Respondents Brief — United States v. Morton

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CORRECTION OF THE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Air Force may

take the pay of one of its members and

pay it over to such member's former wife

on the basis of a void judgment of a state

court, the judgment being void for lack of

in personam jurisdiction over such member,

when the Air Force knew the said state

court's judgment was void before it first

took such member's pay, and after taking

such member's pay be immune from suit by

the member against the Air Force for such

member's military pay.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Summary Of Argument .....eeeeeeesnees aes |

Argument:

1. The Court of Appeals' decision

is consistent with the policy of

the United States concerning the

administration of military pay.

The government's position sup-

ports the taking of military pay

without due process of law. The

military's Home of Record State-

ment does not refer to domicile;

the Alabama judgment for alimony

and child support is void. The

Air Force's contention that the

presumption of the proceedings

being “regular on its face" is

superior to actual knowledge

£8 NOC VALLE... cccccccvcccccccese 9

Utilizing the definitions in 42

U.S.C. 659 et seq., as amended,

requires the Court of Appeals

decision to be upheld; immunity

of the government is not abso-

lute; intent of the Congress was

to insulate the government only

when an order was voidable, not

when it is void; support obli-

gations are not debts until

created by a court of competent

jurisdiction; situs of debt is

with creditor. Notice is not

synonymous with service of

PEOCESES. cee esses seseseeeseseees 27

(44)

(iii)

Argument - Continued: Page

Be

The Comptroller General's opin-

ion is not controlling; later

enacted agency regulations cannot

be relied upon to reverse a court

decision; the court decision does

not aa i ee to Col.Morton

CWICR. cccccccccccccccns eovcccncee 53

The Court of Appeals' decision

does not impose on the govern-

ment greater liability than that

on a private garnishee; the ex-

posure of the government is de

minimis........ TELEULECEREEE EE 61

The Court of Appeals' decision

does not place the government

nor the federal courts in the

domestic relations business.

Congress put the federal govern-

ment in the garnishment business. .69

Domestication of a foreign de-

cree requires in personam juris-

diction over a defendant; the

purposes of 42 U.S.C.659 are

supported by the Court Of Appeals'

decision and in accord with Con-

gressional intent.......eeeeeees 72

Amicus has misunderstood the

facts of this case; URESA is a

good law capable of producing

excellent results and at the same

time treating both parties

fairly “ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 75

Page

CONCLUSION ccccccscccnccccccscccre oosy 97

Certificate of Service .......... cocoe 88

ABMONGIS ccoocccecccccccccccecvcesecee la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Accord v. Parsons, 551 F.Supp.115

(Dee WD VOcs L082) cccccccsccecs 71

ee eS TaUe Rie 1890 oe... 21

Alexander v. FERC, 609 F.2d 543

Wetion Gis gs ERIOE csr cvveneceves 54

Appice of Beyyrer

. a . 933) eee eene . 24

Argserotd v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.

DSS dc ends B6ee a0 hme 21, 23, 44

Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin

. ) *e eeeneneeeneeeeeeeee 75

Beaufort County v. Maye: 207 N.C.

, - . 753 34) eee eeee 43

Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S. 393 (1961).. 9

Bennett Vv. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039

(D.c.Cir. 1982) e*eneeneeeneeneteeeeeeee 71

Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d

87 (4th CaF ABTS) cert.denied

409 U.S.912 (1972) eoeeeeeeeeeeeee 53

(v)

Cases - Continued: Page

Calhoun v. U.S., 557 F.2d 401 (4th

Cir.,1977) cert.denied, 434 U.S.

PES CABT7P. 6 voce aa weeveecdvéses 29, 49

Cherry v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1184

(CI.ct., 1980) and 697 F.2d 1043

(C.A. Fed.Cir., 1983) .w..ceceee 12, 60

City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.57 (1884) 60

Cochran v. Cochran, 353 So.2d 805

as. SOTO) «dsoewdele es bacee 16

Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th

ee a ener yi |

Cunningham v. Dept.of Navy, 455

F.Supp. 1370(D.C.Conn. Sh were 38, 50

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541(1948) 41,44

Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall.(74 U.S)

509 (1

869) Se Vee Ceweeeeeseeseeeeeeees eS 32

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.

73) e*enereenete#enreeente#e#n#ee#keee#e#ee#ee###e#e#*# 6

Greenwood v. Furr, 251 S.W. 332

us SEE RE ca cccdeowens iene oe

Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W. 700 (N.D.,

1935) *enere@enrneteeeee#ee#e#ee#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#ee#ee##e#ee# ee 23

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)40,86

Herb v. Pitcairn, 51 N.E.2d 277

[518 BoC ce 1943) *eeneneeeeeeeeeeeeee 35

(vi)

Cases - Continued: Page

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.352

TRE Silas 5s obese bible 60 Sub b> 44

Howell v. U.S., 195 F.Supp.597(1958) 60

In re Albin, 591 F.2d 94 (9th Cir.

In_re Knuppenburg, et al., 422

F.Supp.274 (Mich 1976) ....eeeeees 70

izmerjian v.Dept.of Air Force

# supp .825 (D., S.C.1978)

Affd. 607 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1979);

cert.denied 444 U.S. 1032 (1980);

CicCt. No.364-82C (Feb.1l, 1984) eee 50

Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.

0) Pr Prrrrrrrrerrr rT rere 51

Mayet v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp.15

Bets: BeBitleS ORIG) vescee cococcece ta

Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555

) *e #w@eeeeeee e*eneretieneeeneeee#ee#ee#se# # 44

Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S.173(1909) .20

Lee v. Indep.School Dist., 149 Iowa

345, N. . , N.W. 533

(S.C., Iowa, 1910) e*enereeeneteneteee e#e © @ 43

Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F.Supp.998

D.C., Wisc. 1982) @eeeeseeeoeee@asenseneee? 71

Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.

Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)...... 39

(vii)

Cases - Continued: Page

Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Nash

So. Ala. 21, 41, 42, 46

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)..36

Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 288

Uews 46 9 erie e#eeeeenete#ees#e#e###e#e#e 45

Minton v. First Natl.Exchange Bank

of Virginia, 206 Va.560, £5 S.E.2da

139 (Va.8.C. 1965) .cccccccccccccee 43

Morton v. U.S., 708 F.2d 680 (C.A.,

Paes SUED) 60 bler we ina 680 23, 55

Natl.Metal Co. v. Greene Corsal

Copper Co., 1l Ariz.108, 89 P.535

(S.Ct. Ariz. 1907) .....eees covesee 43

Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826

(Sth Cir.1963) *eneteneneeeneeeneeee#ee#e##e#e#e#e 70

Orr v. Orr, 351 So.2d 904 (Ala.App.,

1977); 351 So.2d 906 (S.C. Ala.

1977) 440 U.S. 268 (1979) eee ee eee 86

Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So.2d 1170

se) Vt) PEL. stare ciate luisa bets Sls >ae

O'Toole v. Helio Products, Inc.

149 N.E. 2d. 795 (C.A., T11. ,1958).. 48

Overman v. U.S., 563 F.2d 1287

(8th Cis. 1977) seer eeevrereeeeneeve 29, 50

Partlow v.Partlow, 20 S.2d 517

(Ala., 1945) se wee eenreneeneeneeeeneee #¢# @ 42

(viii)

Cases - Continued: Page

Popple v. U.S., 416 F. Supp.1227

tS-C.N Ye 1976) wcoo 29, 38, 50

Rock Island Line v. Strum

(L0e Bch TEE CHOONET ccciedeicscccu 208

Rush v. U.S. Agency for Internatl.

Development, 706 F.2d 1229 (D.c.

Cares FSS) No. 82-1853 (Apr.26,1983)

cert.denied USSC No. 83-382,

Jan.9, 1984 oeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeneene 51

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.186

SRUVER sks ks db Us wien kee eed kaw 41, 86

Sheffield v. Sheffield, 148 S.E.2d

S.C.Va.1L96060) wescccccccves 45

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343

(1948) *enereeneenrnrene#e# #@#e#eeee#e#e##e#e#e#e# 5l, 74

Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn.36, 15 S.W.2d

147 (S.C.Tenn., 1929) ae dats ede waa

Snapp v. U.S.Postal Service-

Texarkana, 004 F.2d 1329, (4th

Cis: 1982) oeeeeeereeeeeeeneeeee 38, 50

Southern eo v. Ward, 26 So.234

a. *enriee@enrtneeteeeeeeee#ee##e#e#e# @ 21, 46

Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall (77 U.S.)

870) *eneeeeenereeeeeeee eeee#e#ee#e 32

Stewart v. Northern Assurance Co.

EB. 218 (W.Va., 1895) eeeeeeeee 61

(ix)

Cases - Continued: Page

Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67,

I a Saw wm elhe 43

U.S. v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1980)... 52

U.S. v. Harris, 347 U.S.612 (1954)... 52

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.

we Ls eben G ab bo 6b 0b we tates 08

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d l

. av eee Se Ce e'o 86 ee e868 8 ee 8 8S. @ 24

Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832

(4th Cir.1982); cert. denied, 103

ER) a eee ae ee |

Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).70

Wilkinson v. Cohen, 57 So.2d 108

FRE se SOBL) cicceveccccccccesessdQ, al

Williams v. North Carolina I, 317

U.s.287 (1942) eee eevee eeeeeenene eee 26

Williams v. North Carolina II,

oie 226 (1945) *enereneeeeteeeeee#eee#e 26

Statutes and Regulations:

Alabama Code sec. 6.6-461 (1977)..45, 46

Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 4:2 (1973) Process ...... 16, 36

Rule 4:B (H) and (I) ener eaeeeeeeenene 37

(x)

Page

California Code of Civil Pro-

SeGere G00. 6L56c60 ccoceccecvsrvecs oe

Debt Collection Act of 1982,

S 8.8.6. BBO. BEAS. Sedvovvidctivecss bh

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

Bee éac oe

Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .. 9

Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C.

Ged. 204.6.<. 15 9, 3

S C.F.R.581.102 wccccccccccces coccces 22

S$81.308 cuccccccccccccccccces 57

S C.FP.R.58l (1983) cc ccccccccccccecee 58

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

Sec.659 et seq. -..-. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 8

43, 14, » 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28

30, 31, 32, 33, 34, .38, 37,: 38, ‘39

49, 50, 58, 62, 67, 69, 72, 74, 80

Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief

Act, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seg. ... 12

13, 20, 64, 66, 68

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

Support Act (URESA), 9 U.L.A.

643 (1979) eee eee eeeee 19, 80, 81, 87

Uniform Services Former Spouses Pro-

tection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1408 ... 12, 14

67, 68

Virginia Code, Sec.20-79

(1950, as amended).... 78

(xi)

Other authorities:

Air Force Regulation 35-18 ..... 84, 85

49 AekeoRs TEAL 6 ic cbecesiegs veces coe 86

l Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative

oe Se & ee |

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and

Garnishment,Sec.357.. 61

46 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments,

Des a 30% 43, 44, 46

SOC. 49 wccccccccecee 47

eS er 21

38 C.J.S., Garnishment, Sec.2(4)™... 20

125 Cong. Rec. S. 6722,

AGCLL 29, 2977 wervcse 39

38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec.293(e).. 46

Federal Register, Vol.48

No.110, June 7, 1983..... 57

H.R.Rep.3477, 9th Cong.

lst Session,1977 ........ 32

In re Technical Sergeant Harry E.

