Petition — Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California
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No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1983
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND
THE TRENTHAM CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
¥.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND
THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
B. R. PRAVEL
PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,
KIRK & KIMBALL
1177 West Loop South
Suite 1010
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 850-0909
Attorney for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
JOHN R. Kirk
CHARLES M. Cox
PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,
KIRK & KIMBALL
1177 West Loop South
Suite 1010
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 850-0909
October 26, 1983
a C8 ——™
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Where Petitioner’s process falls within the literal words of
the claims but, based on the patentee’s interpretation of certain
words of the claims in the proceedings before the Patent Office,
Petitioner’s process is performed in a “substantially different
way” from that of the patent, was the Court of Appeals correct
in ignoring this Court’s decision in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)?
2. Where a patentee placed a limitation on certain words of
a patent claim during the proceedings in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, should such limitation be ignored in
determining infringement because another claim has explicitly
recited such limitation?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .....
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Reasons for Granting the Writ....................
1. Even Though The Supreme Court Doctrine Of
Equivalents In Reverse In Graver Was Squarely
Raised By Petitioners, The CAFC Did Not Even
Mention It — By Its Silence, The CAFC Decided
This Case In Conflict With The Supreme Court's
Decision In Graver. This Court Should Review
This (Case Under Rule 17.1(c).................
2. The CAFC’s Reliance On The Differences In
Claims Is Contrary To The Ninth Circuit
Decision In Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts
Research Labs, Inc., 301 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
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Appendix A — Court of Appeals Opinion.......
Appendix B — District Court’s Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law........
Appendix C — District Court Judgment ........
Appendix D — Order Denying Petition for
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Appendix E-1 Drawing from Patent in Suit .....
Appendix E-2 Excerpt from U.S. Patent No.
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Appendix E-3 Claim | of U.S. Patent No.
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Appendix E-4 Claim 11 of U.S. Patent No.
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Appendix F Excerpt from File History .........
Appendix G Excerpt from File History .........
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
PAGE
CS&M, Inc. v. Covington Brothers Technologies, 672
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Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. Stekoll, 242 F.2d 17 (Sth
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Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
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Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760
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Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs, Inc., 201
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In re Rousso, 106 U.S.P.Q. 108 (C.C.P.A. 1955) ...... 6
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1983
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND
THE TRENTHAM CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Vv.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and
THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Petitioners respectfully pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) entered in the above-
entitled case on July 25, 1983.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the CAFC rendered July 25, 1983 is reported
at 713 F.24 693 (C.A.F.C. 1983) [Appendix A hereto (cited
herein as Pet. App. A-1)]. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California entered August 18, 1982 are not reported
[Appendix B hereto (cited herein as Pet. App. B-1)]. The Judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Central District
of California entered August 18, 1982 is Appendix C hereto
(cited herein as Pet. App. C-1).
JURISDICTION
After the judgment of the CAFC was entered, a petition for
rehearing was timely filed on August 6, 1983. The petition for
rehearing was denied by an Order dated September 21, 1983
[Appendix D hereto (Pet. App. D-1)]. The jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves Title 35, U.S.C. §271(a) which reads as
follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within
the United States during the term of a patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The federal jurisdiction of the United States District Court
was invoked by Petitioners under Title 28 U.S.C. §1338. The
action was initiated by Petitioners as a declaratory judgment
action under Title 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
The patent in suit is United States Patent No. 3,752,877
(Beavon) [Appendix E hereto includes the drawing (Pet. App.
E-1) an excerpt from the specification (Pet. App. E-2) and
claims | and 11 of the Beavon patent (Pet. App. E-3 and E-4)].
During the proceedings in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office before the patent examiner, the language
appearing as element (c) of claim | of the Beavon patent (Pet.
App. E-3) was added by the applicant’ and was continued until
the final grant of the patent. The language of element (c) of
claim | is as follows:
"The word “gas” was not initially in the phrase, but that is not an
issue.
3
“(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated
gas stream”.
That language was added as a result of a rejection by the
patent examiner because the applicant had not met the require-
ments of 35 U.S.C. §112. In making that rejection, the examiner
stated as follows [Appendix F hereto (Pet. App. F)]:
“Reference claims |1 and 12 it is not apparent what utility
exists in removing the water from the gas stream prior to
contact with an aqueous solution.” (Emphasis added.)
In response to that rejection, the applicant amended claims |
and 14 by adding the language which now appears as element
(c) in claim | of the patent as quoted above, and the applicant's
attorney presented the following argument and explanation to
the patent examiner [Appendix G hereto (Pet. App. G)]:
“As to claims 11 and 12, it should be evident from the
disclosure that the presence of water in the gas stream
would dilute an aqueous absorption solution. Removing con-
densed water is now required by claims 1 and 14. . . . In
addition, the absorption solution will not be diluted by
water of condensation nor consumed by chemical reaction
with sulfur dioxide. . . .
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that significant utility
exists in removing water and any trace amounts of sulfur
dioxide from the gas stream prior to contact with an aque-
ous absorption solution.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the patentee’s attorney expressly interpreied the
language “separating condensed water from the hydrogenated
stream” to require removal of the water “prior to contact with
an aqueous absorption solution” although such words were not
spelled out in the claim itself. The patent examiner never again
raised that issue after the patentee’s amendment to the claim
accompanied by his interpretation. Throughout the rest of the
proceedings, that interpretation was never changed.
Not only was that interpretation placed on the claim
language, but the specification itself was amended by the filing
4
of a continuation-in-part application in which the patentee again
emphasized that it was “important” to remove the water prior to
contact with the absorption solution to (1) prevent dilution of
the absorption solution and (2) to prevent consuming valuable
treating chemicals by mixing them in the absorption solution
(Pet. App. E-2).
It is undisputed that even though step (c) of claim | was
literally carried out in Petitioners’ process by “separating con-
densed water from the hydrogenated gas stream”, Petitioners
did not separate the condensed water prior to contact with the
absorption solution and therefore Petitioners could not and did
not get the two above-listed results of such prior removal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. Even Though The Supreme Court Doctrine Of Equivalents In
Reverse In Graver Was Squarely Raised By Petitioner, The
CAFC Did Not Even Mention It — By Its Silence, The
CAFC Decided This Case In Conflict With The Supreme
Court’s Decision In Graver. This Court Should Review This
Case Under Rule 17.1(c).
The Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) stated at pages 608, 609:
“Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a
patented article that it performs the same or a similar func-
tion in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls
within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of
equivalents may beused to restrict the claim and defeat the
patentee’s action for infringement. Westinghouse v. Boyden
Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568, 18 S.Ct. 707, 722, 42
L.Ed. 1136.” (Emphasis added.)
The above doctrine has been called the doctrine of
“equivalents in reverse”. The CAFC made no mention of that
doctrine in its decision (Pet. App. A) even though Petitioners
squarely raised it, both on appeal and in the petition for
rehearing.
5
In the present case, the patentee not only amended the claim
and interpreted the language of the amendment during the
proceedings before the patent examiner, but he thereafter stated
in the patent specification of a continuation-in-part application
that it was “important” to remove the water for two reasons:
(1) It prevented dilution of the treating absorption solution and
(2) it eliminated the consumption of valuable treating chemicals
(Pet. App. E-2). Those two results cannot be accomplished
unless the removal of the condensed water is accomplished prior
to contact of the condensed water with the absorption solution.
Petitioners urged before the CAFC, and now before this
Court, that the Graver doctrine of equivalents in reverse applies
here because even though the words in the patent claim may
literally be read on Petitioners’ process, there cannot be infringe-
ment under that doctrine since the wording of the claim has been
interpreted by the patentee in the proceedings before the Patent
Office to be a “substantially different way” from Petitioners’
process.
Thus, based upon the patentee’s undisputed interpretation of
the patent claim language in step (c) of claim | must be carried
out prior to contact of the water with the absorption soiution.
Since, in Petitioners’ process, it is undisputed that the condensed
water is not removed prior to contact with the absorption solu-
tion, Petitioner’s process is carried out in a “substantially differ-
ent way” from the Beavon patented process and there cannot be
equivalency or infringement under the Graver decision.”
If the CAFC had followed Graver, it could not have found
infringement of the Beavon patent by Petitioners, but the
* Although infringement is usually a fact question, where the facts are
undisputed, the issue of infringement is a matter of law. CS&M,
Inc. v. Covington Brothers Technologies, 678 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.
1982); Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. Stekoll, 242 F.2d 17, 21 ~
Cir. 1957). Further, in Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d
760, 771 (C.A.F.C. 1983), the CAFC held that the application of
“reverse equivalents” is a legal question.
6
CAFC, by its silence, refused to follow Graver. This case is
therefore appropriate for review under Supreme Court Rule
17.1(c).
2. The CAFC’s Reliance On The Differences In Claims Is Con-
trary To The Ninth Circuit Decision In Kemart Corp. v.
Printing Arts Research Labs, Inc., 301 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1953).
The CAFC pointed to the presence of claim 11 (Pet. App.
E-4) which explicitly recited the separation of the water “prior
to contact” with the absorption solution as “indicating that
claim | was allowed without the phrase “prior to contact” for
reasons other than the cited remarks made to the examiner.”
(Pet. App. A-12, 13). In reaching that conclusion, the CAFC
relied upon a 1955 CCPA decision, Jn re Rousso, 106 U.S.P.Q.
108, 110 (Pet. App. A-13).
In re Rousso was not an infringement case, but instead was an
appeal from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The appli-
cant there was attempting to have the Patent Office construe
words in the claim to include specific steps disclosed in the
specification. Other claims on appeal recited the specific steps, so
the CCPA allowed only the claims to the specific steps.’ It was
not a case such as here, where the applicant placed an inter-
pretation on claim language to overcome a rejection, and which
resulted in the examiner withdrawing the rejection.‘
*Graver v. Linde appears to have been mis-cited in Jn re Rousso,
because no basis has been found in Graver to support the CCPA
*The CAFC also summarily dismissed the patentee’s interpretation
of the claim aire because the rejection was on 35 U.S.C. § 112
rather than 35 U.S.C. § 103. Although courts have made that dis-
tinction under the “file wrapper estoppel” doctrine, there was no
basis for the CAFC excluding an interpretation placed on the patent
— dona established the lack of equivalency under Graver, as
above.
7
Further, the Ninth Circuit in Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts
Research Labs, Inc., 201 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1953) when asked
to rule that a limitation present in one claim should not be read
into another claim, held directly contrary to the CAFC’s deci-
sion in this case, as follows:
“But this rule of construction is subordinate to the control-
ling rule that a patentee’s broadest claim can be no bzoader
than his actual invention, no matter how it may be
expressed or what other claim his patent may contain.”
The CAFC also ignored the Ninth Circuit Kemart case.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions, and decisions by other Courts
of Appeals should not be set aside by the CAFC without review
by this Court. Even though the CAFC should be the court of last
resort in most patent cases, that should not be the case when
decisions of this Court and Courts of Appeals other than the
CAFC are being reversed by the CAFC either directly or by
silently ignoring them.
