Petition — Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1983

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND

THE TRENTHAM CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

¥.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND

THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

B. R. PRAVEL

PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,

KIRK & KIMBALL

1177 West Loop South

Suite 1010

Houston, Texas 77027

(713) 850-0909

Attorney for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JOHN R. Kirk

CHARLES M. Cox

PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,

KIRK & KIMBALL

1177 West Loop South

Suite 1010

Houston, Texas 77027

(713) 850-0909

October 26, 1983

a C8 ——™

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Where Petitioner’s process falls within the literal words of

the claims but, based on the patentee’s interpretation of certain

words of the claims in the proceedings before the Patent Office,

Petitioner’s process is performed in a “substantially different

way” from that of the patent, was the Court of Appeals correct

in ignoring this Court’s decision in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.

Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)?

2. Where a patentee placed a limitation on certain words of

a patent claim during the proceedings in the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office, should such limitation be ignored in

determining infringement because another claim has explicitly

recited such limitation?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .....

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Reasons for Granting the Writ....................

1. Even Though The Supreme Court Doctrine Of

Equivalents In Reverse In Graver Was Squarely

Raised By Petitioners, The CAFC Did Not Even

Mention It — By Its Silence, The CAFC Decided

This Case In Conflict With The Supreme Court's

Decision In Graver. This Court Should Review

This (Case Under Rule 17.1(c).................

2. The CAFC’s Reliance On The Differences In

Claims Is Contrary To The Ninth Circuit

Decision In Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts

Research Labs, Inc., 301 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.

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Appendix A — Court of Appeals Opinion.......

Appendix B — District Court’s Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law........

Appendix C — District Court Judgment ........

Appendix D — Order Denying Petition for

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Appendix E-1 Drawing from Patent in Suit .....

Appendix E-2 Excerpt from U.S. Patent No.

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Appendix E-3 Claim | of U.S. Patent No.

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Appendix E-4 Claim 11 of U.S. Patent No.

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Appendix F Excerpt from File History .........

Appendix G Excerpt from File History .........

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

PAGE

CS&M, Inc. v. Covington Brothers Technologies, 672

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Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.

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Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760

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Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1983

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND

THE TRENTHAM CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and

THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Petitioners respectfully pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) entered in the above-

entitled case on July 25, 1983.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the CAFC rendered July 25, 1983 is reported

at 713 F.24 693 (C.A.F.C. 1983) [Appendix A hereto (cited

herein as Pet. App. A-1)]. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-

trict of California entered August 18, 1982 are not reported

[Appendix B hereto (cited herein as Pet. App. B-1)]. The Judg-

ment of the United States District Court for the Central District

of California entered August 18, 1982 is Appendix C hereto

(cited herein as Pet. App. C-1).

JURISDICTION

After the judgment of the CAFC was entered, a petition for

rehearing was timely filed on August 6, 1983. The petition for

rehearing was denied by an Order dated September 21, 1983

[Appendix D hereto (Pet. App. D-1)]. The jurisdiction of this

Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves Title 35, U.S.C. §271(a) which reads as

follows:

“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without

authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within

the United States during the term of a patent therefor,

infringes the patent.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The federal jurisdiction of the United States District Court

was invoked by Petitioners under Title 28 U.S.C. §1338. The

action was initiated by Petitioners as a declaratory judgment

action under Title 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.

The patent in suit is United States Patent No. 3,752,877

(Beavon) [Appendix E hereto includes the drawing (Pet. App.

E-1) an excerpt from the specification (Pet. App. E-2) and

claims | and 11 of the Beavon patent (Pet. App. E-3 and E-4)].

During the proceedings in the United States Patent and

Trademark Office before the patent examiner, the language

appearing as element (c) of claim | of the Beavon patent (Pet.

App. E-3) was added by the applicant’ and was continued until

the final grant of the patent. The language of element (c) of

claim | is as follows:

"The word “gas” was not initially in the phrase, but that is not an

issue.

3

“(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated

gas stream”.

That language was added as a result of a rejection by the

patent examiner because the applicant had not met the require-

ments of 35 U.S.C. §112. In making that rejection, the examiner

stated as follows [Appendix F hereto (Pet. App. F)]:

“Reference claims |1 and 12 it is not apparent what utility

exists in removing the water from the gas stream prior to

contact with an aqueous solution.” (Emphasis added.)

In response to that rejection, the applicant amended claims |

and 14 by adding the language which now appears as element

(c) in claim | of the patent as quoted above, and the applicant's

attorney presented the following argument and explanation to

the patent examiner [Appendix G hereto (Pet. App. G)]:

“As to claims 11 and 12, it should be evident from the

disclosure that the presence of water in the gas stream

would dilute an aqueous absorption solution. Removing con-

densed water is now required by claims 1 and 14. . . . In

addition, the absorption solution will not be diluted by

water of condensation nor consumed by chemical reaction

with sulfur dioxide. . . .

Thus, it is respectfully submitted that significant utility

exists in removing water and any trace amounts of sulfur

dioxide from the gas stream prior to contact with an aque-

ous absorption solution.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the patentee’s attorney expressly interpreied the

language “separating condensed water from the hydrogenated

stream” to require removal of the water “prior to contact with

an aqueous absorption solution” although such words were not

spelled out in the claim itself. The patent examiner never again

raised that issue after the patentee’s amendment to the claim

accompanied by his interpretation. Throughout the rest of the

proceedings, that interpretation was never changed.

Not only was that interpretation placed on the claim

language, but the specification itself was amended by the filing

4

of a continuation-in-part application in which the patentee again

emphasized that it was “important” to remove the water prior to

contact with the absorption solution to (1) prevent dilution of

the absorption solution and (2) to prevent consuming valuable

treating chemicals by mixing them in the absorption solution

(Pet. App. E-2).

It is undisputed that even though step (c) of claim | was

literally carried out in Petitioners’ process by “separating con-

densed water from the hydrogenated gas stream”, Petitioners

did not separate the condensed water prior to contact with the

absorption solution and therefore Petitioners could not and did

not get the two above-listed results of such prior removal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Even Though The Supreme Court Doctrine Of Equivalents In

Reverse In Graver Was Squarely Raised By Petitioner, The

CAFC Did Not Even Mention It — By Its Silence, The

CAFC Decided This Case In Conflict With The Supreme

Court’s Decision In Graver. This Court Should Review This

Case Under Rule 17.1(c).

The Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air

Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) stated at pages 608, 609:

“Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a

patented article that it performs the same or a similar func-

tion in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls

within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of

equivalents may beused to restrict the claim and defeat the

patentee’s action for infringement. Westinghouse v. Boyden

Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568, 18 S.Ct. 707, 722, 42

L.Ed. 1136.” (Emphasis added.)

The above doctrine has been called the doctrine of

“equivalents in reverse”. The CAFC made no mention of that

doctrine in its decision (Pet. App. A) even though Petitioners

squarely raised it, both on appeal and in the petition for

rehearing.

5

In the present case, the patentee not only amended the claim

and interpreted the language of the amendment during the

proceedings before the patent examiner, but he thereafter stated

in the patent specification of a continuation-in-part application

that it was “important” to remove the water for two reasons:

(1) It prevented dilution of the treating absorption solution and

(2) it eliminated the consumption of valuable treating chemicals

(Pet. App. E-2). Those two results cannot be accomplished

unless the removal of the condensed water is accomplished prior

to contact of the condensed water with the absorption solution.

Petitioners urged before the CAFC, and now before this

Court, that the Graver doctrine of equivalents in reverse applies

here because even though the words in the patent claim may

literally be read on Petitioners’ process, there cannot be infringe-

ment under that doctrine since the wording of the claim has been

interpreted by the patentee in the proceedings before the Patent

Office to be a “substantially different way” from Petitioners’

process.

Thus, based upon the patentee’s undisputed interpretation of

the patent claim language in step (c) of claim | must be carried

out prior to contact of the water with the absorption soiution.

Since, in Petitioners’ process, it is undisputed that the condensed

water is not removed prior to contact with the absorption solu-

tion, Petitioner’s process is carried out in a “substantially differ-

ent way” from the Beavon patented process and there cannot be

equivalency or infringement under the Graver decision.”

If the CAFC had followed Graver, it could not have found

infringement of the Beavon patent by Petitioners, but the

* Although infringement is usually a fact question, where the facts are

undisputed, the issue of infringement is a matter of law. CS&M,

Inc. v. Covington Brothers Technologies, 678 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.

1982); Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. Stekoll, 242 F.2d 17, 21 ~

Cir. 1957). Further, in Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d

760, 771 (C.A.F.C. 1983), the CAFC held that the application of

“reverse equivalents” is a legal question.

6

CAFC, by its silence, refused to follow Graver. This case is

therefore appropriate for review under Supreme Court Rule

17.1(c).

2. The CAFC’s Reliance On The Differences In Claims Is Con-

trary To The Ninth Circuit Decision In Kemart Corp. v.

Printing Arts Research Labs, Inc., 301 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.

1953).

The CAFC pointed to the presence of claim 11 (Pet. App.

E-4) which explicitly recited the separation of the water “prior

to contact” with the absorption solution as “indicating that

claim | was allowed without the phrase “prior to contact” for

reasons other than the cited remarks made to the examiner.”

(Pet. App. A-12, 13). In reaching that conclusion, the CAFC

relied upon a 1955 CCPA decision, Jn re Rousso, 106 U.S.P.Q.

108, 110 (Pet. App. A-13).

In re Rousso was not an infringement case, but instead was an

appeal from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The appli-

cant there was attempting to have the Patent Office construe

words in the claim to include specific steps disclosed in the

specification. Other claims on appeal recited the specific steps, so

the CCPA allowed only the claims to the specific steps.’ It was

not a case such as here, where the applicant placed an inter-

pretation on claim language to overcome a rejection, and which

resulted in the examiner withdrawing the rejection.‘

*Graver v. Linde appears to have been mis-cited in Jn re Rousso,

because no basis has been found in Graver to support the CCPA

*The CAFC also summarily dismissed the patentee’s interpretation

of the claim aire because the rejection was on 35 U.S.C. § 112

rather than 35 U.S.C. § 103. Although courts have made that dis-

tinction under the “file wrapper estoppel” doctrine, there was no

basis for the CAFC excluding an interpretation placed on the patent

— dona established the lack of equivalency under Graver, as

above.

7

Further, the Ninth Circuit in Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts

Research Labs, Inc., 201 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1953) when asked

to rule that a limitation present in one claim should not be read

into another claim, held directly contrary to the CAFC’s deci-

sion in this case, as follows:

“But this rule of construction is subordinate to the control-

ling rule that a patentee’s broadest claim can be no bzoader

than his actual invention, no matter how it may be

expressed or what other claim his patent may contain.”

The CAFC also ignored the Ninth Circuit Kemart case.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decisions, and decisions by other Courts

of Appeals should not be set aside by the CAFC without review

by this Court. Even though the CAFC should be the court of last

resort in most patent cases, that should not be the case when

decisions of this Court and Courts of Appeals other than the

CAFC are being reversed by the CAFC either directly or by

silently ignoring them.

