Petition — Town of Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus
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a
83-857
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Petitioner.
V.
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually and as Administrator
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency:
RICHARD DEWLING, Individually and as Regional
Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency: ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1: COUNTY OF ROCKLAND:
TOWN OF RAMAPO: TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN;:
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION: and ROBERT FLACKE.,
as Commissioner of the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DAVID SIVE
DAVID PAGET
(Counsel of Record)
Laurence B. Jones
Winer, Neuburger & Sive, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 421-2150
November 18, 1983
(i)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Ru Did the Administrator and Regional
Administrator ("RA") of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA" or “Federal defendants") fail to
make the determinations required under
33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and 1284 of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") (33 U.S.C. §1251 et
seg.), and 40 C.F.R. Part 35.925 (‘tie
"EPA Regulations"), in making the grants
which are the subject of this action,
and did any such failure render the
grants unlawful?
ra May determinations of the nature of
those required under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283
and 1284 of the CWA, and 40 C.F.R. Part
35.925 be in some form other than in
writing?
(ii)
3 In weighing the controversial
aspects of a major federal action to
determine whether under 42 _ £4U.S.C.
§4322(2)(c), Section 102(2)(c) of the
National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") (42 U.S.C. §4321 et seg.), an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")
should be prepared, does the signifi-
cance of opposition to the action depend
upon whether it is extraordinary in
nature?
(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
REFERENCE TO OPINIONS
JURISDICTION
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual and Legal Background
The Proceedings Below
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
Court of Appeals Opinion
District Court Findings
of Fact and Conclusions
of Law dated January 24,
1983
District Court Findings
of Fact and Conclusions
of Law dated January 25,
1983
24
60
A-29
A-48
(iv)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
District Court Opinion
and Order dated July 26,
1982
District Court Order
dated September 7, 1983
District Court Order
dated January 24, 1983
District Court Judgment
Finding of No Significant
Impact dated August 29,
1980
Clean Water Act §§ 1283
and 1284
Environmental Protection
Agency regulations 40
C.FR. 935.925
National Environmental
Policy Act 42 U.S.C.
§4332(c)
A-57
A-72
A-77
A-78
A-86
A-90
A-100
A-120
(v)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Asarco, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A.,
616 F 5a 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) 39,40
Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co.
Ltd. v. "Federal Maritime Com'n,
310 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1962) 33
Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 193
(1935) 32
Bell Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 363 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.W.Va. 1967) 33
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System
Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (L575) 22,28,
29-30 ’
31
California v. Federal Power
Commission, 345 F. I
(9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 941 (1965) 33
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
(1973) 38-39
Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
(1971) 34,35
36,37-
38,41,
49,54
(vi)
Clermont National Bank v.
Citizens Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
329 F.Supp. 1331 (S.D. Ohio
1971)
Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission,
324 U.S. 581 (1945)
County of Suffolk v. Secretary
of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1064 (1978)
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
569 (1975)
Florida v. United States, 282
U.S. 194 (1930)
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1340)
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town
of Ramage. 30 N.Y.20 359, 3234
> e *
138 (1972)
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F. 823 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
subsequent appeal, 484 F.2d
a3 ), cert.
denied sub nom. Hanly v.
Saxbe, 416 U.S. 1974)
Joseph v. F.C.C., 404 F.2d
207 .c. Cir. 1968)
54
30
39,40
43-44
32
44
56
54
(vii)
Joseph v. F.C.C., 404 F.2d
207 Bc. Cir. 1968)
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
v. United States, 203 F. Supp.
629 (E.D. Mo. 1962)
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United
States v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,
U.S. » 20S Bette
2856 (1983)
Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1975)
Rucker v. Willis 484 F.2d
158 (4th Cir. 1973)
Sterling National Bank of
Davie v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514
(5th Cir. 0), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 375 (1971)
United States v. Baltimore
& O.R. Co., 293 U.S. 454
United States v. Chicago
x sc. ©. & Poe. COce 354
U.S. 499 (1935)
33
41-42,
54
54
56
54
32
32
(viii)
Page
United States v. Fish,
268 U.S. 607 (1925) 31
United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974) 34
USU Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d
455 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 54
Wasson v. Securities Exchange
Commission, 558 F.2d 879 (8th
Cir. 1977) 30
Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d
157 (4th Cir. 1983) 39,40
Wichita R. & Light Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission,
260 U.S. 48 (1922) 31
Federal Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act
5 U.S.C. §555(e) 53
5 U.S.C. §557(c) 53
5 U.S.C. §557(c) (3) (A) 32
5 U.S.C. §555(e) 53
28 U.S.C §1254(1) 3
28 U.S.C. §1331 12
(ix)
28 U.S.C. §1361
28 U.S.C. §2201
28 U.S.C. §2202
29 U.S.C. §482 (a)
Clean Water Act
33 U.S.C. $1251 et seq.
33 U.S.C. §1283
33 U.S.C. §1283(a)
33 U.S.C. §1284
33 U.S.C. §1284 (a)
33 U.S.C. §1284(b) (1)
National Environmental Policy
Act
42 U.S.C. §4321 et seg.
42 U.S.C. §4322(2) (c)
49 U.S.C. §1653(f)
40 C.F.R. Part 6
40 C.F.R. Part 35
Chapter C
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
(x)
§35.917-5 (b) (5)
§35.917-5(b) (6)
§35.917-5(b) (7)
§35.917-8
§35.920-3
Part 35.925
§§ 35.925-1
40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1
through 35.925-21
40
40
40
40
40
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
§35.925-5(b)
§35.925-7
§35.925-8
§35.925-10
Part 1500
11-12
(xi)
State Statute:
McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of N.Y., Environmental
Conservation Law §8-0101 et
seg. (New York State Envi-
ronmental Quality Review
Act)
Secondary Authorities:
R.M. Anderson, New York Zonin
Law and Practice, §7.20 (2d Ed.
1973)
K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treaties (1982 supplement)
K. Davis, Discretionary
Justice: A ee hiner
Inquiry, :
W. Gellhorn, C. Bayse and P.
Strauss, Administrative Law
Cases and Comments (7th Ba.
1979)
Legislative History of the
Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of
1972, Environmental Policy
Division of the Library of
Congress (January 1973)
14
40
46
36-37
25
(xii)
Necessity, Form and Contents
of Express Findings of Fact
to Support Administrative
Determination, Annot., 146
A.L.R. 209 (1943)
Note, Violation by Agencies
of Their Own Regulations,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 74)
3 N. Williams, American Land
Planning Law, §73.10 (1975)
A. Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and
Planning, §11.03 (4th Ed. 82)
Sofaer, Judicial Control of
Informal Discretionary Adjudi-
cation And Enforcement, 7
Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (1972)
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.Pa.
L. Rev. 1267 (1
Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43
hi. L. Rev. 739 (1976)
32
34
44-45
45
ole
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
NO. 83-
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Petitioner,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
REFERENCE TO OPINIONS
The opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
dated September 21, 1983, is reproduced
in the Appendix ("A-") at pages A-l -
A-28. The opinion is not yet reported.
The findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York,
rendered in two parts, are reproduced in
the Appendix* at pages A-29 - A-56.
* The reproduction in the Appendix is a
retyping. The findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as rendered by the
District Court, were essentially those
submitted by defendants, with certain
(footnote continued on next page)
»3e
The District Court also rendered an
opinion on July 26, 1982, which is not
reported and which is reproduced in the
Appendix at pages A-57 - A-71.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals
was entered on September 21, 1983. This
Court has jurisdiction to review the
Court of Appeals decision pursuant to 28
U.8.C. $31254(3).
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The statutes and regulations involved
in this case are 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and
1284 and 40 C.F.R. Part 35.925 and 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(c), Section 102(2)(c) of
(footnote continued from previous page)
portions crossed out and certain changes
and additions written in by the District
Court. Copies of the findings and
conclusions as originally rendered are
transmitted separately to this Court.
NEPA. They are reproduced at pages
a-f00 - A-120.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual and Legal Background
Rockland County is part of the
metropolitan New York area, in which
sewage treatment facilities and related
collector systems are indispensable to
suburban growth.* In the course of such
growth, communities often seek clean
* Rockland County's suburban growth was
one of the most rapid of all suburban
areas in the countrv. It was particu-
larly explosive in Ramapo. Its growth,
and efforts to moderate and contain it,
led to the enactment of the historic
Ramapo Zoning Ordinance, under which the
availability of sewage collection and
treatment facilities was given tag
importance. See Golden v. Plannin
of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, Er
~¥.S. ; A. Rathkopf, Law of
Zoning and Planning, §11.03 (4th Ed.
1962); 3 N. Witlions, American Land
Planning Law, §73.10 (1575); °#¥&.M.
Anderson, New York Zonin Law and
Practice §7. oo (2d Ed. 1973).
residential and commercial development
and to be able to send to other communi-
ties that growth's less desirable
aspects, such as their sewage.
Orangetown, one of the three mostly
suburban towns of the County, has always
collected its own domestic and indus-
trial sewage, and treated it at its own
plant in Orangetown, at Orangeburg. In
the early 1960's, over the vigorous
opposition of Orangetown, the Rockland
County Sewer District No. 1 (the
"District"), consisting of the other two
mostly suburban towns of the County,
Clarkstown and Ramapo, and Orangetown,
was created. The District is governed
by a board of seven Commissioners, only
one of whom is selected by Orangetown.
The District thereafter built its own
treatment plant (the "County plant") in
Orangetown, close to Orangetown's own
plant. At all times since, Clarkstown
and Ramapo have sent the bulk of their
sewage to the County plant. This has
helped them to retain their character as
"bedroom" communities. The County plant
has for many years suffered numerous
breakdowns and failures, causing massive
odor problems, which’ seriously and
adversely affected the lives of the
people residing and working in the
nearby areas of Orangetown.
In the early 1970's, Ramapo and
Clarkstown determined that, in order to
grow as they desired, they needed
additional interceptors and a doubling
of their capacity to treat their sewage.
Never seriously considering aiterna-
tives, and over Orangetown's objections,
they decided to double the capacity of
the County plant in Orangetown. That
decision, if implemented by the neces-
sary financing, would mean that for at
least another generation Clarkstown and
Ramapo would be able to grow by sending
their sewage to Orangetown.
The expanded facilities were to cost
more than $100,000,000. Grants under
Subchapter II of the CWA and its imple-
menting regulations were to provide the
great bulk of the funding.
The grant process, under that Sub-
chapter and the EPA Regulations, 40
C.F.R. Part 35 Subchapter C., consists
of three steps -- planning (Step 1),
design (Step 2) and construction (Step
3). The process focuses in large part
upon development and approval of a
"facilities plan"”.*
* The term "facilities planning" is
(footnote note continued on next page)
The CWA itself outlines some aspects
of the grant process. 33 U.S.C. §1283
(a) requires submission of a facilities
plan to the Administrator of EPA who
"shall act upon [it]", whose "approval
[thereof] shall be deemed a contractual
obligation of the United States for the
payment of its proportional contribution
to such project." 33 U.S.C. §1284 (a)
requires further that the Administrator
make a number of specific determina-
tions, "“[{bJefore approving grants for
any project for any treatment works
bween §1284(b) (1) directs that, "the
(footnote from previous page)
used in the EPA Regulations. It is
defined in 40 C.F.R. §35.925-1. The CWA
speaks of "plans, specifications, and
estimates ...." 33 U.S.C. §1283(a). The
term “facilities plan” or “planning” is
used hereinafter in reference to both
the CWA and the EPA Regulations.
