Petition — Davis v. United States
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88-1241.
NO.
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1983
Roy E. Davis, Individually and
Trading as Roy E. Davis, Seafood,
Petitioner
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its
Agency the United States Air Force
and
THE CITY OF HAMPTON, a political
subdivision of the Commonwealth
of Virginia,
Respondents
and
HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT,
Third-Party Defendant.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
James E. Bradberry
MOORE, MOORE AND BRADBERRY
13185 Warwick Boulevard
Newport News, Virginia 23602-0100
(804) 877-0255
A AAALAC AE AICI ELE OTOP. ES a Te
APPELLATE PRINTING SERVICES. INC.. HERITAGE BLDG . RICHMOND. VA (804) 643-7789
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority, et al v. National Sea Clanmers
Association, et al, eliminating private causes
of action under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, also preclude recovery for
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
when the damages arise from water pollution
caused by the United States?
VRIOY AM :
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECISIONS BELOW eenee3ererereeeeree¢ eeeeeerkese
QUESTION PRESENTED ...... cececcce ee
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION .......+.---
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ....-.++-+- .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......- cecee
ARGUMENT eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeneeeneneeeeeee
The Decision In Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority et
al v. Nationat Sea Clammers
Association et al, While Elim-
inating Private Causes of Ac-
tion Under The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, Has No
Such Adverse Effect On A Claim
For Damages Resulting From
Pollution And Instituted Against
The Offending Party Under The
Federal Tort Claims Act.
CONCLUSION eoeeeeeeeeeeneeeneeeeeeneees
Page
1
2
10
18
20S,
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ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases: Page
city of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
Uéwe 7 68 L.Ea. 2d
BaOeaOn - B.Sc STOO CASO RD acccépe 14
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74,
(D. Mass-1982) eee ew eee eeeee eeeere 13
Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association, 453 U.S.
I, 69 L.Ed. 2d 435, 101 S.Ct.
2615 (1981)... 2,9,10,11,12,13,14,17,18
National Sea Clammers Association
v. City of New York, 616 F.2d
122 CA3= 8 eeeeeee eevee eee 14
Statutes, Codes, Regulations:
S'U.8.C.-B 101) --Ot Meds ccs be ceescvss’ 33
ee. cB .C. DB LIGA aac sh dk cs sec tse
28 U.S.C. BF 1346 (bd) ..ccrccccccdieccede4
SO U.8.Ce.D ASSET ive coe recsibsose <O
28 U.S.C. RAGING) ciawdicvctweiseccee BS
28 U.S.C. BOT hs ctcecesccauisicececs. Ss
28 U.S.C.
§
&
20° UBC. B 2676. ic csinccvctccesode
B. 2680. i rocvccvvcesvcupeed eh
oo
ie ©=S«§3:UT8.C.
ROGL iii ckikiews sc laccadaec ae 4
iii
Table of Citations Continued
Page
ee SOR. Co aks ace eew.be 4,15,16
Title 21, Sec. °18, Code of Va.
1950, as amended ......eee- Por ey 4
Title 21, Sec. 223, Code of Va.
1950, aS amended ..cccceecsececes 4
Title 62.1, Sec. 44.3(6), Code
of Va., 1950, as amended ........ 4
Title 62.1, Sec. 44.5, Code of
Va., 1950, as amended .....-eeee8- 4
Constitutional Citation:
_ om Ff Const. Art. III, 6 2 eeeeeeeeee 3
Legislative History:
/ United States Code Congressional
; and Administrative News, 92nd
¢ Congress, Second Session,
Volume 2, Legislative History,
bi pages 3746 and 3747 eoeeeeeee eee 17
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
No.