_ Mathews, USAF, File No.B-203668

(Comp.Gen. Feb. 2, 1982) .... 53,56

l Restatement (Second) of Judg-

ments Sec.16 comment c 146 (1982)..48

(xii)

Other authorities - Continued: Page

S. Rep. No. 95-66, 95th Cong.

lst Sess., (1977) 91 Stat. 126.... 32

Sutherland Statutory Construction

IV Ed., C. Dallas Sands,

Wok. 2 CE9GS) Bee. GEcOSe cécccsce — 97

-l-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case is a claim brought against

the United States (Air Force) to recover a

military member's pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C.

§204, et seq., and the Pifth Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States. The

defense of the Air Force is that 42 U.S.C.

$659 authorizes it to take the military pay

of one of its members on the basis of a

void judgment even though the Air Force

knew the judgment was void before it took

the member's pay. Such a position would

authorize the taking of property without due

process of law and certainly was not the

intent of Congress when it enacted 42 U.S.C.

$659. The decisions of the Court of

Claims (Claims Court) and of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal :

Circuit, interpret 42 U.S.C.659 so that it

meets not only its obvious intent but also 3

é2e

avoids constitutional difficulties.

l. The lower courts properly applied

the law to the facts in this case, consist-

ent with the policy of the United States

and the statute.

That the Alabama judgment for alimony

and child support upon which the garnish-

ment writ was issued is void for lack of

in personam jurisdiction over Col.Morton

is not contradicted by the Air Force.

It could not do so under the facts in

this case. Congress in the amendments to

42 U.S.C. 659 enacted in 1977, which were

intended to clarify the statute, made it

clear that the immunity granted the govern-

ment under the etatate was a limited one.

The Air Force, however, has lifted out of

context, one phrase of the statute,

“regular on its face” and based its

primary defense on those words. Although.

those words have a legal meaning established 4

~

long before the enactment of this statute,

the Air Force has redefined them for its

convenience to mean that its immunity is

absolute. This is contra to the terms of

the statute and the law of statutory

construction. However, even under the Air

Force's erroneous definition, the Alabama

court's judgment and writ were not regular

on their face.

2. The definitions of terms set forth in

42 U.S.C. 659, when applied to the facts

of this case, make the Air Force's with-

holding of Col. Morton's pay arbitrary

and illegal. The Alabama court was not

"a court of competent jurisdiction" because

of the lack n personam jurisdiction

over Col. Morton. Because the Alabama

judgment for a ny and child support was

not a “judgment issued in accordance with

applicable state law by a court of competent

jurisdiction” (which is the definition given

age

to alimony and child support by 42 U.S.C.

662 (b) and (c)). The procedure in the

Alabama court was not in accordance with

Alabama law. Consequently, the pay that

was withheld and paid to the Alabama court

by the Air Force was not for alimony and

child support:. Additionally, the Court of

Appeals said, these payments were not

“legal obligations" under Section 659(a).

In view of the fact that the Air

Force knew all these facts prior to taking

Bhs pay, its actions show a callous dis-

regard for the rights of the service

member. Nothing in this statute

indicates other statutes and laws are to

be ignored in order to achieve the purposes

of this act. The Air Force's contention

would bring about chaos in the law by

' giving legal effect to void judgments;

it would deny constitutional rights by 4

preventing service members from obtaining f

Coy &,

-5-

a fair and effective hearing; it would

overturn a long line of this court's

cases; and it would encourage forum

shopping for divorce courts.

The Air Porce has failed to distinguish

voidable judgments from void judgments.

Consequently, its conclusions are in error.

3. The Comptroller General's opinion

cannot be cited as authority for reversal

of a court's decision on the same subject.

Neither can regulations promulgated after

a court's decision be used as authority

to overrule that decision. Neither can

regulations expand or take away from the

statutes' clear words.

4. The Court of Appeals' decision places

most of the burden of investigation and

documentation upon the member and upon

the counsel for the garnishors, The

burden on the government is far less than

that placed on a private garnishee, the

-6=

government being immune from suit solely

on the basis of 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq.,

as amended. Further, insistence upon the

Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

being honored by the state court will

remove most if not all the burden.

"Administrative convenience" is not a

shibboleth, the mere recitation of which

dictates constitutionality." Frontiero v.

Richardson 411 U.S.677 (1973).

Ss. Neither the federal courts, nor the

government have been placed in the domestic

relations business by the Court of Appeals’

decision. Simply because 42 U.S.C. 659 et

seg., as amended, requires the Air Force

to make sure the state law is followed and

the court entering the original judgment

upon which the garnishment writ is issued

had jugisdiction of the parties, does not

place it in the domestic relations business. | ‘

oF ’ .

t 0 4

‘ , : ae * 2 va >

“Sy ee ee ols ie a eS hr Pa ee ee se

oa

This case involves only the legal relation-

ship between Col.Morton and the United

States Air Force. The Court of Claims

has not required the government to inter-

vene in the divorce case, nor to enjoin the

suit, nor to modify that judgment in any

way. The Court of Appeals' ruling has

no effect whatsoever on the Alabama judgment.

There is no other necessary party. Patricia

Kay Morton could have been called by the

Air Force as their witness, if in fact her

testimony would have been any different

from that of Col. Morton or his witnesses.

The Air Force did not call her as a witness,

neither in person, nor by deposition, nor

by affidayit. Most of the evidence in the

case was documentary, needing little

evidence by way of testimony. The federal

courts haye ruled that they may not refuse

to entertain suit simply because some facet

of the suit involves intra family aspects.

Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,(4th Cir.1980).

o§e

6. The Air Forces contention that a judg-

ment of a state court can be moved to any

state and a garnishment writ brought on it

is incorrect. Suit must be brought on a

judgment when it is moved to another state

and valid service of process made on the

defendar.t in the state to which it is

moved, thus bringing the judgment debtor

before the court of the second state before

a writ of garnishment can be brought in the

second state.

The purpose of Congress in the enact-

ment of 42 U.S.C. 659, et seq., as amended

has been carried out by the Court of

Appeals' ruling. It could not have been

the intent of Congress to interpret a law

so that it deprives a person of his

constitutional rights.

7. The amicus has erred as to the facts ’

of this case. Consequently, his arguments.

do not apply to this case. He has also

cited cases that support Col.Morton's con-

tentions.

«Qa

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals' decision is consist-

ent with the policy of the United States

concerning the administration of military

pay: The government's position supports

the taking of military pay without due

process of law. The military's Home of

Record Statement does not refer to domicile;

the Alabama judgment for alimony and child

support is void. The Air Force's content-

ion that tlhe presumption of the proceedings

being "regular on its face" is superior to

actual knowledge is not valid.

l. This case was brought against the

United States (Air Force) to recover a

military member's pay pursuant to Title 37,

Sec.204 et seq., United States Code and

the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States. (Res.App.la).(Pet.App.

A-la). It is well settled that the United

States may not circumvent the unambiguous

financial obligation which the law imposes

on the United States to pay to a member

of the Armed Services, his military pay,

without valid, legal justification for

doing so. Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S.393 (1961).

-10-

The strict rules regarding the sanctity of

a military member's right to his military

pay is a well settled principle of the law.

Even in the extreme case of Otho Bell, who

was a turn-coat prisoner-of-war during the

hostilities in Korea in the 1950s, who show-

ed utter disloyalty to his comrades and to

his country, who consorted, fraternized,

and cooperated with the enemy, sought favors

for himself causing hardship to his fellow

prisoners and who refused repatriation and

went to Communist China after the hostilit-

ies ceased, the military service was required

to pay him his military pay for the period

he was a prisoner-of-war because he was not

absent without leave or in any other status

permitting involuntary withholding of pay.

If the military services could withhold

the pay of one of its members on any

principle no matter how seemingly compell-

ing, other than on a strict legal basis,

|

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ae

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* - ; - :

—_ —_ ait? aah * - — oo ee & DP aw wiis ss. - =:

-ll-

surely Otho Bell's case was one. It must be

noted that the Congress in 1982 enacted

legislation providing that the military may

not even withhold a member's pay for a debt

owed to the United States (for the most

part over payments of allowances, claims

for damage to household goods in shipment,

etc.), unless it gives the member (a) 30

days written notice, (b) an opportunity to

inspect the records of the alleged debt,

(c) an opportunity to enter into a written

agreement to establish a schedule for

repayment and (d) an opportunity for a

hearing before an impartial person (to

include an Administrative Law Judge.)

Debt Collection Act of 1982, 5 U.S.C., 5514.

(Res.App.to Brief 1 a). The duty of any

person administering the funds of another

owes that other person the highest fidelity.

The obligation of the military to its

member concerning the military pay is even

— ’ : " —. | . ae a oo ill

-12<

greater because the exigencies of the

military service may effectively prevent the

member from monitoring such administration.

Indeed, he shouldn't have to check.

The military service is liable for

the arbitrary and capricious administration

of a military member's pay. A claim for

restoration of the pay that was due and

unpaid to the military member results from

such acts. Cherry v.U.S., 640 F.2d 1184

(1980); 697 F.2d 1043 (Fed.Circ.1983).

The Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil

Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.A.§501 et seg., prevents

any default judgment for the payment of

money or property from being entered against

a member of the Armed Services on active

duty in the event any suit is allowed to go

forward in such member's absence.

Added to all this, Congress enacted

the Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.

1408, et seg.,which became effective on

. .

So =. met ee,

136

February 1, 1983, (Res.App.to Brief 2a).

This Act provides that any court ordering

payment of child support as defined in

42 U.S.C. 662 (b) and alimony as defined in

42 U.S.C. 662 (c), must be a court of comp-

etent jurisdiction; any judgment must be

issued in accordance with the laws of the

jurisdiction of that court; that the court

order or other documents served with the

court order, certify that the rights of the

military member under the Soldier's and

Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.A.

§50l1 et seq.), were observed; that it must

be issued by a court of competent jurisdict-

ion; it must be legal in form and include

nothing on its face that provides reasonable

notice that it is issued without authority of

law. The Act also stated that "a court may

not treat the disposable retired or retainer

' pay of a member in the manner described

: unless the court has jurisdiction over the

athe

member by reason of (a) his residence, other

than because of military assignment, in the

territorial jurisdiction of the court, (b)

his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction

of the court or (c) his consent to the

jurisdiction of the court." Sec.1408C(4).

(Res.App.to Brief 2 a). Had Congress had

this Morton case before it, it could not

have spoken more clearly to the issue.

From all this, exclusive of the Act

in question in this case, we find the legal

principles and the policies of the United

States are that the military services must

exercise the highest degree of care and

fidelity to the military member in adminis-

tering his pay and allowances.

Regardless of these well settled

legal principles and laws and the policy

they show, the Air Force's contention is

that 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq., as amended,

authorizes it to take the military pay of

-15-

~ one of its Air Force members on the basis

of a void judgment, even though the Air

Force knew the judgment was void before it

took the member's pay 4)

(1) The Air Force received the first writ

of garnishment with a copy of the judgment

attached on 27 December, 1976. On 30 Dec-

ember, 1976, Col. Morton notified the Air

Force Accounting and Finance Center that the

judgment was not served nor was he notified

and that he was not domiciled in nor a resi-

dent of Alabama. (Pet.App.39a,%6). On

January 10, 1977, Col.Morton advised the Air

Force that he had received service of process

by mail. (Pet.App.38a,%5). Despite this, the

Air Force confessed indebtedness on 1l Jan-

uary, 1977, and withheld his pay and paid

it over to Alabama. (Pet.App.39a,47).

By letter of 29 March, 1977, Col.

