Petition — Davis v. United States

Supreme Court brief1984

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

88-1241.

NO.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1983

Roy E. Davis, Individually and

Trading as Roy E. Davis, Seafood,

Petitioner

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its

Agency the United States Air Force

and

THE CITY OF HAMPTON, a political

subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Virginia,

Respondents

and

HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT,

Third-Party Defendant.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

James E. Bradberry

MOORE, MOORE AND BRADBERRY

13185 Warwick Boulevard

Newport News, Virginia 23602-0100

(804) 877-0255

A AAALAC AE AICI ELE OTOP. ES a Te

APPELLATE PRINTING SERVICES. INC.. HERITAGE BLDG . RICHMOND. VA (804) 643-7789

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the decision of the United States

Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage

Authority, et al v. National Sea Clanmers

Association, et al, eliminating private causes

of action under the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, also preclude recovery for

damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act,

when the damages arise from water pollution

caused by the United States?

VRIOY AM :

*

z

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECISIONS BELOW eenee3ererereeeeree¢ eeeeeerkese

QUESTION PRESENTED ...... cececcce ee

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION .......+.---

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ....-.++-+- .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......- cecee

ARGUMENT eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeneeeneneeeeeee

The Decision In Middlesex

County Sewerage Authority et

al v. Nationat Sea Clammers

Association et al, While Elim-

inating Private Causes of Ac-

tion Under The Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, Has No

Such Adverse Effect On A Claim

For Damages Resulting From

Pollution And Instituted Against

The Offending Party Under The

Federal Tort Claims Act.

CONCLUSION eoeeeeeeeeeeneeeneeeeeeneees

Page

1

2

10

18

20S,

a

“ee

ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases: Page

city of Milwaukee v. Illinois,

Uéwe 7 68 L.Ea. 2d

BaOeaOn - B.Sc STOO CASO RD acccépe 14

Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74,

(D. Mass-1982) eee ew eee eeeee eeeere 13

Middlesex County Sewerage

Authority v. National Sea

Clammers Association, 453 U.S.

I, 69 L.Ed. 2d 435, 101 S.Ct.

2615 (1981)... 2,9,10,11,12,13,14,17,18

National Sea Clammers Association

v. City of New York, 616 F.2d

122 CA3= 8 eeeeeee eevee eee 14

Statutes, Codes, Regulations:

S'U.8.C.-B 101) --Ot Meds ccs be ceescvss’ 33

ee. cB .C. DB LIGA aac sh dk cs sec tse

28 U.S.C. BF 1346 (bd) ..ccrccccccdieccede4

SO U.8.Ce.D ASSET ive coe recsibsose <O

28 U.S.C. RAGING) ciawdicvctweiseccee BS

28 U.S.C. BOT hs ctcecesccauisicececs. Ss

28 U.S.C.

§

&

20° UBC. B 2676. ic csinccvctccesode

B. 2680. i rocvccvvcesvcupeed eh

oo

ie ©=S«§3:UT8.C.

ROGL iii ckikiews sc laccadaec ae 4

iii

Table of Citations Continued

Page

ee SOR. Co aks ace eew.be 4,15,16

Title 21, Sec. °18, Code of Va.

1950, as amended ......eee- Por ey 4

Title 21, Sec. 223, Code of Va.

1950, aS amended ..cccceecsececes 4

Title 62.1, Sec. 44.3(6), Code

of Va., 1950, as amended ........ 4

Title 62.1, Sec. 44.5, Code of

Va., 1950, as amended .....-eeee8- 4

Constitutional Citation:

_ om Ff Const. Art. III, 6 2 eeeeeeeeee 3

Legislative History:

/ United States Code Congressional

; and Administrative News, 92nd

¢ Congress, Second Session,

Volume 2, Legislative History,

bi pages 3746 and 3747 eoeeeeeee eee 17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No.