For each of the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should

issue to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

S02 ee ut 6.66662 CF 46 OS'S RO B10 8D Oe ae

B. R. PRAVEL

PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,

KIRK & KIMBALL

1177 West Loop South

Suite 1010

Houston, Texas 77027

(713) 859-0909

Attorneys for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JOHN R. Kirk, JR.

CHARLES M. Cox

PRAVEL, GAMBRELL, HEWITT,

KIRK & KIMBALL

1177 West Loop South

Suite 1010

Houston, Texas 77027

(713) 850-0909

October 26, 1983

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of October, 1983, three

copies of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, via

first class mail, postage prepaid, to Andrew J. Belansky, Esq.,

John T. Grinnell, Esq. and Leo J. Young, of the law firm of

Christie Parker & Hale, 201 South Lake Avenue, Pasadena,

California 91101. I further certify that all parties requiring to be

served have been served.

B. R. Pravel

Attorney for Petitioners

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

APPEAL No. 83-554

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD. AND THE TRENTHAM

CORPORATION,

Appellants,

Ve

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND RALPH M.

PARSONS Co.,

Appellees.

DECIDED: July 25, 1983

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, DAVIS and BALDWIN, Cir-

cuit Judges.

MARKEY, Chief Judge.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Central

District of California holding claims 1-8 and 12 valid and

infringed. We affirm.

Background

In early 1975, Trentham Corporation (Trentham), the sole

general partner of Environmental Designs, Ltd. (Environ-

mental), announced the construction of an effluent gas treating

plant using the Trencor process. On March 22, 1976, Environ-

mental sought a declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent

3,752,877 (877) for an effluent gas treating process known as

the Beavon process, owned by Ralph M. Parsons Co. (Parsons)

and licensed through the Union Oil Co. of California (Union),

was invalid. Parsons and Union counterclaimed for infringement

of claims 1-8 and 12. Trentham was joined as counterclaim

defendant on March 17, 1978. Judge Pfaeizer tried the case

during August and September of 1979 and entered judgment on

August 18, 1982, holding the '877 patent valid and claims 1-8

and |2 infringed, enjoining Environmental and Trentham from

A-2

infringing the claims of the '877 patent, and awarding Parsons

and Union damages of $14,000.00.' Environmental and

Trentham appeal from the holding of validity and infringement.

The Invention

The established Claus process removes about 97% of an

atmospheric pollutant (sulfur) from a gas stream. The Beavon

process of the '877 patent in suit and the accused Trencor

process remove the remaining 3% of the sulfur from the Claus

process effluent.

The sulfur in the effluent includes elemental sulfur (S),

hydrogen sulfide (H,S), sulfur dioxide (SO,), carbonyl sulfide

(COS), and carbon disulfide (CS,). The Beavon process uses

hydrogenation in catalytically converting sulfur dioxide and ele-

mental sulfur into hydrogen sulfide and simultaneously uses

hydrolysis in catalytically converting carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide into hydrogen sulfide. The resulting effluent is

then treated for removal of a single compound, hydrogen sulfide,

rather than for the removal of several compounds present before

the Beavon process is performed. The total amount of sulfur

removed by the Claus and Beavon processes is 99.5% or more.

The °877 patent contains 12 claims of which claim | is

representative:

1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content

of effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide,

carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the

steps of:

(a)(i) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source

of hydrogen to a level which is at least equa! to the

stoichiometric amount of hydrogen required to convert

the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and

water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and

‘A Trentham antitrust counterclaim was dismissed. A motion to add

was filed + hy tena and Trentham. The court, after

a ng, denied the motion.

A-3

(ii) catalytically hydrogenating at least essentially all

of the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and

water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and

(iii) simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature

from about 300 to about 800°F.,

(iv) whereby contained water and water formed in the

hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are

utilized for the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide;

(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the

dew point of water to condense water;

(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated

gas stream; and

(d) treating the cooling hydrogenated gas stream to

remove hydrogen sulfide.

Issues

Did Judge Pfaelzer err: (1) in holding the '877 patent valid;

(2) in holding that the ’877 patent is not unenforceable for fraud

on the Patent and Trademark Office (PO); or (3) in finding

that the Trencor process infringes the '877 patent?

Opinion

Judge Pfaelzer entered 104 findings of fact and 18 conclusions

of law. Environmental has failed to show that any of these

findings were clearly erroneous or that any of those conclusions

were either unsupported in the record or contrary to law.

1. Validity

The sole basis for Environmental’s attack on validity of the

"877 patent lies in its assertion that the invention would have

been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.’

*35 U.S. 103 provides:

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identi-

cally disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title,

if the differences between the subject matter sought to nd epee

and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a w would

have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person

A-4

Obviousness is a conclusion of law based upon fact determina-

tions. As set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17,

148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and in Stevenson v. U.S. Interna-

tional Trade Commission, 612 F.2d 546, 549, 204 USPQ 276,

279 (CCPA 1979), those fact determinations involve (1) the

scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between

the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the level of ordinary

skill in the pertinent art, and (4) additional evidence, which may

serve as indicia of non-obviousness. As is or should be true with

every performance of the judicial process, all relevant evidence

on each dispositive issuc inust be fully considered and evaluated.

When a patent is challenged on the ground that the claimed

invention would have been obvious, all evidence relevant to the

obvious-nonobvious issue must be considered. Jn re Sernaker,

702 F.2d 989, 996, 217 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Scope and Content of the Prior Art

It is undisputed that the prior art consists of that considered

by the PTO and the eleven U.S. and foreign patents, and six

technical articles and brochures cited by Environmental at trial.

Of the art cited by the PTO, the most pertinent are U.S. Patent

2,361,825 (’825) to Doumani, an article by Doumani in /ndus-

trial and Engineering Chemistry, and Australian Patent No.

223,904 ('904) to Thumm. Of the art cited at trial, the most

pertinent are British patents 952,555 ('555) and 1,018,630

(°630), chapter 13 of the book Gas Purification by Kohl and

Riesenfeld, and an article entitled “Hydrogen Sulfide Produc-

tion from Sulfur and Hydrocarbons” by Bacon and Boe.

The Doumani references disclose the reduction of sulfur diox-

ide with hydrogen and that all sulfur dioxide will be converted to

hydrogen sulfide when the ratio of hydrogen to sulfur dioxide is

three or greater.

having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter

pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in

which the invention was made.

A-5

The Thumm ‘'904 patent discloses treatment of a Claus

process effluent containing sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide,

carbonyl sulfide, carbon disulfide and water vapor to vaporize

elemental! sulfur for discharge from the reactor with the gas

stream. Thumm describes addition of steam to the effluent to

hydrolyze carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide to hydrogen

sulfide, and teaches that the hydrolysis occurs simultaneously

with the Claus reaction.

The PTO thus had before it prior art which disclosed the

hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide (Doumani);

the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide to

hydrogen sulfide (Thuinm); simultaneity of certain chemical

reactions (Thumm); and the composition of the Claus effluent

(Thumm).

The *555 patent discloses hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and a

simultaneous conversion of carbon monoxide with water to form

hydrogen and carbon dioxide.

The °630 patent discloses hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and

hydrogenation or hydrogenative decomposition of other,

unspecified impurities present in gases “obtained by partial com-

bustion of carbonaceous combustible materials”.

The Kohl and Riesenfeld book generally discloses hydrolysis

of organic sulfur compounds and the basic reactions for hydrol-

ysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide. It includes a pass-

ing reference to hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide.

The Bacon and Boe article discloses a process for commercial

production of hydrogen sulfide. At one point in the reaction, the

hydrolysis of carbon disulfide and a reaction involving methane

and sulfur proceed simultaneously.

Differences Between the Prior Art

and the Claimed Invention

The Doumani references deal with a sulfur dioxide feed

stream containing none of the other sulfur compounds found in

A-6

the Claus effluent. It provides no indication that hydrogenation

of sulfur dioxide and sulfur would or could proceed simultane-

ously with hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide.

The Thumm reference discloses simultaneous hydrolysis of

carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide, but says nothing about

hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur.

Lhe teachings of the Thumm and Doumani references provide

no indication that the specific hydrogenation and hydrolysis

reactions of the '877 patent will occur simultaneously or that

those reactions should be used in treating a Claus effluent.

The feed stream disclosed in the ‘555 patent contains neither

sulfur dioxide or sulfur. There is no suggestion in the '555 patent

that hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur would be essen-

tially complete as required by the Beavon process.

The feed stream disclosed in the '630 patent contains no sulfur

dioxide. There is no suggestion in that patent of essentially com-

plete hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide, coupled with hydrolysis of

carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide, as required by the Beavon

process.

The feed materials of the Bacon and Boe article are only

methane and sulfur. The feed materials of the Beavon process

include no methane but include sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide,

carbony! sulfide, and carbon disulfide.

Judge Pfaelzer found the prior art cited by Environmental

cumulative, adding nothing to the art cited by the PTO.

Environmental has not shown error in that finding.’

*Environmental argues that the ‘630 patent teaches simultaneous

hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide with hydrogenation of other impurities

and thus is prior art not considered by the PTO. The '630 patent,

however, does not teach simultaneous hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide

with hydrogenation of the specific impurities found in Claus

effluents or that those reactions will take place simultaneously in the

environment of a Claus reactor. Thus, the "630 patent adds nothing

More pertinent to the art cited by the PTO.

A-7

Level of Ordinary Skill

Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordi-

nary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the

inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior

art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innova-

tions are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6)

educational level of active workers in the field. Orthopedic

Equipment Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., Appeal

Nos. 83-513, 83-525 Slip op. at 13 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 1983).

Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or

more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular

case. The important consideration lies in the need to adhere to

the statute, i.e., to hold that an invention would or would not

have been obvious, as a whole, when it was made, to a person of

“ordinary skill in the art’ — not to the judge, or to a layman, or

to those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.

Judge Pfaelzer discussed various factors involved in determin-

ing ordinary skill in the art, but did not specify a particular level

applicable here. Nor need she have done so, for the parties are in

agreement that their respective chemical expert witnesses with

extensive backgrounds in sulfur chemistry are persons of ordi-

nary skill in the art.‘

Additional Evidence

Judge Pfaelzer found that the Beavon process of the °877

satisfied a long felt, but unfilled need because for the first time it

enabied governmental bodies, e.g., Los Angeles County, to adopt

more stringent regulations for controlling sulfur dioxide emis-

sions. She found that the invention achieved commercial success

because a large percentage of the Claus effluent treating plants

‘Environmental argues that Fred Riesenfeld, a Parsons employee

who made an abandoned disclosure of a similar to the

Beavon process should have been incl . That consideration,

however, would not have resulted in a level of skill in the art differ-

ent from that of the parties’ experts.

yon

A-8

in the U.S. are based on the Beavon process. Environmental

claims the need and commercial success were artificially gener-

ated by clean air legislation and should therefore not be

considered.*

That the need was legislatively recognized in this case does

not militate against its existence. There was a long felt need to

remove as much sulfur as possible from the air we breathe.

Judge Pfaelzer found that in 1948, the Air Pollution Control

District (APCD) for Los Angeles County approved the first

regulation limiting the amount of sulfur dioxide to 2000 ppm.

