Petition — Krogul v. Illinois

83-918

Office - Supreme Court, U.S

PIL ity =

No. DEC 1 1983

In Tas . aioe

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Tzrm, 1983

KAY ANN KROGUL,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

TIMOTHY P. O’NEILL *

The John Marshall Law School

315 S. Plymouth Court

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 427-2737

EDWIN J. BELZ

PAUL A. McWILLIAMS

234 N. Northwest Highway

Palatine, Illinois 60067

(312) 359-9191

Attorneys for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

ie

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the double jeopardy clause violated when, following

an acquittal on murder and a hung jury on voluntary man-

slaughter, the prosecution attempts to re-try defendant

for voluntary manslaughter, since Illinois defines the lat-

ter crime as merely consisting of all the elements of

murder plus certain mitigating circumstances?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...............445.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............0..

EE EEAITY So ccccccecctecccccccsvece

DUIINEEEIES s Cebacctccccveccescccccccscee’s

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............45..

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ....

DEC UR SUG hpescsccconvteccccncsccess

APPENDIX

A—Opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois,

EE abn nck cUeciesacecvectsices

B—Order of the Supreme Court of Illinois Deny-

PR OD MEE occ cccccccsctsccecesece

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iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct.

2084, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977) ............. 9

Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct.

ee ae Se hee eer 4

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.

Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1982) ..........0% 6

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53

Sep A MOE Gls od chur sind daeaadvces 5, 6

Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S. Ct.

She Sei es EE EE CREED pccccs cccesence 9

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89

S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969) ...... 5

Sanabria v. United States, 487 U.S. 54, 98 S. Ct.

2170, 57 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1978) .........ce00- 4

United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S.

564, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) 9

Other Authorities

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution . 2,5

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 7-1 (1981) .......... 3

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9-1(a) (1981) ........ 2,5,6

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9-2(b) (1981) ........ 3,5

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f). See 87 Ill. 2d

R. 604(f), effective July 1, 1982 ............ 4

O’Neill, “With Malice Toward None’’: A Solution

to an Illinois Homicide Quandary, 32 DePaul

Sede, PERCU con nnn eeckscecceeGanbue en tas 9

In Tas

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroszr Tzrm, 1983

KAY ANN KROGUL,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE OOURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court:

Kay Ann Krogul petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, is reported at 115 Ill. App. 3d 734, 450 N.E.2d

20 (1983). The order of the Supreme Court of Illinois deny-

ing leave to appeal on October 4, 1983 is as yet unre-

ported.

a

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois was

entered on May 27, 1983 (App. A). The Supreme Court

of Illinois denied leave to appeal on October 4, 1983 (App.

B). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1257(8).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-

tion provides, in pertinent part:

. . » [NJor shall any person be subject for the

—_ offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 provides in pertinent

part:

9-1. MURDER

(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful

justification commits murder if, in performing the acts

which cause the death:

(1) He intends either to kill or do great bodi-

ly harm to that individual or another, or knows

t such acts will cause death to that individual

or another; or

(2) He knows that such acts create a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm to that

indivi or another; ...

—Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,

par. 9-1(a) (1981)

ee

9-2. VoLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills

an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at

the time of the killing he believes the circumstances

to be such that, if they existed, would justify or ex-

onerate the killing under the principles stated in Ar-

ticle 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.

—Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,

par. 9-2(b) (1981)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 16, 1981, the Lake County, Illinois, grand

jury returned a four count indictment against Petitioner

Kay Ann Krogul. Three of the counts were for murder,

with each count specifying a different state of mind (see

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, pars. 9-1(aX1) and 9-1(aX2) (1981)).

The fourth count was for voluntary manslaughter based

on an unreasonable belief of self-defense (Ill. Rev. Stat.

ch. 38, par. 9-2(b) (1981)). (C. 13) All four counts arose out

of one alleged homicide.

Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the

voluntary manslaughter count. (C. 28) At trial, however,

both the prosecutor and defense requested that the jury

be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on unrea-

sonable belief of self-defense (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par.

