Opposition — Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

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Office - Supreme U

FIL A ”

No. 83-1290 APR 29 1994

ALEA OEP 1. STEVAS

Inu the Supreme Court of the Hn

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

MoBIL OIL CORPORATION, PETITIONER

vs

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

F. HENRY HaBIcut, II

Assistant Attorney General

Jacques B. GELIN

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

1318, authorizes EPA to enter the facilities of a point source

of water pollution and obtain samples of wastewater

streams prior to their final treatment.*

*The Petition also presents a question of the sufficiency of the affida-

vits submitted in support of the application for an administrative search

warrant in this case. We do not believe this issue is properly before this

Court.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Statutory provision involved ...........eeeeeeeees 2

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eee sia hha pahseebdbeneteenceesees 7

ere ein 665s kh ae hae v2'6 a0 609008 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,

a Se 11

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

ARS oo Be Or 9

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

CUT etek che wabenseeecesececess 7,9

Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 ..........005: 8

EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,

each nes Ube se 6066200000 12

Marshall vy. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.

LTT aikido dhsa sb beeedcceres 7, 8,9

National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d

eee. ons Soph eens esee eee snes 12

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 .........08: 8

United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 ........ 11

(111)

IV

Page

Constitution and statutes:

Sek Sc, SOUL OW cdc dcanescaevesnbavce 8,9

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. :

Sey oP a BEE cbs ecereornecensces 12

© FONG), 33 U.S.C. TSINE) on ccccscvcsses 12

Fg ok” oererrr esr Terr rs 12

© iyo We AONE cevenenveciosdeetes 13

§ 308, 33 U.S.C.

Pe CilLauseae uae 1.6 7,9, 0. 11, 12, 13

6 Fume), 33 U.E... ISIE) on cc cccccssens 1,6

§ 308(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(1) ........ 6, 12

§ 308(a)(A)(iv), 33 U.S.C.

ST ee eT eT TT eer ee Tey 11

§ 308(a)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C.

Ps Docc vagesskbaacess anus ee 11

§ 308(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1318(b)(2) .......... 10

SORE, FF WU, FINE Kccccrcevsreuscvencs 3

§ 402(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(8) ........-. 13

Miscellaneous:

H.R. Rep. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.

UNTER sack Reh Vout hee ae besareCatansuers 12

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

CUFF Scndacravncntaneeestnceressess cerns 12

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1290

MoBIL OIL CORPORATION, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-8a) is

reported at 716 F.2d 1187. The final order and judgment of

the district court (Pet. App. 9a-13a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 14, 1983. A petition for rehearing was denied on

November 8, 1983 (Pet. App. 14a). The petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on February 6, 1984. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1318,

provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever required to carry out the objective of

this chapter, including but not limited to (1) developing

or assisting in the development of any effluent limita-

tion, or other limitation, prohibition, or effluent

standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-

formance under this chapter; (2) determining whether

any person is in violation of any such effluent limita-

tion, or other limitation, prohibition or effluent stand-

ard, pretreatment standard, or standard of perfor-

mance; (3) any requirement established under this

section; or (4) carrying out sections 1315, 1321, 1342,

1344 (relating to State permit programs), and 1364 of

this title—

(A) The Administrator shall require the owner or

operator of any point source to (i) establish and main-

tain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install,

use, and maintain such monitoring equipment or

methods (including where appropriate, biological

monitoring methods), (iv) sample such effluents (in

accordance with such methods, at such locations, at

such intervals, and in such manner as the Administra-

tor shall prescribe), and (v) provide such other infor-

mation as he may reasonably require, and

(B) The Administrator or his authorized represen-

tative, upon presentation of his credentials—

(i) shall have a right of entry to, upon or through

any premises in which an effluent source is located or

in which any records required to be maintained

under clause (A) of this subsection are located, and

3

(ii) may at reasonable times have access to and

copy any records, inspect any monitoring equipment

or method required under Clause (A), and sample

any effluents which the owner or operator of such

source is required to sample under such clause.

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner operates a petroleum refinery near Joliet,

Illinois. In the course of normal plant operations, the facil-

ity discharges wastewater into a navigable river. Pursuant

to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342, the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency issued a National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit

authorizing petitioner to make such discharges subject to

the restrictions set forth in, or incorporated into, the permit

(Pet. App. 15a-40a). Among other things, the permit

requires petitioner to conduct periodic sampling of its var-

ious wastewater streams ‘at a point representative of [the]

discharge” but “prior to mixing with other effluent streams”

or “prior to its combination with the process water” and to

forward the results to both the United States Environmen-

tal Protection Agency (EPA) and the State agency (Pet.

