Petition — Cordell v. United States

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No. JAN 11 1984

ALEXANDER L. STEVAR

CLERK

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

OcroseR ‘l'eRM, 1983

KELLY L. CORDELL,

Petitioner,

v8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT E. SUTTON

SUTTON & KELLY

1409 East Capitol Drive

Milwaukee, Wiseonsin 53211

Attorney for Petitioner

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO.. CHICAGO, (LLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6981

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the stop of the petitioner and the search and seizure

of his effects at the O’Hare International Airport in

Chicago, [llinois on July 6, 1982 violate the Fourth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States.

iil

INDEX

PAGE

Question Presented For Review... ccaiietaeeniasii i

Opinion Below ............ ‘ee Sgn WS one. aaa

Jurisdiction —......... sh i 2

Statement Of The Case 2

Reasons For Granting The Writ — 0.0.2... 3

L

The Case Furnishes The United States Supreme Court

An Opportunity To Condemn An Epidemic Uncon-

stitutional Violation Uf Fourth Amendment Rights... 3

Es | at eo 5 aie ©

Appendix :

A—Decision of United States Court of Appeals App. 1-11

AUTHORITIES CITED

Royer v. Florida, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) 000000... 3,4

Zeary v. Oise, 353 US. 1 (1968) .........................:.......... 3, 4

United States v. Blatz, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982) .. 3

United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 42 U.S. 873 (1975) 3

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) 3,4

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

()cTOBER TERM, 1983

No.

KELLY L. CORDELL,

Petitioner,

V8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Cirenit filed December 12, 1983.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Cireuit was filed on December 12, 1983 and is

set forth in the appendix, pages App. 1-11. wf

2

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner was stopped by police officers, questioned

and his effects searched at O’Hare International Airport

in Chicago, Illinois on July 6, 1982. The stop was pursuant

to a standard practice engaged in by police to attempt to

apprehend drug traffickers. The petitioner had disembarked

from a flight originating from Miami, Florida—a so-called

‘*source’’ city for narcotics. Contraband was found in an

envelope addressed tu a third party which was in the peti-

tioner’s flight bag. He was charged in a one count indict-

ment with Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Distribute

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Petitioner moved to

suppress the search and seizure as unconstitutional. At

the hearing the police claimed that the petitioner had volun-

tarily consented to the search. Vetitioner claimed he had

not consented and the encounter itself was unconstitutional.

The trial judge found the search constitutionally proper

and the Court of Appeals affirmed. From that decision the

petitioner now requests the United States Supres2c Court

to grant this Petition for Certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THE CASE FURNISHES THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONDEMN

AN EPIDEMIC' UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF

FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

The Court of Appeals’ decision claims to be a logical

extension of the holdings of the United States Supreme

Court in Royer v. Florida, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983), United

States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 42 U.S. 873 (1975), Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446

U.S. 544 (1980).* As Senior Circuit Judge Swygert notes

' The prevelance of the practice engaged in here at O'Hare In-

ternational Airport is commented upon by Judge Swygert in his

coneurring opinion as follows:

“I feel compelled to note in closing that the kind of random

stopping of air travellers illustrated by this case is not un-

usual. At oral argument. government counsel was questioned

about the number and proportions of people who walk away,

who consent to questioning, and who are found to be carrying

drugs when stopped and asked to answer questions. Govern-

ment counsel answered that six to twelve stops per day are

made at O'Hare, and later supplemented his statistics by let-

ter to the panel, indicating that agents had testified in another

case that in their experience at O'Hare approximately 10%

of the people stopped refused to talk, 30% of the encounters

ended after brief questioning without request to search, 30%

involved searches resulting in seizure of narcotics, and 30% in-

volved searches that yielded nothing or contraband other than

drugs. I conclude from these limited and unsystematic statis-

tics that many innocent people are being stopped and ques-

tioned... .”

2 Also see United States v. Blatz, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982)

cert. den. 103 S.Ct. 1520 (1983) for a predecessor opinion of the

Seventh Circuit.