For each of the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
S02 ee ut 6.66662 CF 46 OS'S RO B10 8D Oe ae
B. R. PRAVEL
PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,
KIRK & KIMBALL
1177 West Loop South
Suite 1010
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 859-0909
Attorneys for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
JOHN R. Kirk, JR.
CHARLES M. Cox
PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,
KIRK & KIMBALL
1177 West Loop South
Suite 1010
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 850-0909
October 26, 1983
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of October, 1983, three
copies of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, via
first class mail, postage prepaid, to Andrew J. Belansky, Esq.,
John T. Grinnell, Esq. and Leo J. Young, of the law firm of
Christie Parker & Hale, 201 South Lake Avenue, Pasadena,
California 91101. I further certify that all parties requiring to be
served have been served.
B. R. Pravel
Attorney for Petitioners
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
APPEAL No. 83-554
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND THE TRENTHAM
CORPORATION,
Appellants,
Ve
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND RALPH M.
PARSONS Co.,
Appellees.
DECIDED: July 25, 1983
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, DAVIS and BALDWIN, Cir-
cuit Judges.
MARKEY, Chief Judge.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Central
District of California holding claims 1-8 and 12 valid and
infringed. We affirm.
Background
In early 1975, Trentham Corporation (Trentham), the sole
general partner of Environmental Designs, Ltd. (Environ-
mental), announced the construction of an effluent gas treating
plant using the Trencor process. On March 22, 1976, Environ-
mental sought a declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent
3,752,877 (877) for an effluent gas treating process known as
the Beavon process, owned by Ralph M. Parsons Co. (Parsons)
and licensed through the Union Oil Co. of California (Union),
was invalid. Parsons and Union counterclaimed for infringement
of claims 1-8 and 12. Trentham was joined as counterclaim
defendant on March 17, 1978. Judge Pfaeizer tried the case
during August and September of 1979 and entered judgment on
August 18, 1982, holding the '877 patent valid and claims 1-8
and |2 infringed, enjoining Environmental and Trentham from
A-2
infringing the claims of the '877 patent, and awarding Parsons
and Union damages of $14,000.00.' Environmental and
Trentham appeal from the holding of validity and infringement.
The Invention
The established Claus process removes about 97% of an
atmospheric pollutant (sulfur) from a gas stream. The Beavon
process of the '877 patent in suit and the accused Trencor
process remove the remaining 3% of the sulfur from the Claus
process effluent.
The sulfur in the effluent includes elemental sulfur (S),
hydrogen sulfide (H,S), sulfur dioxide (SO,), carbonyl sulfide
(COS), and carbon disulfide (CS,). The Beavon process uses
hydrogenation in catalytically converting sulfur dioxide and ele-
mental sulfur into hydrogen sulfide and simultaneously uses
hydrolysis in catalytically converting carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide into hydrogen sulfide. The resulting effluent is
then treated for removal of a single compound, hydrogen sulfide,
rather than for the removal of several compounds present before
the Beavon process is performed. The total amount of sulfur
removed by the Claus and Beavon processes is 99.5% or more.
The °877 patent contains 12 claims of which claim | is
representative:
1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content
of effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide,
carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the
steps of:
(a)(i) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source
of hydrogen to a level which is at least equa! to the
stoichiometric amount of hydrogen required to convert
the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and
water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and
‘A Trentham antitrust counterclaim was dismissed. A motion to add
was filed + hy tena and Trentham. The court, after
a ng, denied the motion.
A-3
(ii) catalytically hydrogenating at least essentially all
of the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and
water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and
(iii) simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature
from about 300 to about 800°F.,
(iv) whereby contained water and water formed in the
hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are
utilized for the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide;
(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the
dew point of water to condense water;
(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated
gas stream; and
(d) treating the cooling hydrogenated gas stream to
remove hydrogen sulfide.
Issues
Did Judge Pfaelzer err: (1) in holding the '877 patent valid;
(2) in holding that the ’877 patent is not unenforceable for fraud
on the Patent and Trademark Office (PO); or (3) in finding
that the Trencor process infringes the '877 patent?
Opinion
Judge Pfaelzer entered 104 findings of fact and 18 conclusions
of law. Environmental has failed to show that any of these
findings were clearly erroneous or that any of those conclusions
were either unsupported in the record or contrary to law.
1. Validity
The sole basis for Environmental’s attack on validity of the
"877 patent lies in its assertion that the invention would have
been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.’
*35 U.S. 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identi-
cally disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to nd epee
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a w would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
A-4
Obviousness is a conclusion of law based upon fact determina-
tions. As set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17,
148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and in Stevenson v. U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 612 F.2d 546, 549, 204 USPQ 276,
279 (CCPA 1979), those fact determinations involve (1) the
scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between
the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art, and (4) additional evidence, which may
serve as indicia of non-obviousness. As is or should be true with
every performance of the judicial process, all relevant evidence
on each dispositive issuc inust be fully considered and evaluated.
When a patent is challenged on the ground that the claimed
invention would have been obvious, all evidence relevant to the
obvious-nonobvious issue must be considered. Jn re Sernaker,
702 F.2d 989, 996, 217 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Scope and Content of the Prior Art
It is undisputed that the prior art consists of that considered
by the PTO and the eleven U.S. and foreign patents, and six
technical articles and brochures cited by Environmental at trial.
Of the art cited by the PTO, the most pertinent are U.S. Patent
2,361,825 (’825) to Doumani, an article by Doumani in /ndus-
trial and Engineering Chemistry, and Australian Patent No.
223,904 ('904) to Thumm. Of the art cited at trial, the most
pertinent are British patents 952,555 ('555) and 1,018,630
(°630), chapter 13 of the book Gas Purification by Kohl and
Riesenfeld, and an article entitled “Hydrogen Sulfide Produc-
tion from Sulfur and Hydrocarbons” by Bacon and Boe.
The Doumani references disclose the reduction of sulfur diox-
ide with hydrogen and that all sulfur dioxide will be converted to
hydrogen sulfide when the ratio of hydrogen to sulfur dioxide is
three or greater.
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.
A-5
The Thumm ‘'904 patent discloses treatment of a Claus
process effluent containing sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide,
carbonyl sulfide, carbon disulfide and water vapor to vaporize
elemental! sulfur for discharge from the reactor with the gas
stream. Thumm describes addition of steam to the effluent to
hydrolyze carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide to hydrogen
sulfide, and teaches that the hydrolysis occurs simultaneously
with the Claus reaction.
The PTO thus had before it prior art which disclosed the
hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide (Doumani);
the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide to
hydrogen sulfide (Thuinm); simultaneity of certain chemical
reactions (Thumm); and the composition of the Claus effluent
(Thumm).
The *555 patent discloses hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and a
simultaneous conversion of carbon monoxide with water to form
hydrogen and carbon dioxide.
The °630 patent discloses hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and
hydrogenation or hydrogenative decomposition of other,
unspecified impurities present in gases “obtained by partial com-
bustion of carbonaceous combustible materials”.
The Kohl and Riesenfeld book generally discloses hydrolysis
of organic sulfur compounds and the basic reactions for hydrol-
ysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide. It includes a pass-
ing reference to hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide.
The Bacon and Boe article discloses a process for commercial
production of hydrogen sulfide. At one point in the reaction, the
hydrolysis of carbon disulfide and a reaction involving methane
and sulfur proceed simultaneously.
Differences Between the Prior Art
and the Claimed Invention
The Doumani references deal with a sulfur dioxide feed
stream containing none of the other sulfur compounds found in
A-6
the Claus effluent. It provides no indication that hydrogenation
of sulfur dioxide and sulfur would or could proceed simultane-
ously with hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide.
The Thumm reference discloses simultaneous hydrolysis of
carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide, but says nothing about
hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur.
Lhe teachings of the Thumm and Doumani references provide
no indication that the specific hydrogenation and hydrolysis
reactions of the '877 patent will occur simultaneously or that
those reactions should be used in treating a Claus effluent.
The feed stream disclosed in the ‘555 patent contains neither
sulfur dioxide or sulfur. There is no suggestion in the '555 patent
that hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur would be essen-
tially complete as required by the Beavon process.
The feed stream disclosed in the '630 patent contains no sulfur
dioxide. There is no suggestion in that patent of essentially com-
plete hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide, coupled with hydrolysis of
carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide, as required by the Beavon
process.
The feed materials of the Bacon and Boe article are only
methane and sulfur. The feed materials of the Beavon process
include no methane but include sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide,
carbony! sulfide, and carbon disulfide.
Judge Pfaelzer found the prior art cited by Environmental
cumulative, adding nothing to the art cited by the PTO.
Environmental has not shown error in that finding.’
*Environmental argues that the ‘630 patent teaches simultaneous
hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide with hydrogenation of other impurities
and thus is prior art not considered by the PTO. The '630 patent,
however, does not teach simultaneous hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide
with hydrogenation of the specific impurities found in Claus
effluents or that those reactions will take place simultaneously in the
environment of a Claus reactor. Thus, the "630 patent adds nothing
More pertinent to the art cited by the PTO.
A-7
Level of Ordinary Skill
Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordi-
nary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the
inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior
art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innova-
tions are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6)
educational level of active workers in the field. Orthopedic
Equipment Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., Appeal
Nos. 83-513, 83-525 Slip op. at 13 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 1983).
Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or
more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular
case. The important consideration lies in the need to adhere to
the statute, i.e., to hold that an invention would or would not
have been obvious, as a whole, when it was made, to a person of
“ordinary skill in the art’ — not to the judge, or to a layman, or
to those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.
Judge Pfaelzer discussed various factors involved in determin-
ing ordinary skill in the art, but did not specify a particular level
applicable here. Nor need she have done so, for the parties are in
agreement that their respective chemical expert witnesses with
extensive backgrounds in sulfur chemistry are persons of ordi-
nary skill in the art.‘
Additional Evidence
Judge Pfaelzer found that the Beavon process of the °877
satisfied a long felt, but unfilled need because for the first time it
enabied governmental bodies, e.g., Los Angeles County, to adopt
more stringent regulations for controlling sulfur dioxide emis-
sions. She found that the invention achieved commercial success
because a large percentage of the Claus effluent treating plants
‘Environmental argues that Fred Riesenfeld, a Parsons employee
who made an abandoned disclosure of a similar to the
Beavon process should have been incl . That consideration,
however, would not have resulted in a level of skill in the art differ-
ent from that of the parties’ experts.
yon
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in the U.S. are based on the Beavon process. Environmental
claims the need and commercial success were artificially gener-
ated by clean air legislation and should therefore not be
considered.*
That the need was legislatively recognized in this case does
not militate against its existence. There was a long felt need to
remove as much sulfur as possible from the air we breathe.
Judge Pfaelzer found that in 1948, the Air Pollution Control
District (APCD) for Los Angeles County approved the first
regulation limiting the amount of sulfur dioxide to 2000 ppm.
