Petition — Cramer v. State Bar of Michigan

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83-1588 [Pres

FEB 21 1984

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UN STATES

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.

OCTOBER TERM, 1983 {| — al

VIRGINIA CRAMER,

Petitioner, Plaintiff and Appellant

STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN;

JOHN D, O'HAIR;

WILLIAM LEO CAHALAN;

RICHARD D. KUHN;

H, ROLLIN ALLEN, and All

Members of the State Bar

of Michigan similarly

situated,

Respondents, Defendants and Appellees

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

SIXTH CIRCUIT - (No. 82-1855)

AND

DISTRICT COURT, ED MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION - (No. 81-73926)

AND

REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL, MONETARY DAMAGES,

INJUNCTIVE, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Virginia Cramer

Pro se Petitioner

27314 Clairview

Dearborn Heights,

Michigan 48127

February 1984 (313) 278-7286

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whethe. petitioner's direct

appeal in the United States Court of

Appeals from the federal district court's

dismiss’ 1 of the entire federal action

primarily of "False Arrest and False

Imprisonment", 42 USCA 1983, et seq.,

co-conspiratorially, and as a constitu-

tional cause of action of deprivation

of liberty by violations of the pro-

hibitive provisions and limitations of

the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments

to the U. S. Constitution, and tort

liability in the clear and complete

absence of all jurisdiction by judicial

and law enforcement officers, beyond

the authority granted by any valid

statute, in their personal capacities as

members of the State Bar of Michigan (not

publicly owned), presented one or more

"not plainly frivolous" issues entitling

petitioner to have her appeal reviewed

and determined on the merits by the Court

of Appeals, particularly in the light of

no disparity between the parties on said

appeal that "False Arrest and False Im-

prisonment", 42 USCA 1983, et seq., does

state a claim upon which relief can be

granted; that the district court's memo-

randum opinion is fraught with erroneous,

inaccurate and fallacious findings as very

obvious and exceptional showing of error,

absent of any testimony; and also, part-

icularly in the light of the standards

set forth by this Court in Ellis v United

States (not frivolous) 356 US 674; Arger-

singer v Hamlin (holding inter alia "that

absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,

no person may be imprisoned for any

offense, whether classified as petty,

misdemeanor, or felony" without a trial)

407 U.S. 25, 92 S Ct 2006 (1972); Aikens

v Wisconsin (motive-conduct not privileg-

ed) 195 US 194 (1904); Yaselli v Goff,

12 F 2d 396 (2nd Cir 1926, judge held

liable for damages in acting without

jurisdiction), aff'c 275 U S 503 (1927);

Stump v Sparkman (1978) not controlling:

i.e., not to expectations of parties and

petitioner's refusal to participate by

"failing to voluntarily appear" in ab-

sence of jurisdiction, 435 US 356, 98S

Ct at 1104; McMann v Richardson (lack of

power, i.e., to bring charges in absence

of complaining party or complaining wit-

ness) 397 US 759, 90 S Ct 1441 (1970);

and by the standards of related cases of

the several circuits of the federal court

of appeals in Harper v Merckle (i1legal-

ity) 638 F 2d 1229 (7th Cir 1980);

McAlester v Brown (required factors for

jurisdiction) 469 F 2d 1280 (5th Cir (1972);

Rankin v Howard (personal jurisdiction and

sub ject-matter jurisdiction conjunctional,

both must be met) 633 F 2d 844 (9th Cir

1980); Zarcone v Perry (judge solely

invoked judicial power, i.e., Harper v

Merckle, supra; judge solely invoked his

power for personal objectives, non- judicial

act) 572 F 2d 52 (2nd Cir 1978); and the

standards intended by the 1974 amendment

to the Federal Tort Claims Act, Act of

March 16, 1974, Pub.L. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50,

and Norton v U. S., (CA 4th 1978) 581 F 2d

390, cert den 99 S Ct 613, 439 US 862;

28 USCA 2680 (h) and other related stand-

ards in Monell v Department of Social

Services (1978) 436 US at 690, 98 S Ct at

2035 "persons" under 42 USCA 1983, et seq.;

U. S. v LePatourel (judiciary covered as

employees) 571 F 2d 405 (modified C.A.8th,

1979, 593 F 2d 827); U. S. v Orleans (1976)

(independent ground of jurisdiction,

42 USCA 1983, et seq.) 92 S Ct 1971, 425

U S 867; pertaining to tort liability,

absence of jurisdiction, lack of power,

absence of immunity, "persons" liable

under 42 USCA 1983, et seq., and related

matters, i.e, jurisdiction over subject-

matter and person, both must be met,

2. Whether the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals' refusal to determine peti-

tioner's appeal on the merits constitutes

an unconstitutional (under the Due Process

and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th

Amendment to the U. S. Const.) or unlawful

or otherwise invidiously discriminatory

practices against a person representing

herself -- particularly in the light of

both plaintiff's (petitioner herein) and

all defendants! pleadings showing that

"she failed to appear before the Defendant-

judges" in conflict and in contrast to the

erroneous, inaccurate and fallacious find-

ings of the federal district court and

denial of rehearing thereon as very obvious

and exceptional showing of error having

particular force and effect in points of

law oa particularly in the light of the

court of appeals panel assignment of the

instant case on Tuesday, November 15, 1983

and disposition of voluminous record on

Monday, November 21, 1983 (per docket

entries) or t'iree (3) to four (4) working

days being insufficient and impossible

time-period for proper review of record

on direct appeal; particularly in the

light of Faretta v California (1975) Slip

Opinion No. 73-5772, U S Supreme Court,

and the 4th and 6th Amendments to the U. S.

Constitution, when the issues presented by

petitioner's appeal are issues of a type

which clearly would be reviewed and deter-

mined by the court of appeals on the merits

in &@ comparable case presented by a com-

petent and honest attorney if one could be

found and available for the instant case.

(After diligent and extensive search, such

en attorney could not be found.) For

instance, "75% to 90% of American trial

lawyers are incompetent, or dishonest, or

both" according to Chief Justice Warren

Burger of the United States Supreme Court:

see, Trial Lawyer's Guide, 1971, pp 108-

109. Also, according to March 11, 1981,

U.S. News & World Report survey of judges,

only 4% of American lawyers are competent.

Further, see "A Sick Profession", 5 Tulsa

L J1, January 1968, Judge Warren E. Burger.

See, also, Rosenberg: Stump v Sparkman:

(1978) 435 US 356, 98 S Ct at 1104; Doct-

rine of Judicial Impunity (An invitation

*o judicial lawlessness) 1978, Vol 64:

833 Virginia Law Review,

3. Whether suitor-State Bar of Mich-

igan (a private club), not publicly owned,

not tax-supported, and its attorney-

members, in the absence of a geographical

status of municipality, county or state,

are absolutely immune under the llth

Amendment to the U. S. Const. and 42 USCA

1983, et seq., as to intentional tort

liability of false arrest and false im-

prisonment by the instigation and initia-

tion of improper litigation materials and

the 1981 procurement and enforcement of

constitutionally void ex parte orders

coram non judice (before one not a judge)

im the clear and complete absence of all

jurisdiction, in the wrong jurisdiction,

usurping the power of the State Supreme

Court (see companion case, State Bar v

Cramer (1976-77) 399 Mich 116-161, and not

remanded (40 copies appended)), and the re-

sulting co-conspiratorial plot between

county circuit court judges of different

counties acting in the clear and complete

absence of all jurisdiction, in conflict

with the provisions, limitations and bans

of the State and Federal Cv.iustitutions,

specifically:

(a) The due process and equal protec-

tion clauses of the 14th Amendment;

(b) The ceprivation of liberty ban of

the 5th Amendment by violations of the 4th

and 14th Amendments;

ment (freedom of speech or expression and

peaceful assemblage) made applicable to the

States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protect-

ing persons from "state action" or exertion

of power for personal objectives of sovern-

ment agents or employees who are also mem-

bers of the bar association in their person-

&@l capacities, and who force the general

public to hire Jawyers to generate litiga-

tion-busiress and fees for other members

of the bar in conflict with the Michigan

State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 13, and

in conflict with statutory provisions of

MCLA 600.1430; MSA 274.1430;

(d) The provisions in the Fourth Amend-

ment (search and seizure) made applicable

to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,

protecting persons from non-judicial acts

of judicial officers using the judicial

capacity to vindicate personal objectives,

in perversion of camaraderie, in the

absence of any party invoking the judicial

machinery as to any dispute; - - =- = -

in conflict with the standards set down in

Aikens v Wisconsin (motive~conduct not

privileged) 195 US 194 (1904); Yaselli v

Goff (judge held liable for damages, in

acts absent of jurisdiction) 12 F 2d 396

(2nd Cir 1926), Aff'd 275 US 503 (1927);

Stump v Sparkman, supra; Harper v Merckle,

supra; Zarcone v Ferry, supra; Rankin v

Howard, supra; and other related cases,

@€. &-, Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339;

Mitchum v Foster, ("state action"" 407 US

225; 42 USCA 1983, et seq., Shelley v

Kraemer (1948) prohibiting judicial enforce-

ment of restrictive conditions, 334 US 1.