Claus plants were exempt from the regulation because even

though they emitted approximately 115 tons of sulfur dioxide

into the atmosphere per day, they prevented the emission of 885

tons of sulfur dioxide per day. APCD could not tighten its regu-

lation because “known technical means of accomplishing the

desired results” were not available. Judge Pfaelzer entered

extensive findings reflecting recognition of the need and the

failed efforts of others over time to meet the need. Despite meet-

ings with the affected companies, studies of all known methods,

research reports by governments and industries (including

Trencor), no solution emerged until the Beavon process was

invented.

Environmental has not shown the findings on long felt need to

have been erroneous. Nor could it do so by mere citation of

legislative recognition. That the desire of governmental bodies to

mandate higher purity standards was frustrated by lack of tech-

nology thus dramatizes the need. This was not a situation in

which an invention lay about unneeded until legislation was

passed to create a need. That the Beavon process filled a pre-

* Whether the Beavon process achieved commercial success because

islatively impelled need not be decided in this case. Judge

aelzer did not give excessive weight to the finding. If she had, and

if that had been error, it would have been harmless in light of all the

evidence supporting her conclusion that the '877 patent is valid.

A-9

existing need and thereby freed legislatures to achieve their

long-standing goal is strong evidence of nonobviousness.

As Judge Pfaelzer noted, highly probative evidence of nonob-

viousness resides in the expressions of disbelief by the chemical

experts for both sides (Dr. Lana for Parsons; Dr. Hyne for

Environmental). Before learning of the Beavon process, and with

knowledge of earlier failed efforts, both stated unequivocally

that they believed the reduction of sulfur compounds to

hydrogen sulfide would not adequately solve the problem.‘

Expressions of disbelief by experts constitute strong evidence of

nonobviousness. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52

(1966).

Finally, Environmental points to three independent concep-

tions including the Riesenfeld disclosure, supra n.4, an asserted

1966 proposal by Trentham’s president to simultaneously

hydrogenate sulfur dioxide and hydrolyze carbonyl sulfide, and

the work of Shell Internationale which resulted in U.K. Patent

1,332,337 for a similar process. We need not discuss those con-

ceptions here, for we agree with Judge Pfaelzer that the evidence

concerning them is of insufficient probative force to establish

obviousness.’

Conclusion on Obviousness

All the pieces of the present invention were known in the art,

i.e., the equations for hydrogenation and hydrolysis of sulfur

compounds, the simultaneity of chemical reactions, and the com-

ponents of the Claus effluent. That all elements of an invention

may have been old (the normal situat: on), or some old and some

*Dr. Lana testified that he had believed conversion of sulfur com-

pounds to hydrogen sulfide was the wrong direction to go. In a tech-

nical article, Dr. nee express skepticism of replacing one toxic

component of the effluent with another toxic component.

’ The virtually simultaneous making of the same invention does not in

itself preclude patentability of that invention. Hence, the entirety of

what is known as interference practice. 35 U.S.C. § 135.

A-10

new, or all new, is however, simply irrelevant. Virtually all

inventions are combinations and virtually all are combinations of

old elements. A court must consider what the prior art as a

whole would have suggested to one skilled in the art, Jn re

McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, 170 USPQ 209, 212 (CCPA

1971). Judge Pfaelzer did just that. She then properly and fully

considered all the evidence of record bearing on the validity

issue, finding that the Beavon process filled a long felt need and

had been denigrated by the experts. Her conclusion thai the

invention as a whole would not have been obvious at the time it

was made to one of ordinary skill in the art was eminently

correct.

2. Fraud

A party asserting the defense of fraud bears a heavy burden of

proof which must be met by clear and convincing evidence. Ne/-

son V. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 858, 206 USPQ 881, 885 (CCPA

1980); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797, 167 USPQ 532,

546-47 (CCPA 1970); Orthopedic Equipment Co., supra, at 18.

Environmental argues that Parsons committed fraud on the .

PTO by failing to bring the Riesenfeld disclosure, supra note 4,

and page 443 from the book Gas Purification to the attention of

the PTO.

There was no duty, however, to bring to the attention of the

PTO the Riesenfeid disclosure because it was a mere “concep-

tion” and was admittedly not prior art. Parsons did submit an

affidavit by Riesenfeld setting forth Riesenfeld’s opinion that the

Beavon process would not have been obvious. That prosecution

of a patent application is ex parte, involving PTO reliance on the

candor and good faith of a patent applicant, requires that an

affidavit should be accompanied by information known to the

affiant and inconsistent with the affidavit. That Riesenfeld’s dis-

closure was not prior art and that Riesenfeld could well have

A-11

believed the process nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, notwith-

standing his disclosure, indicate that failure to report the dis-

closure did not constitute fraud. Withheld information must be

material, a condition we find here lacking. The disclosure not

being prior art, it would not have been material to the

patentability of the Beavon process.

Lastly, Parsons submitted page 444 from the book “Gas

Purification” to the PTO. It did net submit page 443 which

showed reactions for hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide. Fuilure to submit page 443 is not evidence of fraud,

however. It is undisputed that those reactions were known and

were of record before the examiner in the PTO when page 444

was submitted. Fraud cannot consist of a failure to duplicate

what is in the file wrapper.

Similarly, that Parsons represented computer examples as

“operating” examples does not evidence fraud. When a second

example was added to the application, and representations were

made to the PTO, a pilot plant was operating and producing

operating results that confirmed the computer examples. A

report of those operational results is part of the file wrapper.

Judge Pfaelzer correctly found that Environmental failed to

meet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence

that Parsons committed fraud on the PTO.

3. Infringement

Environmental’s Trencor process is a Claus effluent treating

process. Judge Pfaelzer found that it includes the identical steps,

i.e., hydrogenation, hydrolyzing, cooling, separating water, and

removing hydrogen sulfide, as those of the process set forth in

Claims 1-8 and 12 of the °877 patent, and that it thus falls

squarely within the literal boundaries of the claims and consti-

tutes infringement. Environmental has not shown error in the

finding that the Trencor process is the same as, operates the

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same as, and achieves the same result as the claimed process. It

thus constitutes not only literal but substantive infringement.

Environmental nevertheless seeks to avoid infringement on the

ground that claim | must be read as including an unstated lim-

itation ((c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated

gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous absorption solu-

tion) not invo'ved in the Trencor process. Environmental says

the claims must be interpreted in light of the specification and

that Parsons is estopped from asserting the claim without that

limitation because it made certain remarks to the examiner in

overcoming a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112.* Neither argu-

ment is persuasive.

The specification must be sufficiently explicit and complete to

enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention, while a

claim defines only that which the patentee regards as his inven-

tion. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The claim, not the specification, measures

the invention, Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag

Co., 210 U.S. 405, 420 (1908). Environmental’s argument that

claim 1 must include a limitation found in the specification is

thus legally unsound. Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935).

Equaliy unsound is Environmental’s argument that Parsons is

estopped from asserting the plain language of the claim by its

remarks to the examiner. Those remarks were made to overcome

a § 112 rejection, not to overcome a § 103 rejection based on

prior art. Nothing of record indicates that a failure to include

the “prior to . . . solution” phrase would have caused continua-

tion of the § 112 rejection, or that claim 1 as it stands is in any

manner vague, indefinite, or lacking in utility. Moreover, as

Judge Pfaelzer recognized, the phrase omitted from claim | is

specifically included in claim 11, indicating that claim 1 was

*Parsons’ remarks were: “Thus, it is respectfully submitted that

significant utility exists in removing water and any trace amounts of

sulfur dioxide from the gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous

absorption solution”.

A-13

allowed without the phrase for reasons other than the cited

remarks made to the examiner. Smith, supra, at 13. It is

improper for courts to read into an independent claim a limita-

tion explicitly set forth in another claim. Jm re Rousso, 106

USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1955). Judge Pfaelzer did not err in

finding infringement of claims 1-8 and 12.

Conclusion

The judgment that the claims of the "877 patent are valid’ and

claims 1-8 and 12 are literally and substantively infringed by

the Trencor process, is affirmed.

AFFIRMFD

* It is not necessary that a district court hold a patent valid. In an

appropriate case, it is necessary to hold only that the chal of a

rye validity failed to carry his burden of proving invalidity. 35

S.C. § 282. result is the same, but the latter holding more

accurately dramatizes that it, like all holdings, is based on the

record of the case at hand. The latter holding also avoids concern

that a patent held valid may be held invalid on a different record in

another case. When, however, a challenger has carried his burden of

as it would appear appropriate to hold the patent invalid, for a

~ that the burden had been carried is synonymous with

invalidity.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DisTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. CV 76-917 MRP

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

V.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and THE RALPH M.

PARSONS COMPANY,

Defendants.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and THE RALPH M.

PARSONS COMPANY,

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

Ve

ENVIRONMENTAL DesiGNs. LTp. and TRENTHAM

CORPORATION,

Counterclaim Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This action was tried by the Court without a jury, and oral

argument was presented at the conclusion of the trial, followed

by the filing of post-trial briefs. The Court has also heard further

oral argument on the issue of infringement. The Court having

reviewed the facts, the law, and the arguments of the parties,

now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law.

B-2

A. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. On March 22, 1976, Environmental Designs, Ltd., a lim-

ited partnership (“Environmental Designs”), filed a complaint

seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877

owned by the Ralph M. Parsons Company (“Parsons’) is

invalid. Union Oil Company of California (“Union Oil”), as

licensing agent of Parsons for the process claimed by the patent,

‘ was joined with Parsons as co-defendant. On April 30, 1976,

Union Oil and Parsons, as part of their answer to the complaint,

counterclaimed for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.

2. Union Oil had, in 1974, called Patent No. 3,752,877

(referred to herein as the Beavon patent) to the attention of

Environmental Designs as a result of advertising by the latter of

a tail gas treating process called the Trencor H,S Preferential

Absorption Process (Trencor H,S Process). In early 1975, it was

announced that Trentham Corporation (“Trentham”), the sole

general partner of Environmental Designs, would construct a tail

gas treating plant utilizing the Trencor H,S process at a refinery

of Tenneco Oil Company at Chalmette, Louisiana.

3. After an exchange of correspondence, Union Oil, in a let-

ter dated November 12, 1975, offered Environmental! Designs a

paid-up license entitling it to have practiced at the Chalmette

refinery the process claimed in the Beavon patent. The offered

license was based upon a formula which would have involved

payment of an amount between $13,000 and $14,000. In

response, Environmental Designs filed this action in March

1976.

4. On or about March 17, 1978, Trentham was, by leave of

Court, joined as counterclaim defendant in the infringement

counterclaim. (Except where separately identified, Environ-

mental Designs and Trentham are referred to herein as “plain-

tiffs’ and Union Oil and Parsons are referred to as

“defendants.”) On or about April 13, 1978, Trentham, as part of

its answer to the infringement counterclaim, filed a “second

Counterclaim Against Defendants (Union Oil and Parsons) for

Violation of the Antitrust Laws”.

B-3

B.’ THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE BEAVON PATENT

5. The patent application which led to issuance of the

Beavon patent was filed in the U.S. Patent Office on August 27,

1969. The Beavon patent issued on August 14, 1973, there hav-

ing been filed, on March 19, 1971, a continuation-in-part

application.

6. The Beavon patent is directed to a process (“Beavon

process”) for treatment of the effluent gases, called tail gases,

from Claus plants to reduce the sulfur content in such gases.

