Respondents Brief — United States v. Morton
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CORRECTION OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Air Force may
take the pay of one of its members and
pay it over to such member's former wife
on the basis of a void judgment of a state
court, the judgment being void for lack of
in personam jurisdiction over such member,
when the Air Force knew the said state
court's judgment was void before it first
took such member's pay, and after taking
such member's pay be immune from suit by
the member against the Air Force for such
member's military pay.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Summary Of Argument .....eeeeeeesnees aes |
Argument:
1. The Court of Appeals' decision
is consistent with the policy of
the United States concerning the
administration of military pay.
The government's position sup-
ports the taking of military pay
without due process of law. The
military's Home of Record State-
ment does not refer to domicile;
the Alabama judgment for alimony
and child support is void. The
Air Force's contention that the
presumption of the proceedings
being “regular on its face" is
superior to actual knowledge
£8 NOC VALLE... cccccccvcccccccese 9
Utilizing the definitions in 42
U.S.C. 659 et seq., as amended,
requires the Court of Appeals
decision to be upheld; immunity
of the government is not abso-
lute; intent of the Congress was
to insulate the government only
when an order was voidable, not
when it is void; support obli-
gations are not debts until
created by a court of competent
jurisdiction; situs of debt is
with creditor. Notice is not
synonymous with service of
PEOCESES. cee esses seseseeeseseees 27
(44)
(iii)
Argument - Continued: Page
Be
The Comptroller General's opin-
ion is not controlling; later
enacted agency regulations cannot
be relied upon to reverse a court
decision; the court decision does
not aa i ee to Col.Morton
CWICR. cccccccccccccccns eovcccncee 53
The Court of Appeals' decision
does not impose on the govern-
ment greater liability than that
on a private garnishee; the ex-
posure of the government is de
minimis........ TELEULECEREEE EE 61
The Court of Appeals' decision
does not place the government
nor the federal courts in the
domestic relations business.
Congress put the federal govern-
ment in the garnishment business. .69
Domestication of a foreign de-
cree requires in personam juris-
diction over a defendant; the
purposes of 42 U.S.C.659 are
supported by the Court Of Appeals'
decision and in accord with Con-
gressional intent.......eeeeeees 72
Amicus has misunderstood the
facts of this case; URESA is a
good law capable of producing
excellent results and at the same
time treating both parties
fairly “ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 75
Page
CONCLUSION ccccccscccnccccccscccre oosy 97
Certificate of Service .......... cocoe 88
ABMONGIS ccoocccecccccccccccecvcesecee la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Accord v. Parsons, 551 F.Supp.115
(Dee WD VOcs L082) cccccccsccecs 71
ee eS TaUe Rie 1890 oe... 21
Alexander v. FERC, 609 F.2d 543
Wetion Gis gs ERIOE csr cvveneceves 54
Appice of Beyyrer
. a . 933) eee eene . 24
Argserotd v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.
DSS dc ends B6ee a0 hme 21, 23, 44
Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin
. ) *e eeeneneeeneeeeeeeee 75
Beaufort County v. Maye: 207 N.C.
, - . 753 34) eee eeee 43
Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S. 393 (1961).. 9
Bennett Vv. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039
(D.c.Cir. 1982) e*eneeneeeneeneteeeeeeee 71
Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d
87 (4th CaF ABTS) cert.denied
409 U.S.912 (1972) eoeeeeeeeeeeeee 53
(v)
Cases - Continued: Page
Calhoun v. U.S., 557 F.2d 401 (4th
Cir.,1977) cert.denied, 434 U.S.
PES CABT7P. 6 voce aa weeveecdvéses 29, 49
Cherry v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1184
(CI.ct., 1980) and 697 F.2d 1043
(C.A. Fed.Cir., 1983) .w..ceceee 12, 60
City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.57 (1884) 60
Cochran v. Cochran, 353 So.2d 805
as. SOTO) «dsoewdele es bacee 16
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th
ee a ener yi |
Cunningham v. Dept.of Navy, 455
F.Supp. 1370(D.C.Conn. Sh were 38, 50
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541(1948) 41,44
Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall.(74 U.S)
509 (1
869) Se Vee Ceweeeeeseeseeeeeeees eS 32
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
73) e*enereenete#enreeente#e#n#ee#keee#e#ee#ee###e#e#*# 6
Greenwood v. Furr, 251 S.W. 332
us SEE RE ca cccdeowens iene oe
Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W. 700 (N.D.,
1935) *enere@enrneteeeee#ee#e#ee#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#ee#ee##e#ee# ee 23
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)40,86
Herb v. Pitcairn, 51 N.E.2d 277
[518 BoC ce 1943) *eeneneeeeeeeeeeeeee 35
(vi)
Cases - Continued: Page
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.352
TRE Silas 5s obese bible 60 Sub b> 44
Howell v. U.S., 195 F.Supp.597(1958) 60
In re Albin, 591 F.2d 94 (9th Cir.
In_re Knuppenburg, et al., 422
F.Supp.274 (Mich 1976) ....eeeeees 70
izmerjian v.Dept.of Air Force
# supp .825 (D., S.C.1978)
Affd. 607 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1979);
cert.denied 444 U.S. 1032 (1980);
CicCt. No.364-82C (Feb.1l, 1984) eee 50
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
0) Pr Prrrrrrrrerrr rT rere 51
Mayet v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp.15
Bets: BeBitleS ORIG) vescee cococcece ta
Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555
) *e #w@eeeeeee e*eneretieneeeneeee#ee#ee#se# # 44
Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S.173(1909) .20
Lee v. Indep.School Dist., 149 Iowa
345, N. . , N.W. 533
(S.C., Iowa, 1910) e*enereeeneteneteee e#e © @ 43
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F.Supp.998
D.C., Wisc. 1982) @eeeeseeeoeee@asenseneee? 71
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)...... 39
(vii)
Cases - Continued: Page
Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Nash
So. Ala. 21, 41, 42, 46
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)..36
Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 288
Uews 46 9 erie e#eeeeenete#ees#e#e###e#e#e 45
Minton v. First Natl.Exchange Bank
of Virginia, 206 Va.560, £5 S.E.2da
139 (Va.8.C. 1965) .cccccccccccccee 43
Morton v. U.S., 708 F.2d 680 (C.A.,
Paes SUED) 60 bler we ina 680 23, 55
Natl.Metal Co. v. Greene Corsal
Copper Co., 1l Ariz.108, 89 P.535
(S.Ct. Ariz. 1907) .....eees covesee 43
Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826
(Sth Cir.1963) *eneteneneeeneeeneeee#ee#e##e#e#e#e 70
Orr v. Orr, 351 So.2d 904 (Ala.App.,
1977); 351 So.2d 906 (S.C. Ala.
1977) 440 U.S. 268 (1979) eee ee eee 86
Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So.2d 1170
se) Vt) PEL. stare ciate luisa bets Sls >ae
O'Toole v. Helio Products, Inc.
149 N.E. 2d. 795 (C.A., T11. ,1958).. 48
Overman v. U.S., 563 F.2d 1287
(8th Cis. 1977) seer eeevrereeeeneeve 29, 50
Partlow v.Partlow, 20 S.2d 517
(Ala., 1945) se wee eenreneeneeneeeeneee #¢# @ 42
(viii)
Cases - Continued: Page
Popple v. U.S., 416 F. Supp.1227
tS-C.N Ye 1976) wcoo 29, 38, 50
Rock Island Line v. Strum
(L0e Bch TEE CHOONET ccciedeicscccu 208
Rush v. U.S. Agency for Internatl.
Development, 706 F.2d 1229 (D.c.
Cares FSS) No. 82-1853 (Apr.26,1983)
cert.denied USSC No. 83-382,
Jan.9, 1984 oeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeneene 51
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.186
SRUVER sks ks db Us wien kee eed kaw 41, 86
Sheffield v. Sheffield, 148 S.E.2d
S.C.Va.1L96060) wescccccccves 45
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948) *enereeneenrnrene#e# #@#e#eeee#e#e##e#e#e#e# 5l, 74
Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn.36, 15 S.W.2d
147 (S.C.Tenn., 1929) ae dats ede waa
Snapp v. U.S.Postal Service-
Texarkana, 004 F.2d 1329, (4th
Cis: 1982) oeeeeeereeeeeeeneeeee 38, 50
Southern eo v. Ward, 26 So.234
a. *enriee@enrtneeteeeeeeee#ee##e#e#e# @ 21, 46
Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall (77 U.S.)
870) *eneeeeenereeeeeeee eeee#e#ee#e 32
Stewart v. Northern Assurance Co.
EB. 218 (W.Va., 1895) eeeeeeeee 61
(ix)
Cases - Continued: Page
Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67,
I a Saw wm elhe 43
U.S. v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1980)... 52
U.S. v. Harris, 347 U.S.612 (1954)... 52
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
we Ls eben G ab bo 6b 0b we tates 08
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d l
. av eee Se Ce e'o 86 ee e868 8 ee 8 8S. @ 24
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832
(4th Cir.1982); cert. denied, 103
ER) a eee ae ee |
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).70
Wilkinson v. Cohen, 57 So.2d 108
FRE se SOBL) cicceveccccccccesessdQ, al
Williams v. North Carolina I, 317
U.s.287 (1942) eee eevee eeeeeenene eee 26
Williams v. North Carolina II,
oie 226 (1945) *enereneeeeteeeeee#eee#e 26
Statutes and Regulations:
Alabama Code sec. 6.6-461 (1977)..45, 46
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4:2 (1973) Process ...... 16, 36
Rule 4:B (H) and (I) ener eaeeeeeeenene 37
(x)
Page
California Code of Civil Pro-
SeGere G00. 6L56c60 ccoceccecvsrvecs oe
Debt Collection Act of 1982,
S 8.8.6. BBO. BEAS. Sedvovvidctivecss bh
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
Bee éac oe
Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .. 9
Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C.
Ged. 204.6.<. 15 9, 3
S C.F.R.581.102 wccccccccccces coccces 22
S$81.308 cuccccccccccccccccces 57
S C.FP.R.58l (1983) cc ccccccccccccecee 58
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Sec.659 et seq. -..-. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 8
43, 14, » 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, .38, 37,: 38, ‘39
49, 50, 58, 62, 67, 69, 72, 74, 80
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seg. ... 12
13, 20, 64, 66, 68
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA), 9 U.L.A.
643 (1979) eee eee eeeee 19, 80, 81, 87
Uniform Services Former Spouses Pro-
tection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1408 ... 12, 14
67, 68
Virginia Code, Sec.20-79
(1950, as amended).... 78
(xi)
Other authorities:
Air Force Regulation 35-18 ..... 84, 85
49 AekeoRs TEAL 6 ic cbecesiegs veces coe 86
l Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative
oe Se & ee |
6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and
Garnishment,Sec.357.. 61
46 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments,
Des a 30% 43, 44, 46
SOC. 49 wccccccccecee 47
eS er 21
38 C.J.S., Garnishment, Sec.2(4)™... 20
125 Cong. Rec. S. 6722,
AGCLL 29, 2977 wervcse 39
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec.293(e).. 46
Federal Register, Vol.48
No.110, June 7, 1983..... 57
H.R.Rep.3477, 9th Cong.
lst Session,1977 ........ 32
In re Technical Sergeant Harry E.
