Petition — Valenta v. United Steelworkers

3 - 1596 Office - Supreme Court, U.S. |

FILED

FEB i? 1984

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

NO. CLERK

FRANK J. VALENTA, Petitioner

vs.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

Respondent

and

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor,

U.S. Department of Labor, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Samuel J. Mamich

Attorney for Petitioner

25601 Miles Avenue

Warrensville Hts., Ohio 44128

(216) 464-3380

and

Robert Marcus

Attorney for Petitioner

Four Smithfield Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 391-9990

Kenneth Stein

Attorney for Respondent

14480 Gateway Building

3535 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether a successful candidate

in a labor election can intervene in an

action brought by the Secretary of Labor

under Title IV of the election enforce-

ment provisions of the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.

Section 401, 481-483, only if his inter-

vention is to help advance the claims of

the Secretary of Labor.

(2) Whether it is prejudicial to a

successful candidate in a labor election

to have his Motion for Intervention of

Right denied in an action brought by the

Secretary of Labor under Title IV of the

election enforcement provision of the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 401, 481-483 on

timeliness grounds, without first review-

ing the important issue of whether the

successful candidate was entitled to

intervene of right.

INDEX

Page

DT My « « « © 6© © «© 6 © 6 ¢ 6

JURISDICTION - ats é¢ & es s © 6 6

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...... -« 7

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....-. 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. . 14

i. « “« « «¢ = « « * 6 se 37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Te “Grtates 38

a e286 eS eb ee 40

OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

tt ei. ee ke Se ew ee le ol SE

JOURNAL ENTRY OF UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ... 48

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR

ED ie) a es kg Ge we me en

oo, meee GOne . c«*e « « 0 ae

2 = eel Ee ee eee

a maltose Memeeee G68 . 2 «eo eo oe SS

i & 2 eee EE ee eee

3

TABLE OF CASES Page

Brennan v. Connecticut State

UAW Community Action Program

Council (CAP), 373 F. Supp.

286 (D. Conn. 1974) —

21

Calhoun v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134,

140, 13 L. Ed. 2d 190, 194, 85

BS: Cen Bee (A966) «'s «© © © 6 18

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.

Rizzo, 530 F. 2d 501 (1976),

cert. den., 426 U.S. 921

(1976) ses = 8

32, 33

Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp.,

427 F. 2d 1118, 1125-1126 (5th

Cir.) cert. den., 4C0O U.S. 878,

92 S$. €t. 126, 27 L. BG. 26 135

caeeee 4. ke See ole eS. ee 33

General Electric Company v. Bovitz

Manufacturing Company, 289 F.

Sump. 506 (i9GG) . © © «© © © 27

Hobson v. Hansen, 44 FRD 18

}) 3: See err a ee ee 24

Iowa State University Research

Foundation v. Honeywell, Inc.,

459 F. 2d 447, 449 (8th Cir.

See 2k ele. 6s we ee es 33

Kozek v. Wells, 278 F. 2d 104 at

nue. Geen Gas. 2960) « « « 8 + 6 33

NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at

367-368, 93 S. Ct. 2591, 37

L. Ed. 2d 648 ers

33

Schultz v. United

Page

Steelworkers of

America, 312 F.

Supp. 539 (W.D.

Pa. 1970) 26

Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,

404 U.S. 528, 532, 30 L.

Ed. 2d 686, 92 S. Ct. 630 28, 22

(1972) Soares 25, 36

Wirtz v. International Union

Operating Engineers, 254 F.

Supe. Dea Caeeer « & « ws oe 30

Wirtz v. Laborers International

Union, 389 U.S. 477, 482, 19

Mi ae we wae, Co 8: CS. Oe

(1968) ... 17

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. Section 1254 .... 6

7, 8

29 U.S.C. Section 401 10, 12

29 U.S.C. Section 481 7, 8

aihaal ats 16, a2

7; bs 2

29 U.S.C. Section 4&2 .... 12, 14

13, 32

7s We ae

29 U.S.C. Section 483 12, 17

CIVIL RULES

Rule 24(a)(2), Federal Rules 23, 24

of Civil Procedure ..... 27, 28

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

NO.

FRANK J. VALENTA, Petitioner

Vv.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

Respondent

and

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor,

U.S. Department of Labor, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice

and Associate Justices of the Supreme

Court of the United States:

Frank J. Valenta, the Petitioner

herein, prays that a Writ of Certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit entered in the above-

entitled case on December 12, 1983.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is

unreported and is printed in Appendix A

hereto, infra, page 41. The Journal

Entry of Judgment of the United States

District Court for the Western District

of Pennsylvania is printed in Appendix A

hereto, infra, page 48.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

(Appendix A, infra, page 41) was entered

on November 15, 1983. A timely petition

for rehearing was denied on December 12,

1983 (Appendix A, infra, page 52). The

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the authority

conferred on the Secretary of Labor

pursuant to Title IV of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959, 29 U.S.C. Section 401, 481-483,

which is printed in Appendix A hereto,

infra, pages 54-71.

]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A lawsuit was filed by the Secretary

of Labor against the United Steelworkers

of America, an international union,

seeking to set aside an election for the

International Office of District Director

of District 28, an office currently held

by Frank J. Valenta. The action was

filed by the Secretary pursuant’ to

authority conferred by Title IV of the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959, 29 U.8.C. Section 401,

481-483. Frank Valenta, who was not

named as an individual defendant by the

Secretary, filed a Motion seeking to

intervene in this action for the limited

and marrow purpose of asserting and

protecting substantial interests, duties,

and obligations as an officer of the

union. The U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania denied

intervention and an appeal to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit was timely made and the Court

denied the appeal and after a timely

petition for rehearing the Court upheld

their decision. Petitioner now prays

this Honorable Court will grant his

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

(1) This appeal arose out of an

action brought by the Department of

Labor (DOL) under Title IV ot the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959 (LMRDA) against the United Steel-

workers of America (hereafter USWA,

International or union) in connection

with the nomination and election of

Director for District 28. The relevant

provisions governing that action are

contained in Sections 401 and Sec-

tions 481-483 of LMRDA infra. The Peti-

tioner, Frank J. Valenta, was the incum-

bent Director of District 28.