4, Whether the State Bar of Michigan

(a private club) is entitled to claim

sovereign immunity under the llth Amend-

ment to the U. S. Const., in confiict with

the standards of Moose Lodge No. 107 v Irvis,

407 U S 163 (holding that discriminatory

practices of a private club could not be

attributed to the state merely because the

state regulated the club and conferred bene-

fits to it in the form of "licensing"), when

the tort action of False Arrest and False

Imprisonment occurred by, specifically:

(a) action by court officers beyond

their statutory powers;

(ob) even though within scope of their

authority, powers themselves or manner in

which they are exercised are constitutionally

void; and

State Bar of Michigan "waiver of immunity"

is expressed and implied by grant of power

to sue and be sued, as made applicable by

the provisions and limitations of the Due

Process and Equal Protection clauses of the

Sth and llth Amendments to the U. S. Consti-

tution.

(d) That the members of the State Bar of

Michigan are not licensed by the State.

5. Whether petitioner is entitled to

jury trial and monetary damages for inten-

tional tort of "False Arrest and False Im-

prisonment" for injuries to person, proper-

ty and business,

6, Whether petitioner is entitled to

injunctive relief against the State Bar of

Michipanm members, a5 TPoilows:

"A, Ordered ond Adjuiged that the

members of the State Bar of Michigan, as

applicable, the said defendants, their

agents, representatives, employees and

attorneys be restrained and enjoined from:

1. Harassing, hasseling, annoying,

molesting and/or otherwise interferring and/

or meddling with the trade and business of

persons exercising their constitutional

right of self-help and self-representation;

2, Denying and/or preventing access to

information, forms, instructions, documents,

typewriting assistance, filing assistance

and services to incividuals seeking to exer-

cise their guaranteed constitutional right of

self-representation in the courts of we

State of Michigan;

3. Initiating or attempting to initiate

and/or assisting to initiate any proceedings

against Plaintiff-Virginia Cramer in the

absence of a complaining witness, in the

absence of probable cause, and/or in the

absence of real party in interest;

4, Harassing, hasseling, anioying or

molesting any members of the general public

utilizing services of the trade and busi=

ness of Virginia Cramer, Plaintif: herein;

5. Engaging and/or assisting in engaging

in a plot to prevent, interfere with, restrict

or preclude the proper effectiveness in the

aid of administration of justice;

6. Engaging and/or assisting in engaging

in a plot and/or conspiracy against or inter-

ferring with the trade or business of enabling

persons of the general public to exercise

self-representation;

7. Engaging in other conduct or miscon-

duct contrary to the primary best interests

and protection of the general public with

regard to self-help and self-representation

and services therefor;

8. Enforcing or attempting to enforce

a judgment or Order which orders nothing.

(inter alia) ** * ,"

1’

7. WHETHER THE PETITIONER AND THE

GENERAL PUBLIC ARE ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY

RELIEF IN THAT THEY SHALL NiCTl BE FORCED TO

HIRE A LAWYER AND BE VICTIMIZED BY AND/OR

BE SUBJECTED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTER

OF Tit LACK OF QUALITY OF PERSONS IN THE

LEGAL PROFESSION,

8, Whether the lower court judiciary,

on behalf of themselves or on behalf of the

State Bar of Michigan, have the power to

enforce:

(a) An injunctive order which prima facie

orders nothing;

(b) An injunctive order affirmed, retain=

ed and/or terminated and not remanded by the

state supreme court;

against a person in the absence of subject-

matter jurisdiction;

(d) Ex parte orders procured or issued

against a person in the absence of personal

Jurisdiction;

(e) Bench Warrants for the arrest of a

person who intentionally "failed" to volun-

tarily appear on ex parte orders procured

or issued without a hearing thereon; and

thus,

(f) Constitutionally void orders by an

arrest and imprisonment of a person when

that person intentionally "failed" to

appear because she knew she would be dealing

with judges who had no subject-matter juris-

diction and no personal jurisdiction over

said person.

The ultimate question presented is

whether the district court and the Sixth

Circuit court of appeals erred in aetermin-

ing that absolute immunity is applicable as

to Tort liability of "False Arrest and False

Imprisonment in the absence of both personal

and subject-matter jurisdiction" as failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted (FRCP 12 (b) (6)), and involves

whether the judiciary may exert such power

im tle courts so as to deny the veneral

public and your petitioner access to the

courts and relief sought unless represented

by an attorney in civil actions and in con-

flict with Michigan Constitution, Art. I,

Sec. 13 and statutory provisions of MCLA

600.1430; MSA 274.1430; and by engaging in

invidiously discriminatory practices to

invalidly protect the legal profession in

conflict with the provisions in 7 JS 727,

Practice of Law,

" * * * In the enactment of statutes

* * * the Legislature will be held to

have intended only to protect the

general public from exploitation, and

not to protect tne legal profession,

especially since any such attempt of

the latter would be invalid, * * *

(emphasis ag See, Peo ae v Black,

282 NYs 197, 156 Misc —

and in conflict with,

"No presumption of innocence or improb-

ability of wrongdoing exists in favor of

the attorney." 7 Am Jur ed, Attorneys

at law, at 95;

"he must refrain from doing an inten-

tional wrong to the adverse party."

7 Am Jur 2a, Attorneys at law, at 4,

The main thrust of this action is tnat

petitioner was arrested and imprisoned for

her refusal to participate and her inten-

tional "failure" to appear voluntarily on

constitutionally void cx parte orders,

issued or procured coram non judice (before

one not a judge) withouta hearing thereon,

wnen your petitioner knew She would be deal-

ing with judges who were acting ultra vires

(be yond authority) or nNon-judicially, on

classic hearsay (in "Cramer's" absence),

in the clear and Complete absence of per-

Sonal Jurisdiction and Subject-matter JjJuris-

diction, in the absence of issuance of

Summons, in the absence of complaint and/or

complaining party, absent of affidavit and

service of process, absent of any specifics,

aosent of any Showing of provable cause,

and that the members of the State Bar of

Michigan (lawyers and judges in their person-

al capacities) procured and issued constitu-

tionally void £x parte orders and bench

warrants in the clear and complete absence

of all jurisdiction to bait, entrap, intimi-

anc/or Lorce your petitioner

to suomit voluntarily to tie county circuit

court jurisdictions (Wayne County and Oakland

County) to besiege her with litigation as

dirty back-alley tactics, beyond the offi-

cials authority because the state cannot

lawfully authorize its officials to violate

tne constitution, and usurping the power of

the state supreme court in retention of an

injunctive order affirm2d but not remanded

to any lower court obviously because the

so-called injunctive order (dated January 5,

1973) prima facie orders nothing.