_ Mathews, USAF, File No.B-203668
(Comp.Gen. Feb. 2, 1982) .... 53,56
l Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments Sec.16 comment c 146 (1982)..48
(xii)
Other authorities - Continued: Page
S. Rep. No. 95-66, 95th Cong.
lst Sess., (1977) 91 Stat. 126.... 32
Sutherland Statutory Construction
IV Ed., C. Dallas Sands,
Wok. 2 CE9GS) Bee. GEcOSe cécccsce — 97
-l-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is a claim brought against
the United States (Air Force) to recover a
military member's pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C.
§204, et seq., and the Pifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. The
defense of the Air Force is that 42 U.S.C.
$659 authorizes it to take the military pay
of one of its members on the basis of a
void judgment even though the Air Force
knew the judgment was void before it took
the member's pay. Such a position would
authorize the taking of property without due
process of law and certainly was not the
intent of Congress when it enacted 42 U.S.C.
$659. The decisions of the Court of
Claims (Claims Court) and of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal :
Circuit, interpret 42 U.S.C.659 so that it
meets not only its obvious intent but also 3
é2e
avoids constitutional difficulties.
l. The lower courts properly applied
the law to the facts in this case, consist-
ent with the policy of the United States
and the statute.
That the Alabama judgment for alimony
and child support upon which the garnish-
ment writ was issued is void for lack of
in personam jurisdiction over Col.Morton
is not contradicted by the Air Force.
It could not do so under the facts in
this case. Congress in the amendments to
42 U.S.C. 659 enacted in 1977, which were
intended to clarify the statute, made it
clear that the immunity granted the govern-
ment under the etatate was a limited one.
The Air Force, however, has lifted out of
context, one phrase of the statute,
“regular on its face” and based its
primary defense on those words. Although.
those words have a legal meaning established 4
~
long before the enactment of this statute,
the Air Force has redefined them for its
convenience to mean that its immunity is
absolute. This is contra to the terms of
the statute and the law of statutory
construction. However, even under the Air
Force's erroneous definition, the Alabama
court's judgment and writ were not regular
on their face.
2. The definitions of terms set forth in
42 U.S.C. 659, when applied to the facts
of this case, make the Air Force's with-
holding of Col. Morton's pay arbitrary
and illegal. The Alabama court was not
"a court of competent jurisdiction" because
of the lack n personam jurisdiction
over Col. Morton. Because the Alabama
judgment for a ny and child support was
not a “judgment issued in accordance with
applicable state law by a court of competent
jurisdiction” (which is the definition given
age
to alimony and child support by 42 U.S.C.
662 (b) and (c)). The procedure in the
Alabama court was not in accordance with
Alabama law. Consequently, the pay that
was withheld and paid to the Alabama court
by the Air Force was not for alimony and
child support:. Additionally, the Court of
Appeals said, these payments were not
“legal obligations" under Section 659(a).
In view of the fact that the Air
Force knew all these facts prior to taking
Bhs pay, its actions show a callous dis-
regard for the rights of the service
member. Nothing in this statute
indicates other statutes and laws are to
be ignored in order to achieve the purposes
of this act. The Air Force's contention
would bring about chaos in the law by
' giving legal effect to void judgments;
it would deny constitutional rights by 4
preventing service members from obtaining f
Coy &,
-5-
a fair and effective hearing; it would
overturn a long line of this court's
cases; and it would encourage forum
shopping for divorce courts.
The Air Porce has failed to distinguish
voidable judgments from void judgments.
Consequently, its conclusions are in error.
3. The Comptroller General's opinion
cannot be cited as authority for reversal
of a court's decision on the same subject.
Neither can regulations promulgated after
a court's decision be used as authority
to overrule that decision. Neither can
regulations expand or take away from the
statutes' clear words.
4. The Court of Appeals' decision places
most of the burden of investigation and
documentation upon the member and upon
the counsel for the garnishors, The
burden on the government is far less than
that placed on a private garnishee, the
-6=
government being immune from suit solely
on the basis of 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq.,
as amended. Further, insistence upon the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
being honored by the state court will
remove most if not all the burden.
"Administrative convenience" is not a
shibboleth, the mere recitation of which
dictates constitutionality." Frontiero v.
Richardson 411 U.S.677 (1973).
Ss. Neither the federal courts, nor the
government have been placed in the domestic
relations business by the Court of Appeals’
decision. Simply because 42 U.S.C. 659 et
seg., as amended, requires the Air Force
to make sure the state law is followed and
the court entering the original judgment
upon which the garnishment writ is issued
had jugisdiction of the parties, does not
place it in the domestic relations business. | ‘
oF ’ .
t 0 4
‘ , : ae * 2 va >
“Sy ee ee ols ie a eS hr Pa ee ee se
oa
This case involves only the legal relation-
ship between Col.Morton and the United
States Air Force. The Court of Claims
has not required the government to inter-
vene in the divorce case, nor to enjoin the
suit, nor to modify that judgment in any
way. The Court of Appeals' ruling has
no effect whatsoever on the Alabama judgment.
There is no other necessary party. Patricia
Kay Morton could have been called by the
Air Force as their witness, if in fact her
testimony would have been any different
from that of Col. Morton or his witnesses.
The Air Force did not call her as a witness,
neither in person, nor by deposition, nor
by affidayit. Most of the evidence in the
case was documentary, needing little
evidence by way of testimony. The federal
courts haye ruled that they may not refuse
to entertain suit simply because some facet
of the suit involves intra family aspects.
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,(4th Cir.1980).
o§e
6. The Air Forces contention that a judg-
ment of a state court can be moved to any
state and a garnishment writ brought on it
is incorrect. Suit must be brought on a
judgment when it is moved to another state
and valid service of process made on the
defendar.t in the state to which it is
moved, thus bringing the judgment debtor
before the court of the second state before
a writ of garnishment can be brought in the
second state.
The purpose of Congress in the enact-
ment of 42 U.S.C. 659, et seq., as amended
has been carried out by the Court of
Appeals' ruling. It could not have been
the intent of Congress to interpret a law
so that it deprives a person of his
constitutional rights.
7. The amicus has erred as to the facts ’
of this case. Consequently, his arguments.
do not apply to this case. He has also
cited cases that support Col.Morton's con-
tentions.
«Qa
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals' decision is consist-
ent with the policy of the United States
concerning the administration of military
pay: The government's position supports
the taking of military pay without due
process of law. The military's Home of
Record Statement does not refer to domicile;
the Alabama judgment for alimony and child
support is void. The Air Force's content-
ion that tlhe presumption of the proceedings
being "regular on its face" is superior to
actual knowledge is not valid.
l. This case was brought against the
United States (Air Force) to recover a
military member's pay pursuant to Title 37,
Sec.204 et seq., United States Code and
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. (Res.App.la).(Pet.App.
A-la). It is well settled that the United
States may not circumvent the unambiguous
financial obligation which the law imposes
on the United States to pay to a member
of the Armed Services, his military pay,
without valid, legal justification for
doing so. Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S.393 (1961).
-10-
The strict rules regarding the sanctity of
a military member's right to his military
pay is a well settled principle of the law.
Even in the extreme case of Otho Bell, who
was a turn-coat prisoner-of-war during the
hostilities in Korea in the 1950s, who show-
ed utter disloyalty to his comrades and to
his country, who consorted, fraternized,
and cooperated with the enemy, sought favors
for himself causing hardship to his fellow
prisoners and who refused repatriation and
went to Communist China after the hostilit-
ies ceased, the military service was required
to pay him his military pay for the period
he was a prisoner-of-war because he was not
absent without leave or in any other status
permitting involuntary withholding of pay.
If the military services could withhold
the pay of one of its members on any
principle no matter how seemingly compell-
ing, other than on a strict legal basis,
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—_ —_ ait? aah * - — oo ee & DP aw wiis ss. - =:
-ll-
surely Otho Bell's case was one. It must be
noted that the Congress in 1982 enacted
legislation providing that the military may
not even withhold a member's pay for a debt
owed to the United States (for the most
part over payments of allowances, claims
for damage to household goods in shipment,
etc.), unless it gives the member (a) 30
days written notice, (b) an opportunity to
inspect the records of the alleged debt,
(c) an opportunity to enter into a written
agreement to establish a schedule for
repayment and (d) an opportunity for a
hearing before an impartial person (to
include an Administrative Law Judge.)
Debt Collection Act of 1982, 5 U.S.C., 5514.
(Res.App.to Brief 1 a). The duty of any
person administering the funds of another
owes that other person the highest fidelity.
The obligation of the military to its
member concerning the military pay is even
— ’ : " —. | . ae a oo ill
-12<
greater because the exigencies of the
military service may effectively prevent the
member from monitoring such administration.
Indeed, he shouldn't have to check.
The military service is liable for
the arbitrary and capricious administration
of a military member's pay. A claim for
restoration of the pay that was due and
unpaid to the military member results from
such acts. Cherry v.U.S., 640 F.2d 1184
(1980); 697 F.2d 1043 (Fed.Circ.1983).
The Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.A.§501 et seg., prevents
any default judgment for the payment of
money or property from being entered against
a member of the Armed Services on active
duty in the event any suit is allowed to go
forward in such member's absence.
Added to all this, Congress enacted
the Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.
1408, et seg.,which became effective on
. .
So =. met ee,
136
February 1, 1983, (Res.App.to Brief 2a).
This Act provides that any court ordering
payment of child support as defined in
42 U.S.C. 662 (b) and alimony as defined in
42 U.S.C. 662 (c), must be a court of comp-
etent jurisdiction; any judgment must be
issued in accordance with the laws of the
jurisdiction of that court; that the court
order or other documents served with the
court order, certify that the rights of the
military member under the Soldier's and
Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.A.
§50l1 et seq.), were observed; that it must
be issued by a court of competent jurisdict-
ion; it must be legal in form and include
nothing on its face that provides reasonable
notice that it is issued without authority of
law. The Act also stated that "a court may
not treat the disposable retired or retainer
' pay of a member in the manner described
: unless the court has jurisdiction over the
athe
member by reason of (a) his residence, other
than because of military assignment, in the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, (b)
his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court or (c) his consent to the
jurisdiction of the court." Sec.1408C(4).
(Res.App.to Brief 2 a). Had Congress had
this Morton case before it, it could not
have spoken more clearly to the issue.
From all this, exclusive of the Act
in question in this case, we find the legal
principles and the policies of the United
States are that the military services must
exercise the highest degree of care and
fidelity to the military member in adminis-
tering his pay and allowances.
Regardless of these well settled
legal principles and laws and the policy
they show, the Air Force's contention is
that 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq., as amended,
authorizes it to take the military pay of
-15-
~ one of its Air Force members on the basis
of a void judgment, even though the Air
Force knew the judgment was void before it
took the member's pay 4)
(1) The Air Force received the first writ
of garnishment with a copy of the judgment
attached on 27 December, 1976. On 30 Dec-
ember, 1976, Col. Morton notified the Air
Force Accounting and Finance Center that the
judgment was not served nor was he notified
and that he was not domiciled in nor a resi-
dent of Alabama. (Pet.App.39a,%6). On
January 10, 1977, Col.Morton advised the Air
Force that he had received service of process
by mail. (Pet.App.38a,%5). Despite this, the
Air Force confessed indebtedness on 1l Jan-
uary, 1977, and withheld his pay and paid
it over to Alabama. (Pet.App.39a,47).
By letter of 29 March, 1977, Col.