These tail gases include a number of chemical compounds. The

sulfur compounds in the tail gas include hydrogen sulfide (H,S),

sulfur dioxide (SO,), elemental sulfur (S), carbonyl sulfide

(COS), and carbon disulfide (CS,). These tail gases also include

water (H,O) in the vapor state and molecular hydrogen (H,), as

well as other compounds.

7. The overall purpose of the Beavon process is to reduce the

sulfur content of Claus plant tail gas to a level low enough to be

environmentally acceptable.

8. The Claus process is itself a process for removing sulfur

compounds from gas streams. However, the practical limitations

of the Claus process only permit recovery of about 97% of sulfur

compounds. In view of the quantities of sulfur-containing gases

which are processed, this means that, dependent upon the

geographical region, large quantities of sulfur compounds would

still be discharged daily into the atmosphere if sulfur removal

were limited to the practice of the Claus process.

9. It is the 3% or more of sulfur compounds still remaining

in tail gases from Claus plants to which the Beavon process is

directed. In the Beavon process, sulfur dioxide and elemental

sulfur in the tail gas are, by hydrogenation, catalytically con- ©

verted to hydrogen sulfide; simultaneously, carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide are, by hydrolysis, catalytically converted to the

same sulfur compound, hydrogen sulfide. The gas stream in

which the above-described chemical conversions have simultane-

ously taken place is then treated to remove the sulfur which has

B-4

been converted to a single chemical form — hydrogen sulfide —

instead of being in several different chemical forms. By the prac-

tice of the Beavon process, the difficult-to-remove last few

percentages of sulfur values are prevented from entering the

atmosphere and overall sulfur removal efficiencies, i.e., the total

amount of sulfur values removed first by the Claus process and

then by the Beavon process, of 99.5% or better have been

attained.

10. Although the Beavon patent contains 12 claims, claim |

may be taken as representatively describing the process in con-

sidering the issue of patent validity. It reads:

1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content

of effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide,

carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the

steps of:

(a)(i) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source

of hydrogen to a level which is at least equal to the

stoichiometric amount of hydrogen required to convert

the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and

water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and

(ii) catalytically hydrogenating at least essentially all

of the contained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and

water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and

(iii) simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature

from about 300 to about 800°F.,

(iv) whereby contained water and water formed in the

hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are

utilized for the hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide;

(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the

dew point of water to condense water;

(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated

gas stream; and

(d) treating the cooled hydrogenated gas stream to

remove hydrogen sulfide.

B-5

11. The Beavon process solved the complex problems inher-

ent in a multi-component chemical system — one in which

sulfur was present in several chemical forms. Beavon’s solution

was the simultaneous catalytic conversion of these several forms

to one chemical form — hydrogen sulfide. Sulfur dioxide is cat-

alytically converted by hydrogenation to hydrogen sulfide;

carbon disulfide and carbonyl sulfide are simultaneously cat-

alytically converted by hydrolysis to hydrogen sulfide. Then, by

the subsequent process steps, the offensive constituent, sulfur, is

removed by the removal of the i.vcsugen sulfide, in which the

sulfur is chemically bound.

C. THE CLAUS PROCESS

12. When emitted into the atmosphere, sulfur-containing

compounds are pollutants. This is true whether the emitted com-

pound is the relatively odorless compound, sulfur dioxide, or the

highly offensive compound, hydrogen sulfide, or some other

sulfur compound such as carbon disulfide or carbonyl sulfide.

13. Since the combustion of sulfur-containing fuels results in

emissions into the atmosphere of sulfur compounds, various

refining processes and treating processes have been developed to

remove sulfur, i.e., desulfurize, fuel oils, gasoline, and natural

gas. The removal of sulfur from the fuel, however, does not end

the potential for sulfur pollution. The latter can be avoided only

if the sulfur removed from fuels is itself disposed of in a manner

which prevents its emission into the atmosphere.

14. The Claus process is a sulfur recovery process which, as

a basic process, has been known for many years. In the Claus

process, elemental sulfur is recovered as a solid in a process

involving the basic reaction:

SO, + 2H,S > 3S + 2H,O

In words, the sulfur (S) present in the gaseous compounds,

sulfur dioxide (SO,) and hydrogen sulfide (H,S), is by the prac-

tice of this process converted to elementa! sulfur which is con-

densed and removed as a solid from the gas stream. Solid ele-

mental sulfur is a valuable commodity which is used as a

B-6

fertilizer and as a raw material in the production of industrial

chemicals.

15. The Claus process provided a means for reducing emis-

sion of sulfur-containing compounds into the atmosphere.

Sulfur-containing waste gases from refinery desulfurization

processes could be collected and further processed in Claus

sulfur recovery plants. Sulfur-containing waste gases from treat-

ing processes for “sour” (sulfur-containing) natural gas could be

similarly treated.

16. In the Claus process, the conversion of sulfur-containing

compounds to elemental sulfur is not complete. In a two-stage

Claus plant (one in which the reaction is successively conducted

in two reactors with treatment between the stages to improve

reaction conditions in the second reactor), the percentage con-

version of sulfur compounds to elemental sulfur is about 92%.

The addition of a third stage improves the overall conversion to

about 97%.

17. The tail gas exiting from a Claus plant still contains

sulfur-containing compounds including sulfur, unreacted sulfur

dioxide, unreacted hydrogen sulfide, and carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide which are formed by side reactions that take

place in the Claus reactor.

18. In the past, the tail gas from Claus plants, containing

these several sulfur compounds, was incinerated and discharged

into the atmosphere. Incineration did not reduce the amount of

sulfur discharged into the atmosphere; it simply converted all of

the sulfur compounds in the tail gas to sulfur dioxide — a com-

pound of less toxicity than other sulfur compounds. Sulfur diox-

ide was also a pollutant and its discharge into the atmosphere in

the quantities involved caused many complaints. But, prior to

1969, there was no effective control process which could reduce

in amount the sulfur content of the Claus tail gas being dis-

charged into the atmosphere.

B-7

19. The magnitude of the pollution problem that still

remained on a national scale is illustrated by the situation which

existed in Los Angeles County in 1966.

20. The first regulation in Los Angeles County limiting to

2000 ppm (0.2% by volume) the amount of sulfur dioxide which

could be emitted was issued in 1948 by the Air Pollution Control

District (“APCD”) for Los Angeles County. But that regulation

included a then necessary exclusion. The exclusion permitted so-

called scavenger plants to discharge in excess of the 2000 ppm

limit if the total sulfur dioxide emissions from the scavenger

plant and the units served by it were less than the amount which

would have been emitted without the scavenger plant in opera-

tion. The operation of Claus plants came within this exclusion.

21. The result of the regulation was that Claus plants were

installed. By 1966, nine sulfur recovery plants, i.e., Claus plants,

were operating in Los Angeles County. These plants were

preventing emissions of 885 tons of sulfur dioxide per day.

Nevertheless, even with that step forward, 115 tons of sulfur

dioxide were still being emitted into the atmosphere daily, the

major portion of which came from incineration of Claus tail

gases from Claus plants concentrated in the small heavily-popu-

lated area, i.e., the South Bay area of Los Angeles County.

D. THE EARLIER FAILURES TO RECOGNIZE THE

BEAVON SOLUTION

22. The need for a means for reducing sulfur dioxide emis-

sions beyond the level achievable by Claus process treatment and

incineration of the Claus tail gases was widely evident in Los

Angeles County and elsewhere during the 1960's.

23. In Los Angeles County, numerous complaints were

made to the APCD by the public regarding the continuing sulfur

dioxide emissions. At this time, the APCD operated under a

policy laid down by the Board of Supervisors and County Coun-

sel that required the existence of “known technical means of

accomplishing the desired results” before more stringent

standards as to emissions would be adopted. In response to the

B-8

complaints, meetings were held with the companies involved in

efforts to find a solution by which emissions could be reduced.

No such solution emerged. In that period, 1965-1969; no control

process was available which would reduce the sulfur emissions

from Claus plants.

25. Parsons, a leader in the construction of Claus plants, also

recognized the need. It recognized that, if no solution to the

problem of sulfur dioxide was found. construction of such plants

would be adversely affected. Parsons’ president in 1966

requested that the Parsons engineering staff make a concerted

effort to solve the problem. Contemporaneously, engineers at

Parsons prepared an extensive report for a company in Alberta,

Canada where large quantities of hydrogen sulfide-containing

natural gas were produced. The report described in detail the

results of a review of methods for reducing sulfur dioxide emis-

sions from Claus plants. The solution later invented by Mr.

Beavon was not even suggested in this report.

26. In January 1969 (some few months before the Beavon

invention), the National Air Pollution Control Techniques Com-

mittee issued a comprehensive report entitled “Control Tech-

niques for Sulfur Oxide Air Pollutants.” The constituency of this

committee was national in scope; its members represented a

broad cross-section of industry. This report compiled the avail-

able information in the literature, as well as information

received from committee members, industrial contributors, the

staff of the federal agencies involved, and local control agencies

across the country. It covered then-existing commercial

processes for control of SO, emissions, as well as such processes

which were in the development or research stage. In referring to

sulfurous emissions from Claus plants, only incineration was

listed in the report as the usual method of control and the recom-

mended method of control.

27. Trentham’s approach to the problem was summarized in

a Resume of Trencor Research and Development Program

which referred to the state of affairs in 1970. While the Resume

made proposals for treatment of Claus tail gas, it contained no

B-9

reference whatsoever to the reduction of all sulfur compounds to

hydrogen sulfide, the approach followed in the Beavon process.

28. There were serious obstacles to solving the problem

because multi-component chemical systems involve considerable

complexity. Where a number of chemical reactions take place

simultaneously, each may be influenced by different variables

and predictability is difficult. The Claus tail gas is a multi-com-

ponent chemical system. In addition to hydrogen sulfide and

sulfur dioxide, it contains carbonyl sulfide (COS) and carbon

disulfide (CS,), compounds which plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Hyne,

described as “proven to be the two most intractable components

of Claus tail-gas streams in desulfurization.”

29. There was also skepticism as to a process for treating

Claus tail gases which, even in part, involved conversion of the

contained sulfur compounds to hydrogen sulfide. One of

defendants’ chemical experts, Dr. Dalla Lana, made a proposal

in 1970 that all the contained sulfur compounds be converted to

sulfur dioxide because he believed that conversion to hydrogen

sulfide was the wrong direction to go. Plaintiffs’ chemical expert,

Dr. Hyne, in a technical article published before the first public

announcement of the Beavon process, expressed his own skepti-

cism in the following terms:

The main disadvantage of the direct reduction with

hydrogen is that the reduction cannot be stopped at the zero

oxidation state of sulphur — namely elemental sulphur —

and significant amounts of the SO, are reduced even further

to the —2 oxidation state, namely H,S. One is therefore in

the somewhat embarrassing position of having replaced one

toxic component of the effluent gas, namely SO,, with

another toxic material, namely H,S.

30. The three-pronged standard for factual inquiry into non-

obviousness articulated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.

1, 17 (1966), requires examination of (1) the scope and content

of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the

claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent

art.