Claus plants were exempt from the regulation because even
though they emitted approximately 115 tons of sulfur dioxide
into the atmosphere per day, they prevented the emission of 885
tons of sulfur dioxide per day. APCD could not tighten its regu-
lation because “known technical means of accomplishing the
desired results” were not available. Judge Pfaelzer entered
extensive findings reflecting recognition of the need and the
failed efforts of others over time to meet the need. Despite meet-
ings with the affected companies, studies of all known methods,
research reports by governments and industries (including
Trencor), no solution emerged until the Beavon process was
invented.
Environmental has not shown the findings on long felt need to
have been erroneous. Nor could it do so by mere citation of
legislative recognition. That the desire of governmental bodies to
mandate higher purity standards was frustrated by lack of tech-
nology thus dramatizes the need. This was not a situation in
which an invention lay about unneeded until legislation was
passed to create a need. That the Beavon process filled a pre-
* Whether the Beavon process achieved commercial success because
islatively impelled need not be decided in this case. Judge
aelzer did not give excessive weight to the finding. If she had, and
if that had been error, it would have been harmless in light of all the
evidence supporting her conclusion that the '877 patent is valid.
A-9
existing need and thereby freed legislatures to achieve their
long-standing goal is strong evidence of nonobviousness.
As Judge Pfaelzer noted, highly probative evidence of nonob-
viousness resides in the expressions of disbelief by the chemical
experts for both sides (Dr. Lana for Parsons; Dr. Hyne for
Environmental). Before learning of the Beavon process, and with
knowledge of earlier failed efforts, both stated unequivocally
that they believed the reduction of sulfur compounds to
hydrogen sulfide would not adequately solve the problem.‘
Expressions of disbelief by experts constitute strong evidence of
nonobviousness. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52
(1966).
Finally, Environmental points to three independent concep-
tions including the Riesenfeld disclosure, supra n.4, an asserted
1966 proposal by Trentham’s president to simultaneously
hydrogenate sulfur dioxide and hydrolyze carbonyl sulfide, and
the work of Shell Internationale which resulted in U.K. Patent
1,332,337 for a similar process. We need not discuss those con-
ceptions here, for we agree with Judge Pfaelzer that the evidence
concerning them is of insufficient probative force to establish
obviousness.’
Conclusion on Obviousness
All the pieces of the present invention were known in the art,
i.e., the equations for hydrogenation and hydrolysis of sulfur
compounds, the simultaneity of chemical reactions, and the com-
ponents of the Claus effluent. That all elements of an invention
may have been old (the normal situat: on), or some old and some
*Dr. Lana testified that he had believed conversion of sulfur com-
pounds to hydrogen sulfide was the wrong direction to go. In a tech-
nical article, Dr. nee express skepticism of replacing one toxic
component of the effluent with another toxic component.
’ The virtually simultaneous making of the same invention does not in
itself preclude patentability of that invention. Hence, the entirety of
what is known as interference practice. 35 U.S.C. § 135.
A-10
new, or all new, is however, simply irrelevant. Virtually all
inventions are combinations and virtually all are combinations of
old elements. A court must consider what the prior art as a
whole would have suggested to one skilled in the art, Jn re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, 170 USPQ 209, 212 (CCPA
1971). Judge Pfaelzer did just that. She then properly and fully
considered all the evidence of record bearing on the validity
issue, finding that the Beavon process filled a long felt need and
had been denigrated by the experts. Her conclusion thai the
invention as a whole would not have been obvious at the time it
was made to one of ordinary skill in the art was eminently
correct.
2. Fraud
A party asserting the defense of fraud bears a heavy burden of
proof which must be met by clear and convincing evidence. Ne/-
son V. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 858, 206 USPQ 881, 885 (CCPA
1980); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797, 167 USPQ 532,
546-47 (CCPA 1970); Orthopedic Equipment Co., supra, at 18.
Environmental argues that Parsons committed fraud on the .
PTO by failing to bring the Riesenfeld disclosure, supra note 4,
and page 443 from the book Gas Purification to the attention of
the PTO.
There was no duty, however, to bring to the attention of the
PTO the Riesenfeid disclosure because it was a mere “concep-
tion” and was admittedly not prior art. Parsons did submit an
affidavit by Riesenfeld setting forth Riesenfeld’s opinion that the
Beavon process would not have been obvious. That prosecution
of a patent application is ex parte, involving PTO reliance on the
candor and good faith of a patent applicant, requires that an
affidavit should be accompanied by information known to the
affiant and inconsistent with the affidavit. That Riesenfeld’s dis-
closure was not prior art and that Riesenfeld could well have
A-11
believed the process nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, notwith-
standing his disclosure, indicate that failure to report the dis-
closure did not constitute fraud. Withheld information must be
material, a condition we find here lacking. The disclosure not
being prior art, it would not have been material to the
patentability of the Beavon process.
Lastly, Parsons submitted page 444 from the book “Gas
Purification” to the PTO. It did net submit page 443 which
showed reactions for hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide. Fuilure to submit page 443 is not evidence of fraud,
however. It is undisputed that those reactions were known and
were of record before the examiner in the PTO when page 444
was submitted. Fraud cannot consist of a failure to duplicate
what is in the file wrapper.
Similarly, that Parsons represented computer examples as
“operating” examples does not evidence fraud. When a second
example was added to the application, and representations were
made to the PTO, a pilot plant was operating and producing
operating results that confirmed the computer examples. A
report of those operational results is part of the file wrapper.
Judge Pfaelzer correctly found that Environmental failed to
meet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that Parsons committed fraud on the PTO.
3. Infringement
Environmental’s Trencor process is a Claus effluent treating
process. Judge Pfaelzer found that it includes the identical steps,
i.e., hydrogenation, hydrolyzing, cooling, separating water, and
removing hydrogen sulfide, as those of the process set forth in
Claims 1-8 and 12 of the °877 patent, and that it thus falls
squarely within the literal boundaries of the claims and consti-
tutes infringement. Environmental has not shown error in the
finding that the Trencor process is the same as, operates the
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same as, and achieves the same result as the claimed process. It
thus constitutes not only literal but substantive infringement.
Environmental nevertheless seeks to avoid infringement on the
ground that claim | must be read as including an unstated lim-
itation ((c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated
gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous absorption solu-
tion) not invo'ved in the Trencor process. Environmental says
the claims must be interpreted in light of the specification and
that Parsons is estopped from asserting the claim without that
limitation because it made certain remarks to the examiner in
overcoming a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112.* Neither argu-
ment is persuasive.
The specification must be sufficiently explicit and complete to
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention, while a
claim defines only that which the patentee regards as his inven-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The claim, not the specification, measures
the invention, Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 420 (1908). Environmental’s argument that
claim 1 must include a limitation found in the specification is
thus legally unsound. Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935).
Equaliy unsound is Environmental’s argument that Parsons is
estopped from asserting the plain language of the claim by its
remarks to the examiner. Those remarks were made to overcome
a § 112 rejection, not to overcome a § 103 rejection based on
prior art. Nothing of record indicates that a failure to include
the “prior to . . . solution” phrase would have caused continua-
tion of the § 112 rejection, or that claim 1 as it stands is in any
manner vague, indefinite, or lacking in utility. Moreover, as
Judge Pfaelzer recognized, the phrase omitted from claim | is
specifically included in claim 11, indicating that claim 1 was
*Parsons’ remarks were: “Thus, it is respectfully submitted that
significant utility exists in removing water and any trace amounts of
sulfur dioxide from the gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous
absorption solution”.
A-13
allowed without the phrase for reasons other than the cited
remarks made to the examiner. Smith, supra, at 13. It is
improper for courts to read into an independent claim a limita-
tion explicitly set forth in another claim. Jm re Rousso, 106
USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1955). Judge Pfaelzer did not err in
finding infringement of claims 1-8 and 12.
Conclusion
The judgment that the claims of the "877 patent are valid’ and
claims 1-8 and 12 are literally and substantively infringed by
the Trencor process, is affirmed.
AFFIRMFD
* It is not necessary that a district court hold a patent valid. In an
appropriate case, it is necessary to hold only that the chal of a
rye validity failed to carry his burden of proving invalidity. 35
S.C. § 282. result is the same, but the latter holding more
accurately dramatizes that it, like all holdings, is based on the
record of the case at hand. The latter holding also avoids concern
that a patent held valid may be held invalid on a different record in
another case. When, however, a challenger has carried his burden of
as it would appear appropriate to hold the patent invalid, for a
~ that the burden had been carried is synonymous with
invalidity.
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DisTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. CV 76-917 MRP
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and THE RALPH M.
PARSONS COMPANY,
Defendants.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and THE RALPH M.
PARSONS COMPANY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
Ve
ENVIRONMENTAL DesiGNs. LTp. and TRENTHAM
CORPORATION,
Counterclaim Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This action was tried by the Court without a jury, and oral
argument was presented at the conclusion of the trial, followed
by the filing of post-trial briefs. The Court has also heard further
oral argument on the issue of infringement. The Court having
reviewed the facts, the law, and the arguments of the parties,
now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
B-2
A. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. On March 22, 1976, Environmental Designs, Ltd., a lim-
ited partnership (“Environmental Designs”), filed a complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877
owned by the Ralph M. Parsons Company (“Parsons’) is
invalid. Union Oil Company of California (“Union Oil”), as
licensing agent of Parsons for the process claimed by the patent,
‘ was joined with Parsons as co-defendant. On April 30, 1976,
Union Oil and Parsons, as part of their answer to the complaint,
counterclaimed for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.
2. Union Oil had, in 1974, called Patent No. 3,752,877
(referred to herein as the Beavon patent) to the attention of
Environmental Designs as a result of advertising by the latter of
a tail gas treating process called the Trencor H,S Preferential
Absorption Process (Trencor H,S Process). In early 1975, it was
announced that Trentham Corporation (“Trentham”), the sole
general partner of Environmental Designs, would construct a tail
gas treating plant utilizing the Trencor H,S process at a refinery
of Tenneco Oil Company at Chalmette, Louisiana.
3. After an exchange of correspondence, Union Oil, in a let-
ter dated November 12, 1975, offered Environmental! Designs a
paid-up license entitling it to have practiced at the Chalmette
refinery the process claimed in the Beavon patent. The offered
license was based upon a formula which would have involved
payment of an amount between $13,000 and $14,000. In
response, Environmental Designs filed this action in March
1976.
4. On or about March 17, 1978, Trentham was, by leave of
Court, joined as counterclaim defendant in the infringement
counterclaim. (Except where separately identified, Environ-
mental Designs and Trentham are referred to herein as “plain-
tiffs’ and Union Oil and Parsons are referred to as
“defendants.”) On or about April 13, 1978, Trentham, as part of
its answer to the infringement counterclaim, filed a “second
Counterclaim Against Defendants (Union Oil and Parsons) for
Violation of the Antitrust Laws”.
B-3
B.’ THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE BEAVON PATENT
5. The patent application which led to issuance of the
Beavon patent was filed in the U.S. Patent Office on August 27,
1969. The Beavon patent issued on August 14, 1973, there hav-
ing been filed, on March 19, 1971, a continuation-in-part
application.