Morton's present counsel forwarded to James ~
R.Russell, Civilian Attorney-Advisor assigned
to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center,
Denver, Colorado 80279 (Pet.App.37a) a letter
explaining why the Alabama judgment for
alimony, custody and child support was
void and enclosed a certified copy of the
entire Alabama record which Mr. Russell in
his affidavit refers to as documents, and
which included the affidavit of non-residency
of Col. Morton, executed by Patricia Kay
Morton (Pet.App.39a,4%18). Attached to
the letter were copies of cancelled checks
drawn by Col. Morton to Patricia K.Morton
proving he had paid her voluntarily.
@16<
In other words the government's position is
that 42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended, author-
izes their taking of the pay and allowances
of a military member without due process of
law and in spite of the fact that the govern-
ment is aware that the taking was without due
process of law when the taking occurrea{?)
(2) On June 1,1977, the said Attorney-Advisor
for the Air Force wrote a letter to the U.S.
Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama and the said
Attorney-Advisor prepared an affidavit for this
case in which he stated that the U.S.attorney
advised that such service was sufficient pur-
suant to Rule 4:2, Alabama Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. (Pet.App.40a). However, the said Air
Force attorney, knowing the date of the certi-
fied mail he referred to in his affidavit was
1974 and not 1977, failed to point out this
crucial fact to the U.S.Attorney. (See Res.App.
to Brief la). Rule 4 of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure in effect in 1974, (Res.App.7a)
when the suit was filed and substituted service
was made, did not permit substituted service on
a non-resident in a domestic case for any pur-
pose except the termination of the marital
status. This was changed in January 1977, by
Rule 4:2 which requires, in order for Alabama
to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
non-resident for purposes of alimony, child
support and custody, that the parties had to
have last lived together in Alabama and one
spouse had to continue to live in Alabama or
. some wrong against the marriage had to have
occurred in Alabama. (Res.App.to Brief 3a).
The U.S. Attorney's reference to Rule 4:2 ~
proyed that he understood the time involved
to be 1977 not 1974. (See Res.App.to Brief 57a).
Cochran v. Cochran, 353 So.2d 805 (1978).
eile
After the Air Force received the writ of
garnishment in this case, Col. Morton put
the Air Force on Notice that the Alabama
proceedings were void. He did this before
the Air Force withheld his pay. The Air
Force withheld and paid his pay to Alabama
in spite of his protestations and without
investigation. After a letter from Col.
Morton's counsel which enclosed the Alabama
records, an Air Force Attorney-Advisor, whose
duties are to review these garnishments, did
decide to check into the matter by asking a
U.S. Attorney in Alabama about it. However,
he erroneously advised the U.S. Attorney
that the Air Force records showed Col.Morton
to be an Alabama domiciliary. This was the
Air Force "Home of Record” document. Depart-
ment of Defense regulations make it clear
that the "Home of Record" document is used
solely for the purpose of fixing travel and
transportation allowances. (Pet.App.82a%6(b)).
It only refers to the place from which the
-18-
member entered the service and the Air
Force cautions, in the "Home of Record"
document, that it is not to be confused
with "“domifile” of the member. (Res.App.
to Brief 7a).
The Air Force does not argue in its
Petition or Brief that the Alabama judgment
for alimony and child support is not void.
Indeed, such an argument would be difficult
in the face of the facts in this case. Col.
Morton was not personally served with process
to bring him before the Alabama court (Pet.
App.89(a)); he was not a domiciliary of
Alabama when the suit was filed (Pet.App.
7la); he had no “minimum contacts" with
Alabama when the suit was filed (Pet.App.
78a); there is no evidence Col.Morton
committed any act against the marriage in
Alabama (Pet.App.90a); and the Mortons last
lived together in Virginia (Pet.App.85a);
Alabama had no “long-arm" statute for
bow
af
~
-~
iY
—
~19@
alimony and child support when the Alabama
suit was filed (Pet.App.93a,94a), except of
course the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, and Col. Morton made no appear-
ance of any Kind in the Alabania divorce suit.
(Pet.App.89a). To this must be added the
facts that the Alabama suit was dismissed
prior to judgment for lack of prosecution
and the dismissal set aside without any
Notice to Col.Morton, (Pet.App.89a), and
that Col.Morton voluntarily paid alimony/
child support payments to Patricia Kay
Morton from the date of their separation
until the garnishment of his pay began,
(Pet.App.88a,89a). The initial garnishment
was for $4,100.00 which amount Col. Morton
could not have owed, assuming the Alabama
court had had jurisdiction over him by virtue
of the fact he had been voluntarily paying
Mrs.Morton. The Air Force also knew all of
this prior to the taking of Col.Morton's pay.
(Pet.App. 66a).
a > ie ee Gs Wide be i.
-20-
There was no affidavit filed among
the Alabama suit papers concerning Col.
Morton's military status, and no guardian
ad litem was appointed for him in accordance
with The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act, 50 U.S.C.A.§520. (Pet.App. 89a).
The Air Force contends, however, that
its actual knowledge of the fact that the
judgment upon which the garnishment writ was
predicated was void, is of less import in
legal effect in the administration of 42 U.S.C.
659 et seq., as amended, than the presumption
that the garnishment and judgment was "regular
on its face". This is an absurd contention.
Garnishment is an ancilliary or auxil-
iary proceeding, growing out of and dependent
on another original or primary action or
proceeding. Accordingly, where the principal
action is void, the garnishment is also void.
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, §2(4); Wilkinson v.
Cohen, 57 So.2d 108, (Ala.1951); Laborde v.
@2le@
Ubarri, 214 U.S.173,174(1909). A valid
judgment against a defendant in the original
suit is a prerequisite of the validity of a
judgment against a garnishee. Wilkinson v.
Cohen, (supra). A judgment, writ, order, and
the like, cannot be regular on its face if
the underpinnings of that judgment, the
proceedings that support it, are void no
matter what the judgment itself declares
itself to be. 46 Am.Jur.2d,Judgments, §663;
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.568 (1952);
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.416 (1957).
In Alabama, the state of the garnishment in
the case at bar, the garnishee has a duty to
see that there has been valid service of
process upon the defendant in the original
action (the divorce action in this case),
and that a valid judgment has been entered.
Southern Ry.Co. v. Ward, 26 So.234 (Ala.1898) ;
Alabama G.S.R.Co.v.Chumley, 9 So.286 (1890);
Louisville and N.R.Co.v. Nash,23 So.825
(1897). This same duty is written into the
-22-
Code of Federal Regulations implementing
42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended (5 C.F.R.
§581.102(f)). This is necessary to protect
the serviceman who, because of the exigencies
of the service, is not free to leave his
military post to litigate a divorce case.
Under the position espoused by the defendant
if the member of the service didn't do just
that, at the time the case was filed, his
property would be taken without due process
and contra to all the laws. The Air Force would
have given it away no matter how void it knew
the judgment to be. The statute 42 U.S.C.§659,
et seq., as amended, which is intended to
cure one wrong, would be perpetrating another
wrong, the more serious because it is a
danger to the rights created in our Constitut-
ion. The government contends that Col.Morton
must return to Alabama and litigate this
matter. In addition to being an exceptional
problem to the military member, this court
° “]
ut
. u
4 z
4 : EL Tis Bik wey Tote
{ i” ae meer ED y * ee ok ae oh ee
=230
summarily rejected such an argument in
Armstrong v. Armstrong, (supra). The
military member, contra to the civilian,
is not free to move about physically where-
ever and whenever he chooses.
The Court of Appeals did not feel
the need to address the issue of whether the
writ and judgment were "regular on their
face" (708 F.2d 680). The only reference
in this regard was made by the Court of
Claims (Claims Court) in its Findings of
Fact that the writ was on a "regular form"
used in Alabama. (Pet.App.90a).
The term "regular on its face" or
its opposite, "void on its face", is a legal
term of art having a definite meaning in the
law. The "face" of a judgment or writ is
not, as the Air Force contends, the last
document filed in a cause, it is the entire
record of the case. (Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W.
700 (N.D.1935). A judgment is “void on its
face" when its invalidity appears upon
=24-
inspection of the judgment roll. Application
of Behymer, 19 P.2d 829 (Calif.1933);
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d 1 (Ala.1957).
The Air Force's use of the term indicates
it is defining "regular on its face" to
mean only the last document in the file.
The definition supplied by the Air Force is
not calculated to weed out any void judgments.
Under the Air Force's definition of "regular
on its face" it would have to be said that
when the Congress felt the need to clarify
this Act, 42 U.S.C.§659 et.seq., in 1977,
it was indulging in useless direction and
definitions and doing a useless act.
Nowhere on a writ of garnishment alone can
it be determined that it was issued pursuant
to legal process by a court of competent
jurisdiction, as required by 42 U.S.C.662(e).
(Pet.App.98a,99a).
It is necessary to look at the
return of process in the original suit and
XY
)
=a28e
look at the state law to determine whether
the process is legal and whether it comes from
a court of competent jurisdiction.Nowhere on
a garnishment writ alone can it be determined
whether the decree, order or judgment was
issued in accordance with applicable state
laws by a court of competent¢jurisdiction so
that it meets the definition of alimony and
child support as is required by 42 U.S.C.
662 (b)g(c). (Res.App.3a-5a). Unless these
definitions are met, the Air Force would be
withholding the member's pay, and paying it
over to the Alabama Court in this case, for
something other than alimony and child
support. Assuming, however, the Air Force's
definition of "regular on its face" means
only the writ received by them, in this
case that writ showed the garvishnent was
| not “regular”. The writ served on the Air
Force, included a copy of the divorce
judgment which was attached, as it should
=26e
be. The divorce judgment, however, stated
that the defendant had been "duly served"
and failed to appear. (Pet.App.38a). Such
language as “duly served" is ambiguous in an
action for divorce because it fails to say
duly served for what purpose. Divorce suits
have been different in nature from other
forms of action since 1942 when this Court
decided the cases of Williams v. North
Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) and
Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S.226
(1945), in that they are divisible. That is,
the court in a divorce suit may very well
have jurisdiction to terminate the marital
status if one party is domiciled in the
state but have no jurisdiction whatsoever
to award a money decree for alimony or
child support. Therefore, even under the
Air Force's definition of “regular on its
face", the portion of the writ that was the
judgment was ambiguous. This put the Air
_ > : ae ee
-27-
Force on notice that a further check of the
proceedings was necessary. In this case,
however, the Air Porce already knew the
Alabama judgment was void.
The arbitrariness of the United States
in the administration of Col.Morton's pay,
is amply and repeatedly shown from the record.
2. Utilizing the definitions in 42 U.S.C.
659 et seq.,as amended, requires the Court
of Appeals' decision to be upheld; immunity
of the government is not absolute; intent
of Congress was to insulate the government
only when an order was voidable, not when
it is void; support obligations are not
debts until created by a court of competent
jurisdiction; situs of debt is with credit-
or. Notice is not synonymous with service
of process.
(a) The clear language used in 42 U.S.C.
659, effective January 1, 1975, stated
that the obligations that could
we
-28-
be honored by the United States had to be
"..-legal obligations to provide child
support or make alimony payments.” (Emphasis
added). The statute was initially silent
as to the immunity of the government for
wrongful and illegal taking of the property
of a military member or employee. (Res.App.2a).
In 1975, the Department of Defense
Pay Manual Section 70710. Garnishment of Pay
for Enforcement of Child Support and Alimony
Obligations, (Res.App.3a), made it clear to
all military personnel that garnishment of a
member's pay had to be based on an order by
a court of competent jurisdiction. The Air
Force cannot claim ignoranc? of its own
Regulations, Department of Defense Regulations
being binding on the Air Force.
