Petition — Cordell v. United States
Supreme Court brief1984
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
8 3 = 1 1 3 v4 TC ae US.
No. JAN 11 1984
ALEXANDER L. STEVAR
CLERK
Iu the
Supreme Court of the United States
OcroseR ‘l'eRM, 1983
KELLY L. CORDELL,
Petitioner,
v8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT E. SUTTON
SUTTON & KELLY
1409 East Capitol Drive
Milwaukee, Wiseonsin 53211
Attorney for Petitioner
UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO.. CHICAGO, (LLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6981
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the stop of the petitioner and the search and seizure
of his effects at the O’Hare International Airport in
Chicago, [llinois on July 6, 1982 violate the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
iil
INDEX
PAGE
Question Presented For Review... ccaiietaeeniasii i
Opinion Below ............ ‘ee Sgn WS one. aaa
Jurisdiction —......... sh i 2
Statement Of The Case 2
Reasons For Granting The Writ — 0.0.2... 3
L
The Case Furnishes The United States Supreme Court
An Opportunity To Condemn An Epidemic Uncon-
stitutional Violation Uf Fourth Amendment Rights... 3
Es | at eo 5 aie ©
Appendix :
A—Decision of United States Court of Appeals App. 1-11
AUTHORITIES CITED
Royer v. Florida, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) 000000... 3,4
Zeary v. Oise, 353 US. 1 (1968) .........................:.......... 3, 4
United States v. Blatz, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982) .. 3
United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 42 U.S. 873 (1975) 3
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) 3,4
Iu the
Supreme Court of the United States
()cTOBER TERM, 1983
No.
KELLY L. CORDELL,
Petitioner,
V8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Cirenit filed December 12, 1983.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Cireuit was filed on December 12, 1983 and is
set forth in the appendix, pages App. 1-11. wf
2
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner was stopped by police officers, questioned
and his effects searched at O’Hare International Airport
in Chicago, Illinois on July 6, 1982. The stop was pursuant
to a standard practice engaged in by police to attempt to
apprehend drug traffickers. The petitioner had disembarked
from a flight originating from Miami, Florida—a so-called
‘*source’’ city for narcotics. Contraband was found in an
envelope addressed tu a third party which was in the peti-
tioner’s flight bag. He was charged in a one count indict-
ment with Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Petitioner moved to
suppress the search and seizure as unconstitutional. At
the hearing the police claimed that the petitioner had volun-
tarily consented to the search. Vetitioner claimed he had
not consented and the encounter itself was unconstitutional.
The trial judge found the search constitutionally proper
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. From that decision the
petitioner now requests the United States Supres2c Court
to grant this Petition for Certiorari.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
THE CASE FURNISHES THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONDEMN
AN EPIDEMIC' UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
The Court of Appeals’ decision claims to be a logical
extension of the holdings of the United States Supreme
Court in Royer v. Florida, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983), United
States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 42 U.S. 873 (1975), Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980).* As Senior Circuit Judge Swygert notes
' The prevelance of the practice engaged in here at O'Hare In-
ternational Airport is commented upon by Judge Swygert in his
coneurring opinion as follows:
“I feel compelled to note in closing that the kind of random
stopping of air travellers illustrated by this case is not un-
usual. At oral argument. government counsel was questioned
about the number and proportions of people who walk away,
who consent to questioning, and who are found to be carrying
drugs when stopped and asked to answer questions. Govern-
ment counsel answered that six to twelve stops per day are
made at O'Hare, and later supplemented his statistics by let-
ter to the panel, indicating that agents had testified in another
case that in their experience at O'Hare approximately 10%
of the people stopped refused to talk, 30% of the encounters
ended after brief questioning without request to search, 30%
involved searches resulting in seizure of narcotics, and 30% in-
volved searches that yielded nothing or contraband other than
drugs. I conclude from these limited and unsystematic statis-
tics that many innocent people are being stopped and ques-
tioned... .”
2 Also see United States v. Blatz, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982)
cert. den. 103 S.Ct. 1520 (1983) for a predecessor opinion of the
Seventh Circuit.