Morton's present counsel forwarded to James ~

R.Russell, Civilian Attorney-Advisor assigned

to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,

Air Force Accounting and Finance Center,

Denver, Colorado 80279 (Pet.App.37a) a letter

explaining why the Alabama judgment for

alimony, custody and child support was

void and enclosed a certified copy of the

entire Alabama record which Mr. Russell in

his affidavit refers to as documents, and

which included the affidavit of non-residency

of Col. Morton, executed by Patricia Kay

Morton (Pet.App.39a,4%18). Attached to

the letter were copies of cancelled checks

drawn by Col. Morton to Patricia K.Morton

proving he had paid her voluntarily.

@16<

In other words the government's position is

that 42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended, author-

izes their taking of the pay and allowances

of a military member without due process of

law and in spite of the fact that the govern-

ment is aware that the taking was without due

process of law when the taking occurrea{?)

(2) On June 1,1977, the said Attorney-Advisor

for the Air Force wrote a letter to the U.S.

Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama and the said

Attorney-Advisor prepared an affidavit for this

case in which he stated that the U.S.attorney

advised that such service was sufficient pur-

suant to Rule 4:2, Alabama Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure. (Pet.App.40a). However, the said Air

Force attorney, knowing the date of the certi-

fied mail he referred to in his affidavit was

1974 and not 1977, failed to point out this

crucial fact to the U.S.Attorney. (See Res.App.

to Brief la). Rule 4 of the Alabama Rules of

Civil Procedure in effect in 1974, (Res.App.7a)

when the suit was filed and substituted service

was made, did not permit substituted service on

a non-resident in a domestic case for any pur-

pose except the termination of the marital

status. This was changed in January 1977, by

Rule 4:2 which requires, in order for Alabama

to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the

non-resident for purposes of alimony, child

support and custody, that the parties had to

have last lived together in Alabama and one

spouse had to continue to live in Alabama or

. some wrong against the marriage had to have

occurred in Alabama. (Res.App.to Brief 3a).

The U.S. Attorney's reference to Rule 4:2 ~

proyed that he understood the time involved

to be 1977 not 1974. (See Res.App.to Brief 57a).

Cochran v. Cochran, 353 So.2d 805 (1978).

eile

After the Air Force received the writ of

garnishment in this case, Col. Morton put

the Air Force on Notice that the Alabama

proceedings were void. He did this before

the Air Force withheld his pay. The Air

Force withheld and paid his pay to Alabama

in spite of his protestations and without

investigation. After a letter from Col.

Morton's counsel which enclosed the Alabama

records, an Air Force Attorney-Advisor, whose

duties are to review these garnishments, did

decide to check into the matter by asking a

U.S. Attorney in Alabama about it. However,

he erroneously advised the U.S. Attorney

that the Air Force records showed Col.Morton

to be an Alabama domiciliary. This was the

Air Force "Home of Record” document. Depart-

ment of Defense regulations make it clear

that the "Home of Record" document is used

solely for the purpose of fixing travel and

transportation allowances. (Pet.App.82a%6(b)).

It only refers to the place from which the

-18-

member entered the service and the Air

Force cautions, in the "Home of Record"

document, that it is not to be confused

with "“domifile” of the member. (Res.App.

to Brief 7a).

The Air Force does not argue in its

Petition or Brief that the Alabama judgment

for alimony and child support is not void.

Indeed, such an argument would be difficult

in the face of the facts in this case. Col.

Morton was not personally served with process

to bring him before the Alabama court (Pet.

App.89(a)); he was not a domiciliary of

Alabama when the suit was filed (Pet.App.

7la); he had no “minimum contacts" with

Alabama when the suit was filed (Pet.App.

78a); there is no evidence Col.Morton

committed any act against the marriage in

Alabama (Pet.App.90a); and the Mortons last

lived together in Virginia (Pet.App.85a);

Alabama had no “long-arm" statute for

bow

af

~

-~

iY

—

~19@

alimony and child support when the Alabama

suit was filed (Pet.App.93a,94a), except of

course the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

Support Act, and Col. Morton made no appear-

ance of any Kind in the Alabania divorce suit.

(Pet.App.89a). To this must be added the

facts that the Alabama suit was dismissed

prior to judgment for lack of prosecution

and the dismissal set aside without any

Notice to Col.Morton, (Pet.App.89a), and

that Col.Morton voluntarily paid alimony/

child support payments to Patricia Kay

Morton from the date of their separation

until the garnishment of his pay began,

(Pet.App.88a,89a). The initial garnishment

was for $4,100.00 which amount Col. Morton

could not have owed, assuming the Alabama

court had had jurisdiction over him by virtue

of the fact he had been voluntarily paying

Mrs.Morton. The Air Force also knew all of

this prior to the taking of Col.Morton's pay.

(Pet.App. 66a).

a > ie ee Gs Wide be i.

-20-

There was no affidavit filed among

the Alabama suit papers concerning Col.

Morton's military status, and no guardian

ad litem was appointed for him in accordance

with The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief

Act, 50 U.S.C.A.§520. (Pet.App. 89a).

The Air Force contends, however, that

its actual knowledge of the fact that the

judgment upon which the garnishment writ was

predicated was void, is of less import in

legal effect in the administration of 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended, than the presumption

that the garnishment and judgment was "regular

on its face". This is an absurd contention.

Garnishment is an ancilliary or auxil-

iary proceeding, growing out of and dependent

on another original or primary action or

proceeding. Accordingly, where the principal

action is void, the garnishment is also void.

38 C.J.S. Garnishment, §2(4); Wilkinson v.

Cohen, 57 So.2d 108, (Ala.1951); Laborde v.

@2le@

Ubarri, 214 U.S.173,174(1909). A valid

judgment against a defendant in the original

suit is a prerequisite of the validity of a

judgment against a garnishee. Wilkinson v.

Cohen, (supra). A judgment, writ, order, and

the like, cannot be regular on its face if

the underpinnings of that judgment, the

proceedings that support it, are void no

matter what the judgment itself declares

itself to be. 46 Am.Jur.2d,Judgments, §663;

Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.568 (1952);

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.416 (1957).

In Alabama, the state of the garnishment in

the case at bar, the garnishee has a duty to

see that there has been valid service of

process upon the defendant in the original

action (the divorce action in this case),

and that a valid judgment has been entered.

Southern Ry.Co. v. Ward, 26 So.234 (Ala.1898) ;

Alabama G.S.R.Co.v.Chumley, 9 So.286 (1890);

Louisville and N.R.Co.v. Nash,23 So.825

(1897). This same duty is written into the

-22-

Code of Federal Regulations implementing

42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended (5 C.F.R.

§581.102(f)). This is necessary to protect

the serviceman who, because of the exigencies

of the service, is not free to leave his

military post to litigate a divorce case.

Under the position espoused by the defendant

if the member of the service didn't do just

that, at the time the case was filed, his

property would be taken without due process

and contra to all the laws. The Air Force would

have given it away no matter how void it knew

the judgment to be. The statute 42 U.S.C.§659,

et seq., as amended, which is intended to

cure one wrong, would be perpetrating another

wrong, the more serious because it is a

danger to the rights created in our Constitut-

ion. The government contends that Col.Morton

must return to Alabama and litigate this

matter. In addition to being an exceptional

problem to the military member, this court

° “]

ut

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4 z

4 : EL Tis Bik wey Tote

{ i” ae meer ED y * ee ok ae oh ee

=230

summarily rejected such an argument in

Armstrong v. Armstrong, (supra). The

military member, contra to the civilian,

is not free to move about physically where-

ever and whenever he chooses.

The Court of Appeals did not feel

the need to address the issue of whether the

writ and judgment were "regular on their

face" (708 F.2d 680). The only reference

in this regard was made by the Court of

Claims (Claims Court) in its Findings of

Fact that the writ was on a "regular form"

used in Alabama. (Pet.App.90a).

The term "regular on its face" or

its opposite, "void on its face", is a legal

term of art having a definite meaning in the

law. The "face" of a judgment or writ is

not, as the Air Force contends, the last

document filed in a cause, it is the entire

record of the case. (Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W.

700 (N.D.1935). A judgment is “void on its

face" when its invalidity appears upon

=24-

inspection of the judgment roll. Application

of Behymer, 19 P.2d 829 (Calif.1933);

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d 1 (Ala.1957).

The Air Force's use of the term indicates

it is defining "regular on its face" to

mean only the last document in the file.

The definition supplied by the Air Force is

not calculated to weed out any void judgments.

Under the Air Force's definition of "regular

on its face" it would have to be said that

when the Congress felt the need to clarify

this Act, 42 U.S.C.§659 et.seq., in 1977,

it was indulging in useless direction and

definitions and doing a useless act.

Nowhere on a writ of garnishment alone can

it be determined that it was issued pursuant

to legal process by a court of competent

jurisdiction, as required by 42 U.S.C.662(e).

(Pet.App.98a,99a).

It is necessary to look at the

return of process in the original suit and

XY

)

=a28e

look at the state law to determine whether

the process is legal and whether it comes from

a court of competent jurisdiction.Nowhere on

a garnishment writ alone can it be determined

whether the decree, order or judgment was

issued in accordance with applicable state

laws by a court of competent¢jurisdiction so

that it meets the definition of alimony and

child support as is required by 42 U.S.C.

662 (b)g(c). (Res.App.3a-5a). Unless these

definitions are met, the Air Force would be

withholding the member's pay, and paying it

over to the Alabama Court in this case, for

something other than alimony and child

support. Assuming, however, the Air Force's

definition of "regular on its face" means

only the writ received by them, in this

case that writ showed the garvishnent was

| not “regular”. The writ served on the Air

Force, included a copy of the divorce

judgment which was attached, as it should

=26e

be. The divorce judgment, however, stated

that the defendant had been "duly served"

and failed to appear. (Pet.App.38a). Such

language as “duly served" is ambiguous in an

action for divorce because it fails to say

duly served for what purpose. Divorce suits

have been different in nature from other

forms of action since 1942 when this Court

decided the cases of Williams v. North

Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) and

Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S.226

(1945), in that they are divisible. That is,

the court in a divorce suit may very well

have jurisdiction to terminate the marital

status if one party is domiciled in the

state but have no jurisdiction whatsoever

to award a money decree for alimony or

child support. Therefore, even under the

Air Force's definition of “regular on its

face", the portion of the writ that was the

judgment was ambiguous. This put the Air

_ > : ae ee

-27-

Force on notice that a further check of the

proceedings was necessary. In this case,

however, the Air Porce already knew the

Alabama judgment was void.

The arbitrariness of the United States

in the administration of Col.Morton's pay,

is amply and repeatedly shown from the record.

2. Utilizing the definitions in 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq.,as amended, requires the Court

of Appeals' decision to be upheld; immunity

of the government is not absolute; intent

of Congress was to insulate the government

only when an order was voidable, not when

it is void; support obligations are not

debts until created by a court of competent

jurisdiction; situs of debt is with credit-

or. Notice is not synonymous with service

of process.

(a) The clear language used in 42 U.S.C.

659, effective January 1, 1975, stated

that the obligations that could

we

-28-

be honored by the United States had to be

"..-legal obligations to provide child

support or make alimony payments.” (Emphasis

added). The statute was initially silent

as to the immunity of the government for

wrongful and illegal taking of the property

of a military member or employee. (Res.App.2a).

In 1975, the Department of Defense

Pay Manual Section 70710. Garnishment of Pay

for Enforcement of Child Support and Alimony

Obligations, (Res.App.3a), made it clear to

all military personnel that garnishment of a

member's pay had to be based on an order by

a court of competent jurisdiction. The Air

Force cannot claim ignoranc? of its own

Regulations, Department of Defense Regulations

being binding on the Air Force.

