petitions by Dow Chemical Company to remove certain
pollutants from the § 307(a) list. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18282 (Mar. 27,
1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 34691 (June 15, 1979). Moreover, EPA’s
March 27, 1979 list of factors to be considered by the Agency also
mentions the extent of point source discharges of the pollutant into
water and the annual production and “use patterns” of the pollut-
ants in the United States. 44 Fed. Reg. 18279 (Mar. 27, 1979).
NRDC contends that the statute only permits EPA to consider the
usual and potential presence of the affected organisms in water.
Brief for appellee NRDC at 58. Of course we do not need to resolve
the disagreement between EPA and NRDC about what factors may
properly be considered by the Agency in making listing decisions.
All we need do is acknowledge the existence of this controversy
which indicates that the toxic criteria case is not moot.
® See Deferred Joint Appendix (Def. App.) at 20.
80a
appellants’ contention that the proper procedure for the
District Court to follow in these circumstances was to
vacate the settlement agreement and rehear the two
remaining cases. Appellants have not pointed to any
cases that have addressed this precise issue of the pro-
cedure to follow when some of the cases underlying a
settlement become moot. However, courts have on nu-
merous occasions dealt with the question whether a
change in circumstances which moots some of the issues
in a particular case thereby eliminates the court’s juris-
dition over the entire case. The usual practice in such
situations is for the court to determine whether any
remaining controversies in the case provide an adequate
basis for continued jurisdiction. An illustration of this
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. McCormack,
895 U.S. 486 (1969). There, Representative Powell had
been denied his seat in the House by the 90th Congress,
but by the time the case was heard in the Supreme
Court he had been reelected and seated by the 91st Con-
gress. Without determining whether his claims for more
specific relief had become moot, the Court ruled that his
claim for damages on account of past salary required
disposition of the merits of the case. The Court pointed
out that [w] here one of the several issues presented be-
comes moot, the remaining live issues supply the con-
stitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Id. at
497.“
This disposition of partially moot cases suggests that
even under appellants’ mootness theory a court continues
to have jurisdiction over a settlement agreement where
some of the cases that underlie the agreement remain
live controversies. Thus the District Court had jurisdic-
tion over the Agreement because the pretreatment and
toxic criteria cases had not become moot. While it may
* See also, e.g., Liner v. Jafeo, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 3880 U.S. 75 (1947); Petersen v. Talis-
man Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1978).
8la
become necessary to modify the terms of a settlement
agreement because some of the cases which provided the
basis for it have become moot, we do not agree with
appellants’ suggestion that the court must first vacate the
settlement agreement and rehear the remaining live cases.
Nothing in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra,
suggests that this is the required procedure.“ And as we
have previously indicated, the decision whether to modify
a settlement agreement in light of changed circumstances
is ordinarily left to the discretion of the District Court.
As the Supreme Court noted in System Federation No.
91 v. Wright, supra, “A balance must * * * be struck
between the policies of res judicata and the right of the
court to apply modified measures to changed circum-
stances. Where there is such a balance of imponderables
there must be wide discretion in the District Court.” 324
U.S. at 647-648. We are of the view that the procedure
to follow in circumstances such as those presented by
this case is also best left to the discretion of the District
Court. Where it deems it appropriate the court may
choose to vacate the settlement and rehear the remaining
live controversies. Alternatively, the court may simply
decide whether modification of the agreement is necessary
or appropriate.
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Duke
Power case suggests a different rule. Duke Power in-
volved a situation in which the action of the defendants
in terminating the contract that had been at issue in
the first proceeding before the District Court completely
In a sense Congress’ action in amending the Railway Labor Act
to permit union shops mooted the controversy between the employ-
ees and the railroad and the unions over whether the employees
could be discriminated against because of their failure to join a
union. The Supreme Court simply ruled in System Federation that
the District Court should have amended the consent decree to reflect
this change. The Court did not suggest that the proper procedure
for the court to follow in deciding this issue was to first vacate the
consent decree and then rehear the remaining controversies.