App. 18a-26a).

On April 28, 1982, Basim J. Dihu, an EPA environmental

engineer, attempted to conduct an inspection of petitioner’s

Joliet facility. Dihu was admitted to the premises and per-

mitted to take samples of the process treatment plant and

non-contact cooling water, as well as storm water dis-

charge. Petitioner refused, however, to permit Dihu to

sample internal waste streams before the point at which

they reach an aeration basin or a treated water guard basin.

Permission to obtain samples of sludge before heat treat-

ment was similarly refused. Pet. App. 2a, 46a-47a.

2. On August 27, 1982, EPA applied to the district court

for an administrative warrant “to enter, inspect and photo-

graph the premises and to take samples of sludge and liquid

4

influents and effluents at the Mobil Oil Company facility

* * * on three separate days within a ten-day period in

accordance with Section 308 of the Clean Water Act” (Pet.

App. 42a). The warrant application was supported by an

affidavit executed by Dihu recounting petitioner's refusal to

allow him to take the requested samples (Pet. App. 46a-

47a). The warrant application was also supported by the

affidavit of Jonathan Barney, an EPA chemical engineer

(Pet. App. 43a-45a). Barney’s affidavit stated that peti-

tioner’s facility had been selected for inspection pursuant to

“an ongoing administrative program to monitor facilities

that have some potential for the discharge of toxic pollu-

tants” (Pet. App. 45a). Such extended compliance sampling

inspection for toxicants (known as CSI-Ts) is intended to

check for compliance with existing permit requirements

and to determine whether toxic pollutants are being dis-

charged that are not subject to permit limitations, but which

should be regulated in future permits (id. at 43a). Barney

further explained that, for a complex plant such as petition-

er’s facility, samples must often be collected from selected

process waste streams within a plant, as well as from the

final effluent, in order to achieve the most accurate mea-

surements possible, to assess the adequacy of existing

treatment methods, and to eludicate the nature of the sludge

resulting from treatment (id. at 44a). The Barney affidavit

described the specific locations at which EPA desired to

take samples, concluding that “[a]nalysis of these samples is

necessary to enable the U.S. EPA accurately [to] assess

compliance and develop any necessary new permit limits for

this Mobil Oil facility” (id. at 45a).

The United States Magistrate granted the warrant appli-

cation and issued the inspection warrant on August 27,

1982. The warrant authorized inspector Dihu to (Pet. App.

49a-50a):

5

1. Entfer] * * * upon or through the above de-

scribed premises including all buildings, struc-

tures, equipment, machines, devices, materials

and sites to inspect, sample, monitor and inves-

tigate the said premises.

2. Sample and seize combined effluent from the

east and west clarifiers of the activated sludge

treatment system.

3. Sample and seize sludge prior to the heat treat-

ment system.

4. Sample and seize influent to the east and west

aeration basins to the activated sludge treat-

ment system (combined raw waste following

east equalization basin).

5. Sample and seize any and all final effluent(s).

6. Takesuch photographs of the above authorized

procedures as they may be required or necessary.

EPA commenced execution of the warrant and taking of

samples. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant, but

the motion was denied by the magistrate. Thereafter, EPA

completed execution of the warrant.

3. Petitioner commenced this action on September 2,

1982. Petitioner's complaint alleged, inter alia, that “{t]he

Clean Water Act does not authorize U.S. EPA to inspect,

sample or monitor MOBIL’S internal waste streams at

points other than the NPDES point source discharge”

(C.A. App. 5) and that the warrant exceeded the scope of

EPA's statutory powers. Petitioner sought an injunction

directing the EPA to return “all samples taken, findings,

test results and any other data, records or documents”

resulting from the completed inspection and barring EPA

“from at any time inspecting, sampling or monitoring

6

MOBIL’S internal waste streams at points other than the

NPDES point source discharge” (C.A. App. 6-7).

Petitioner’s action was consolidated with an appeal taken

by petitioner from the magistrate’s order denying its motion

to quash the warrant. The district court entered an interloc-

utory order restraining EPA from disclosing or using the

contested samples or any information derived from them

pending a final decision. After considering the case on the

merits, the district court entered a final order dissolving the

preliminary injunction, denying injunctive relief, and dis-

missing the complaint (Pet. App. 9a-13a).'