(2) USWA is an International Labor

Organization which is divided into

twenty-four (24) geographical districts.

The districts are not in themselves labor

organizations, but administrative sub-

divisions of the International Union.

One such district, District 28, covers an

area in north central Ohio which has its

District headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio.

Each geographical area elects a District

Director every four (4) years by referen-

dum vote of the members within that

10

District. The last such election was

held on May 28, 1981. A candidate, in

order to have his name placed on the

ballot for election as Director, must

obtain nominations from five (5) local

unions plus one additional local union

for every 10,000 members (or majority

fraction thereof) in the District. In

connection with the most recent election

of Director of District 28, which had

slightly less than 50,000 members at the

time, the formula translated into a

requirement to receive the nominations of

ten (10) locals out of the 199 local

unions in the District. Every local

union held a nomination meeting in March

to select its nominee. The International

Union Executive Board credited Albert

Forney with only eight (8) such nomina-

tions.

11

(3) The DOL's case centers on the

International Union's failure to rerun

the nominations of two local unions.

These locals are Local Union 1001 and

Local Union 2981, both of which are

located in District 28. The Secretary of

Labor also raises an issue with Local

Union 2732, which is not protested by

Forney.

(4) Prior to the DOL's institution

of the lawsuit, candidate Albert Forney,

whose complaint triggered the Sec-

tion 401, 481-483 investigation, filed

his own lawsuit against the USWA and

certain local union officers (hereafter

the Cleveland lawsuit) in the United

States District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio. The Cleveland lawsuit

alleged essentially the same arguments as

the DOL's suit. In December of 1982,

Judge White for the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of

12

Ohio dismissed the Cleveland case because

it lacked jurisdiction. It was at this

time Frank J. Valenta and his counsel

determined it was imperative that he

intervene in the DOL's action in order to

protect his interests because it was

obvious that the Union would not ade-

quately represent those interests and he

could adversely be affected by any deci-

sion of the Court.

(5) Petitioner made a timely Motion

to Intervene of Right and his motion was

denied on the grounds that (1) Title IV

LMRDA does not permit intervention unless

it is to advance the Secretary of Labor's

(hereafter the Secretary) position; and

(2) Petitioner's motion was not timely.

(6) Petitioner then timely appealed

to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit seeking reversal of the

District Court's order denying interven-

tion. The Court affirmed the District

13

Court's decision, completely ignoring the

important issue of whether intervention

in a suit filed by the Secretary of Labor

by the successful candidate in a con-

tested election is permitted under the

election enforcement provision of the

LMRDA.

(7) Petitioner now seeks a Writ of

Certiorari from this Honorable Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Certiorari should be granted because

the District Court decided a federal

question in a way in conflict with appli-

cable decisions of this Court.

The District Court ruled that in

order for a Movant's petition to inter-

vene as a party defendant to be granted

in an action under Title IV of the LMRDA,

29 U.S.C. Section 482(b) by the Secretary

of Labor, the Movant must show that he is

14

intervening to advance the claims of the

Plaintiff-Secretary.

Title IV, U.S.C. Section 482 states:

(a) Filing of complaint; pre-

sumption of validity of

challenged election. A

member of a labor organi-

zation -

(1) who has exhausted the

remedies available

under the constitu-

tion and by-laws of

such organization and

of any parent body,

or

(2) who has invoked such

available remedies

without obtaining a

final decision within

three calendar months

after their invoca-

tion, may file a

complaint with’ the

Secretary within one

calendar month there-

after alleging the

violation of any

provision of Sec-

tion 401 (29 USCS

Section 481) (includ-

ing violation of the

constitution and

by-laws of the labor

organization pertain-

ing to the election

and removal of offi-

cers). The chal-

lenged election shall

15

(b)

be presumed valid

pending a final

decision thereon (as

hereinafter provided)

and in the interim

the affairs of the

organization shall be

conducted by the

officers elected or

in such other manner

as its constitution

and by-laws may

provide.

Investigation of com-

plaint; commencement of

Civil action by Secretary;

jurisdiction; preservation

of assets. The Secretary

shall investigate such

complaint and, if he finds

probable cause to believe

that a violation of this

title (29 USCS Sections

481 et seq.) has occurred

and has not been remedied,

he shall, within sixty

days after the filing of

such complaint, bring a

Civil action against the

labor organization as an

entity in the district

court of the United States

in which such labor organ-

ization maintains its

principal office to set

aside the invalid elec-

tion, if any, and to

direct the conduct of an

election or hearing and

vote upon the removal of

officers under the super-

vision of the Secretary

16

and in accordance with the

provisions of this title

(29 USCS Sections 481

et seq.) and such rules

and regulations as_ the

Secretary may prescribe.

The court shall have power

to take such action as it

deems proper to preserve

the assets of the labor

organization.

The LMRDA Title IV does not specifi-

cally deny union members the right to

intervene. In Wirtz v. Laborers' Inter-

national Union, 389 U.S. 477, 482, 19 L.

Ed. 2d 716, 88 S. Ct. 643 (1968), the

LMRDA Title IV was interpreted by the

Supreme Court to protect both the public

interest and the rights of individual

union members. These rights are not

limited to the defeated candidate, but

extend to the incumbent as well where the

results of an election are challenged.