See, companion case, State Bar v Cramer,

1976-1977, 399 Mich 116-161 (copies appended);

see, “Judgment for Plaintiff (State “ar) and

Injunctive Order" dated January 5, 1973, in

Petitioner's Appendix (tan cover),

9. Whether the judge of the district

court and/or one or more of the judges of

the court of appeals should have raised the

issue ot "judge's disqualification" when

the judge's impartiality might reasonably

be questioned in a proceeding in which the

judge

(a) is interested as a party and has

regarded himself as one of the members of the

autonomous political subdivision "Tne State

Bar of Michigan", one who is "similarly

situated", and

(ob) is personally biased or prejudiced

against a party-plaintiff and for a party-

attorney (H. Rollin Allen, individual-defend-

ant) and

attorney-H. Rollin Allen, individual-defend-

ant is not a United States officer) and thus,

the district court judge improperly set aside

the clerk's entry of default against defend-

ant-H. Rollin Allen ‘n the absence of a

motion by the individual-defendant-H. Rollin

Allen, in the absence of a showing of good

cause, in the absence ofa showing of a

meritorious defense;

and in conflict with FRCP Rule 6, Time (b)

Enlargement; FRCP Rule 12 (a) 20 days time;

"ROP Rule 55 Derault (2) Entry, (bv) Judgment;

Summary Judgment (e) form of affidavits;

further testimony; Defense Required * * *

"affidavits shall be made on personal knowl-

edge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, * * * ,"

LIST OF RESPONDENTS, DEFENDANTS , APPELLEES

H. Rollin Allen, Member of Unauthorized

Practice of Law Committee, State Bar of

Michigan

Jonn Db. Otfair, ” (former Judge of the Wayne

County Circuit Court) Member of the State

Bar of Michigan

William Leo Cahalan, (Judge of the Wayne

County Circuit Court) Member of the State

Bar of Michigan

1/ This federal action against Defendant,

Judge John D, O'Hair was commenced on

October 21, 1981; John D, O'Hair

resigned from the Wayne County Circuit

Court bench on May 1, 1983.

Richard D. Kuhn, (Judge of the Oakland

County Circuit Court) Member of the State

Bar of Michigan

The State Bar of Michigan and All Members of

the State Bar of Michigan similarly

situated

NOTE: the above list excluues the following:

United States court employees (federal),

Michigan State Supreme Court members,

Michigan Court of Appeals members,

Attorney Grievance Commission members,

Attorney Discipl:.ne Board members,

Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission

members.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

LIST OF RESPONDENTS, DEFENDANTS,

APPELLEES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

CONCLUSION

VOLUME II

EXHIBIT A Injunctive Order 1/5/73

EXHIBIT AA Remittitur of Discon-

tinuance 1/20/77

EXHIBIT AAA Docket Entries, State

Case No, 72-218-571-CZ

EXHIBIT AA-1l1 Ex Parte Motion

Filed 2/17/81

EXHIBIT AA-2 Ex Parte Order

Filed 2/17/81

EXHIBIT AA-3 Ex Parte Motion

Filed 3/13/81

EXHIBIT AA-4 Ex Parte Order 3/13/81

EXHIBIT AA-5 Ex parte Order 3/13/81

True Copy

page

1-20

20-21

‘tT. -*

BAHIB: 17

EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT

A hy ll! ,

AA -7

Bel

B-6

B-7

/O1

Warrant 4/293

Order for Bond 6/5/81

Special and Limited

Appearance in pro per

Filed 7/13/81 - Notice,

Motion to Quash, Brief

Letter 2/24/76 to Judge

Kuhn and others

Letter 10/5/81 by

H. Rollin Allen

Proposed Judgment,

Not Signed

Affidavit of W.Neville

Filed 11/13/81

No, 81-73926

Docket Entries

Seaholm v Seaholm

Horn v Horn

Judge Kunn

Ex Parte Order 4/4/75

Return

No filing date

Order for Bench Warrant

issued 4/9/75

Order for Cancellation

of Bench Warrant

Filed 6/19/81

Ex Parte Order

Filed 5/9/75

Return on Service If

Not Found 5/16/75

Order for Substituted

Service - filed 6/3/75

103

104

107

pm BS

112

114

116

117

119

120

122

123

Order for Bench Warrant

no filing date 125

EXHIBIT Bell Order for Cancellation

of Bench Warrant

Issued ye Al

Filed 6/19/81 iRT

EXHIBIT BB Letter to R. Hadley

3/13/81 from

H. Rollin Allen 128

VOLUME IIL

TRANSCRIPT Proceedings 1/25/82

U. S. District Court

No, 81-73926 129 -

190

TABS OF AUTHORITIEL.

Aikens v Wisconsin (1904) 195 US 194

Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25,

92 S Ct 2006 (1972)

Augusta Medical Comp. Inc. v Blue

Cross of Kan (Kan 1980) 608 Ped 890

DeKuyper v DeKuyper, 365 Mich Rep 487

Duba v McIntyre, 501 F 2d 590

(8th Cir 1974)

Ellis v United States, 356 US 674

Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339

Faretta v California (1975)

Slip Opinion No. 73-5772

Harper v Merckle (7th Cir 1980)

638 F 2d 1229

In re Wellman, 3 Kan App 100,

4s P 726 (1896)

Lopez v Vanderwater, 620 F 2d 1229

(7th Cir 19805

Moose Lodge No. 107 v Irvis

407 US 163

Maness v Meyers, 419 US 449 (1975)

McAlester v Brown (5th Cir 1972)

469 F 2d 1280

McMann v Richardson (1970) 397 US 759

90 S Ct 1441

Mitchum v Foster, 407 US 225

page

e, 9

Monell v Dept of Soc Ser (1978)

436 US at 690, 98 S Ct at 2035 4

Morris v Radley, (1943) 306 Mich 689

11 NW 2d 291 54

Norton v U. S. (CA 4th 1978)

581 F 2d 390, cert den 99 S % 613 a

People v Black, 282 NYS 197

156 Misc 516 16, 58

Rankin v Howard (9th Cir 1980)

633 F 2d 84y 3, 44, 48

Rammage v Kendall, 168 Ky 26,

181 SW 631 4s

Ryan v Scoggin, 245 F 2d 54

(10th Cir 1957) yy

Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 (1974) 60

Shelley v Kraemer (1948) 334 US 1 10

Smyth v Lubbers (6tn Cir) 1974

390 F Supp 777 59

State Bar v Cramer ped 8, 18, 54

399 Mich 116-161 (copies appended)

Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 356

98 S Ct at 1104 3, 47

United States v (United) Mine Workers

330 US 258, 67 S Ct 677 (1947) hy

U. S. v LePatourel, 571 F 2d 405 (1978)

(modified CA 8th 1979)

593 F 2d 827

U. S. v Orleans (1976) 425 US 867

92 S Ct 1971

Watkins v Dunbar (I11 1925) 149 NE 14 45, 57

Yaselli v Goff, 12 F 2d 396 (2nd Cir 1926)

Aff'd 275 US 503 (1927 2, 3, 50

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, RULES

lst, 4th, 5th, 6th, 14th Amendments 1, 5, 8

lith Ane ndment ,

28 USCA 2680 (h)

Federal Tort Claims Act (Amended)

farcl. 16, 1974, Pub. L 93-253

80 Stat. 50 4

28 USCA 1343 25, 26

42 USCA 1983, et seq i, 7, @&, @%, 22

Federal Rules Civil Procedure

Rule 6 (b) 19

Rule 12 (a) 19

Rule 12 (b) (6) 15

Rule 55 (a) 20

Rule 56 20

Michigan Const. 1963,

Art I, Sec 13 9, 16

Michigan Statutes

MCLA 600.1430 9, 16, 27

MCLA 600.1901 45

MCLA 600.1905 45

MCLA 600.1912 27

MCLA 600.1815 27

MCLA 600.1711 27, 49

Michigan Court Rule 760.1 27, 49

page

TEXTS

5B CJS, Appeal and Error,

1956, 1959, 1962 54

7 CJS 727, Practice of Law 16, 58

7 Am Jur 2d, Attorney at law,

at 4, at 95 16

59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, at 1, 11, 192 45

MISCELLANEOUS

Trial Lawyer's Guide, 1971, pp 108 6

U. S. News & World Report survey of

judges, March 11, 1981 6

A Sick Profession, 5 Tulsa L J l,j

January 1968 7

Rosenberg: Stump v Sparkman (1978)

Doctrine of Judicial Impunity

(An invitation to judicial

lawlessness) Vol 64:833 Va L R 7

RULES CONCERNING STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN

Rules 1, 5 and 16 27, 57

NO,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

VIRGINIA CRAMER,

Petitioner, Plaintiff and Appellant,

STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN;

JOHN D, O'HAIR;

WILLIAM LEO CAHALAN;

RICHARD D,. KUHN;

H. ROLLIN ALLEN, and All

Members of the State Bar

of Michigan similarly

situated,

Respondents, Defendants and Appellees,

To the Chief Justice and Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Virginia Cramer in propria persona

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the memorandum opinion of the district court,

the orders of dismissal of the entire action,

the order affirming by the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals in this case,

OPINIONS BELOW

The order and erroneous opinion of the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 82-1855,

filed November 21, 1983 is not per curiam

and is not officially reported. See,

separate volume (tan cover) Petitioner's

Appendix, APPENDIX A, pp. 1 and 2, also

issued as Mandate, December 29, 1984 (repeat

1984 date). Order denying stay of mandate

was entered on December 27, 1983, APPENDIX

B, pe 3. See Petitioner's Appendix (tan cover)

The erroneous memorandum opinion and

erroneous finding of fact with erroneous

conclusions of iaw by the U. S,. District

Cour: (No. 81-73926) was filed on July l,

1982, APPENDIX D, pp. 6 - 25, Subsequently,

Orders of dismissal as to all defendants were

filed on July 7, 1982, July 12, 1982 and

July 20, 1982 in the district court,

APPENDIX E, A FENDIX F, APPENDIX G, pp. 26,

27 and 28, "Petitioner's Appendix",

Timely motion for rehearing was denied

by the district court; memorandum opinion

filed on October 12, 1982, APPENDIX H, pp.