9-2(b) (1981)), and the trial judge obliged. The jury was

also instructed on justifiable use of force, i.e. self-defense.

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 7-1 (1981).

Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of

“not guilty” for the offense of murder, and a judgment

and

of acquittal was entered on that charge. (C. 72) However,

the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the voluntary

manslaughter charge, and a mistrial was declared. (C. 74)

The State subsequently attempted to re-try Petitioner

on the voluntary manslaughter charge. Petitioner filed a

motion to dismiss claiming that a second trial was barred

by the previous acquittal. The trial court denied the mo-

tion. (C. 86-91) Petitioner then appealed, pursuant to IIli-

nois Supreme Court Rule 604(f). See 87 Ill. 2d R. 604(f),

effective July 1, 1982.

The Appellate Court made no attempt to analyze the

elements of the offenses of murder and voluntary man-

slaughter, but merely held that double jeopardy did not

bar a re-trial on a charge in which a jury failed to reach

a verdict. (App. A)

The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Petitioner’s re-

quest for leave to appeal on October 4, 1983. (App. B)

ja We

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case involves little more than a straight-forward

application of the principles of Brown v. Ohio, 4382 U.S.

161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 187 (1977) concerning

“greater” and “lesser included”’ offenses for purposes of

the double jeopardy clause. U.S. Const. amend. V. What

is unique, however, is that in this case the Illinois

Criminal Code punishes the “lesser included offense” more

severely than the “greater offense.’’ This factual oddity

has prevented Illinois courts from fully appreciating the

double jeopardy interests at stake in this case.

Kay Ann Krogul was tried for murder. Ill. Rev. Stat.

ch. 38, par. 9-1 (1981). At trial, both the State and defen-

dant requested that the jury be instructed on voluntary

manslaughter based upon the unreasonable use of deadly

force. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9-2(b) (1981). The jury

returned a “not guilty” verdict as to murder and a judg-

ment of acquittal was entered on that charge. (C. 72) The

jury was unable to reach a verdict on the voluntary man-

slaughter charge and a mistrial was declared. (C. 74)

When the State attempted to again try Ms. Krogul for

voluntary manslaughter, she objected on double jeop-

ardy grounds. (C. 86-91) Both the trial court and the

Appellate Court of Illinois denied relief. (App. A) The

Illinois Supreme Court denied her petition for leave

to appeal. (App. B)

The general principles of double jeopardy are not in

dispute. The double jeopardy clause forbids a second

prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23

L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969). The established test for determin-

a

ing whether two criminal counts are two offenses or on-

ly one is “whether each provision requires proof of a fact

which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States,

284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). Brown

v. Ohio compared “greater” and “lesser included offenses”

thusly:

As is invariably true of a greater and lesser included

offense, the lesser offense . . . requires no proof

beyond that which is required for conviction of the

ter .... The greater offense is thereform by de-

ition the ‘same’ for p ses of double jeopardy

a, lesser offense included in it. 482 U.S. at

With these principles in mind, the Illinois murder and

voluntary manslaughter statutes must be examined. It

should first be noted that these Illinois offenses bear no

relation to the identically named common law crimes. The

Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 deleted all references to

the common law concept of “malice aforethought.”’ IIli-

nois retained the common law names but jettisoned the

common law substance.

The prosecution establishes murder in Illinois simply by

showing that a defendant performed acts which caused

the unjustified death of the victim and that the acts were

performed with one of several specified mental states. IIl.

Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9-1(a) (1981). This is the instruc-

tion the jury received at the trial (emphasis added):

To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove

the following propositions:

First: That the defendant performed the acts which

caused the death of [the deceased]; and

Second: That when the defendant did so,

(1) She intended to kill or do great bodily harm to

[the deceased];

or

ote

- 2 Wee

= 7

(2) She knew that her act would cause death or

great bodily harm to [the deceased];

or

(3) She knew that her acts created a strong proba-

bility of death or great bodily harm to [the de-

ceased];

Third: That the defendant was not justified in using

the force which she used.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence

that each of these propositions has been proved beyond

a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant

guilty.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence

that any one of these propositions has not been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-

dant not guilty.

