Petition — Painters & Decorators Joint Committee East Bay Counties, Inc. v. Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass'n of Sacramento, Inc.
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FILED
No. DEC 30 1983
In the Supreme Court<««
ALEXANDER UL. STEVAS.
OF THE
United States
Octoser Term, 1983
Tue Painters anpD Decorators JorInt
Committee East Bay Counties, Ixc.
Petitioner,
vs.
Tue Partntinc anp Decornatine ConTRACTORS
or SacrkaMENTO, I nc., a California
non-profit corporation,
Respondent.
Petition For Writ of Certiorari To
The United States Court of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
Davip A. RosenreL_p
COUNSEL OF RECORD
Van Bours, ALLEN, WEINBERG
& Roces
875 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone : (415) 864-4000
Attorneys for Petstioner
PP wx
Question Presented.
Whether a District Court has jurisdiction
to enjoin a joint labor-management conm-
mittee acting in an ajudicatory function
under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. Section
185, which provides that district courts
may enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments where the joint labor-management
committee is not a party to the
agreement?
Parties Below and Affiliates of Appellant
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
28.1, Petitioner states that although a
corporation there are no parent
companies, subsidiaries or affiliates.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question presented ....-s.
I
Opinions below . ..+-+e««-«.
II
Jurisdiction ...++-s+-« »
III
Statutory provisions ....
IV
Statement of the case ..
v
Reason why this petition
should be granted ....
VI
(jj mii = 6 « .« ~ » «
Page
11
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Automobile Workers v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1966) . . . . . . . . . 7 + . .
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
0 v. The Celotex Corporation,
706 F.cd 460 (9th Cir. 1963)...
Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers,
Ses U.S. Zia (3919) 0 se © oo
Carpenters Local Union No. 1846
v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690
F.od 4595, 500-02 TSth Cir. 1982),
cert den., U.S. (1983). .
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery
and Confectionery Workers, 370
U.S. 254 (1962) . . . . 7 . . . .
W. R. Grace v. Local Union 759
Rubberworkers, _U.S.___ (1983) .
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 2 U.S. 55 ’ 55 -559
(1976) > >. > > >. > > * > > > >.
fumporey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
19 > >. >. >. >. >. . . . > * . .
International Union, U.A.W. v.
Greyhound Lines, inc., 701 F.ed
1181 (8th Cir. 1983) . Se
Page(s)
. 7
10
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page(s)
Loss v. Blakenship, 673 F.2d
942, 946 (7th Cir. 1982) .. ele oe 9
Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local
334, 452 Uebe 615 (1981) . 7 . . 8
Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Service,
Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th
Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Robbins v. Prosser's Moving and
Storage Co., 100 F.od 433 Cath
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert
granted, U.S... (1983)... 10
Smith v. Evening News Associa-
tion, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) -: owe 8
Teamsters Local 30 v. Helms
Express, Inc., 591 F.2d 211, 217
r. ), cert den., 444
U.S. OST (9079) « « oe es eo wee 9
Teamsters v. Riss & Co., 372
U.S. 517 (1963) o . - . . . . . . 7
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Statutes
26 U.8.C-?
Doan Se © thee ee @ e
eeu Beprcery © 6 eo ee «@
29 US.C.:
SS ae ae ee
Beetion 165 . « «2 « i, 2
Labor Management Relations
Act > > > > > >. > _ > > > >. >
Rules
Supreme Court Rule 28.1...
Page(s)
No.
In the Supreme Court
of the
United States
October Term, 1983
Painters and Decorators Committee of the
East Bay Counties, Inc.
Petitioner,
vs.
The Painting and Decorating Contractors
Association of Sacramento, Inc., a
California non-profit corporation,
Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari To The
United States Court of Appeals For the
Ninth Circuit
The Painters and Decorators Joint
Committee of the East Bay Counties, Inc.
(hereinafter "Joint Committee")
respectfully prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issued to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in
this proceeding.
I
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals
(Appendix A) is reported at 707 F.2d
1067. That Court's order denying
Petitioner's petition for rehearing and
rejecting Petitioner's suggestion for a
rehearing en banc and reprinted as
Appendix B is reported at 717 F.2d 1293.
The preliminary injunction from which the
appeal was taken is Appendix C.