It has been the Secretary of Labor's

position that 29 U.S.C. 483 which states

as follows:

17

No labor organization shall be

required by law to conduct

elections of officers with

greater frequency or in a

different form or manner than

is required by its own consti-

tution or by-laws, except as

otherwise provided by this

title (29 USCS Sections 481

et seq.). Existing rights and

remedies to enforce the consti-

tution and by-laws of a labor

Organization with respect to

elections prior to the conduct

thereof shall not be affected

by the provisions of this title

(29 USCS Sections 481 et seq.).

The remedy provided by this

title (29 USCS Sections 481 et

seq.) for challenging an elec-

tion already conducted shall be

exclusive.

to mean that members of the Union will be

barred from intervening in the lawsuit as

well as initiation of a suit by members.

The Supreme Court has held that Sec-

tion 483 does prohibit union members from

initiating a private suit to set aside an

election. Calhoun v. Harvey, 379 U.S.

134, 140, i3 &. Ba. 364 i906. 194, 85

S. Ct. 292 (1964).

However, as to the issue of inter-

vention in the case of Trbovich v. U. ited

18

Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 532, 30

L. Ed. 2d 686, 92 S. Ct. 630 (1972) the

Supreme Court held:

In looking at the history shows

that Congress made suit by the

Secretary the exclusive post-

election remedy for two princi-

pal reasons:

(1) To protect unions from

frivolous litigation and

unnecessary judicial

interference with their

elections, and

(2) To centralize in a single

proceeding such litigation

as miqht be warranted with

respect to a single elec-

ticn.

The Court went on further to say:

That there is no evidence

whatsoever that Congress was

opposed to participation by

union members in the litiga-

tion, so long as the participa-

tion did not interfere with the

screening and centralizing

functions of the Secretary

(691).

The Court further went on to say

that the primary objection to the provi-

sion for member suits was that it might

lead to multiple litigation and multiple

19

forms and thereby impose on the Union the

severe burden of mounting multiple defen-

ses. It was the legislative fear that

the Union would be burdened with unneces-

sary litigation that placed a restriction

on members filing suits individually, but

nothing was ever said about the interven-

tion by union members. The Court then

went on further to say Professor

Archibald Cocks, who was a principal

consultant to the draftsman, the Kennedy

proposal made suit by the Secretary the

exclusive post-election remedy in order

to "centralize control of the proceed-

ings," to adjudicate the validity of an

election “once and for all in one form,"

and to avoid "unnecessary harassment of

the Union on one side and... friendly

suits aimed at foreclosing the Secre-

tary's action on the other." A look at

the Motion to Intervene filed by the

proposed intervenor Frank Valenta did not

20

frustrate either of the objectives re-

quired by the legislative history and

required by the Supreme Court. It is the

intervenor's contention that he could

lend evidence to the claims of illegality

and make sure that all these claims were

presented in a proper fashion. And even

then the intervenor could have lent or

given input to a possible suitable reme-

dial order in the event that the Union

was desirous of settling this issue.

See also, Brennan v. Connecticut State

UAW Community Action Program Council

CAP), 373 F. Supp. 286 (D. Conn. 1974).

But more importantly, the District

Court failed to set up an evidentary

hesring to determine the real purpose of

the intervention and sua sponte overruled

the Motion to Intervene based on repre-

sentations made by the Secretary of Labor

in his Brief.

21

What the District Court failed to do

is properly interpret Trbovich at Page

694; the holding reflects as follows:

We hold that in a post-election

enforcement suit, Title IV

poses no bar to intervention by

a union member, so long as that

intervention is limited to the

claims of illegality presented

by the Secretary's Complaint.

This does not mean that the evidence

that Valenta may add to the case would

advance the claim of the Plaintiff-Secre-

tary. It means that claims will be

presented as to the illegality of the

claim. This, Petitioner intends to do.

In conclusion, the District Court's

denial of the Petitioner's Motion to

Iatervene is in conflict with applicable

decisions of this Court.

Il.

Certiorari should be granted because

the lower courts have decided an impor-

tant question of federal law which hag

22

not been, but should be, settled by this

Court.

This is the first case of this sort

before this Court from the standpoint of

a successful incumbent candidate seeking

to intervene in an action brought by the

Secretary of Labor against an Interna-

tional Labor Union, i.e. defendant,

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,

in that intervention was sought nearly

thirteen months after the suit was ini-

tially filed.

Timeliness by itself is not a new

issue, but when coupled with intervention

by a candidate in a labor dispute, the

issue takes on even more significance.

Before a successful candidate can inter-

vene in an action brought by the Secre-

tary of Labor, he has a number of serious

considerations to make. An intervenor

cannot just jump into the case. Rule

24(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil

23

Procedure, provides the guidelines for

intervention. Rule 24(a)(2) provides

inter alia, as follows:

(a) Intervention of Right

: (2) When the appli-

cant claims an interest

relating to the property

or transaction which is

the subject of the action

and he is so situated that

the disposition of the

action may as a practical

matter impair or impede

his ability to protect

that interest, unless the

applicant's interest is

adequately represented by

existing parties.

The successful candidate must first

determine if he is an eligible candidate

for intervention.

The first prerequisite of Rule

24(a)(2) states that an applicant shall

be permitted to intervene when he claims

an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the

action. See, Hobson v. Hansen, 44 FRD 18

(1968). As an Officer and Director of

the Union and a member of the Union's

24

International Executive Committee, the

Petitioner has an obligation and duty to

the Union to defend it from frivolous

lawsuits and unnecessary expenditures of

funds. As a loyal Union member the

Petitioner has a duty to defend the

Constitution of the Union. Along with

that duty is an obligation to discover

any misfeasance or malfeasance by any

other officer, director or member. Only

if the Petitioner is made a party to the

lawsuit can he actively seek to discover

the wrongdoers, if any. A further obli-

gation of the Petitioner is if there is

any wrongdoing, then it is up to the

Petitioner to find out who the wrongdcer

is and bring that person up on charges

for disciplinary action. Trbovich gave

one reason why an incumbent should be

permitted to intervene; should the Court

find that there was misconduct during

the election, an incumbent should be

25

permitted to intervene to help form a

remedy. A serious question arises if the

Court orders a run-off election and the

incumbent loses. Will the incumbent be

forced to pay back any compensation and

benefits he earned during the period he

held office illegally together with

interest? This is a substantial interest

on the part of the incumbent-intervenor.