29 - 31; together with "Order Amending

Memorandum Opinion of June 30, 1982" also

filed on October 12, 1982, APPENDIX I, p. 31.

Subsequently, Orders denying rehearing

were filed on October 14, 19 and 21, 1982;

APPENDIX J, APPENDIX K, APPENDIX L, pp. 32,

34 and 35; None are reported.

Order denying "Remand" of State case of

the Wayne County Circuit Court, No. 72-218-

571-CZ, was filed on October 18, 1982.

APPENDIX S, p. 89, and is not reported,

A companion case, State Bar of Michigan

v Cramer (not remanded) reported at: 399

Mich 116-161, is substantially involved,

photocopies (40) of which are separately

appended together with "Petitioner's Appendix"

(tan cover) hereto. The case was heard by

only six (6) justices 2° ot the Michigan

Supreme Court, Remittitur of discontinuance

2/ (former) Associate Justice John B, Swain-

son (also formerly Governor of State of

Michigan) disbarred and ousted from the

Michigan Supreme Court (1976) involving

bribery.

was issued January 20, 1977. See, EAHIBIT

AA, infra, pp. 70-71.

JURISDICTION

The final order of the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals (APPENDIX A) is dated Novem-

ber 21, 1983. The jurisdiction of this court

is invoked under 28 USC 1254 (1) and 42 USCA

1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. APPENDIX FF,

APPENDIX GG, APPENDIX HH, pp. 163, 165, 166.

Original jurisdiction in the district

court invoked under 28 USCA 1343, together

with 42 USCA 1983, et seq. (See APPENDIX

EE, p. 161.)

Petitioner has no parent companies, sub-

Sidiaries or affiliates. Also, respondents

State Bar of Michigan submitted their "Dis-

Closure of Corporate Affiliations and Finan-

cial Interest" in the negative, as Ordered

by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, No.

82-1855, on May 4, 1983; that the State Bar

of Michigan is not a subsidiary or affiliate

of a publicly owned corporation and that

there is no publicly owned corporation with

a substantial financial interest not a pirty

to the appeal. (See, Items 13 and 14, Docket

Entries, C.A. No. 82-1855.) See, "Order"

filed May 4, 1983, APPENDIX C, p. 4.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States Con-

stitution, in relevant parts, as shown in

"Petitioner's Appendix" (tan cover) are

involved; also, see Amendments Eight, Nine

and Ten to the U. S. Constitution relevant

herein; A BENDIX AA, APPENDIX BB, APPENDIX

CC, APPENDIX DD, pp. 158, 159, 160, 161 of

"Petitioner's Appendix",

The Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution, erroneously claimed by

respondents State Bar of Michigan and in

error by the district court, is shown at

APFENDIX CC, p. 160.

Federal statutory provisions involved

are 28 USCA 1343, 42 USCA 1983, 1985, 1986

and 1988,Federal Rul2s of Civil Procedure,

Rules 12 and 56, APPRENOIY Be, APPENDIX wD,

APPENDIX GG, APPENDIX Hi, APPENDIX IL, pp.

161 - 169.

Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. I,

Sec, 13; Michigan Statutory provisions,

MCLA 600.1430; MSA 27A.1430; MCLA 600.1901;

MSA 27A.1901; MCLA 600.1905; MSA 27A.,1905;

MCLA 600.1912; MSA 27A.1912; MCLA 600.1815;

MSA 27A.1815; MCLA 600.1711; MSA 27A.1711;

(Revised Judicature Act, Michigan Compiled

Laws Annotated and Michigan Statutes Annot-

ated) are involved as shown in Petitioner's

Appendix (tan cover), together with Michigan

General Court Rules 760.1, 865 and 866, and

"Rules Concerning State Bar of Michigan"

Rules 1, 5 and 16 -- APPENDIX JJ, KK, LL,

MM, NN and 00, pp. 169 - 176.

MCLA 600,916; MSA 27A,916 erroneously

Claimed by defendants and the district court

is shown at APPENDIX PP, p. 177, but is not

involved,

STATEMENT

BACKGROUND OF FACTS

In 1973, suitor State Bar of Michigan,

an autonomous political subdivision, 4 priv-

ate club of lawyers and judges (a public

body corporate, not publicly owned, not tax-

supported) obtained a "Judgment for Plaint-

iff (State Bar) and Injunctive Order", Case

No. 72-218-571-CZ, in the Wayne County Cir-

cuit Court, against "Cramer" and others, A

fair reading of said “injunctive order”

dated January 5, 1973, signed by Judge John

D, O'Hair, shows that it prima facie orders

nothing. See, EXHIBIT A, amended, infra,

p. 66.

Subsequently, "Cramer" (Petitioner here-

in) was found in contempt of said "injunctive

order", fined and jailed various and numer-

our times and her office was "pad-locked",

by Judge John D. O'Hair, Defendant herein,

Ultimately, "Cramer" alone appealed, The

Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the injunc-

tive order together with one contempt, re-

versing the other contempts, and did not

remand the case, nor any part of it, to any

other jurisdiction. See, companion case,

State Bar v Cramer, 1976-1977, reported at

399 Mich 116-161, photocopies annexed to

"Petitioner's Appendix" hereto,

Rehearing was not, sought. Remand was

not requested, Remittitur of discontinuance

was filed January 20, 1977, EXHIBIT AA,

infza, p. 70; MGCR 865 and 866, APPENDIX NN,

p. 174.

No mandate was filed in the Wayne County

Circuit Court and the original record of

Civil Action No. 72-218-571-CZ was not return-

ed to the lower court following the perfected

appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, as

pertaining to "Cramer",

‘In the interim, defendant-respondent

attorney-H. Rollin Allen, co-conspiratori-

ally with various and several county circuit

court judges of different counties in the

State of Michigan, have been "ambulance-

chasing", in effect, and soliciting directly

to numerous individuals who sought to exer-

cise their guaranteed constitutional right

of self-representation (Michigan Constitu-

tion of 1963, Art I, Sec 13 and MCLA 600,

1430; MSA 27A.1430, pp. 169-170 Petitioner's

Avpendix), but who were intimidated, harassed

and hassled by court officers in various ways,

For example, see EXHIBIT BB, letter to Roset-

ta Hadley, dated March 13, 1981, EXHIBIT BB,

infra, p. 126. See, also, Transcripts of

proceedings (1972-1980) Sykes v Sykes,

Hudson v Hudson, Austin v Austin, Chapman v

Chapman, APPENDIX W, APPENDIX X, APPENDIX Y

and APPENDIX Z, pp. 128 = 157.

The bar association members have never

been able to find a person to sue "Cramer",

although they have solicited for this pur-

pose of besieging "Cramer" with litigation,

for more than ten (10) years.

Also, in the interim of 1975, Judge

Richard D, Kuhn, defendant-respondent herein,

had issued constitutionally void ex parte

orders against "Cramer" and misdemeanor

bench warrants for "Cramer's" arrest, "for

failure to appear" in the cases of Seaholm

v Searolm No, 74-115-277-D0, and Horn v

Horn No. 75-121954-D0, Oakland County Circuit

Court. See, Docket Entries of these two cases

shown in EXHIBIT B-2, infra, p. 109 - 110.