B-10

a) The Scope and Content of the Prior Art

31. The prior art included the reports, documents, and

knowledge detailed in Section D, supra. It included also a

number of patents and a technical article (Doumani — Indus-

trial and Engineering Chemistry, April, 1944) which were cited

by the Patent Office examiner during the prosecution of the

patent applications leading to issuance of the Beavon patent.

Further, the prior art included additional patents and publica-

tions upon which plaintiffs rely in support of their contention of

the obviousness of the subject matter of the Beavon patent.

(i) Prior Art Cited by the Patent Office

32. The most pertinent prior art cited by the Patent Office

examiner was Doumani (Patent No. 2,361,825), the con-

temporaneous Industrial and Engineering Chemistry article by

the same Doumani, and Thumm (Australian Patent No.

223,904).

33. The Doumani patent issued in 1944. It stated that “(t)he

reduction of sulphur dioxide with hydrogen has been known for

many years,” and included the statement, “With a ratio of

hydrogen to sulphur dioxide of 3 or greater, all of the sulphur

dioxide can be converted to hydrogen sulphide with but traces of

free sulphur.”

34. The Doumani patent described only a sulfur dioxide feed

stream in which there were none of the other sulfur-containing

constituents of a Claus tail gas; it made no reference to COS or

CS,. Further, there was absent from Doumani any indication

that hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur could or would

proceed simultaneously with hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide.

35. The Thumm patent described treating of a tail gas from

a Claus plant — a gas described as containing SO,, H,S, CS,,

COS, and H,O. The Claus tail gas was passed through a Claus

reactor in which sulfur had previously been deposited on the

catalyst in the reactor as a result of operating the Claus reactor

at low temperature, i.e., “a cold bed Claus.” The tail gas was at

B-11

a temperature high enough, i.e., above the dew point of sulfur, to

vaporize the deposited sulfur, and the vaporized sulfur was car-

ried out of the reactor by the gas stream.

36. Thumm also described an embodiment of his process in

which steam was added to the tail gas before it entered the

above-described reactor so that carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide were hydrolyzed over the catalyst in the reactor accord-

ing to the following reactions:

COS + H,O > CO, + H,S

CS, + H,O > CO, + 2H,S

Thumm described, therefore, the hydrolysis reactions for both

carbony] sulfide (COS) and carbon disulfide (CS,). Thumm also

stated that, within the Claus reactor, the Claus reaction between

hydrogen sulfide (H,S) and sulfur dioxide (SO,) occurred

simultaneously with the above-given hydrolysis reactions.

37. The Patent Office had before it separate pieces of prior

art which described hydrogenation of SO, (Doumani patent;

Doumani article), a Claus tail gas stream containing COS and

CS, (Thumm); the equations for hydrolysis of COS and CS,

(Thumm); and simultaneity of chemical reactions, specifically,

the Claus reaction and the hydrolysis reactions for COS and CS,

(Thumm). There was not, however, any prior art which made

obvious or even suggested catalytically hydrogenating at least

substantially all of the sulfur dioxide and sulfur to hydrogen

sulfide, and sirnultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature from about

300 to about 800F. When all of the claims in the final applica-

tion for patent had been amended to so define the invention, the

Beavon patent issued.

(ii) Prior Art Cited by Plaintiffs

38. In its Notice Under 35 U.S.C. § 252 filed before trial,

plaintiffs cited eleven foreign and U.S. patents and six technical

articles and brochures in addition to the prior art patents and

publications which had been cited by the Patent Office during

B-12

the prosecution of the Beavon applications. In the course of trial,

plaintiffs emphasized only the following: the Doumani patent,

supra; British Patent Nos. 952,555 and 1,018,630; Chapter 13 of

the Kohl and Riesenfeld book, “Gas Purification”; and the

Bacon and Boe article “Hydrogen Sulfide Production from

Sulfur and Hydrocarbons.”

39. The additional prior art materials relied upon by plain-

tiffs add nothing to the prior art teachings which were before the

Patent Office examiner.

40. British Patent 952,555 describes hydrolysis of carbonyl

sulfide. It states, too, that the so-called shift reaction, which is

the conversion of carbon monoxide with water to form hydrogen

and carbon dioxide, does under certain conditions take place

simultaneously with the above-described carbonyl sulfide hydrol-

ysis reaction. There is, however, neither sulfur dioxide nor sulfur

in the feed stream of the '555 patent. There is no suggestion in

that patent of the essentially complete hydrogenation of those

compounds which is a requisite step in the Beavon process.

41. British Patent 1,018,630 also describes hydrolysis of

carbonyl sulfide. The patent refers to “hydrogenation or

hydrogenative decomposition of certain other impurities.” The

expert testimony as to the content of the patent itself and the

expert testimony as to the partial oxidation unit described in the

patent established that no sulfur dioxide would be present in the

feed gas stream treated in British Patent 1,018,630. There is no

Suggestion in this patent of essentially complete hydrogenation

of sulfur dioxide coupled with essentially complete hydrolysis of

carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide.

42. The Bacon and Boe article was published in 1945 and

describes a process for commercial production of hydrogen

sulfide. The feed materials were methane and sulfur. Unlike the

feed gas to the Beavon process, there was no sulfur dioxide, no

hydrogen sulfide, no carbonyl sulfide, and no carbon disulfide

present in the feed gas. At some point in the described single-

step reaction, two reactions, one involving hydrolysis cf carbon

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disulfide and the other involving the reaction of methane and

sulfur, proceeded simultaneously. However, the same article

warns that sulfur dioxide was formed in the single-step reaction.

The Beavon process converts all sulfur compounds, including

sulfur dioxide, to hydrogen sulfide.

43. The Kohl and Riesenfeld book “Gas Purification” dis-

cusses a large number of purification processes. It generally

describes hydroly.js of organic sulfur compounds; it states the

basic reactions for hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide; it describes some specific processes which involve

hydrolysis of organic sulfides. But it goes no further as a teach-

ing of the Beavon process. A passing reference to hydrogenation

of sulfur dioxide is made in a chapter entitled “Dry Oxidation

Processes”; the references to hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide are in a separate chapter entitled “Catalytic

Conversion of Gas Impurities.”

b) The Differences between the Prior Art and the Claimed

Beavon Process

44. Issued patents are entitled to a statutory presumption of

validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282. In the case of the Beavoa patent, the

most relevant prior art was before the Patent Office examiner.

The additional prior art cited by plaintiffs is merely cumulative.

It does not disclose anything which was not founa in the

Doumani patent and in the Thumm patent. Plaintiffs have failed

to rebut the presumption of validity.

45. The Doumani patent teaches the hydrogenation of sulfur

dioxide to hydrogen sulfide. It made no reference, however, to

either carbonyl! sulfide or carbon disulfide. The Thumm patent

described hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and ¢ irbon disulfide to

hydrogen sulfide. It also described that the hydrolysis reaction:

took place in a Claus reactor simultaneously with the Claus

reaction by which hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide are

reacted to form elemental sulfur. The product gas from the

Thumm process was therefore a Claus-type tail gas.

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46. While Thumm described simultaneous chemical reac-

tions, including hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide, the hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide

was totally absent. The Doumani and Thumm prior art gave no

Suggestion that simultaneous catalytic hydrogenation and

hydrolysis of contained sulfur compounds to a single form —

hydrogen sulfide — would produce the successful results

achieved by the Beavon process.

47. Although the reactions involved were separately known,

the Beavon process involves simultaneous occurrence of a

number of reactions, each of which could be influenced by differ-

ent variables. The occurrence of a chemical reaction under one

set of variables gives no assurance to whether or to what extent it

will take place under a different set of variables. The results

achieved by the Beavon process are therefore unusual and

surprising.

c) The Level of Skill

48. Factual findings on the level of ordinary skill in the per-

tinent art can be made only by an analysis of the problem solved

by the invention and the efforts of others to arrive at a satisfac-

tory solution. Photo Electronics Corporation v. England, 581

F.2d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 1978).

49. In the period 1965-1969, many were working on the

development of a process for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions.

The 1966 Parsons report directed to reduction of SO, emissions

included a summation of the Doumani patent and the Doumani

technical article and, in addition, referenced the Kohl and

Riesenfeld book. Yet, the availability of those prior art materials

did not suggest to the Parsons engineers the Bexvon solution.

Engineers s¢ Trentham studied the Doumani patent in 1966.

Yet, even in 1972, the Trentham approaches to the problem did

not contemplate the reduction of all sulfur compounds to

hydrogen sulfide, the solution found by “Ar. Beavon.

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50. Both Dr. Dalla Lana, defendants’ chemical expert, and

Dr. Hyne, plaintiffs’ chemical expert, have extensive back-

grounds in sulfur chemistry. Both of these individuals, prior to

learning of the Beavon invention, separately expressed views that

_ reduction of sulfur compounds to hydrogen sulfide was not the

way to solve the problem. The basic chemical reactions for

hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide

were known. So, too, were the basic chemical reactions for

hydrolysis of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide. Mr. Beavon

was the first to combine these reactions to provide a widely

accepted process for control of sulfur dioxide emissions.

51. Plaintiffs have urged that the “Riesenfeld disclosure” is

probative of the level of skill of the art. Fred Riesenfeld was a

Parsons employee who in 1960 prepared an handwritten dis-

closure in which he described hydrogenation of sulfur dioxide

and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide. He also referred to reducing

carbonyl sulfide to hydrogen sulfide with an appropriate reduc-

ing agent such as hydrogen. Mr. Riesenfeld made no reference

to carbon disulfide in his disclosure; further, he made no refer-

ence to hydrolysis reactions.

52. In 1961, Mr. Riesenfeld requested that Parsons make

some computer calculations based upon his disclosure; he also

inquired of two manufacturers as to possible catalysts. After

1961, Mr. Riesenfeld did nothing further with his disclosure. He

was again reminded of it only when, in 1969, he saw an internal

memorandum of Mr. Beavon, a co-worker of Mr. Riesenfeld, in

which the Beavon process was described.

53. Although the Riesenfeld disclosure may be considered a

“conception”, it was not an invention. The facts surrounding the

Riesenfeld disclosure establish that the subject matter of the

disclosure was abandoned. It lay buried in a drawer from 1961

to 1969, spanning a period during which Parsons was actively

seeking a solution to the problem of sulfur dioxide emissions.

54. Evidence that other persons worked under the same state

of the prior art and independently arrived at the same solution as

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that embodied in a patent claim has been held to provide

evidence of obviousness, even though the other solutions were

not prior art. Ceco Corp v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc.,

557 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1977); Servo Corporation of

America v. General Electric Company, 337 F.2d 716, 720 (4th

Cir. 1964). Evidence of “independent conception” has been

treated as a sub-test of obviousness in the same sense as com-

mercial success has been treated as a sub-test of nonobviousness.

Reeves Brothers, Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 417 F.2d 869,

872 (2nd Cir. 1969).

55. The Court has given consideration to the Riesenfeld dis-

closure in the context of a sub-test on the issue of obviousness.

The Court’s conclusion of nonobviousness is not affected by the

evidence with respect to the Riesenfeld “conception”. The

foregoing applies with equal force to Shell British Patent No.

1,332,337 upon which plaintiffs also appear to rely as an

“independent conception.”