Between the time of the initial
enactment of 42 U.S.C.659 in 1975 and the
amendment of it in 1977 there had already
been at least one suit against the United
-29-
States concerning this statute, Popple v.
U.S. 416 F.Supp.1227 (1976) and at least
two more cases filed and ready for decision,
Overman v. U.S. 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir.1977)
and Calhoun v. U.S. 557 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.
1977). Congress had the opportunity to
completely exempt the government from any
liability by merely saying any order received
by the government for garnishment of a
member's pay will be honored by the govern-
ment and there shall be no liability on the
part of the government for honoring any
order for alimony and child support.
Congress did not do that. It added
subsection (f) (Pet.App.98a) which is very
clear that the United States shall enjoy
immunity with respect to these payments
",...made from moneys due or payable from
the United States to any individual
pursuant to legal process regular on its
face, if such payment is made in accordance
@30@
with this section and the regulations
issued to carry out this section.”
(Emphasis added). When Congress amended
42 U.S.C.659 in 1977, it also repeated and
reiterated the phrase, "...legal obligations
to provide child support or make alimony
payments." (Emphasis added). (Pet.App.99a).
It added Definitions in Section 662, (b) defin-
ing child support and (c) defining alimony.
(Res. App.3a). The Congress again made it
quite clear that the government may only
honor “legal obligations", as a result of a
"judgment issued in accordance with applic-
able State law by a court of competent
jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). The Congress
also defined "legal process" used in 42 U.S.C.
659 (a) in subsection (e) (Pet.App.98a-99a)
as that process issuing from a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The statute by its own terms defines
what "alimony" and "child support” are, for
a
PL.
can.
the purposes of this Act. No matter what
other definitions there may be, in garnish-
ment proceedings pursuant to this statute,
we are limited to these definitions. Pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended,
there is no “alimony” or "child support"
unless it issues from a court of competent
jurisdiction. The Act also requires that the
alimony and child support be issued in accord-
ance with applicable state law. 42 U.S.C.
§662(e)(1). In order to insulate the
government from liability, orders and decrees
honored by the government must be from a
court of competent jurisdiction and must be
legal process regular on its face, issued from
a court of competent jurisdiction and issued
in_ accordance with applicable State law. The
immunity of the United States for taking a
member's pay is, therefore, by clear terms
of the statute, a limited immunity. In
stating very clearly in what situations the fe
,> ‘o ‘ ’ y Pi dal $
Pl. ae sai nie oe eA ae ae a ae *
@32=
United States could not be sued, Congress
obviously rejected any contention that it
could never be sued for its long established
legal obligations to pay a service member
his pay. The specific enumerations of
exclusions from liability set forth in the
statute indicate that no other immunity is
granted. Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.)
509 (1869); Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall.(77
U.S.) 321 (1870). The legislative history of
the 1977 amendments to 42 U.S.C.659 made it
quite clear that the amendments were to
clarify the act. Section 501 of Public Law
95-30 contained the amendments. Public Law
95-30 was the Tax Reduction and Simplification
Act of 1977. As introduced, it contained no
provisions concerning garnishment H.R.Rep.3477
95th Cong. lst Sess., 1977; 91 Stat. 126,
Section 501 of the act was added to the
amendments on the floor of the Senate
-33-
(125 Cong.Rec. 6722 April 29,1977) by
Senator Nunn who said,
"The intent of these amend-
ments that I am introducing
today will be to clarify the
garnishment provisions to
provide for administrative
improvements and to aid in
the evaluation of the program."
A general explanation was included in the
Congressional Record, Part A., "Clarification
of Garnishment Provisions" stated the object
of Section 501 (the amendments to 42 U.S.C.
659) was to clarify existing law. (125 Cong.
Rec.6722(supra)). The question thus arises
why Congress felt the need to clarify
42 U.S.C.659 by these amendments if the
government's position is correct; that is
that even if the government knows the judgment
of the State Court which issued the writ is
void, the government owes no duty to its .
military member and is obligated to take
his property and give it to the wife or
former wife of such member upon receipt of
-34-
J
a copy of this void writ because it is on a
“regular form” issued by the State Court. For
such a position as that of the government,
no interpretation or clarification by amend-
ment of the statute to read that the govern-
ment would not be liable when it honored a
State Court Order if the writ was legal
process regular on its face, issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to
applicable State law. Those conditions set
by Congress were intended to insulate the
government from suit when it honored a
"voidable" judgment as opposed to a "void"
judgment, void because the Court issuing it
had no jurisdiction over the defendant to
enter such an order. The fact that the
amendments to 42 U.S.C.659(f) fail to state
that the government is totally, unequivocally
and completely immune from liability for the gj
taking of a military member's or its civilian
employee's pay is not error or ommission on
! Se as ——
yn be ih wy ee ee, 4 Thy ee at Nias
NA ee ee AS re i PR, te Sete yh
@33e
the part of Congress. The amendment was
clearly an attempt to make the statute,
42 U.S.C. 659, constitutional in its appli-
cation by assuring that the military member
or its employee is afforded due process of
law. To accept the government's position is
to license the denial of due process of law
by the United States. No such intent should
or could be attributed to the Congress. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Herb v. Pitcairn,
G84 I111.237,51 N.E.2d 277,280 (111.8.C.1943))
explains the distinction between "void" and
"voidable" judgments as follows:
"It is the element of jurisdiction
that differentiates a void from
a voidable judgment; both the
subject matter and the parties must
be before the court, and jurisdiction
of the one without the other will
not suffice; the two must concur
or the judgment will be void in any
case in which the court assumes to
act. Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297
111.451, 130 N.E.787. And we have
further held that even a court of
general jurisdiction has no power
to do any act or render any judgment
affecting persons or property, unless
the particular act or judgment is
te
-36=
brought within its jurisdiction
according to law. People ex rel.
Brundage v. Righeimer, 298 Ill.
611, 133 N. IEEE These are general
principles upon which substantially
all courts are in agreement.”
Although Alabama had long-armed statutes
based on torts committed in Alabama and
actions arising from doing business in
Alabama, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4, Process (C) (1) (B) (1973) (Res.App.5a),
permitted substituted service of process
(by mail) on a non-resident of Alabama for
divorce only. When a statute says "divorce"
and does not include the terms alimony and
child support, process pursuant to such a
statute is limited to termination of status
and does not permit in personam judgments
based onsuch process. May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528 (1953). As previously noted,
divorce has long Been severable from alimony,
custody and child support. Alabama had no
long-arm statute for alimony and child © 4
support in 1974, (Pet.App.93a931-94a). The :
/
-37]=
Alabama judgment would not have been valid
even under the long-arm statute that became
effective in 1977. Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 4.B(H) required that the
parties have last lived in the marital
relationship in Alabama and one party to
have continued to live in Alabama in order
for the court to exercise jurisdiction over
a non-resident and Rule 4:B(I) required that
a wrong had to be committed in Alabama against
the marital relationship for the court to
exercise such jurisdiction. These are not the
facts in ths instant case.
None of the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
659 et seq., as amended, so that the Air
Force is insulated from liability, exist in
this case. It is not immune from suit for
military pay if only one of these require-
ments is missing, much less when all of
them are missing.
The Air Force argues from both sides
of the coin. It argues it is under
4
~ ;
-39-
compulsion to withhold Col.Morton'‘s pay and
pay it into the Alabama Court or be subject
to contempt proceedings and it would be
subject to default judgments if it failed
to honor a state court writ. On the other
hand, the Air Force has argued since the di
inception of this suit that 42 U.S.C. 659 et
seg., as amended, did not grant a cause of
action against the government. Cunningham v.
Department of the Navy, 455 F.Supp.1370
(D.C.Conn.1978); Popple v. U.S., 416 F.Supp.
1227 (D.C.N.¥.1976); Snapp v. U.S.Postal
Service - Texarkana, 664 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir.
1982). Col. Morton has never denied that
contention. Col. Morton's cause of action
in this suit was not based on 42 U.S.C.659,
but was an action to recover his military
pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C.204, et seq. |
It is the subject matter of the
Petition, Complaint, Declaration, Motion
for Judgment, or whatever it may be called
- 39.
in the various courts that determines the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the lawsuit and not the subject
matter of the defense. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908).
In any event, the Air Force is immune
from contempt proceedings, default judgments
and the like in state courts, except for
negligence acts that may be brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1346. To refuse to honor a writ of
garnishment because the state court pro-
. ceedings do not conform to the require-
ments of 42 U.S.C. 662 (e) (1), will not
create legal difficulties for the Air Force.
The Air Force argues that where a
defendant has been given notice by the
garnishee this satisfies the due process
requirement because such a defendant will
have an opportunity to defend himself in
-40-
the attachment suit and cites Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). There is
a distinction however, between the attach-
ment of a debt that exists before the
necessity of a court judgment to create it
and alimony and child: support obligations
© which do not exist until they are created
by a court that has in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant. Until a court of com-
petent jurisdiction rules that a defendant
is obligated to make alimony and child
support payments, until such a court fixes
the amount of such alimony and child
support, and until such a defendant is in
arrears in the orders of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, there is no debt to
be condemned. The principle that the Air
Force cites does not apply when there is
no debt. ‘
The other principle of Harris v.
Balk, (supra) that the intangible debt may
be attached in a state in which the creditor
-41-
has no minimun contacts has been overruled
by this court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). Under Alabama law, the
situs of the debt has always followed the
creditor, not the debtor. Louisville and
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Nash, (supra). This
court has also found the situs of the debt
to be where the creditor is. Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). It is logical
that the situs of a debt be with the
creditor because the creditor owns the
cause of action for the debt. The Air
Force's argument that the Alabama court had
both the subject matter and personal jur-
isdiction in the suit by Patricia Kay Morton
against the United States is erroneous.
The debt (subject matter) owed by the
United States to Col. Morton was not
located in Alabama. It was located where
Col. Morton was,in Alaska.
The Air Force acknowledges that
=-42-
state courts have held garnishees liable to
reimbursement to, the principal debtor where
the underlying judgment was void and
acknowledges Alabama is one of the those
states. Lousiville & Nashville R.R. Co.
v. Nash, (supra). But, it argues that
this is because the principal defendant
had been given no actual notice of the ~—
underlying action. The Air Force's position
is that "service of process" and "notice"
are synonymous. This is erroneous. Know-
ledge of the pendency of a suit against
a defendant does not give the court in
which the suit is pending jurisdiction over
the defendant. In the Alabama case of
Partlow v. Partlow, 20 So. 2d 517 (Ala.
1945) the court said, "The mere fact that
the defendant (non-resident) has actual
knowledge or notice of the institution of
the proceedings against him is not suffi-
8k
o*
a
cient to give the court jurisdiction."
o4 3a
It is essential to the proper
renditon of a judgment in personam that
the Court have jurisdiction of the parties,
even though such parties have knowledge as
distinguished from notice, of the action,
and, indeed, even though they are present
at the trial. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments,
Sec. 25 p. 330. Minton v. First National
Exchange Bank of Virginia, 145 S.E. 2d
139 (Va. 1935). National Metal Co. v.
Greene Corsal Copper Co., 89 P.535, (1907).
Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67, 52 P.16l
(1895}; Lee v. Indep. School Dist., 149
Iowa 345, 128 N.W. 533 (1910); Beaufort
County v. Mayo, 207 N.C. 211, 176 S.E.