Administrator shall not approve = any
grant for any treatment works ... unless
he shall first have [made a number of
other determinations].”
Much of the grant process consists of
facilities planning. Implementina 33
U.S.C. §1283, approval of the facilities
plan by both the State and the EPA
Administrator, acting by the RA, is
required, (40 C.F.R. §§ 35.920-3, and
35.917-8). Implementing 33 U.S.C.
§1284, 40 C.F.R. §35.925 mandates that:
Before awarding initial grant
assistance for any project for
a treatment works through a
grant or grant amendment, the
Regional Administrator shall
determine that all of the
applicable requirements of
§35.920-3 have been met. He
~e. shall also determine the
following.” 40 C.F.R. §35.925
(emphasis supplied).
There follow twenty-one paragraphs of
separate determinations which must be
@10=
made by the RA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1
through 35.925-21.
Many of the determinations required
by both the CWA and the EPA Regulations
concern critical aspects of the pro-
ject's funding. The RA must determine,
among other things, that the applicant
has "(tjhe legal, institutional, mana-
gerial, and financial capability to
insure adequate construction, operation
and maintenance of the treatment
works..." (40 C.F.R. §35.925-5(b)); that
the design of the works complies with
certain requirements (40 C.F.R. §35.
925-7); that the environmental review
reguirements for the project have been
met (40 C.F.R. §35.925-8); and that the
applicant "has made satisfactory provi-
sion to assure proper and efficient
aijie
operation and maintenance of the treat-
ment works...." (40 C.F.R. §35-925-10).
Essential to the grant process is
"public participation" at all principal
stages of the facilities planning and
environmental processing. There must
be: consultation with the public "before
selecting alternatives" (40 C.F.R. §35.
917-5(b) (5))3 a public meeting "when
alternatives are largely developed but
before an alternative or plan has been
selected" (40 C.F.R. §35.917-5(b) (6));
and a public hearing "before final
adoption of the facilities plan."
(40 C.F.R. §35.917-5(b) (7)).
The public participation requirements
concerning the alternatives to the
project stem from the environmental
processing requirements under NEPA and
the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), 40 C.F.R.
@12<
Part 1500, together with EPA's regula-
tions implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. Part
6. The NEPA processing is integrated
with the CWA processing.
The Proceedings Below
This action was commenced on February
21, 1981. Jurisdiction is based upon 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 2201 and 2202; 42
U.S.C. §4321 et seg. (and its implement-
ing regulations), 33 U.S.C. §1251 et
seg. (and regulations promulgated there-
under) and the principles of pendent
jurisdiction.
Orangetown has sought judgment
declaring unlawful Step 2 and Step 3
grants of approximately $10,000.000* by
* Step 3 grants for $30,000,000 for
major construction costs have been
awarded since the District Court
judgment in this action and are the
subject of a subsequent federal court
action and state court proceeding.
-13-
EPA and the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (the "DEC" or
the "State defendants") to the District,
for the design and for a small portion
of the construction costs of the
project. Orangetown claims that EPA, in
making the grants, acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and otherwise contrary to
law, by failing to make most of the
determinations required before the
grants might lawfully be made, and
otherwise.
The action also challenges EPA's
environmental processing of the project,
charging that an EIS was required to be
prepared, and that a short and shallow
Environmental Assessment ("EA"), upon
which a preliminary finding of no
significant impact ("FNSI") was based,
was inadequate.
@14-
Claims are also made under the New
York State Environmental Quality Review
Act ("SEQRA"), Environmental Conserva-
tion Law ("ECL"), §8-0101 et _ seq.
Orangetown also alleges that the opera-
tion of the County plant and its emis-
sion of foul and noxious odors consti-
tutes a nuisance which will be continued
and aggravated if the project proceeds.
Each defendant has denied the
material allegations of the complaint as
to the illegality of the grants and as
to the operation of the County plant
constituting a nuisance.
In April, 1981, the State defendants
moved, upon sovereign immunity and
Statute of Limitations grounds, to
dismiss the complaint as against them.
The motion was heard on July 17, 1981.
Decision was reserved.
=] S=
The State defendants' motion was
still sub judice in July 1982, when the
District, County of Rockland and Ramapo
(collectively the "County defendants")
moved to dismiss for plaintiff's alleged
failure to prosecute, or in the alter-
native, for an immediate trial. The
District Court thereupon scheduled the
trial for October 12, 1982. Shortly
thereafter, the Court granted, in part,
the State defendants' motion of April
1981, by dismissing, on Statute of
Limitations grounds, plaintiff's claim
under SEQRA.
Plaintiff sought discovery beginning
in May 1981. It attempted to depose EPA
by Delmar Karlen, Jr., Esq., the officer
furnished by EPA. The deposition was
not permitted by the Court except as to
some aspects of the determination of
-16-
what was in the administrative record.
The administrative record, of approxi-
mately 45 files, was first produced and
certified by EPA in the fall of 1981.
On September 9 and 22, 1982, with trial
imminent, they found and produced some
20 additional files. On October 7,
1982, EPA found and produced an addi-
tional 20 files. Trial began on October
12, as scheduled, and continued until
October 27. At its conclusion, the
District Court dismissed plaintiff's
nuisance claims and reserved judgment on
its other claims. It directed the
parties to prepare findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
On January 24 and 25, 1983, the Court
essentially adopted the defendants'
findings and conclusions. It dismissed
a} Fa
the complaint. Judgment was entered on
February 4, 1983.
Plaintiff appealed on February 10,
1983. On motion by the County defen-
dants, the Court of Appeals expedited
the briefing and argument of the appeal.
Argument was set down for, and held on,
April 22, 1983.*
Approximately four months after the
oral argument, a highly unusual and
unorthodox sequence of events took
place, relating to the first question
presented by this petition. On or about
August 8, 1983, the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals, without informing peti-
tioner's counsel, requested of EPA
bd Seventeen days after argument EPA
counsel, without any request therefore
by the Court of Appeals, supplemented
its brief and oral argument, regarding
aspects of the impact of the project
upon wetlands, in and by a three page
letter to the panel of judges.
-18-
counsel that it forward to the Court of
Appeals for its review so much of the
administrative record as related to
EPA's administrative actions pursuant to
40 C.F.R. §35.925. On August 9, 1983
EPA's counsel responded, forwarding
portions of the record, and stating, by
letter dated August 9, 1983, the fol-
lowing:
We are herewith transmitting
the portions of the record
cited in pages 36-41 of our
brief, together with a copy of
the index to the administra-
tive record. The administra-
tive record was introduced at
trial as EPA Exhibit D, and
each sequentially numbered
folder in the administrative
record ("A.R.") was given a
corresponding number in EPA
Exhibit D (i.e., Folder "A.R.
2" was introduced as_ EPA
Exhibit D 2, Folder "A.R. 3"
was introduced as EPA Exhibit
D 3, etc.).
Plaintiff's counsel learned of the
request and response upon receipt of a
copy of the letter of August 9, 1983.
~19=
On or about August 15, 1983, the
Court of Appeals was evidently still
unable to locate the determinations in
the amorphous 86 volume record. The
Deputy Clerk of the Court of Appeals
called EPA counsel a second time and
requested that EPA identify those
portions of the administrative record
constituting its determinations pursuant
to 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1 through 35.925-
Zi. Plaintiff's counsel were not
informed of this second request.
EPA counsel responded approximately
one week later. The response was a 27
page letter-brief to the Court of
Appeals, in which it presented argu-
ments, supplementing, and in some
respects differing from, the arguments
in its brief and oral argument, as to
what the administrative record set forth
=-20-
in lieu of most of the findings re-
quired. It also argued that it "never
expressly or implicitly consented to
trial of such claims and could have
offered other evidence if there had been
adequate notice that all 21 subdivisions
[of 40 C.F.R. §35.925] were in issue."
(August 23, 1983 letter at page 3).
Plaintiff's counsel learned of the
Court of Appeals' second request and the
27 page response thereto upon receipt of
a copy of it. Plaintiff thereupon moved
the Court of Appeals for an order
striking the response, as an authorized
poet-dieuaunt brief, or, in the alterna-
tive, for five (5) working days to
respond thereto if the motion to strike
were not granted. Plaintiff's motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals,
without any reason given or any state-
=2i-
ment as to time for response. Plain-
tiff's counsel thereupon interposed a
letter answering some of the points made
by EPA counsel in their post-argument
letter-brief.
On September 21, 1983, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's
judgment in all respects, with each
party to bear its own costs. It upheld
the District Court with respect to EPA's
"Finding of No Significant Impact" and
its "Procedural Compliance with Con-
struction Grants Program". With respect
to Orangetown's contention that EPA
failed to assess and make the specific
findings required by 40 C.F.R. §§
35.925-1 through 35.925-21, the Court of
Appeals stated:
We note, however, that while a
clear and -concise document
outlining seriatim the agen-
cy's response to the demands
-22-
of Section 35.925 would be of
considerable assistance to a
court's review of EPA's
actions, the regulations do
not require that the agency's
actions be set down in any
particular order or form, or
even that its determinations
be made in writing. All that
is necessary is that a review-
ing court be able to trace
from the written record the
path followed by the agency in
deciding to take a particular
action. See generally Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc. ["Bowman"], 419 U.S. 281,
285-86 (1974). (A-25 - A-26).
Annotating (A-24 n. 10) its ruling
concerning the determinations question,
the Court of Appeals stated that "only
three of the 21 determinations were
contested in the district court.” This
statement was based upon its implied
affirmance of the District Court's
denial of plaintiff's motion under "Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15 (b) to conform its
=23<
pleadings to the proof adduced at
trial...." Id.
Petitioner submits that the issue of
the "17 remaining determinations" was,
however, before the District Court. Id.
Whether or not all or any of the re-
quired determinations were made is
determined by the administrative record.
EPA put the entire administrative record
in evidence and submitted no other
evidence. EPA was not denied any
Opportunity to "offer any additional
evidence", because no other evidence
could have been adduced to prove what
was in the record. EPA fought through-
out the trial and pretrial proceedings
to bar any evidence outside of the
administrative record. (A-24 n.10).
The unusual sequence of events dealing
with the 40 C.F.R. §35.925 determina-
o24@
tions that took place four months after
argument of the appeal also enabled EPA
counsel to do more than would a party
litigating, in the ordinary fashion in
the District Court, the issue of the
requirements of the said determinations.