4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-8a). The

court held that Section 308(a) of the Clean Water Act

authorizes EPA to sample the wastewaters of a point source

at any location within the facility, including wastewaters

prior to treatment or partially treated effluents. The court

observed that Section 308(a)(1) indicates that one of the

primary purposes of Section 308 was to give EPA access to

information useful in “ ‘developing or assisting in the

development of any effluent limitation, or other limitation,

prohibition, or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or

standard of performance’ " (Pet. App. 5a, quoting Section

308(a)(1)). To achieve the statutory goal of setting rational

effluent limitations, “information is necessary to determine

how efficiently the permittee is treating the water, which

obviously requires a sample of water both before and after

treatment” (Pet. App. 5a). The court also noted that EPA

can more accurately assess samples of the final treated

'The court of appeals entered an interim injunction prohibiting EPA

from using, transmitting or releasing any of the samples obtained

pursuant to the warrant or information derived from those samples

during the pendency of the appeal. The stay order also barred EPA

from “inspecting, sampling or monitoring Mobil’s waste streams at

points other than those described in the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System Permit pending disposition of this appeal.”

7

effluents “if it knows the level of pollutants in that waste

water before it has been treated” (Pet. App. 6a).?

ARGUMENT

Petitioner’s primary submission (Pet. 12-21) is that the

affidavits that EPA submitted in support of its application

for an administrative warrant did not meet the standards

articulated by this Court in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436

U.S. 307 (1978), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

523 (1967). This issue was not raised in the court of appeals

and accordingly is not properly presented here. In any

event, the affidavits in question satisfy the standards deli-

neated in Barlow's and Camara. In addition, petitioner

contends (Pet. 21-27) that, in the circumstances of this case,

Section 308 of the Clean Water Act affords EPA no author-

ity to obtain samples of its wastewater before it has been

fully treated. The court of appeals correctly rejected this

contention.

1. In Camara v. Municipal Court, this Court held that,

outside of certain carefully defined classes of cases, a war-

rantless non-consensual search of private property is un-

reasonable even though not undertaken to uncover evi-

dence of crime. At the same time, however, the Court held

that, in the context of such civil administrative searches, a

warrant need not rest upon a showing of probable cause to

believe that a violation is occurring in the location to be

inspected. 387 U.S. at 534. Rather, a warrant may issue

where the applicant has shown that its request to search

private property is justified by reasonable governmental

?The court of appeals denied petitioner's motion to stay issuance of its

mandate pending certiorari. Thereafter, on November 23, 1983, Justice

Stevens denied petitioner's application to stay issuance of the court of

appeals’ mandate and to bar EPA from employing the samples it had

obtained or conducting further sampling pending dispostion of this

petition.

8

interests. “[R Jeasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If

a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated,

then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted

search warrant.” /d. at 539. Inthe companion case of See; v.

City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that the

general requirement of obtaining a warrant for searches

applies in the context of commercial buildings as well as

private residences.?

In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), this

Court reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily

requires authorities to obtain a warrant prior to conducting

an administrative search of a commercial establishment.

Again, however, the Court emphasized that the government

need not show thata specific violation is likely taking place

in a particular establishment. “Probable cause in the crimi-

nal law sense is not required” (id. at 320). Rather, a warrant

may issue upon a “showing that a specific business has been

chosen for a * * * search on the basis of a general adminis-

trative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from

neutral sources” (id. at 321). The Court explained: such “{a]

warrant * * * would provide assurances from a neutral

officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitu-

tion, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an adminis-

trative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a

warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope

and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector

is not expected to proceed” (436 U.S. at 323 (footnotes

omitted)).

3In See, this Court left open the question of whether “business pre-

mises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than

private homes * * *."387 U.S. at 546. Recently, in Donovan v. Dewey,

452 U.S. 594, 598-599 (1981), this Court stated that “the expectation of

privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property

differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home™

and recognized that, in certain commercial circumstances, this expecta-

tion may be so limited as to justify warrantless searches.