4

in his concurring opinion it appears that the reading of the

cases compels the conclusion that the search and seizure

in the case at bar has been authorized and under the rule

of stare decisis Judge Swygert believed himself compelled

to concur in the holding although his reservations are

noted. To quote: ‘‘Today’s holding may presage further

atrophying of an important segment of the bill of rights.’’

If the practice as followed by the police in the case at bar

is not struck down as abhorrent to the Fourth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States, the police now

have a foolproof method of accomplishing dragnet searches

of the effects of citizens at airports without probable cause.

Claiming a right under Royer-Terry-Mendenhall to arbi-

trarily stop and question passengers disembarking from

‘*source’’ city airplanes, they can then search the effects

of these persons as long as they base their authority on

‘“‘consent’’ and swear im court that the subjects consented

to the request to search. Any defendant’s claim to the

contrary will in most cases be unavailing despite its in-

herent logic."

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court

should grant the Petition for Certiorari in order to review

its holdings in Royer, Terry and Mendenhall and to modify,

distinguish, explain, or reverse those decisions insofar as

they appear to countenance the unconstitutional search and

seizure reflected on the record in the case at bar.

Respectfully submitted,

Roxsert E. Sutrox

Attorney for Petitioner

* Again see the concurring opinion of Senior Circuit Judge Swy-

gert wherein he observes that such “consents” are inherently in-

voluntary, despite the authority to the contrary.

att Base):

Sac? AG

Lae

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

in the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 83-1103

Unrrep States or AMERICA,

Plaintiff -A ppellee,

Keuty L. Corpe.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 82 CR 471—William T. Hart, Judge.

Argued September 21, 1983—Decided December 12, 1983

Before Escuspach and Posner, Circutt Judges, and

Swycert, Senior Circuit Judge.

Escusacn, Circuit Judge. We are asked in this appeal

to determine whether, during au encounter between police

officers and the appellant, Kelly Cordell, Cordell was il-

legally detained in violation of his right under the Fourth

Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures. We

are also asked to determine whether the government pre-

sented sufficient evidence at trial to show that Cordell

knowingly possessed the cocaine with which he was found.

Because we have determined that Cordell’s rights under

App. 2

the Fourth Amendment were not violated, and that the

evidence against him was sufficient, we affirm Cordell’s

conviction.

F

Cordell was charged in a one count indictment with

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.

$ 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the cocaine, contending

that it had been illegally seized. The district court held

a suppression hearing and made findings of fact, which

we summarize below.

On July 6, 1982, Chicago police officers Terrence O’Con-

nor and Ricardo Abreu were assigned to narcotics duty

at O’Hare International Airport. The officers were moni-

toring a non-stop flight to Chicago originating in Miami,

a known ‘‘source’’ city for narcotics. The officers observed

Cordell disembark from the Miami flight, carrying a travel

bag. Cordell proceeded at a very rapid pace through the

airport terminal. The officers followed Cordell at a dis-

tance as he proceeded down two escalators and into an

open area that connects the terminals to the parking garage

and the Hilton Hotel. The area is a well lighted public

place. The officers approached Cordell from behind, and

4 O’Connor said, ‘‘Pardon me, sir.’’ The officers identified

themselves as police, and asked if Cordell would speak

to them. Cordell agreed, and placed his travel bag on

the floor beside him. O’Connor requested some identifica-

tion, and Cordell produced his Wisconsin driver’s license.