The District Court's denial of Orange-
town's motion to conform the pleadings
to the proof is plainly erroneous.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. This case involves important issues,
going to the heart of the administrative
process, concerning the enforceability
of statutory and regulatory requirements
that an agency make specific determina-
tions and findings* as the basis of non-
adjudicative agency action.
* The terms "determinations" and
"determine" are used in this petition,
as did all parties in the proceedings
below, interchangeably or together with
the terms "findings" and "find".
=25-
Both 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and 1284 of
the CWA, and EPA's own regulations
direct that before the making of the
grants a number of important explicit
factual and legal determinations be
made. Many of the determinations were
directly related to important* statutory
conditions precedent for the grants.
Only two of the determinations can even
arguably be said to appear in the
administrative record, placed in
evidence, in its entirety, by the
Federal defendants. (EPA Ex. D1-86).**
Positions taken by the Federal defen-
dants to explain the absence of the
* See generally a Legislative History
of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Environmental
Policy Division of the Library of
Congress (January 1973).
** This reference is to the exhibits
entered at the trial in the District
Court.
=26
findings took an erratic course before
the District Court and Court of Appeals.
At the deposition of EPA, by Delmar
Karlen, Jr.,* plaintiff's counsel asked
him what documents constituted the
determinations required by 40 C.F.R.
§35.925. Counsel for EPA agreed to deem
that question an interrogatory and to
respond thereto. EPA's answer, by
letter dated October 14, 1982, stated:
You have asked for a statement
of the documents in the record
that relate to 40 C.F.R.
§ 925. As the federal defen-
dants explained previously
(Karlen Affidavit, para. 11),
award of the Rockland County
Sewer District No. 1 ("R.C.
S.D. No. 1") and Town of
Ramapo grants by EPA, after
review of the facilities plan,
constituted EPA's determina-
tions regarding the require-
* The District Court limited questions
asked at that deposition to the steps
taken by EPA to assemble its administra-
tive record.
@27=
ments of 40 C.F.R. §35.925.
As the federal defendants also
noted, the administrative
record may contain additional
evidence of these determina-
tions. . « «
Additionally, the administra-
tive record contains numerous
letters approving various sets
of plans and specifications
and subagreements. (emphasis
supplied).
The interrogatory and answer were
read into the record of the trial
without objection. At trial, EPA's
counsel placed the entire administrative
record in evidence but did not identify
where in that record any of the deter-
minations appeared.
In their post-trial brief, defendants
argued that the subject matter of the
items was analyzed thoroughly by DEC and
EPA and that the EA, not the “award of
the ... grants", constituted most of
EPA's determinations. The District
-28-
Court's finding with respect to the
subject matter was:
The Administrative record
reflects that the EPA con-
sidered those elements of the
project required to be anal-
yzed by 40 C.F.R. §35.925.
Although there is no separate
document listing specific
determinations with respect to
every element specified in 40
C.F.R. 35.925, taken as a
totaling the administrative
record reflects that the
objectives of 40 C.F.R.
§35.925 were accomplished and
therefore EPA complied with
its terms. (A-44).
In the Second Circuit, defendants
relied upon the EA as the place to find
the determinations. They argued at page
36 of their brief, citing Bowman, that
"the administrative record is more than
sufficient for a reviewing court to
follow the path the agency took in
discharging its statutory duties."
Four months after oral argument of
the appeal, EPA furnished in its post-
=29-
hearing brief the details of the evi-
dence that allegedly would support the
findings, had they been made.
The Court of Appeals adopted defen-
dants' argument about "the path the
agency took", citing Bowman. That case,
plaintiff submits, does not stand for
the proposition that statutory and
regulatory requirements for specific
findings need not be followed, and that
"a decision of less than ideal clarity"
may be upheld, “if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned." Bowman, 419
U.S. at 286.
The "agency path" language of the
Supreme Court in Bowman appears at the
conclusion of a paragraph of the opinion
of this Court in Bowman, per Mr. Justice
Douglas, discussing in general terms the
"arbitrary and capricious' standard" of
-30-
judicial review of agency action. Id.
at 285. The paragraph immediately
preceding the paragraph in which that
quotation appears is the specific
recital by this Court of the fact that
the agency involved, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, had "made both
findings" required by its organic act.*
* The "path followed" phrase appears in
an earlier opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S.
581, 584 (1945) in which Orders under
"§5 of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. §717d, 15 U.S.C.A.
§717da", were reviewed and affirmed by
the Tenth Circuit. In affirming the
ruling of the Tenth Circuit, this Court
Giscussed the sufficiency of detail of
the Federal Power Commission's findings.
The findings were said to be "quite
summary” incorporating by reference
Commission exhibits, but, the Court
stated, "the path which it followed can
be discerned.” Id. at 595. Accord,
Wasson v. Securities Exchange Commis-
Sion, 558 F.2q 879 (8th Cir. 1977).
=3le
Bowman accordingly, cannot be deemed to
be this Court's answer to the question
of the effect of the failure of an
agency to render findings required by
statute or by its own regulation as the
basis of non-adjudicative agency action.
In a number of earlier cases, con-
cerned with more formal agency action,
the Supreme Court has held that such an
agency failure invalidates its deter-
mination. See Wichita R. & Light Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48
(1922) (rate order); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32 (1924) (deportation of an
alien); United States v. Fish, 268 U.S.
607 (1925) (order of board of general
appraisers). In a number of cases
involving the ICC, this Court has also
held that, apart from specific statutory
requirements, determinations y that
agency could not be sustained unless
=32-
supported by express findings of the
basic or jurisdictional facts. United
States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 293 U.S.
454 (1935); United States v. Chicago,
Me, St. 7 & 4 ee Co. , 294 U.S. 499
(1935); Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 193 (1935);
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194
(1931).*
Perhaps the most pervasive findings
requirement is that of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.
$557 (c) (3) (A), which requires that in
every on the record proceeding the
agency rendering a decision include a
statement of “findings and conclusions,
and the reasons or basis therefore, on
* See Necessity, form and contents of
findings of fact to rt
-33-
all the material issues of fact, law, or
discretion presented in the _ record."
This requirement is rigorously enforced,
although there are varying rulings, from
case to case, as to the exact degree of
particularity of the findings required.
See, e.g., California v. Federal Power
Commission, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.),
cert. den., 382 U.S. 941 (1965); Anglo-
Canadian Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 310 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.
1962); Bell Lines, Ince. v. United
States, 263 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.W. Va.
1967); Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
United States, 203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D.
Mo. 1962).
Should the determinations require-
ments, statutory and regulatory,* for
* Enforcement of an agency's regulatory
(footnote continued on next page)
-34-
grants under the treatment works program
of the CWA be enforced at least as
rigorously as those of the APA? This
Court has not ruled on the question.
Nor, so far as petitioner's counsel have
been able to discover, does any decision
of this Court answer the same question
in the context of agency grant making
action or other informal agency action.
The function and importance of
findings requirements is a principal
subject of Overton Park. This Court,
after holding that action of the Secre-
(footnote continued from previous page)
requirement of specific determinations
is consistent with the more general rule
that an agency must adhere to "a strict
standard of compliance" with its own
regulations and procedures. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park ("Overton Park"),
71 U.S. FO2 (i97i). See also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 554256
(1574). See Note, Violation by Agencies
of Their Own Regquiations, 6) Harv. L.
Rev. 629, 630 (1 4).
=-35-
tary of Transportation under Section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. §1653(f)) was
reviewable, began discussion of the
review process by observing that:
Undoubtedly, review of the
Secretary's action is hampered
by his failure to make such
findings, but the absence of
formal findings does not
necessarily require that the
case be remanded to the Secre-
tary. Neither the Department
of Transportation Act nor the
Federal-Aid Highway Act re-
gquire[d] such formal findings.
Moreover, the Administrative
Procedure Act requirements
that there be formal findings
in certain rulemaking’ and
adjudicatory proceedings do
not apply to the Secretary's
action here. See 5 U.S.C. §§
553(a) (2), 554(a) (1964 ed.,
Supp. V).* Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 417.
* The Court further noted that:
And, although formal findings
may be required in some cases
(footnote continued on next page)
=36-
The Court went on to hold that the
lower court review of the Secretary's
action, "based ... on the litigation
affidavits that were presented" was
inadequate because "(those]) affidavits
were merely ‘post hoc' rationalizations
eee" Overton Park at 419. This Court
remanded the action to the district
court for review "based on the full
administrative record".* In that review
(footnote continued from previous page)
in the absence of statutory
directives when the nature of
the agency action is ambig-
uous, those situations are
rare. See City of Yonkers v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298,
320 (1953). Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 417.
® Subsequent proceedings in the
district court are described in W.
Gelhorn, CC. Bayse and P. Strauss,
(footnote continued on next page)
=37-
the district court might "require the
administrative officials who partici-
(footnote continued from previous page)
Administrative Law Cases and Comments
(7th Ed. 1979):
The remand in Overton Park was
indeed arduous; it produced a
25-day hearing in district
court following extensive (and
disruptive) pre-trial discov-
ery, all seeking to ‘'prove'
the Secretary's reasoning
process for the purpose of
permitting Section 706(2) (A)
review to occur. The process
threatened to bring into
public view pre-decisional
advice to the Secretary
ordinarily regarded as priv-
ileged, as part of the ‘full
administrative record that was
before the Secretary at the
time he made his decision.'
Whether or not ‘formal find-
ings' were ‘'required', surely
there was profound impetus to
making them in the Court's
observation that, ‘where there
are administrative findings
that were made at the same
time as the decision, as was
-38- ~
pated in the decision to give testimony
[by deposition or on trial] explaining
their action." Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 420.
The availability of discovery to
supplement the administrative record, as
well as the propriety of the Court's
receiving evidence -- on summary judg-
ment motion or at trial -- beyond the
administrative record, has become a
problem of increasing import’ since
Overton Park. The problem was before
this Court in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 142 (1973), in which it held that
(footnote continued from previous page)
the case in [United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)]),
there must be a strong showing
of bad faith or improper
behavior before such inquiry
may be made.' See also Cam
Id.
v. Pitts, p. 338 above.
at 368-69 (footnotes omitted).
=39-
"the focal point for judicial review [of
administrative action] should be the
administrative record already in
existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.”
Since Camp v. Pitts, supra, a large
number of cases have dealt with the
problem of whether in review of infor-
mal agency action the administrative
record may be supplemented.
The problem is acute in review of
environmental agency action and in a
number of cases,* particularly those
involving review of the sufficiency of
EAs or EISs, it has been held that
* See, e.g., Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d
157 (4th Cir. 1983); Asarco, Inc. v.
U.S.E.P.A. ("Asarco"), 616 F.2d 1153
(9th Cir. 1980); County of Suffolk v.
Secretar of Interior ("Count of
Suffolk}, 562 F.og 1368 (2a Cir. toTTT,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
-40-
supplementation of the administrative
record should be permitted and discovery
should be available.* The District
Court held to the contrary herein. It
forbade inquiry, on discovery and at
trial, into what constituted the
findings and where they were, = and
precluded virtually all other discovery.