6. The Beavon patent is directed to a process (“Beavon
process”) for treatment of the effluent gases, called tail gases,
from Claus plants to reduce the sulfur content in such gases.
These tail gases include a number of chemical compounds. The
sulfur compounds in the tail gas include hydrogen sulfide (H,S),
sulfur dioxide (SO,), elemental sulfur (S), carbonyl sulfide
(COS), and carbon disulfide (CS,). These tail gases also include
water (H,O) in the vapor state and molecular hydrogen (H,), as
well as other compounds.
7. The overall purpose of the Beavon process is to reduce the
sulfur content of Claus plant tail gas to a level low enough to be
environmentally acceptable.
8. The Claus process is itself a process for removing sulfur
compounds from gas streams. However, the practical limitations
of the Claus process only permit recovery of about 97% of sulfur
compounds. In view of the quantities of sulfur-containing gases
which are processed, this means that, dependent upon the
geographical region, large quantities of sulfur compounds would
still be discharged daily into the atmosphere if sulfur removal
were limited to the practice of the Claus process.
9. It is the 3% or more of sulfur compounds still remaining
in tail gases from Claus plants to which the Beavon process is
directed. In the Beavon process, sulfur dioxide and elemental
sulfur in the tail gas are, by hydrogenation, catalytically con- ©
verted to hydrogen sulfide; simultaneously, carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide are, by hydrolysis, catalytically converted to the
same sulfur compound, hydrogen sulfide. The gas stream in
which the above-described chemical conversions have simultane-
ously taken place is then treated to remove the sulfur which has
B-4
been converted to a single chemical form — hydrogen sulfide —
instead of being in several different chemical forms. By the prac-
tice of the Beavon process, the difficult-to-remove last few
percentages of sulfur values are prevented from entering the
atmosphere and overall sulfur removal efficiencies, i.e., the total
amount of sulfur values removed first by the Claus process and
then by the Beavon process, of 99.5% or better have been
attained.
10. Although the Beavon patent contains 12 claims, claim |
may be taken as representatively describing the process in con-
sidering the issue of patent validity. It reads:
1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content
of effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide,
carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the
steps of:
(a)(i) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source
of hydrogen to a level which is at least equal to the
stoichiometric amount of hydrogen required to convert
the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and
water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and
(ii) catalytically hydrogenating at least essentially all
of the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and
water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and
(iii) simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature
from about 300 to about 800°F.,
(iv) whereby contained water and water formed in the
hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are
utilized for the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide;
(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the
dew point of water to condense water;
(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated
gas stream; and
(d) treating the cooled hydrogenated gas stream to
remove hydrogen sulfide.
B-5
11. The Beavon process solved the complex problems inher-
ent in a multi-component chemical system — one in which
sulfur was present in several chemical forms. Beavon’s solution
was the simultaneous catalytic conversion of these several forms
to one chemical form — hydrogen sulfide. Sulfur dioxide is cat-
alytically converted by hydrogenation to hydrogen sulfide;
carbon disulfide and carbonyl sulfide are simultaneously cat-
alytically converted by hydrolysis to hydrogen sulfide. Then, by
the subsequent process steps, the offensive constituent, sulfur, is
removed by the removal of the i.vcsugen sulfide, in which the
sulfur is chemically bound.
C. THE CLAUS PROCESS
12. When emitted into the atmosphere, sulfur-containing
compounds are pollutants. This is true whether the emitted com-
pound is the relatively odorless compound, sulfur dioxide, or the
highly offensive compound, hydrogen sulfide, or some other
sulfur compound such as carbon disulfide or carbonyl sulfide.
13. Since the combustion of sulfur-containing fuels results in
emissions into the atmosphere of sulfur compounds, various
refining processes and treating processes have been developed to
remove sulfur, i.e., desulfurize, fuel oils, gasoline, and natural
gas. The removal of sulfur from the fuel, however, does not end
the potential for sulfur pollution. The latter can be avoided only
if the sulfur removed from fuels is itself disposed of in a manner
which prevents its emission into the atmosphere.
14. The Claus process is a sulfur recovery process which, as
a basic process, has been known for many years. In the Claus
process, elemental sulfur is recovered as a solid in a process
involving the basic reaction:
SO, + 2H,S > 3S + 2H,O
In words, the sulfur (S) present in the gaseous compounds,
sulfur dioxide (SO,) and hydrogen sulfide (H,S), is by the prac-
tice of this process converted to elementa! sulfur which is con-
densed and removed as a solid from the gas stream. Solid ele-
mental sulfur is a valuable commodity which is used as a
B-6
fertilizer and as a raw material in the production of industrial
chemicals.
15. The Claus process provided a means for reducing emis-
sion of sulfur-containing compounds into the atmosphere.
Sulfur-containing waste gases from refinery desulfurization
processes could be collected and further processed in Claus
sulfur recovery plants. Sulfur-containing waste gases from treat-
ing processes for “sour” (sulfur-containing) natural gas could be
similarly treated.
16. In the Claus process, the conversion of sulfur-containing
compounds to elemental sulfur is not complete. In a two-stage
Claus plant (one in which the reaction is successively conducted
in two reactors with treatment between the stages to improve
reaction conditions in the second reactor), the percentage con-
version of sulfur compounds to elemental sulfur is about 92%.
The addition of a third stage improves the overall conversion to
about 97%.
17. The tail gas exiting from a Claus plant still contains
sulfur-containing compounds including sulfur, unreacted sulfur
dioxide, unreacted hydrogen sulfide, and carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide which are formed by side reactions that take
place in the Claus reactor.
18. In the past, the tail gas from Claus plants, containing
these several sulfur compounds, was incinerated and discharged
into the atmosphere. Incineration did not reduce the amount of
sulfur discharged into the atmosphere; it simply converted all of
the sulfur compounds in the tail gas to sulfur dioxide — a com-
pound of less toxicity than other sulfur compounds. Sulfur diox-
ide was also a pollutant and its discharge into the atmosphere in
the quantities involved caused many complaints. But, prior to
1969, there was no effective control process which could reduce
in amount the sulfur content of the Claus tail gas being dis-
charged into the atmosphere.
B-7
19. The magnitude of the pollution problem that still
remained on a national scale is illustrated by the situation which
existed in Los Angeles County in 1966.
20. The first regulation in Los Angeles County limiting to
2000 ppm (0.2% by volume) the amount of sulfur dioxide which
could be emitted was issued in 1948 by the Air Pollution Control
District (“APCD”) for Los Angeles County. But that regulation
included a then necessary exclusion. The exclusion permitted so-
called scavenger plants to discharge in excess of the 2000 ppm
limit if the total sulfur dioxide emissions from the scavenger
plant and the units served by it were less than the amount which
would have been emitted without the scavenger plant in opera-
tion. The operation of Claus plants came within this exclusion.
21. The result of the regulation was that Claus plants were
installed. By 1966, nine sulfur recovery plants, i.e., Claus plants,
were operating in Los Angeles County. These plants were
preventing emissions of 885 tons of sulfur dioxide per day.
Nevertheless, even with that step forward, 115 tons of sulfur
dioxide were still being emitted into the atmosphere daily, the
major portion of which came from incineration of Claus tail
gases from Claus plants concentrated in the small heavily-popu-
lated area, i.e., the South Bay area of Los Angeles County.
D. THE EARLIER FAILURES TO RECOGNIZE THE
BEAVON SOLUTION
22. The need for a means for reducing sulfur dioxide emis-
sions beyond the level achievable by Claus process treatment and
incineration of the Claus tail gases was widely evident in Los
Angeles County and elsewhere during the 1960's.
23. In Los Angeles County, numerous complaints were
made to the APCD by the public regarding the continuing sulfur
dioxide emissions. At this time, the APCD operated under a
policy laid down by the Board of Supervisors and County Coun-
sel that required the existence of “known technical means of
accomplishing the desired results” before more stringent
standards as to emissions would be adopted. In response to the
B-8
complaints, meetings were held with the companies involved in
efforts to find a solution by which emissions could be reduced.
No such solution emerged. In that period, 1965-1969; no control
process was available which would reduce the sulfur emissions
from Claus plants.
25. Parsons, a leader in the construction of Claus plants, also
recognized the need. It recognized that, if no solution to the
problem of sulfur dioxide was found. construction of such plants
would be adversely affected. Parsons’ president in 1966
requested that the Parsons engineering staff make a concerted
effort to solve the problem. Contemporaneously, engineers at
Parsons prepared an extensive report for a company in Alberta,
Canada where large quantities of hydrogen sulfide-containing
natural gas were produced. The report described in detail the
results of a review of methods for reducing sulfur dioxide emis-
sions from Claus plants. The solution later invented by Mr.
Beavon was not even suggested in this report.
26. In January 1969 (some few months before the Beavon
invention), the National Air Pollution Control Techniques Com-
mittee issued a comprehensive report entitled “Control Tech-
niques for Sulfur Oxide Air Pollutants.” The constituency of this
committee was national in scope; its members represented a
broad cross-section of industry. This report compiled the avail-
able information in the literature, as well as information
received from committee members, industrial contributors, the
staff of the federal agencies involved, and local control agencies
across the country. It covered then-existing commercial
processes for control of SO, emissions, as well as such processes
which were in the development or research stage. In referring to
sulfurous emissions from Claus plants, only incineration was
listed in the report as the usual method of control and the recom-
mended method of control.
27. Trentham’s approach to the problem was summarized in
a Resume of Trencor Research and Development Program
which referred to the state of affairs in 1970. While the Resume
made proposals for treatment of Claus tail gas, it contained no
B-9
reference whatsoever to the reduction of all sulfur compounds to
hydrogen sulfide, the approach followed in the Beavon process.
28. There were serious obstacles to solving the problem
because multi-component chemical systems involve considerable
complexity. Where a number of chemical reactions take place
simultaneously, each may be influenced by different variables
and predictability is difficult. The Claus tail gas is a multi-com-
ponent chemical system. In addition to hydrogen sulfide and
sulfur dioxide, it contains carbonyl sulfide (COS) and carbon
disulfide (CS,), compounds which plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Hyne,
described as “proven to be the two most intractable components
of Claus tail-gas streams in desulfurization.”
29. There was also skepticism as to a process for treating
Claus tail gases which, even in part, involved conversion of the
contained sulfur compounds to hydrogen sulfide. One of
defendants’ chemical experts, Dr. Dalla Lana, made a proposal
in 1970 that all the contained sulfur compounds be converted to
sulfur dioxide because he believed that conversion to hydrogen
sulfide was the wrong direction to go. Plaintiffs’ chemical expert,
Dr. Hyne, in a technical article published before the first public
announcement of the Beavon process, expressed his own skepti-
cism in the following terms:
The main disadvantage of the direct reduction with
hydrogen is that the reduction cannot be stopped at the zero
oxidation state of sulphur — namely elemental sulphur —
and significant amounts of the SO, are reduced even further
to the —2 oxidation state, namely H,S. One is therefore in
the somewhat embarrassing position of having replaced one
toxic component of the effluent gas, namely SO,, with
another toxic material, namely H,S.