The said constitutionally void orders

and bench warrants, issued by Judge Richard

D. Kuhn (Oakland County) were entered as liens

on "Cramer's" vehicle operator's license in

1975 and remained for "State-wide pick-up”

until sometime in 1981. "Cramer" was arrest-

ed and jailed on June 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1981

in the Wayne County Jail and Oakland County

Jail. See, APPENDIX T ard U, pp. 90 - 101,

Transcripts of 6/5/81 and 6/12/81.

Also, in 1975, Judge Richard D, Kuhn

purposefully caused or affirmatively encour-

aged the dispatch of seven (7) government

vehicles filled with personnel of the Oakland

County Sheriff's office and the Dearborn

Heights City police and detectives on execu-

tion of his bench warrant issued in the case

of Seaholm v Seaholm for "Cramer's" arrest,

TR-26 and TR-27, January 25, 1982, Transcript,

infra, pp. 129 - 190. Also, EXHIBIT in

Volume III of Appellant's Append‘x, page 360,

U.S. Court of Appeals No. 82-185') "General

Case Report, Dearborn Heights Police Dept.

Assisting Oakland County Sheriff, dated

April 10, 1975."

In February and March, 1981, without a

remand by the Michigan Supreme Court in the

1976-1977 companion case of State Bar v

Cramer, supra, attorney-H. Rollin Allen pro-

cured ex parte orders issued by Judge John D,

O'Hair and Judge William Leo Cahalan, Wayne

County Circuit Court, without a hearing there-

on. See, State Case Docket Entries involved,

EXHIBIT AAA, infra, p. 72.

"Cramer" did not appear and intentionally

disregarded the ex parte orders, because she

knew she would be dealing with judges who had

no subject-matter jurisdiction and were absent

of personal jurisdiction over "Cramer", in the

lower court. On April 29, 1981, Judge O'Hair

issued a bench warrant for "Cramer's" arrest

when she "failed to voluntarily appear” on

April 24, 1981, EXHIBITS AA-6, AA-7, infra,

p. 86; and see, Transcript of proceedings had

on June 5, 1961, APPENDIX T, pp. 90 = 96, and

in part, as follows: (Quotation)

"THE COURT: (Judge O'Hair) It seems to

me that we have to have her assur-

ance in Court, either on 4 voluntary

basis or an involuntary basis and

the former has not proved at all,

so it seems that the latter course

is necessary."

On June 12, 1981, "Cramer" was arrested

at her residence in Dearborn Heights, Michi-

gan and transported to Detroit, Michigan, and

forcibly brought into Judge O'Hair's court-

room at aprjroximately 3 P. M. See, Transcript

of June 12, 4981, APPENDIX U, pp. 97 - 101,

in part, as fllows: (Quotation)

"THE COURR: (Judge O'Hair) You are

broug in on the warrant as a

Court's order to show cause,

There is @ problem that has

brought to my attention. * * *

In addition to the warrant I issued,

two have been issued out of the

Oakland County Circuit Court and

they have holds for you in the event

you are arrested * * * You are not

going to get out of. jail.

* &

"MRS; CRAMER: There is no case pending

in the Oakland County Circuit Court

that would name anyone to make me a

party to any kind of action in the

Oakland County Circuit Court. There

is no jurisdiction in the Oakland

County Circuit Court and I claim

likewise, there is no jurisdiction

jin the Wayne County Circuit Court,

"THE COURT: You are not asked to, * * *

"MRS, CRAMER: Your Honor has been charged

with exceeding his jurisdiction in

the Michigan Supreme Court. I am

sure you had an opportunity to read

the pleadings.

"THE COURT: Mrs. Cramer, the hearing is

over,"

On June 12, 1981, "Cramer" deposited

$1,000 cash "bond" with the Wayne County Jail,

for her release pending the date set by Judge

O'Hair as June 17, 1981. However, "Cramer"

" was not released; instead, she was jailed in

the Wayne County Jail to await the arrival of

the Oakland County Sheriff's deputies who, at

about 7 P. M. arrested "Cramer" at the Wayne

County Jail and transported her to the Oakland

County Jail, in Pontiac, Michigan. "Cramer"

was booked, fingerprinted, mugged, deprived of

her liberty, clothes, personal effects, money,

jewelry, purse, and jailed on June 12, 13, 14

and 15, 1981.

On June 15, 1981, at approximately 11 A.M.

(Monday) "Cramer" was forcibly brought, hand-

cuffed, chained and shackled, into Judge Rich-

a one (Oak lf

Cramer’ had sever before been in Judge

Kuhn's presence or in his courtroom; not on

any occasion. Jvdge Kuhn did not "examine"

"Cramer" on anything. (See, EXHIBIT B, infra,

p. 99, Letter dated February 24, 1976, to

Judge Kuhn and others, )

After about an hour, "Cramer" was taken

back to the Oakland County Jail and released

at approximately 3 P. M. at the rear of said

Jail, on June 15, 1981.—-7

On June 17, 1981, "Cramer" expected

restitution of her $1,000 (cash) "bona", so

she showed up in Judge O'Hair's courtroom

at 9:00 A.M. for that purpose and that only.

However, the $1,000 cash was not refunded to

her until on August 11, 1981, where Judge

O'Hair adjourned the matter to August 1l,

1981. In the interim, "Cramer" did not res-

pond to the State Bar's (H. Rollin Allen's)

motions and amended motion (Wayne, No. 72-

218-571-CZ) and on July 13, 1981 “Cramer"

filed her "Special and Limited Appearance,

In Propria Persona" with her Motion to Quash

cervice and to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-

tion, in the Wayne County Circuit Court.

See, EXHIBIT B-1, infra, p. 89. Also, see

EXHIBIT D, infra, p. 104, not signed, not

entered. Further, see EXHIBIT E, infra, p.

105, "Affidavit of William W, Neville" filed

in the federal district court on November 13,

1981. It appears that Judge O'Hair contempl-

ated jailing "Cramer" again, for 30 days,

unless she paid money to Mr, Neville who did

not ask for anything, who did not want any-

thing from "Cramer",

See, EXHIBITS B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7,

B-8, B-9, B-10 and Bell, infra, pp. 112-125,

which includes the constituionally void ord-

ers and bench warrants issued by Judge Rich-

ard D. Kuhn, without a hearing thereon, in

the absence of personal jurisdiction and in

the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction,

as pertaining to "Cramer", Also, no affida-

vits were filed or served, no summons issued,

no complaints filed, no amended complaints or

allegations were filed, no notice of hearing

was filed, as pertaining to "Cramer",

urther, see EXHIBITS AAA, AAgl, AAg=2,

AA=3, AA-4, AA-5, AA-6, AA-7, infra, pp. 72 -

88, and EXHIBIT D, p. 104, in connection with

EXHIBIT E, p. 105, "Affidavit of William W.

Neville" in part, as follows: (Quoting)

"], That he is the William W, Neville

who was subpoenaed by H. Rollin Allen

as the attorney for the State Bar of

“cap for proceedings held in the

1yne County Circuit Court, State of

Michigan, before the Honorable John D.

O'Hair on August 11, 1981.

"O, That he appeared and gave testi-

mony on said date of August 11, 1981,

in the said proceedings before the said

Honorable John D,. O'Hair,.

"3, That he has read the transcript of

the proceedings of August 11, 1981,

before the Honorable John D,. O'Hair as

appears to be submitted and filed in

the United States District Court,

Docket No. 81-73926 attached to the

pleadings of H. Rollin Allen under

date of October 30, 1981.

"4, That pertinent herein is the

Honorable John D. O'Hair's statement

on pages 7 and 8 of the herein afore-

mentioned transcript of August 11,

1981, as follows:

"She is also to forthwith pay into

the Court, a sum of $95.00. That

fee that she charged Mr, Neville

for rendering service, immediately.

* * * Prepare a proposed order, Mr.