II
JURISDICTION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of
the Ninth Circuit was entered on June 8,
1983, and a timely petition for rehearing
and suggestion for a hearing en banc
1
was filed on June 22, 1983. On October
4, 1983, the petition for rehearing was
denied and the suggestion for a rehearing
en banc was rejected. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254 (1). This
Petition is timely filed with this Court
under 28 U.S.C. Section 2101 (ce).
III
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provision is 29
U.S.C. Section 185 which provides:
Suits for violation of
contracts between an
employer and a labor
organization representing
employees in an industry
affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor
organizations, may be
brought in any district
court of the United
States having
jurisdiction of the
2
parties, without respect
to the amount in
controversy or without
regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying dispute concerns the
interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement covering painting and
decorating contractors in ten counties of
California between a union: The District
Council of Painters No. 16 and two
multi-employer associations: The
Painting and Decorating Contractors
Association of Napa-Solano Counties,
Inc. and the Painting and Decorating
Contractors Association of the East Bay
Counties, Inc. The dispute concerning
that agreement arose when a group of
contractors in Sacramento formed a rump
association known as the Painting and
Decorating Contractors Association of
Sacramento, Inc., which withdrew its
affiliation from the employer association
known as the Painting and Decorating
Contractors of California, Inc. As a
result of this inter-employer dispute,
the two multi-employer associations took
the position that the Sacramento rump
group was not recognized under the
contract as a "member signatory"
contractor, thus requiring each of the
contractors who were members of that rump
group to pay additional fees in order to
maintain a shop card which entitles the
contractor to advertise that he is union
and to employ union members.
As a result of this dispute, the
Petitioner, the Painters and Decorators
Joint Committee of the East Bay Counties,
Inc., was asked to declare the Sacramento
Contractors (numbering slightly less than
40) as "non-member signatory"
contractors, which would trigger certain
provisions of the contract requiring the
payment of substantially increased shop
card fees.
As a result of this action, the
Sacramento "rump group" sought an
injunction against the Joint Committee
from ajudicating the Sacramento rump
4
group as "non-member signatory."
Injunctive relief was also sought against
the contractor associations, although no
injunctive relief was sought against the
union, District Council No. 16. 1/
The Complaint also sought declaratory
relief as well as other forms of relief.
The District Court issued an injunction
restraining the Joint Committee from
imposing the "non-member signatory" fee
upon the Sacramento rum group members.
In addition, the District Court
restrained the Joint Committee from
removing the two individuals who sat on
the Joint Committee as delegates of the
Sacramento group.
The Joint Committee, consisting
of equal representatives of labor and
management, appealed to the Court of
Appeals which held that it had
jurisdiction over the Joint Committee and
otherwise sustained the issuance of
injunctive relief.
This case, therefore, presents a
i/ Any such relief would have been
prohibited by the terms of 29 U.S.C. 104.
5
sharply defined legal issue. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Joint
Labor Management Committee was acting as
an ajudicatory body just like an
arbitration panel. It was requested by
the multi-employer associations to
determine that the Sacramento rump group
Was required to pay an additional "non-
member signatory" fee, which action the
District Court restrained. The question
before this Court is whether such a joint
committee, which is not a party to the
collective bargaining agreement but
which is created by the agreement, may be
the subject of the District Court's
jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. Section
185.
v
REASON WHY THIS PETITION SHOULD BE
GRANTED
This Court has developed a substantial
body of law favoring the grievance and
arbitration process in collective
bargaining agreemen*s. See W. R. Grace
v. Local Union 759 Rubberworkers,
U.S. (1983). This Court, has
6
therefore prohibited the courts from
interfering in that grievance and
arbitration process. As a corollary,
this Court has recognized that joint
labor management committees are an
intregal part of that process and
affirmed that their decisions were no
different and no less enforceable than
decisions of sole arbitrators. See,
Teamsters v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517
(1963). Since that date, the Courts of
Appeal have never been troubled by
enforcing the decisons of such joint
committees. See, e.g. Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 70-v. The Celotex
Corporation, 708 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1983). See also, Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 558-559
(1976) and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964).
It is thus fair to say that such
joint labor management committees are now
an essential part of the process of
grievance resolution under collective
bargaining agreements.