O’Connor then asked to see Cordell’s airline ticket. Cor-

dell produced a ticket, purchased for cash, in the name of

P. Baldwin. Cordell appeared extremely nervous during

the conversation, but was polite and cooperative. O’Con-

nor handed the ticket and license to Abreu, told Cordell

they were conducting a narcotics investigation, and asked

App. 3

Cordell if he was carrying narcotics. When Cordell re-

plied that he was not, O’Connor asked if Cordell would

object to the officers looking in his travel bag. Cordell

replied, ‘‘No, sir, go ahead.’’ O’Connor opened the bag

and saw miscellaneous items of clothing and a large

padded packing-type envelope. The envelope was sealed,

addressed to a Milwaukee address with a Florida return

address, and bore unecancelled stamps. O’Connor asked

Cordell what was inside the envelope. Cordell replied that

he did not know, as a man in the Miami airport had given

it to him and asked him to deliver it to Milwaukee. O’Con-

nor asked if Cordell would object if he opened the enve-

lope. Cordell stated that he did not mind because the en-

velope was not his. O’Connor opened the envelope and

observed a plastic bag containing a white powder. O’Con-

nor then informed Cordell that he was under arrest, ad-

vised him of his rights, and escorted him to the Drug En-

forcement Administration Office in the airport. The white

powder discovered in Cordell’s bag was subsequently dis-

closed to be approximately 240 grams of fifty-percent

cocaine.

The trial court denied Cordell’s motion to suppress the

cocaine, ruling that, although the search was not con-

ducted pursuant to a warrant, none was necessary as Cor-

dell had consented to the search. Cordell was convicted

of the charge after a bench trial, sentenced to a term of

one year and one day, and further ordered to serve a

special parole term of five years.

IL.

A. The Airport Encounter

The district court found that Cordell’s consent to the

search of his travel bag and the envelope containing the

App. 4

cocaine was voluntarily given. While the appellant testi-

fied that he withheld his consent to the search of the

envelope, the trial judge did not credit his testimony. We

do not understand Cordell’s argument on appeal to be that

his consent was involuntary because it was given under

coercion or duress. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Rather, Cordell claims that he was

being illegally detained at the time the search was con-

ducted, rendering the cocaine discovered in that search

inadmissible against him as ‘‘the fruit of the poisonous

tree.’’ See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

The question, then, is whether at some point during the

encounter, Cordell was being detained and, if so, whether

the detention was constitutional.

Not all encounters between police officers and citizens

implicate the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. In

Royer vy. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), Justice White

was joined by seven other justices in holding that:

Law enforcement officers do not violate the provi-

sions of the Fourth Amendment by merely approach-

ing an individual on the street or in another public

place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some

questions, by putting questions to him if the person

is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a

criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such

questions. ... Nor would the fact that the officer iden-

tifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert

the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of

objective justification.

Id. at 1324 (citations omitted). When officers O’Connor

and Abreu identified themselves as police officers, asked

Cordell if he would speak to them, and requested his iden-

tification and airline ticket, theyewere doing nothing that

could be construed as a Fourth Amendment seizure unless

App. 5

one views all encounters between the police and citizens

as seizures requiring justification, and we do not.

However, when O’Connor handed Cordell’s driver’s li-

cense and airline ticket to Abreu, and told Cordell they

were conducting a narcotics investigation, the encounter

had become a detention. The detention, though, never ex-

ceeded the boundaries of an investigatory stop. /d. at 1326.

Thus the question we must answer is whether the officers

had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity

—the standard of justification for investigatory stops.

lnited States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).

At the time they detained Cordell, the officers in this

case did have a reasonable suspicion. Royer, 103 S. Ct.

at 1326 (on facts similar to those here, eight justices

agreed officers had reasonable suspicion justifying investi-

gatory stop). In this case, Cordell had arrived from a

major ‘‘source’’ city for narcotics. The names on his air-

line ticket and his driver’s license did not match. He had

paid cash for his ticket. He appeared to be extremely

nervous, and became more nervous as the officers con-

tinued to question him. Officers O’Connor and Abreu had

been involved in narcotics investigations for seven and

five years, respectively, and had been assigned to the

O’Hare Task Force for well over a year. The officers

clearly were ‘‘entitled to assess the facts of [their] ex-

perience,’’ Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, and to suspect

Cordell of a violation of the narcotics laws.

Finally, unlike the situation in Royer v. Florida, the

detention in this case never matured into an arrest for

which probable cause was needed. Royer was told he was

under investigation for criminal activity, and taken to a

small room while his baggage was retrieved, without his

consent, from the airline. As Justice White noted for the

App. 6

plurality, ‘‘had Royer consented to a search on the spot

[e.g., in the terminal where he was stopped}, the search

could have been conducted . .. and any evidence recovered

would have been admissible against him.’’ 103 S. Ct. at

1328. In the instant case, Cordell did consent to a search

‘‘on the spot,’’ and the evidence discovered in the search

was properly admitted against him.