4
in his concurring opinion it appears that the reading of the
cases compels the conclusion that the search and seizure
in the case at bar has been authorized and under the rule
of stare decisis Judge Swygert believed himself compelled
to concur in the holding although his reservations are
noted. To quote: ‘‘Today’s holding may presage further
atrophying of an important segment of the bill of rights.’’
If the practice as followed by the police in the case at bar
is not struck down as abhorrent to the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, the police now
have a foolproof method of accomplishing dragnet searches
of the effects of citizens at airports without probable cause.
Claiming a right under Royer-Terry-Mendenhall to arbi-
trarily stop and question passengers disembarking from
‘*source’’ city airplanes, they can then search the effects
of these persons as long as they base their authority on
‘“‘consent’’ and swear im court that the subjects consented
to the request to search. Any defendant’s claim to the
contrary will in most cases be unavailing despite its in-
herent logic."
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court
should grant the Petition for Certiorari in order to review
its holdings in Royer, Terry and Mendenhall and to modify,
distinguish, explain, or reverse those decisions insofar as
they appear to countenance the unconstitutional search and
seizure reflected on the record in the case at bar.
Respectfully submitted,
Roxsert E. Sutrox
Attorney for Petitioner
* Again see the concurring opinion of Senior Circuit Judge Swy-
gert wherein he observes that such “consents” are inherently in-
voluntary, despite the authority to the contrary.
att Base):
Sac? AG
Lae
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
in the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 83-1103
Unrrep States or AMERICA,
Plaintiff -A ppellee,
Keuty L. Corpe.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 82 CR 471—William T. Hart, Judge.
Argued September 21, 1983—Decided December 12, 1983
Before Escuspach and Posner, Circutt Judges, and
Swycert, Senior Circuit Judge.
Escusacn, Circuit Judge. We are asked in this appeal
to determine whether, during au encounter between police
officers and the appellant, Kelly Cordell, Cordell was il-
legally detained in violation of his right under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures. We
are also asked to determine whether the government pre-
sented sufficient evidence at trial to show that Cordell
knowingly possessed the cocaine with which he was found.
Because we have determined that Cordell’s rights under
App. 2
the Fourth Amendment were not violated, and that the
evidence against him was sufficient, we affirm Cordell’s
conviction.
F
Cordell was charged in a one count indictment with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.
$ 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the cocaine, contending
that it had been illegally seized. The district court held
a suppression hearing and made findings of fact, which
we summarize below.
On July 6, 1982, Chicago police officers Terrence O’Con-
nor and Ricardo Abreu were assigned to narcotics duty
at O’Hare International Airport. The officers were moni-
toring a non-stop flight to Chicago originating in Miami,
a known ‘‘source’’ city for narcotics. The officers observed
Cordell disembark from the Miami flight, carrying a travel
bag. Cordell proceeded at a very rapid pace through the
airport terminal. The officers followed Cordell at a dis-
tance as he proceeded down two escalators and into an
open area that connects the terminals to the parking garage
and the Hilton Hotel. The area is a well lighted public
place. The officers approached Cordell from behind, and
4 O’Connor said, ‘‘Pardon me, sir.’’ The officers identified
themselves as police, and asked if Cordell would speak
to them. Cordell agreed, and placed his travel bag on
the floor beside him. O’Connor requested some identifica-
tion, and Cordell produced his Wisconsin driver’s license.