The importance of findings can hardly
be overstated. Findings are not some
formal tidying up of administrative
agency decisionmaking, on the record or
informal. Whether they exist or not is
the first and fundamental inquiry in the
judicial review process. They are the
clearest indication of the bases of the
administrative action. If findings do
* See, Webb v. Gorsuch, supra; Asarco,
supra, County of Suffolk, supra. K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise at
570-74 (1982 Supplement).
o4]<
not appear in the record and the bases
of the decisionmaking are not otherwise
clear, the court reviewing the action
may require discovery.
Twenty-one years after Overton Park,
in its most recent statement of general
principles of the scope and manner of
judicial review of the administrative
action, this Court again referred to
findings as an essential aspect of such
review. The duty of the agency, as
stated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. ("Motor Vehicle"), v.38. , 103
S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1973), quoting
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), is to “examine
the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action
-42-
including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.'"
In Motor Vehicle the facts to be
found were not specifically mandated by
statute or regulation. In this case
they are. It is not the function of the
reviewing court to find the facts. Nor
when specific determinations are man-
dated by the very statute that defines
the power and duty of the agency to act,
and by the agency itself, should it be
permitted to tell the reviewing court:
"You trace our path to find the ‘facts
[we] found'. We assure you they are
there somewhere.”
Findings are closely related to a
statement of reasons. Both enable a
reviewing court to examine into the
bases of the agency decisionmaking to
determine whether it is rationally
-43-
connected to the facts. In Dunlop Vv.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), this
Court construed §401 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §482(a), to
require a detailed statement of reasons
by the Secretary of Labor for his
non-adjudicative action of denying a
complaint by an unsuccessful candidate
for union office. The Court stated:
[W]hen action is taken by [the
Secretary] it must be such as
to enable a reviewing Court to
determine with some measure of
confidence whether or not the
discretion, which still
reamins in the Secretary, has
been exercised in a manner
that is neither arbitrary nor
Capricious ocee {I]t is
necessary for [him] to delin-
eate and make explicit the
basis upon which discretionary
action is taken... [W]w may
reasonably infer that Congress
intended that the Secretary
supply the member with a
reasoned statement why he
determined not to proceed ...
Finally, a ‘reasons' require-
~44-
ment promotes thought by the
Secretary and compels him to
cover the relevant points and
eschew irrelevancies... Id.
at 571-72 (citations
omitted) .*
The Court ruled insufficient the
statement by Secretary Dunlop that:
[b]ased on the investigative
findings, it has been deter-
mined ... that civil action to
set aside the challenged
election is not warranted. Id
eat 363.
EPA's failure to make virtually all
of the determinations required by the
* Whether and when formal findings or
statements of reasons may be required as
a matter of procedural due process has
been a subject of increasing attention
since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). In Some Kind of Hearing, 123
U.Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975), Judge
Friendly has stated:
A written statement of rea-
sons, almost essential if
there is to be judicial
review, is desirable on many
other grounds. The necessity
(footnote continued on next page)
~45-
CWA and its own Regulations left its
grantmaking decisions virtually without
(footnote continued from previous page)
for justification is a power-
ful preventive of wrong
decisions. Id. at 1292.
In A Study of Informal Adjudication
Procedures, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73
(1976), Professor Verkuil states:
A statement of reasons for a
decision has long been an
essential predicate to judi-
cial review and a concern of
due process. Failure by an
agency to provide some con-
temporary statement of reasons
for informal decision making
places the reviewing court in
an unseemly dilemma. The
court must either exercise
weak review over the informal
process and affirm even when
in doubt about the basis for
the decision or engage in
strict review that can involve
an unwarranted intrusion into
the decision maker's mental
processes. Id. at 739
(footnotes omitted).
(footnote continued on next page)
-46-
findings or a statement of reasons. The
burden of searching for findings and
reasons was cast upon the reviewing
court, and thereby on the plaintiff
charged with the burden of proof.
The thwarting of plaintiff on both
discovery and trial rendered the
imposition upon the plaintiff of
finding-the findings task especially
egregious in this case. In weighing the
Significance of the absence of the
required findings this Court must, of
course, consider the nature of the
administrative action brought before the
District Court for review. It was
(footnote continued from previous page)
See also kK. Davis, Discretionar
Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, EE
; oafer, Judicial Control of
Informal Discretionary Adjudication and
Enforcement, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1293
o47@
non-adjudicative, non-adversarial. The
District was the applicant for the
grants and EPA the grantor. Orangetown
was in essence an intervenor.
Intervenors have important rights,
however. Orangetown's interest in
opposing use of over $100,000,000 of
federal grants, to compel it to suffer
Clarkstown's and Ramapo's sending their
sewage to Orangetown for at least
another generation (the "transaction
which [was] the subject of the [admin-
istrative] action..." ), was at least
equal to the interests of a party
entitled to intervention as of right or
permissive intervention in ae civil
action, under Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The burden of searching for the
findings was, of course, added to the
~48-
David versus Goliath type burdens
ordinarily cast upon small communities
attempting to assert their interests and
rights before comparatively massive
federal agencies and their grantees.
The imposition of the additional burdens
was unlawful and unjust.
2. The Court of Appeals ruling that the
determinations required by 40 C.F.R. §§
35.925-1 through 35.925-21 may be in a
form other than in writing, is in
conflict with applicable decisions of
this Court.
The Court of Appeals held that the
EPA Regulations "do not require that the
agency's actions be set down in any
particular order or form, or even that
its determinations be made in
writing..." (A-24).
It is correct that no particular form
is required. The holding that the
-49-
determinations need not be in writing
must mean, however, that (1) they may be
oral or (2) they may be implied by the
agency and inferred by a reviewing
court.
If they are oral they would appear in
the administrative record. They would
have to be proven by oral testimony from
an official, presumably, testifying
"Yes, we made those §§ 35.925-1 through
35.925-21 determinations". Thereupon
the official would be subject to cross-
examination as to when and by whom they
were rendered and other details. The
same matters would be within the scope
of discovery, by deposition and other-
wise, which would be permitted because
the bases of the agency's decisionmaking
would not be clear from the record. See
Overton Park, supra.
-50-
The foregoing scenario might be a
feasible one in some cases. Plaintiff
was not permitted any such inquiry in
this case. The District Court forbade
such inquiry both on discovery and
trial.*
ad The barring of such discovery is
discussed above. At the trial, the
following colloquy between plaintiff's
counsel and the court occurred:
The regulations call for
specifically certain deter-
minations and rulings by EPA.
We have been told that all of
those determinations and
rulings luck somewhere in all
of these boxes.
We have been trying, since the
beginning of this action to
determine where is which. If
no evidence comes out with
respect to that, then for your
Honor to determine whether
those rulings and determin-
ations have been made, your
Honor must at the close of
(footnote continued on next page)
=§)-
If determinations or findings may be
implied by the agency, the requirement
of determinations or findings may, for
all practical purposes, be deemed
stricken from statute and the regula-
tion. The reviewing court would have to
(footnote continued from previous page)
this case or at some time go
through all of those docu-
ments.
THE COURT: No. I am not
going through all of the
documents. I am relying on
counsel for the government to
point out to me where in the
documents these rulings, the
requirement that there be
determinations have been
complied with.
MR. SIVE: And that is, your
Honor, if they are to point
that out to you, then I submit
that that should be pointed
out to us as part of the case
(footnote continued on next page)
~52=
search through each document in the
administrative record for its impli-
cations. In this case, four months
after argument of the appeal, the Court
of Appeals had to ask EPA counsel to
assist it in finding the determinations.
EPA's 27 page post-argument letter-brief
purported to explain their absence.
(footnote continued from previous page)
so that we may look at those
which they point out and then
argue to your Honor they are
or are not.
THE COURT: Look, that's not
before me at this moment.
What's before me at this
moment is whether this witness
is to be asked what documents,
I take it, he considers to be
those. That's what you want
to ask him?
MR. SIVE: That's correct.
THE COURT: I already ruled I
won't permit that question.
=-§3<
If determinations may be implied by
the agency, any requirement by statute
or by the agency itself that it make
them would have less force than a
requirement of a statement of reasons.
The requirement of §555(e) of the APA,
applicable to on the record and informal
agency action, woud have greater force
than that of §557(c) requiring findings
and conclusions in on the record
proceedings. The premise leading to
such a result must be rejected.
Whether the Court of Appeals holding
is deemed to mean that the required
determinations may be implied by EPA or
may be oral, petitioner submits that it
is inconsistent with the rulings of this
-54-
Court in Overton Park and Motor Vehicle
and other cases.*
3. The Court of Appeals' ruling con-
cerning public controversy decides an
important question of federal law which
has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court.
The District was born in the contro-
versy inherent in one community's
sending its sewage to another. The
controversy deepened through the years
as the County plant emitted massive
odors, reshaping life in the areas of
* See also Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1975); USU Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455,
46 Betis Gare iS73y3 Joseph v. F.C.C.,
404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1566) . Compare
with Clermont National Bank v. Citizens
Bank National Ass'n, 329 F. Supp. 1331,
1336 (S.D. Ohio 1971) and Sterlin
National Bank of Davie v. Corp., rei
F. 9 (5th Cir. 1970} cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
-55-
Orangetown around it. As the District,
controlled by Clarkstown and Ramapo,
developed its plans, never’ seriously
considering alternatives of treating
their own sewage in their own communi-
ties, the controversy deepened and
broadened. When the District, in or
about 1974, determined to double its
plant's capacity by using over
$100,000,000 of federal monies, long
before the first public meeting held by
it concerning the project, the contro-
versy was further aggravated.
The Court of Appeals considerd and
ruled upon the "Pubic controversy"
aspect of the project. It referred to
the rule that the term refers to
instances where "a substantial dispute
exists as to the size, nature or effect
of the major federal action rather than
-86-
to the existence of opposition to a
use." Hanly v. Kleindienst ("Hanly II"),
471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908, subsequent appeal,
484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Hanly v. Saxbe, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
The Court of Appeals then, however,
applied a different standard for
evaluating controversy, ruling that:
"The record lacks a sufficient basis to
indicate that the cpposition to this
project was of such an extraordinary
nature as to require an EIS." (A-22).
Neither Hanley II nor _ Rucker vy.
Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.
1973) holds that opposition to a project
need be “extraordinary in nature” in
order to be a factor in determining
whether a major project significantly
o§ Je
affects the human environment, thereby
requiring an EIS. What is meant by that
phrase is also unclear. If it means
that the opposition to a project, in
order to be a factor in determining
whether an EIS should be prepared, must
use some unusual means or methods, or
arise in some groups of people who would
not ordinarily oppose a project, or who
are members of some small elite
constitutency, the "extraordinary"
requirement would indeed be counter to
decided cases and to sound public
policy.
The fact is that the opposition of
Orangetown to the project is ordinary in
the sense that it is the logical
reaction by one community to that of
others who want their development but
not their sewage, and seek massive
federal monies to indulge such wants.
-58-
Sewage treatment plants are, of course,
inherently undesirable. (A-51). Under
the best of circumstances they create
problems, including, at times, odors.