30. The three-pronged standard for factual inquiry into non-
obviousness articulated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17 (1966), requires examination of (1) the scope and content
of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art.
B-10
a) The Scope and Content of the Prior Art
31. The prior art included the reports, documents, and
knowledge detailed in Section D, supra. It included also a
number of patents and a technical article (Doumani — Indus-
trial and Engineering Chemistry, April, 1944) which were cited
by the Patent Office examiner during the prosecution of the
patent applications leading to issuance of the Beavon patent.
Further, the prior art included additional patents and publica-
tions upon which plaintiffs rely in support of their contention of
the obviousness of the subject matter of the Beavon patent.
(i) Prior Art Cited by the Patent Office
32. The most pertinent prior art cited by the Patent Office
examiner was Doumani (Patent No. 2,361,825), the con-
temporaneous Industrial and Engineering Chemistry article by
the same Doumani, and Thumm (Australian Patent No.
223,904).
33. The Doumani patent issued in 1944. It stated that “(t)he
reduction of sulphur dioxide with hydrogen has been known for
many years,” and included the statement, “With a ratio of
hydrogen to sulphur dioxide of 3 or greater, all of the sulphur
dioxide can be converted to hydrogen sulphide with but traces of
free sulphur.”
34. The Doumani patent described only a sulfur dioxide feed
stream in which there were none of the other sulfur-containing
constituents of a Claus tail gas; it made no reference to COS or
CS,. Further, there was absent from Doumani any indication
that hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur could or would
proceed simultaneously with hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide.
35. The Thumm patent described treating of a tail gas from
a Claus plant — a gas described as containing SO,, H,S, CS,,
COS, and H,O. The Claus tail gas was passed through a Claus
reactor in which sulfur had previously been deposited on the
catalyst in the reactor as a result of operating the Claus reactor
at low temperature, i.e., “a cold bed Claus.” The tail gas was at
B-11
a temperature high enough, i.e., above the dew point of sulfur, to
vaporize the deposited sulfur, and the vaporized sulfur was car-
ried out of the reactor by the gas stream.
36. Thumm also described an embodiment of his process in
which steam was added to the tail gas before it entered the
above-described reactor so that carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide were hydrolyzed over the catalyst in the reactor accord-
ing to the following reactions:
COS + H,O > CO, + H,S
CS, + H,O > CO, + 2H,S
Thumm described, therefore, the hydrolysis reactions for both
carbony] sulfide (COS) and carbon disulfide (CS,). Thumm also
stated that, within the Claus reactor, the Claus reaction between
hydrogen sulfide (H,S) and sulfur dioxide (SO,) occurred
simultaneously with the above-given hydrolysis reactions.
37. The Patent Office had before it separate pieces of prior
art which described hydrogenation of SO, (Doumani patent;
Doumani article), a Claus tail gas stream containing COS and
CS, (Thumm); the equations for hydrolysis of COS and CS,
(Thumm); and simultaneity of chemical reactions, specifically,
the Claus reaction and the hydrolysis reactions for COS and CS,
(Thumm). There was not, however, any prior art which made
obvious or even suggested catalytically hydrogenating at least
substantially all of the sulfur dioxide and sulfur to hydrogen
sulfide, and sirnultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature from about
300 to about 800F. When all of the claims in the final applica-
tion for patent had been amended to so define the invention, the
Beavon patent issued.
(ii) Prior Art Cited by Plaintiffs
38. In its Notice Under 35 U.S.C. § 252 filed before trial,
plaintiffs cited eleven foreign and U.S. patents and six technical
articles and brochures in addition to the prior art patents and
publications which had been cited by the Patent Office during
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the prosecution of the Beavon applications. In the course of trial,
plaintiffs emphasized only the following: the Doumani patent,
supra; British Patent Nos. 952,555 and 1,018,630; Chapter 13 of
the Kohl and Riesenfeld book, “Gas Purification”; and the
Bacon and Boe article “Hydrogen Sulfide Production from
Sulfur and Hydrocarbons.”
39. The additional prior art materials relied upon by plain-
tiffs add nothing to the prior art teachings which were before the
Patent Office examiner.
40. British Patent 952,555 describes hydrolysis of carbonyl
sulfide. It states, too, that the so-called shift reaction, which is
the conversion of carbon monoxide with water to form hydrogen
and carbon dioxide, does under certain conditions take place
simultaneously with the above-described carbonyl sulfide hydrol-
ysis reaction. There is, however, neither sulfur dioxide nor sulfur
in the feed stream of the '555 patent. There is no suggestion in
that patent of the essentially complete hydrogenation of those
compounds which is a requisite step in the Beavon process.
41. British Patent 1,018,630 also describes hydrolysis of
carbonyl sulfide. The patent refers to “hydrogenation or
hydrogenative decomposition of certain other impurities.” The
expert testimony as to the content of the patent itself and the
expert testimony as to the partial oxidation unit described in the
patent established that no sulfur dioxide would be present in the
feed gas stream treated in British Patent 1,018,630. There is no
Suggestion in this patent of essentially complete hydrogenation
of sulfur dioxide coupled with essentially complete hydrolysis of
carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide.
42. The Bacon and Boe article was published in 1945 and
describes a process for commercial production of hydrogen
sulfide. The feed materials were methane and sulfur. Unlike the
feed gas to the Beavon process, there was no sulfur dioxide, no
hydrogen sulfide, no carbonyl sulfide, and no carbon disulfide
present in the feed gas. At some point in the described single-
step reaction, two reactions, one involving hydrolysis cf carbon
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disulfide and the other involving the reaction of methane and
sulfur, proceeded simultaneously. However, the same article
warns that sulfur dioxide was formed in the single-step reaction.
The Beavon process converts all sulfur compounds, including
sulfur dioxide, to hydrogen sulfide.
43. The Kohl and Riesenfeld book “Gas Purification” dis-
cusses a large number of purification processes. It generally
describes hydroly.js of organic sulfur compounds; it states the
basic reactions for hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide; it describes some specific processes which involve
hydrolysis of organic sulfides. But it goes no further as a teach-
ing of the Beavon process. A passing reference to hydrogenation
of sulfur dioxide is made in a chapter entitled “Dry Oxidation
Processes”; the references to hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide are in a separate chapter entitled “Catalytic
Conversion of Gas Impurities.”
b) The Differences between the Prior Art and the Claimed
Beavon Process
44. Issued patents are entitled to a statutory presumption of
validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282. In the case of the Beavoa patent, the
most relevant prior art was before the Patent Office examiner.
The additional prior art cited by plaintiffs is merely cumulative.
It does not disclose anything which was not founa in the
Doumani patent and in the Thumm patent. Plaintiffs have failed
to rebut the presumption of validity.
45. The Doumani patent teaches the hydrogenation of sulfur
dioxide to hydrogen sulfide. It made no reference, however, to
either carbonyl! sulfide or carbon disulfide. The Thumm patent
described hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and ¢ irbon disulfide to
hydrogen sulfide. It also described that the hydrolysis reaction:
took place in a Claus reactor simultaneously with the Claus
reaction by which hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide are
reacted to form elemental sulfur. The product gas from the
Thumm process was therefore a Claus-type tail gas.
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46. While Thumm described simultaneous chemical reac-
tions, including hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide, the hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide
was totally absent. The Doumani and Thumm prior art gave no
Suggestion that simultaneous catalytic hydrogenation and
hydrolysis of contained sulfur compounds to a single form —
hydrogen sulfide — would produce the successful results
achieved by the Beavon process.
47. Although the reactions involved were separately known,
the Beavon process involves simultaneous occurrence of a
number of reactions, each of which could be influenced by differ-
ent variables. The occurrence of a chemical reaction under one
set of variables gives no assurance to whether or to what extent it
will take place under a different set of variables. The results
achieved by the Beavon process are therefore unusual and
surprising.
c) The Level of Skill
48. Factual findings on the level of ordinary skill in the per-
tinent art can be made only by an analysis of the problem solved
by the invention and the efforts of others to arrive at a satisfac-
tory solution. Photo Electronics Corporation v. England, 581
F.2d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 1978).
49. In the period 1965-1969, many were working on the
development of a process for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions.
The 1966 Parsons report directed to reduction of SO, emissions
included a summation of the Doumani patent and the Doumani
technical article and, in addition, referenced the Kohl and
Riesenfeld book. Yet, the availability of those prior art materials
did not suggest to the Parsons engineers the Bexvon solution.
Engineers s¢ Trentham studied the Doumani patent in 1966.
Yet, even in 1972, the Trentham approaches to the problem did
not contemplate the reduction of all sulfur compounds to
hydrogen sulfide, the solution found by “Ar. Beavon.
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50. Both Dr. Dalla Lana, defendants’ chemical expert, and
Dr. Hyne, plaintiffs’ chemical expert, have extensive back-
grounds in sulfur chemistry. Both of these individuals, prior to
learning of the Beavon invention, separately expressed views that
_ reduction of sulfur compounds to hydrogen sulfide was not the
way to solve the problem. The basic chemical reactions for
hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide
were known. So, too, were the basic chemical reactions for
hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide. Mr. Beavon
was the first to combine these reactions to provide a widely
accepted process for control of sulfur dioxide emissions.
51. Plaintiffs have urged that the “Riesenfeld disclosure” is
probative of the level of skill of the art. Fred Riesenfeld was a
Parsons employee who in 1960 prepared an handwritten dis-
closure in which he described hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide
and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide. He also referred to reducing
carbonyl sulfide to hydrogen sulfide with an appropriate reduc-
ing agent such as hydrogen. Mr. Riesenfeld made no reference
to carbon disulfide in his disclosure; further, he made no refer-
ence to hydrolysis reactions.
52. In 1961, Mr. Riesenfeld requested that Parsons make
some computer calculations based upon his disclosure; he also
inquired of two manufacturers as to possible catalysts. After
1961, Mr. Riesenfeld did nothing further with his disclosure. He
was again reminded of it only when, in 1969, he saw an internal
memorandum of Mr. Beavon, a co-worker of Mr. Riesenfeld, in
which the Beavon process was described.
53. Although the Riesenfeld disclosure may be considered a
“conception”, it was not an invention. The facts surrounding the
Riesenfeld disclosure establish that the subject matter of the
disclosure was abandoned. It lay buried in a drawer from 1961
to 1969, spanning a period during which Parsons was actively
seeking a solution to the problem of sulfur dioxide emissions.
54. Evidence that other persons worked under the same state
of the prior art and independently arrived at the same solution as
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that embodied in a patent claim has been held to provide
evidence of obviousness, even though the other solutions were
not prior art. Ceco Corp v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc.,
557 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1977); Servo Corporation of
America v. General Electric Company, 337 F.2d 716, 720 (4th
Cir. 1964). Evidence of “independent conception” has been
treated as a sub-test of obviousness in the same sense as com-
mercial success has been treated as a sub-test of nonobviousness.
Reeves Brothers, Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 417 F.2d 869,
872 (2nd Cir. 1969).
55. The Court has given consideration to the Riesenfeld dis-
closure in the context of a sub-test on the issue of obviousness.