O’Connor then asked to see Cordell’s airline ticket. Cor-
dell produced a ticket, purchased for cash, in the name of
P. Baldwin. Cordell appeared extremely nervous during
the conversation, but was polite and cooperative. O’Con-
nor handed the ticket and license to Abreu, told Cordell
they were conducting a narcotics investigation, and asked
App. 3
Cordell if he was carrying narcotics. When Cordell re-
plied that he was not, O’Connor asked if Cordell would
object to the officers looking in his travel bag. Cordell
replied, ‘‘No, sir, go ahead.’’ O’Connor opened the bag
and saw miscellaneous items of clothing and a large
padded packing-type envelope. The envelope was sealed,
addressed to a Milwaukee address with a Florida return
address, and bore unecancelled stamps. O’Connor asked
Cordell what was inside the envelope. Cordell replied that
he did not know, as a man in the Miami airport had given
it to him and asked him to deliver it to Milwaukee. O’Con-
nor asked if Cordell would object if he opened the enve-
lope. Cordell stated that he did not mind because the en-
velope was not his. O’Connor opened the envelope and
observed a plastic bag containing a white powder. O’Con-
nor then informed Cordell that he was under arrest, ad-
vised him of his rights, and escorted him to the Drug En-
forcement Administration Office in the airport. The white
powder discovered in Cordell’s bag was subsequently dis-
closed to be approximately 240 grams of fifty-percent
cocaine.
The trial court denied Cordell’s motion to suppress the
cocaine, ruling that, although the search was not con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant, none was necessary as Cor-
dell had consented to the search. Cordell was convicted
of the charge after a bench trial, sentenced to a term of
one year and one day, and further ordered to serve a
special parole term of five years.
IL.
A. The Airport Encounter
The district court found that Cordell’s consent to the
search of his travel bag and the envelope containing the
App. 4
cocaine was voluntarily given. While the appellant testi-
fied that he withheld his consent to the search of the
envelope, the trial judge did not credit his testimony. We
do not understand Cordell’s argument on appeal to be that
his consent was involuntary because it was given under
coercion or duress. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Rather, Cordell claims that he was
being illegally detained at the time the search was con-
ducted, rendering the cocaine discovered in that search
inadmissible against him as ‘‘the fruit of the poisonous
tree.’’ See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The question, then, is whether at some point during the
encounter, Cordell was being detained and, if so, whether
the detention was constitutional.
Not all encounters between police officers and citizens
implicate the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. In
Royer vy. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), Justice White
was joined by seven other justices in holding that:
Law enforcement officers do not violate the provi-
sions of the Fourth Amendment by merely approach-
ing an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions, by putting questions to him if the person
is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such
questions. ... Nor would the fact that the officer iden-
tifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert
the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of
objective justification.
Id. at 1324 (citations omitted). When officers O’Connor
and Abreu identified themselves as police officers, asked
Cordell if he would speak to them, and requested his iden-
tification and airline ticket, theyewere doing nothing that
could be construed as a Fourth Amendment seizure unless
App. 5
one views all encounters between the police and citizens
as seizures requiring justification, and we do not.
However, when O’Connor handed Cordell’s driver’s li-
cense and airline ticket to Abreu, and told Cordell they
were conducting a narcotics investigation, the encounter
had become a detention. The detention, though, never ex-
ceeded the boundaries of an investigatory stop. /d. at 1326.
Thus the question we must answer is whether the officers
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
—the standard of justification for investigatory stops.
lnited States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
At the time they detained Cordell, the officers in this
case did have a reasonable suspicion. Royer, 103 S. Ct.
at 1326 (on facts similar to those here, eight justices
agreed officers had reasonable suspicion justifying investi-
gatory stop). In this case, Cordell had arrived from a
major ‘‘source’’ city for narcotics. The names on his air-
line ticket and his driver’s license did not match. He had
paid cash for his ticket. He appeared to be extremely
nervous, and became more nervous as the officers con-
tinued to question him. Officers O’Connor and Abreu had
been involved in narcotics investigations for seven and
five years, respectively, and had been assigned to the
O’Hare Task Force for well over a year. The officers
clearly were ‘‘entitled to assess the facts of [their] ex-
perience,’’ Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, and to suspect
Cordell of a violation of the narcotics laws.
Finally, unlike the situation in Royer v. Florida, the
detention in this case never matured into an arrest for
which probable cause was needed. Royer was told he was
under investigation for criminal activity, and taken to a
small room while his baggage was retrieved, without his
consent, from the airline. As Justice White noted for the
App. 6
plurality, ‘‘had Royer consented to a search on the spot
[e.g., in the terminal where he was stopped}, the search
could have been conducted . .. and any evidence recovered
would have been admissible against him.’’ 103 S. Ct. at
1328. In the instant case, Cordell did consent to a search
‘‘on the spot,’’ and the evidence discovered in the search
was properly admitted against him.