56. In sum, the Beavon process satisfied a long felt but

unfilled need. It was one of the processes which enabled Los

Angeles County to adopt more stringent regulations for control-

ling sulfur dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. The Beavon

process has met with substantial commercial success. A large

percentage of the Claus tail gas treating plants in the United

States are based upon the Beavon process. In recognition of the

achievements of the Beavon process, various individual engineer-

ing awards have been presented to Mr. Beavon, and Parsons has

received a project award.

F. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE

57. Plaintiffs charged defendants with fraud and inequitable

conduct on the prosecution of the Beavon patent before the

Patent Office. They rely upon a number of alleged acts and

omissions as constituting the alleged fraud and inequitable con-

duct — (i) failure to submit the Riesenfeld disclosure and

certain portions of the Kohl and Riesenfeld book to the Patent

Office; (ii) failure to perform and submit to the Patent Office

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certain computer calculations while performing and submitting

to the Patent Office certain other computer calculations; (iii)

alleged misstatements as to the content of the Doumani patent;

(iv) use of computer calculations as examples in the Beavon

patent.

58. Subjective culpability is required for a finding of fraud

on the United States Patent Office. There must be some element

of wrongfulness, wilfulness or bad faith. Carpet Seaming Tape

Licensing Corporation v. Best Seam Incorporated, 616 F.2d

1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1980). The presence of this mental element

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Carpet Seam-

ing at 1139. The applicant for a patent is accorded the right to

exercise good faith judgment in deciding what matters are and

are not of sufficient relevance and materiality to require dis-

closure. Xerox Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 322 F. Supp. 963,

968-969 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

59. Plaintiffs did not establish by clear and convincing

evidence that as to any of the alleged acts and omissions, there

was any subjective culpability on the part of defendants. In fact,

the evidence established that defendants exercised good faith

judgment in a difficult area of practice which requires applica-

tion of principles of law in conjunction with an understanding of

highly technical subject matter. Further, there was no evidence

that any alleged act or omission misled the Patent Office

examiner into allowing a claim.

60. As to the Riesenfeld disclosure, plaintiffs conceded that

that disclosure was not prior art. It was advanced as probative

only of the level of skill. Under the current rules of the Patent

Office, which impose no less a standard of disclosure than the

ones which existed in 1970-1973, no duty is imposed for “dis-

closure of information concerning the level of skill for purposes

of determining obviousness.” The failure to submit the

Riesenfeld disclosure to the Patent Office does not constitute

fraud or inequitable conduct.

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61. There was neither fraud nor inequitable conduct in the

prosecution before the U.S. Patent Office of the Beavon patent.

G. THE INFRINGEMENT ISSUE

62. Defendants have counterclaimed for infringement of

nine claims (1-8 and 12) of the Beavon patent. None of the

differences between these nine claims is material to the

determination of the infringement issue. Accordingly, claim | is

the only one of these nine claims which is discussed in these

Findings.

63. The preamble of claim | of the Beavon patent, read in

light of the specification, reveals that the overall purpose of the

process of claim 1 is to reduce the sulfur content of Claus plant

tail gas to a level low enough to be environmentally acceptable.

64. The body of claim | consists of clauses (a) through (d)

that recite four steps to take to accomplish the overall purpose of

the process of claim 1. The disclosure of the Beavon patent sets

forth the principles involved in these recited steps, the functions

they perform, the way they work, and the intermediate and over-

all results they produce.

65. Read in light of the specification, claim 1 embraces a tail

gas clean-up process, the heart of which is set out in clause (a):

the simultaneous catalytic hydrogenation and hydrolysis step.

Because this step is carried out first, essentially all of the sulfur

in the gas stream that undergoes subsequent processing in the

remaining steps is in the form of hydrogen sulfide. Thus, the

remaining steps are applied to a gas stream with little or none of

the intractable sulfur compounds carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide, and with little or none of the sulfur compound sulfur

dioxide which is a reactant in the formation of corrosive poly-

thionic acids. The gas stream that emerges from the catalytic

reaction zone is not amenable to immediate treatment to remove

hydrogen sulfide. The reaction zone is maintained at tempera-

tures in the range from about 300° to 800°F, and accordingly

the emerging gas stream is hot. Further, the gas stream at that

point contains a substantial amount of water in vapor phase. A

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principle of the Beavon invention pointed out in claim | is to cool

the gas stream to cause water to change from vapor phase to

liquid phase and separate liquid water before treating the cooled

gas stream to remove hydrogen sulfide.

66. The disclosure makes it clear that the Beavon invention

can be carried out not solely by following the practice described

as “preferred” but alternativeiy by following practices that are

convenient alternatives and substantively the same.

67. Other patent documents including the prior art and the

file history of the Beavon patent explain the scope of the inven-

tion set forth in claim 1. These documents reveal the intentions

that both Mr. Beavon and the Patent Office examiner

manifested with respect to claim |.

68. What became patent claim | was presented to the Patent

Office examiner as claim 22 of Mr. Beavon’s CIP application; its

language resulted from an interview. The file history contains

the following record of what was agreed to during that interview:

Claim 22 requires, as was agreed to be one clear point of

distinction, namely that hydrogenation and hydrolysis occur

simultaneously in one catalytic reaction zone, at the

temperatures specified, in combination with the steps of

cooling the gas stream to at least the dew point of water to

condense water and separating condensed water from the

hydrogenated stream and finally treating the hydrogenated

stream to remove hydrogen sulfide. (PX 3, p. 93; emphasis

added.)

69. On the same page of the file history, it is noted that other

claims, which include the claim that became patent claim 11, set

forth the manner in which hydrogen sulfide is removed from the

gas stream. Patent claim 11 specifies that “formed water and

water present in the hydrogenated gas stream are condensed

prior to contact with the absorption solution.”

70. The defendants’ counterclaim for infringement is

directed to a process plaintiffs call “The Trencor H,S Preferen-

tial Absorption Process (“Trencor H,S process”).

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71. The Trencor H,S process is a tail gas treating process. It

has been practiced in a tail gas treating plant built by Trentham

for Tenneco Oil Company (““Tenneco”) at Tenneco’s refinery in

Chalmette, Louisiana. Environmental granted Tenneco a license

to use technical information relating to this process. Both

Trentham and Environmental induced Tenneco to use the

Trencor H.S process.

72. Tenneco has a Claus plant at its Chalmette refinery. The

effluent gas stream from that Claus plant contains water, sulfur,

sulfur dioxide, carbonyl sulfide, and carbon disulfide. The pur-

pose for using the Trencor H,S process at the Chalmette

refinery is to reduce the sulfur content of that effluent gas stream

to yield a treated gas stream. When the treated gas stream is

vented to the atmosphere, its sulfur content is low enough to be

environmentally acceptable. The overall purpose of the Trencor

H,S process is identical to the overall purpose of the Beavon

invention as recited in the preamble of claim 1 of the Beavon

patent.

73. The Trencor H,S process comprises four steps. These

steps are: first, a hydrogenation step; second, a cuoling step;

third, a water separating step; and fourth, a hydrogen sulfide

removing step.

74. Asa result of the hydrogenation step, essentially all of

the sulfur content of the gas stream undergoing treatment is in

the form of hydrogen sulfide. To carry out this first step,

hydrogen is added to the effluent gas stream exiting the Claus

plant. The resulting hydrogen-enriched gas stream enters a cat-

alytic reactor in which the temperature is in the range from

about 300°F to 800°F. In the reactor, simultaneous reactions

occur. Elemental sulfur and sulfur dioxide each enter into a

hydrogenation reaction with hydrogen to produce hydrogen

sulfide and water. Simultaneously, carbonyl sulfide and carbon

disulfide each enter into a hydrolysis reaction with water to

produce hydrogen sulfide. The gas stream emerging from the

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reactor is called the hydrogenated gas stream. The water it con-

tains is in vapor form because the hydrogenated gas stream

temperature exceeds the dew point of water.

75. The recitations of clause (a) of claim | of the Beavon

patent apply literally and substantively to the above-described

hydrogenation step of the Trencor H,S process.

76. The purpose and effect of the cooling step of the Trencor

H,S process is to cool the hydrogenated gas stream to a tempera-

ture low enough to cause the water to change phase from a vapor

to a liquid. This temperature is below the dew point of water.

Comparing this to the corresponding step of the Beavon inven-

tion as set out in clause (b) of claim 1, the purpose and effect of

the two corresponding steps are identical.

77. At trial, two words were used to describe the physical

way in which water undergoes a change of phase from vapor to

liquid. One was “condensation”; the other was “absorption.”

78. At trial, plaintiffs’ expert testified that the word “absorp-

tion,” not the word “condensation,” describes the way the water

changes phase in the Trencor H,S process. Mr. Beavon testified,

“any chemical engineer that I know of in ordinary practice

would consider it condensation.” In short, the trial testimony ‘is

in conflict whether the word “condensation” literally applies to

the change of phase water undergoes in the Trencor H,S process.

Irrespective of which of the two words literally applies, findings

are required on the issue of whether the clauses of claim | sub-

stantively apply to the corresponding steps of the Trencor H,S

process. Findings Nos. 79-91 are directed to that issue.

79. In the Trencor H,S process, the cooling step is carried

out in two stages. The first-stage cooling occurs in a waste heat

boiler that is located between the reactor and a booster blower.

The waste heat boiler is a heat exchanger in which the

hydrogenated gas stream flows adjycent to, but not in direct

contact with, another stream. As a result, the hydrogenated gas

stream is somewhat cooled, and steam is generated. Having been

somewhat cooled in the waste heat boiler, the hydrogenated gas

B-22

stream is pushed by the booster blower into equipment called an

“absorber,” where it comes into direct contact with a liquid and

undergoes the second-stage cooling.

80. In the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent,

the cooling step is likewise carried out in two stages. The first-

Stage cooling occurs in a tail gas cooler. The tail gas cooler is

identical in all respects to the waste heat boiler used in the

Trencor H,S process. Both perform the identical heat exchang-

ing function by having the hydrogenated gas stream flow

adjacent to, but not in contact with, another stream that receives

heat to generate steam. Having been somewhat cooled in the tail

gas cooler, the hydrogenated gas stream enters a contact con-

denser. In the contact condenser, the hydrogenated gas stream

comes into direct contact with a liquid and undergoes the

second-stage cooling.

81. The process steps in the Trencor H,S process and that in

the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent are identi-

cal. They have the same overall purpose and effect. Further-

more, the cooling step of the Trencor H,S process, like the cool-

ing step disclosed in the Beavon patent, involves a first-stage

cooling with a heat exchanging relationship rather than a direct

contacting of the hydrogenated gas stream with a liquid, and

then second-stage cooling with the hydrogenated gas stream

directly contacting a liquid. However, the composition of the

liquid used in the absorber to effect the second-stage cooling in

the Trencor H,S process is not identical to the fiature of the

liquid used in the contact condenser to effect the second-stage

cooling disclosed in the Beavon patent.

82. The absorber in the Trencor H,S process is a tower that

includes two zones, viz, a quenching zone in the lower part of the

tower and an absorbing zone in the upper part.