Between the time of the initial

enactment of 42 U.S.C.659 in 1975 and the

amendment of it in 1977 there had already

been at least one suit against the United

-29-

States concerning this statute, Popple v.

U.S. 416 F.Supp.1227 (1976) and at least

two more cases filed and ready for decision,

Overman v. U.S. 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir.1977)

and Calhoun v. U.S. 557 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.

1977). Congress had the opportunity to

completely exempt the government from any

liability by merely saying any order received

by the government for garnishment of a

member's pay will be honored by the govern-

ment and there shall be no liability on the

part of the government for honoring any

order for alimony and child support.

Congress did not do that. It added

subsection (f) (Pet.App.98a) which is very

clear that the United States shall enjoy

immunity with respect to these payments

",...made from moneys due or payable from

the United States to any individual

pursuant to legal process regular on its

face, if such payment is made in accordance

@30@

with this section and the regulations

issued to carry out this section.”

(Emphasis added). When Congress amended

42 U.S.C.659 in 1977, it also repeated and

reiterated the phrase, "...legal obligations

to provide child support or make alimony

payments." (Emphasis added). (Pet.App.99a).

It added Definitions in Section 662, (b) defin-

ing child support and (c) defining alimony.

(Res. App.3a). The Congress again made it

quite clear that the government may only

honor “legal obligations", as a result of a

"judgment issued in accordance with applic-

able State law by a court of competent

jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). The Congress

also defined "legal process" used in 42 U.S.C.

659 (a) in subsection (e) (Pet.App.98a-99a)

as that process issuing from a court of

competent jurisdiction.

The statute by its own terms defines

what "alimony" and "child support” are, for

a

PL.

can.

the purposes of this Act. No matter what

other definitions there may be, in garnish-

ment proceedings pursuant to this statute,

we are limited to these definitions. Pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended,

there is no “alimony” or "child support"

unless it issues from a court of competent

jurisdiction. The Act also requires that the

alimony and child support be issued in accord-

ance with applicable state law. 42 U.S.C.

§662(e)(1). In order to insulate the

government from liability, orders and decrees

honored by the government must be from a

court of competent jurisdiction and must be

legal process regular on its face, issued from

a court of competent jurisdiction and issued

in_ accordance with applicable State law. The

immunity of the United States for taking a

member's pay is, therefore, by clear terms

of the statute, a limited immunity. In

stating very clearly in what situations the fe

,> ‘o ‘ ’ y Pi dal $

Pl. ae sai nie oe eA ae ae a ae *

@32=

United States could not be sued, Congress

obviously rejected any contention that it

could never be sued for its long established

legal obligations to pay a service member

his pay. The specific enumerations of

exclusions from liability set forth in the

statute indicate that no other immunity is

granted. Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.)

509 (1869); Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall.(77

U.S.) 321 (1870). The legislative history of

the 1977 amendments to 42 U.S.C.659 made it

quite clear that the amendments were to

clarify the act. Section 501 of Public Law

95-30 contained the amendments. Public Law

95-30 was the Tax Reduction and Simplification

Act of 1977. As introduced, it contained no

provisions concerning garnishment H.R.Rep.3477

95th Cong. lst Sess., 1977; 91 Stat. 126,

Section 501 of the act was added to the

amendments on the floor of the Senate

-33-

(125 Cong.Rec. 6722 April 29,1977) by

Senator Nunn who said,

"The intent of these amend-

ments that I am introducing

today will be to clarify the

garnishment provisions to

provide for administrative

improvements and to aid in

the evaluation of the program."

A general explanation was included in the

Congressional Record, Part A., "Clarification

of Garnishment Provisions" stated the object

of Section 501 (the amendments to 42 U.S.C.

659) was to clarify existing law. (125 Cong.

Rec.6722(supra)). The question thus arises

why Congress felt the need to clarify

42 U.S.C.659 by these amendments if the

government's position is correct; that is

that even if the government knows the judgment

of the State Court which issued the writ is

void, the government owes no duty to its .

military member and is obligated to take

his property and give it to the wife or

former wife of such member upon receipt of

-34-

J

a copy of this void writ because it is on a

“regular form” issued by the State Court. For

such a position as that of the government,

no interpretation or clarification by amend-

ment of the statute to read that the govern-

ment would not be liable when it honored a

State Court Order if the writ was legal

process regular on its face, issued by a

court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to

applicable State law. Those conditions set

by Congress were intended to insulate the

government from suit when it honored a

"voidable" judgment as opposed to a "void"

judgment, void because the Court issuing it

had no jurisdiction over the defendant to

enter such an order. The fact that the

amendments to 42 U.S.C.659(f) fail to state

that the government is totally, unequivocally

and completely immune from liability for the gj

taking of a military member's or its civilian

employee's pay is not error or ommission on

! Se as ——

yn be ih wy ee ee, 4 Thy ee at Nias

NA ee ee AS re i PR, te Sete yh

@33e

the part of Congress. The amendment was

clearly an attempt to make the statute,

42 U.S.C. 659, constitutional in its appli-

cation by assuring that the military member

or its employee is afforded due process of

law. To accept the government's position is

to license the denial of due process of law

by the United States. No such intent should

or could be attributed to the Congress. The

Illinois Supreme Court in Herb v. Pitcairn,

G84 I111.237,51 N.E.2d 277,280 (111.8.C.1943))

explains the distinction between "void" and

"voidable" judgments as follows:

"It is the element of jurisdiction

that differentiates a void from

a voidable judgment; both the

subject matter and the parties must

be before the court, and jurisdiction

of the one without the other will

not suffice; the two must concur

or the judgment will be void in any

case in which the court assumes to

act. Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297

111.451, 130 N.E.787. And we have

further held that even a court of

general jurisdiction has no power

to do any act or render any judgment

affecting persons or property, unless

the particular act or judgment is

te

-36=

brought within its jurisdiction

according to law. People ex rel.

Brundage v. Righeimer, 298 Ill.

611, 133 N. IEEE These are general

principles upon which substantially

all courts are in agreement.”

Although Alabama had long-armed statutes

based on torts committed in Alabama and

actions arising from doing business in

Alabama, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 4, Process (C) (1) (B) (1973) (Res.App.5a),

permitted substituted service of process

(by mail) on a non-resident of Alabama for

divorce only. When a statute says "divorce"

and does not include the terms alimony and

child support, process pursuant to such a

statute is limited to termination of status

and does not permit in personam judgments

based onsuch process. May v. Anderson, 345

U.S. 528 (1953). As previously noted,

divorce has long Been severable from alimony,

custody and child support. Alabama had no

long-arm statute for alimony and child © 4

support in 1974, (Pet.App.93a931-94a). The :

/

-37]=

Alabama judgment would not have been valid

even under the long-arm statute that became

effective in 1977. Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 4.B(H) required that the

parties have last lived in the marital

relationship in Alabama and one party to

have continued to live in Alabama in order

for the court to exercise jurisdiction over

a non-resident and Rule 4:B(I) required that

a wrong had to be committed in Alabama against

the marital relationship for the court to

exercise such jurisdiction. These are not the

facts in ths instant case.

None of the requirements of 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended, so that the Air

Force is insulated from liability, exist in

this case. It is not immune from suit for

military pay if only one of these require-

ments is missing, much less when all of

them are missing.

The Air Force argues from both sides

of the coin. It argues it is under

4

~ ;

-39-

compulsion to withhold Col.Morton'‘s pay and

pay it into the Alabama Court or be subject

to contempt proceedings and it would be

subject to default judgments if it failed

to honor a state court writ. On the other

hand, the Air Force has argued since the di

inception of this suit that 42 U.S.C. 659 et

seg., as amended, did not grant a cause of

action against the government. Cunningham v.

Department of the Navy, 455 F.Supp.1370

(D.C.Conn.1978); Popple v. U.S., 416 F.Supp.

1227 (D.C.N.¥.1976); Snapp v. U.S.Postal

Service - Texarkana, 664 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir.

1982). Col. Morton has never denied that

contention. Col. Morton's cause of action

in this suit was not based on 42 U.S.C.659,

but was an action to recover his military

pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C.204, et seq. |

It is the subject matter of the

Petition, Complaint, Declaration, Motion

for Judgment, or whatever it may be called

- 39.

in the various courts that determines the

jurisdiction of the court over the subject

matter of the lawsuit and not the subject

matter of the defense. Louisville &

Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149

(1908).

In any event, the Air Force is immune

from contempt proceedings, default judgments

and the like in state courts, except for

negligence acts that may be brought under

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1346. To refuse to honor a writ of

garnishment because the state court pro-

. ceedings do not conform to the require-

ments of 42 U.S.C. 662 (e) (1), will not

create legal difficulties for the Air Force.

The Air Force argues that where a

defendant has been given notice by the

garnishee this satisfies the due process

requirement because such a defendant will

have an opportunity to defend himself in

-40-

the attachment suit and cites Harris v.

Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). There is

a distinction however, between the attach-

ment of a debt that exists before the

necessity of a court judgment to create it

and alimony and child: support obligations

© which do not exist until they are created

by a court that has in personam jurisdiction

over a defendant. Until a court of com-

petent jurisdiction rules that a defendant

is obligated to make alimony and child

support payments, until such a court fixes

the amount of such alimony and child

support, and until such a defendant is in

arrears in the orders of a court of com-

petent jurisdiction, there is no debt to

be condemned. The principle that the Air

Force cites does not apply when there is

no debt. ‘

The other principle of Harris v.

Balk, (supra) that the intangible debt may

be attached in a state in which the creditor

-41-

has no minimun contacts has been overruled

by this court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433

U.S. 186 (1977). Under Alabama law, the

situs of the debt has always followed the

creditor, not the debtor. Louisville and

Nashville Ry. Co. v. Nash, (supra). This

court has also found the situs of the debt

to be where the creditor is. Estin v.

Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). It is logical

that the situs of a debt be with the

creditor because the creditor owns the

cause of action for the debt. The Air

Force's argument that the Alabama court had

both the subject matter and personal jur-

isdiction in the suit by Patricia Kay Morton

against the United States is erroneous.

The debt (subject matter) owed by the

United States to Col. Morton was not

located in Alabama. It was located where

Col. Morton was,in Alaska.

The Air Force acknowledges that

=-42-

state courts have held garnishees liable to

reimbursement to, the principal debtor where

the underlying judgment was void and

acknowledges Alabama is one of the those

states. Lousiville & Nashville R.R. Co.

v. Nash, (supra). But, it argues that

this is because the principal defendant

had been given no actual notice of the ~—

underlying action. The Air Force's position

is that "service of process" and "notice"

are synonymous. This is erroneous. Know-

ledge of the pendency of a suit against

a defendant does not give the court in

which the suit is pending jurisdiction over

the defendant. In the Alabama case of

Partlow v. Partlow, 20 So. 2d 517 (Ala.

1945) the court said, "The mere fact that

the defendant (non-resident) has actual

knowledge or notice of the institution of

the proceedings against him is not suffi-

8k

o*

a

cient to give the court jurisdiction."

o4 3a

It is essential to the proper

renditon of a judgment in personam that

the Court have jurisdiction of the parties,

even though such parties have knowledge as

distinguished from notice, of the action,

and, indeed, even though they are present

at the trial. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments,

Sec. 25 p. 330. Minton v. First National

Exchange Bank of Virginia, 145 S.E. 2d

139 (Va. 1935). National Metal Co. v.

Greene Corsal Copper Co., 89 P.535, (1907).

Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67, 52 P.16l

(1895}; Lee v. Indep. School Dist., 149

Iowa 345, 128 N.W. 533 (1910); Beaufort

County v. Mayo, 207 N.C. 211, 176 S.E.

753 (1934); Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn. 36,

15 S.W. 2d 747; Greenwood v. Furr 251

S.W. 332 (Tex.1923).

"A personal judgment rendered without such

jurisdiction is in violation of the due

process clause of the United States .

~

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-44-

Constitution and is not merely voidable

but is void." (Emphasis added). 46 Am.

Jur. 2d Judgments § 25 (supra). The

citations for this proposition are too

numerous to quote but the case of Hess

v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 71 L.Ed.1091(1927),

47 S.Ct. 632, accurately sets forth the

law. Clearly knowledge is not a legal

substitute for service of process and

cannot give a Court in personam jurisdic-

tion over a person. Estin v. Estin (supra);

Kreiger v. Kreiger 334 U.S. 555 (1948);

Armstrong v. Armstrong (supra); Vanderbilt

v. Vanderbilt (supra). It is the lack of

proper service of process that makes the

judgment void.

Had there been legal service of

process on Col. “asec in the divorce suit, |

it would have given the Alabama Court ii

continuing jurisdiction over him to enforce

the court's judgment by garnishment on the -

strength of mere notice to him prior to

OP ARI aed: be os ualtcult teh Jaa)

-45-"

the garnishment. Michigan Trust Co. v.

Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Sheffield v.

Sheffield, 148 S.E. 2d 771 (S.C.Va.1966) ;

Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So. 2d 1170 (Ala.

1978). Garnishment being only ancilliary

to the Fbdeitints, the jurisdiction continues.

(b) Many state court statutes are

cited by the Air Force which provide gen-

erally the same ot Musbown’ a: that *.<.-

the judgment condemning the debt, mohey or

effects to the satisfaction of the plaint-

iff's demand is conclusive as between the

garnishee and the defendant to the extent

of such judgment, unless the defendant

prosecutes to effect an appeal from such

judgment.” Alabama Code Sec. 6.6-461

(1977). This statute, and those like it |

are predicated upon the fact that the

court issuing the original judgment had

jurisdiction of the person and the subject

matter. Otherwise, these statutes would a

=46e

be authorizing the taking of property with-

out due process of law. Jurisdiction is

the threshold question of every cause of

action and the court must have jurisdiction

of both. "A judgment rendered without

such jurisdiction is a violation of the

due process clause of the United States

Constitution and is not merely voidable

but void.” 46 Am. Jur 2d Judgments § 25

: (supra). The courts are agreed that if

the judgment in a garnishment proceeding

is void because of lack of either subject

matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over

the defendant, payment by a garnishee is

no protection to him against a subsequent

action by his creditors to recover the

debt. 49 A.L.R. 1411 Annotation-Garnish-

ment-Void-Protection, which cites Louis-

ville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Nash, (supra)

and Southern Ry. Co. v. Ward, 26 So. 234

(Ala. 1898), 38 C.J.S. Garnishment, 293 ,

(e). The Alabama Code § 6-6-461 and other a

vor See

plead

a47a

similar statutes apply to voidable judgments

where the irregularity does not effect the

jurisdiction of the court.They do not apply

when the judgment is void. To interpret

these statutes as applying when the orig-

inal judgment is void for want of jurisdic-

tion over the judgment debtor would indeed

make these statutes constitutionally objection-

able, particularly, as in this case, if the

debt is contingent upon the judgment creat-

ing it. The Air Force errs in that it

fails to distinguish between a voidable

judgment which must be set aside before it

is void and a void judgment which is ipso

facto void and requires no action to set it

aside. 46 Am.Jur.2d,Judgments §49. Thus, an

argument based on the need for relief from

a void judgment is inappropriate. A voidable

judgment is one in which the defect does not

affect jurisdiction. A void judgment is one

issued by a court without jurisdiction of

subject matter or a party. Lacking

- ™

-48-

either, the court is not a court of compe-

tent jurisdiction. [ The Air Forces' cita- :

tion 1 New Restatement (Second) of Judg-

ments § 16, Comment C 146 (1982) is irreve-

lant because it does not refer to judgments

void ab initio but to reversed judgments,

etc.]

In O'Toole v. Helio Products Inc., 149

N. E. 2d 795 (C.A.I11.,1958) the court in

holding that the garnishee has a duty to

inquire into the validity of the judgment

upon which the garnishment proceedings are

based, also held the garnishee is not pro-

tected in making payments pursuant to the

garnishment writ if the original judgment

against the principal debtor is void for

want of jurisdiction over the judgment

debtors. The Air Force says this is the

only case it has found to this effect. Col.

Morton's counsel agrees. Cases of judgments

I that are void for lack of jurisdiction over

4 ‘ / Tif / / /

x ‘ ‘ , / " . : « us + 4 x ve

; toad ey, . , on RE TS. TPM” Mee a at ad

Si ie eed hon: ‘ jetta ara RPE be ete. @ es Sk a Al oa oe

-49-

a party defendant are indeed rare. Since

the enactment of 42 U.S.C. 659, there have

been only a handful of cases even alleging

such.

One of these cases alleging lack of

jurisdiction in the original court was the

case of Calhoun v. U.S.(supra). The Air

Force states that Calhoun is in direct con-

flict with the case at bar. In addition to

the distinction between that case and the

instant one made by the Court of Appeals

that Calhoun was decided prior to the clar-

ifying amendments to 42 U. S. C. 659, Mr.

Calhoun failed to give the Navy notice of

any invalidity of the service of process on

him prior to the time the Navy garnished

his pay. Further, he never informed the

District Court as to where he was in fact

domiciled. California had a long-arm statute

about which that Court of Appeals said

, the face of the judgment shows that ser- y

-50-

vice of process was had in accordance with

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec.

415.40. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

looked into the matter of the original ser-

vice of process. The cases of Cunningham

v. Dept. of the Navy, 455 F. Supp. 1370,

(Dist. Conn. 1978); Popple v. United States

(supra); and Snapp v. U. S. Postal Service-

Texarkana (supra), relied on by the Air

Force for its position as to the effect of

42 U. S. C. 659 et. seq. as amended, were

cases alleging a cause of action pursuant

to the said statute. The statute did not

create a cause of action. Overman v. U. S.

(supra) was for an injunction alleging

fraud in the procurement of the original

judgment. In those cases the Court had jur-

isdiction of the parties and the subject

matter in the underlying suit so that any

defect in such a cause would make the judg-

ment voidable, not void. In Jismerjian y-

-5l-

Dept. of the Air Force, 457 F. Supp. 820

(DC... &. C. 1978) aff'd. 607 F. 2d 1001

(4th Cir. 1979),cert. den. 444 U. S.1082,

1980), Mr. Jizmerjian accepted service of

process in the Arizona court. In Rush v.

U. S. Agency of Int. Dev. (706 F. 2d 1229

(D. C. Cir. 1983) (this court denied certio-

rari,No. 83-382, Jan 9, 1984) Mr. Rush

actually brought the action himself in the

state court. In each of these cases the

parties were both before the court which

issued the original judgment. Each had an

opportunity to contest jurisdiction and he

failed to do so. Therefore, the matter of

jurisdiction became res judicata. Johnson

v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951);

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948)

These cases are all distinguishable from

the case at bar. |

The litigation over this garnishment

act has been exceedingly minimal. Such

~ yee

+

a83s

cases will become even less as lawyers and

judges become more familiar with what is

required of them in order to comply with

federal requirements.

The Air Forces' arguments that the

garnishee under this act is a mere stake-

holder under this act pales in view of the

nearly seven years of litigation in this

cause when all it had to do if it thought

it was a mere stakeholder was to interplead

the money. It knew Better and it fully un-

derstands what must occur in order to make

the government immune from liability.

This Act is a good one. The manner in

which it is administered, however, must not

be allowed to deprive anyone of their con-

stitutional rights.

The Court of Appeals was correct in }

holding that a court should construe legis-

lative enactments to avoid constitutional =

difficulty if possible. U. S. v. Clark,

454 U. S$. 595 (19801; Us S./v. Harris,347 /

a83e

U. S. 612, 618 (1954); Blasecki v. City of

Durham, 456 F. 2d 87, cert.den.409 U. S. — 2s

912 (1972). Certainly, we do not wish to

throw the baby out with the bath water,

when all we need is to clean the tub.

3. The Comptroller General's opinion is

not controlling; later enacted agency regu-

lations cannot be relied upon to reverse a

court decision; the court decision does

not require payment to Col. Morton twice.

The government refers to a decision

of the Comptroller General dated 2 February,

1982 (B-203668 - Matter of Technical Sergeant

Harry E. Mathews, (U.S.A.F.). (Pet.App.F.).

The Comptroller General refused to allow

Sergeant Mathews to be reimbursed the amounts

that had been taken from his pay between the

dates that an ex parte judgment had been

rendered against him in Florida and the

date that the Florida court ordered the

| c

. garnishment set aside. The only basis for og

po . y y, / y, , f yea

-54-

disallowing his claim was that the documents

received bythe Air Force Finance Center were

“regular on their face". At no place in the

opinion does the Comptroller General, who

although basically a financial administrative

officer has certain “quasi-judicial” responsi-

bilities when he rules on requests of doubt-

ful expenditures presented to him by finance

officers, mention the basic legal issues in

these cases. That is, was the writ valid

legal process from a court of competent

jurisdiction? The Comptroller General,

like the Air Force, merely looked at the

garnishment order and seeing the word "court"

pronounced it "valid on its face".

One court commented on the weight

to be given to opinions of the Comptroller

General in Alexander v. FERC 609 F. 2d 543,

546 U. S. Court of App. RD. Cc. 1979.

tes

=§S—

"The court disagrees with. the petitioner's

assertion that it should give weight to

opinions of the Comptroller General concern-

ing interagency transfers. Questions on

review concerning the authority of the

F.E.R.C. are for the court to decide and

this responsibility should not be abdicated

to the Comptroller General."

The Comptroller General's decision,

it is noted, was decided after the Court of

Claims had decided this case, Morton v. U.S.,

Cecided December 14, 1981, (Pet.App.62a).

The Comptroller General completely ignores |

the opinion of the Court of Claims where an

ample discussion of court of competent juris-

diction appears. Administrative agencies,

such as the General Accounting Office, are

bound by decisions of the Court of Claims

as well as all other Federal Courts. The

legal conclusions of the Comptroller General

are entitled to no weight in this case in

re

the face of a contra decision of the Court

of Claims. The facts in Mathews, do serve

to point out the difficulties of a military

member who is not present to litigate.

After the initial decision was reached

by the Court of Claims on December 14, 1981,

later promulgated amendments in regulations

cannot have any effect on the decision of

the court. The Court of Claims' decision,

although not final as to the amount of Col.

Morton's pay to be paid to him, was final

as to the question of the government's

liability to him for the pay. Retroactive

laws and regulations promulgated after a

court decision is final would be legislative

encroachment upon judicial powers. Since

legislative enactments and regulations

which would have the effect of rendering

court judgments ineffective, cannot be >|

applied retroactively because it would be

direct legislative or executive reversal sq

f / |

3 ; : - ws x . F oy - - =e be _

ae Peon Se hag Paes eo ee 4 aca ass “wis Renee oe ried go SF

Phe, RE Ra ek oe es es Bite: ee eS. cs See tie Mate eet ate

«Se

of a court- decision and such is per se

objectionable. Sutherland Statutory

Construction IV ed. C. Dallas Sands, Vol.2

(1972) 1983 pocket supplement, §41.08.