[llinois Pattern Jury

Instructions—Criminal

7.02 and 24-25.06A

(2d ed. 1981)

The jury found defendant “not guilty” of this charge and

a judgment of acquittal was entered. (C. 72)

The jury at defendant’s trial could not agree on a ver-

dict for voluntary manslaughter. This is the instruction

the jury received; should there be a second trial, that jury

would receive an identical instruction (emphasis added):

To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the

State must prove the following propositions:

First: That the defendant performed the acts which

caused the death of [the deceased]; and

Second: That when defendant did so,

(1) She intended to kill or do great bodily harm to

[the deceased];

or

(2) She knew that her acts would cause death or

great bodily harm to [the deceased];

or

~—

(3) She knew that her acts created a strong proba-

bility of death or great bodily harm to [the de-

ceased]; and

Third: That when the defendant did so she believed

that circumstances existed which would have justified

killing [the deceased]; and

Fourth: That the defendant’s belief that such circum-

stances existed was unreasonable.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence

that each one of these propositions has been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-

dant guilty.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence

that any one of these propositions has not been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-

dant not guilty.

Illinois Pattern Jury

Instructions—Criminal

No. 7.06 (2d ed. 1981)

Note that the entire offense of murder is subsumed by

voluntary manslaughter. Of the three elements needed to

prove murder, the first two elements are identical to the

first two elements of voluntary manslaughter; the third

element—lack of justification—is presumed by the third

and fourth elements of voluntary manslaughter. Unlike

common law, which defined manslaughter as ‘‘murder

minus malice,” the Illinois code defines its own version

of voluntary manslaughter as “murder plus mitigating cir-

cumstances.”’ Murder and voluntary manslaughter in IIli-

nois are thus the “same offense” under the Blockburger

test. A jury has already determined that the elements

of murder were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt;

since these same elements are all found within the offense

i

+

ae

of voluntary manslaughter in Illinois, double jeopardy prin-

ciples prohibit a second trial for voluntary manslaughter.*

Illinois courts have exhibited a great deal of confusion

concerning the changes in homicide law brought about by

the Criminal Code of 1961. See O’Neill, “With Malice

Toward None”: A Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quan-

dary, 32 DePaul L.R. 107 (1982). Unlike the usual Brown

situation, here the “greater offense”—i.¢., the offense com-

prised of all the elements of the “lesser included offense”

in addition to other elements—is voluntary manslaughter,

the offense punished less severely than murder.

This case involves no novel legal question, merely a

unique factual twist. Yet granting this petition would help

not only to clarify double jeopardy principles, but would

also prevent an ob-ious injustice. Correction of this error

after a second trial will come too late. Abney v. United

States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651

(1977). Moreover Petitioner respectfully suggests that this

case is well suitea for a summary decision on the merits

without the necessity of briefing and argument.

1 It is undeniable tnat the jury’s two actions—a “not guilty” ver-

dict for murder and a “hung jury” on voluntary ter—

=~

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully asks this

Court to grant this petition and reverse the decision of

the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL *

The John Marshall Law School

315 S. Plymouth Court

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(812) 497-2737

EDWIN J. BELZ

PAUL A. vary

234 N. Northwest Hi

Palatine, Illinois

(312) 359-9191

Attorneys for Petitioner

* Connsel of Record

OV

No. 82-623 Filed May 27, 1983

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Kay ANN KROGUL,

Defendant-A ppellant.

Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,

Lake County, Illinois.

Justice Hopr delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant was indicted on three counts of murder (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(aX1) and 9-1(aX2)), and

one count of volun manslaughter (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981,

ch. 38, par. 9-2(b)). The State entered a nolle i

on the volun ee count before trial. At r

both the defendant and the State tendered an instruction

on voluntary ter and the State’s instruction was

given to the jury which tried the case. Defendant also

submitted an n on justifiable use of force or self-

defense, which was also given to the jury. A not-guilty

verdict ye — for the rep pHs yo we —°

udgment of acquittal was ente on charge.

was unable to reach a verdict on the voluntary man-

slaughter charge, and a mistrial was declared.

ee

The State attempted to continue the voluntary man-

slaughter prosecution, whereupon defendant filed a motion

to dismiss claiming that the prosecution was barred by

the previous nolle prosequi and acquittal. The motion was

denied, and defendant als pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 604(f). 87 Ill. 2d R. f), effective July 1, 1982.