On the other hand, this Court has
always read Section 185 broadly and
permitted parties to agreements to
enforce them in the District Courts. See
@e.g- Automobile Workers v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(union); Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery
and Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962) (employer); Carbon Fuel Co. v.
Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, (1979)
(international union) and Smith v.
Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195
(1962) (individual). Jurisdiction under
this section has been extended to other
parties to such contracts. See Cf.
Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334,
452 U.S. 615 (1981).
On the other hand, this Court has
not extended the jurisdiction of Section
185 to suits brought by entities which
are not parties to such written
agreements. Presented in this case is
the question whether a non-party which
serves as an ajudicatory function and
which is created by the collective
bargaining agreement may be subject to a
court's jurisdiction.
8
The court below held that
jurisdiction could be asserted over the
Joint Labor Management Committee, noting,
however, that "(o)ther courts have
interpreted Section 301 (a) jurisdiction
to be limited to the actual signatories
to the contract at issue". Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit was correct that at least
two other circuits have expressly ruled
that such joint labor-management
committees are not subject to a District
Court's jurisdiction. See Ramsey v.
Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 631 F.2d
1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1980) and Teamsters
Local 30 v. Helms Express, Inec., 591
F.2d 211, 217 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert
den., 444 U.S. 837 (1979). And other
circuits have declined to assert
jurisdiction over entities which are not
parties to the written agreement. See
Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 946
(7th Cir. 1982); Carpenters Local Union
No. 1646 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690
F.2d 489, 500-02 (5th Cir. 1982), cert
den., U.S. (1983). See
also other cases cited at note 3 of
Appendix A.
It is only the Ninth Circuit
which has broadened Section 185 to
include non-parties and broadened it to
those entities which serve the arbitral
function. We only note the havoc which
such a rule can create in circumstances
where the arbitrator (or joint committee)
is dragged into disputes between labor
and management where it serves a position
of interpreting or applying the
agreement. See also International
Union, U.A.W. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
701 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1983) (quasi-
judicial immunity for arbitrator).
For these reasons, the question is
of substantial importance to the role
which such joint labor-management
committees may play in the resolution of
contractual disputes and in furtherance
of the national labor policy. Moreover,
the issue is related to a question now
pending before this Court in Robbins v.
Prosser's Moving and Storage Co., 700
F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc),
cert granted, U.S. (1983),
10
which concerns the question of whether
trustees which are not parties to a
collective bargaining agreement must
exhaust the gricvance procedure in the
contract before suing to collect trust
fund contributions.
VI
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court below has
created a square conflict with the
decision of other circuits with respect
to the power of a District Court to
assert jurisdiction over a joint labor
Management committee. It is an issue of
importance and this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari should be granted.
Dated: December 21, 1983
Respectfully submitted,
VAN BOURG, ALLEN, WEINBERG
& ROGER
DAVID A. ROSENFELD
COUNSEL OF RECORD
Attorneys for Petitioner
11
APPENDIX A
FILED
June 8, 1983
PHILLIP B. WINBERRY
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
SACRAMENTO, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation,
DC No. C-82-3077 WAI
Plaintiff-
Appellee,
Ve
PAINTERS AND OPINION
DECORATORS
COMMITTEE OF THE
EAST PAY
COUNTLES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS OF
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CALIFORNIA, IWC.,)
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
NAPA-~SOLANO
COUNTIES, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
THE EAST BAY
COUNTIES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation; and
DISTRICT COUNCIL
OF PAINTERS NO.
16, an
unincorporated
labor
organization,
Defendants-
Appellants.
ee a a re a ee ee 8 8 8 ee 8 ee
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
California
Honorable William A. Ingram, District
Judge, Presiding
Argued February 16, 1983
Submitted February 25, 1983
Before: MERRILL, CHOY and ALARCON,
Circuit Judges.
CHOY, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal from the grant of
a preliminary injunction, we are faced
with the question of whether a non -
Signatory to a collective bargaining
agreement is a proper party to a suit
brought under Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act. We conclude it
is and affirm the order of the district
court granting the preliminary
injuction.
I. Facts and Proceeding Below
Plaintiff-appellee, Painting and
Decorating Contractors Association of
Sacramento ("Sacramento Association") is
a multi~employer trade group consisting
of painting and decorating contractors in
a six-county area of Northern California.