It was obviously an attempt by the

government to overturn the decision in this

case when the government promulgated a new

set of regulations which were published in

the Federal Register, Vol.48, No.110,

Tuesday, June 7, 1983. The said publication

stated: "This revision expressly provides

that agencies will not be required to

ascertain whether the court or other author-

ity which issued the garnishment order had

obtained personal jurisdiction over the

obligor prior to its issuance of the order.”

And, "Two Federal agencies submitted comments

concerning the amendment to 5 CFR 581.305(f£),

which state that when a governmental entity

receives legal process that appears to con-

form to the laws of the jurisdiction from

which it was issued, the entity shall not

= 58-

be required to ascertain whether the

authority which issued legal process had

obtained personal jurisdiction over the

obligor. The amendment is consistent with

the position that the government has taken

in litigation concerning the issue.”

Legislation may not be enacted by an

administrative agency under the guise of its

exercise of the power to make rules and

regulations by issuing a rule or regulation

which is inconsistent or out of harmony with

or which alters, adds to, extends or enlarges,

subverts, or impairs, limits or restricts

the act being administered. 1 Am.Jur.2d

Administrative Law, §132. The 1983 amend-

ments to 5 C.F.R.581, promulgateiafter the

Court of Claims' decision, attempts to insu-

late the government from all liability when

such is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended. The statute is

clear that unless the judgment for alimony a

sis

- 5% |

and child support is in conformity with the

laws of the state which renders the judgment,

it is not alimony and child support. In

order to determine whether the judgment

conforms to local state law, the government

has to look into it, at least where it is

put on notice of the defect. Otherwise,

the government is paying out the pay of its

employees for purposes other than child

support and alimeny. The government has

attempted to expand the statute on its

immunity and impair the right of the

employee or member to his pay.

The Air Force contends it should not’

have to pay twice. It's not paying Col.

Morton twice because it never paid Col.

Morton the first time. There was no

valid debt for alimony and child support due

from him to Patricia Kay Morton and, there-

fore, the Air Force has not discharged an ;

ohligation of Col. Morton's which is what P|

- 60-

occurred in The City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.

57 (1884). That case is distinguishable in

that there was a pre-existing debt which was

discharged by the garnishee. However, the

legality of the proceedings could not with-

stand todays legal scrutiny.

The Air Force is required to make

payment to a party legally due the money

even if it has previously paid the money

to someone else. Howell v. U.S. 195 F.Supp.

597 (1958). If the Air Force has been

arbitrary and capricious in the admini-

stration of a military member's pay and

pays it to the wrong party, it must pay

the member his pay. Cherry y. U.S., (supra).

-6l<

4. The Court of Appeals' decision does

not impose on the government greater

liability than that on a private garnishee;

the exposure of the government is de minimis.

It is stated by the Air Force that

the Court of Appeals' decision would impose

on the government far greater liability and

responsibility for legal investigation,

analysis, and litigation than is borne by

private garnishees. This is incorrect. The

government, like any other Alabama garnishee,

has a duty to assert all proper defenses of

its creditor of which the defendant has

knowledge. (6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and

Garnishment, Sec. 357 and Stewart v. Northern

-62-

Assurance Co., 32 S.E. 218 (W.Va. 1898).

The government had knowledge of the inval-

idity of the judgment in the case at bar.

However, in order to afford the military

member the same protection that a private

garnishee affords its employer by asserting

such defenses in the litigation, the Air

Force is not required to do anything if it

does not choose to do so. Because

42 U.S.C. 659 and its amendment created no

cause of action against the government, it

can merely refuse to honor any garnishment

that does not conform to the terms of the

statute and such will not subject it to

liability. Consequently, the Court of

Appeals' decision imposes much less liabil

ity and litigation on the government than

a private garnishee.

Under the Court of Appeals’ ruling

the government would not be challenging a

state court's order. The Court of Appeals’

-63-

ruling has absolutely no effect on the

state court's order. It doesn't change it

in any way. It merely says to the plaintiff

in the state courts “seek your collection

procedures in another manner where the

service member will have an opportunity to .

be heard and challenge the court order", if

there is a substantial claim of a jurisdict-

ional defect. It does not require the

government to intervene in the underlying

litigation. Indeed, the government does not

know of such litigation until the under-

lying action is concluded. The government

is not required to take sides in the under-

lying litigation as the Air Force alleges.

It should not take sides at any time. The r

Court of Appeals’ decision only requires

that the government uphold the federal law 4

and administer the pay of a military member 4

in accordance with that law. The Court of F

Appeals’ decision actually relieved the

-64-

government of much of the burden that a

private garnishee encounters when the

original judgment on which the garnishment

is based is void. The Court of Appeals'

decision places the burden on the military

member to notify the government of the lack

of jurisdiction of the state court before

the government pays over the member's pay.

It puts the burden on the plaintiff's

lawyers in the state court to follow the

1aw??

The government is in a far superior

position under the Court of Appeals' decis-

ion than is a private garnishee in that the

government is blessed, or cursed as the

case may be, with in excess of 67,500

attorneys in its employ. See Hearings on

Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R.Rep.96-1005,

Part I, at page 8 on 28 U.S.C. §2412.

Had t ama lawyer follow t

mandates of the Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil

Relist Act and a guardian ad Litem had been ny

appo for Col.Morton, the great probabil-

ity is that this case would not have been

necessary.

-65-

Those include those Air Force Judge Advocates,

like the one at Elmendorf Air Force Base,

Alaska, who advised Col.Morton, through the

Air Force's legal assistance program, that

the Alabama Court's decision was void for

lack of personal jurisdiction over Col.

Morton (Res.App.to Brief 10 a). The Air

Force Accounting and Finance Center in

Denver, has an entire staff of attorneys,

one being the attorney-advisor who stated

that his principal duty was to review the

legality of state garnishments served on

the Air Force. The question arises as to

why those attorneys are needed if the Air

Force owed no duty to its member and was

only a stakeholder? Any clerk could

routinely -confess judgment to a state court.

The Air Force knew it had legal responsi-

‘bilities in administering this act in

spite of the fact that such is denied.

In order to fully comply with the

- 66-

Court of Appeals' decision, all that is

needed after the Air Force has been notified

of the jurisdictional defect, is for the Air

Force to require the garnishor's attorney

to submit two additional authenticated

sheets of paper, one showing the return of

the process and two, a copy of the state law

concerning process. The military can

require its members to set forth their

domicile on the finance records and put the

burden on the member to keep it correct.

The government can require its member or

employee to submit evidence of the member's

contention. If these facts are not conclus-

ive, it can interplead the funds. It certain-

ly can demand that the mandates of the

Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

6

(supra) be followed. This will eliminate

most problems. g

ey

Almost all the states have now enacted ~

a form of long-armed statute for alimony,

-67-

custody and child support based on the last

place the parties had their marital abode as

husband and wife. This information is known

to the military or can be documented by

the member. Such evidence is usually in the

Air Force files. Determining these minimum

contacts presents much less of a problem to

the government than to a private employer.

In any event, the government no |

longer has a choice in cases of a retired

member or member on retainer pay. It is now

mandatory thatthe Air Force, pursuant to said

10 U.S.C.1408, Former Spouses Protection Act,

determine all the facts that 42 U.S.C.659,

et seg., as amended, requires. That is,

it must determine whether the court was a

court of competent jurisdiction; whether

the final decree of divorce was issued in

accordance with the laws of the jurisdict-

ion of that court and whether the order and

other documents served with the court order

-6 8-

certify that the rights of the member under

the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

(supra) were observed. It is additionally

required to determine, among other things,

whether the court has jurisdiction over the

member by reason of his residence, other

than because of military assignment in all

cases brought pursuant to 10 U.S.C.1408.

The machinery required to make those deter-

minations can certainly make the determinat-

ions required by the Court of Appeals'

decision. This is particularly true when

the percentage of ex-parte orders, not

based on a separation and property settle-

ment agreement, is minute. As a result of

what was referred to in hearings before the

enactment of this statute as a drastic

departure from anything that existed in

the past, one only has to look at the very

small number of cases that have arisen

concerning the garnishment of federal pay

- 69-

as compared to the 13,000 garnishments the

Air Force maintains exist for servicemen

alone. (Pet.App.19).

5. The Court of Appeals’ decision does

not place the government nor the federal

courts in the domestic relations business.

Congress put the federal government in the

garnishment business.

The Air Force says that the Court of

Appeals' decision places the Federal Courts

in the business of domestic relations. The

Congress of the United States enacted this

legislation and it put the federal govern-

ment in the business of garnishing pay for

alimony and child support out of which arises

this military pay claim. Congress was indeed

cognizant of such claims and that is one

of the reasons for the amendment of 42 U.S.C.

659. The federal courts are not called

upon to award divorces, make alimony, custody

and child support rulings nor to modify a

+

state court's ruling on these matters. The

validity of a garnishment is an issue that

arises from the domestic case, it is not a

domestic case itself. The federal courts

have been called upon since very early on,

to make decisions of what is alimony and what

is not alimony in bankruptcy proceedings,

even when the term alimony is used in the

state court judgment, order, or decree.

Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); In

re Knuppenburg, et al, 422 F. Supp. 274

( Mich 1976); In_re Albin 591 F. 2d 94

and, indeed, to determine the validity of

marriages, Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826,

(9th Circ.1963). Such determination under a

federal statute,does not put the federal

courts in the business of domestic relations.

The federal courts are as adept at deter-

mining these questions as the state courts. ‘

The federal courts are also hearing cases

arising from parental kidnapping and

=Tj<

child concealment between spouses and former

spouses. Kajtazi vy. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp.

15 (E.D.N.¥.1978); Accord v. Parsons, 551 F.

Supp. 115 (W.D.Val982); Bennett v. Bennett,

682 F.2d 1039 (D.C.Cir.1982); Lloyd v.

Loeffler, 539 F.Supp.998 (D.C.Wisc.2982);

Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th

Cir.1982); cert den. 103 S.ct. 372 (1983).

These federal courts did not consider them-

selves in the domestic relations business.

In Wasserman the court restated the wording

in Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.1980),

and said at page 834 of 671 F.2d:

"A district court may not simply

avoid all diversity cases having

intra family aspects. Rather it

must consider the exact nature of

the rights asserted or the breaks

alleged... So long as diversity

jurisdictin endures, federal

courts cannot shirk the inconven- *

b | tence of sometimes trading in wares ;

; from the foul rag-and-bone shop of a,

| the heart.” a

a The Court of Appeals here looked at the . 3

nature of the right asserted, the claim for oe

>

military pay. The fact that it arose from

a garnishment based on a claim for alimony

and child support does not make it a

domestic relations case nor put the court

in the domestic relations business.

6. Domestication of a foreign decree

requires in personam jurisdiction over a

defendant; the purposes of 42 U.S.C.659

are supported by the Court of Appeals’

decision and in accord with congressional

intent.

The Air Force further contends that

if Patricia K. Morton had obtained her

divorce in Virginia, she could have filed

a garnishment action on it in Alabama and

then the term "Legal process *** issued by

*** a court of competent jurisdiction"

| would refer to the Alabama proceedings not “4

. to the prior Virginia proceedings. The Air a

‘ | Force is operating under a false concept as a

to how these procedures work. One cannot.

Vv

me

Lt

i> 9 Bit

bring a garnishment proceeding in a state

different from the state where the judgment

upon which the garnishment is based was

granted, without first domesticating the

judgment. It is true all states must give

full faith and credit to a valid judgment

of a sister state but the procedure for

doing that requires that a new law suit be

filed for such purpose in the state where

the judgment is going to be domesticated.