82a
eliminated the controversy in that case. As such the court
no longer had jurisdiction over the case. In order to vest
the court with jurisdiction over the new controversy
created by the existence of the new contract executed by
the County and the federal government, the District
Court’s decree in the first case had to be vacated and the
parties allowed to amend their pleadings in light of the
new factual and legal issues that were raised by the
second contract. Duke Power has been uniformly inter-
preted as indicating the procedure to be followed by an
appellate court asked to review a decision which has been
mooted by events that transpired after the lower court’s
decision was rendered. See, e.g., United States v. Mun-
singwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); Giumarra Vine-
yards Corp. v. Farrell, 431 F.2d 928, 925 (9th Cir.
1970); Knapp v. Baker, 509 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975) ;
Narrangansett Improvement Co. v. Local Union No. 251,
506 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1974); Welch v. Simon, 498 F.2d
1060, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As the Supreme Court ex-
plained, “Where it appears upon appeal that [a] con-
troversy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the
appellate court to set aside the decree below and to re-
mand the cause with directions to dismiss.” Duke Power
Co. v. Greenwood County, supra, 299 U.S. at 267. Thus
Duke Power does not purport to prescribe a rule to
govern situations such as the one in the instant case.
All we need to decide in this case, then, is whether the
District Court abused its discretion by refusing to follow
the procedure suggested by the Companies. As a prelimi-
nary matter, it should be noted that the Companies do
not appear to have urged this procedure on the District
Court with as much vigor as they press it on appeal.“
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the
* Apparently, the first time the Companies raised this issue was
in a Post-Hearing Brief filed on January 18, 1979, and this issue
was only mentioned in a footnote in the brief. See brief for appel-
lants at 44-45 n.50.
88a
court declined to follow this procedure. Be that as it
may, the District Court noted that the “Agreement rep-
resents a comprehensive, interrelated package of conces-
sions made by EPA in return for plaintiffs’ agreement
not to pursue the claims raised in the four lawsuits.”
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra,
12 ERC at 1838. It further noted that “it cannot be
said that each portion of the Agreement is specifically
responsive to a particular claim contained in one or more
of the original complaints.” Jd. Finally, the court pointed
out that “the [Companies] nowhere have suggested that
the two causes of action as to which controversies still
survive would not alone have provided a substantial basis
for the settlement approved by the court in 1976.“ Id.“
Plainly, the District Court found that these cases do in
fact provide an adequate basis for continuing the Agree-
ment. In these circumstances we do not believe that the
court abused its discretion by refusing to follow the pro-
cedure suggested by the Companies. The court’s conclu-
sion that the two non-moot cases provided an adequate
basis for continuing the Agreement obviated any need
to vacate the Agreement and rehear the cases.
Nor do we think that the District Court was required
to make a further determination that the toxic criteria
and pretreatment cases could provide an adequate basis
for the modifications to the settlement agreement that it
approved. Even assuming that the Companies are correct
in claiming that the modified settlement agreement
“places substantial new burdens and obligations
* The Companies contend that this suggestion by the District
Court ignored the footnote referred to in note 66 supra, in which
they had argued that the proper procedure for the District Court
to follow if it were to conclude that the pretreatment and toxic
criteria cases were not moot was to vacate the Agreement and
rehear these two cases. However, this argument about the proper
procedure to follow is not quite the same as a showing that the
settlement agreement could not be supported by the remaining live
controversies.
84a
upon EPA,“ a claim we will examine in due course,
we do not agree that the District Court had to find that
these “new burdens” could be supported by the two non-
moot cases. The modifications to the settlement agree-
ment were designed to resolve a new controversy that
had arisen over EPA’s non-compliance with the court’s
1976 order approving the Agreement. There can be no
question that the District Court had the power to enforce
the provisions of a settlement agreement it had approved
by requiring further action from the offending party.