Allen, If the $95 is not paid

within the five days as ordered,

Mrs, Cramer is to be committed to

the Wayne County Jail,"

your arfiant nerej: ot iced

nat t Ld teretn described transe-

cript of August 11, 1981, as submitted

and attached to the copies oj plead-

ings by H. Rollin Allen, omits the

testimony of said William W, Neville,

affiant herein.

tye

"6, That your affiant did not request

any refund of any moneys as pertaining

or relative to or involving this mat-

ter; that he does not want any repay-

ment or refund or reimbursement of any

moneys pertaining or relative to or

involving this matter,

"7, That your affiant did not author-

ize anyone to request any refund to

him of «ny moneys involving this matter,

"8, That your affiant believes that

the attorney-H. Rollin Allen has unduly

imposed upon and harassed your affiant;

that your affiant did not and has not

engaged the services of H. Rollin Allen;

and further, that no attorney, especi-~

ally not H. Rollin Allen, has been

authorized to represent the said William

W,. Neville, affiant herein.

Filed /s/ WILLIAM W, NEVILLE * * * "

11/13/81

Further, EXHIBIT D, infra, p. 104, Pro-

posed Judgment submitted by H. Rollin Allen

as of October 5, 1981, Wayne Circuit Court

Case No, 72-218-571-CZ (which was not remanded

by the Michigan Supreme Court, 399 Mich 116,

Docket No, 56413) reads, in part as follows:

"Tt is FURTHER ORDERED that Lefend

(Cramer) shall forthwith pay into the

Wayne County Circuit Court the sum of

Ninety-Five Dollars ($95.00), which

eee Sum WAS charged William W. Neville.”

"TT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Defendant,

Virginia Cramer, does not pay the sum of

Ninety Five Dollars ($95.00) to the

Wayne County Clerk on or before August

16, 1981, Defendant shall be committed

to the Wayne County Jail."

As aforementioned, with reference to

EXHIBIT A, infra, p. 66, which is the "injunc-

tive order" dated January 5, 1973, it orders

nothing and was not remanded by the Michigan

Court.

Petitioner "Cramer" claims that, on June

12, 13, 14 and 15, 1981, she was falsely

arrested and falsely imprisoned on constitu-

ticnally void ex parte orders procured by H.

Rollin Allen on behalf of the State Bar of

Michigan and issued by Judges John D, O'Hair

and William Lec Cahalan of the Wayne County

Circuit Court, members of the State Bar of

Michigan in their personal capacities, in the

clear and complete absence of all jurisdic-

tion.

Petitioner "Cramer" further claims that,

also, on June 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1981, she

was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned

on constitutionally void ex parte orders

issued by Judge Richard D, Kuhn, Oakland

County Circuit Court, on behalf of himself in

his personal capacity (non-judicially) and as

a member of the State Bar of Michigan, in the

clear and complete absence of all jurisdic-

tion.

Petitioner "Cramer" further claims that,

the ex parte orders procured and/or issued

in both the Wayne County Circuit Court and

the Oakland County Circuit Court, were, in

fact, done so in the clear and complete

absence of subject-matter jurisdiction and in

the clear and complete absence of personal

jurisdiction over "Cramer"; in the absence of

authority, coram non judice (before one not

a judge).

n October 21, 1961, Petitioner "Cramer"

filed her complaint in the federal district

court, together with ex parte "removal" of

the Wayne County Circuit Court action No. 72-

218-571-CZ, involving only the State Bar's

initiation of ex parte motions and ex parte

orders procured and issued in February and

March 1981 and up to the contemplated entry

of the "proposed" Judgment as of October 5,

1981. These were the actions taken by attor-

ney-H. Rollin Allen on benalf of the State

Bar and the actions taken by the Wayne Circuit

judges, subsequent to the determination of the

Michigan Supreme Court decision and opinions

of 1976-1977 (reported at 399 Mich 116-161)

and not remanded to any lower court, in the

same case No. 72-218-571-CZ.

Petitioner "Cramer" claims that such ex

parte orders of February 17 and March 13,

1981 (Wayne County Circuit Court), further,

usurped the Michigan Supreme Court's power

to retain or enforce or terminate the "injunc-

tive order dated January 5, 1973" which prima

facie orders nothing. Thus, Rtitioner

‘rarer further claims that the e» parte

orders of February 17 and Merch 13, 1481

procured and issued in the Wayne County Cir-

cult Court are constitutionally void, and

that the action taken by the State Bar of Mich-

igan and the Wayne County Circuit Court judges

are absolutely void, in the clear and comp-

lete absence of all jurisdiction,

See, APPENDIX N, "Petitioner's Complaint"

and APPENDIX M, "Removal of State ca: 2, APPEN-

DIX O, "Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition

for Removal of State Case" claiming 'state

action' involved. Further, Petitioner sought

to enjoin the members of the State Bar of

Michigan (see, "Complaint'"), pp. 36 - 76.

On November 13, 1981, Entry of Default

against attorney-H. Rollin Allen was filed

for his failure to plead and defend within

the 20-day time period prescribed by FRCP

Rule 12, APPENDIX II, pp. 167-169. Defendant-

attorney H. Rollin Allen sought no relief

from the court as to said "Entry of Default”.

All defendants moved to dismiss, or in

the alternative for a grant of summary judg-

“immanity” (ef one sort or ar

intentional tort liability for "False Arrest

and False Imprisonment",

On June 30, 1982, the federal district

court dismissed Plaintiff-petitioner's action

by memorandum opinion (with erroneous and

fallacious contentions and erroneous conclus-=

lons) filed July 1, 1982, The district court

stated that "suits for damages under 42 USC

1983 against a "state agency" are prohibited

by the llth Amendment", as pertaining to the

State Bar and Allen, its attorney. Fetition-

er "Cramer" asserts that the llth Amendment

is not applicable for the reason that the

State Bar and Allen are not a part of any

tax-supported State agency and that under the

"Rules Concerning the State Bar of Michigan",

a@ self-interest group, Rules 1, 5 and 16,

they have waived "immunity" constitutionally,

among other reasons, APPENDIX OO, pp. 175 -

176.

Further, the district court stated that

the three (3) judges, John D, O'Hair, William

‘eo Canainn and Ficnard !), Kuhn ec protected

from liability to plaintiff by tie doctrine

of "judicial immunity" relying solely on

Stump v Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1975),

erroneously.

Petitioner "Cramer" asserts Stump, supra,

is not applicable and not controlling for

many reasons, among which, that subject-matter

and personal jurisdiction are conjunctional;

both must be met before @ court has authority

to adjudicate the rights of parties toa dis-

pute. Rankin v Howard, 633 F 2d S44 (1960);

Lopez v Vanderwater, 620 F 2d 1229, 1235-37

(7th Cir 1980); Duba v McIntyre, 501 F 2d

590, at 592 (8th Cir 1974); Ryan v Scoggin,

2eus F 2d 54, at 58 (10th Cir 1957); Harper v

Merckle, 638 F 2d 848 (5th Cir 1981);

DeKuyper v DeKuyper, 365 Mich Rep 487; United

States v (United) Mine Workers, 330 US 258,

at 293, 67 S Ct 677 (1947); Maness v Meyers,

419 US 449, 458-459, 95 S Ct 584 (1975).

Further, see, "Rosenberg (Associate Law

Professor): Stump v Sparkman: The DOCTRINE

OF JUDICIAL IMPUNITY, 64 Va L Rev 833, 836

(1978) ("Stump" is a possible invitation to

judicial lawlessness"). And see, Yaselli v

Goff, 12 F 2d 396 (2nd Cir 1926) Aff'd 275

US 503 (1927); Zarcone v Perry, 572 F ed (2nd

Cir 1976); Aikens v Wisconsin, 195 US 194.

(1904); In re Wellman, 3 Kan App 100, 45 P

726 (1896); McAlester v Brown, 469 F 2d 1280

(5th Cir 1972); Watkins v Dunbar, (Ill. 1925)

149 NE 14; Rammage v Kendall, 168 Ky 26, 181

SW 631.

Further, see, MCLA 600.1901; MSA 27A.

1901, MCLA 600.1905; MSA 27A.1905, MCLA 600.

1912; MSA 27A.1912, MCLA 600.1815; MSA 27A.

1815 (capias ad respondendum is abolished

and no civil actions shall be started by

arrest) MCLA 600.1711; MSA 27A.1711, 59 Am

Jur 2d, Parties, at 1, 11 and 192 et seq.

APPENDIX KK, APPENDIX LL, APPENDIX MM, pp.

170-173 "Petitioner's Appendix" (tan cover).