B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
Cordell also claims that the evidence against him was
insufficient to establish his knowing possession of the co-
caine found in his travel bag. We find no merit to this
claim. There is no question that Cordell arrived from
Miami with approximately 240 grams of fifty-percent co-
caine in his bag. Cordell maintained that a stranger in
the Miami airport asked hm to deliver the envelope con-
taining the cocaine to Milwaukee, the city to which it was
addressed. The return address on the envelope was ficti-
tious. The Milwaukee address exists, but does not belong
to ‘‘Joe Scott,’’ to whom the envelope was addressed.
Beyond the question of how a stranger in the Miami air-
port would have known that Cordell, who was boarding
a flight for Chicago, was ultimately to arrive in Milwau-
kee, we find it inherently incredible, as did the district
court, that a stranger would entrust appellant with drugs
worth close to $60,000. Appellant did not claim that he
was not in knowing possession of the envelope itself;
rather, he claimed to be ignorant of its contents. Under
these circumstances, there is more than enough evidence
to establish Cordell’s knowledge.
Ill.
For the reasons expressed in the opinion, the judgment
of conviction is affirmed.
« App.7
Swycert, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. I coneur in
the judgment of this court that the conviction of the de-
fendant should be affirmed. I write separately, however,
to express my views on the issues and why I feel con-
strained by the principle of stare decisis to vote for
affirmance.
It cannot be disputed that the two police officers who
accosted the defendant at O’Hare Airport initially had no
reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved
in illegal activity. The facts that aroused their attention—
that he came from Miami and walked through the airport
rapidly after leaving the plane—are insufficient to justify
even an investigatory detention (a ‘‘Terry stop,’’ see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) short of an arrest. See
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).
But it is established that not every ‘‘stop’’ is a detention
requiring the modest fourth amendment protection of
‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ prescribed by Terry. In particu-
lar, the Supreme Court has held that police officers may
‘‘approach| | an individual on the street or in another
public place,...ask{ | him if he is willing to answer some
questions, {and} put| | questions to him if the person is
willing to listen’’ without implicating the fourth amend-
ment at all. Florida vy. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983)
(plurality opinion); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 US. at
440 n.*; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. It is generally
agreed that an encounter is not covered by the fourth
amendment unless ‘‘a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave.’’ l/nited States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart,
J.); see also United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 134 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1520 (1983).
I believe that as a factual psychological matter people
who are stopped for questioning of this kind by police offi-
App. 8
cers, particularly officers who identify themselves as nar-
cotics investigators, generally do not feel ‘‘free to leave’’
because of the implicit show of authority and singling out
of the individual as suspicious. If 1 were writing on a clean
slate, therefore, I would hold that such stops, as con-
trasted with non-confrontational encounters such as ask-
ing for directions or questioning possible witnesses of a
crimes satisfy the Mendenhall criterion and must be justi-
fied by reasonable, articulable suspicion. The juxtaposi-
tion of the Royer and Mendenhall lines of cases demon-
strates, however, that whether a reasonable person would
feel free to leave is a technical legal construct rather than
a simple inquiry, and that the category of cases in which *
one would feel ‘‘free to leave’’ in this sense includes simple
requests for questioning. I therefore am compelled to con-
clude that the police officers were free to approach the
defendant in this case and elicit answers from him without
any basis for suspicion whatever. My conclusion would
be different, of course, if the officers had blocked his path,
approached him in a non-public place, displayed weapons,
overcome hesitancy by the invocation of authority, or
otherwise displayed their power to compel compliance.
The legality of the initial encounter does not end the
inquiry, for if the officers prolong the encounter it may
become a detention within the fourth amendment’s ambit.