3
The Sacramento Assocation, along with two
other multi-employer trade groups, the
Painting and Decorating Contractors
Association of Napa-Solano Counties,
Inc.("Napa-Solano Association") and the
Painting and Decorating Contractors of
the East Bay Counties, Inc. ("East Bay
Association"), is signatory to a
collective bargaining agreement
("Agreement") with the District Council
of Painters No. 16 ("District Council),
which is a labor organization composed of
several local unions within the
California counties covered by the
Agreement. The employer-members of the
Sacramento Association are parties to the
Agreement by virtue of their membership
in the association.
The Agreement provides for the
establishment of a Joint Committee
(formally, Painters and Decorators Joint
Committee of the East Bay Counties, Inc.)
to administer and enforce the Agreement.
The Joint Committee is a California
non-profit corporation consisting of two
representatives from each of the three
signatory employer associations and
representatives from the District
Council. The Joint Committee's duties
and responsibilities are delineated in
the Agreement. One of the primary
functions of the Joint Committee is to
issue Shop Cards to employers indicating
that the employer is a party to the
Agreement and is thus observing the terms
and conditions of the Agreement. The
District Council will not provide labor
for any employer who does not have a Shop
Card.
Employers who are members of one
of the three signatory assocations are
considered "member signatories" for
purposes of receiving a Shop Card and are
charged $50 per year for their Shop Card.
However, the Agreement allows employers
who are not members of one of three
signatory associations to become parties
to the Agreement and to obtain a Shop
Card. Such employers are designated by
the Agreement as "non-member signatories"
and in order to obtain a Shop Card must
sign a copy of the Agremeent and pay the
Shop Card fee of $50 per year plus the
equivalent amount of yearly chapter dues
paid by members of the Painting and
Decorating Contractors Associationi/ in
the area in which the employer does
business.
On January 22, 1982, the
Sacramento Association withdrew its
membership from the state (Painting and
Decorating Contractors of California
("PDCC") and the national (Painting and
Decorating Contractors of America
("PDCA")) chapters of the Painting and
Decorating Contractors Association. The
reason for the withdrawal was to avoid
paying the annual membership fees of
these organizations. By withdrawing, the
Sacramento Association would be able to
save $240 per member in yearly fees.
On April 28, 1982, each member of
the Sacramento Association was informed
by the PDCC that he would be considered a
non-member signatory if he did not (1)
rescind his withdrawal from the PDCC and
the PDCA, or (2) join the Napa-Soleno
Association, whose jurisdiction had Seen
expanded to cover the territory formerly
governed by the Sacramento Association.
The Joint Committee accepted the position
of the PDCC.
As non-member signatories,
members of the Sacramento Association
would have to pay an additional $700 in
yearly Shop Card fees on the renewal date
of June 30, 1982. Additionally,
representatives from the Sacramento
Association were denied access to the
April meeting of the Joint Committee.
On June 15, 1982, the Sacramento
Association filed suit in district court
under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185,
naming the Joint Committee, the District
Council, the Napa-Solano Association, the
East Bay Association and the PDCC as
defendants. The gravamen of the
complaint is that there is nothing in the
Agreement which conditions
member-signatory status on being
affiliated with the PDCC and that the
defendants breached the Agreement by
Classifying the Sacramento Association
7
employers as non-member signatories upon
their withdrawal from the PDCC and the
PDCA.
The Sacramento Assocation sought
relief in the form of a preliminary and
permanent injunction prohibiting the
Joint Committee from (1) refusing to
allow the Sacramento Association
delegates to sit and participate as
voting members in the Joint Committee's
meetings; (2) refusing to renew the shop
Cards of the employer-members of the
Sacramento Association upon payment of
$50 from each member; and (3) threatening
to take any action to disqualify the Shop
Card of any employer-member of the
Sacramento Association. They also sought
to enjoin the PDCC and the Napa-Solano
Association from attempting to induce
members of the Sacramento Assocaition to
drop their membership in the Sacramento
Association and to affiliate with the
Napa-Solano Association on the basis that
if they failed to do so, they would be
considered non-member signatories.