ROY E. DAVIS, Individually and
Trading as Roy E. Davis, Seafood,
Petitioner
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its
Agency the United States Air Force
and
THE CITY OF HAMPTON, a political
subdivision of the Commonwealth
of Virginia,
Respondents
and
HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT,
Third-Party Defendant.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DECISIONS BELOW
The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, on
April 13, 1982, found for the respondent
the United States. (App. p. 22a)
On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. (App. p. 26a)
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewer-
age Authority, et al v. National Sea
Clammers Association, et al, eliminating
private causes of action under the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act, also pre-
clude recovery for damages under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, when the damages
arise from water pollution caused by the
United States?
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The petitioners petition the Supreme
——
Court of the United States for a Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the
decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which
decision was handed down the 14th day of
September, 1983.
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is
based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act,
23 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. 2671, et
seq. Venue is based upon 28 U.S.C. 1391
(e).
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit is based upon 28 W.s.c. 8 1254(1)
and on the U.S. Const., Art. I1r, 8 2,
GAs Be
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS
The constitutional provisions, trea-
ties, statutes, ordinances and regula-
tions which this case involves are as
A ad
» ee
Vt
follows:
28 U.S.C. § 1331
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)
28 U.S.C. § 2674
28 U.S.C. § 2680
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (e)
Title 21, Sec. 218, Code of Va.,
1950, as amended
Title 21, sec. 223, Code of Va.,
1950, as amended
Title 62.1, Sec. 44.3(6), Code of
Va., 1950, as amended
Title 62.1, Sec. 44.5, Code of
Va., 1950, as amended
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Roy E. Davis (hereinafter
"Davis") is engaged in the seafood busi-
ness in Back River, a tributary of the
Chesapeake Bay, and does business as Roy
E. Davis Seafood.
His principal business is the purchas-
ing of polluted clams, pursuant to Common-
wealth of Virginia supervision, trans- ig
_ . et
he “ o
planting said clams from polluted waters
to Back River, where the clams are clean-
ed; and resale of the clams to the
public. Normal cleansing time is about
15 days.
Respondent United States, through its
instrumentality, Langley Air Force Base
(hereinafter "Langley"), fronts on said
River. Further, said river is bordered
by the City of Hampton (hereinafter
"Hampton").
The United States operates a sewage
collection system and pumping facilities
at Langley. Sewage and wastes are pump-
ed into sewage lines owned and controlled
by Hampton Roads Sanitation District
(hereinafter "HRSD"). However, on at
least 9 separate occasions between Febru-
ary 25, 1979 and September 6, 1979, un-
treated sewage in excess of 17 million
a gallons was dumped into the Back River by
:
6
the United States. As a result of the
discharges, Back River was closed by the
Virginia State Health Department until
such time as the colliform bacterial
level was reduced to limits determined
by the department to be safe.
On June 22, 1979, the Environmental
Protection Agency found that Langley had
violated the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (hereinafter "FWPCA") by
discharging untreated sewage into the
Back River, and ordered compliance with
the act. However, some incidents of
dumping occurred after that finding and
warning.
Between January 1, 1979 and July 3l,
1980, more than 400,000 gallons of raw
sewage were discharged into the Back
River, on at least 28 separate occasions,
by Hampton. The discharges by Hampton,
in conjunction with the discharges by the
United States, created the pollution
problem aforementioned.
As a result of such actions, Petition-
er was caused substantial damage and com-
pelled to close his business.
‘On September 13, 1979, Davis submit-
ted his alates for damages to the United
States. On May 6, 1980, the claim was
rejected by the United States and Davis
was advised of his right to sue under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Further, Davis complied with the no-
tice requirements of the FWPCA with re-
gard to the United States and Hampton,
and notified the City of Hampton, in
accordance with Virginia law, that it was
illegally discharging pollutants into a
navigable waterway.
On October 27, 1980, Davis instituted
action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
f
|
.
as
.
ginia against the United States and the
City of Hampton, alleging that untreated
sewage flowing from Langley and Hampton
contaminated the shellfishing grounds in
which Davis conducted his business, caus-
ing said shellfishing grounds to be
closed, and resulting in, substantial
damage.