The Court’s conclusion of nonobviousness is not affected by the
evidence with respect to the Riesenfeld “conception”. The
foregoing applies with equal force to Shell British Patent No.
1,332,337 upon which plaintiffs also appear to rely as an
“independent conception.”
56. In sum, the Beavon process satisfied a long felt but
unfilled need. It was one of the processes which enabled Los
Angeles County to adopt more stringent regulations for control-
ling sulfur dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. The Beavon
process has met with substantial commercial success. A large
percentage of the Claus tail gas treating plants in the United
States are based upon the Beavon process. In recognition of the
achievements of the Beavon process, various individual engineer-
ing awards have been presented to Mr. Beavon, and Parsons has
received a project award.
F. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE
57. Plaintiffs charged defendants with fraud and inequitable
conduct on the prosecution of the Beavon patent before the
Patent Office. They rely upon a number of alleged acts and
omissions as constituting the alleged fraud and inequitable con-
duct — (i) failure to submit the Riesenfeld disclosure and
certain portions of the Kohl and Riesenfeld book to the Patent
Office; (ii) failure to perform and submit to the Patent Office
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certain computer calculations while performing and submitting
to the Patent Office certain other computer calculations; (iii)
alleged misstatements as to the content of the Doumani patent;
(iv) use of computer calculations as examples in the Beavon
patent.
58. Subjective culpability is required for a finding of fraud
on the United States Patent Office. There must be some element
of wrongfulness, wilfulness or bad faith. Carpet Seaming Tape
Licensing Corporation v. Best Seam Incorporated, 616 F.2d
1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1980). The presence of this mental element
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Carpet Seam-
ing at 1139. The applicant for a patent is accorded the right to
exercise good faith judgment in deciding what matters are and
are not of sufficient relevance and materiality to require dis-
closure. Xerox Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 322 F. Supp. 963,
968-969 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
59. Plaintiffs did not establish by clear and convincing
evidence that as to any of the alleged acts and omissions, there
was any subjective culpability on the part of defendants. In fact,
the evidence established that defendants exercised good faith
judgment in a difficult area of practice which requires applica-
tion of principles of law in conjunction with an understanding of
highly technical subject matter. Further, there was no evidence
that any alleged act or omission misled the Patent Office
examiner into allowing a claim.
60. As to the Riesenfeld disclosure, plaintiffs conceded that
that disclosure was not prior art. It was advanced as probative
only of the level of skill. Under the current rules of the Patent
Office, which impose no less a standard of disclosure than the
ones which existed in 1970-1973, no duty is imposed for “dis-
closure of information concerning the level of skill for purposes
of determining obviousness.” The failure to submit the
Riesenfeld disclosure to the Patent Office does not constitute
fraud or inequitable conduct.
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61. There was neither fraud nor inequitable conduct in the
prosecution before the U.S. Patent Office of the Beavon patent.
G. THE INFRINGEMENT ISSUE
62. Defendants have counterclaimed for infringement of
nine claims (1-8 and 12) of the Beavon patent. None of the
differences between these nine claims is material to the
determination of the infringement issue. Accordingly, claim | is
the only one of these nine claims which is discussed in these
Findings.
63. The preamble of claim | of the Beavon patent, read in
light of the specification, reveals that the overall purpose of the
process of claim 1 is to reduce the sulfur content of Claus plant
tail gas to a level low enough to be environmentally acceptable.
64. The body of claim | consists of clauses (a) through (d)
that recite four steps to take to accomplish the overall purpose of
the process of claim 1. The disclosure of the Beavon patent sets
forth the principles involved in these recited steps, the functions
they perform, the way they work, and the intermediate and over-
all results they produce.
65. Read in light of the specification, claim 1 embraces a tail
gas clean-up process, the heart of which is set out in clause (a):
the simultaneous catalytic hydrogenation and hydrolysis step.
Because this step is carried out first, essentially all of the sulfur
in the gas stream that undergoes subsequent processing in the
remaining steps is in the form of hydrogen sulfide. Thus, the
remaining steps are applied to a gas stream with little or none of
the intractable sulfur compounds carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide, and with little or none of the sulfur compound sulfur
dioxide which is a reactant in the formation of corrosive poly-
thionic acids. The gas stream that emerges from the catalytic
reaction zone is not amenable to immediate treatment to remove
hydrogen sulfide. The reaction zone is maintained at tempera-
tures in the range from about 300° to 800°F, and accordingly
the emerging gas stream is hot. Further, the gas stream at that
point contains a substantial amount of water in vapor phase. A
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principle of the Beavon invention pointed out in claim | is to cool
the gas stream to cause water to change from vapor phase to
liquid phase and separate liquid water before treating the cooled
gas stream to remove hydrogen sulfide.
66. The disclosure makes it clear that the Beavon invention
can be carried out not solely by following the practice described
as “preferred” but alternativeiy by following practices that are
convenient alternatives and substantively the same.
67. Other patent documents including the prior art and the
file history of the Beavon patent explain the scope of the inven-
tion set forth in claim 1. These documents reveal the intentions
that both Mr. Beavon and the Patent Office examiner
manifested with respect to claim |.
68. What became patent claim | was presented to the Patent
Office examiner as claim 22 of Mr. Beavon’s CIP application; its
language resulted from an interview. The file history contains
the following record of what was agreed to during that interview:
Claim 22 requires, as was agreed to be one clear point of
distinction, namely that hydrogenation and hydrolysis occur
simultaneously in one catalytic reaction zone, at the
temperatures specified, in combination with the steps of
cooling the gas stream to at least the dew point of water to
condense water and separating condensed water from the
hydrogenated stream and finally treating the hydrogenated
stream to remove hydrogen sulfide. (PX 3, p. 93; emphasis
added.)
69. On the same page of the file history, it is noted that other
claims, which include the claim that became patent claim 11, set
forth the manner in which hydrogen sulfide is removed from the
gas stream. Patent claim 11 specifies that “formed water and
water present in the hydrogenated gas stream are condensed
prior to contact with the absorption solution.”
70. The defendants’ counterclaim for infringement is
directed to a process plaintiffs call “The Trencor H,S Preferen-
tial Absorption Process (“Trencor H,S process”).
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71. The Trencor H,S process is a tail gas treating process. It
has been practiced in a tail gas treating plant built by Trentham
for Tenneco Oil Company (““Tenneco”) at Tenneco’s refinery in
Chalmette, Louisiana. Environmental granted Tenneco a license
to use technical information relating to this process. Both
Trentham and Environmental induced Tenneco to use the
Trencor H.S process.
72. Tenneco has a Claus plant at its Chalmette refinery. The
effluent gas stream from that Claus plant contains water, sulfur,
sulfur dioxide, carbonyl sulfide, and carbon disulfide. The pur-
pose for using the Trencor H,S process at the Chalmette
refinery is to reduce the sulfur content of that effluent gas stream
to yield a treated gas stream. When the treated gas stream is
vented to the atmosphere, its sulfur content is low enough to be
environmentally acceptable. The overall purpose of the Trencor
H,S process is identical to the overall purpose of the Beavon
invention as recited in the preamble of claim 1 of the Beavon
patent.
73. The Trencor H,S process comprises four steps. These
steps are: first, a hydrogenation step; second, a cuoling step;
third, a water separating step; and fourth, a hydrogen sulfide
removing step.
74. Asa result of the hydrogenation step, essentially all of
the sulfur content of the gas stream undergoing treatment is in
the form of hydrogen sulfide. To carry out this first step,
hydrogen is added to the effluent gas stream exiting the Claus
plant. The resulting hydrogen-enriched gas stream enters a cat-
alytic reactor in which the temperature is in the range from
about 300°F to 800°F. In the reactor, simultaneous reactions
occur. Elemental sulfur and sulfur dioxide each enter into a
hydrogenation reaction with hydrogen to produce hydrogen
sulfide and water. Simultaneously, carbonyl sulfide and carbon
disulfide each enter into a hydrolysis reaction with water to
produce hydrogen sulfide. The gas stream emerging from the
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reactor is called the hydrogenated gas stream. The water it con-
tains is in vapor form because the hydrogenated gas stream
temperature exceeds the dew point of water.
75. The recitations of clause (a) of claim | of the Beavon
patent apply literally and substantively to the above-described
hydrogenation step of the Trencor H,S process.
76. The purpose and effect of the cooling step of the Trencor
H,S process is to cool the hydrogenated gas stream to a tempera-
ture low enough to cause the water to change phase from a vapor
to a liquid. This temperature is below the dew point of water.
Comparing this to the corresponding step of the Beavon inven-
tion as set out in clause (b) of claim 1, the purpose and effect of
the two corresponding steps are identical.
77. At trial, two words were used to describe the physical
way in which water undergoes a change of phase from vapor to
liquid. One was “condensation”; the other was “absorption.”
78. At trial, plaintiffs’ expert testified that the word “absorp-
tion,” not the word “condensation,” describes the way the water
changes phase in the Trencor H,S process. Mr. Beavon testified,
“any chemical engineer that I know of in ordinary practice
would consider it condensation.” In short, the trial testimony ‘is
in conflict whether the word “condensation” literally applies to
the change of phase water undergoes in the Trencor H,S process.
Irrespective of which of the two words literally applies, findings
are required on the issue of whether the clauses of claim | sub-
stantively apply to the corresponding steps of the Trencor H,S
process. Findings Nos. 79-91 are directed to that issue.
79. In the Trencor H,S process, the cooling step is carried
out in two stages. The first-stage cooling occurs in a waste heat
boiler that is located between the reactor and a booster blower.
The waste heat boiler is a heat exchanger in which the
hydrogenated gas stream flows adjycent to, but not in direct
contact with, another stream. As a result, the hydrogenated gas
stream is somewhat cooled, and steam is generated. Having been
somewhat cooled in the waste heat boiler, the hydrogenated gas
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stream is pushed by the booster blower into equipment called an
“absorber,” where it comes into direct contact with a liquid and
undergoes the second-stage cooling.
80. In the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent,
the cooling step is likewise carried out in two stages. The first-
Stage cooling occurs in a tail gas cooler. The tail gas cooler is
identical in all respects to the waste heat boiler used in the
Trencor H,S process. Both perform the identical heat exchang-
ing function by having the hydrogenated gas stream flow
adjacent to, but not in contact with, another stream that receives
heat to generate steam. Having been somewhat cooled in the tail
gas cooler, the hydrogenated gas stream enters a contact con-
denser. In the contact condenser, the hydrogenated gas stream
comes into direct contact with a liquid and undergoes the
second-stage cooling.
81. The process steps in the Trencor H,S process and that in
the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent are identi-
cal. They have the same overall purpose and effect. Further-
more, the cooling step of the Trencor H,S process, like the cool-
ing step disclosed in the Beavon patent, involves a first-stage
cooling with a heat exchanging relationship rather than a direct
contacting of the hydrogenated gas stream with a liquid, and
then second-stage cooling with the hydrogenated gas stream
directly contacting a liquid. However, the composition of the
liquid used in the absorber to effect the second-stage cooling in
the Trencor H,S process is not identical to the fiature of the
liquid used in the contact condenser to effect the second-stage
cooling disclosed in the Beavon patent.