9

b. Petitioner asserts that the affidavits that EPA sub-

mitted in support of its warrant application did not satisfy

the foregoing standard and complains that “the Seventh

Circuit did not examine EPA's action in light of the stand-

ards set forth in Barlow’s” (Pet. 13.) The court of appeals’

failure to advert to Barlow's or Camara, or to address the

adequacy of EPA's affidavits, however, affords no basis for

complaint in this Court for petitioner simply did not con-

tend on appeal that those affidavits were in any way defi-

cient.4 Because petitioner failed to raise its primary conten-

tion in the court of appeals and the court of appeals’ opinion

reflects no ruling on that point, the issue is not properly

before this Court. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 147 n.2 (1970).

c. Even if it had been properly presented, the question of

the sufficiency of EPA’s affidavits merits no further review,

for the affidavits satisfied the Barlow’s and Camara stand-

ards. The affidavit of Jonathan Barney (Pet. App. 43a-45a)

‘Contrary to petitioner's suggestion (Pet. 13) the court of appeals did

not “use[] its own ‘interest-balancing’ analysis to determine whether

Mobil had any Fourth Amendment rights * * * worthy of protection

and whether EPA's regulatory interest out-weighed Mobil's privacy

interest”. The court of appeals confined its opinion to the question

whether Section 308 of the Clean Water Act authorized EPA to obtain

the samples at issue. The court's language quoted at pages 13-14 of the

petition clearly addresses this statutory argument and not any Fourth

Amendment issue. In the court of appeals, petitioner argued only that

the sampling conducted under the warrant was not authorized by

Section 308 (Pet. C.A. Br. 7-35; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 4-21). Petitioner

did not challenge the sufficiency of EPA's affidavits, and did not cite

Camara at all. Barlow's was cited only in connection with petitioner's

argument that injunctive relief from the alleged statutory violation

should be granted (Pet. C.A. Br. 37, 40; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 22).

Petitioner invoked the Fourth Amendment only in asserting that,

because ultra vires, the challenged inspection was an unreasonable

intrusion upon its protected privacy interests (see Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 22

& n.17). Nor did petitioner's rehearing petition present the contention

now made in this Court.

10

explained that petitioner's facility had been selected for

inspection as part of an ongoing EPA program to monitor

facilities having some potential for discharge of toxic pollu-

tants. The purposes and operations of that program were

also described. Barney’s affidavit also explained why EPA

believed that the challenged sampling procedures were

necessary and it precisely identified the samples that EPA

sought. In the proceedings below petitioner did not chal-

lenge the accuracy of any of the facts in the affidavits.5 The

warrant was carefully limited both in scope and duration.

See pages 3-5, supra. Petitioner, moreover, has not demon-

strated that it was subject to discriminatory treatment or

deliberate harassment; nor has it shown that the sampling

authorized constituted any more than the most minimal of

intrusions upon its normal operations.® Under these cir-

cumstances, the warrant was clearly valid.

‘Petitioner now attempts to do so for the first time in this Court (Pet.

16-17) relying on materials reproduced at pages 5la-94a of its appendix.

None of these materials are part of the record below; they were not

considered by the courts below. Nor has petitioner demonstrated that

they could not have been timely obtained with due diligence. Petition-

er's effort to retry its case in this Court is impermissible. In any event, a

close reading of the materials cited by petitioner discloses that they do

not support its claims. For example, petitioner asserts (Pet. 17) that

EPA policy requires a “lengthy” affidavit when EPA seeks information

from a source and refers to certain documents in the appendix to

support this conclusion. The cited materials, however (even assuming

that they establish a binding agency policy), nowhere require a

“lengthy” affidavit. Rather they indicate that the affidavit should fully

describe the agency program involved and explain why the particular

facility in question was selected for inspection (Pet. App. 57a). As

indicated above, the Barney affidavit meets this standard. The fact that

a different EPA employee may have submitted a lengthier affidavit

when seeking to inspect a different facility in a different industry for

different purposes (See Pet. App. 77a-85a) does not establish that

EPA's affidavit here was inadequate. Petitioners’ other assertions are

similarly flawed.

*Petitioner has not claimed that EPA's sampling threatens to com-

promise any trade secret. Section 308(b)(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. 1318(b)(2), provides a special mechanism whereby an owner or

2. Section 308(a)(A)(iv) of the Ciean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. 1318(a)(A)(iv), provides that the Administrator

shall require the owner or operator of a point source to

“sample such effluents (in accordance with such methods, at

such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the

Administrator shall prescribe).” Section 308(a)(B)(ii), 33

U.S.C. 1318(a)(B)(ii), in turn, authorizes the Administrator

or his authorized representative to sample “any effluents”

which the owner or operator is required to sample under the

prior clause. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 21-27) that Section 308

does not authorize EPA to secure samples of its untreated

or partially treated wastewaters. The courts below correctly

rejected this contention. In any event, the decision below

does not — and is not asserted to — conflict with any

decision of this Court or of any court of appeals and war-

rants no further review.