C. Modifications to the Settlement Agreement
In contending that EPA contravened public notice and
comment requirements of the APA, the Clean Water Act,
EPA regulations, an Executive Order, and due process
rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in propos-
ing the modifications to the settlement agreement, the
Companies focus on two changes made by the modifica-
tions. The first is a new paragraph 4(c) which modifies
paragraph 4 of the origina] settlement agreement. Para-
graph 4 had required EPA to develop pretreatment stand-
ards for any of the 65 pollutants listed in the Agree-
ment which are not susceptible to treatment by, or are
otherwise incompatible with, publicly owned treatment
works. In addition, EPA was required to promulgate,
by December 31, 1979, pretreatment standards for all
other incompatible pollutants present in the emissions
from any of the 21 industries covered by the Agree-
ment.” New paragraph 4(c) requires EPA to initiate
a program “to identify and study” pollutants (other than
the 65 explicitly covered by the Agreement) which are
incompatible with POTWs, and it specifies certain in-
Brief for appellants at 47.
—
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 8,
8 ERC at 2124.
85a
vestigatory steps that the Agency is to follow.” Second,
the Companies focus on the modifications to paragraph
12 of the 1976 Agreement. That provision had required
7 Paragraph 4(c) provides that:
The Administrator shall establish and implement a program
to identify and study other pollutants which are introduced into
such treatment works and which are not susceptible to treat-
ment by such works or which interfere with, pass through, or
are otherwise incompatible with such works. The program
shall, at a minimum, address those pollutants listed in Ap-
pendix C identifiable by computer-based mass spectra search
programs (“computer matching’), and shall consist of steps
to: tentatively identify by computer matching pollutants dis-
charged by point source categories listed in Appendix B; de-
termine frequencies of occurrence and order-of-magnitude con-
centrations for the tentatively identified pollutants; analytically
confirm the computer identification of those pollutants found
with significant frequency in at least one subcategory and in
high concentrations (the term “high” to be based on compari-
son with the concentrations of other pollutants found or known
to be in the discharge and, where possible, on readily available
information with respect to toxicity of the pollutants); deter-
mine for those pollutants analytically confirmed, based upon a
comprehensive literature search of the latest scientific knowl-
edge, the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on aquatic
organisms and human health; develop from the above informa-
tion a list of pollutants that are candidates for national regula-
tion; determine, by molecular structure analysis and/or labora-
tory test data and/or field studies, or other appropriate means
where practicable, both the probable compatibility of the listed
pollutants with treatment works (as defined in Section 212 uf
the Act) which are publicly owned, and the probable extent to
which industrial technology designed to remove pollutants
cluded in Appendix A also will remove listed pollutants.
Administrator may remove pollutants from said pollutant
didate list that he deems to be compatible with publicly
treatment works or effectively controlled by
ogy upon which pretreatment standards
to § 307 (b) of the Act are based, or are present in
amounts and are neither
i
He
86a
EPA to set up an investigatory program to determine
when and if effluent limitations more stringent than the
technology-based limitations mandated by the Agreement
are necessary to protect human health or aquatic life.“
EPA agreed to establish “a specific and substantial pro-
gram” * for this purpose by June 30, 1978, and to de-
velop such more stringent limitations whenever the Ad-
ministrator determined that they were necessary.” The
modifications to paragraph 12 specify that this program
should include processes for identifying seriously con-
taminated navigable waters and pollutants for which
more stringent limitations are necessary, and a process
for developing the necessary strategies for limiting dis-
charge of these toxic pollutants. The modifications also
set deadlines for EPA to develop and announce these
strategies.”
The Companies and EPA disagree in their characteri-
zation of the changes made by these modifications. EPA
argues that they provide some fine-tuning of the Agree-
ment, incorporating lessons the Agency has learned in
over two years of implementing the Agreement and al-
lowing it greater flexibility and additional time to focus
on major environmental problems. In particular, EPA
contends that paragraph 4(c) actually increases its rule-
making discretion under the Agreement while merely
committing it to specific preliminary investigative ac-
™ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 3,
8 ERC at 2127-2128.
* Jd. at 2128.
* Id. at 2127-2128.
™ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note
89, 12 ERC at 1843-1844.
™ EPA ia to finish identifying the pollutants and polluted waters
by July 1, 1981, and is to publish its proposed strategies no later
than December 31, 1981.