753 (1934); Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn. 36,
15 S.W. 2d 747; Greenwood v. Furr 251
S.W. 332 (Tex.1923).
"A personal judgment rendered without such
jurisdiction is in violation of the due
process clause of the United States .
~
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o. rt 4 “ >. ’ ba Re Fp. Viptep ke ty 2 ve ait ie oe +
Fe ES Se STS PAE IEE or ee eg RARE OY gy Meee
Re arr, vee aorta se A a eae tae NOT GS Gre ee, he 4
-44-
Constitution and is not merely voidable
but is void." (Emphasis added). 46 Am.
Jur. 2d Judgments § 25 (supra). The
citations for this proposition are too
numerous to quote but the case of Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 71 L.Ed.1091(1927),
47 S.Ct. 632, accurately sets forth the
law. Clearly knowledge is not a legal
substitute for service of process and
cannot give a Court in personam jurisdic-
tion over a person. Estin v. Estin (supra);
Kreiger v. Kreiger 334 U.S. 555 (1948);
Armstrong v. Armstrong (supra); Vanderbilt
v. Vanderbilt (supra). It is the lack of
proper service of process that makes the
judgment void.
Had there been legal service of
process on Col. “asec in the divorce suit, |
it would have given the Alabama Court ii
continuing jurisdiction over him to enforce
the court's judgment by garnishment on the -
strength of mere notice to him prior to
OP ARI aed: be os ualtcult teh Jaa)
-45-"
the garnishment. Michigan Trust Co. v.
Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Sheffield v.
Sheffield, 148 S.E. 2d 771 (S.C.Va.1966) ;
Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So. 2d 1170 (Ala.
1978). Garnishment being only ancilliary
to the Fbdeitints, the jurisdiction continues.
(b) Many state court statutes are
cited by the Air Force which provide gen-
erally the same ot Musbown’ a: that *.<.-
the judgment condemning the debt, mohey or
effects to the satisfaction of the plaint-
iff's demand is conclusive as between the
garnishee and the defendant to the extent
of such judgment, unless the defendant
prosecutes to effect an appeal from such
judgment.” Alabama Code Sec. 6.6-461
(1977). This statute, and those like it |
are predicated upon the fact that the
court issuing the original judgment had
jurisdiction of the person and the subject
matter. Otherwise, these statutes would a
=46e
be authorizing the taking of property with-
out due process of law. Jurisdiction is
the threshold question of every cause of
action and the court must have jurisdiction
of both. "A judgment rendered without
such jurisdiction is a violation of the
due process clause of the United States
Constitution and is not merely voidable
but void.” 46 Am. Jur 2d Judgments § 25
: (supra). The courts are agreed that if
the judgment in a garnishment proceeding
is void because of lack of either subject
matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over
the defendant, payment by a garnishee is
no protection to him against a subsequent
action by his creditors to recover the
debt. 49 A.L.R. 1411 Annotation-Garnish-
ment-Void-Protection, which cites Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Nash, (supra)
and Southern Ry. Co. v. Ward, 26 So. 234
(Ala. 1898), 38 C.J.S. Garnishment, 293 ,
(e). The Alabama Code § 6-6-461 and other a
vor See
plead
a47a
similar statutes apply to voidable judgments
where the irregularity does not effect the
jurisdiction of the court.They do not apply
when the judgment is void. To interpret
these statutes as applying when the orig-
inal judgment is void for want of jurisdic-
tion over the judgment debtor would indeed
make these statutes constitutionally objection-
able, particularly, as in this case, if the
debt is contingent upon the judgment creat-
ing it. The Air Force errs in that it
fails to distinguish between a voidable
judgment which must be set aside before it
is void and a void judgment which is ipso
facto void and requires no action to set it
aside. 46 Am.Jur.2d,Judgments §49. Thus, an
argument based on the need for relief from
a void judgment is inappropriate. A voidable
judgment is one in which the defect does not
affect jurisdiction. A void judgment is one
issued by a court without jurisdiction of
subject matter or a party. Lacking
- ™
-48-
either, the court is not a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. [ The Air Forces' cita- :
tion 1 New Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 16, Comment C 146 (1982) is irreve-
lant because it does not refer to judgments
void ab initio but to reversed judgments,
etc.]
In O'Toole v. Helio Products Inc., 149
N. E. 2d 795 (C.A.I11.,1958) the court in
holding that the garnishee has a duty to
inquire into the validity of the judgment
upon which the garnishment proceedings are
based, also held the garnishee is not pro-
tected in making payments pursuant to the
garnishment writ if the original judgment
against the principal debtor is void for
want of jurisdiction over the judgment
debtors. The Air Force says this is the
only case it has found to this effect. Col.
Morton's counsel agrees. Cases of judgments
I that are void for lack of jurisdiction over
4 ‘ / Tif / / /
x ‘ ‘ , / " . : « us + 4 x ve
; toad ey, . , on RE TS. TPM” Mee a at ad
Si ie eed hon: ‘ jetta ara RPE be ete. @ es Sk a Al oa oe
-49-
a party defendant are indeed rare. Since
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. 659, there have
been only a handful of cases even alleging
such.
One of these cases alleging lack of
jurisdiction in the original court was the
case of Calhoun v. U.S.(supra). The Air
Force states that Calhoun is in direct con-
flict with the case at bar. In addition to
the distinction between that case and the
instant one made by the Court of Appeals
that Calhoun was decided prior to the clar-
ifying amendments to 42 U. S. C. 659, Mr.
Calhoun failed to give the Navy notice of
any invalidity of the service of process on
him prior to the time the Navy garnished
his pay. Further, he never informed the
District Court as to where he was in fact
domiciled. California had a long-arm statute
about which that Court of Appeals said
, the face of the judgment shows that ser- y
-50-
vice of process was had in accordance with
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec.
415.40. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
looked into the matter of the original ser-
vice of process. The cases of Cunningham
v. Dept. of the Navy, 455 F. Supp. 1370,
(Dist. Conn. 1978); Popple v. United States
(supra); and Snapp v. U. S. Postal Service-
Texarkana (supra), relied on by the Air
Force for its position as to the effect of
42 U. S. C. 659 et. seq. as amended, were
cases alleging a cause of action pursuant
to the said statute. The statute did not
create a cause of action. Overman v. U. S.
(supra) was for an injunction alleging
fraud in the procurement of the original
judgment. In those cases the Court had jur-
isdiction of the parties and the subject
matter in the underlying suit so that any
defect in such a cause would make the judg-
ment voidable, not void. In Jismerjian y-
-5l-
Dept. of the Air Force, 457 F. Supp. 820
(DC... &. C. 1978) aff'd. 607 F. 2d 1001
(4th Cir. 1979),cert. den. 444 U. S.1082,
1980), Mr. Jizmerjian accepted service of
process in the Arizona court. In Rush v.
U. S. Agency of Int. Dev. (706 F. 2d 1229
(D. C. Cir. 1983) (this court denied certio-
rari,No. 83-382, Jan 9, 1984) Mr. Rush
actually brought the action himself in the
state court. In each of these cases the
parties were both before the court which
issued the original judgment. Each had an
opportunity to contest jurisdiction and he
failed to do so. Therefore, the matter of
jurisdiction became res judicata. Johnson
v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948)
These cases are all distinguishable from
the case at bar. |
The litigation over this garnishment
act has been exceedingly minimal. Such
~ yee
+
a83s
cases will become even less as lawyers and
judges become more familiar with what is
required of them in order to comply with
federal requirements.
The Air Forces' arguments that the
garnishee under this act is a mere stake-
holder under this act pales in view of the
nearly seven years of litigation in this
cause when all it had to do if it thought
it was a mere stakeholder was to interplead
the money. It knew Better and it fully un-
derstands what must occur in order to make
the government immune from liability.
This Act is a good one. The manner in
which it is administered, however, must not
be allowed to deprive anyone of their con-
stitutional rights.
The Court of Appeals was correct in }
holding that a court should construe legis-
lative enactments to avoid constitutional =
difficulty if possible. U. S. v. Clark,
454 U. S$. 595 (19801; Us S./v. Harris,347 /
a83e
U. S. 612, 618 (1954); Blasecki v. City of
Durham, 456 F. 2d 87, cert.den.409 U. S. — 2s
912 (1972). Certainly, we do not wish to
throw the baby out with the bath water,
when all we need is to clean the tub.
3. The Comptroller General's opinion is
not controlling; later enacted agency regu-
lations cannot be relied upon to reverse a
court decision; the court decision does
not require payment to Col. Morton twice.
The government refers to a decision
of the Comptroller General dated 2 February,
1982 (B-203668 - Matter of Technical Sergeant
Harry E. Mathews, (U.S.A.F.). (Pet.App.F.).
The Comptroller General refused to allow
Sergeant Mathews to be reimbursed the amounts
that had been taken from his pay between the
dates that an ex parte judgment had been
rendered against him in Florida and the
date that the Florida court ordered the
| c
. garnishment set aside. The only basis for og
po . y y, / y, , f yea
-54-
disallowing his claim was that the documents
received bythe Air Force Finance Center were
“regular on their face". At no place in the
opinion does the Comptroller General, who
although basically a financial administrative
officer has certain “quasi-judicial” responsi-
bilities when he rules on requests of doubt-
ful expenditures presented to him by finance
officers, mention the basic legal issues in
these cases. That is, was the writ valid
legal process from a court of competent
jurisdiction? The Comptroller General,
like the Air Force, merely looked at the
garnishment order and seeing the word "court"
pronounced it "valid on its face".
One court commented on the weight
to be given to opinions of the Comptroller
General in Alexander v. FERC 609 F. 2d 543,
546 U. S. Court of App. RD. Cc. 1979.
tes
=§S—
"The court disagrees with. the petitioner's
assertion that it should give weight to
opinions of the Comptroller General concern-
ing interagency transfers. Questions on
review concerning the authority of the
F.E.R.C. are for the court to decide and
this responsibility should not be abdicated
to the Comptroller General."
The Comptroller General's decision,
it is noted, was decided after the Court of
Claims had decided this case, Morton v. U.S.,
Cecided December 14, 1981, (Pet.App.62a).
The Comptroller General completely ignores |
the opinion of the Court of Claims where an
ample discussion of court of competent juris-
diction appears. Administrative agencies,
such as the General Accounting Office, are
bound by decisions of the Court of Claims
as well as all other Federal Courts. The
legal conclusions of the Comptroller General
are entitled to no weight in this case in
re
the face of a contra decision of the Court
of Claims. The facts in Mathews, do serve
to point out the difficulties of a military
member who is not present to litigate.
After the initial decision was reached
by the Court of Claims on December 14, 1981,
later promulgated amendments in regulations
cannot have any effect on the decision of
the court. The Court of Claims' decision,
although not final as to the amount of Col.
Morton's pay to be paid to him, was final
as to the question of the government's
liability to him for the pay. Retroactive
laws and regulations promulgated after a
court decision is final would be legislative
encroachment upon judicial powers. Since
legislative enactments and regulations
which would have the effect of rendering
court judgments ineffective, cannot be >|
applied retroactively because it would be
direct legislative or executive reversal sq
f / |
3 ; : - ws x . F oy - - =e be _
ae Peon Se hag Paes eo ee 4 aca ass “wis Renee oe ried go SF
Phe, RE Ra ek oe es es Bite: ee eS. cs See tie Mate eet ate
«Se
of a court- decision and such is per se
objectionable. Sutherland Statutory
Construction IV ed. C. Dallas Sands, Vol.2
(1972) 1983 pocket supplement, §41.08.