This question can only be settled if the

Petitioner is permitted to intervene.

The Union does not and cannot repre-

sent the Petitioner's personal interests.

It does not and cannot represent his

personal interests in continuing in the

office to which he was elected and which

is the subject of this litigation. Nor

does it or can it represent his personal

interest in safeguarding his right and

interest in keing a candidate. Schultz

v. United Steelworkers of America, 312 F.

Supp. 539, (W.D. Pa. 1970). Petitioner

26

has met the burden of prerequisite number

one.

The second prerequisite for inter-

vention under Rule 24(a)(2) is that the

applicant be so situated that the dispo-

sition of the action may, as a practical

matter, impair or impede his ability to

protect his interest. The Petitioner's

interests will not adequately be repre-

sented by the Union. This second prere-

quisite has been construed to mean that

if the disposition of the action will

cause an economic loss to absent parties

already possessing a sufficient interest

in the litigation, then they are in a

Situation of being unable to protect

their interests and should be allowed to

intervene. See, General Electric Company

v. Bovitz Manufacturing Company, 289 F.

Supp. 504 (1968). If the Petitioner is

not permitted an opportunity to inter-

vene, he will be unable to effectively

27

protect his interests. Petitioner has

met the burden of prerequisite number

two.

The third prerequisite for interven-

tion under Rule 24(a)(2) is that the

existing parties to the action are not

adequately representing the Petitioner's

interest. It seems rather incongruous

that the Secretary will represent the

interest of Petitioner. Petitioner's

interests and the Secretary's position

are opposite and to expect fair or ade-

quate representation by the Secretary is

impossible. That leaves the Union as the

Petitioner's representative of his inter-

ests. A large labor union is a political

body with the same powei struggles as are

seen in our own political system. If an

incumbent officer is not permitted to

intervene he is at the mercy of his

Union, which at times can be an unsympa-

thetic friend. The Union is not always

28

in favor of the candidate that is the

elected choice of the membership. There

remains the possibility that a Union

could take advantage of a suit by the

Secretary to unseed an incumbent director

and gain control of a strategic district

or even the entire International Union.

When there are underlying motives, an

incumbent's interests and rights will not

be aggressively and vigorously defended

by the Union, and therefore an incum-

bent's interests will go unvindicated.

The Union had failed to raise issues

that the Petitioner would raise if he

were permitted to intervene. The Peti-

tioner contends that the Secretary has

raised issues in his Complaint that were

not even raised previously, and there-

fore, Al Forney, the other candidate,

failed to exhaust his internal Union

remedies. The Secretary may not sue the

Union except on grounds asserted by the

29

complaining Union member in exhausting

his Union remedies. See Wirtz v. Inter-

national Union Operating Engineers, 254

F. Supp. 962. Since a Union member must

exhaust his internal Union’ remedies

before filing a Complaint with the Secre-

tary of Labor, the Secretary may not sue

to correct a violation which the member

has not protested to the Union. Al

Forney's complaint to the International

Executive Board related to his eligi-

bility as a candidate for Union office.

His argument was that he had 0been

nominated by ten (10) locals and there-

fore, he should be placed on the ballot.

The International Executive Board, after

having been notified by two (2) locals

that Al Forney did not get their nomina-

tions and then investigating the reasons,

upheld the local board's decisions and

dismissed his protest. The Secretary, in

his Complaint, raises issues that were

30

not brought before the International

Executive Board. They are as follows:

(a) denying members in good

standing a reasonable

opportunity to nominate

candidates;

(b) denying a member in good

standing the right to be a

candidate and hold office;

and

(c) denying members in good

standing the right to vote

for the candidate or

candidates of their

choice.

(d) Forney protested the

results in local unions

2981 and 1001. The Secre-

tary of Labor raises an

issue with local 2732 -

not protested by Forney.

Clearly, these arguments are raised

for the first time in the Secretary's

Complaint and therefore, these issues

were never presented to the Union by Al

Forney so that the Union may rule upon

such complaints and therefore, he failed

to exhaust his internal Union remedies as

required by 29 U.S.C. Section 482. This

31

is an absolute requirement before a Union

member brings his complaint to the Secre-

tary of Labor.

The Union failed to adequately

represent the interests of the Petitioner

and therefore, Petitioner has met the

burden of prerequisite number three.

What the District Court and Court of

Appeals failed to recognize is that a

labor organization is a highly political

entity and an elected official must tread

lightly before making an important deci-

sion such as intervening in a labor

action between the Secretary of Labor and

his International Union. Such a decision

could have disastrous ramifications. The

lower courts looked at the issue of

timeliness and followed the guidelines

from the Third Circuit decision in

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo,

530 F. 2d 501 (1976), cert. den. 426 U.S.

921 (1976), which are as follows:

32

(1) How far the proceedings

have gone when the Movant

seeks to intervene.

NAACP v. New York, 413

U.S. at 367-366, 93 S. Ct.

2591, 37 L. Ed. 2d 648;

Iowa State University

Research Foundation Vv.

Honeywell,Inc., 459 F. 2d

447, 449 (8th Cir. 1972).

(2) Prejudice which resultant

delay might cause to other

parties, Diaz v. Southern

Drilling Corp., 427 F. 2d

1118, 11251125 (5th Cir.)

cert. denied, 400 U.S.

8768, 91 8. Ct. 116, 27 b&.

Ed. 2a 115 (1970); Kozek

v. Wells, 278 F. 2d 104)

at 109 (8th Cir. 1960),

and

(3) The reason for the delay,

Iowa State University

Research Foundation Vv.