ROY E. DAVIS, Individually and

Trading as Roy E. Davis, Seafood,

Petitioner

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its

Agency the United States Air Force

and

THE CITY OF HAMPTON, a political

subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Virginia,

Respondents

and

HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT,

Third-Party Defendant.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DECISIONS BELOW

The United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia, on

April 13, 1982, found for the respondent

the United States. (App. p. 22a)

On appeal the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed

the decision of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia. (App. p. 26a)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the decision of the United States

Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewer-

age Authority, et al v. National Sea

Clammers Association, et al, eliminating

private causes of action under the Feder-

al Water Pollution Control Act, also pre-

clude recovery for damages under the Fed-

eral Tort Claims Act, when the damages

arise from water pollution caused by the

United States?

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

The petitioners petition the Supreme

——

Court of the United States for a Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to review the

decisions of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which

decision was handed down the 14th day of

September, 1983.

Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is

based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act,

23 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. 2671, et

seq. Venue is based upon 28 U.S.C. 1391

(e).

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of

the United States to review the decision

of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit is based upon 28 W.s.c. 8 1254(1)

and on the U.S. Const., Art. I1r, 8 2,

GAs Be

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

AND REGULATIONS

The constitutional provisions, trea-

ties, statutes, ordinances and regula-

tions which this case involves are as

A ad

» ee

Vt

follows:

28 U.S.C. § 1331

28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)

28 U.S.C. § 2674

28 U.S.C. § 2680

33 U.S.C. § 1365 (e)

Title 21, Sec. 218, Code of Va.,

1950, as amended

Title 21, sec. 223, Code of Va.,

1950, as amended

Title 62.1, Sec. 44.3(6), Code of

Va., 1950, as amended

Title 62.1, Sec. 44.5, Code of

Va., 1950, as amended

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Roy E. Davis (hereinafter

"Davis") is engaged in the seafood busi-

ness in Back River, a tributary of the

Chesapeake Bay, and does business as Roy

E. Davis Seafood.

His principal business is the purchas-

ing of polluted clams, pursuant to Common-

wealth of Virginia supervision, trans- ig

_ . et

he “ o

planting said clams from polluted waters

to Back River, where the clams are clean-

ed; and resale of the clams to the

public. Normal cleansing time is about

15 days.

Respondent United States, through its

instrumentality, Langley Air Force Base

(hereinafter "Langley"), fronts on said

River. Further, said river is bordered

by the City of Hampton (hereinafter

"Hampton").

The United States operates a sewage

collection system and pumping facilities

at Langley. Sewage and wastes are pump-

ed into sewage lines owned and controlled

by Hampton Roads Sanitation District

(hereinafter "HRSD"). However, on at

least 9 separate occasions between Febru-

ary 25, 1979 and September 6, 1979, un-

treated sewage in excess of 17 million

a gallons was dumped into the Back River by

:

6

the United States. As a result of the

discharges, Back River was closed by the

Virginia State Health Department until

such time as the colliform bacterial

level was reduced to limits determined

by the department to be safe.

On June 22, 1979, the Environmental

Protection Agency found that Langley had

violated the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act (hereinafter "FWPCA") by

discharging untreated sewage into the

Back River, and ordered compliance with

the act. However, some incidents of

dumping occurred after that finding and

warning.

Between January 1, 1979 and July 3l,

1980, more than 400,000 gallons of raw

sewage were discharged into the Back

River, on at least 28 separate occasions,

by Hampton. The discharges by Hampton,

in conjunction with the discharges by the

United States, created the pollution

problem aforementioned.

As a result of such actions, Petition-

er was caused substantial damage and com-

pelled to close his business.

‘On September 13, 1979, Davis submit-

ted his alates for damages to the United

States. On May 6, 1980, the claim was

rejected by the United States and Davis

was advised of his right to sue under the

Federal Tort Claims Act.

Further, Davis complied with the no-

tice requirements of the FWPCA with re-

gard to the United States and Hampton,

and notified the City of Hampton, in

accordance with Virginia law, that it was

illegally discharging pollutants into a

navigable waterway.

On October 27, 1980, Davis instituted

action in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Vir-

f

|

.

as

.

ginia against the United States and the

City of Hampton, alleging that untreated

sewage flowing from Langley and Hampton

contaminated the shellfishing grounds in

which Davis conducted his business, caus-

ing said shellfishing grounds to be

closed, and resulting in, substantial

damage.

