Opposition — Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Department
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Office - Supreme Court, U.
FILED
APR 114 1984
83 yi 1 9) 0 1 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
NO. | CLERK
In The Supreme Court
of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
Alean Hester Faust, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Lonnie Faust, Deceased; Tommy Bennett, and Curtis Muldrow,
Petitioners,
vs.
South Carolina State Highway Department, and the United
States of America,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SOUTH CAROLINA
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT IN OPPOSITION
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
Attorney General
KENNETH P. WOODINGTON
Senior Assistant Attorney General
PO. Box 11549
Columbia, S.C. 29211
(803) 758-2072
ELLISON D. SMITH, IV
Long, Smith and Jordan
PO. Box 419
Charleston, S.C. 29402
(803) 577-4520
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the Court of Appeals correctly follow the decisions of this
Court by concluding, as have all Circuits which have addressed this
question, that the State of South Carolina did not waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by maintaining, as part of its highway
system, a ferry across the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway?
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OF AUTHORITIES
Question Presented for Review
Statement of the Case .......
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Reasons Why the Writ Should be Denied .................
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AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) ....... 6.50000
Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v. Lauritzen,
404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968) ......... cece cece cece eee
Edeiman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) ... 2.0... eee cece eee
Employees v. Dept. of Public Health and Welfare,
CRUE edebis aces Gone tb ovecceduee he
Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County Georgia,
SUED soc cunsbcs Jeeevecsuccesuas
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
EE rr Oks Fabs dance usdes cbbess anewbe
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union,
I Cohen oles dibe euneees panct cAtaal
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) ........-...
Red Star Towing and Transportation Co. v. Connecticut,
431 F.Supp. 1003 (D.Conn. 1976),
aff'd. 556 F.2d $59 (2nd Cir. 1977). .... 62... cece ee eees
Red Star Towing and Transportation Co. v. Dept. of
Transportation of New Jersey,
Ge EE CP GAR PE os oe cowce wc cacsebbcvvewnes
Riggle v. California, S77 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978)............
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, .
SF IIE ya 6 0Scb0 wen bawanscudanipcivccnnes
Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, (1888)
Williamson Towing Ca. Inc. v. Illinois,
SOG BBG TIS i Ge TOFD os cc cccwiewccccescseaccens
United States Constitution
ey AED ons. aac a chin sidbns cugiewader deen
-iii-
3 Code of Laws of South Carolina:
S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 57-15-140 (1976)... 6... cece cece ee ed
OPINIONS BELOW
respectively requests that this Court deny the Petition for Certiorari,
seeking review of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in this case. That
opinion is reported at 721 F.2d 932, rev’g. 527 F.Supp 1021.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Constitution
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
i
|
eee
NO.
In The Supreme Court
of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
Alean Hester Faust, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Lonnie Faust, Deceased; Tommy Bennett, and Curtis Muldrow,
Petitioners,
vs.
South Carolina State Highway Department, and the United
States of America,
Respondents.
ON PEL ITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIGRARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SOUTH CAROLINA
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages against the South Carolina State
Highway Department and the United States arising out of the death
of Petitioner Faust’s decedent and injuries to the two other Peti-
tioners. The injuries resulted from the collision of the saia!! pleasure
boat in which the injured parties were riding with 2. guide cable whicii
was used at the time to pull a ferry operated by the South Carolina
Highway Department across the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway. The
ferry was operated as a continuation of a state highway. S.C. Code
Ann. Sec. 57-15-140 (1976).
The Respondent South Carolina State Highway Dep: tment
moved to dismiss the action based upon the Eleventh Amendment.
The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals
-2-
reversed that decision, concluding that the state was immune under
the Eleventh Amendment and had engaged in no activity which con-
stituted a waiver of that immunity.
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED
L.
There is no conflict with the decisions of this Court.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the leading cases
of this Court respecting a state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity through its participation in federally - regulated activity.
In so doing, the lower court applied those cases in the same man-
ner as all other circuits which have been presented with this question.
This Court’s cases hold that a state may waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by entering an area which Congress had
undertaken to regulate, Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184
(1964), but that a state’s Constitutional immunity under the amend-
ment can only be abrogated by a Congressional enactment which
contains an express waiver provision, Edeiman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), or where an analysis of the statute and its legislative
history makes it manifest that Congress clearly and unmistakenily
intended an Eleventh Amendment waiver. Employees v. Dept. of
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1973).