"Cramer" was not a party in any suit in

either the Wayne County Circuit Court or the

Oakland County Circuit Court at the time the

constitutionally void Ex Parte orders were

issued and at the time she was arrested and

jailed on June 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1981.

blaintiff-petitioner's motion for rehear-

ing was denied and the district court entered

an "Order Amending Memorandum Opinion" filed

on October 12, 1982, APPENDIX I, p. 31.

On timely appeal to the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals, the court issued its Order

on November 21, 1983 affirming the lower

court memorandum opinion, and pursuant to

Rule 9(d)(2), Rules of the Sixth Circuit, as

a "frivolous" appeal, Stay of Mandate was

timely sought, which the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals denied on Lecember 27, 1983, and

issued the Mandate dated December 29, 1984

(repeat) 1984; APPENDIX B, p. 3.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Presented in this case are important

constitutional questions concerning the judi-

ciary and the State Bar of Michigan, co-cons-

piratorially, in exertion of power, by impro-

per methods, improper allegation procedure,

improper litigation materials, usurping the

power and authority of the State supreme

court, among other drastic irregularities,

4 7

where your petitioner was arrested and im-

prisoned for refusal to participate and

"failure to voluntarily appear" on such con-

stitutionally void orders,

Defendants-respondents sought to bait,

intimidate, coerce and/or force your Peti-

tioner to submit voluntarily to the juris-

diction of the Wayne County Circuit Court

and the Oakland County Circuit Court, in

malice and bad faith.

The memorandum opinion of the district

court and the disposition of the case, affirm-

ed by the Sixth Circuit court of appeals,

seriously misconstrues this Court's decision

in Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 356, at 356-

357-362. Said memorandum opinion also raises

further constitutional questions, and in

reference to Stump v Sparkman, supra, to the

extent that if Linda Sparkman had "failed to

voluntarily appear" or refused to participate,

would this Court have found her in contempt?

would she have been arrested, jailed and

imprisoned and forced to submit involuntarily?

would she have been forcibly made to "appear"

on orders issued without prior notice or

WiLONOUtL a neariny

fy, Without an opy or tunity of

confrontation, without affidavits of witness-

€s, without a complaint, without 4 summons

issued, without being made a "party" toa

suit?

In the instant case are further important

constitutional questions involving the judici-

ary acting out of personal motivation and

using the judicial office as an offensive

weapon to vindicate personal objectives, and

where no "party" had invoked the judicial

machinery. The Fifth Circuit Court of appeals,

in Harper v Merckle (1981) 638 F 2d 848, held

"these nonjudicial acts, to state

the obvious, are not cloaked with

judicial immunity from suit under

section 1983".

Particularly in view of Rankin v Howard

(9th Cir 1980) 633 F 2d 844, holding,

"Requirements of subject matter and

personal jurisdiction are conjunctional,

as both must be met before a court has

the authority to adjudicate rights of

parties to a dispute,"

and, in the instant case involving whether the

"judge" may be the only disputing non-party,

together with Harper v Merckle, supra, the

lower court's ciismissal of the instant entire

action and the court of appeals affirming the

disposition, in conflict with Harper v Merkle >’

supra, Rankin v Howard, supra, and Stump v

Sparkman, supra, review of the decision below

is most essential,

This case is of first impression. The

memorandum opinion of the district court with

erroneous, inaccurate and fallacious findings

therein are very obvious and an exceptional

showing of error. For example, in Michigan,

proceedings may not be "commenced" by MCLA

600.1711 and MGCR 760.1 where prior jurisdic-

tion has not been obtained and the "person"

is not a party to a suit. See, Petitioner's

Appendix (tan cover), APPENDIX KK and APPENDIX

3/ In 1983, Arden Merckle resigned as chief

judge of the circuit and left the bench

in shame, The resignation came after a

newspaper reported how he had switched a

sentence in @ cocaine case from a jail

term to probation as a favor to a fellow

judge. The Judicial Qualifications Com-

mission found Merckle unfit to be a judge.

However, Merckle is still a member of the

Florida Bar and on the list of special

assistant public defenders and can be

appointed to cases with state-paid fees.

LL, ppe 170, 171 and 1723 MCLA 660,1901, MULA

600.1905, MCLA 600,1912 and 59 Am Jur 2d,

Parties, at l, ll, 192.

For Petitioner's questions presented for

review, 1 through 9, at pages 1 through 20

herein, the character of the reasons for con-

Sidering and granting certiorari may be summed

up as follows:

Petitioner-Cramer is a non-lawyer advo-

cate of "Do-it-yourself Divorce", This idea

apparently originated in the State of Cali-

fornia in about 1972, where currently, it is

said that 30% to 40% of the divorces obtain-

ed in California are by the persons handling

their own divorce matter, without lawyers,

Also, the idea of do-it-yourself-divorce has

expanded into approximately 15 other states,

so far, where constitutionally the people

have a guaranteed right to represent them-

selves, in civil actions,

However, judicial officials performing

certain functions analogous to those of

complaining adverse party, complaining witness,

investigator, interrogator, finder of infer-

ences on wrong conclusions, finder of fact,

prosecutor, executioner, prejudicial biased

judge, abandoning impartiality and acting on

behalf of the bar association, forcing the

people to hire lawyers and/or issuing consti-

tutionally void orders against "Cramer", and

utilizing the judicial machinery for personal

objectives on their own behalf, should not be

able to claim absolute immunity with respect

to such illegal acts, See, Harper v Merckle,

supra; Yaselli v Goff, 12 F 2d 396 (2nd Cir

1926) (collecting authorities), aff'd mem.,

275 U S 503 (1927).

In essence, the character of this case

boils down to where the residue remaining is

the lack of quality of the persons in the

legal profession, Hardly a day goes by and

we hear or read of the "wrongdoings" of judges

and lawyers. Where it is said (quoting Chief

Justice Warren E, Burger) that 75% to 90% of

the lawyers are either incompetent, or dis-

honest, or both; and where judges resign

from the bench in shame as unfit for judicial

office, but then, they are still members of

tne bar, and where people are forced to hire

these incompetents and/or dishonest members

of the legal profession, it does little or

nothing to promote public confidence in our

legal system,

The legal profession has been adamant

about self-regulation and even about the nec-

essity for secrecy in handling its disciplin-

ary affairs. Dishonored judges have been

given assignments back on the public payroll

which is no way to convince the public that

the status has been earned,

In our legal system, which is the most

expensive and least efficient of anything that

can be named, the people are subjected to the

wrath of the terrorist-gang of the organized

legal mafia and the unsporting contest of

dirty back-alley tactics of incompetent and

dishonest lawyers and judges who cover-up for

each other, at the terrible expense of the

general public and taxpayers.

The legal profession apparently has an

unconditional admiration for the wrong doings

of lawyers and judges. The more attempt is

Oo eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeEeeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeeEeeeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeG50_0<QqQueeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee_eeeeeeeeee eee

made to change things, the more they stay the

same. '/ They act in accordance with their

fundamental character of arrogance and hypoc-

risy. They treat the opposition of laypeople

as puny and therefore they feel free to sub-

jugate the people through fear resulting in

exploitation and victimization of laypeople.

The entire scheme centers on generating more

litigation and more business for lawyers, at

taxpayer's expense,

Further, in this instant case, the State

Bar of Michigan and its attorney H. Rollin

Allen (as suitor in the action of false arrest

and false imprisonment) claim they are entit-

led to “sovereign immunity" under the llth

Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, in the

absence of a geographical status. Even so,

"false arrest and false imprisonment” is a

constitutional cause of action (deprivation of

liberty), and where the State Bar usurped the

power and the authority of the Michigan Sup-

4/ It was Abraham Lincoln who said "Never

wrestle with pigs in the mud because the

pigs like it that way."

reme Court where there was "no remand" in the

same case, and jurisdiction was not restored

to the lower court, constituting a violation

of the due process and equal protection claus-

es of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U. S,

Constitution,

Certainly no decision of this Court or

any federal court of appeals has previously

suggested that "jurisdiction of a lower court

is restored without a remand", See, 5B CJS

Appeal and Error, Mandate and Proceedings in

Lower Court, at sections 1958, 1959, 1962,

"* * * The lower court does not have

the power to act on the judgment of

the appellate court until the mandate

is received, (citing, Morris v Radley,

(1943) 306 Mich 689, 11 NW 2d 291),

and action taken by the lower court

before the receipt or issuance of the

mandate is absolutely void and required

to be dismissed or set aside,"

(emphasis added)

Moreover, see 5B CJS "Waiver", at 1959,

"the requirement of a formal remanding order

may be waived as by the voluntary appearance

of the parties and their participating in

Subsequent proceedings in the lower court

without objection." In the instant case,

"Cramer' did not appear voluntarily. She

refused to participate and disregarded the

ex parte order because jurisdiction was not

restored to the lower court in State Bar v

Cramer (not remanded) 399 Mich 116-161.