B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence

Cordell also claims that the evidence against him was

insufficient to establish his knowing possession of the co-

caine found in his travel bag. We find no merit to this

claim. There is no question that Cordell arrived from

Miami with approximately 240 grams of fifty-percent co-

caine in his bag. Cordell maintained that a stranger in

the Miami airport asked hm to deliver the envelope con-

taining the cocaine to Milwaukee, the city to which it was

addressed. The return address on the envelope was ficti-

tious. The Milwaukee address exists, but does not belong

to ‘‘Joe Scott,’’ to whom the envelope was addressed.

Beyond the question of how a stranger in the Miami air-

port would have known that Cordell, who was boarding

a flight for Chicago, was ultimately to arrive in Milwau-

kee, we find it inherently incredible, as did the district

court, that a stranger would entrust appellant with drugs

worth close to $60,000. Appellant did not claim that he

was not in knowing possession of the envelope itself;

rather, he claimed to be ignorant of its contents. Under

these circumstances, there is more than enough evidence

to establish Cordell’s knowledge.

Ill.

For the reasons expressed in the opinion, the judgment

of conviction is affirmed.

« App.7

Swycert, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. I coneur in

the judgment of this court that the conviction of the de-

fendant should be affirmed. I write separately, however,

to express my views on the issues and why I feel con-

strained by the principle of stare decisis to vote for

affirmance.

It cannot be disputed that the two police officers who

accosted the defendant at O’Hare Airport initially had no

reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved

in illegal activity. The facts that aroused their attention—

that he came from Miami and walked through the airport

rapidly after leaving the plane—are insufficient to justify

even an investigatory detention (a ‘‘Terry stop,’’ see

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) short of an arrest. See

Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).

But it is established that not every ‘‘stop’’ is a detention

requiring the modest fourth amendment protection of

‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ prescribed by Terry. In particu-

lar, the Supreme Court has held that police officers may

‘‘approach| | an individual on the street or in another

public place,...ask{ | him if he is willing to answer some

questions, {and} put| | questions to him if the person is

willing to listen’’ without implicating the fourth amend-

ment at all. Florida vy. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983)

(plurality opinion); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 US. at

440 n.*; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. It is generally

agreed that an encounter is not covered by the fourth

amendment unless ‘‘a reasonable person would have be-

lieved that he was not free to leave.’’ l/nited States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart,

J.); see also United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 134 (7th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1520 (1983).

I believe that as a factual psychological matter people

who are stopped for questioning of this kind by police offi-

App. 8

cers, particularly officers who identify themselves as nar-

cotics investigators, generally do not feel ‘‘free to leave’’

because of the implicit show of authority and singling out

of the individual as suspicious. If 1 were writing on a clean

slate, therefore, I would hold that such stops, as con-

trasted with non-confrontational encounters such as ask-

ing for directions or questioning possible witnesses of a

crimes satisfy the Mendenhall criterion and must be justi-

fied by reasonable, articulable suspicion. The juxtaposi-

tion of the Royer and Mendenhall lines of cases demon-

strates, however, that whether a reasonable person would

feel free to leave is a technical legal construct rather than

a simple inquiry, and that the category of cases in which *

one would feel ‘‘free to leave’’ in this sense includes simple

requests for questioning. I therefore am compelled to con-

clude that the police officers were free to approach the

defendant in this case and elicit answers from him without

any basis for suspicion whatever. My conclusion would

be different, of course, if the officers had blocked his path,

approached him in a non-public place, displayed weapons,

overcome hesitancy by the invocation of authority, or

otherwise displayed their power to compel compliance.

The legality of the initial encounter does not end the

inquiry, for if the officers prolong the encounter it may

become a detention within the fourth amendment’s ambit.