The opposition of Orangetown has not
used any unusual means or methods to
render it extraordinary. It has
petitioned the agency, appeared before
it, albeit not before the alternative to
which it objected was selected by the
District, because no opportunity to do
sO was provided. It has made its case
in court. The opposition may be deemed
extraordinary in the sense of the
numbers and varied groups united in
opposition, represented by the Town
government exercising its lawful
governmental powers.
The Court of Appeals, petitioner
submits, applied a criterion not
recognized by the prior cases or by the
=§9-
CEQ Regulations and incompatible with
sound public policy.
No Supreme Court case has ruled on
the nature or degree of the controversy
that may be relevant to the determin-
ation of whether an EIS is required.
Every litigated proceeding adminis-
trative or judicial, raising the issue
of the requirement of an EIS reflects
controversy. This Court should rule on
the matter of public controversy under
NEPA.
~¢0-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID SIVE
DAVID PAGET
(Counsel of Record)
Laurence B. Jones
Winer, Neuburger &
Sive, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Tel. (212) 421-2150
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
—
No. 1260—August Term, 1982
(Argued April 22, 1983 Decided September 21, 1983)
Docket No. 83-6035
—-
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
—_—Yo=
ANNE GorsucH, Individually and as Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individually and as Regional Ad-
ministrator of the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER DISTRICT
No. 1; COUNTY OF ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; and ROBERT FLACKE, as Com-
missioner of the New York State Department of En-
vironmental Conservation,
Defendants-Appellees.
6617
Before:
OAKES, PIERCE and PEcCK,*
Circuit Judges.
<-
Appeal from a final judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Owen, J.) which dismissed plaintiff’s action seeking
declaratory, injunctive and other relief under the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act.
Affirmed.
aoe
DaviD SivE, New York City (Laurence B.
Jones, Winer Neuburger & Sive, PC.,
New York City, of counsel) for Plaintiff-
Appellant Town of Orangetown.
PETER A.A. BERLE, New York City (Carol A.
Buckler, Berle, Butzel, Kass & Case, New
York City, of counsel) for Defendant-Ap-
pellees Rockland County Sewer District
No. 1, et al.
GAINES GWATHMEY, Assistant United States
Attorney, Southern District of New York
(John S. Martin, United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York;
° Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
6618
Thomas D. Warren, Assistant United
States Attorney, Southern District of New
York; Gary M. Rowan, Assistant Re-
gional Counsel of U.S.E.PA., of coun-
sel) for Defendant-Appellee U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency.
MARY LYNDON, Assistant Attorney General
for the State of New York (Robert
Abrams, Attorney General for the State
of New York, of counsel) for Defendant-
Appellee Flacke.
VINCENT J. ACESTE, Harrison, New York (AI-
fred E. Page, Clune, White & Nelson,
Harrison, New York, of counsel) for De-
fendant-Appellee Town of Clarkstown.
-
PIERCE, Circuit Judge:
The Town of Orangetown appeals from a final judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Richard Owen, Judge, dismissing
plaintiff’s challenge to the approval by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) of construction grants for the
design and expansion of the Rockland County Sewer
District No. 1 (RCSD) sewage treatment system, and for a
portion of the construction costs of said expansion. At
the heart of this appeal is the issue of the appropriate
scope of judicial review of an administrative agency’s
decision-making process and the standard against which
such decisions are to be measured.'
! For the convenience of the reader, the following abbreviations are
set forth:
6619
A4
On appeal, Orangetown’s principal contentions are: (1)
that the EPA acted unlawfully in failing to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before providing
funds for the expansion and design of the RCSD waste
treatment system, (2) that the agency acted in violation of
its regulations in administering the subject federal con-
struction grant program, (3) that the district court erred
in determining that operation of the RCSD plant did not
constitute a nuisance and, (4) that the court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's New York State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA) claim as barred by the
statute of limitations. For the reasons stated hereinbelow,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS
The proposed project against which this action is
directed involves the expansion of the sewage treatment
plant of the Rockland County Sewer District No. 1. The
project entails the expansion of the plant’s sewage collec-
tion system and the installation of modern odor-control
equipment. The waste treatment plant presently services
the Rockland County Sewer District No. 1 which covers
approximately 80 square miles and provides sewage treat-
CWA — Clean Water Act or Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972
DEC -— State Department of Environmental Conservation
EA — Environmental Assessment
EID — Environmental Information’Document
EIS — Environmental Impact Statement
EPA — Environmental Protection Agency
l/l — Infiltration and Inflow
mgd — million gallons per day
NEPA — National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
RCSD — Rockland County Sewer District
SEQRA — State Environmental Quality Review Act
SSES — Sewer System Evaluation Survey
6620
ment for 160,000 residents in the Towns of Clarkstown
and Ramapo and the Villages of Spring Valley and New
Square. Sewage from the district is piped into and treated
at the plant’s main facility in the Town of Orangetown,
New York. Although the County’s treatment plant is
situated in Orangetown, that town’s sewage is treated in
its own plant, which is located less than one mile from the
County plant.
In recent years, it has become apparent that the RCSD
plant is inadequate to meet the area’s present and future
needs. The already overtaxed plant has experienced
several equipment breakdowns and has been allegedly
associated with foul and noxious odors. After commis-
sioning a number of waste treatment studies of the plant
system, the sewer district sought to expand the capacity of
the RCSD plant’s sewage disposal system and related
piping, modernize its equipment, and repair the present
plant facilities.
The xisting RCSD sewage treatment plant presently
has a design capacity to treat 3,800 cubic meters (10
million gallons per day, or “10 mgd”), but present waste-
water flows substantially exceed this quantity. A large
part of the excessive flow at the plant is due to the
infiltration of groundwater and the inflow of stormwater
into the interceptor and collection system.’ As part of the
2 Infiltration refers to “[wjater other than wastewater that enters a
sewerage system (including sewer service connections) from the ground
through such means as defective pipes, pipe joints, connections, or
manholes.”
Inflow refers to “[wjater other than wastewater that enters a sew-
erage system (including sewer service connections) from sources such
as roof leaders, cellar drains, yard drains, area drains, foundation
drains, drains from springs and swampy areas, manhole covers, cross
connections between storm sewers and sanitary sewers, catch basins,
cooling towers, storm waters, surface runoff, street wash waters, or
drainage.” 40 C.F.R. § 35.905.
6621
A6
project presently being proposed, the RCSD treatment
plant will be expanded to 8,500 cu m (25 mgd) to handle
existing and future sewage flows from the sewer district as
well as the infiltration and inflow from groundwater and
stormwater. The proposed sewerage system expansion will
enable the RCSD to sewer presently unsewered areas of
the RCSD, and relieve the burden on the present RCSD
plant as well as on numerous smaller municipally and
privately owned sewage treatment plants.
In 1976, pursuant to the EPA construction grant pro-
gram, 40 C.F.R. § 35.900-35.970 (1982), the Town of
Ramapo and the RCSD applied to the EPA for funding to
initiate a planning process for the modernization and
expansion of the RCSD waste treatment plant system.’
The requests for funding were made pursuant to a three-
step federal assistance program, the purpose of which is
tO assist municipalities in constructing waste treatment
works. Jd. § 35.903. Step I Funds pay the partial cost of
generating a “Facilities Plan” which outlines the pro-
posed project; Step I] Funds pay the partial cost of .
designing the project; and Step III Funds help defray the
costs of actual construction.
In response to the requests for funding, EPA made a
grant of Step | Funding to the Town of Ramapo and the
RCSD in 1976. During the next four years, a number of
waste treatment studies or Sewer System Evaluation Sur-
3 Due to an already overburdened sewerage system, the Town of
Ramapo proposes to retire its municipal sewerage facilities and con-
struct a system of gravity and pressure sewer lines to feed into the
RCSD system. In this way, the town will provide the sewerage services
needed to sewer approximately one third of the town which is presently
unsewered. Although the Town of Ramapo has submitted a separate
construction grant application for state and federal funding, the
town’s proposal is a joint undertaking with the RCSD. For purposes of
this opinion, the construction projects proposed by the Town of
Ramapo and the RCSD will be considered as one project.
6622
A-7
veys (SSES) were conducted and a nine-volume Facilities
Plan was prepared by the RCSD and the Town of Ram-
apo. During the development of the various drafts of the
Facilities Plan, coordination and exchanges of informa-
tion were made with consulting engineering firms directly
through the RCSD or through various federal and state
agencies. Other data used in the planning process were
obtained from the Rockland County Planning Board,
local municipalities, and surveys of the sewer district and
sewer system previously sponsored by state and federal
agencies. During the same period, the RCSD held public
information meetings and a formal public hearing so that
pertinent documentation could be presented for review by
the public and various environmental groups.‘ Based on
data derived at the information meetings and public
hearing, adjustments to the planning were made. Still
further input to the planning process was provided
through frequent negotiations between the RCSD, the
New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion (State DEC) and the Regional Administrator of the
EPA. Due to this interaction of parties, the Facilities Plan
was the subject of numerous amendments, and other
subsequent modifications were incorporated into the fa-
cility’s design. The record shows exchanges of correspon-
dence indicating that specific proposals were made to
both the State DEC and EPA and were given careful
4 The record reveals that RCSD conducted several public information
meetings between February 14, 1978 and June 4, 1979 in various towns
located within the district. Input was sought from the public, environ-
mentalists and various agencies of the town governments within the
sewer district. On January 28, 1980, RCSD conducted a formal public
hearing. At the hearing, testimony was presented by eight speakers
from the Sewer District, local legislators and local officials before the
floor was opened for public discussion. Materials received from the
public information meetings were incorporated into the facilities plan-
ning process.
6623
consideration. For example, the initial location of the
administration building was changed to another site to
overcome environmental concerns about protecting
wetlands. Also, a meeting held August 6, 1980, between
the agencies and RCSD led to deletion of a rear access
road from the Facilities Plan, while a proposal to build
prefabricated ventilated buildings over the first stage of
rotating biological disks was included in the Facilities
Plan to minimize adverse environmental effects.
The Facilities Plan and related documents were submit-
ted to the State DEC for its review and approval by late
summer of 1980, and the State DEC, having worked in
concert with the EPA and the applicants to conform the
project to federal and state agency standards, certified the
Facilities Plan to the Grants Administration Branch of
the EPA on August 29, 1980.
Upon receipt of the Step II grant applications from the
RCSD and Ramapo, the EPA performed an environmen-
tal review of the project. On the same date, the EPA
issued a public statement which concluded that the agency
had determined that “no significant impact will result
from the proposed action.”* Consequently, the agency
determined not to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) before granting construction funds for
the project. Instead, the EPA attached to the public
notice of “no significant impact,” a thirty-four page
Environmental Assessment (EA), which described the
facilities planning area of the project, set forth the pur-
pose of and need for the project, identified the selected
plan and its costs, evaluated the environmental conse-
$ The EPA was able to issue its finding of no significant impact on the
same day as the state certification because RCSD had already submit-
ted its preliminary grant application for consideration pursuant to 40
C.F.R. § 35.920-2(b).