The Petitioners incorrectly maintain that Eleventh Amendment
waiver should be implied when a state engages in activity in an area
subject to federal regulation. (Pet., p. 51). However, it is firmly
established that mere entry by a state into an area of federal domain,
standing by itself, has no effect on a state’s Constitutional immunity.
E.g., Employees, supra. Petitioners fail to recognize the requizement
established in Employees, supra, but absent here, that Congressional
intent to create a private right of action against the state must be
found. See, Intracoastal Thansp., Inc. v. Decatur County Georgia,
482 F.2d 361 (Sth Cir. 1973); Riggie v. California, 577 F.2d $79 (9th
Cir. 1978).
In this case, the state has done nothing more than maintain a ferry
across the A:lantic Intracoastal Waterway as part of its state highway
3-
system! The essence of Petitioners’ claim is that this constituted an
obstruction to navigation giving rise to a private cause of action.
However, this Court has recently reaffirmed its long-held rule that
there is “no federal common law ‘which prohibits obstructions and
nuisances in navigable waters: ” California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287, 295 (1981); quoting Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125
US. 1, 8 (1888). Likewise, this Court concluded that the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 401, ef seq., did
not create a private right of action arising as a result of an ob-
struction of navigation. Jd.
Piciabintdin slip deen bttietenan nicitbins ntti Couitiainet
holdings interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the Petitioners then
confusingly maintain that the federal courts can, by devising a
federal common law remedy, effect a waiver of the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. This contention is based upon a strained
interpretation of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970). Moragne, a case which involved only private parties and
where the court’s jurisdiction was clear, simply held that maritime
law affords a cause of action for wrongful death caused by unsea-
worthiness. It did not address immunity of a state, and Petitioners
can point to no case which so extends Moragne. On the contrary,
the federal common law power upon which Moragne was predicated
does not and cannot operate to create jurisdiction in admiralty where
it is prohibited by the Eleventh Amen!ment and where both the state
and Congress have declined to subject the state to suit. Cf, North-
west Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-97 (1981);
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981). Thus,
while Petitioners’ argument is imaginative, it is unsound. Indeed,
to reach the result contended for by Petitioners in this case would
require this Court to abandon the large body of well-established
Eleventh Amendment precedent which it has developed.
The decision of the court below is therefore squarely in accord
with prior decisions of this Court involving waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
"Sec. 57-15-140, S.C. Code Ann. (1976, provides that the ferry in question
“[florms a part of State Highway No. 716, ...”
4
Il.
There is no conflict among the circuits.
There can be no argument that the result in this case creates con-
flicts among the circuits, and the Petitioners have cited no court of
appeals decision with which the lower court’s Eleventh Amer.dment
holding conflicts. Indeed, the only conflict which had existed prior
to this case was in the Fourth Circuit itself. Chesapeake Bay Bridge
and Tunnel District v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968). The
courts of the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (the
only other ones which have considered the question) have all either
expressly or isnpliedly declined to follow the Fourth Circuit’s
Lauritzen decision. See, Red Star Towing and Transportation Co.
v. Connecticut, 431 F. Supp. 1003 (D.Conn. 1976), aff'd. 556 F.2d
$59 (2nd Cir. 1977); Red Siar Towing and Transportation Co. v. Dept.
of Transportation of New Jersey, 423 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1970); In-
tracoastal Transportation, Inc. v. Decatur County Georgia, 482 F.2d
361 (Sth Cir. 1973); Williamson Towing Ca, Inc. v. Illinc?s, $34 F.2d
758 (7th Cir. 1976); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1978).
As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized, 721 F.2d
at 941, (Pet., p. B-31), its conclusion in the present case brought the
Fourth Circuit into accord with every other court of appeals which
has considered this issue.
-5-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is manifest:
1. That the decision of the court below is not in conflict with any
prior decisions of this Court, but rather is fully in accord with those
decisions;
2. That the decision below did not create, but rather resolved, a
conflict in the circuits with regard to implied waiver of a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
For these reasons the Respondent submits that here is no basis
for granting the Petition for Certiorari in this case, and accordingly
the petition should be denied.
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
Attorney General
KENNETH P. WOODINGTON
Senior Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549 ;
Columbia, S.C. 29211
(803) 758-2072
ELLISON D. SMITH, IV
Long, Smith and Jordan
P.O. Box 419
Charleston, S.C. 29402
(803) 577-4520
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