Honeywell, Inc., supra,

459 F. 2d at 449.

A trial court should only look to

these guidelines after they have examined

the issue of whether the Movant is en-

titled to intervene.

The Court in Rizzo should have had

one more guideline, that is, was the

Intervenor required to act in a prudent

33

manner before moving for intervention.

If the trial court had examined Peti-

tioner's entitlement to intervention and

then examined whether his actions were

prudent, the Court would have granted his

Motion to Intervene. Notwithstanding the

above, the Petitioner's actions were

timely.

It is true that nearly thirteen (13)

months passed before Frank J. Valenta

moved to intervene. There are good

reasons for his delay. First, the United

Steelworkers of America was made a co-

defendant to a lawsuit in Cleveland by Al

Forney, the complainant in the Secre-

tary's action. In this lawsuit, issues

pertinent to the Pittsburgh case were

raised and fully argued. Judge White,

towards the end of the trial, suggested

that his Court may not have jurisdiction

in that matter and that is when it was

decided intervention in the Pittsburgh

34

case was imperative. On December 3, 1982

the Cleveland Court held that it indeed

lacked jurisdiction and that exclusive

jurisdiction layed in the Pittsburgh Dis-

trict Court.

Secondly, it was also necessary for

Frank J. Valenta to sit back and see if

the Union would adequately represent his

interests in the case. After viewing the

arguments raised by the Union, it was

necessary for Frank J. Valenta to become

involved in the above case. Clearly,

issues discussed at ‘trial were not raised

by the Union's counsel.

The issues the Petitioner intends to

raise are to protect his interests.

These interests would not have been

different had they been raised thirteen

months earlier. What was necessary was

for Petitioner to view the acts of the

Union to see if they would adequately

represent his interests. They did not.

35

Therefore, it was imperative that he take

action to become a party to the suit.

Counsel for Petitioner in his Motion

to Intervene made it clear that no exten-

sions of time would be required to facil-

itate discovery if he were permitted to

intervene. In fact, if Petitioner were

permitted to intervene and the trial date

set for tomorrow, he would be prepared to

go forward immediately.

In Trbovich at 536 the Supreme Court

found:

"Intervention by Union members

in a pending enforcement suit,

unlike initiation of a separate

suit, subjects the Union to

relatively little additional

burden. The principal intru-

sion or internal Union affairs

has already been summoned into

Court to defend the legality of

its election. Intervention in

the suit by Union members will

not subject the Union to bur-

densome multiple litigation,

nor will it compel the Union to

respond to a new and poten-

tially groundless suit."

It is clear that the Trbovich Court

found that intervention would add a

36

Minimal burden to the Union. If this

burden is at best minimal at the begin-

ning of the lawsuit then it should not

increase as the suit proceeds and the

Union becomes prepared to go to trial.

Since the Union will suffer no greater

burden now than it did at the beginning

there can be no issue of lack of timeli-

ness.

Therefore, Petitioner's Motion to

Intervene was timely and should have been

granted by the District Court.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully

prays that a Writ of Certiorari be

granted.

(/

L\ar

‘Samuel J. Mamich

Attorney for Petitioner

25601 Miles Avenue

Warrensville Hts., Ohio 44128

(216) 464-3380

37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, A true copy of the foregoing Peti-

tion for a Writ of Certiorari was sent by

Regular U.S. Mail on this 16th day of

February, 1984 to the following parties:

FRANCIS X. LILLY

Deputy Solicitor of Labor

JOHN F. DEPENBROCK

Associate Solicitor

HELENE BOETTiCHER

Counsel for Litigation

DENNIS A. PAQUETTE

Attorney

c/o U.S. Department of Labor

Washington, D.C. 20210

KENNETH STEIN, ESQ.

14480 Gateway Building

3535 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Counsel for U.S. Department of

Labor

JAMES D. ENGLISH, ESQ.

Associate General Counsel

. United Steelworkers of America

Five Gateway Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

United States Solicitor General

Room 5614

y.Ss. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

MARK A. ROCK, ESQ.

Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf &

Rock

616 Bond Court

1300 East Ninth Street

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

BERNARD KLEIMAN, ESQ.

Suite 1910

East Wack Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

j oO (

KOIY . x

ee, J ~iA~LA£ Ba: 4 ”~ i ty

/SAMUEL J. MAMYCH/

Attorney for Petitioner

25601 Miles Avenue

Warrensville Hts., Ohio 44128

(216) 464-3380

39

APPENDIX

40

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 83-5178

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN,

Secretary of Labor,

U.S. Department of Labor

vs.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO

FRANK J. VALENTA

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District

of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh)

(D.C. Civil No. 81-1726)

Argued

November 4, 1983

Before: ALDISERT, HUNTER, and WEIS,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed November 15, 1983)

Samuel J. Mamich, Esq. (ARGUED)

25601 Miles Avenue

Warrensville Heights, Ohio 44128

Robert Marcus, Esq.

Four Smithfield Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

41

Kenneth Stein, Esq.

14480 Gateway Building

3535 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

COUNSEL FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR

Francis X. Lilly

Deputy Solicitor of Labor

Jonn F. Depenbrock

Associate Solicitor

Helene Boetticher

Counsel for Litigation

Dennis A. Paquette (ARGUED)

Attorney

U.S. Department of Labor

Washington, D.C. 20210

COUNSEL FOR THE SECRETARY OF

LABOR

James D. English (ARGUED)

Associate General Counsel

United Steelworkers of America

Five Gateway Center

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

Mark A. Rock, Esq.

Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock

616 Bond Court

1300 East Ninth Street

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

OF COUNSEL:

Bernard Kleiman, Esq.

Suite 1910

East Wack Drive

Chicago,

Illinois 60601

COUNSEL FOR UNITED STEELWORKERS

OF AMERICA

42

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from the denial of

incumbent union officer Frank J.