6624
quences of the various alternatives to expanding the
present plant system and listed, inter alia, the projected
effects on wetlands, floodplains, vegetation, and sedi-
mentation. The EA also outlined the steps taken to
minimize adverse environmental consequences and listed
the Special Grant Conditions which would be attached to
any federal construction grants in order to protect en-
vironmentally sensitive areas from development.
On September 30, 1980, the EPA offered a Step II
design grant to the RCSD in the amount of $2,858,627
and to Ramapo in the amount of $505,950. The grants
were accepted by both applicants in November, 1980.
However, before the RCSD could apply for Step III
construction funding, the Town of Orangetown com-
menced the instant action challenging the EPA’s environ-
mental processing of the applications. Plaintiff’s
amended complaint asserted five causes of action primar-
ily seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The first
claim alleged that the environmental processing of the
RCSD project violates the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA); the second claim alleged that the award of
Step II grants violates the Clean Water Act (CWA); the
third claim alieged that the state and local defendants
violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA) by unlawfully treating the project as excluded
from the requirements of that Act; and the fourth and
fifth claims sought injunctive and monetary relief for the
improper operation of the County plant, which plaintiff
alleged to be a nuisance.® In their answers, RCSD and
6 At the start of trial, Orangetown obtaified leave to amend the
complaint to allege a sixth cause of action which reflected the fact that
during the pretrial proceedings, EPA awarded the project a Step III,
Phase | grant. The sixth claim alleges the same violations as those
alleged with respect to the Step II grants and claims that EPA's
issuance of the Step Ill, Phase I grant violates NEPA and EPA's
regulations.
6625
A-10
Ramapo asserted counterclaims seeking injunctive and
monetary relief and alleged that Orangetown’s own se-
werage treatment plant constituted the nuisance in the
area.
At pretrial proceedings, the district court granted the
State DEC’s motion to dismiss the third (SEQRA) claim
as barred under the applicable state statute of limita-
tions.’ Trial on the nuisance issues and EPA’s finding of
no significant impact began on October 12 and continued
until October 27, 1982. Upon completion of the plain-
tiff’s case, the district court dismissed the fifth claim as
against the County Defendants and EPA, and the fourth
claim as against the State DEC and EPA for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.*
On January 24 and 25, 1983, the district court issued
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the NEPA,
CWA and nuisance claims before dismissing the counter-
claims and plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Specifi-
cally, the court denied the relief sought after finding that,
based upon the administrative record, the EPA had con-
sidered the relevant environmental factors in determining
that the project would not have a significant impact on
the environment. The court also concluded that EPA’s
action in approving the Step II and Step III, Phase I
grants fully complied with NEPA and CWA provisions, as
well as the EPA’s construction grant regulations. In ad-
dressing the nuisance claims, the court found that the
At the completion of the plaintiff's case, the district court granted a
similar motion by the County Defendants and dismissed the third
cause of action in its entirety.
evidence presented did not support a finding that either
plant constituted a public nuisance.
DISCUSSION
On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA) was enacted to promote a national policy
which would “encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1976). To achieve this national policy, NEPA
requires that federal agencies proposing “major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” include in their proposals or recommenda-
tions an EIS which provides an assessment of the benefi-
cial and adverse environmental impacts of the proposed
action. Jd. § 4332(2)(C). An EIS is evidence that an
agency has considered the reasonably foreseeable environ-
mental effects of a proposed major action before making
a decision to take the action. However, no EIS is required
where the major federal action is not “significant” within
the meaning of NEPA. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d
823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)
(“Hanly II”); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (“Hanly I”).
Essential to the outcome herein is the determination
whether the EPA erred in deciding that providing partial
funding for the modernization and expansion of the
RCSD sewage treatment system will not “significantly”
affect the quality of the human environment in Rockland
County Sewer District No. 1 and, in particular, in the
Town of Orangetown.
A-12
Scope Of Review
The issue of whether a particular agency’s action will
have a “significant” effggt on the environment is a sub-
stantive issue which has traditionally been left to the
informed discretion of the agency proposing the action or
project. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983). See also
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, 453 F.2d 463, 480 (2d Cir. 1971)(“[T]he
resolution of highly complex technological issues such as
these was entrusted by Congress to the [agency] and not
to the courts.”), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). NEPA
does, however, provide a procedural framework within
which substantive judgments must be made. The courts
must ensure that agencies comply with the “procedural
duties” mandated by NEPA, Kileppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 406 & n.15 (1976), while still assuring com-
pliance with the substantive purposes of that Act.
Orangetown argues that the EPA is required to prepare
an EIS which would highlight what Orangetown perceives
to be the significant environmental impacts of that
agency’s decision to grant funds for the RCSD moderni-
zation and expansion project. Orangetown contends that
the EPA has not adhered to the procedural framework
dictated by NEPA, and that its finding of “no significant
impact” was arbitrary and capricious.
EPA’s determination of “no significant impact” is
neither a rulemaking nor an adjudicatory function, but
rather a factual finding made by an agency with particu-
lar expertise in environmental matters. The appropriate
scope of review is therefore prescribed by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), which provides that agency
action may be overruled by a court only if the agency
action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
A-13
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); City of
New York vy. United States Department of Transporta-
tion, slip op. at 5730 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 1983); Cross-
Sound Ferry Service, Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725,
729 (2d Cir. 1978); Hanly I], 471 F.2d at 828-29.
In Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court addressed the question of the scope of review of
agency decisions on environmental issues. Although the
holding of the case is limited to the question of whether
NEPA requires the agencies to elevate environmental
concerns over other legitimate concerns, the Court quoted
from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978), in finding that, under NEPA, the judicially re-
viewable duties that are imposed on agencies are “essen-
tially procedural,” and that “once an agency has made a
decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the
only role for a court is to insure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences.” 444 U.S. at
227. The court cannot “interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to
be taken.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21
(quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Recognizing the limits of our review herein, we under-
stand the “procedural” requirements of NEPA to be the
guidelines with which this court must assess the kinds of
relevant environmental factors that must be weighed. We
must, therefore, look to see whether the environmental
impact assessment contains the type of reasoned elabora-
tion required to support the agency’s determination of no
6629
A-14
significant impact. In short, the appropriate role of the
court is to ensure that EPA has taken a “hard look” at the
environmental consequences which are likely to result
from the RCSD modernization and expansion program,
to be attuned to whether the EPA has considered the
relevant areas of environmental concerns, and to assess
whether the agency has convincingly documented its de-
termination of “no significant impact.” See e.g., Mary-
land-National Capitol Park & Planning Commission v.
U.S. Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1. Finding of No Significant Impact
Orangetown contends that an EIS should have been
prepared by EPA because of specific impacts which it
believes federal funding will have in causing a significant
effect on the environment. It claims that the EPA’s failure
to assess, Or in some instances, to more adequately assess,
these impacts constituted an abuse of discretion. Specifi-
cally, Orangetown points to several matters which it
claims were not given adequate consideration by the EPA: -
the project’s impact on wetlands, floodplains, and land
use; the project’s alleged inadequate design; and consider-
ation of the controversial nature of the project. These
claims will be examined seriatim.
A. Wetlands
Orangetown claims that the sewage treatment plant
modernization and expansion project will have a “signifi-
cant adverse effect” on wetlands and floodplains in the
area of the plant expansion and along the system of
piping where new interceptors and collector sewers will be
placed. In support of Ms contention that an EIS is
required, Orangetown cites the EPA’s own Review Proce-
6630
A-15
dures for Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants
Program, 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(2), which requires the
responsible official of the EPA to ensure that an EIS will
be issued when “[t]he treatment works or collector system
will have significant adverse effects on wetlands, includ-
ing indirect effects, or any major part of the treatment
works will be located on wetlands.” Id. (emphasis added).
Orangetown contends that the administrative record con-
tains no reference to the fact that a major part of the new
construction for the project, including the grit tanks and
chambers, digested sludge storage, sludge and grit han-
dling buildings, new primary settling tanks and pumping
Stations, will be on land which appellant’s expert claims
to be wetlands.
However, the proposed area to be affected by construc-
tion of the plant expansion has not been designated as a
“wetlands” area by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. Part 6 App. A
§ 6(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
(1) Floodplain/Wetlands Determination—Before
undertaking an Agency action, each program office
must determine whether or not the action will be
located in or affect a floodplain or wetlands. The
Agency shall utilize maps prepared by the Federal
Insurance Administration ... Fish and Wildlife
Service . . . and other appropriate agencies to deter-
mine whether a proposed action is located in or will
likely affect a floodplain or wetlands.
Id. (emphasis added). Under New York State law, the
State DEC is the responsible “agency” for the supervision
and protection of wetlands and is charged with preparing
detailed maps of wetlands as part of this responsibility.
See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 664.1, 664.7 (1980). As the Facilities
Plan indicates, the State DEC has not designated the
6631
A-16
affected area as a “wetlands.” Thus, the EPA did not err
in not issuing an EIS since a major part of the proposed
addition to the RCSD treatment works will not be located
on “wetlands” as defined by an appropriate federal or
state agency.
Orangetown contends that regardless of whether the
State DEC has designated the area to be a wetlands, the
proposed area, populated with reeds, flooded shrubs and
wooded live deciduous trees, is nonetheless a wetlands
area. Orangetown further suggests that the State DEC has
not designated the area as a wetlands because the affected
area will be less than 12.4 acres and has not been defined
as an area of “unusual local importance,” both factors to
be considered by the State DEC in designating areas as
wetlands. See 6 Id. §§ 662.2(a), 662.4(b) (1976). However,
our review of the administrative record reveals that the
EPA was notified in the Facilities Plan of the “wetlands
species” in the area, as well as of the relatively small size
of the affected area. See EPA exh. D4, VII-2. Under these
circumstances, and in light of the fact that the State DEC
has not found the area to be of “unusual local impor-
tance,” and did not designate the area as a wetlands, EPA
cannot be faulted for failing to issue an EIS solely
because of the wetlands effect.
We note that the Facilities Plan also indicates that a
substantial area surrounding the plant has already been
“disturbed” by the existing RCSD plant. As this court
stated in Hanly IJ, while both the absolute and compara-
tive effects of an agency’s actions must be evaluated, it
must be recognized that “[w]here conduct conforms to
existing uses, its adverse consequences will usually be less
significant than when it represents a radical change. . . .
One more highway in an area honeycombed with roads
usually has less of an adverse impact than if it were
6632
A-17
constructed through a roadless public park.” 471 F.2d at
831. Moreover, the administrative record herein indicates
that principally, new interceptors were routed to follow
existing rights of way and are to be placed along routes
already disturbed by roadways or existing piping. See,
e.g., EPA exh. D3, Plates V-12, V-13. In this way, the
project was designed to minimize the wetlands impact due
to expansion of the sewerage system.
Finally, the record reveals that the RCSD redesigned
the plant’s specifications to comply with the EPA’s insis-
tence on reducing wetlands impacts. See Memorandum of
EPA Life Scientist Peter Gruber, May 27, 1980, EPA exh.