The district court granted the
preliminary injunction ulpon conlcuding
that the Sacramento Association was
likely to prevail on the merits, and the
balance of hardships tipped in favor of
the Sacramento Association because the
Sacramento Association and its
employer-members would be threatened with
immediate and irreparable injury and
economic loss if the injunction was not
granted. The Joint Committee and the
District Council appeal the grant of the
preliminary injunction contending that
the district court erred in its
determination that: (1) the instant
case is not a labor dispute within the
meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29
U.S.C. Section 101, et seqg.; (2) there
is no mandatory grievance procedure
contained in the Agreement to be
exhausted before the case can come to
court; and (3) preliminary injunction was
not granted.
E We noted appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1) and
affirm the district court's findings and
order in all respects on the basis of its
reasoning as stated above. However, we
feel that the issue of jurisdiction over
the joint Committee under Section 301
needs explication.
II. Section 301 Jurisdiction
Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
Section 185(a), provides:
Suits for
violation of contracts
between an employer and
a labor organization re-
presenting employees in
an industry affecting
commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between
any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in
any district court of
the United States having
jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect
to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard
to citizenship of the
parties.
10
To assert jurisdiction under
Section 301(a), a litigant must allege a
breach of a contract beween an employer
and a labor organization or between labor
organizations in an industry affecting
commerce. There is no question that the
jurisdictional requirements of Section
301(a) have been met with respect to the
District council, the Napa-Solano
Association and the East Bay Assocaition,
since the suit is based on an alleged
breach of contract bween an employer and
a labor organization in an industry
affecting commerce, and they are all
Signatories to the agreement. However,
there is some uncertainty as to Section
301(a) jurisdiction over the Joint
Committee because it is not signatory to
the Agreement.2/ Other courts have
interpreted Section 301(a) jurisdetion to
be limited to the actual signatories to
the contract at issue.3/ However, we
do not give Section 301(a) such a
reading.
Section 301 is to be gien a broad
interpretation. Smith v. Evening News
11
Association, 371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962).
The fact that the Joint Committee is not
a party to the Agreement is immaterial.
Section 301(a) does not contain any
requirment that the parties to an action
brought thereunder must also be the
parties to the allegedly breached
contract. As this court has stated:
Section 301 jurisdiction
is not dependent upon the
parties to the suit but
rather the nature or
subject matter of the
action. Jurisdiction
exists as long as the
suit is for violation of
a contract between a
union and employer even
if neither party is a
union or an employer.
Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366
(9th Cir. 1976); see Stelling v.
international Brotherhood of Electrical
Workrs, 587 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944
(1979), Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d
12
156, 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 874 (1975); Peggs Run Coal Co. v.
District 5, UMW, 338 F. Supp. 1275, 1276
(W.D. Penn. 1972), aff'd mem., 500 F.2d
1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
All that is required for
jurisdiction to be proper under Section
301(a) is that the suit be based on an
alleged breach of contract between an
employer and a labor organization and
that the resolution of the lawsuit be
focused upon and governed by the terms of
the contract. See Castenada v. Dura-
Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 616 (9th
Cir. 1981). Here, there is no argument
that the suit is based on an alleged
breach of contract between an employer
and a labor organization. Furthermore,
the adjudication of this case, and the
Joint Committee's liability in
particular, hinges on the interpretation
of the Agremeent (i.e., whether member-
Signatory status is conditioned on
affiliation with the PDCC).
Consequently, there is clearly Section
301(a) jurisdiction over the Joint
13
Committee even though it is not signatory
to the Agreement since the requirements
of Sedion 301(a) have been met.
To exclude the Joint Committee
from federal court and thus force the
Sacramento Association to pursue its
Claim against the Joint Committee in
state court would be contrary to the
policy underlying Sectgion 301. That
policy is to promote industrial peace by
permitting agreements between labor
organizations and employers to be
enforced in federal court. Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Millis, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
Collective bargaining agreements must be
interpreted and enforced in a uniform
manner to accomplish such a policy.
Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engining,
605 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1979). As
the Sacramento Association points out,
it is possible that the district court
could interpret the Agreement one way and
a state court could interpret it a
different way with respect to the Joint
Committee, even though the same factual
14
setting were before both courts. "The
possibility that individual contract
terms might have different meanings under
state and fedral law would inevitably
exert a disruptive influence upon both
the negotiation and administration of
collective agreements." Local 1743,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95, 103 (1962). For public policy
reasons, then, inclusion of the Joint
Committee in this action is essential.