Petitioner initially asserts (Pet. 21-22) that the waste-

waters coming out of its various production facilities do not

become “effluents” within the meaning of Section 308 until

after they have been fully treated and are ready for dis-

charge into navigable waters. Petitioner fails to advance

any creditable argument in support of this assertion. As

petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 21), the term “effluent” is not

defined by the Act. When a term is not defined in a statute

itself, the courts will, whenever possible, assign the word a

meaning that is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the

term, which effectuates the purposes for which the statute

was enacted, and which does not render other provisions of

the statute meaningless. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc.

v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981); United States v.

Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). EPA’s interpretation of

“effluent” is the only one which meets all of these standards.

operator who supplies information pursuant to Section 308 may seek to

have the information held confidential. Petitioner has not attempted to

invoke this provision.

12

The conventional meaning of “effluent” is “something

that flows out.” ’ Accordingly, EPA has sensibly under-

stood “effluent” to include those wastewaters that flow out

of production facilities. Moreover, EPA’s interpretation

effectuates the purposes of the Clean Water Act. For exam-

ple, pursuant to Sections 301 and 304, 33 U.S.C. 1311 and

1314, EPA must establish, periodically review and, if

appropriate, revise, effluent limitations that require the

application of the best available technology economically

achievable (BAT) for a given category or class of dis-

charges. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449

U.S. 64, 69-72 (1980).* This task requires that the agency be

thoroughly familiar with all facets of wastewater treatment

technology and economics. The ability to take samples at a

variety of locations in the course of a pollution treatment

process significantly enhances EPA's ability to establish

and maintain rational effluent limitations.’ Finally,

’ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 363 (1977).

’Section 301(d), 33 U.S.C. 1311(d). The statutory duty periodically to

review and revise effluent limitations belies petitioner's suggestion (Pet.

25-27) that because effluent limitations for petitioner's facility have

already been initially established, EPA could have no possible use for

any data derived from the sampling here.

%As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 5a) Section 308 was

expressly designed to provide the EPA Administrator with a means of

obtaining information needed for “developing or assisting in the devel-

opment of any effluent limitation, or other limitation, prohibition, or

effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance

(§ 308(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(1)). The legislative history of the Clean

Water Act confirms that EPA's inspection and sampling authority is to

be construed broadly. Thus, in explaining the need for Section 308,

Congress specifically pointed out the agency's “difficulty in obtaining

reliable cost and waste loading information to set effluent limits and to

enforce effective pollution control.” H.R.Rep. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess. 113-114(1972). Indeed, unless EPA can secure this kind of data, it

may be vulnerable to challenges to the validity of its effluent limitations

in which it is argued that the limitations do not reflect consideration of

all pertinent data. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,

442-443 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

13

petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 22) that the term “effluent

encompasses only wastewaters at the point of their dis-

charge into navigable waters renders several other provi-

sions of the Act meaningless. For example, Section 308

expressly provides for inspections, monitoring and sam-

pling to assist in development of “pretreatment standards”

pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1317, which

applies to discharges to publicly-owned treatment works.

Petitioner’s restrictive interpretation of the term “effluent”

would render these provisions inoperative. See also Section

402(b)(8) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(8).

Petitioner also argues (Pet. 23-24) that Section 308 limits

the Administrator to sampling those effluents that the point

source itself has been required to sample. Assuming that

petitioner’s premise is correct, petitioner still cannot prevail

here. As petitioner admits (Pet. 24), it is required by the

terms of its permit to take samples of its effluents. Pursuant

to the warrant, EPA obtained samples of those same efflu-

ents, only at locations different from those at which peti-

tioner performs its own sampling. Nothing in Section 308,

however, confines EPA's authority to sample effluents to

the particular locations at which the owner or operator

performs sampling to meet the requirements of its NPDES

permit. !°

”

©The court of appeals properly rejected (Pet. App. 4a-7a) petitioner's

claim that sampling of a given waste stream at two locations in the

course of treatment constitutes sampling of two different effluents for

purposes of Section 308.

14

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT, II

Assistant Attorney General

JACQUES B. GELIN

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

Attorneys

APRIL 1984

DOJ-1984-04

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