In personam service of process in such new

law suit must be made on the defendant in

the new cause to domesticate the foreign

decree. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §9.30.

This being the case, the defendant, when

legally served in the domestication suit,

can raise jurisdictional questions concern-

ing the original judgment as well as claim =

other defenses in the forum which is foreign

to the state of the judgment. Thus, any

jurisdictional problem that there may be _ .

o7qe~

in the original judgment becomes res judicata .

if not raised in the latter proceedings.

Sherrer v. Sherrer, (supra). The under-

pinnings of a garnishment from a state,

other than that from which the original

judgment was entered, also must be from a

court of competent jurisdiction.

Contrary to the Air Force's argument

that the majority's opinion destroys the

intended purposes of 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq.,

the majority decision applies the statute

so that it is not constitutionally suspect |

by an interpretation that condones the

taking of property without due process of

law. Such an application is in accord

with the intent of the 1977 amendment to

the statute.

_;=

Y Amicus has misunderstood the facts of

this case; URESA is a good law capable of

producing excellent results and at the same

time treating both parties fairly.

The amicus has misunderstood the facts

in this case. FPirst, he cites Associated

Oil Co. v. Mullin, 294 P.421 (1930) for the

proposition that neither the parties nor

their privies, not strangers, can attack a

judgment of a domestic court of record on

jurisdictional grounds unless the want of

"jurisdiction appears on the face of the

record. He concludes that the appropriate-

ness of this suit is questionable. He is

apparently unaware that the purported

service in the Morton suit shows that

Col. Morton was a non-resident of Alabama.

Alabama haying no long-arm statute for

alimony and child support claims at that

time, the jurisdictional defect appears on

the record, Interestingly enough, the iy

-76-

California Court in using the term "court

of record" lends corroboration to Col.

Morton's position that "court of competent

jurisdiction" means jurisdiction of the

parties as well as the subject matter

because if Congress had meant “court of

record", that court which has subject

matter jurisdiction, it would have said so.

Second, although the Air Force concedes

the Alabama judgment was void for alimony

and child support, the amicus differs and

argues that after the date of the service’

of process on September 17, 1974, it

doesn't matter what Col. Morton did. The

amicus was unaware that Col. Morton had the

intent to be domiciled in Alaska in May of

1974 and he was in Alaska in May of 1974 and

had contracted to buy a home there.

Third, he argues that Col.Morton told

the Air Force he was an Alabamian so he

could avoid the expense in moving his wife

i

ov%.

and children to Alabama. Col.Morton never

told the Air Force he was an Alabamian.

(Pet.App.27 a). Col. Morton was not

obligated to move Patricia Kay Morton any-

where. Col. Morton merely permitted her

to use his moving benefit. They were still

married. Patricia Kay Morton unilaterally

left Col. Morton in Virginia in the marital

home where he remained for nearly nine

months. She refused to accompany him to

Alaska. (Pet.App. ll a). Col.Morton didn't

"ship" Patricia Kay Morton anywhere.

Fourth, and most grieyous, is the amicus’

statement that "...Col.Morton did not simply

comply with one of those civilities of a

divorce too often ohserved in the breach,

visitation." The minor Morton child was i

living with Col. Morton in Alaska. (See.

Res.App.to Brief 9a). Apparently the

amicus also does not think children go to

the visiting parent's home instead of baa si

~96-

visiting parent going to the child's home.

Such assumption as the amicus made is erron-

eous.

Fifth, Col. Morton never anticipated

that his wife or the state of Alabama would

support his children. Col.Morton voluntarily

provided support for his children in an

amount that had been agreed upon by the

Mortons. Col.Morton provided support when

he had no legal obligation to do so.

Sixth, there is no evidence that Col.

Morton's conduct forced Patricia Kay Morton

to leave Col. Morton. She didn't wish to

live with him in Alaska. (Pet.App.1l a).

Too, the doors of the Virginia court were

open to her for almost nine months after

she left Col.Morton prior to his leaving:

See Section 20-72 of 1950 Code of Virginia,

as amended. (Res.App. 19 a). She chose

not to use them.

Seventh, the amicus’ position that a

- litigation. Why should Col. Morton do that a

-79-

fair forum is based on the economic circun-

stances of the parties has no application

‘to the fact in this case. If Patricia Kay

Morton had no funds, it seems absurd to

say she would have moved to Alabama and

only hegun proceedings a year later when

she could have gone into the Virginia

Courts for immediate funds in either a

pendente lite hearing in a divorce suit

or a suit for separate maintenance.

Eighth, the amicus'statement that Col.

Morton couldn't have voluntarily paid

Patricia Kay Morton because the garnish-

ment is based on an order for that amount,

is tantamount to saying a man can't be

charged with a crime because he is

innocent. The fact is, Col. Morton

voluntarily paid Mrs. Morton. (Pet.App.21 a).

Ninth, the amicus states Col.Morton had

defenses that could control the Alabama —

-80-

when the Air Force Judge Adyocate advised

him that the Alabama court had no authority

to enter an in personam judgment against

him? Too, a military man can only fly space

available if he is free to leave his duties.

At the time he was acting Commander at

Elmendorf Air Base, Alaska, (Res.App. to

Brief 10a) which is the Air Base between

the continental United States and Russia.

Tenth, Patricia Kay Morton did not have

to file in Alaska to litigate Her right to

alimony and child support. She can do that

through URESA (supra). URESA is a very

effective law. The amicus is obviously

biased and in favor of a system that permits

unilateral deduction of pay of a serviceman

without benefit of a hearing as opposed to 3

one that would permit both parties to be -

heard. Such a position also may result in

double payments to a spouse. URESA and ce

42 U.S.C. 659 et seq., as mended can

; ee: J ee

ae”

-81-

exist side by side. Garnishment is fine

when the member has been afforded a hearing

but URESA should be used when the member has

not been given a hearing. The machinery is

present in both statutes to provide excellent

satisfaction in reaching the object for which

they were enacted. However, neither law can

eliminate the human factor in the admini-

stration of the law.

Eleventh, the Amicus laments that

Patricia Kay Morton must support herself and

two minor children on $500 a month. The

amicus is assuming facts not in evidence

because he doesn't know how much Patricia

Kay Morton earns. If we are going to

assume facts not in evidence, let us assume

for the purpose of argument alone, that

Patricia Kay Morton left Col.Morton in

Virginia in order to gq live with her high

school sweetheart who is also in the military;

that the eldest child married before he was

7

% rma

-82-

18 and the minor child was living with

Col. Morton in Alaska and that she didn't

marry her childhood sweetheart until the

Air Force stopped sending Col. Morton's

money to Alabama, although the Air Force

continues to withhold his pay, even after

both court decisions, which withholdings

are now in excess of $31,000.00. The fore-

going statements are not all in the record,

just as the amicus’ are not in the record.

(The portion of the claim of Col.Morton

finding how much is owed to him in back-

pay is not final in this cause.) Would

the amicus in assuming the hypothetical

posed take the same position he has under

his assumed facts? The hypothetical is

used merely to point out that not all ;

women are good and being taken advantage

of and not all men are had and take 4

advantage. The law must never operate on

that assumption. Neither should court |

-83-

briefs be written on assumptions. We do not

haye to assume, however, that the Alabama

court, in an ex-parte proceeding in which

there was no defense to voice an objection

to whatever amount the Alabama court decided

was appropriate, awarded Patricia Kay Morton

$500.00 per month as alimony and partial

child support. What the other part of

child support is, counsel cannot possibly

speculate. Certainly no defendant would

know what to comply with in such an order.

Its definition does not appear in the record.

Mrs. Morton has been paid three times for

the same thing, once when the case was

| settled in Loudoun County, Virginia, once

when Col.Morton voluntarily paid her and

s once when the Air Force took his pay and ‘

gave it to her. :

4 Twelfth, the amicus fails to understand j

the divisible nature of the proceeding to as

terminate the marital status and the

-84-

proceedings for alimony and child support

when he argues the theory of estoppel.

Thirteenth, the amicus also suggests

that Col. Morton did not submit himself to

the jurisdiction of the Alabama Court

because he says the Air Force would have

ordered Col.Morton to pay more money to

Patricia Kay Morton or he would be discharged

from the service. He says Col.Morton has

avoided a claim of non-support and prevented

an investigation by the Air Force in this

manner. The amicus has his facts all

wrong again. The Air Force has no authority

to set alimony and child support nor order

any member to pay any of his debts. In

citing Air Force Regulation 35-18, para-

graphs 3 and 5 (b),the amicus neglects to

mention the paragraph that explains the

limitations on the authority of the Air

Force and which merely defines policy.

The relevant portions of Air Force Regu-

-85-

lation 35-18 A.(1) states as follows:

"1. Air Force Policy. The Air Force

expects its members tc pay their

debts on time. Within the limits of

available resources, the Air Force

provides financial management inform-

ation, opportunities for education and

personal counseling designed to

enhance management of personal

finances, and takes administrative

or disciplinary action in cases

of continued financial irresponsi-

bility. Such action is taken to

improve discipline and maintain the

standards of conduct expected of

Air Porce personne’. but cannot be

used to enforce private civil

Obligations.” Cieshasts atice).

"2. Indebtedness.

a) Air Force Enforcement of

Private Obligations. The Air Force

does not aeetecets disputed debts,

admit or deny whether or not the

eens oF tes Beebe

ty o ts ers.

nder no circumstances does the

Air Force communicate to complain-

ants, whether any action has been

taken against members as a result

of complaints. Except for debts owed

to the Federal Government, including

its instrumentalities (for example,

nonappropriated fund activities),

the Air Force is not authorized to

require a member to pay a private

debt or to usé any part of his or

her earnings to pay the debt, even

though the indebtedness may have

been reduced to judgment by a civil

court. The enforcement of private

obligations of Air Force members is q

a matter for civil authorities.” «Gam

(Emphasis added). : ye

é86<

The amicus has totally misunderstood

Orrox v. Orr (Lillian M.) 364 So.2d 1170

(1978). Mr. Orr was personally before

the Alabama court in the divorce proceeding.

Orr v. Orr, (Lillian M. v. William Herbert),

Ala.App.351 So.2d 904 (1977); 351 So.2d

906 (S.C.Ala 1977); 440 U.S. 268 (1979).

The Alabama Court had continuing jurisdiction

over Mr. Orr.

Amicus cites Rock Island Line v. Sturn,

(174 U.S.710 (1899) for the proposition

that debts belong to the creditors to whom

they are payable. That is correct.

Col. Morton is the creditor. In stating

that a judgment creditor has a right of

action against any debtor of the judgment

debtor in any forum the judgment debtor td

could himself have brought suit, has been

over-ruled. This is the concept of Harris :

"2 v. Balk, (supra) that Shaffer v. Heitner, | auf

& (Supra), over-ruled. Further, Patricia Kay ‘a

aQ®Ja

Morton oie abe a judgment creditor, the

judgment being void.

The amicus states that when an

obligor moves, under URESA, the obligee

is deprived of support. This is not correct.

The move of the obligor merely deprives the ;

obligee of the right to have the obligor

cited for contempt of court where the

obligor resided when the order was entered.

However, that order will support a garnish-

ment writ, the obligor having been before

the court when the order was entered.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

should be affirmed.

co

ae

Respectfully submitted,

Allan Wayne Morton,

<a ae on 7 1

aoe

Se

ae

1 ;

4015 Chain Bridge Road

P.O.Box 434 8 i)

A Fairfax, Virginia 22030

4 : (703) 591-40

ae

on 4,

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify, under penalty of

F perjury, that on the 10th day of April,

1984, I mailed two typewritten copies of

the foregoing Brief on the Merits of the

Respondent Allan Wayne Morton, to the .