To reiterate, Section 301(a) is a
basis for jurisdiction when the suit is
based on a colorable claim of breach of
contract4/ between an employer and a
labor organization in an industry
affecting commerce and the resolution of
the lawsuit is focused upon and governed
by the terms of the contract.
The jurisdictional requisites of
Section 301(a) having been satisfied
with respect to the Joint Committee, it
is a proper party to this action. The
findings and order of the district court
are AFFIRMED.
15
FOOTNOTES
1. The Painting and Decorating
Contractors Association is a national
trade organization of painting and
decorating contractors. It is an entity
separate from the three signatory
employer assocations and is not a party
to the Agreement.
2. The Joint Committee probably is
not an employer or a labor organization
under the Labor Management Relations Act
either. We need not rule on that point,
however, because it is well settled that
parties in a Section 301 action do not
necessarily have to be employers or labor
organizations. The word "between" in
Section 301(a) refers to "contracts
between an employer and a labor
Organization, not to "suits" between
them. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 200 (1962); Stelling v.
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers,
587 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
3. E.g., Carpenters Local Union
No. 1846, etc. v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc,
690 F.2d. 489, 500-502 (5th Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W.
3651 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No. 82-1414);
Loss v. Blakenship, 673 F.2d 942, 946
(7th Cir. 1982); Ramsey v. Signal
Delivery Service, Ine., 631 F.2d 1210,
1212 ((5th Cir. 1980); Teamsters Local
Union No. 30 v. Helms Express, Inc., 591
F.2d 211, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 837 (1979); Baker v. Fleet
Maintenance, Ine., 409 F.2d 551, 554 (7th
Cir. 1969); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal,
Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 423 (ist Cir. 1968);
Fox v. Mitchell Transport, Inec., 506 F.
Supp. 1346, 1349 (D. Md.), aff'd men.,
671 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1981); Fabian v.
Freight Drivers & Helpers Local No. 557,
448 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Md. 1978).
Despite some broad language in
those cases stating that non-signatories
to the allegedly breached contract are
never appropriate parties to Section
301(a) action, the non-signatory parties
there were not dismissed because the
determination of their liability was not
focused upon nor governed by the terms of
the cotract alleged to have been
breached, a jurisdictional prerequisite
of Section 301(a). Here, since the
question of the Joint Committees liabiity
is to be determined by the district
court's interpretations of the Agreement,
the present case is clearly factually
distinguishable from the cases cited
above, and thus the reasoning behind
those decisions is inapposite.
4. The contract need not be a
collective bargaining agreement as long
as it is an "agreement between employers
and labor organizations significant to
the maintenance of labor peace between
ii
them." Retail Clerks International Ass'n
v. Lion Dry Goods, Ine., 369 U.S. 17, 28
(1962). Cf. District 2 Marine
Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. Grand
Bassa Tankers, Inc., 663 F.2d 392, 401
(2d Cir. 1981) (contract must not only
promote labor peace but must also be
between an employer and its employees).
iii
APPENDIX B
FILED
OCT 4 1983
PHILLIP B. WINBERRY
CLERK,
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
SACRAMENTO, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation,
Plaintiff-
Appellee,
PAINTERS AND
DECORATORS
COMMITTEE OF THE
EAST BAY
COUNTIES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
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DECORATING )
No. 82-4469
ORDER (For
publication)
CONTRACTORS OF
CALIFORNIA, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
NAPA-SOLANO
COUNTIES, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
THE EAST BAY
COUNTIES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation; and
DISTRICT COUNCIL
OF PAINTERS NO.
16, an
unincorporated
labor
organization,
Defendants-
Appellants.
de ee de ee ee ee ee ee oe ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
Before: MERRILL, CHOY and ALARCON,
Circuit Judges.
In our Opinion in this case, 707
2
F.2d 1067, we held that the lower court
properly had jurisdiction over a
nonsignatory to a labor agreement under
Section 301(a) of the Lbor Management
relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C.
Section 185(a). We stated, "All that is
required for jurisdiction to be proper
under Section 301(a) is that that suit be
based on an alleged breach of contract
between an employer and a labor
organization and that the resolution of
the lawsuit be focused upon and governed
by the terms of the contract." 707 F. 2d
at 1071. We further held that the lower
court was not precluded by the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Sections
101-115, from issuing an injunction in
this dispute, since the conflict is not a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of
that Act. 707 F.2d at 1070.