Valenta's motion to intervene in an

action by the Secretary of Labor under

Title IV of the Labor Management Report-

ing and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA),

29 U.S.C. Section 482(b), seeking to set

aside the election for the office of dis-

1

trict director. A number of questions

a. 29 U.S.C. Section 482(b) provides:

The Secretary shall investigate such com-

plaint and, if he finds probable cause to

believe that a violation of this subchapter

has occurred and has not been remedied, he

shall, within sixty days after the filing of

such complaint, bring a civil action against

the labor organization as an entity in the

district court of the United States in which

such labor organization maintains its prin-

cipal office to set aside the invalid elec-

tion, if any, and to direct the conduct of an

election or hearing and vote upon the removal

of officers under the supervision of the

Secretary and in accordance with the provi-

sions of this subchapter and such rules and

regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.

The court shall have power to take such

action as it deems proper to preserve the

assets of the labor organization.

43

relating to intervention are presented,

but in the view we take, it will be

necessary to review only the district

court's determination that Valenta's

motion to intervene was not timely. For

the purposes of our analysis we assume,

without deciding, that intervention by

the successful candiate in a contested

election is permitted under the election

enforcement provision of the LMRDA and

that the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),

F.R.Civ.P., other than timeliness, were

met.”

ae Other questions presented include whether an

officer who had been successful in the election is

permitted to intervene on the side of the defen-

dant union under 29 U.S.C. Section 482 and whether

such officer has a right to intervene under the

terms of Rule 24(a)(2), F.R.Civ.P.

3. Rule 24(a)(2), R.F.Civ.P. provides:

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely

application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action: ... (2) when the

applicant claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject

of the action and he is so situated that the

44

Central to intervention in any

proceeding is that the motion to inter-

vene be timely. In the exercise of its

sound discretion, the district court

determines timeliness after consideration

of all the circumstances. We will re-

verse only for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo,

530 F.2d 501, 506 (3rd Cir.) cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976).

This court set forth several factors

in Rizzo to inform the district court's

discretion in determining whether a

motion to intervene is timely. Id. They

include: (1) the stage of the proceed-

ings when the movant seeks to intervene;

(2) possible prejudice caused to other

parties by delay; and (3) the reason for

disposition of the action may as a practical

matter impair or impede his ability to pro-

tect that interest, unless the applicant's

interest is adequately represented by exist-

ing parties.

45

delay. Id. (quoting Nevilles v. EEOC,

511 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir. 1975)).

In the case at bar, the district

court considered the factors and found

against appellant on each of them.

First, appellant did not seek to inter-

vene until more than thirteen months

after the complaint had been filed. All

of the pre-trial work was complete at

that time and the case was already sched-

uled for trial. Second, the court found

that substantial prejudice could result

to the other parties. We agree. The

longer the proceedings are delayed, the

longer the challenging candidate remains

out of office and the longer the inter-

venor retains the office. Allowing

intervention at this point would contra-

vene Congress's interest in resolving

challenges to union elections as quickly

as possible. See Dunlop v. Bachowski,

421 U.S. 560, 569 (1975). Third, the

46

district court found that appellant

offered no meaningful justification for

his delay. Again, we agree. The excuses

offered by appellant are not persuasive.

He argues that he was awaiting the out-

come of a second suit pending in federal

court in the Northern District of Ohio,

hoping it would be res judicata to the

present one. That suit was dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. Appellant further

argues that he delayed intervention until

he could determine whether his interests

were adequately represented. These argu-

ments resemble evidence of tactical

decisions; collectively and individually,

they do not excuse the delay for inter-

vention in the case here.

The judgment of the district court

denying intervention will be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit

47

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN,

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPART-

MENT OF LABOR,

Plaintiff

Civil Action

No. 81-1726

Vv.

UNITED STEELWORKERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

me ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee”

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of Decem-

ber, 1982, a motion to intervene having

been filed in the above-captioned case on

behalf of Frank J. Valenta together with

a brief in support thereof, and, the

plaintiff having filed a reply brief in

opposition to the motion, and the court

having given the matter due considera-

tion, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to

48

intervene be and the same hereby is

denied for the following reasons:

7 1.) The court finds that the

movant's petition to intervene

as a party defendant is barred

under Title IV of the Labor

Management Reporting and Dis-

closure Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec-

tion 482(b), for the reason

that the movant does not seek

to intervene to advance the

Claims of the plaintiff-secre-

tary. Trbovich v. United Mine

Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 537

(1972); Brennan v. United

Steelworkers of America, 554

F.2d 586, 594 (3rd Cir. 1977);

Brennan v. Silvergate Dist.

Lodge No. 50 et al., 503 F.2d

, 800, 805 (9th Cir. 1974); Cf.

Hodgson v. Carpenters Resil-

ient Flooring Lodge Union

No. 2212, 457 F.2d 1364 (3d

Circ. 1972).

In addition, the court finds

that the movant's petition is

untimely under the standards

enunciated in Commonwealth of

Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 506

(3rd Gat: 1976) in that:

(a) the motion has been thir-

teen months after this suit was

initiated and after the case

was listed for trial; (b) the

intervention at this stage of

the proceedings by the movant

will result in prejudice to

both the plaintiff and defen-

dant as the movant's interests

are potentially adverse to each

party; and (c) the movant

50

offers no justification for the

delay in presenting his motion.

/s/ Gustave Diamond

United States District Judge

cc: All counsel of record.

51

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 83-5178

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN,

Secretary of Labor,

U.S. Department of Labor

vs.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

FRANK J. VALENTA, Appellant

(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 81-1726)

SUR_ PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, and

ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS,

GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER and

BECKER, Circuit Judges.