82. The absorber in the Trencor H,S process is a tower that
includes two zones, viz, a quenching zone in the lower part of the
tower and an absorbing zone in the upper part.
83. The somewhat cooled hydrogenated gas stream enters
the tower at its bottom and flows upwardly. During its upward
flow, the gas stream is subjected to these steps: the completion of
the cooling step; the water separating step; and the hydrogen
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sulfide removing step. The completion of the cooling step and the
water separating step occur in the quenching zone. The
hydrogen sulfide removing step occurs in the absorbing zone.
84. These steps occur because the gas stream flows through
a downwardly flowing liquid containing an amine, viz, methyl
diethanolamine (“MDEA”). At the top of the tower, where the
MDEA solution enters the tower, the MDEA solution is lean.
That is, its capacity to absorb hydrogen sulfide is at its
maximum.
85. While the MDEA solution flows down through the
absorbing zone, it removes hydrogen sulfide from the gas stream
it contacts. As it progressively absorbs hydrogen sulfide, its
Capacity to further absorb hydrogen sulfide progressively
decreases. By the time it leaves the absorbing zone, the MDEA
solution has become loaded with absorbed hydrogen sulfide.
86. The loaded MDEA solution flows into the quenching
zone and merges with a recirculating MDEA solution. This
MDEA solution recirculates at a high volumetric flow rate to
remove heat from and cool the gas stream it contacts to beiow
the dew point of water. As a result, water vapor in the gas
stream changes phase to liquid water, separates from the gas
stream, and enters the recirculating MDEA solution. The loaded
MDEA solution that emerges from the bottom carries with it not
only the amount of water that entered the absorber as part of the
lean MDEA solution, but also the amount of water that
separated from the cooled hydrogenated gas stream. The above-
described cooling and water separating steps are performed by
using a liquid (loaded MDEA) that is heated by the gas stream
it cools. Consequently, it does not treat the gas stream to remove
hydrogen sulfide. Rather, desorption occurs resulting in addition
of hydrogen sulfide to the gas stream.
87. After the hydrogenated gas stream has been subjected
both to the second-stage cooling that completes the cooling step
and to the water separating step, it is then subjected to the
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hydrogen sulfide removing step. The MDEA solution in the
absorbing zone is used to carry out this removing step.
88. The recitations of clause (d) of claim | of the Beavon
patent apply literally and substantively to the above-described
hydrogen sulfide removing step of the Trencor H,S process. The
use of the treating MDEA solution to remove the hydrogen
sulfide is in accordance with the principles taught in the Beavon
patent as indicated by the statement therein (column 4, lines 73-
75) that an amine absorption system is a “convenient alterna-
tive.” The sequence of performing the hydrogen sulfide removing
step after the water separating step is also in accordance with
the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent. Because
the water separating step occurs in the quenching zone before
the hydrogenated gas stream has risen into the absorbing zone,
there is no dilution of the treating MDEA solution that performs
the function of removing hydrogen sulfide.
89. The liquid which is diluted as a result of the cooling and
water separating steps in the Trencor H,S process is the loaded
MDEA solution in the quenching zone. The corresponding liquid
disclosed in the Beavon patent is a condensate circulating
through the contact condenser. This condensate is used to
perform the functions of liquefying and separating water from
the hydrogenated gas stream before the function of treating to
remove hydrogen sulfide is performed. An advantage of doing
this is set out in the Beavon patent at column 5, lines 12-13, as
follows, “dilution of a treating absorption solution or like due to
the presence of condensable water is precluded.” The same
advantage inheres in using the loaded MDEA solution to
perform the same functions. The loaded MDEA solution is not a
treating absorption solution. Only the MDEA solution in the
absorbing zone is a treating absorption solution.
90. In the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent,
the condensate includes a neutralizer to provide a safeguard
against the possibility of an undesired happening upsteam in
which some sulfur dioxide remains in the hydrogenated gas
stream. One of plaintiffs’ engineering documents describes soda
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ash injection points. One point of injection is into the quenching
zone. The injection of soda ash provides the same safeguard in
the Trencor H,S process that the neutralizer provides in the
preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent.
91. The condensate and the loaded MDEA solution are both
liquid, although not identical in composition. Both perform the
same functions of liquefying and separating water from the
hydrogenated gas stream before the function of treating to
remove hydrogen sulfide is preformed. The MDEA solution,
when jean, has a quality the condensate lacks, i.e., the ability to
absorb a substantial amount of hydrogen sulfide. That difference
in quality between the condensate and the lean MDEA solution
does not exist between the condensate and the loaded MDEA
solution. This is so because the loaded MDEA solution has been
formed by combining the lean MDEA solution with the removed
hydrogen sulfide.
92. In the way these two ingredients are used in the respec-
tive equipment, i.¢., the contact condenser and the quenching
zone, the loaded MDEA is a substitute for the condensate. The
two are interchangeable. Exhibits CL and EV show that
Trentham offered to build plants to carry out this process in
which a contact condenser would be used. In short, the conden-
sate and the loaded MDEA are equivalents as used in this
process. Likewise, the quenching zone and the absorbing zone in
the single absorbing tower are the equivalent of the two units, a
contact condenser and an absorption system, that are disclosed
in the Beavon patent.
93. The recitations of clauses (b) and (c) of claim 1 the |
Beavon patent apply substantively to the cooling and water
separating steps of the Trencor H,S process. The overall purpose
of the Trencor H,S process is identical to the overall purpose of
the Beavon invention as recited'in the preamble of claim 1. The
recitations of clauses (a) and (d) of claim | apply literally and
substantively to the hydrogenation and hydrogen sulfide remov-
ing steps, respectively, of the Trencor H,S process. Thus, every
clause of claim | applies substantively to a corresponding step of
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the Trencor H,S process. As a whole, the patented process and
the Trencor H,S process involve the same principles; they use
the same steps; they perform these steps in the same sequential
order; and they produce the same result.
94. In resolving the literal infringement issue, the Ceurt con-
sidered the question of whether the word “condensation” applies
to the change of phase the water undergoes in the quenching
zone in the Trencor H,S process. In Exhivit AL, a document in
which plaintiffs described the construction and operation of the
quenching zone, they said, “In quenching the hot gas a consider-
able amount of water will be condensed.” In an answer given in
an interrogatory (No. 22) during discovery, plaintiffs affirmed
“condensed water [will] be removed from the gas stream.” Mr.
Trentham gave deposition testimony in which he testified,
“Well, water is first stripped from the solution at the inlet to the
quench tower and then condensation occurs.” A vice president of
Trentham who serves as a process and project manager, viz, Mr.
Baumann, likewise testified that condensation occurs in the
quench tower. Plaintiffs’ contention that the word “condensa-
tion” does not apply rests solely on the trial testimony of their
expert who understands the phrase “condensed water” to be lim-
ited to liquid phase consisting of water and only water. The
meaning of the word “condensation” conveyed by the Beavon
patent is not so limited. Instead, it applies to liquid phase water
in a condensate that includes small amounts of hydrogen sulfide
and other chemicals. Mr. Beavon testified that any chemical
engineer would consider the way the water changes phase in the
Trencor H,S process to be condensation. The Court finds that
the preponderance of the evidence is persuasive that the word
“condensation” applies. Thus, clauses (b) and (c) of claim |
apply literally, as well as substantively, to the cooling and water
separating steps of the Trencor H,S process.
H. THE ANTITRUST COUNTERCLAIM
95. Approximately two years after Environmental initiated
this litigation, Trentham filed a pleading containing allegations
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that are collectively referred to herein as the “antitrust counter-
claim.” Under the theory advanced by Trentham, it was
required to prove that the patent was fraudulently procured (a
so-called “ Walker Process claim’ under Walker Process Equip.
Vv. Food Mach. Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 [1965]) or
known by the defendants to be invalid.
96. A clear and convincing standard of proof applies to a
Walker Process claim. Cataphote Corporation v. De Soto
Chemical Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1971).
97. The same standard of proof applies to a claim based on
bad faith infringement suits. Hangards, Inc. v. Ethicon, 601
F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979), .ets forth this rule and notes, “a
patentee’s infringement suit is presumptively in good faith and
that this presumption can be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing evidence.”
98. Trentham filed to establish either that the Beavon patent
was fraudulently procured or that defendants knew or should
have known the patent wes invalid. This failure of proof is a
sufficient basis for dismissing Trentham’s antitrust counterclaim.
99. Further, with respect to the alleged violation of Section |
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Trentham failed to show the
existence of any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade. The evidence at trial revealed only a lawful business
arrangement under which defendant Union acts as the principal
licensing agent for negotiating licenses authorizing use of the
Beavon process, and under which the defendants share royalties
received from licenses.
100. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, prohibits
monopolization, and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.
When Section 2 is applied to allegations of the type Trentham
has made, the claims of an illegal patent “in and of themselves,
must provide the monopoly power proscribed by Section 2...”
Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Curtis Laboratories, 597 F.2d
1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1979). As to Trentham’s allegations of
attempt and conspiracy to monopolize, Trentham had the
B-28
burden to establish “(1) specific intent to control prices or
destroy competition which respect to a part of commerce; (2)
predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing
the unlawful purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability of suc-
cess." Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing v. Best Seam
Incorporated, 616 F.2d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 1980).
101. Trentham failed to show that defendants, individually
or jointly, had a specific intent to control prices or destroy com-
petition. In licensing of the Beavon process, defendants have fol-
lowed a basic approach of offering nonexclusive licenses to inter-
ested parties under terms that are nondiscriminatory. The
reasonableness of the license fee belies any intent to control
prices and is further confirmation of what was separately estab-
lished by other evidence, namely, the claims of the Beavon
patent do not place in defendants the power to control prices of,
or exclude competition from, Claus plant tail gas treating
processes. The Beavon process has competed and continues to
compete in the marketplace with alternative processes.
102. An antitrust injury is an injury that “flows” from an
antitrust violation. “To ‘flow’ from the wrong, ... the loss must
be ‘the type of loss that the claimed violations would be likely to
cause.” Handgards, supra, at 997. Trentham failed to prove it
sustained any such antitrust injury. Trentham offered only its
expenses in this litigation as its proof of damages. The litigation,
however, was initiated by Environmental (in which Trentham is
the sole general partner) and that action was taken at a time
when no decision had been made by defendants regarding litiga-
tion against either Environmental or Trentham. Trentham’s
assertions of claimed “injury,” ¢.g., that the litigation was
required to protect an investment in development work, were not
supported by evidence establishing either that the “injury” had
occurred or a connection between the claimed “injury” and the
existence of the Beavon patent.
B-29
I. DAMAGES FOR INFRINGEMENT
103. Defendants had an established royalty rate for the
granting of non-exclusive licenses under the Beavon patent to
interested parties. The royalty rate was calculated on a formula
which, when applied to the facts of this case, works out to
$14,000. A license at that rate was in fact offered to plaintiff by
defendants.