Respondent United States admitted

jurisdiction under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (App. p. 10a) and elected to

file a third-party complaint against

Hampton Roads Sanitation District, a po-

litical subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Virginia, and the agency responsible

for accepting and treating sewage from

all of the localities on the Peninsula

including Hampton, and Langley.

Additionally, each of the respondents ,

filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12,

and the City of Hampton moved to dismiss

under Rule 19 for failure to join essen-

tial parties, asserting that the non-

joinder of all persons bordering Back

River constituted a violation of Rule 19

for which the suit should be dismissed

as to them.

Each of respondents motions were re-

sponded to in timely fashion. On March

22, 1982, the United States moved to dis-

miss on new jurisdictional grounds, alleg-

ing the absence of tort jurisdiction and

citing in support thereof the decision

of the United States Supreme Court in

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority et.

al. v. National Sea Clammers Association

et. al., 453 U. S. 1 69 L. Ed. 2d 435,

101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).

By Memorandum Order, dated April 13,

1982, the District Court granted the mo-

tion of the United States and dismissed

the suit on the grounds of lack of jur-

10

isdiction. (App. p. 3la) MThe action

against the City of Hampton was likewise

dismissed, without prejudice, the pendent

jurisdiction supporting that action hav-

ing been destroyed upon dismissal of the

Suit against the United States.

By Per Curian decision of September

14, 1983, the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed the District Court.

(App. p. 38a ).

ARGUMENT

THE DECISION IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY

SEWERAGE AUTHORITY ET AL. V. NATIONAL

SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION ET AL., WHILE

ELIMINATING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION

UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-

TROL ACT, HAS NO SUCH ADVERSE EFFECT ON

A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM POLLU-

TION AND INSTITUTED AGAINST THE OFFENDING

PARTY UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT.

Counsel for Petitioner will concede

1l

that the effect of Middlesex County Sew-

erage Authority, et al. v. National Sea

Clammers Association, et al, 453 U. S. l,

69 L.Ed. 2d. 435 101 S. Ct. 2615, (1981),

other than enforcement suits, under the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

(herinafter the FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq., and to eliminate the concept of

a federal common law of nuisance as a

jurisdictional basis for individual citi-

zens suits complaining of water pollu-

tion. Reviewing the legislative history

of the FWPCA, the Court discussed the op-

portunity of citizens to enforce pollu-

tion standards under Sections 1365 (a)

and (b) of the act, and then quoted it-

self, stating:

",..it is an elemental

canon of statutory con-

struction that where a

statute expressly pro-

vides a particular remedy q

or remedies, a court must 4

be chary of reading if

12

others into it...In the

absence of strong indicia

of a contrary congression-

al intent, we are com-

pelled to conclude that

Congress provided pre-

cisely the remedies it

considered appropriate."

Middlesex County, 453 US

at 14, 69 L.E dad. at

447, 101 S. Ct. at 2623.

It is unreasonable and tortured con-

struction to suggest that an admonition

against inclusion of unintended remedies

be extended to bar separate, independent

and long-standing remedies for damages

caused by the tortious misconduct of the

government. Legitimate judicial concern

about a plethora of "citizen" suits

should not result in a loss of individual

rights under the Federal Tort Claims Act,

whether those claims arise from the neg-

ligent operation of a mail truck, or

negligent pollution of a privately leased

shellfishing ground.

The same principal was enunciated in

13

Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp 74 (D. Mass-

1982) by ‘Tudge Nelson, who declined to

dismiss a suit against the U. S. Army

Corps oi Engineers on Middlesex grounds,

finding instead that independent bases

of jurisdiction were provided under 28

U. S. C. 1331 (a) and the Administrative

Procedures Act (5 U. S. C. 701 et seq.).

A fair construction of the complaint

(App. p. 2a) can only lead to the con-

clusion that Roy Davis seeks to recover

for damages caused by pollution and that

the pollution was caused by the negli-

gence of the United States and the City

of Hampton. While the actions of the

United States and Hampton may violate

the FWPCA, it #s the physical pollution

of the water, not breach of an adminis-

trative standard, for which Davis seeks

compensation. There is not even a

suggestion that Davis relies upon a

bs Bin

14

"Federal common law of nuisance", City

of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 US 304, 68

L. Ed. 2d. 114, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).

The interpretation of the Complaint by

the Court of Appeals ignores the plain

language of the pleading.