In its petition for rehearing,
appeallant Joint Committee argues that
the two holdings noted above are
irreconcilable. The Joint Committee
maintains that Section 301(a)
jurisdiction is limited to "labor
disputes." Although Section 301(a) is
not so limited by its terms,i/ it was
enacted as part of the same Act that
elsewhere defined "labor dispute" in
the same language as Norris-La Guardia.
Compare LMRA Sections 101(9), 501(3),
29 U.S.C. Sections 142(3),152(9) with
Norris-La Guardia Section 13(¢c), 29
U.S.C. Section 113(c).
Interestingly, we have found no
case that specifically addresses the
i1/ Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. Section
185(a), reads:
Suits for
violation of contracts
between an employer and a
labor organization
representing employees in
an industry affecting
commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between
any such labor
organizations, may be
brought in any district
court of the United
States having
jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect
to the amount in
controversy or without
regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
4
point raised by the Joint Committee.
Three cases, two from our court and one
from the Second Circuit, have held that
Section 301(a) gave jurisdiction to issue
an injunction where the conduct to be
enjoined was not among the specific acts
listed in Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia,
29 U.S.C. Section 104, and where the
injunction would not be at variance with
the policy expressed by Norris-La
Guardia. Local 2750, Lumber & Sawmill
Workers Union v. Cole, 663 F.2d 983 (9th
Cir. 1981); Retail Clerks Union Local
1222 v. Alfred M. Lewis, Ince., 327 F.2d
442, 446-48 (9th Cir. 1964); Drywall
Tapers and Pointers, Local 1974 vs.
Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons'
International Association, 537 F.2d
669, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1976). None of
these cases held that the litigation
before it was not a "labor dispute" as
defined by Norris-La Guardia, although
the Alfred M. Lewis court did state
that its case was a "labor dispute" "only
in the most refined and technical sense."
327 F.2d at 448. One district court
5
specifically found Section 301(a)
jurisdiction in the absence of a "labor
dispute," but did not discuss any
possible conflict between those two
holdings. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of America v.
Albany, Schenectady, Troy & Vicinity
District Counsel (sic), 553 F. Supp. 55,
58 n.4¥ (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
The proper response to the Joint
Committee's argument is simply that it is
anon sequitur. The Norris-La Guardia
Act and Section 301(a) play distinct and
separate roles in national labor policy.
The Norris-La Guardia Act was enacted to
remedy the indiscriminate use of
injunctions as a means of disrupting the
organization and progress of labor
unions. See Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 250-51 (1970); Alfred M.
Lewis, 327 F.2d at 447; F. Frankfurter &
N. Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
Section 301(a), on the other hand, serves
to promote industrial peace and
responsibility by permitting agreements
6
between labor organizations and employers
to be enforced in federal court. Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957).
Additionally, Section 301(a) jurisdiction
allows the development of a body of labor
law that gives consistent and uniform
interpretations of labor contract terms.
See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
These important purposes have
consistently justified a broad
interpretation of Section 301(a). See,
e.g., Smith v. Evening News
Association, 371 U.S. 195, 199-200
(1962); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir.
1970).
Section 301(a) is neither
specifically nor implicitly limited in
its reach to labor disputes, however
defined. Although cases adjudicated ;
under Section 301(a) will often, or
usually, involve labor disputes as
defined by Norris-La Guardia and the
LMRA, a labor dispute is not a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.
The petition for rehearing is
denied and the suggestion for rehearing
en banc is rejected.
APPENDIX C
FILED
AUG4 1982
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
SACRAMENTO, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation,
NO. C-82-3077-WAI
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) COURT'S ORDER AND
) FINDINGS RE:
Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFF'S
) APPLICATION FOR
Vv. ) PRELIMINARY
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INJUNCTION
PAINTERS AND
DECORATORS
COMMITTEE OF THE
EAST BAY
COUNTIES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS OF
CALIFORNIA, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
NAPA-SOLANO
COUNTIES, INC.,
a California
non-profit
corporation;
PAINTING AND
DECORATING
CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF
THE EAST BAY
COUNTIES, INC., a
California
non-profit
corporation; and
DISTRICT COUNCIL
OF PAINTERS NO.