The petition for rehearing filed by

Appellant in the above entitled case

having been submitted to the judges who

participated in the decision of this

court and to all other available circuit

judges of the circuit in regular active

service, and no judge who concurred in

the decision having asked for rehearing,

52

.

and a majority of the circuit judges of

the circuit in regular active service not

having voted for rehearing by the court

in banc, the petition for rehearing is

denied.

BY THE COURT,

/s/ Aldisert

Circuit Judge

DATED: DEC 12 1983

53

Section 401. Congressional declaration

of findings, purposes, and policy

(a) The Congress finds that, in the

public interest, it continues to be the

responsibility of the Federal Government

to protect employees' rights to organize,

choose their own representatives, bargain

collectively, and otherwise engage in

concerted activities for their mutual aid

Or protection; that the relations between

employers and labor organizations and the

millions of workers they represent have a

substantial impact on the commerce of the

Nation; and that in order to accomplish

the objective of a free flow of commerce

it is essential that labor organizations,

employers, and their officials adhere to

the highest standards of responsibility

and ethical conduct in administering the

affairs of their organizations, particu-

larly as they affect labor-management

relations.

54

(b) The Congress further finds,

from recent investigations in the labor

and management fields, that there have

been a number of instances of breach of

trust, corruption, disregard of the

rights of individual employees, and other

failures to observe high standards of

responsibility and ethical conduct which

require further and supplementary legis-

lation that will afford necessary protec-

tion of the rights and interests of

employees and the public generally as

they relate to the activities of labor

organizations, employers, labor relations

consultants, and their officers and

representatives.

(c) The Congress, therefore, fur-

ther finds and declares that the enact-

ment of this Act is necessary to elim-

inate or prevent improper practices on

the part of labor organizations, em-

ployers, labor relations consultants,

55

and their officers and representatives

which distort and defeat the policies of

the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,

as amended and the Railway Labor Act, as

amended, and have the tendency or neces-

sary effect of burdening or obstructing

commerce by (1) impairing the efficiency,

safety, or operation of the instrumental-

ities of commerce; (2) occurring in the

current of commerce; (3) materially

affecting, restraining, or controlling

the flow of raw materials or manufactured

or processed goods into or from the

channels of commerce, or the prices of

such materials or goods in commerce; or

(4) causing diminution of employment and

wages in such volume as substantially to

impair or disrupt the market for goods

flowing into or from the channels of

commerce. (Sept. 14, 1959, P.L. 86-257,

Section 2, 73 Stat. 519.)

56

Section 481. Terms of office

and election procedures

(a) Officers of national or inter-

mational labor organizations; manner of

election. Every national or interna-

tional labor organization, except a

federation of national or international

labor organizations, shall elect its

officers not less often than once every

five years either by secret ballot among

the members in good standing or at a

convention of delegates chosen by secret

ballot.

(b) Officers of local labor organi-

zations; manner of election. Every local

labor organization shall elect its offic-

ers not less often than once every three

years by secret ballot among the members

in good standing.

(c) Requests for distribution of

campaign literature; civil action for

57

enforcement; jurisdiction; inspection of

membership lists; adequate safeguards to

insure fair election. Every national or

international labor organization, except

a federation of national or international

labor organizations, and every local

labor organization, and its oficers,

shall be under a duty, enforceable at the

suit of any bona fide candidate for

office in such labor organization in the

district court of the United States in

which such labor organization maintains

its principal office, to comply with all

reasonable requests of any candidate to

distribute by mail or otherwise at the

candidate's expense campaign literature

in aid of such person's candidacy to all

members in good standing of such labor

organization and to refrain from discrim-

ination in favor of or against any candi-

date with respect to the use of lists of

members, and whenever such labor organi-

zations or its officers authorize the

distribution by mail or otherwise to

members of campaign literature on behalf

of any candidate or of the labor organi-

zation itself with reference to such

election, similar distribution at the

request of any other bona fide candidate

shall be made by such labor organization

and its officers, with equal treatment as

to the -expense of such distribution.

Every bona fide candidate shall have the

right, once within 30 days prior to an

election of a labor organization in which

he is a candidate, to inspect a list

containing the names and last known

addresses of all members of the labor

organization who are subject to a collec-

tive bargaining agreement requiring

membership therein as a condition of

employment, which list shall be main-

tained and kept at the principal office

59

of such labor organization by a desig-

nated official thereof. Adequate safe-

guards to insure a fair election shall be

provided, including the right of any can-

didate to have an observer at the polls

and at the counting of the ballots.

(d) Officers of intermediate

bodies; manner of election. Officers of

intermediate bodies, such as general

committees, system boards, joint boards,

Or joint councils, shall be elected not

less often than once every four years by

secret ballot among the members in good

standing or by labor organization offic-

ers representative of such members who

have been elected by secret ballot.

(e) Nomination of candidates; eli-

gibility; notice of election; voting

rights; counting and publication of re-

sults; preservation of ballots and re-

cords. In any election required by this

section which is to be held by secret

60

ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be

given for the nomination of candidates

and every member in good standing shall

be eligible to be a candidate and to hold

office (subject to section 504 [29 USCS

Section 504] and to reasonable qualifica-

tions uniformly imposed) and shall have

the right to vote for or otherwise sup-

port the candidate or candidates of his

choice, without being subject to penalty,

discipline, or improper interference or

reprisal of any kind by such organization

or any member thereof. Not less than

fifteen days prior to the election notice

thereof shall be mailed to each member at

his last known home address. Each member

in good standing shall be entitled to one

vote. No member whose dues have been

withheld by his employer for payment to

such organization pursuant to his volun-

tary authorization provided for in a

collective bargaining agreement shall be

61

declared ineligible to vote or be a

candidate for office in such organization

by reason of alleged delay or default in

the payment of dues. The votes cast by

members of each local labor organization

shall be counted, and the results pub-

lished, separately. The election offi-

cials designated in the constitution and

bylaws or the secretary, if no other

official is designated, shall preserve

for one year the ballots and all other

records pertaining to the election. The

election shall be conducted in accordance

with the constitution and bylaws of such

organization insofar as they are not

inconsistent with the provisions of this

title [29 USCS Sections 481 et seq.].