It was obviously an attempt by the
government to overturn the decision in this
case when the government promulgated a new
set of regulations which were published in
the Federal Register, Vol.48, No.110,
Tuesday, June 7, 1983. The said publication
stated: "This revision expressly provides
that agencies will not be required to
ascertain whether the court or other author-
ity which issued the garnishment order had
obtained personal jurisdiction over the
obligor prior to its issuance of the order.”
And, "Two Federal agencies submitted comments
concerning the amendment to 5 CFR 581.305(f£),
which state that when a governmental entity
receives legal process that appears to con-
form to the laws of the jurisdiction from
which it was issued, the entity shall not
= 58-
be required to ascertain whether the
authority which issued legal process had
obtained personal jurisdiction over the
obligor. The amendment is consistent with
the position that the government has taken
in litigation concerning the issue.”
Legislation may not be enacted by an
administrative agency under the guise of its
exercise of the power to make rules and
regulations by issuing a rule or regulation
which is inconsistent or out of harmony with
or which alters, adds to, extends or enlarges,
subverts, or impairs, limits or restricts
the act being administered. 1 Am.Jur.2d
Administrative Law, §132. The 1983 amend-
ments to 5 C.F.R.581, promulgateiafter the
Court of Claims' decision, attempts to insu-
late the government from all liability when
such is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C.
659 et seq., as amended. The statute is
clear that unless the judgment for alimony a
sis
- 5% |
and child support is in conformity with the
laws of the state which renders the judgment,
it is not alimony and child support. In
order to determine whether the judgment
conforms to local state law, the government
has to look into it, at least where it is
put on notice of the defect. Otherwise,
the government is paying out the pay of its
employees for purposes other than child
support and alimeny. The government has
attempted to expand the statute on its
immunity and impair the right of the
employee or member to his pay.
The Air Force contends it should not’
have to pay twice. It's not paying Col.
Morton twice because it never paid Col.
Morton the first time. There was no
valid debt for alimony and child support due
from him to Patricia Kay Morton and, there-
fore, the Air Force has not discharged an ;
ohligation of Col. Morton's which is what P|
- 60-
occurred in The City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.
57 (1884). That case is distinguishable in
that there was a pre-existing debt which was
discharged by the garnishee. However, the
legality of the proceedings could not with-
stand todays legal scrutiny.
The Air Force is required to make
payment to a party legally due the money
even if it has previously paid the money
to someone else. Howell v. U.S. 195 F.Supp.
597 (1958). If the Air Force has been
arbitrary and capricious in the admini-
stration of a military member's pay and
pays it to the wrong party, it must pay
the member his pay. Cherry y. U.S., (supra).
-6l<
4. The Court of Appeals' decision does
not impose on the government greater
liability than that on a private garnishee;
the exposure of the government is de minimis.
It is stated by the Air Force that
the Court of Appeals' decision would impose
on the government far greater liability and
responsibility for legal investigation,
analysis, and litigation than is borne by
private garnishees. This is incorrect. The
government, like any other Alabama garnishee,
has a duty to assert all proper defenses of
its creditor of which the defendant has
knowledge. (6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and
Garnishment, Sec. 357 and Stewart v. Northern
-62-
Assurance Co., 32 S.E. 218 (W.Va. 1898).
The government had knowledge of the inval-
idity of the judgment in the case at bar.
However, in order to afford the military
member the same protection that a private
garnishee affords its employer by asserting
such defenses in the litigation, the Air
Force is not required to do anything if it
does not choose to do so. Because
42 U.S.C. 659 and its amendment created no
cause of action against the government, it
can merely refuse to honor any garnishment
that does not conform to the terms of the
statute and such will not subject it to
liability. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals' decision imposes much less liabil
ity and litigation on the government than
a private garnishee.
Under the Court of Appeals’ ruling
the government would not be challenging a
state court's order. The Court of Appeals’
-63-
ruling has absolutely no effect on the
state court's order. It doesn't change it
in any way. It merely says to the plaintiff
in the state courts “seek your collection
procedures in another manner where the
service member will have an opportunity to .
be heard and challenge the court order", if
there is a substantial claim of a jurisdict-
ional defect. It does not require the
government to intervene in the underlying
litigation. Indeed, the government does not
know of such litigation until the under-
lying action is concluded. The government
is not required to take sides in the under-
lying litigation as the Air Force alleges.
It should not take sides at any time. The r
Court of Appeals’ decision only requires
that the government uphold the federal law 4
and administer the pay of a military member 4
in accordance with that law. The Court of F
Appeals’ decision actually relieved the
-64-
government of much of the burden that a
private garnishee encounters when the
original judgment on which the garnishment
is based is void. The Court of Appeals'
decision places the burden on the military
member to notify the government of the lack
of jurisdiction of the state court before
the government pays over the member's pay.
It puts the burden on the plaintiff's
lawyers in the state court to follow the
1aw??
The government is in a far superior
position under the Court of Appeals' decis-
ion than is a private garnishee in that the
government is blessed, or cursed as the
case may be, with in excess of 67,500
attorneys in its employ. See Hearings on
Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R.Rep.96-1005,
Part I, at page 8 on 28 U.S.C. §2412.
Had t ama lawyer follow t
mandates of the Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil
Relist Act and a guardian ad Litem had been ny
appo for Col.Morton, the great probabil-
ity is that this case would not have been
necessary.
-65-
Those include those Air Force Judge Advocates,
like the one at Elmendorf Air Force Base,
Alaska, who advised Col.Morton, through the
Air Force's legal assistance program, that
the Alabama Court's decision was void for
lack of personal jurisdiction over Col.
Morton (Res.App.to Brief 10 a). The Air
Force Accounting and Finance Center in
Denver, has an entire staff of attorneys,
one being the attorney-advisor who stated
that his principal duty was to review the
legality of state garnishments served on
the Air Force. The question arises as to
why those attorneys are needed if the Air
Force owed no duty to its member and was
only a stakeholder? Any clerk could
routinely -confess judgment to a state court.
The Air Force knew it had legal responsi-
‘bilities in administering this act in
spite of the fact that such is denied.
In order to fully comply with the
- 66-
Court of Appeals' decision, all that is
needed after the Air Force has been notified
of the jurisdictional defect, is for the Air
Force to require the garnishor's attorney
to submit two additional authenticated
sheets of paper, one showing the return of
the process and two, a copy of the state law
concerning process. The military can
require its members to set forth their
domicile on the finance records and put the
burden on the member to keep it correct.
The government can require its member or
employee to submit evidence of the member's
contention. If these facts are not conclus-
ive, it can interplead the funds. It certain-
ly can demand that the mandates of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
6
(supra) be followed. This will eliminate
most problems. g
ey
Almost all the states have now enacted ~
a form of long-armed statute for alimony,
-67-
custody and child support based on the last
place the parties had their marital abode as
husband and wife. This information is known
to the military or can be documented by
the member. Such evidence is usually in the
Air Force files. Determining these minimum
contacts presents much less of a problem to
the government than to a private employer.
In any event, the government no |
longer has a choice in cases of a retired
member or member on retainer pay. It is now
mandatory thatthe Air Force, pursuant to said
10 U.S.C.1408, Former Spouses Protection Act,
determine all the facts that 42 U.S.C.659,
et seg., as amended, requires. That is,
it must determine whether the court was a
court of competent jurisdiction; whether
the final decree of divorce was issued in
accordance with the laws of the jurisdict-
ion of that court and whether the order and
other documents served with the court order
-6 8-
certify that the rights of the member under
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
(supra) were observed. It is additionally
required to determine, among other things,
whether the court has jurisdiction over the
member by reason of his residence, other
than because of military assignment in all
cases brought pursuant to 10 U.S.C.1408.
The machinery required to make those deter-
minations can certainly make the determinat-
ions required by the Court of Appeals'
decision. This is particularly true when
the percentage of ex-parte orders, not
based on a separation and property settle-
ment agreement, is minute. As a result of
what was referred to in hearings before the
enactment of this statute as a drastic
departure from anything that existed in
the past, one only has to look at the very
small number of cases that have arisen
concerning the garnishment of federal pay
- 69-
as compared to the 13,000 garnishments the
Air Force maintains exist for servicemen
alone. (Pet.App.19).
5. The Court of Appeals’ decision does
not place the government nor the federal
courts in the domestic relations business.
Congress put the federal government in the
garnishment business.
The Air Force says that the Court of
Appeals' decision places the Federal Courts
in the business of domestic relations. The
Congress of the United States enacted this
legislation and it put the federal govern-
ment in the business of garnishing pay for
alimony and child support out of which arises
this military pay claim. Congress was indeed
cognizant of such claims and that is one
of the reasons for the amendment of 42 U.S.C.
659. The federal courts are not called
upon to award divorces, make alimony, custody
and child support rulings nor to modify a
+
state court's ruling on these matters. The
validity of a garnishment is an issue that
arises from the domestic case, it is not a
domestic case itself. The federal courts
have been called upon since very early on,
to make decisions of what is alimony and what
is not alimony in bankruptcy proceedings,
even when the term alimony is used in the
state court judgment, order, or decree.
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); In
re Knuppenburg, et al, 422 F. Supp. 274
( Mich 1976); In_re Albin 591 F. 2d 94
and, indeed, to determine the validity of
marriages, Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826,
(9th Circ.1963). Such determination under a
federal statute,does not put the federal
courts in the business of domestic relations.
The federal courts are as adept at deter-
mining these questions as the state courts. ‘
The federal courts are also hearing cases
arising from parental kidnapping and
=Tj<
child concealment between spouses and former
spouses. Kajtazi vy. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp.
15 (E.D.N.¥.1978); Accord v. Parsons, 551 F.
Supp. 115 (W.D.Val982); Bennett v. Bennett,
682 F.2d 1039 (D.C.Cir.1982); Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 539 F.Supp.998 (D.C.Wisc.2982);
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th
Cir.1982); cert den. 103 S.ct. 372 (1983).
These federal courts did not consider them-
selves in the domestic relations business.
In Wasserman the court restated the wording
in Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.1980),
and said at page 834 of 671 F.2d:
"A district court may not simply
avoid all diversity cases having
intra family aspects. Rather it
must consider the exact nature of
the rights asserted or the breaks
alleged... So long as diversity
jurisdictin endures, federal
courts cannot shirk the inconven- *
b | tence of sometimes trading in wares ;
; from the foul rag-and-bone shop of a,
| the heart.” a
a The Court of Appeals here looked at the . 3
nature of the right asserted, the claim for oe
>
military pay. The fact that it arose from
a garnishment based on a claim for alimony
and child support does not make it a
domestic relations case nor put the court
in the domestic relations business.
6. Domestication of a foreign decree
requires in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant; the purposes of 42 U.S.C.659
are supported by the Court of Appeals’
decision and in accord with congressional
intent.
The Air Force further contends that
if Patricia K. Morton had obtained her
divorce in Virginia, she could have filed
a garnishment action on it in Alabama and
then the term "Legal process *** issued by
*** a court of competent jurisdiction"
| would refer to the Alabama proceedings not “4
. to the prior Virginia proceedings. The Air a
‘ | Force is operating under a false concept as a
to how these procedures work. One cannot.
Vv
me
Lt
i> 9 Bit
bring a garnishment proceeding in a state
different from the state where the judgment
upon which the garnishment is based was
granted, without first domesticating the
judgment. It is true all states must give
full faith and credit to a valid judgment
of a sister state but the procedure for
doing that requires that a new law suit be
filed for such purpose in the state where
the judgment is going to be domesticated.