83. The somewhat cooled hydrogenated gas stream enters

the tower at its bottom and flows upwardly. During its upward

flow, the gas stream is subjected to these steps: the completion of

the cooling step; the water separating step; and the hydrogen

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sulfide removing step. The completion of the cooling step and the

water separating step occur in the quenching zone. The

hydrogen sulfide removing step occurs in the absorbing zone.

84. These steps occur because the gas stream flows through

a downwardly flowing liquid containing an amine, viz, methyl

diethanolamine (“MDEA”). At the top of the tower, where the

MDEA solution enters the tower, the MDEA solution is lean.

That is, its capacity to absorb hydrogen sulfide is at its

maximum.

85. While the MDEA solution flows down through the

absorbing zone, it removes hydrogen sulfide from the gas stream

it contacts. As it progressively absorbs hydrogen sulfide, its

Capacity to further absorb hydrogen sulfide progressively

decreases. By the time it leaves the absorbing zone, the MDEA

solution has become loaded with absorbed hydrogen sulfide.

86. The loaded MDEA solution flows into the quenching

zone and merges with a recirculating MDEA solution. This

MDEA solution recirculates at a high volumetric flow rate to

remove heat from and cool the gas stream it contacts to beiow

the dew point of water. As a result, water vapor in the gas

stream changes phase to liquid water, separates from the gas

stream, and enters the recirculating MDEA solution. The loaded

MDEA solution that emerges from the bottom carries with it not

only the amount of water that entered the absorber as part of the

lean MDEA solution, but also the amount of water that

separated from the cooled hydrogenated gas stream. The above-

described cooling and water separating steps are performed by

using a liquid (loaded MDEA) that is heated by the gas stream

it cools. Consequently, it does not treat the gas stream to remove

hydrogen sulfide. Rather, desorption occurs resulting in addition

of hydrogen sulfide to the gas stream.

87. After the hydrogenated gas stream has been subjected

both to the second-stage cooling that completes the cooling step

and to the water separating step, it is then subjected to the

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hydrogen sulfide removing step. The MDEA solution in the

absorbing zone is used to carry out this removing step.

88. The recitations of clause (d) of claim | of the Beavon

patent apply literally and substantively to the above-described

hydrogen sulfide removing step of the Trencor H,S process. The

use of the treating MDEA solution to remove the hydrogen

sulfide is in accordance with the principles taught in the Beavon

patent as indicated by the statement therein (column 4, lines 73-

75) that an amine absorption system is a “convenient alterna-

tive.” The sequence of performing the hydrogen sulfide removing

step after the water separating step is also in accordance with

the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent. Because

the water separating step occurs in the quenching zone before

the hydrogenated gas stream has risen into the absorbing zone,

there is no dilution of the treating MDEA solution that performs

the function of removing hydrogen sulfide.

89. The liquid which is diluted as a result of the cooling and

water separating steps in the Trencor H,S process is the loaded

MDEA solution in the quenching zone. The corresponding liquid

disclosed in the Beavon patent is a condensate circulating

through the contact condenser. This condensate is used to

perform the functions of liquefying and separating water from

the hydrogenated gas stream before the function of treating to

remove hydrogen sulfide is performed. An advantage of doing

this is set out in the Beavon patent at column 5, lines 12-13, as

follows, “dilution of a treating absorption solution or like due to

the presence of condensable water is precluded.” The same

advantage inheres in using the loaded MDEA solution to

perform the same functions. The loaded MDEA solution is not a

treating absorption solution. Only the MDEA solution in the

absorbing zone is a treating absorption solution.

90. In the preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent,

the condensate includes a neutralizer to provide a safeguard

against the possibility of an undesired happening upsteam in

which some sulfur dioxide remains in the hydrogenated gas

stream. One of plaintiffs’ engineering documents describes soda

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ash injection points. One point of injection is into the quenching

zone. The injection of soda ash provides the same safeguard in

the Trencor H,S process that the neutralizer provides in the

preferred practice disclosed in the Beavon patent.

91. The condensate and the loaded MDEA solution are both

liquid, although not identical in composition. Both perform the

same functions of liquefying and separating water from the

hydrogenated gas stream before the function of treating to

remove hydrogen sulfide is preformed. The MDEA solution,

when jean, has a quality the condensate lacks, i.e., the ability to

absorb a substantial amount of hydrogen sulfide. That difference

in quality between the condensate and the lean MDEA solution

does not exist between the condensate and the loaded MDEA

solution. This is so because the loaded MDEA solution has been

formed by combining the lean MDEA solution with the removed

hydrogen sulfide.

92. In the way these two ingredients are used in the respec-

tive equipment, i.¢., the contact condenser and the quenching

zone, the loaded MDEA is a substitute for the condensate. The

two are interchangeable. Exhibits CL and EV show that

Trentham offered to build plants to carry out this process in

which a contact condenser would be used. In short, the conden-

sate and the loaded MDEA are equivalents as used in this

process. Likewise, the quenching zone and the absorbing zone in

the single absorbing tower are the equivalent of the two units, a

contact condenser and an absorption system, that are disclosed

in the Beavon patent.

93. The recitations of clauses (b) and (c) of claim 1 the |

Beavon patent apply substantively to the cooling and water

separating steps of the Trencor H,S process. The overall purpose

of the Trencor H,S process is identical to the overall purpose of

the Beavon invention as recited'in the preamble of claim 1. The

recitations of clauses (a) and (d) of claim | apply literally and

substantively to the hydrogenation and hydrogen sulfide remov-

ing steps, respectively, of the Trencor H,S process. Thus, every

clause of claim | applies substantively to a corresponding step of

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the Trencor H,S process. As a whole, the patented process and

the Trencor H,S process involve the same principles; they use

the same steps; they perform these steps in the same sequential

order; and they produce the same result.

94. In resolving the literal infringement issue, the Ceurt con-

sidered the question of whether the word “condensation” applies

to the change of phase the water undergoes in the quenching

zone in the Trencor H,S process. In Exhivit AL, a document in

which plaintiffs described the construction and operation of the

quenching zone, they said, “In quenching the hot gas a consider-

able amount of water will be condensed.” In an answer given in

an interrogatory (No. 22) during discovery, plaintiffs affirmed

“condensed water [will] be removed from the gas stream.” Mr.

Trentham gave deposition testimony in which he testified,

“Well, water is first stripped from the solution at the inlet to the

quench tower and then condensation occurs.” A vice president of

Trentham who serves as a process and project manager, viz, Mr.

Baumann, likewise testified that condensation occurs in the

quench tower. Plaintiffs’ contention that the word “condensa-

tion” does not apply rests solely on the trial testimony of their

expert who understands the phrase “condensed water” to be lim-

ited to liquid phase consisting of water and only water. The

meaning of the word “condensation” conveyed by the Beavon

patent is not so limited. Instead, it applies to liquid phase water

in a condensate that includes small amounts of hydrogen sulfide

and other chemicals. Mr. Beavon testified that any chemical

engineer would consider the way the water changes phase in the

Trencor H,S process to be condensation. The Court finds that

the preponderance of the evidence is persuasive that the word

“condensation” applies. Thus, clauses (b) and (c) of claim |

apply literally, as well as substantively, to the cooling and water

separating steps of the Trencor H,S process.

H. THE ANTITRUST COUNTERCLAIM

95. Approximately two years after Environmental initiated

this litigation, Trentham filed a pleading containing allegations

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that are collectively referred to herein as the “antitrust counter-

claim.” Under the theory advanced by Trentham, it was

required to prove that the patent was fraudulently procured (a

so-called “ Walker Process claim’ under Walker Process Equip.

Vv. Food Mach. Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 [1965]) or

known by the defendants to be invalid.

96. A clear and convincing standard of proof applies to a

Walker Process claim. Cataphote Corporation v. De Soto

Chemical Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1971).

97. The same standard of proof applies to a claim based on

bad faith infringement suits. Hangards, Inc. v. Ethicon, 601

F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979), .ets forth this rule and notes, “a

patentee’s infringement suit is presumptively in good faith and

that this presumption can be overcome only by clear and con-

vincing evidence.”

98. Trentham filed to establish either that the Beavon patent

was fraudulently procured or that defendants knew or should

have known the patent wes invalid. This failure of proof is a

sufficient basis for dismissing Trentham’s antitrust counterclaim.

99. Further, with respect to the alleged violation of Section |

of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Trentham failed to show the

existence of any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint

of trade. The evidence at trial revealed only a lawful business

arrangement under which defendant Union acts as the principal

licensing agent for negotiating licenses authorizing use of the

Beavon process, and under which the defendants share royalties

received from licenses.

100. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, prohibits

monopolization, and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.

When Section 2 is applied to allegations of the type Trentham

has made, the claims of an illegal patent “in and of themselves,

must provide the monopoly power proscribed by Section 2...”

Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Curtis Laboratories, 597 F.2d

1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1979). As to Trentham’s allegations of

attempt and conspiracy to monopolize, Trentham had the

B-28

burden to establish “(1) specific intent to control prices or

destroy competition which respect to a part of commerce; (2)

predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing

the unlawful purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability of suc-

cess." Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing v. Best Seam

Incorporated, 616 F.2d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 1980).

101. Trentham failed to show that defendants, individually

or jointly, had a specific intent to control prices or destroy com-

petition. In licensing of the Beavon process, defendants have fol-

lowed a basic approach of offering nonexclusive licenses to inter-

ested parties under terms that are nondiscriminatory. The

reasonableness of the license fee belies any intent to control

prices and is further confirmation of what was separately estab-

lished by other evidence, namely, the claims of the Beavon

patent do not place in defendants the power to control prices of,

or exclude competition from, Claus plant tail gas treating

processes. The Beavon process has competed and continues to

compete in the marketplace with alternative processes.

102. An antitrust injury is an injury that “flows” from an

antitrust violation. “To ‘flow’ from the wrong, ... the loss must

be ‘the type of loss that the claimed violations would be likely to

cause.” Handgards, supra, at 997. Trentham failed to prove it

sustained any such antitrust injury. Trentham offered only its

expenses in this litigation as its proof of damages. The litigation,

however, was initiated by Environmental (in which Trentham is

the sole general partner) and that action was taken at a time

when no decision had been made by defendants regarding litiga-

tion against either Environmental or Trentham. Trentham’s

assertions of claimed “injury,” ¢.g., that the litigation was

required to protect an investment in development work, were not

supported by evidence establishing either that the “injury” had

occurred or a connection between the claimed “injury” and the

existence of the Beavon patent.

B-29

I. DAMAGES FOR INFRINGEMENT

103. Defendants had an established royalty rate for the

granting of non-exclusive licenses under the Beavon patent to

interested parties. The royalty rate was calculated on a formula

which, when applied to the facts of this case, works out to

$14,000. A license at that rate was in fact offered to plaintiff by

defendants.

104. Any Conclusion of Law deemed to be a Finding of Fact

is hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Any Finding of Fact deemed to be a Conclusion of Law is

incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.

2. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28

U.S.C. § 1338.

3. Parsons is the owner of the entire right, title, and interest

in and to the Beavon patent and has the right to maintain a

counterclaim for infringement.

4. Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, the Beavon patent is entitled to a

presumption of validity. The additional prior art that has been

cited by plaintiffs does not weaken or destroy the presumption of

validity. It is merely cumulative to prior art cited to the U.S.