Defendant contends that her motion to dismiss was erro-

neously denied because after the nolle prosequi of the

voluntary manslaughter count and her acquittal of murder,

nothing was pending before the court. She further claims

that a retrial of the volun manslaughter charge is

barred by her former acquittal of the greater offense of

murder. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 3-4(bX1).)

For the reasons that follow, we believe defendant’s con-

tentions are without merit.

The crime of voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included

offense of murder and an accused may be convicted of

volun manslaughter under an indictment for murder

if the evidence warrants such a finding. (People v. Fausz

(1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 558, 562, 487 N.E.2d 702; People

v. Ellis (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 608, 611, 487 N.E.2d 409;

People v. Burks (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 616, 619, 431

N.E.2d 1085.) Thus, it is clear that the indictment for

murder was sufficient to apprise defendant of the —_

of voluntary mans ter. (P. v. Simmons (1982),

Ill. 2d 94, 100-101, N.E.2d 891.) The State’s nolle pro-

sequi of the voluntary manslaughter count is therefore of

no legal significance, and that count need not be revived

by the State in order for the court to retain jurisdiction

over the defendant as to that charge. We also note that

defendant herself raised the issue of justifiable use of force

in the initial trial, submitted an instruction on this issue

to peg 8 yw there was evidence to support this de-

nme re . recunel wae failure to do

tary man ter was ired, and a failure to do so

would have constituted reversible error on ee

v. Manley (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 478, , 482

.E.2d 1108; P v. Smith (1981), 94 Tl. . 3d 969,

972-78, 419 N.E.2d 404; People v. Lockett (1980), 82 Ill.

AJ

» tia .

—3a—

2d 546, 550, 413 N.E.2d 378.) The ch of voluntary

manslaughter was therefore properly before the jury in

the original trial of this cause.

It is also well established that where a trial court, ab-

sent an abuse of discretion, discharges a jury because of

its failure to reach a verdict, the constitutional prohibi-

tion against double jeopardy does not bar a new trial on

that ane. (People v. Rehberger (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d

964, 969, 392 N.E.2d 395; People v. Bean (1976), 64 Ill.

2d 128, 128, 355 N.E.2d 17; Illinois v. Somerville (1973),

410 U.S. 458, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 93 S. Ct. 1066.) Defen-

dant has not alleged an abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s discharge of the jury. Thus, it must be presumed

no abuse of discretion occurred. It is therefore evident

that the reprosecution of defendant on the voluntary

manslaughter charge is not barred on double jeopardy

grounds.

Finally, defendant claims the retrial is barred by the

compulsory joinder provisions of sections 3-3(b) and

3-4(bX1) of the Criminal inal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981,

ch. 38, pars. 3-3(b) and 3-4(bX1).) Section 3-3(b) provides:

“(b) Ifthe several offenses are known to the proper

prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the

prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single

court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecu-

tion, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are

based on the same act.”

Section 3-4(bX1) provides:

“(b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was

formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the

same offense based upon different facts, if such for-

mer prosecution:

(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal,

and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense

of which the defendant could have been con-

victed on the former prosecution; or was for an

offense with which the defendant should have

ig

, |

ee

been charged on the former prosecution, as pro-

vided for in Section 3-3 of this Code (unless the

court ordered a separate trial of such charge);

or was for an offense which involves the same

conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof

of a fact not required on the other prosecution,

or the offense was not consummated when the

former trial began; * * *.”

Defendant claims that because she was formerly acquitted

of the offense of murder arising out of the same occur-

rence as that which forms the basis of the voluntary

manslaughter charge, that acquittal acts as a bar to her

subsequent prosecution for voluntary manslaughter.