In personam service of process in such new
law suit must be made on the defendant in
the new cause to domesticate the foreign
decree. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §9.30.
This being the case, the defendant, when
legally served in the domestication suit,
can raise jurisdictional questions concern-
ing the original judgment as well as claim =
other defenses in the forum which is foreign
to the state of the judgment. Thus, any
jurisdictional problem that there may be _ .
o7qe~
in the original judgment becomes res judicata .
if not raised in the latter proceedings.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, (supra). The under-
pinnings of a garnishment from a state,
other than that from which the original
judgment was entered, also must be from a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Contrary to the Air Force's argument
that the majority's opinion destroys the
intended purposes of 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq.,
the majority decision applies the statute
so that it is not constitutionally suspect |
by an interpretation that condones the
taking of property without due process of
law. Such an application is in accord
with the intent of the 1977 amendment to
the statute.
_;=
Y Amicus has misunderstood the facts of
this case; URESA is a good law capable of
producing excellent results and at the same
time treating both parties fairly.
The amicus has misunderstood the facts
in this case. FPirst, he cites Associated
Oil Co. v. Mullin, 294 P.421 (1930) for the
proposition that neither the parties nor
their privies, not strangers, can attack a
judgment of a domestic court of record on
jurisdictional grounds unless the want of
"jurisdiction appears on the face of the
record. He concludes that the appropriate-
ness of this suit is questionable. He is
apparently unaware that the purported
service in the Morton suit shows that
Col. Morton was a non-resident of Alabama.
Alabama haying no long-arm statute for
alimony and child support claims at that
time, the jurisdictional defect appears on
the record, Interestingly enough, the iy
-76-
California Court in using the term "court
of record" lends corroboration to Col.
Morton's position that "court of competent
jurisdiction" means jurisdiction of the
parties as well as the subject matter
because if Congress had meant “court of
record", that court which has subject
matter jurisdiction, it would have said so.
Second, although the Air Force concedes
the Alabama judgment was void for alimony
and child support, the amicus differs and
argues that after the date of the service’
of process on September 17, 1974, it
doesn't matter what Col. Morton did. The
amicus was unaware that Col. Morton had the
intent to be domiciled in Alaska in May of
1974 and he was in Alaska in May of 1974 and
had contracted to buy a home there.
Third, he argues that Col.Morton told
the Air Force he was an Alabamian so he
could avoid the expense in moving his wife
i
ov%.
and children to Alabama. Col.Morton never
told the Air Force he was an Alabamian.
(Pet.App.27 a). Col. Morton was not
obligated to move Patricia Kay Morton any-
where. Col. Morton merely permitted her
to use his moving benefit. They were still
married. Patricia Kay Morton unilaterally
left Col. Morton in Virginia in the marital
home where he remained for nearly nine
months. She refused to accompany him to
Alaska. (Pet.App. ll a). Col.Morton didn't
"ship" Patricia Kay Morton anywhere.
Fourth, and most grieyous, is the amicus’
statement that "...Col.Morton did not simply
comply with one of those civilities of a
divorce too often ohserved in the breach,
visitation." The minor Morton child was i
living with Col. Morton in Alaska. (See.
Res.App.to Brief 9a). Apparently the
amicus also does not think children go to
the visiting parent's home instead of baa si
~96-
visiting parent going to the child's home.
Such assumption as the amicus made is erron-
eous.
Fifth, Col. Morton never anticipated
that his wife or the state of Alabama would
support his children. Col.Morton voluntarily
provided support for his children in an
amount that had been agreed upon by the
Mortons. Col.Morton provided support when
he had no legal obligation to do so.
Sixth, there is no evidence that Col.
Morton's conduct forced Patricia Kay Morton
to leave Col. Morton. She didn't wish to
live with him in Alaska. (Pet.App.1l a).
Too, the doors of the Virginia court were
open to her for almost nine months after
she left Col.Morton prior to his leaving:
See Section 20-72 of 1950 Code of Virginia,
as amended. (Res.App. 19 a). She chose
not to use them.
Seventh, the amicus’ position that a
- litigation. Why should Col. Morton do that a
-79-
fair forum is based on the economic circun-
stances of the parties has no application
‘to the fact in this case. If Patricia Kay
Morton had no funds, it seems absurd to
say she would have moved to Alabama and
only hegun proceedings a year later when
she could have gone into the Virginia
Courts for immediate funds in either a
pendente lite hearing in a divorce suit
or a suit for separate maintenance.
Eighth, the amicus'statement that Col.
Morton couldn't have voluntarily paid
Patricia Kay Morton because the garnish-
ment is based on an order for that amount,
is tantamount to saying a man can't be
charged with a crime because he is
innocent. The fact is, Col. Morton
voluntarily paid Mrs. Morton. (Pet.App.21 a).
Ninth, the amicus states Col.Morton had
defenses that could control the Alabama —
-80-
when the Air Force Judge Adyocate advised
him that the Alabama court had no authority
to enter an in personam judgment against
him? Too, a military man can only fly space
available if he is free to leave his duties.
At the time he was acting Commander at
Elmendorf Air Base, Alaska, (Res.App. to
Brief 10a) which is the Air Base between
the continental United States and Russia.
Tenth, Patricia Kay Morton did not have
to file in Alaska to litigate Her right to
alimony and child support. She can do that
through URESA (supra). URESA is a very
effective law. The amicus is obviously
biased and in favor of a system that permits
unilateral deduction of pay of a serviceman
without benefit of a hearing as opposed to 3
one that would permit both parties to be -
heard. Such a position also may result in
double payments to a spouse. URESA and ce
42 U.S.C. 659 et seq., as mended can
; ee: J ee
ae”
-81-
exist side by side. Garnishment is fine
when the member has been afforded a hearing
but URESA should be used when the member has
not been given a hearing. The machinery is
present in both statutes to provide excellent
satisfaction in reaching the object for which
they were enacted. However, neither law can
eliminate the human factor in the admini-
stration of the law.
Eleventh, the Amicus laments that
Patricia Kay Morton must support herself and
two minor children on $500 a month. The
amicus is assuming facts not in evidence
because he doesn't know how much Patricia
Kay Morton earns. If we are going to
assume facts not in evidence, let us assume
for the purpose of argument alone, that
Patricia Kay Morton left Col.Morton in
Virginia in order to gq live with her high
school sweetheart who is also in the military;
that the eldest child married before he was
7
% rma
-82-
18 and the minor child was living with
Col. Morton in Alaska and that she didn't
marry her childhood sweetheart until the
Air Force stopped sending Col. Morton's
money to Alabama, although the Air Force
continues to withhold his pay, even after
both court decisions, which withholdings
are now in excess of $31,000.00. The fore-
going statements are not all in the record,
just as the amicus’ are not in the record.
(The portion of the claim of Col.Morton
finding how much is owed to him in back-
pay is not final in this cause.) Would
the amicus in assuming the hypothetical
posed take the same position he has under
his assumed facts? The hypothetical is
used merely to point out that not all ;
women are good and being taken advantage
of and not all men are had and take 4
advantage. The law must never operate on
that assumption. Neither should court |
-83-
briefs be written on assumptions. We do not
haye to assume, however, that the Alabama
court, in an ex-parte proceeding in which
there was no defense to voice an objection
to whatever amount the Alabama court decided
was appropriate, awarded Patricia Kay Morton
$500.00 per month as alimony and partial
child support. What the other part of
child support is, counsel cannot possibly
speculate. Certainly no defendant would
know what to comply with in such an order.
Its definition does not appear in the record.
Mrs. Morton has been paid three times for
the same thing, once when the case was
| settled in Loudoun County, Virginia, once
when Col.Morton voluntarily paid her and
s once when the Air Force took his pay and ‘
gave it to her. :
4 Twelfth, the amicus fails to understand j
the divisible nature of the proceeding to as
terminate the marital status and the
-84-
proceedings for alimony and child support
when he argues the theory of estoppel.
Thirteenth, the amicus also suggests
that Col. Morton did not submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the Alabama Court
because he says the Air Force would have
ordered Col.Morton to pay more money to
Patricia Kay Morton or he would be discharged
from the service. He says Col.Morton has
avoided a claim of non-support and prevented
an investigation by the Air Force in this
manner. The amicus has his facts all
wrong again. The Air Force has no authority
to set alimony and child support nor order
any member to pay any of his debts. In
citing Air Force Regulation 35-18, para-
graphs 3 and 5 (b),the amicus neglects to
mention the paragraph that explains the
limitations on the authority of the Air
Force and which merely defines policy.
The relevant portions of Air Force Regu-
-85-
lation 35-18 A.(1) states as follows:
"1. Air Force Policy. The Air Force
expects its members tc pay their
debts on time. Within the limits of
available resources, the Air Force
provides financial management inform-
ation, opportunities for education and
personal counseling designed to
enhance management of personal
finances, and takes administrative
or disciplinary action in cases
of continued financial irresponsi-
bility. Such action is taken to
improve discipline and maintain the
standards of conduct expected of
Air Porce personne’. but cannot be
used to enforce private civil
Obligations.” Cieshasts atice).
"2. Indebtedness.
a) Air Force Enforcement of
Private Obligations. The Air Force
does not aeetecets disputed debts,
admit or deny whether or not the
eens oF tes Beebe
ty o ts ers.
nder no circumstances does the
Air Force communicate to complain-
ants, whether any action has been
taken against members as a result
of complaints. Except for debts owed
to the Federal Government, including
its instrumentalities (for example,
nonappropriated fund activities),
the Air Force is not authorized to
require a member to pay a private
debt or to usé any part of his or
her earnings to pay the debt, even
though the indebtedness may have
been reduced to judgment by a civil
court. The enforcement of private
obligations of Air Force members is q
a matter for civil authorities.” «Gam
(Emphasis added). : ye
é86<
The amicus has totally misunderstood
Orrox v. Orr (Lillian M.) 364 So.2d 1170
(1978). Mr. Orr was personally before
the Alabama court in the divorce proceeding.
Orr v. Orr, (Lillian M. v. William Herbert),
Ala.App.351 So.2d 904 (1977); 351 So.2d
906 (S.C.Ala 1977); 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
The Alabama Court had continuing jurisdiction
over Mr. Orr.
Amicus cites Rock Island Line v. Sturn,
(174 U.S.710 (1899) for the proposition
that debts belong to the creditors to whom
they are payable. That is correct.
Col. Morton is the creditor. In stating
that a judgment creditor has a right of
action against any debtor of the judgment
debtor in any forum the judgment debtor td
could himself have brought suit, has been
over-ruled. This is the concept of Harris :
"2 v. Balk, (supra) that Shaffer v. Heitner, | auf
& (Supra), over-ruled. Further, Patricia Kay ‘a
aQ®Ja
Morton oie abe a judgment creditor, the
judgment being void.
The amicus states that when an
obligor moves, under URESA, the obligee
is deprived of support. This is not correct.
The move of the obligor merely deprives the ;
obligee of the right to have the obligor
cited for contempt of court where the
obligor resided when the order was entered.