D36; see also EA at 9, Plaintiff’s exh. 4. In short, EPA
specifically analyzed the wetlands impact of the entire
project, and then determined that the wetlands affected
would not be significant enough to mandate preparation
of an EIS. We do not find this to be an arbitrary or
capricious decision.
B. Floodplains
Orangetown contends that no consideration was given
by EPA to encroachment of the county plant on a nearby
floodway, and that pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(4),
issuance of an EIS was required. That section provides
that an EIS is reqisired where implementation of a project
may directly cause or induce changes that significantly
“[a]dversely affect a floodplain.” This argument is devoid
of merit. The EPA administrative record reveals that the
actual encroachment on the floodway involves only a
small portion of two buildings. See EPA exh. D6. It
would be difficult to conclude that this de minimis intru-
sion onto the floodway could “significantly adversely
affect a floodplain.” The EA also indicates that EPA
considered the project’s effect on floodplains, and noted
6633
A-18
with approval RCSD’s efforts to route the interceptors
and collectors in such a way as to avoid nearby flood-
plains. See EA at 8, Plaintiff’s exh. 4. These circum-
stances do not suggest that EPA ignored the project’s
effect on floodplains and wetlands, or that the EPA
abused its discretion by determining that the wetlands and
floodplains impact of this project did not warrant prepa-
ration of an EIS. See Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,
503 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d mem., 639 F.2d 776
(3d Cir. 1980).
C. Land use impacts
Orangetown argues further that the land use impacts of
the project are so significant that an EIS should have
been prepared. EPA’s regulations require that an EIS be
issued if the treatment works will “induce significant
changes. ..in. . . residential land use concentration
and distribution.” 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(1). Apparently,
Orangetown contends that expansion of the RCSD sew-
age treatment plant will automatically provide pressure
for development in what is now undeveloped lands in the
Town of Ramapo. Appellant’s assertion lacks a substan-
tial basis in the record and does not provide a ground to
require the issuance of an EIS.
The Facilities Plan reviewed by the EPA defined in
detail the scope of the project within the constraints of
existing zoning regulations and contains zoning maps for
the communities affected by either the plant expansion or
the routing of interceptors, collectors and pipes. The
Facilities Plan also contains a review of the demographic
characteristics of the affected area and projected antici-
pated growth of the communities. Based on this informa-
tion, the EPA found that the project was designed only to
meet population growth expected to occur in the sewer
6634
A-19
district, and noted in the EA that sewers were to be
installed only in places where development was already
taking place or was anticipated. The EA states that:
[t]he population of the planning area is projected to
increase from approximately 160,000 to 201,000 over
the 20 year design period of the proposed sewerage
facilities. The population projections are based on
recent development plans, zoning, and a constraints
analysis which excluded environmentally sensitive
areas (such as wetlands, floodplains, agricultural
lands and step [sic] slopes) from development.
EA at 2, Plaintiff's exh. 4. Based on the available
information, the EPA concluded in the EA that although
the project “may” cause an increase in the rate of devel-
opment, such an increase was not sufficiently significant
to require the preparation of an EIS.
Appellant has not established that expansion of the
sewage treatment system will encourage a significant
increase in development rather than merely meet the
district’s presently overburdened needs and anticipated
growth. It is possible that Orangetown’s position would
have been stronger had it established at trial that the
projected capacity of the new sewage collection system
greatly exceeded the required capacity for anticipated
growth. Appellant might then argue that grossly excessive
capacity would be an inducement to developers to utlilize
the undeveloped lands and to tap into the collection
system. In light of the lack of sufficient evidence to
indicate that there would be excessive capacity under the
approved plan, and that the plant expansion would have
the effect of inducing a significant change in land devel-
opment, EPA did not abuse its discretion in not issuing an
EIS. See City of New York v. United States Department
6635
A-20
of Transportation, slip op. at $726 n.14 (“The fact that
effects are only a possibility does not insulate the pro-
posed action from consideration under NEPA, but it does
accord an agency some latitude in determining whether
the risk is sufficient to require preparation of an EIS.”);
See also Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,
503 F. Supp. at 324.
é
‘D. Sewage Treatment Plant Design
Orangetown argues that the capacity of pipes carrying
effluent to the sewage treatment plant (inflow) and the
capacity of the discharge pipe which carries treated ef-
fluent from the plant to the Hudson River (outflow) are
insufficient, and that this state of affairs will cause raw
sewage to spew into the streets and streams of Orange-
town. This alleged miscalculation has been criticized by
appellant as further proof that EPA’s finding of no
significant impact was arbitrary and capricious. However,
both claims are without merit.
The Facilities Plan contemplates peak flow through the
plant of 53 mgd by the year 2000. However, an interim
SSES study commissioned by the RCSD, and completed
before issuance of the finding of no significant impact,
estimated that the maximum influent in the year 2000
could reach 54.6 to 57.6 mgd. As the Facilities Plan
explains, the estimated amount of a sewer pipe flow is
composed of numerous variables including projected
elimination of infiltration and inflow, demographic pat-
terns and the constantly changing ways in which a com-
munity uses its water. Under these circumstances, EPA’s
utlilization of the $3 mgd figure at the Facilities Planning
Stage cannot be said to be arbitrary given the relatively
small difference between the two estimates of maximum
6636
A-21
flow in the year 2000 (53 mgd as against 54.6-57.6 mgd,
or 2.6% to 8.7% variance).
With regard to the outfall pipe, Orangetown contends
that the 102 mgd capacity of the outfall pipe, which is
shared by the Orangetown and RCSD plants, is insuffi-
cient. However, examination of the administrative record
and testimony at trial reveals appellant’s argument to be a
non-issue.
The Facilities Plan states that the joint outfall pipe has
a capacity of 102 mgd. By contract, 42 mgd is allotted to
the Orangetown plant and 60 mgd to RCSD. As Orange-
town correctly states, a 1982 study commissioned by
RCSD estimates that projected flow in the year 2030
could, under certain circumstances, exceed the outfall
pipe’s capacity of 102 mgd, and could reach as high as
104 mgd. However, this state of affairs seems unlikely to
occur since the record reveals that Orangetown’s total
plant overflow is currently 6.95 mgd, and the projection
for maximum outflow is 15.5 to 17 mgd in the year 2000.
Without a significant expansion of Orangetown’s own
sewage treatment plant, the outflow pipe will not reach its
designed capacity. Moreover, an expert in wastewater flow
whose firm conducted the 1982 study testified at trial
that, based on the projected flows from the Orangetown
plant, there was no possibility of excess flow until at least
the year 2030. Under these circumstances, we do not find
that EPA acted arbitrarily in concluding that the project’s
design would not significantly affect the environment.
E. Public Controversy
Orangetown argues that an EIS is required because of
local opposition to the plant expansion project. Opposi-
tion and a high degree of controversy, however, are not
synonymous. It is to be expected that expansion of an
6637
A-22
unpopular sewage treatment plant would generate a con-
siderable degree of opposition; however, the term “highly
controversial” as found in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4)
(which outlines factors to be assessed in determining the
“intensity” of a project, including “[t]he degree to which
the effects on the quality of the human environment is
likely to be highly controversial”) refers to instances
where “a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature
or effect of the major federal action rather than to the
existence of opposition to a use.” Hanly I], 471 F.2d at
830. To hold otherwise “would require an impact state-
ment whenever a threshold determination dispensing with
one is likely to face a court challenge [and would] surren-
der the determination to opponents of a federal action,
no matter whether [the project is] major or not, nor how
insignificant its environmental effects might be.” Rucker
v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Hanly
I], 471 F.2d at 830 n.9A; Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, -
$30 F.2d 982, 988-89 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In light of the
evidence herein supporting a finding of no significant
impact, something more than the mere speculation that
the plant expansion will increase odor problems, rather
than alleviate such existing problems, is necessary before
a project can be called “highly controversial.” The record
lacks a sufficient basis to indicate that the opposition to
this project was of such an extraordinary nature as to
require an EIS.
Upon examination of the administrative record relied
upon by the EPA, and that agency’s findings as published
in the EA, we find that the EPA considered the relevant
data, investigated the relevant environmental concerns,
and concisely documented the evidence supporting its
conclusion that funding for the RCSD system expansion
would not have a significant effect on the environment.
6638
A-23
Since the challenged findings are supported by substantial
evidence, are not arbitrary and capricious, and do not
represent an abuse of discretion, it is not within the
competence of this court to overrule the agency’s deter-
mination. See City of New York v. United States Depart-
ment of Transportation, slip op. at 5723, 5730;
Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission, 482 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir.
1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission, 453 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
Il. Procedural Compliance With Construction Grant
Program
Orangetown next contends that EPA violated its regula-
tions governing the construction grant program by omit-
ting certain procedural steps and by not requiring
compliance with the procedural aspects of the program
prior to issuance of the Step II and Step III, Phase I
grants. Upon careful examination of the record, we find
that RCSD, as grantee, complied with the “public partici-
pation” requirements of 40.C.F.R. § 35.917-5 (1977) by
holding timely public information meetings and a formal
hearing; that the public had adequate opportunity to
participate in the planning process; that the Facilities
Plan was submitted to the State DEC, and that the State
certified the Facilities Plan prior to submitting the Plan to
the EPA pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.917-7, 35.917-8;
that the EA contains a wetlands/floodplains assessment;
that since the Facilities Plan was commenced prior to
December 15, 1979, an Environmental Information Doc-
ument (EID) was not required to be prepared; that the
®
° See 40 C.F.R. § 6.102(cK2).
6639
A-24
Facilities Plan had been approved by the EPA prior to the
grant of Step II Funds; that the Step II grant applications
from RCSD and the Town of Ramapo were filed with the
EPA; and that the EPA reviewed these applications and
awarded Step II Funds to the applicants.
Orangetown contends that EPA failed to assess and
make specific findings required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1
through 35.925-21.'° These sections set forth a series of
conditions that EPA must find to exist prior to the award
of a grant under the construction grants program for
sewage treatment works. We note, however, that while a
clear and concise document outlining seriatim the
agency’s response to the demands of Section 35.925
would be of considerable assistance to a court’s review of
EPA’s actions, the regulations do not require that the
agency’s actions be set down in any particular order or
form, or even that its determinations be made in writing.
10 Only three of the 21 determinations were contested in the district
court. Plaintiff's amended complaint only challenged compliance with
subdivisions 35.925-7 (“Design”), 35.925-8 (“Environmental Review”),
and 35.925-13 (“Sewage Collection System”), as determinations which
the Regional Administrator had failed to properly address prior to an
award of construction grant funds. These three issues were among
Orangetown’s claims as the action proceeded to trial. More than two
months after completion of the trial, on January 6, 1983, Orangetown
moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) to conform its pleadings to
the proof adduced at trial to place in issue the claim that EPA “did not
make the determinations required by 40 C.F.R. § 35.925.” On January
24, 1983, the district court denied the motion. Since inclusion of the 17
remaining determinations of Section 35.925 were not tried by the
parties’ express or implied consent, and were not presented in such a
way that the defendants could fairly “defend. . . [and] offer any
additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory,”
Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., $60 F.2d 1078,
1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice { 15.13{2), at
993 (2d ed. 1966)), we find the district court did not abuse its broad
discretion in denying the motion. “The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to
allow the pleadings to conform to issues actually tried, not to extend
the pleadings to introduce issues inferentially suggested by incidental
evidence in the record.” Browning, 560 F.2d at 1086.