It should be remembered that the Fed-

eral Tort Claim Act was asserted, in

Middlesex, as a basis for jurisdiction,

but suit was not instituted in timely

fashion. Accordingly, that jurisdiction-

al basis was rejected by the Court of

Appeals, National Sea Clammers Associa-

tion v. City of New York, 616 F 2d 1222

(1980), and never considered by the

Supreme Court. However, it is reasonable

to construe the Federal Tort Claims Act

as som2what more than an umbrella for

nuisance claims. There are certainly no

exceptions in 28 U.S.C. 8 2680 which

would constitute a bar to tort action

sh

= ‘ h o ay

15

against the Federal sovereign for negli-

gent pollution, and the resuitant damage.

It is difficult to ignore the langu-

) age of 33 U.S.C. S 1365 (e) which states:

"Nothing in this section

shall restrict any right

which any person (or class

of persons) may have under

any statute or common

law to seek enforcement of

any effluent standard or

limitation or to seek any

other relief (including

relief against the Adminis-

trator or a State agency).”

The decision of the District Court

creates an environmental Catch-22; on

the one hand, the Court rules that the

FWPCA provides citizens an exclusive

statuatory basis upon which to institute

action for the purpose of terminating

pollution; on the other hand, citizens

who are damaged by pollution are barred

from instituting suit for damages

arising from the tortious misconduct of

the polluter, in this case the Federal

ORE eT Ne pee ee ee ED

16

sovereign and a municipal government.

Title 33, United States Code, 8 1365

(e) and the legislative history of the

FWPCA specifically rebut that proposi-

tion.

In discussing the savings clause of

the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 8 1365(e), the re-

port of the Senate Public Works Committee

states as follows:

"Section 505 (33 U.S.C.

8 1365) would provide

that a citizen enforcement

action might be brought

against an individual

or a government agency.

As recognized under sec-

tion 313 of the bill,

Federal facilities gener-

ate considerable water

pollution. Since some

Federal agencies such

as the Department of De-

fense have failed in

abating pollution and in

requesting appropriations

to develop control mea-

sures, citizens can seek,

through the courts, to

expedite the government

performance specifically

directed under section

313... It should be noted,

17

however, that the section

would specifically preserve

an, rights or remedies

under any other law.

Thus, if damages could

be shown, other remedies

would remain available.

Compliance with require-

ments under this Act

would not be a defense

to a common law action

for pollution damages."

United States Code Con-

gressional and Adminis-

trative News, 92nd Cong-

ress, Second Session,

Volume 2, Legislative

History, pages 3746 and

3747.

To suggest that the Supreme Court in-

tended to narrow the scope of the FWPCA

and constructively limit the number of

suits arising thereunder is an acceptable

position. To suggest that Middlesex has

meaning beyond that proposition is to

read far more into Middlesex than the

specific language of the Justices would

suggest or permit.

It is respectfully submitted that am-

ple reason is provided in the opinions

18

of the District and Circuit Courts to

support the granting of a Writ of Cer-

tiorari to Roy E. Davis, under the guide-

line set forth in Rule 17.1(c), Rules of

the Supreme Court. Further, comparable

suits are presently docketed in Michigan

(Frank J. Kelley et al v. U. S., G-83-

630, W. D. Michigan) and Florida (Dick-

erson, Inc. v. American Electric Corpor-

ation and United States, 82-244-CIV-JB,

j M. D. Fla.). It is reasonable to assume

that the issue raised herein will not be

settled until the principles enunciated

in Middlesex are clarified.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons,

Petitioner Roy E. Davis, by counsel, re-

spectfully prays that a Writ of Certior-

ari issue forth.

Respectfully submitted,

19

JAMES E. BRADBERRY

D. WAYNE MOORE

MOORE, MOORE & BRADBERRY

13185 Warwick Boulevard

Newport News, Virginia

23602

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.