Solicitor General of the United States,

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

20530, postage prepaid and properly

addressed. J

i . N.C Carro

. af

‘

—

la

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX

l. 5 U.S.C. § 5401, provides in relevant

part:

(a) (1). When the head of an agency or

his designee determines that an employee,

member of the Armed Forces or Reserve of

the Armed Forces, is indebted to the United

States for debts to which the United States

is entitled to be repaid at the time of the

determination by the head of an agency or

his, designee*** :

(2) *** prior to initiating any pro-

ceedings under paragraph (1) .... to collect

any indebtedness of an individual, the head

of the agency holding the debt or his desig-

nee shall provide the individual with -

(A) a minimum of thirty days written

notice, informing such individual of the

nature and amount of the indebtedness deter-

mined ...to be due, the intention of the

agency to initiate proceedings to collect

the debt through deductions from pay, and

an explanation of the rights of the indiv-

idual ee

(B) an opportunity to inspect and

copy Government records relating to the debt;

(C) an opportunity to enter into a

written agreement... to establish a sched-

ule for the repayment of the debt; and

(D) ft hearing

the euteuntns of an cane qoncenniae

2a

the existence or the amount of the debt***

A hearing*** as» may not be conducted by an

individual under the supervision or control

of the head of the agency, except that

nothing in this sentence shall be construed

to prohibit the appointment of, an adminis-

trative law judge.

2. Uniform Services Former Spouses

Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 9

provides in part:

Section (a) (1) ‘court' means -

(a)"(A)any court of competent juris-

diction of any state***"s+e-s

‘Court order' means a final decree of

divorce*** ma,

(A) is issued in accordance with the

laws of the jurisdiction of that court; ***

Section (b) (1) service of a Court

order is effective if -

(B) “That Court order is regular on

its face;"***

ane

(D) The Court order or other documents -

served with the Court order certify that the ve

rights of the member under the Soldiers’ and ~—

Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.

App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and

; (2) A court order is regular on its

face if the order -

? ~

I

3a

(2) (A) is issued by a Court of

competent jurisdiction

(2) (B) is legal in form; and

(2) (C) includes nothing on its face

that provides reasonahle notice that it is

issued without authority of law.

aan

"(4) A Court may not treat the dis-

posable retired or retainer pay of a member

in the manner described in paragraph. (1)

unless the Court has jurisdiction over the

member by reason of a his residence other

than because of milita assignment, in the

territorial jurisdiction of the Court, (B)

s domicile the territoria urisdiction

of t Court or his consent to e

urisdiction of the Court.” Emphasis added.

eet

(f) (1) The United States and any

officer or employee of the United States

shall not be liable with respect to any —

payment made from retired or retainer pay

to any member, spouse or former spouse

pursuant to a Court order that is regular

on its face if such payment is made in

accordance with this section and the

regulations prescribed pursuant to

subsection ch). *

3. = -

Court of .

i ‘ti ent par'

4a

"PROCESS: BASIS FOR AN METHODS OF

OUT-OF-STATE SERVICE.

(a) Basis for Out-Of-State Service:

(1) When proper. Appropriate

basis exists for service of process outside

of this state upon a person in any action

in this state when

{A) the person is, at the time of

the service of process, either a non-resident

of this state or a resident of this state who

is absent from this state, and (Emphasis added)

(B)} the person has sufficient contacts

with this state, as set forth in (a) 2 of this

rule, so that the prosecution of the action

against the person in this state or the

Constitution of the United States, or ***

(2) Sufficient Contacts. A person

has sufficient contacts with the State when

that person, *cting directly or by agent,

is or may be .egally responsible as a

consequence of that person's ***

(H) living in the marital

relationship within this state, notwith-

standing subsequent departure from this

state, as to all obligations arising from

alimony, custody, child support, or property

settlement, if the other party to the marital

relationship continues to reside in this state;

or

(I) otherwise having some mini-

mum contacts with this state and, under the

circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to

require the person to come to this state to E

defend an action. The minimum contracts

referred to in this subdivison (I) shall be

-

yt

5a

deemed sufficient, notwithstanding a fail-

ure to satisfy the requirement of sub-

division (A)-(H) of this subsection (2),

so long as the prosecution of the action

against a person in this state is not

inconsistent with the Constitution of

this state or the Constitution of the

United States."

4. Letters from James R.Russell to

Wayman G. Sherrer and letter from

Caryl P. Privett to James R.Russell:

1 June 1977

JA

Morton v. Morton, (Tenth Judicial Circuit

Court) No. 186-818

Wayman G. Sherrer

United States Attorney

200 Federal Building

1800 Fifth Avenue North

Birmingham AL 35203

Dear Mr. Sherrer

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a decree of

divorce, and attendant thereto, an affidavit

for service of process by certified or

registered mail.

In short, the Circuit Court entered a

decree of divorce which contained a $500.00

per month alimony award based upon this

service by certified mail. We are concerned

as to whether this procedure secured the

requisite "in personam" jurisdiction over

ocho Se to lawfully support this alimony

award. ’

. ait Z

Cy ste eee

6a

Our records demonstrate that Mr.Morton

was a domiciliary of the State of Alabama

and at the time of service by certified

mail was in the State of Alaska in

Military service. In August 1976, his

attorney advised him to change his state

of domicile by paying taxes etc. in the

new state. The records of the court

demonstrate that the return receipt for

service of process in the divorce action

bore Mr. Morton's signature and was duly

returned to the court. The decree of

divorce specifically stated that "defendant

was duly served".

We are currently in a position where we

must determine the viability of this

service of process in order to ascertain

the effectiveness of a Writ of Garnishment

to collect an arrearage for alimony.

Therefore, we respectfully request that

you advise us if service of process by

certified mail on a nonresident domiciliary

of Alabama secures “in personam" juris-

diction so as to authorize the entry of a.

money judgment as was made herein.

JAMES R. RUSSELL

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

June 7, 1977

James R. Russell 4

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate “4

Department of the Air Force

Headquarters Air Force Accounting

and Finance Center

Denver, Colorado 80279

ATTN of: JA a

PS at, oe

laa | ve

Ja

RE: Morton vy. Morton, Tenth Judicial Circuit

Court, No. 186-518

Dear Mr. Russell:

Please he advised that under the circun-

stances as you related them in your letter

of June l, 1977, the service of process by

certified mail was sufficient.

The pertinent law is encompassed in the

Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(b)

states: "All process may be served anywhere

in this state and, when authorized by law

or these rules, may be served outside this

state." A copy of Rule 4.2 which pertains

to basis for and methods of out-of-state

process is enclosed, the relevant portions

are marked.

If you have any further questions, do not

hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

WAYMAN G. SHERRER

United States Attorney

BY: CARYL P. PRIVETT

Assistant United States Attorney

S. Air Force Document defining "Home of

s 3° to 2

Plaintiff's ~

eer a ee ae nent ps part: %

"You should not confuse the State which

8a

legal residence/domicile.Your "home of record"

is used for fixing travel and transportation

allowances. A "home of record” must be

changed if it was erroneously or fraudulently

recorded initially.

Enlisted members may change their “home of

record" at the time they sign a new enlist-

ment contract. Officers may not change their

"home of record" except to correct an error,

or after a break-in service.The State which

is your "home of record" may be your State

of legal residence/domicile only if it

meets certain criteria."

6. Letter from Patricia Kay Morton to

the Base Commander and letter from

the Base Commander to Patricia Ka

Morton. (From Exhibits to Objections

and fesponses, to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment) :

September 19,1975 .

The Base Commander

Elmendorf A.P. .B.,

Alaska.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a copy of the divorce decree

awarded me on the 14th of August, 1975.

This divorce was un-contested by Col.Allan

W. Morton. Col.Morton has failed to send

all money set aside By the courts. The

decree states I am to receive $500.00 per

month beginning the date the divorce was

granted. I have received only half. the

sd

9a

amount specified by the courts. This amount

is to be sent to me By Col.Morton whether

or not the children are living with me.

Col. Morton owes me $250.00 for the month

of August and $250.00 for the month of

September. He has also ignored the court

cost incurred in the amount of $350.00

payable to Mr. G.W. Nicholson, Attorney.

I am asking your help in this matter as I

am in a terrible financial bind at this

time because of Col. Morton's failure to

live up to his obligations to me and to

his son Allan, who is living with me.

(Our son Bryan is living with Col.Morton).

Col. Morton feels that since Bryan is with

him, that I should receive only half of

the $500.00, but according to the judge

and my lawyer, the full amount of $500.00

per month is due me.

If it is possible, could the child support/

alimony be put in an alottment check to

protect against Col.Morton's not sending a

check each month? I think this could

solve that problem.

Also, I would like for Col.Morton to send

the proper papers for our son, Allan to

have a new I.D. card made, as his expired

in August.

I am sorry to have inyolved you in this

matter, but I just didn't know any other

way to go.

Allan W.Morton Sincerely, rs

CES Patricia K. Morton “

Elmendorf AFB 849 Sherwood Por.Dr.

Birmingham, Alabama. ae

pied Wh ese ts

4S

> ha .

10a

28 Oct 1975

Mrs.Patricia K. Morton

849 Sherwood Forest Drive

Birmingham, Alabama 35275

Dear Mrs .Morton:

I have received your letter of 19 September

1975, along with a copy of Final Judgment

of Divorce, dissolving your marriage to

Colonel Allan W. Morton of this organization.

Please accept my apology for not having

replied before now, But the delay was due

to the fact that I have been away on

temporary duty elsewhere; and in my

absence, Colonel Morton, being the next

ranking officer in the 21 Air Base Group,

assumed my role as Base Commander.

In regard to your request for help in the

matter of Colonel Morton not furnishing

the entire $500.00 per month set forth in

the divorce decree, I referred the question

to my Staff Judge Advocate for advice, and

after thorough study, he informs me that

he does not have enough information to

give me an absolutely definitive answer.

Specifically, he states that he would need

a copy of the petition for divorce; whether

personal service was obtained on Colonel

Morton within the State of Alabama; and,

if not, whether Colonel Morton waived in

writing, personal service; and finally,

a copy of any separation agreement or

property settlement agreement that may

have been entered into.

In spite of the above, Colonel Morton is

obligated to provide support for his two

sons. I am advised that this is so not .

withstanding that one son is presently

lla

residing with him in the absence of an

amended decree or agreement between you

and Colonel Morton, allowing him to assume

full custody of the child residing with

him. By not having the additional informat-

ion described in the above paragraph it is

difficult to determine exactly the amount

appropriate. Hence, I must rely on a

yardstick using terms such as "ability to

provide,” “reasonableness,” and “station

in life." Accordingly, I feel that you

are entitled to more than $250.00 per

month. and have advised Colonel Morton of

such. Also, I have informed him of his

obligation to furnish you with the

appropriate documents to obtain a new ID

card for your son, Allan.

It is possible to make support payments by

allotment, however, that would have to be

done on Colonel Morton's personal

initiative as I Have no authority to compel

him to do so.

Iamgsorry I do not have the information to

be more succinct in my answer, but trust

this fully explains the Air Force position

in such matters. Too, I sincerely hope that

the hardship which you recited will be

promptly alleviated to the satisfaction of

all concerned.

Sincerely,

JAMES D. DUNN, Colonel USAF

Commander

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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