As Judge Eschbach indicates in his opinion, the initial
questioning in this case ripened into a detention impli-
cating the fourth amendment because the officers retained
Cordell’s driver’s license and ticket, impeding his depar-
ture. This detention was proper only if the officers could
articulate sufficient suspicion based on what they knew at
that time. The additional information they had elicited was
that Cordell had purchased his ticket in cash, used an
alias, and was physically trembling during the question-
A
Ais pate ee}
App. 9
ing. The officers’ intuition based on experience does not
constitute an independent datum; experience may enable
officers to spot suspicious circumstances to which the un-
trained would be oblivious, hut is no more a part of the
suspicion than binoculars are part of the landscape. See
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S, at 441. We cannot defer to bare
intuition because ‘‘(t)he scheme of the Fourth Amend-
ment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at
some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances,’’ Terry vy. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote
omitted), and review is possible only if the basis for offi-
cial action is articulable. Although I believe the facts
then known by the officers were a slender reed on which
to base a detention, like the majority I defer to the state-
ment in Hoyer, analyzing similar facts, that ‘travelling
under an assumed name, ... paying cash for a one-way
ticket, the mode of checking the two bags {under an alias
and with a vague destination}, and [the defendant’s) ap-
pearance and conduct in general . . . were adequate
grounds for suspecting (him! of carrying drugs and for
temporarily detaining him and his luggage while [the offi-
cers} attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a
manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative
detention.’’ 103 S. Ct. at 1326.
Finally, in the course of the detention the officers sought
and received permission to search Cordell’s bag and the
package it contained. It is established ‘‘that where the
validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the
burden of proving that the necessary consent was ob-
tained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission
App. 10
to a claim of lawful authority.’’ /d. at 1324 (citations
omitted). Again, if I could write afresh, | would conclude
that in reality consent to a search that is so obviously
contrary to one’s interest is no more voluntary than
‘‘mere submission to a claim of lawful authority’’ because
of the likelihood that the consent was uninformed and be-
cause of the pressures of the situation. The reality here
is that the officers had the defeudant’s driver’s license
and airline ticket in their hands. They told him that they
were conducting a narcotics investigation and asked him
if he was carrying narcotics, He was not told that he need
not consent to the search. It is clear to me that psycho-
logically he could only believe that he had no choice but
to consent. Nevertheless, I defer to the holding of Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58, that such considerations are
not dispositive, and therefore would affirm the district
court’s finding that the consent was voluntary,
I feel compelled to note in closing that the kind of ran-
dom stopping of air travelers illustrated by this case is
not unusual, At oral argument, government counsel was
questioned about the number and proportions of people
who walk away, who consent to questioning, and who are
found to be carrying drugs when stopped and asked to
answer questions, Government counsel answered that six
to twelve stops per day are made at O’Hare, and later
supplemented his statistics by letter to the panel, indi-
cating that agents had testified in another case that in
their experience at O’Hare approximately ten percent of
the people stopped refused to talk, thirty percent of the
encounters ended after brief questioning without requests
to search, thirty percent involved searches resulting in
seizures of narcotics, and thirty percent involved searches
that yielded nothing or contraband other than drugs. I
conclude from these limited and unsystematic statistics
App. 11]
that many innocent people are being stopped and ques-
tioned. Few people who are stopped for questioning know
that they need not give answers and may walk away with-
out consequences. Few people will assert their rights,
even if known, in the face of police authority.
This practice is troubling for two reasons, Countenanc-
ing large numbers of minor, though unwarranted, intru-
sions erodes the principle of freedom from official inter-
ference guaranteed by the fourth amendment, and invites
the use of arbitrary or discriminatory principles of selec-
tion abhorrent to the fourth amendment. See Brown y.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (fourth amendment embodies
dual concerns of protecting privacy and avoiding arbitrari-
ness and abuse); Delaware vy. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654,
661, 662-63 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. at 14 &
nll, 15, 21-22. That the amendment may, at times, pro-
tect the criminal is the price that must be paid if we are
to keep these protections alive for all people. Today’s
holding may presage further atrophying of an important
segment of the bill of rights,
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circut
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.