Respondent United States admitted
jurisdiction under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (App. p. 10a) and elected to
file a third-party complaint against
Hampton Roads Sanitation District, a po-
litical subdivision of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and the agency responsible
for accepting and treating sewage from
all of the localities on the Peninsula
including Hampton, and Langley.
Additionally, each of the respondents ,
filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12,
and the City of Hampton moved to dismiss
under Rule 19 for failure to join essen-
tial parties, asserting that the non-
joinder of all persons bordering Back
River constituted a violation of Rule 19
for which the suit should be dismissed
as to them.
Each of respondents motions were re-
sponded to in timely fashion. On March
22, 1982, the United States moved to dis-
miss on new jurisdictional grounds, alleg-
ing the absence of tort jurisdiction and
citing in support thereof the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority et.
al. v. National Sea Clammers Association
et. al., 453 U. S. 1 69 L. Ed. 2d 435,
101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
By Memorandum Order, dated April 13,
1982, the District Court granted the mo-
tion of the United States and dismissed
the suit on the grounds of lack of jur-
10
isdiction. (App. p. 3la) MThe action
against the City of Hampton was likewise
dismissed, without prejudice, the pendent
jurisdiction supporting that action hav-
ing been destroyed upon dismissal of the
Suit against the United States.
By Per Curian decision of September
14, 1983, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court.
(App. p. 38a ).
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY
SEWERAGE AUTHORITY ET AL. V. NATIONAL
SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION ET AL., WHILE
ELIMINATING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT, HAS NO SUCH ADVERSE EFFECT ON
A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM POLLU-
TION AND INSTITUTED AGAINST THE OFFENDING
PARTY UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT.
Counsel for Petitioner will concede
1l
that the effect of Middlesex County Sew-
erage Authority, et al. v. National Sea
Clammers Association, et al, 453 U. S. l,
69 L.Ed. 2d. 435 101 S. Ct. 2615, (1981),
other than enforcement suits, under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(herinafter the FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq., and to eliminate the concept of
a federal common law of nuisance as a
jurisdictional basis for individual citi-
zens suits complaining of water pollu-
tion. Reviewing the legislative history
of the FWPCA, the Court discussed the op-
portunity of citizens to enforce pollu-
tion standards under Sections 1365 (a)
and (b) of the act, and then quoted it-
self, stating:
",..it is an elemental
canon of statutory con-
struction that where a
statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy q
or remedies, a court must 4
be chary of reading if
12
others into it...In the
absence of strong indicia
of a contrary congression-
al intent, we are com-
pelled to conclude that
Congress provided pre-
cisely the remedies it
considered appropriate."
Middlesex County, 453 US
at 14, 69 L.E dad. at
447, 101 S. Ct. at 2623.
It is unreasonable and tortured con-
struction to suggest that an admonition
against inclusion of unintended remedies
be extended to bar separate, independent
and long-standing remedies for damages
caused by the tortious misconduct of the
government. Legitimate judicial concern
about a plethora of "citizen" suits
should not result in a loss of individual
rights under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
whether those claims arise from the neg-
ligent operation of a mail truck, or
negligent pollution of a privately leased
shellfishing ground.
The same principal was enunciated in
13
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp 74 (D. Mass-
1982) by ‘Tudge Nelson, who declined to
dismiss a suit against the U. S. Army
Corps oi Engineers on Middlesex grounds,
finding instead that independent bases
of jurisdiction were provided under 28
U. S. C. 1331 (a) and the Administrative
Procedures Act (5 U. S. C. 701 et seq.).
A fair construction of the complaint
(App. p. 2a) can only lead to the con-
clusion that Roy Davis seeks to recover
for damages caused by pollution and that
the pollution was caused by the negli-
gence of the United States and the City
of Hampton. While the actions of the
United States and Hampton may violate
the FWPCA, it #s the physical pollution
of the water, not breach of an adminis-
trative standard, for which Davis seeks
compensation. There is not even a
suggestion that Davis relies upon a
bs Bin
14
"Federal common law of nuisance", City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 US 304, 68
L. Ed. 2d. 114, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
The interpretation of the Complaint by
the Court of Appeals ignores the plain
language of the pleading.