As previously stated, an indictment for murder allows

a defendant to be convicted of the lesser included offense

of voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Fausz (1982), 107

Ill. App. 3d 558, 562, 487 N.E.2d 702; Py v. Goolsby

(1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836, 388 N.E.2d 894.) Thus,

the voluntary manslaughter charge was not required to

be formally joined under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.

3-3(b). Further, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 3-401),

is inapplicable in circumstances such as exist here. That

section has been held to bar prosecutions which could have

been brought in the first trial of the cause, but were not

(People v. Goolsby; cf. People v. Harrison (1946), 395 Ill.

463, 70 N.E.2d 596), or prosecutions of a lesser included

offense where the defendant was agar y= Bee wags with

and acquitted of the greater offense and trier of fact

in the first trial was silent as to lesser included offenses.

In the latter situation, acquittal of the lesser offenses is

implied by the jury’s silence. (See P. v. Chatman

(1981), 102 Ii. App. 3d 692, 698, 480 N.E.2d 257; People

v. Jenkins (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 392, 393, 354 N.E.2d

La — of caawaaer exist in the fot —

voluntary mans ter charge was implicitly jo

with the murder charge in the original prosecution, and

although the defendant was acquitted of murder, the jury

was not silent as to the voluntary manslaughter offense.

’

»

7.

te c*

dis

The record reveals the jury was instructed on that charge

and considered it, but was unable to return a unanimous

verdict of either guilt or innocence. Under these circum-

stances, the jury was not silent on the voluntary man-

slaughter charge, and an acquittal of that charge need not

be inferred from silence. Accord, People v. Chatman; Peo-

ple v. Jenkins.

A similar situation existed in People v. Jenkins (1976),

41 Ill. App. 3d 392, 354 N.E.2d 139. In that case, the

defendant was indicted for attempted murder and the

lesser included offense of aggravated battery. Following

a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of attempted murder,

but a mistrial was declared when the jury was unable to

reach a verdict on the aggravated battery charges. The

State attempted to reprosecute defendant for aggravated

battery, and defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming

section 3-4(bX1), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, par. 3-4(bX1),

barred a subsequent prosecution of the lesser included of-

fense following acquittal on the greater offense. The trial

court granted the motion, but the appellate court re-

versed, stating that section 3-4(b) was “never intended

to be applied when the lesser included offense was

charged in the indictment and a mistrial was declared

because the jury failed to agree on a verdict.” (41 Ill. App.

3d 392, 398, 354 N.E.2d 139.) Defendant here distingui

Jenkins from the instant case on the ground that in

Jenkins defendant was formally indicted on the lesser in-

cluded offense, whereas here the formal indictment on the

lesser offense was nol-prossed by the State. While this

distinction does exist, it is in our opinion of little

— in light of established case law permitting a

voluntary manslaughter conviction upon an indictment for

murder. One of the principal purposes of an indictment

is to put the defendant on notice of what he stands

charged with so that he might adequately prepare his

defense. ape once gone through a t on these

charges, the defendant certainly such notice. (People

v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 524, 404 N.E.2d 181,

cert. dismissed (1980), 449 U.S. 811, 66 L. Ed. 2d 14, 101

—ba—

S. Ct. 59; People v. Sims (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 648, 651,

439 N.E.2d 518.) We therefore find the Jenkins case con-

trolling here, despite the absence of a formal indictment

for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court of Lake

County denying defendant’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

SEIDENFELD, P.J., REINHARD, J., concur.

—7a—

APPENDIX B

—__

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

Supreme Court Building

pringfield, Ill. 62706

(217) 782-2035

October 4, 1983

Mr. Edwin J. Belz

Attorney at Law

234 N. Northwest Highway

Palatine, IL 60067

No. 58604—People State of Illinois, respondent, vs. Kay

Ann , petitioner. Leave to appeal, Ap-

pellate Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for

leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

Very truly yours,

/s/_ Juleann rig,

Clerk of the Supreme

Court

P. S. The Mandate of this Court will issue to the

Appellate Court on October 26, 1983.