{f) Election of officers by conven-

tion of delegates; manner of conducting

convention; preservation of records.

When officers are chosen by a convention

of delegates elected by secret ballot,

62

the convention shall be conducted in

accordance with the constitution and

bylaws of the labor organization insofar

as they are not inconsistent with the

provisions of this title [29 USCS Sec-

tions 481 et seq.]. The officials desig-

nated in the constitution and bylaws or

the secretary, if no other is designated,

shall preserve for one year the creden-

tials of the delegates and all minutes

and other records of the convention

pertaining to the election of officers.

(g) Use of dues, assessments or

Similar levies, and funds of employer for

promotion of candidacy of person. No

moneys received by any labor organization

by way of dues, assessment, or similar

levy, and no moneys of an employer shall

be contributed or applied to promote the

candidacy of any person in an election

subject to the provisions of this title

{29 USCS Sections 481 et seq.]. Such

63

moneys of a labor organization may be

utilized for notices, factual statements

of issues not involving candidates, and

other expenses necessary for the holding

of an election.

(h) Removal of officers guilty of

serious misconduct. If the Secretary,

upon application of any member of a local

labor organization, finds after hearing

in accordance with the Administrative

Procedure Act that the constitution and

bylaws of such labor organization do not

provide an adequate procedure for the

removal of an elected officer guilty of

serious misconduct, such officer may be

removed, for cause shown and after notice

and hearing, by the members in good

standing voting in a secret ballot con-

ducted by the officers of such labor

organization in accordance with its

constitution and bylaws insofar as they

are not inconsistent with the provisions

64

of this title [29 USCS Sections 481 et

seq. ]

(i) Rules and regulations for de-

termining adequacy of removal procedures.

The Secretary shall promulgate rules and

regulations prescribing minimum standards

and procedures for determining the ade-

quacy of the removal procedures to which

reference is made in subsection (h).

(Sept. 14, 1959, P.L. 86-257, Title IV,

Section 401, 73 Stat. 532.)

65

Section 482. Enforcement

(a) Filing of complaint; presump-

tion of validity of challenged election.

A member of a labor organization --

(1) who has exhausted the remedies

available under the constitution and

bylaws of such organization and of

any parent body, or

(2) who has invoked such available

remedies without obtaining a final

decision within three calendar

months after their invocation,

may file a complaint with the Secretary

within one calendar month thereafter

alleging the violation of any provision

of section 401 {29 USCS Section 481]

(ancluding violation of the constitution

and bylaws of the labor organization

pertaining to the election and removal

of officers). The challenged election

shall be presumed, valid pending a final

decision thereon (as hereinafter

66

provided) and in the interim the affairs

of the organization shall be conducted by

the officers elected or in such other

manner as its constitution and bylaws may

provide.

(b) Investigation of complaint;

commencement of civil action by Secre-

tary; jurisdiction; preservation of

assets. The Secretary shall investigate

such complaint and, if he finds probable

cause to believe that a violation of this

title [29 USCS Sections 481 et seq.] has

occurred and has not been remedied, he

shall, within sixty days after the filing

of such complaint, bring a civil action

against the labor organization as an

entity in the district court of the

United States in which such labor organi-

zation maintains its principal office to

set aside the invalid election, if any,

and to direct the conduct of an election

or hearing and vote upon the removal of

67

officers under the supervision of the

Secretary and in accordance with the

provisions of this title [29 USCS Sec-

tions 481 et seq.] and such rules and

regulations as the Secretary may pre-

scribe. The court shall have power to

take such action as it deems proper to

preserve the assets of the labor organi-

zation.

(c) Declaration of void election;

order for new election; certification of

result of vote for removal of officers.

If, upon a preponderance of the evidence

after a trial upon the merits, the court

finds --

(1) that an election has not been

held within the time prescribed

by section 401 [29 USCS Sec-

tion 481], or

(2) that the violation of section

401 [29 USCS Section 481] may

68

have affected the outcome of an

election,

the court shall declare the election, if

any, to be void and direct the conduct of

a new election under supervision of the

Secretary and, so far as lawful and

practicable, in conformity with the

constitution and bylaws of the labor

organization. The Secretary shall

promptly certify to the court the names

of the persons elected, and the court

shall thereupon enter a decree declaring

such persons to be the officers of the

labor organization. If the proceeding is

for the removal of officers pursuant to

subsection (h) of section 401 [29 USCS

Section 481(h)], the Secretary shall

certify the results of the vote and the

court shall enter a decree declaring

whether such persons have been removed as

officers of the labor organization.

69

(d) Review of orders; stay of order

directing election. An order directing

an election, dismissing a complaint, or

designating elected officers of a labor

organization shall be appealable in the

same manner as the final judgment in a

Civil action, but an order directing an

election shall not be stayed pending

appeal. (Sept. 14, 1959, P.L. 86-257,

Title IV, Section 402, 73 Stat. 534.)

70

Section 483. Application of other laws;

existing rights and remedies;

exclusiveness of remedy

for challenging election

No labor organization shall be

required by law to conduct elections of

officers with greater frequency or in a

different form or manner than is required

by its own constitution or bylaws, except

as otherwise provided by this title [29

USCS Sections 481 et seq.]. Existing

rights and remedies to enforce the con-

stitution and bylaws of a labor organiza-

tion with respect to elections prior to

the conduct thereof shall not be affected

by the provisions of this title [29 USCS

Sections 481 et seg.]. The remedy pro-

vided by this title [29 USCS Sections 481

et seg.) for challenging an election

already conducted shall be exclusive.

(Sept. 14, 1959, P.L. 86-257, Title IV,

Section 403, 73 Stat. 534.)

71