It should be remembered that the Fed-
eral Tort Claim Act was asserted, in
Middlesex, as a basis for jurisdiction,
but suit was not instituted in timely
fashion. Accordingly, that jurisdiction-
al basis was rejected by the Court of
Appeals, National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion v. City of New York, 616 F 2d 1222
(1980), and never considered by the
Supreme Court. However, it is reasonable
to construe the Federal Tort Claims Act
as som2what more than an umbrella for
nuisance claims. There are certainly no
exceptions in 28 U.S.C. 8 2680 which
would constitute a bar to tort action
sh
= ‘ h o ay
15
against the Federal sovereign for negli-
gent pollution, and the resuitant damage.
It is difficult to ignore the langu-
) age of 33 U.S.C. S 1365 (e) which states:
"Nothing in this section
shall restrict any right
which any person (or class
of persons) may have under
any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any
other relief (including
relief against the Adminis-
trator or a State agency).”
The decision of the District Court
creates an environmental Catch-22; on
the one hand, the Court rules that the
FWPCA provides citizens an exclusive
statuatory basis upon which to institute
action for the purpose of terminating
pollution; on the other hand, citizens
who are damaged by pollution are barred
from instituting suit for damages
arising from the tortious misconduct of
the polluter, in this case the Federal
ORE eT Ne pee ee ee ED
16
sovereign and a municipal government.
Title 33, United States Code, 8 1365
(e) and the legislative history of the
FWPCA specifically rebut that proposi-
tion.
In discussing the savings clause of
the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 8 1365(e), the re-
port of the Senate Public Works Committee
states as follows:
"Section 505 (33 U.S.C.
8 1365) would provide
that a citizen enforcement
action might be brought
against an individual
or a government agency.
As recognized under sec-
tion 313 of the bill,
Federal facilities gener-
ate considerable water
pollution. Since some
Federal agencies such
as the Department of De-
fense have failed in
abating pollution and in
requesting appropriations
to develop control mea-
sures, citizens can seek,
through the courts, to
expedite the government
performance specifically
directed under section
313... It should be noted,
17
however, that the section
would specifically preserve
an, rights or remedies
under any other law.
Thus, if damages could
be shown, other remedies
would remain available.
Compliance with require-
ments under this Act
would not be a defense
to a common law action
for pollution damages."
United States Code Con-
gressional and Adminis-
trative News, 92nd Cong-
ress, Second Session,
Volume 2, Legislative
History, pages 3746 and
3747.
To suggest that the Supreme Court in-
tended to narrow the scope of the FWPCA
and constructively limit the number of
suits arising thereunder is an acceptable
position. To suggest that Middlesex has
meaning beyond that proposition is to
read far more into Middlesex than the
specific language of the Justices would
suggest or permit.
It is respectfully submitted that am-
ple reason is provided in the opinions
18
of the District and Circuit Courts to
support the granting of a Writ of Cer-
tiorari to Roy E. Davis, under the guide-
line set forth in Rule 17.1(c), Rules of
the Supreme Court. Further, comparable
suits are presently docketed in Michigan
(Frank J. Kelley et al v. U. S., G-83-
630, W. D. Michigan) and Florida (Dick-
erson, Inc. v. American Electric Corpor-
ation and United States, 82-244-CIV-JB,
j M. D. Fla.). It is reasonable to assume
that the issue raised herein will not be
settled until the principles enunciated
in Middlesex are clarified.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons,
Petitioner Roy E. Davis, by counsel, re-
spectfully prays that a Writ of Certior-
ari issue forth.
Respectfully submitted,
19
JAMES E. BRADBERRY
D. WAYNE MOORE
MOORE, MOORE & BRADBERRY
13185 Warwick Boulevard
Newport News, Virginia
23602
Counsel for Petitioner
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