As Judge Eschbach indicates in his opinion, the initial

questioning in this case ripened into a detention impli-

cating the fourth amendment because the officers retained

Cordell’s driver’s license and ticket, impeding his depar-

ture. This detention was proper only if the officers could

articulate sufficient suspicion based on what they knew at

that time. The additional information they had elicited was

that Cordell had purchased his ticket in cash, used an

alias, and was physically trembling during the question-

A

Ais pate ee}

App. 9

ing. The officers’ intuition based on experience does not

constitute an independent datum; experience may enable

officers to spot suspicious circumstances to which the un-

trained would be oblivious, hut is no more a part of the

suspicion than binoculars are part of the landscape. See

Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S, at 441. We cannot defer to bare

intuition because ‘‘(t)he scheme of the Fourth Amend-

ment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at

some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing

the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral

scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness

of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular

circumstances,’’ Terry vy. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote

omitted), and review is possible only if the basis for offi-

cial action is articulable. Although I believe the facts

then known by the officers were a slender reed on which

to base a detention, like the majority I defer to the state-

ment in Hoyer, analyzing similar facts, that ‘travelling

under an assumed name, ... paying cash for a one-way

ticket, the mode of checking the two bags {under an alias

and with a vague destination}, and [the defendant’s) ap-

pearance and conduct in general . . . were adequate

grounds for suspecting (him! of carrying drugs and for

temporarily detaining him and his luggage while [the offi-

cers} attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a

manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative

detention.’’ 103 S. Ct. at 1326.

Finally, in the course of the detention the officers sought

and received permission to search Cordell’s bag and the

package it contained. It is established ‘‘that where the

validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the

burden of proving that the necessary consent was ob-

tained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a

burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission

App. 10

to a claim of lawful authority.’’ /d. at 1324 (citations

omitted). Again, if I could write afresh, | would conclude

that in reality consent to a search that is so obviously

contrary to one’s interest is no more voluntary than

‘‘mere submission to a claim of lawful authority’’ because

of the likelihood that the consent was uninformed and be-

cause of the pressures of the situation. The reality here

is that the officers had the defeudant’s driver’s license

and airline ticket in their hands. They told him that they

were conducting a narcotics investigation and asked him

if he was carrying narcotics, He was not told that he need

not consent to the search. It is clear to me that psycho-

logically he could only believe that he had no choice but

to consent. Nevertheless, I defer to the holding of Men-

denhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58, that such considerations are

not dispositive, and therefore would affirm the district

court’s finding that the consent was voluntary,

I feel compelled to note in closing that the kind of ran-

dom stopping of air travelers illustrated by this case is

not unusual, At oral argument, government counsel was

questioned about the number and proportions of people

who walk away, who consent to questioning, and who are

found to be carrying drugs when stopped and asked to

answer questions, Government counsel answered that six

to twelve stops per day are made at O’Hare, and later

supplemented his statistics by letter to the panel, indi-

cating that agents had testified in another case that in

their experience at O’Hare approximately ten percent of

the people stopped refused to talk, thirty percent of the

encounters ended after brief questioning without requests

to search, thirty percent involved searches resulting in

seizures of narcotics, and thirty percent involved searches

that yielded nothing or contraband other than drugs. I

conclude from these limited and unsystematic statistics

App. 11]

that many innocent people are being stopped and ques-

tioned. Few people who are stopped for questioning know

that they need not give answers and may walk away with-

out consequences. Few people will assert their rights,

even if known, in the face of police authority.

This practice is troubling for two reasons, Countenanc-

ing large numbers of minor, though unwarranted, intru-

sions erodes the principle of freedom from official inter-

ference guaranteed by the fourth amendment, and invites

the use of arbitrary or discriminatory principles of selec-

tion abhorrent to the fourth amendment. See Brown y.

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (fourth amendment embodies

dual concerns of protecting privacy and avoiding arbitrari-

ness and abuse); Delaware vy. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654,

661, 662-63 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. at 14 &

nll, 15, 21-22. That the amendment may, at times, pro-

tect the criminal is the price that must be paid if we are

to keep these protections alive for all people. Today’s

holding may presage further atrophying of an important

segment of the bill of rights,

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circut

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