87a
tion,”* and that the changes made in paragraph 12 do
not reduce the Agency’s discretion.” The Companies, on
the other hand, maintain that these new provisions re-
quire EPA to undertake a new series of programs leading
to further regulations that go beyond those mandated
by the original Agreement and the requirements of the
1977 Amendments. They argue that these modifications
mandate that “EPA undertake specified steps and puts
EPA in a straightjacket [sic] where, by contrast, Con-
gress had left the Agency’s discretion unfettered.” ™* The
Companies further argue that, because the modifications
place substantial new burdens and obligations on EPA
and the industries it regulates, the Agency is required
to provide notice and opportunity for public comment
prior to taking action of the sort it took in proposing
these modifications.
In developing this argument the Companies first con-
tend that EPA violated the notice and comment require-
ments of the APA’s rulemaking provisions.” Noting that
the APA defines a rule as “the whole or part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability
™ EPA maintains that whereas paragraph 4 of the original
Agreement appeared to require the Agency to promulgate pretreat-
ment standards for all “incompatible” pollutants discharged by the
21 industries covered by the Agreement, paragraph 4(c) substan-
tially limits its obligations by only requiring the Agency to initiate
& program for investigating “incompatible” pollutants without spe-
cifying how many, and by allowing the Administrator to reduce the
number of pollutants being studied at various steps in the investiga-
tory process. In addition, the decision about which pollutants should
be regulated is left to the Administrator's discretion.
* EPA notes that while the modifications to paragraph 12 re-
quire the Agency to develop processes for identifying contaminated
waters and problem pollutants, no attempt is made to specify what
these processes shall be. Moreover, the determination of the need
for more stringent controls is left to the Administrator's judgment.
8 Brief for appellants at 50.
6 U.S.C. §658(b) & (e) (1976).
88a
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency,” ® ap-
pellants argue that the modified settlement agreement
amounts to a rule since “it has future effect and is de-
signed to mandate programs leading ultimately to regula-
tions and regulatory action * .“ u Appellants point
out that this court indicated in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that the
APA’s definition of a rule “could be read literally to en-
compass virtually any utterance by an agency,” and
that Congress limited the breadth of this definition by
excepting certain specified categories of agency activity.
Appellants reason from this that unless the modifications
can fit within one of these exceptions they must fall
within the statutory definition of a rule to which the
notice and comment provisions apply, and they argue that
none of these exceptions applies to the modifications.
First, appellants contend that the modifications do
not fall within the statutory exemption for “general state-
ments of policy” ™ because they substantially affect the
rights of various members of the public by specifying
the manner in which EPA will carry out regulatory pro-
grams and take administrative actions under the Clean
Water Act.“ Appellants point out that this court ruled
0 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1976).
1 Brief for appellants at 53.
* 5 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1976).
Appellants pcint out that in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
eil v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977), this court acknowledged
89a
in Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d
1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that agency decisions that have
substantial effects on rights are not general policy state-
ments, and they argue that Pickus is a persuasive prece-
dent for this appeal. Second, appellants maintain that
the modifications cannot be said to constitute an “inter-
pretative rule“ exempt from APA notice and comment
requirements. The Companies note that the court indi-
cated in Pickus that this exception applies to “adminis-
trative construction of a statutory provision on a ques-
tion of law reviewable in the courts * * .“ Id. at 1113.
Third, the Companies contend that the modifications are
not exempt as a “rule of agency organization, procedure,
or practice” which was described in Pickus as applying
to technical regulation of the form of agency action and
proceedings.” Id. Finally, appellants argue that the last
statutory exemption—“ for good cause — also does not
apply to the modifications. The Companies conclude,
therefore, that the modifications to the settlement agree-
ment fit within the statutory definition of a rule since
none of the exceptions apply to them.™
Appellants next argue that by adopting the modifica-
tions EPA contravened public participation requirements
of the Clean Water Act and its own regulations. The
Companies note that the Act’s public participation provi-
sion states in pertinent part:
Public participation in the development, revision,
and enforcement of any regulation, standard, efflu-
the programs established by the modifications to the settlement
agreement which is equivalent . their interest in the programs set
up by the original Agreement.
„ Appellants argue that EPA would have benefitted substantially
if it had sought and obtained commen
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