Patent Office. Sante Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P & Z Company, Inc.,

569 F.2d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978).

5. The subject matter of the Beavon patent was nonobvious

and meets ali the conditions for patentability under 35 U.S.C.

§ 103.

6. During the prosecution of the Beavon applications which

led to issuance by the U.S. Patent Office of the Beavon patent,

there was neither fraud nor inequitable conduct which adversely

affects the validity or enforceability of the Beavon patent.

7. The Beavon patent is valid and enforceable.

8. Any person who actively induces direct infringement of a

patent is liable as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). It is an act of

B-30

direct infringement to use a patented invention within the

United States during the patent term, without the patentee’s

consent, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The “patented invention” is defined

by the claim or claims of the patent.

9. There are two main steps in the analysis of whether a

claim has been infringed. The first involves an examination of

the relationship between the claim and the teachings which the

patentee has addressed to those skilled in the art. In this

examination, the claim language is construed in light of relevant

patent documents to determine the scope of the invention the

patentee has pointed out in the claims. The second involves an

examination of the relationship between the claimed invention

and the product or process that stands accused of infringement.

If that product or process is within the scope of the claimed

invention, infringement exists; otherwise it does not.

10. A finding that the claim applies both literally and sub-

Stantively to the accused product process necessitates a

determination that the claim has been infringed. Graver Tank

Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-609 (1950).

Alternatively, a finding that the claim applies substantively,

although not literally, to the accused product or process requires

a determination that the claim has been infringed, so long as

there is no file wrapper estoppel that precludes such a

determination of infringement. Union Oil Co. of California v.

American Bitumuls Co., 109 F.2d 140, 144-146 (9th Cir. 1940).

11. The parties have advanced contrary contentions as to

what claim | means, particularly with respect to two matters.

One matter concerns the word “condensation” and its cognates

which appear in the claim; the other matter concerns the phrase

“prior to contact” which does not appear in the claim.

12. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the

word “condensation” literally applies to the change of phase

water undergoes in the Trencor H,S process within the quench-

ing zone. Furthermore, the purpose and effect of liquefying

water in the Trencor H,S process are identical to the purpose

B-31

and effect of liquefying water in accordance with claim |. Sub-

stantially the same means is used for the identical purpose to

bring about the identical effect.

13. The phrase “prior to contact” appears in a dependent

claim, viz, claim 11, not included within the counterclaim for

infringement. The expression of this limitation in the dependent

claim but not in the independent claim supports the conclusion

that the independent claim has a broader scope.

14. Reading claim | more broadly than dependent claim 11

does not enlarge the scope of the patent beyond the actual inven-

tion Mr. Beavon taught therein. The actual invention embraces

convenient alternatives that are substantively the same; it is not

limited to the preferred practice disclosed in the specification. In

that preferred practice, the cooling and water separating steps

occur in a contact condenser by contacting the gas stream with a

cooling liquid identified as a condensate. No absorption solution,

lean or loaded, is part of that condensate. However, the actual

invention is not limited to using a cooling liquid that does not

include an absorption solution. To the contrary, the use of

loaded MDEA solution for the same purpose and to the same

effect, viz, cooling the gas stream and separating liquefied water

before treating to remove hydrogen sulfide, is within the scope of

the actual invention. Likewise, replacing the contact condenser

and absorption system with an absorption tower having two

functionally separate zones for sequentially quenching and then

absorbing is within the scope of the actual invention. No Joint

Concrete Pipe Co. v. Hanson, 344 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1965).

15. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel does not prevent a

determination that the Trencor H,S process is within the scope

of claim 1. The gravamen of that doctrine “is that an applicant

who acquiesces in the rejection of his claim, and accordingly

modifies it to secure its allowance, will not subsequently be

allowed to expand his claim by interpretation to include the

principles originally rejected or their equivalents.” /nternational

Manufacturing Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.

1964).

B-32

16. Neither claim 1 nor any of the independent claims

presented to the examiner was ever modified to express the

phrase “prior to contact.” None of these claims was ever modi-

fied to include that phrase by necessary implication. The extent

of the necessary implication of the relevant modifications, which

involved the cooling and water separating steps, was that the

claim required the water separating step to precede the final step

of treating to remove hydrogen sulfide. The Trencor H,S process

requires that. The determination that claim | embraces the

Trencor H,S process does not expand the claim to include any

principles originally rejected or their equivalents.

17. Further, the modifications to the cooling and water

separating steps did not secure the allowance of any claim.

Instead, the application was allowed as a result of the redefini-

tion of the first step of the claim to require simultaneous cat-

alytic hydrogenation and hydrolysis. The Trencor H,S process

requires that. In summary, the Trencor H,S process in every

substantive respect comes within the scope of claim 1. The prac-

tice of the Trencor H,S Process infringes the Beavon patent.

18. The defendants’ and counterclaim plaintiffs’ established

royalty rate is the proper measure of damages to be awarded to

them on account of counterclaim defendants’ infringement of

the Beavon patent. United States National Bank v. Fabri-Valve

Company, 235 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1956).

DATED: August 18, 1982

/s/ MARIANA R. PFAELZER

Mariana R. Pfaelzer

United States District

Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. CV 76-917 MRP

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and

THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,

Defendants.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and

THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY,

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

Vi

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS. 'TD. and

TRENTHAM CORPORATION,

Counterclaim Defendants.

This action having come on for trial before the Honorable

Mariana R. Pfaelzer, United States District Judge presiding, the

issues having been duly tried and Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law having been entered,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED,

1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in

this action are adopted for the purposes of, and are hereby made

a part of, this Final Judgment, and the permanent injunction

herein granted is issued on the basis of said Findings and

Conclusions.

2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter hereof

and the parties hereto.

3. The claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877 are valid and

enforceable.

C-2

4. Counterclaim defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd.

and Trentham Corporation have each infringed, and have each

actively induced infringement of, claims 1 through 8 and 12 of

U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.

5. Plaintiff (and counterclaim defendant) Environmental

Designs, Ltd.’s complaint for declaration of invalidity and non-

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877 is dismissed.

6. The separate counterclaim of Trentham Corporation for

alleged antitrust violations is dismissed.

7. Counterclaim defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd.

and Trentham Corporation, their officers, agents, servants,

employees, and those persons, companies, or corporations in

active concert or in participation with either of them, and each

of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from infringing the

claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,752,877.

8. Defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs The Ralph M.

Parsons Company and Union Oil Company of California are,

based upon their proofs of an established royalty as the fee for a

non-exclusive paid-up license, jointly awarded damages in the

amount of $14,000 for the infringing acts of counterclaim

defendants Environmental Designs, Ltd. and Trentham

Corporation, said counterclaim defendants to be jointly and

severally liable for said damages.

9. Defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs The Ralph M.

Parsons Company and Union Oil Company of California are

jointly awarded their costs in this action, Environmental

Designs, Ltd. and Trentham Corporation to be jointly and sever-

ally liable for said costs.

DATED: August 18, 1982

/s/ MARIANA R. PFAELZER

Mariana R. Pfaelzer

United States District Judge

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 83-554

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS, LTD., AND THE TRENTHAM CorP.,

Appellants,

V.

UNION O1L COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA AND RALPH M.

Parsons, Co.,

Appellees.

ORDER

A petition for rehearing having been filed in this case,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is Ordered by the

court that the petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby,

Denied.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ GeorGeE E. HUTCHINSON

CLERK

September 21, 1983

Date

ce: Andrew J. Belansky

B. R. Pravel

E-|

7

-

APPENDIX E-

3,752,877

D. K BEAVYON

Aug. 14, 1973

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E-2

APPENDIX E-2

EXCERPT FROM U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877

Col. 5, Lines 6-16

The step of cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least

the dew point of water and removing the water condensed is

important to hydrogen sulfide extraction. First of all, the gas

stream may be reduced to a temperature desirable for extraction

of absorption of formed hydrogen sulfide. Since the cooled

stream will be in some equilibrium with its contained water,

dilution of a treating absorption solution or like due to the

presence of condensable water is precluded. In addition, any

trace amounts of sulfur dioxide which would react with and con-

sume valuable treating chemicals is eliminated.

E-3

APPENDIX E-3

CLAIM | OF U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877

1. A continuous process for reducing the sulfur content of

effluent gas streams containing water, sulfur dioxide, carbonyl

sulfide and carbon disulfide which comprises the steps of:

(a) enriching the effluent gas stream with a source of

hydrogen to a level which is at least equal to the stoichi-

ometric amount of hydrogen required ‘o convert the con-

tained sulfur dioxide to hydrogen sulfide and water and

sulfur to hydrogen sulfide and catalytically hydrogenating

at least essentially all of the contained sulfur dioxide to

hydrogen sulfide and water and sulfur to hydrogen sulfide

and simultaneously hydrolyzing carbonyl sulfide and

carbon disulfide to hydrogen sulfide at a temperature

from about 300 to about 800°F., whereby contained

water and water formed in the hydrogenation of sulfur

dioxide to hydrogen sulfide are utilized for the hydrolysis

of carbonyl sulfide and carbon disulfide;

(b) cooling the hydrogenated gas stream to at least the dew

point of water to condense water;

(c) separating condensed water from the hydrogenated gas

stream; and

(d) treating the cooled hydrogenated gas stream to remove

hydrogen sulfide.

E-4

APPENDIX E-4

CLAIM 11 OF U.S. PATENT NO. 3,752,877

11. A process as claimed in claim 8 in which the formed

water and water present in the hydrogenated effluent gas stream

are condensed prior to contact with the absorption solution.

i. stl tm

F-1

APPENDIX F

EXERPT FROM FILE HISTORY

Page 40

Claims 1-5 and 8-13 are rejected as not complying with the

requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112. Reference claim | it is not

apparent how a stream of sulfur dioxide may be mixed with 70%

of the stoichiometric requirement of hydrogen and essentially all

of the sulfur oxide be converted to hydrogen sulfide. These lim-

itations would appear (disclosure p. 3, lines 10-20) to be

alternate procedures. Reference claim 9 it is not apparent how

simple addition of carbon monoxide to sulfur dioxide will result

in formation of hydrogen. Reference claims 11 and | 2 it is not

apparent what utility exists in removing the water from the gas

stream prior to contact with an aqueous solution.

G-1

APPENDIX G

EXERPT FROM FILE HISTORY

Page 46 (Paragraphs 2 & 3)

As to claims 11 and 12, it should be evident from the dis-

closure that the presence of water in the gas stream would dilute

an aqueous absorption solution. Removing condensed water is

now required by claims | and 14. This, as has well been pointed

out, occurs under conditions where there is essentially no sulfur

dioxide present to form corrosive polythionic acids. This permits

the gas stream to be introduced to an aqueous absorption solu-

tion free of water of condensation and free of corrosive com

pounds. In addition, the absorption solution will not be diluted

by water of condensation nor consumed by chemical reaction

with sulfur dioxide. Any trace amounts of sulfur dioxide which

eluded hydrogenation is removed in solution with condensed

water and easily controlled by the addition of alkali to the con-

densed water. (See page 6, line 29 et sec.)

Thus, it is respectfully submitted that significant utility exists

in removing water and any trace amounts of sulfur dioxide from

the gas stream prior to contact with an aqueous absorption

solution.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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