"Cramer" knew she would be dealing with judges

in the Wayne County Circuit Court who had no

subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the

"injunctive order of January 5, 1973" which

orders nothing, affirmed and retained and/or

terminated in the Michigan Supreme Court.

Consistently, without exception, where

an appeal is taken and perfected and not

remanded by the supreme court to any lower

court, the court below is without jurisdiction

in the matter; i. e.,

"The mandate of the Appellate Court is

res judicata if it is final and conclu-

Sive and if it does not order a general

remand to the lower court,"

Relph v Board of Ed, of DePue Unit

chool Dist. No. 103 of Bureau County,

39 Ill Dec 331, 404 NE 2d 922 (1980)

"Jurisdiction of trial court is ousted

until appellate court renders judgment

with mandate returning jurisdiction to

trial court,”

Shirley v Shirley, 361 So 2d 590 (1978)

"Trial court lacks power to deviate

from terms of appellate mandate in

absence of permission from 1 3977).

court to do otherwise," (Fla 1977)

Mendelson v Mendelson, .341 So 2d 811

"A trial court is without authority to

depart from terms of an appellate

mandate." (1978)

— Airlines Inc. v Seat, 584 P 2d

"Circuit Court order entered without

mandate from Supreme Court was entered

without jurisdiction and thus had to

be set aside." (Ark 1975) 525 SW 2d

915.

"Mandate should be recorded before

further proceedings are had in trial

court.” (Conn 1972) Nowell v Nowell,

302 A 2d 260, 163 Conn 116.

"A mandate or an order of remand is

necessary to reinvest a lower court

with jurisdiction to proceed with

a case which has been appealed,’

(Tenn 1960) Sanders v Loyd, 364 SW

2d 369.

"Lower court was without jurisdiction

to consider motion where Supreme Court

had not ordered a remand, Couture v

Lowery 7 A 2d 371 (1962); Turner v

aah ve 334, 3363 inne A 2a 548,

Bragg, 11

ho,

Further, in support of Fetitioner's claim

that the State Bar (suitor) usurped the power

of the Michigan Supreme Court, see Augusta

Medical Complex, Inc v Blue Cross of Kansas,

Inc (Kan 1980) 608 P 2d 890, holding " * * *

reve. eECtlie_eeVaX--

the Supreme Court had the power to hold in

abeyance enforcement of such injunction by

the injunction remaining in effect in the

Supreme Court until mandate of said court

was spread of record in the court below, to

give the parties time to re-evaluate posi-

tions." Further, that "Restraining order of

Supreme court pending final determination of

appeal expires on final determination of such

appeal regardless of whether mandate is

issued." Jackson v Dillehay, 210 Ark 556,

196 SW 2a 909,

Where the lower court was without author-

- ity to re-instate the case on perfected appeal,

in the absence of a "remand" in the same case,

"any order in the same case subsequently

entered in the lower court is coram non judice

(before one not a judge)." Watkins v Dunbar,

(I11 1925) 149 NE 14,

As to the erroneous claim of "sovereign

immunity" by the State Bar of Michigan, this

is in direct conflict with the "Rules Concern-

ing the State Bar of Michigan," Rules 1, 5

and 16, APPENDIX 00, p. 175-176, Petitioner's

Apne naix (tan cover) ° fhe State Har r les

are a grant of power to sue and be sued,

expressed and implied, as made applicable by

the provisions and limitations of the 14th

Amendment to the U, S, Constitution, Rules

5 and 16 constitute ‘a "Waiver" of immunity,

especially when the State Bar is the Suitor,

together with MCLA 600.916, APPENDIX PP,

Pp. 177, together with 7 CJS, Practice of Law,

at 727,

" * * * In the enactment of statutes

* * * the Legislature will be held

to have intended only to protect the

general public from exploitation,

and not to protect the legal profes-

Sion, especially since any such

attempt of the latter would be

invalid, * * * "

In People v Black, 282 NYS 197, 156 Misc

516, that court extended further in explana-

tion that the legal profession does not re-

Quire such artificial aid (from the courts )

and held,

"Any attempt to protect the legal pro-

fession is invalid, * * * The protec-

tion of the legal profession could not

have been attempted, and if attempted

or intended, is clearly invalid, * * *

The legal profession does not require

and should resent any such artificial

aid, "

In Michigan, we have & number of judges

who nave said "Nobody can come into my court-

room without a lawyer, "9/ In Smyth v Lubbers,

(6th Cir) 1975, 398 F Supp 777, the court

said,

"An official action which is found to

have violated constitutional rights is

deemed ultra vires, beyond the officials

authority because the state cannot

lawfully authorize its officials to

violate the constitution. Thus, under

Section 1983, any person who, under

color of law, deprives another of his

* * * constitutional rights, is liable

to-the injured party at law or in

equity. If a person acts under color

of law, it is irrelevant whether the

official was acting within or without

5/ When law-student Jack Rose attempted to

represent himself, Judge James S, Thorburn

(Oakland County Circuit Court) appointed

lawyer-Steven Andrews (Thorburn's campaign

manager) as "guardian ad litem" for Jack

Rose; where Jack Rose never even spoke to

said so-called "guardian ad litem", Judge

Thorburn ordered Jack Rose to pay $20,000.

attorney fees to said "guardian ad litem",

Judge Thorburn committed Rose to jail about

20 different times and on one occasion a

detective was planted in jail, with Rose,

to pose as a hit-man to set Rose up on

framed charges that Rose wanted to kill

Judge Thorburn, That case terminated by

Rose's suicide in taking cyanide while in

the courtroom. (Previously, Judge Kuhn

had jailed Jack Rose for 10 days when

Rose had only requested to see the public

records in the Seaholm v Seaholm case, )

the scope of his employnent by common-

’ 5 " ° +. “-

law standard, see, hx rte Youn,

’ ¢ . =

209 US 123, 26 S Ct 4 909

Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 (1974)

Smyth v Lubbers, 398 F Supp 777, 14.784

Petitioner herein has been ruthlessly

denied due process of law and the equal

protection of the law by the position taken

by the Court of Appeals in this case, All

of the issues which petitioner presented to

the Court of Appeals for appellate deter-

mination on the merits are issues "not plain-

ly frivolous", The invidiously discrimina-

tory practices of the courts are obvious to

the layperson representing herself, where

at some level the appellant-layperson is cut

off from having the appeal heard and deter-

mined on its merits and where the right to

prosecute such an appeal has been estab-

lished as in the instant case, No one would.

doubt that if the present case were being

handled by a lawyer, it would have been

heard and determined on its merits, even if

the merits of issues were far less substan-

tial than the issues tendered by this FPeti-

tioner, The circumstances greatly point out

the gravity of the unlawful and inv.diously

discriminatory practices against persons who

attempt to exercise their "guaranteed" con-

stitutional right to represent themselves,

to avoid and/or escape from being exploited

and/or victimized by incompetent or dishon-

est lawyers. However, in the present case,

even the referral service of the Detroit Bar

Association could not find a lawyer to

"handle Cramer's legal matters,"

Petitioner submits, furthermore, that

the erroneous memorandum opinion and the

“ dismissal by the district court of the entire

constitutional cause of action under 42 USCA

1983, et seq., is a flagrantly invalid pro-

tection of the legal profession,

Further, where settled principles of

judicial self-restraint are disregarded,

this Court should literally leap to the oppor-

tunity to correct the serious errors of the

district court and the Court of Appeals.

CONC LUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari

Should be granted and this Court should

permit & complete briefing in this case,

February 1984

paiva submitted.

ira POT

Virginia Cramer, Petitioner

In Propria Fersona

Plaintiff-appellant below

Cc Quip

27314 Clairview

Dearborn Hts., Mich 48127

(313) 278-7286

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