However, that order will support a garnish-
ment writ, the obligor having been before
the court when the order was entered.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.
co
ae
Respectfully submitted,
Allan Wayne Morton,
<a ae on 7 1
aoe
Se
ae
1 ;
4015 Chain Bridge Road
P.O.Box 434 8 i)
A Fairfax, Virginia 22030
4 : (703) 591-40
ae
on 4,
/
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify, under penalty of
F perjury, that on the 10th day of April,
1984, I mailed two typewritten copies of
the foregoing Brief on the Merits of the
Respondent Allan Wayne Morton, to the .
Solicitor General of the United States,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
20530, postage prepaid and properly
addressed. J
i . N.C Carro
. af
‘
—
la
RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX
l. 5 U.S.C. § 5401, provides in relevant
part:
(a) (1). When the head of an agency or
his designee determines that an employee,
member of the Armed Forces or Reserve of
the Armed Forces, is indebted to the United
States for debts to which the United States
is entitled to be repaid at the time of the
determination by the head of an agency or
his, designee*** :
(2) *** prior to initiating any pro-
ceedings under paragraph (1) .... to collect
any indebtedness of an individual, the head
of the agency holding the debt or his desig-
nee shall provide the individual with -
(A) a minimum of thirty days written
notice, informing such individual of the
nature and amount of the indebtedness deter-
mined ...to be due, the intention of the
agency to initiate proceedings to collect
the debt through deductions from pay, and
an explanation of the rights of the indiv-
idual ee
(B) an opportunity to inspect and
copy Government records relating to the debt;
(C) an opportunity to enter into a
written agreement... to establish a sched-
ule for the repayment of the debt; and
(D) ft hearing
the euteuntns of an cane qoncenniae
2a
the existence or the amount of the debt***
A hearing*** as» may not be conducted by an
individual under the supervision or control
of the head of the agency, except that
nothing in this sentence shall be construed
to prohibit the appointment of, an adminis-
trative law judge.
2. Uniform Services Former Spouses
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 9
provides in part:
Section (a) (1) ‘court' means -
(a)"(A)any court of competent juris-
diction of any state***"s+e-s
‘Court order' means a final decree of
divorce*** ma,
(A) is issued in accordance with the
laws of the jurisdiction of that court; ***
Section (b) (1) service of a Court
order is effective if -
(B) “That Court order is regular on
its face;"***
ane
(D) The Court order or other documents -
served with the Court order certify that the ve
rights of the member under the Soldiers’ and ~—
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.
App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and
; (2) A court order is regular on its
face if the order -
? ~
I
3a
(2) (A) is issued by a Court of
competent jurisdiction
(2) (B) is legal in form; and
(2) (C) includes nothing on its face
that provides reasonahle notice that it is
issued without authority of law.
aan
"(4) A Court may not treat the dis-
posable retired or retainer pay of a member
in the manner described in paragraph. (1)
unless the Court has jurisdiction over the
member by reason of a his residence other
than because of milita assignment, in the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court, (B)
s domicile the territoria urisdiction
of t Court or his consent to e
urisdiction of the Court.” Emphasis added.
eet
(f) (1) The United States and any
officer or employee of the United States
shall not be liable with respect to any —
payment made from retired or retainer pay
to any member, spouse or former spouse
pursuant to a Court order that is regular
on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the
regulations prescribed pursuant to
subsection ch). *
3. = -
Court of .
i ‘ti ent par'
4a
"PROCESS: BASIS FOR AN METHODS OF
OUT-OF-STATE SERVICE.
(a) Basis for Out-Of-State Service:
(1) When proper. Appropriate
basis exists for service of process outside
of this state upon a person in any action
in this state when
{A) the person is, at the time of
the service of process, either a non-resident
of this state or a resident of this state who
is absent from this state, and (Emphasis added)
(B)} the person has sufficient contacts
with this state, as set forth in (a) 2 of this
rule, so that the prosecution of the action
against the person in this state or the
Constitution of the United States, or ***
(2) Sufficient Contacts. A person
has sufficient contacts with the State when
that person, *cting directly or by agent,
is or may be .egally responsible as a
consequence of that person's ***
(H) living in the marital
relationship within this state, notwith-
standing subsequent departure from this
state, as to all obligations arising from
alimony, custody, child support, or property
settlement, if the other party to the marital
relationship continues to reside in this state;
or
(I) otherwise having some mini-
mum contacts with this state and, under the
circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to
require the person to come to this state to E
defend an action. The minimum contracts
referred to in this subdivison (I) shall be
-
yt
5a
deemed sufficient, notwithstanding a fail-
ure to satisfy the requirement of sub-
division (A)-(H) of this subsection (2),
so long as the prosecution of the action
against a person in this state is not
inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the
United States."
4. Letters from James R.Russell to
Wayman G. Sherrer and letter from
Caryl P. Privett to James R.Russell:
1 June 1977
JA
Morton v. Morton, (Tenth Judicial Circuit
Court) No. 186-818
Wayman G. Sherrer
United States Attorney
200 Federal Building
1800 Fifth Avenue North
Birmingham AL 35203
Dear Mr. Sherrer
Enclosed herewith is a copy of a decree of
divorce, and attendant thereto, an affidavit
for service of process by certified or
registered mail.
In short, the Circuit Court entered a
decree of divorce which contained a $500.00
per month alimony award based upon this
service by certified mail. We are concerned
as to whether this procedure secured the
requisite "in personam" jurisdiction over
ocho Se to lawfully support this alimony
award. ’
. ait Z
Cy ste eee
6a
Our records demonstrate that Mr.Morton
was a domiciliary of the State of Alabama
and at the time of service by certified
mail was in the State of Alaska in
Military service. In August 1976, his
attorney advised him to change his state
of domicile by paying taxes etc. in the
new state. The records of the court
demonstrate that the return receipt for
service of process in the divorce action
bore Mr. Morton's signature and was duly
returned to the court. The decree of
divorce specifically stated that "defendant
was duly served".
We are currently in a position where we
must determine the viability of this
service of process in order to ascertain
the effectiveness of a Writ of Garnishment
to collect an arrearage for alimony.
Therefore, we respectfully request that
you advise us if service of process by
certified mail on a nonresident domiciliary
of Alabama secures “in personam" juris-
diction so as to authorize the entry of a.
money judgment as was made herein.
JAMES R. RUSSELL
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
June 7, 1977
James R. Russell 4
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate “4
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters Air Force Accounting
and Finance Center
Denver, Colorado 80279
ATTN of: JA a
PS at, oe
laa | ve
Ja
RE: Morton vy. Morton, Tenth Judicial Circuit
Court, No. 186-518
Dear Mr. Russell:
Please he advised that under the circun-
stances as you related them in your letter
of June l, 1977, the service of process by
certified mail was sufficient.
The pertinent law is encompassed in the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(b)
states: "All process may be served anywhere
in this state and, when authorized by law
or these rules, may be served outside this
state." A copy of Rule 4.2 which pertains
to basis for and methods of out-of-state
process is enclosed, the relevant portions
are marked.
If you have any further questions, do not
hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
WAYMAN G. SHERRER
United States Attorney
BY: CARYL P. PRIVETT
Assistant United States Attorney
S. Air Force Document defining "Home of
s 3° to 2
Plaintiff's ~
eer a ee ae nent ps part: %
"You should not confuse the State which
8a
legal residence/domicile.Your "home of record"
is used for fixing travel and transportation
allowances. A "home of record” must be
changed if it was erroneously or fraudulently
recorded initially.
Enlisted members may change their “home of
record" at the time they sign a new enlist-
ment contract. Officers may not change their
"home of record" except to correct an error,
or after a break-in service.The State which
is your "home of record" may be your State
of legal residence/domicile only if it
meets certain criteria."
6. Letter from Patricia Kay Morton to
the Base Commander and letter from
the Base Commander to Patricia Ka
Morton. (From Exhibits to Objections
and fesponses, to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment) :
September 19,1975 .
The Base Commander
Elmendorf A.P. .B.,
Alaska.
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of the divorce decree
awarded me on the 14th of August, 1975.
This divorce was un-contested by Col.Allan
W. Morton. Col.Morton has failed to send
all money set aside By the courts. The
decree states I am to receive $500.00 per
month beginning the date the divorce was
granted. I have received only half. the
sd
9a
amount specified by the courts. This amount
is to be sent to me By Col.Morton whether
or not the children are living with me.
Col. Morton owes me $250.00 for the month
of August and $250.00 for the month of
September. He has also ignored the court
cost incurred in the amount of $350.00
payable to Mr. G.W. Nicholson, Attorney.
I am asking your help in this matter as I
am in a terrible financial bind at this
time because of Col. Morton's failure to
live up to his obligations to me and to
his son Allan, who is living with me.
(Our son Bryan is living with Col.Morton).
Col. Morton feels that since Bryan is with
him, that I should receive only half of
the $500.00, but according to the judge
and my lawyer, the full amount of $500.00
per month is due me.
If it is possible, could the child support/
alimony be put in an alottment check to
protect against Col.Morton's not sending a
check each month? I think this could
solve that problem.
Also, I would like for Col.Morton to send
the proper papers for our son, Allan to
have a new I.D. card made, as his expired
in August.
I am sorry to have inyolved you in this
matter, but I just didn't know any other
way to go.
Allan W.Morton Sincerely, rs
CES Patricia K. Morton “
Elmendorf AFB 849 Sherwood Por.Dr.
Birmingham, Alabama. ae
pied Wh ese ts
4S
> ha .
10a
28 Oct 1975
Mrs.Patricia K. Morton
849 Sherwood Forest Drive
Birmingham, Alabama 35275
Dear Mrs .Morton:
I have received your letter of 19 September
1975, along with a copy of Final Judgment
of Divorce, dissolving your marriage to
Colonel Allan W. Morton of this organization.
Please accept my apology for not having
replied before now, But the delay was due
to the fact that I have been away on
temporary duty elsewhere; and in my
absence, Colonel Morton, being the next
ranking officer in the 21 Air Base Group,
assumed my role as Base Commander.
In regard to your request for help in the
matter of Colonel Morton not furnishing
the entire $500.00 per month set forth in
the divorce decree, I referred the question
to my Staff Judge Advocate for advice, and
after thorough study, he informs me that
he does not have enough information to
give me an absolutely definitive answer.
Specifically, he states that he would need
a copy of the petition for divorce; whether
personal service was obtained on Colonel
Morton within the State of Alabama; and,
if not, whether Colonel Morton waived in
writing, personal service; and finally,
a copy of any separation agreement or
property settlement agreement that may
have been entered into.
In spite of the above, Colonel Morton is
obligated to provide support for his two
sons. I am advised that this is so not .
withstanding that one son is presently
lla
residing with him in the absence of an
amended decree or agreement between you
and Colonel Morton, allowing him to assume
full custody of the child residing with
him. By not having the additional informat-
ion described in the above paragraph it is
difficult to determine exactly the amount
appropriate. Hence, I must rely on a
yardstick using terms such as "ability to
provide,” “reasonableness,” and “station
in life." Accordingly, I feel that you
are entitled to more than $250.00 per
month. and have advised Colonel Morton of
such. Also, I have informed him of his
obligation to furnish you with the
appropriate documents to obtain a new ID
card for your son, Allan.
It is possible to make support payments by
allotment, however, that would have to be
done on Colonel Morton's personal
initiative as I Have no authority to compel
him to do so.
Iamgsorry I do not have the information to
be more succinct in my answer, but trust
this fully explains the Air Force position
in such matters. Too, I sincerely hope that
the hardship which you recited will be
promptly alleviated to the satisfaction of
all concerned.
Sincerely,
JAMES D. DUNN, Colonel USAF
Commander
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.