16, an
unincorporated
labor
organization,
Defendants.
me eee eo eee ee ee ee te
)
The application of plaintiff for
injunctive relief came on for hearing
before the Court on July 19, 1982. The
Court, having reviewed the documents
2
filed with it, and having heard the oral
argument of counsel, and being fully
apprised of the facts, finds that this is
a proper case for granting a preliminary
injunction, and that unless a preliminary
injunction is granted as prayed for,
plaintiff and its employer-members will
suffer substantial and irreparable injury
before this mattr cn be heard on the
merits.
AND NOW, having heard oral
argument and having considered the
declarations, pleadings and briefs filed
herein, the Court finds that:
1. The Court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter of this action;
2. The imposition of a Non-
Member Signatory fee of Seven Hundred
Dollars ($700) on employer-members of
plaintiff PAINTING AND DECORATING
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF SACRAMENTO,
INC., ("SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION") for
renewal of their Shop Cards for the
period of July 1, 1982 through June 30,
1983, in addition to the Shop Card fee of
Fifty Dollars ($50), and the removal of
the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION'S two
representative delegates from the
PAINTING AND DECORATORS JOINT COMMITTEE
OF THE EAST BAY COUNTIES, INC., ("JOINT
COMMITTEE") and the refusal of the JOINT
COMMITTEE to allow the SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION delegates to participate as
voting members in the meetings and
activities of the JOINT COMITTEE, prior
to a hearing of this case on the merits,
will result in irreparable injury, loss,
and damage to the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION
and its employer-members. If the
injunction sought by the SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION were not granted, there is
sufficient evidence to indicate that
individual employer-members of the
SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION could be caused to
go out of business or to suffer severe
economic injury or to terminate their
membership in the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION,
thereby threatening the continued
existence of the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION;
3. The equities in this case
favor granting the preliminary injunction
in that the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION and
its employer-members would be threatened
with immediate and irreparable injury and
economic loss if the injunction were
denied; while, on the other hand, if the
injunction is granted, there would not be
corresponding irreparable injury or
economic loss to defendants JOINT
COMMITTEE, PAINTING AND DECORATING
CONTRACTORS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., and
PAINTING AND DECORATING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF NAPA-SOLANO COUNTIES,
INC., that cannot be protected against
the posting of a bond by plaintiff;
4. This is not a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris-La
Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 101 et
Seq. ;
5. There is no mandatory
grievance procedure to be exhausted in
this case;
6. Plaintiff SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION is a signatory to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement;
7. The employer-member of the
plaintiff SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION are
parties to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by virtue of their membership
in plaintiff SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION, and
are entitled to renew their Shop Cards
upon payment of Fifty Dollars ($50);
8. The plaintiff SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION need not be affiliated with
the PAINTING AND DECORATING CONTRACTORS
OF CALIFORNIA, INC.;
9. SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION has
presented evidence demonstrating the
likelihood of its prevailing on the
merits of this case;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
A. That the JOINT COMMITTEE, its
officers, agents, employees, and voting
members, and all persons acting in
concert with it and under its direction
and on its behalf pending the
determination of this action, be enjoined
(1) from refusing to allow the SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION delegtes to sit on and to
participate as voting members in the
meetings and activities of the JOINT
COMMITTEE: (2) from refusing to renew the
Shop Cards of the employer-members of the
SACRAMENTO ASSOCATION, upon payment of
6
Fifty Dollars ($50) to the JOINT
COMMITTEE from each employer-member; and
(3) from threatening to take any action
to disqualify the Shop Card of any
employer-member of the SACRAMENTO
ASSOCIATION or any action to enforce any
alleged "obligations" of the such
employer-members to pay any sum other
than Fifty LDollars ($50) to the JOINT
COMMITTEE for renewal of their Shop
Cards;
B. That the STATE COUNCIL and
the NAPA-SOLANO ASSOCIATION, pending the
determination of this action, be enjoined
and restrained from attempting to induce
employer-members of the SACRMENTO
ASSOCIATION to drop their membership in
the SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION and to
affiliate with the NAPA-SOLANO
ASSOCIATION on the basis that if they
fail to do so, they will be and become
"non-member signatories" under the
Agreement.
C. Plaintiff shall post a bond
in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars
($40,000).
DATED: 8/4/82
WILLIAM A. INGRAM
United States District Judge
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