104. Any Conclusion of Law deemed to be a Finding of Fact
is hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Any Finding of Fact deemed to be a Conclusion of Law is
incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
2. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28
U.S.C. § 1338.
3. Parsons is the owner of the entire right, title, and interest
in and to the Beavon patent and has the right to maintain a
counterclaim for infringement.
4. Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, the Beavon patent is entitled to a
presumption of validity. The additional prior art that has been
cited by plaintiffs does not weaken or destroy the presumption of
validity. It is merely cumulative to prior art cited to the U.S.
Patent Office. Sante Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P & Z Company, Inc.,
569 F.2d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978).
5. The subject matter of the Beavon patent was nonobvious
and meets ali the conditions for patentability under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
6. During the prosecution of the Beavon applications which
led to issuance by the U.S. Patent Office of the Beavon patent,
there was neither fraud nor inequitable conduct which adversely
affects the validity or enforceability of the Beavon patent.
7. The Beavon patent is valid and enforceable.
8. Any person who actively induces direct infringement of a
patent is liable as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). It is an act of
B-30
direct infringement to use a patented invention within the
United States during the patent term, without the patentee’s
consent, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The “patented invention” is defined
by the claim or claims of the patent.
9. There are two main steps in the analysis of whether a
claim has been infringed. The first involves an examination of
the relationship between the claim and the teachings which the
patentee has addressed to those skilled in the art. In this
examination, the claim language is construed in light of relevant
patent documents to determine the scope of the invention the
patentee has pointed out in the claims. The second involves an
examination of the relationship between the claimed invention
and the product or process that stands accused of infringement.
If that product or process is within the scope of the claimed
invention, infringement exists; otherwise it does not.
10. A finding that the claim applies both literally and sub-
Stantively to the accused product process necessitates a
determination that the claim has been infringed. Graver Tank
Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-609 (1950).
Alternatively, a finding that the claim applies substantively,
although not literally, to the accused product or process requires
a determination that the claim has been infringed, so long as
there is no file wrapper estoppel that precludes such a
determination of infringement. Union Oil Co. of California v.
American Bitumuls Co., 109 F.2d 140, 144-146 (9th Cir. 1940).
11. The parties have advanced contrary contentions as to
what claim | means, particularly with respect to two matters.
One matter concerns the word “condensation” and its cognates
which appear in the claim; the other matter concerns the phrase
“prior to contact” which does not appear in the claim.
12. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the
word “condensation” literally applies to the change of phase
water undergoes in the Trencor H,S process within the quench-
ing zone. Furthermore, the purpose and effect of liquefying
water in the Trencor H,S process are identical to the purpose
B-31
and effect of liquefying water in accordance with claim |. Sub-
stantially the same means is used for the identical purpose to
bring about the identical effect.
13. The phrase “prior to contact” appears in a dependent
claim, viz, claim 11, not included within the counterclaim for
infringement. The expression of this limitation in the dependent
claim but not in the independent claim supports the conclusion
that the independent claim has a broader scope.
14. Reading claim | more broadly than dependent claim 11
does not enlarge the scope of the patent beyond the actual inven-
tion Mr. Beavon taught therein. The actual invention embraces
convenient alternatives that are substantively the same; it is not
limited to the preferred practice disclosed in the specification. In
that preferred practice, the cooling and water separating steps
occur in a contact condenser by contacting the gas stream with a
cooling liquid identified as a condensate. No absorption solution,
lean or loaded, is part of that condensate. However, the actual
invention is not limited to using a cooling liquid that does not
include an absorption solution. To the contrary, the use of
loaded MDEA solution for the same purpose and to the same
effect, viz, cooling the gas stream and separating liquefied water
before treating to remove hydrogen sulfide, is within the scope of
the actual invention. Likewise, replacing the contact condenser
and absorption system with an absorption tower having two
functionally separate zones for sequentially quenching and then
absorbing is within the scope of the actual invention. No Joint
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Hanson, 344 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1965).
15. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel does not prevent a
determination that the Trencor H,S process is within the scope
of claim 1. The gravamen of that doctrine “is that an applicant
who acquiesces in the rejection of his claim, and accordingly
modifies it to secure its allowance, will not subsequently be
allowed to expand his claim by interpretation to include the
principles originally rejected or their equivalents.” /nternational
Manufacturing Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.
1964).
B-32
16. Neither claim 1 nor any of the independent claims
presented to the examiner was ever modified to express the
phrase “prior to contact.” None of these claims was ever modi-
fied to include that phrase by necessary implication. The extent
of the necessary implication of the relevant modifications, which
involved the cooling and water separating steps, was that the
claim required the water separating step to precede the final step
of treating to remove hydrogen sulfide. The Trencor H,S process
requires that. The determination that claim | embraces the
Trencor H,S process does not expand the claim to include any
principles originally rejected or their equivalents.
17. Further, the modifications to the cooling and water
separating steps did not secure the allowance of any claim.
Instead, the application was allowed as a result of the redefini-
tion of the first step of the claim to require simultaneous cat-
alytic hydrogenation and hydrolysis. The Trencor H,S process
requires that. In summary, the Trencor H,S process in every
substantive respect comes within the scope of claim 1. The prac-
tice of the Trencor H,S Process infringes the Beavon patent.
18. The defendants’ and counterclaim plaintiffs’ established
royalty rate is the proper measure of damages to be awarded to
them on account of counterclaim defendants’ infringement of
the Beavon patent. United States National Bank v. Fabri-Valve
Company, 235 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1956).
DATED: August 18, 1982
/s/ MARIANA R. PFAELZER
Mariana R. Pfaelzer
United States District
Judge
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. CV 76-917 MRP
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and
THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,
Defendants.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and
THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
Vi
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS. 'TD. and
TRENTHAM CORPORATION,
Counterclaim Defendants.
This action having come on for trial before the Honorable
Mariana R. Pfaelzer, United States District Judge presiding, the
issues having been duly tried and Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law having been entered,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED,
1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in
this action are adopted for the purposes of, and are hereby made
a part of, this Final Judgment, and the permanent injunction
herein granted is issued on the basis of said Findings and
Conclusions.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter hereof
and the parties hereto.
3. The claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877 are valid and
enforceable.
C-2
4. Counterclaim defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd.
and Trentham Corporation have each infringed, and have each
actively induced infringement of, claims 1 through 8 and 12 of
U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.
5. Plaintiff (and counterclaim defendant) Environmental
Designs, Ltd.’s complaint for declaration of invalidity and non-
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877 is dismissed.
6. The separate counterclaim of Trentham Corporation for
alleged antitrust violations is dismissed.
7. Counterclaim defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd.
and Trentham Corporation, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and those persons, companies, or corporations in
active concert or in participation with either of them, and each
of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from infringing the
claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.
8. Defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs The Ralph M.
Parsons Company and Union Oil Company of California are,
based upon their proofs of an established royalty as the fee for a
non-exclusive paid-up license, jointly awarded damages in the
amount of $14,000 for the infringing acts of counterclaim
defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd. and Trentham
Corporation, said counterclaim defendants to be jointly and
severally liable for said damages.
9. Defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs The Ralph M.
Parsons Company and Union Oil Company of California are
jointly awarded their costs in this action, Environmental
Designs, Ltd. and Trentham Corporation to be jointly and sever-
ally liable for said costs.
DATED: August 18, 1982
/s/ MARIANA R. PFAELZER
Mariana R. Pfaelzer
United States District Judge
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 83-554
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD., AND THE TRENTHAM CorP.,
Appellants,
V.
UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND RALPH M.
Parsons, Co.,
Appellees.
ORDER
A petition for rehearing having been filed in this case,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is Ordered by the
court that the petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby,
Denied.
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ GeorGeE E. HUTCHINSON
CLERK
September 21, 1983
Date
ce: Andrew J. Belansky
B. R. Pravel
E-|
7
-
APPENDIX E-
3,752,877
D. K BEAVYON
Aug. 14, 1973
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E-2
APPENDIX E-2
EXCERPT FROM U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877
Col. 5, Lines 6-16
The step of cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least
the dew point of water and removing the water condensed is
important to hydrogen sulfide extraction. First of all, the gas
stream may be reduced to a temperature desirable for extraction
of absorption of formed hydrogen sulfide. Since the cooled
stream will be in some equilibrium with its contained water,
dilution of a treating absorption solution or like due to the
presence of condensable water is precluded. In addition, any
trace amounts of sulfur dioxide which would react with and con-
sume valuable treating chemicals is eliminated.
E-3
APPENDIX E-3
CLAIM | OF U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877
1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content of
effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide, carbonyl
sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the steps of:
(a) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source of
hydrogen to a level which is at least equal to the stoichi-
ometric amount of hydrogen required ‘o convert the con-
tained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and water and
sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and catalytically hydrogenating
at least essentially all of the contained sulfur dioxide to
hydrogen sulfide and water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide
and simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and
carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature
from about 300 to about 800°F., whereby contained
water and water formed in the hydrogenation of sulfur
dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are utilized for the hydrolysis
of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide;
(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the dew
point of water to condense water;
(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated gas
stream; and
(d) treating the cooled hydrogenated gas stream to remove
hydrogen sulfide.
E-4
APPENDIX E-4
CLAIM 11 OF U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877
11. A process as claimed in claim 8 in which the formed
water and water present in the hydrogenated effluent gas stream
are condensed prior to contact with the absorption solution.
i. stl tm
F-1
APPENDIX F
EXERPT FROM FILE HISTORY
Page 40
Claims 1-5 and 8-13 are rejected as not complying with the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112. Reference claim | it is not
apparent how a stream of sulfur dioxide may be mixed with 70%
of the stoichiometric requirement of hydrogen and essentially all
of the sulfur oxide be converted to hydrogen sulfide. These lim-
itations would appear (disclosure p. 3, lines 10-20) to be
alternate procedures. Reference claim 9 it is not apparent how
simple addition of carbon monoxide to sulfur dioxide will result
in formation of hydrogen. Reference claims 11 and | 2 it is not
apparent what utility exists in removing the water from the gas
stream prior to contact with an aqueous solution.
G-1
APPENDIX G
EXERPT FROM FILE HISTORY
Page 46 (Paragraphs 2 & 3)
As to claims 11 and 12, it should be evident from the dis-
closure that the presence of water in the gas stream would dilute
an aqueous absorption solution. Removing condensed water is
now required by claims | and 14. This, as has well been pointed
out, occurs under conditions where there is essentially no sulfur
dioxide present to form corrosive polythionic acids. This permits
the gas stream to be introduced to an aqueous absorption solu-
tion free of water of condensation and free of corrosive com
pounds. In addition, the absorption solution will not be diluted
by water of condensation nor consumed by chemical reaction
with sulfur dioxide. Any trace amounts of sulfur dioxide which
eluded hydrogenation is removed in solution with condensed
water and easily controlled by the addition of alkali to the con-
densed water. (See page 6, line 29 et sec.)
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that significant utility exists
in removing water and any trace amounts of sulfur dioxide from
the gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous absorption
solution.
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