6640
A-25
All that is necessary is that a reviewing court be able to
trace from the written record the path followed by the
agency in deciding to take a particular action. See gener-
ally Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas Best
Freight System,. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Our
review of the EPA administrative record supports the
district court’s finding that “[t]Jaken as a totality the
administrative record reflects that the objectives of 40
C.F.R. § 35.925 were accomplished and [that] therefore
EPA complied with its terms.”
Ill. Nuisance Claim
Orangetown claims that the district court committed
clear error in dismissing its public nuisance claim against
the County defendants. We find the district court cor-
rectly dismissed appellant’s nuisance claim.
Orangetown alleged at trial that operation of the
County plant constituted a nuisance by virtue of its
frequent equipment failures, which allegedly caused foul
and noxious odors to permeate the air. After conducting a
non-jury trial, the district judge concluded that both the
Town and County waste treatment plants had generated
offensive odors. Since the two plants are situated within
1800 feet of each other, the district judge found he could
not conclude that the odors emanating from one plant
alone created a “significant and unreasonable interference
with public rights.” See, e.g., Copart Industries, Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d
968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977); New York Trap Rock Corp.
v. Town of Clarkstown, 299 N.Y. 77, 85 N.E.2d 873
(1949).
Both parties offered evidence at trial from lay and
expert witnesses that the other party’s waste treatment
plant was poorly operated and emitted foul odors.
664 |
A-26
Further, several witnesses testified that they were not
prepared to identify which of the plants was the source of
the odors they had experienced. The district court cred-
ited this testimony and concluded that it could not make
an unequivocal finding of causation. Therefore, the dis-
trict judge dismissed plaintiff’s nuisance claim. From our
review of the evidence presented at trial, we find no basis
for overturning the district court’s ruling that Orange-
town’s evidence, taken as a whole, failed to prove by a
preponderance that the county plant operation resulted in
a public nuisance.
IV. SEQRA Claim
Orangetown contends that the district court erred in
dismissing its third cause of action which sought to enjoin
the State DEC from granting the state portion of con-
struction funding for the RCSD sewage treatment plant
expansion. Appellant’s third cause of action alleges that
the State DEC did not comply with the requirements of
SEQRA by granting state funds and certifying the project
for federal funding, without requiring that an EIS be
prepared.
The district court found that Orangetown’s SEQRA
challenge was a claim against a New York State agency
and thus was governed by the statute of limitations as set
forth in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217 (McKinney 1972)."'
" N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217 provides:
Uniess a shorter time is provided in the law authorizing the
proceeding, @ proceeding againsi a body or officer must be com-
menced within four months after the determination to be reviewed
becomes final and binding upon the petitioner or the person whom
he represents in law or in fact, or after the respondent's refusal,
upon the demand of the petitioner or the person whom he repre-
sents, te perform its duty; or with leave of the court where the
A-27
The court dismissed the SEQRA claim against the State
DEC on July 26, 1982, and wrote:
Plaintiff’s third claim for relief raises a state law
issue. Where state created rights are being contested,
the limitations period is governed by state statute.
See, e.g., Guaranty ,Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945). In this instance, the appropriate statute is
section 217 of the New York Civil Procedure Laws
and Rules which allows that proceedings against a
state officer must be commenced “within four
months after the determination to be reviewed be-
comes final and binding. . . .”
On September 11 and 12, 1980, the state defen-
dants submitted and certified the application atten-
dant to the Orangetown plant to the Grants
Administration Branch of the EPA. That activity
concluded the state defendant’s obligations pursuant
to SEQRA, and the commencement of the action in
February, 1981, was beyond the statute of limita-
tions. The claim is therefore barred. Reisel, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 349 N.Y.S.2d 14, 20 (2d Dept. 1973),
aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 888 (1975).
Because we find the determination of the district court to
be correct, we affirm the dismissal of appellant’s third
cause of action against the State DEC.
Appellant’s complaint, filed February 26, 1981, was
filed approximately five months after the State DEC’s
approval of RCSD’s Step II grant application. Orange-
town argues, however, that its late filing should be no bar
since a challenge to a SEQRA determination is not
such refusal, was under a disability specified in section 208, within
two years after such time.
(emphasis added).
6643
reviewable under a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. Appel-
lant further contends that the district court misinterpreted
its third cause of action, which it alleges is actually a
claim for injunctive and declaratory relief, and that thus,
a six-year statute of limitation should be applied. This
argument is without foundation or merit.
CPLR Section 217, or Article 78 proceedings, are
applicable to final state determinations under SEQRA.
See, e.g., In re Town of Yorktown v. New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene, 92 A.D.2d 897, 459
N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dept. 1983); Jn re State of New York
Northeastern Queens Nature and Historical Preserve
Commission v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 928, 453 N.Y.S.2d 773
(2d Dept. 1981). Therefore, Orangetown’s challenge to
the State DEC certification was required to be made
within four months of that agency’s final determination.
Orangetown also errs in assuming that it can avoid the
applicable bar by labeling its action as one seeking de-
claratory or injunctive relief. New York law requires its
courts to look to the substance of a claim to determine
which statute of limitations applies. If this examination
reveals that a claim for declaratory relief could have been
resolved through another form of action which has a
specific limitations period, the specific period of time will
govern. See Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695,
409 N.E.2d 870, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1980); Solnick v.
Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 401 N.E.2d 190, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1980). Therefore, we find appellant has not complied
with the applicable specific four month statute of limita-
tions period provided in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217, and
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the third cause
of action accordingly.
The judgment is affirmed in all respects. Each party
shall bear its own costs.
6644
700—9-27-83 * USCA—30208
RECORD PRESS, INC., 1$7 Chambers St., N.Y. 10007 (212) 243-5775
A-29
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Defendants.
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A-30
FINDINGS OF FACT*
i. This is an action brought by the
Town of Orangetown against Rockland
County, the Rockland County Sewer
District No. 1 ("RCSD"), the Town of
Ramapo, the New York State Department of
Envioronmental Conservation ("DEC") and
the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to enjoin the
expansion of a sewage treatment plant
and related sewage piping.
y The objectives of the project,
which has been undertaken by RCSD with
EPA grant assistance, are the improve-
ment of water quality in the area, the
decrease of harmful characteristics of
* The fact that certain proposed
findings herein were excised by the
Court does not mean that they were
rejected or that there was no evidence
to support them but merely that they
were not deemed necessary for the dis-
position in the case.
A-31
effluent discharged into the Hudson
River, and the upgrading of RCSD's plant
in Orangetown.
36 RCSD comprises appriximately 80
square miles in area and constitutes
approximately one half of the County.
The population of the area served by the
district is approximately 160,000. RCSD
provides sewage service to residents in
the townships of Clarkstown and Ramapo
and the Villages of Spring Valley and
New Square.
4. Paragraph omitted.
5. It has been apparent for a
number of years that the capacity of the
RCSD plant is insufficient to meet the
area's present and future needs.
6. Paragraph omitted.
T 6 The plant also experienced odor
problems and other operational diffi-
culties.
A-32
8. Paragraph omitted.
9. Because of the foregoing, RCSD
has needed to expand the capacity of its
sewage disposal system and related
piping and update its facilities.
10. RSCD and the Town cf Ramapo
applied to EPA for funding to initiate a
planning process for an expanded waste-
water treatment work, interceptor system
and collection system in 1976. Facil-
ities planning grants to both applicants
were made later that year.
ii. The process by which facilities
plans were prepared extended over a
four-year period and involved EPA, DEC
and RCSD. RCSD and the Town of Ramapo
hired a number of consultants to aid in
the accomplishment of this task. The
administrative record contains Facil-
ities Plans, a Sewer System Evaluation
A-33
Survey, and studies of engineering and
environmental aspects of the project.
12. The Facilities Plans were
submitted to EPA in draft. Thereafter,
numerous amendments of the proposal were
accomplished. A number of design
changes were instituted specifically to
answer EPA's concerns relating to
environmental impacts.
ide Between 1976 and 1980, public
meetings and one public hearing con-
cerning the project were held. Plain-
tiff participated actively in this
process.
14. Paragraph omitted.
15. The New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation approved
the Facilities Plan on August 29, 1980.
16. EPA notified the public that,
in accordance with the procedures for
the preparation of environmental impact
A-34
statements (under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4332), it
had reviewed the project, and issued a
Finding of No Significant Impact
("FNSI"). Attached to the public notice
was the agency's Environmental Assess-
ment ("EA"). The agency further stated
that no action would be taken on the
project for at least 30 days after the
date of the FNSI.
a7. The EA described the facilities
planning area and the project in detail,
set forth the purpose of and need for
the project, identified the selected
plan and its costs, evaluated various
alternatives, described the environment-
al consequences of the plan and the
steps to minimize adverse environmental
effects and stated various grant condi-
tions to accomplish minimization of
environmental consequences.
A-35
18. The EA evaluated whether the
project would induce significant popu-
lation changes and concluded only that
the proposed project "may" cause an
increase in the rate of development,
however of serving that the plan calls
for sewers in areas already developed or
with an already strong potential for
development. The EA concluded that
there would be no significant land use
effects (and no significant secondary
air, water and wildlife effects through
induced development). Special grant
conditions eliminating adverse land use
consequences were listed. Wetlands
effects were evaluated with grat care as
were issues relating to interbasin
transfer and odor control.
19. On September 12, 1980, RCSD and
Ramapo submitted their formal Step II
A-36
grant applications to EPA and the agency
approved them on September 30, 1980.
20. Paragraph omitted.
ai. Paragraph omitted.
as Paragraph omitted.
23. Paragraph omitted.
23. Paragraph omitted.
25. Paragraph omitted.
26. Paragraph omitted.
29. Paragraph omitted.
30. Paragraph omitted.
31. Paragraph omitted.
st All sewage treatment plants can
be expected to generate some _ local
opposition. This proposed plant was no
exception. I do not, however, find it
to be controversial in the legal sense.
33. Paragraph omitted.
34. The administrative record
demonstrates that EPA appropriately con-
sidered whether the project provides for
the best practicable waste treatment
A-37
technology, whether the project has
sufficient reserve capacity, whether the
design, size and capacity of the project
are cost effective, whether the sewer
collection system is subject to ex-
cessive infiltration, whether the sewage
collection system has sufficient capa-
city as planned to adequately treat the
collected sewage, whether the sewage
collection system is cost effective,
whether the sewage compositing proposed
was appropriate and whether the environ-
mental review of the project complied
with the requirements of NEPA.
35. Paragraph omitted.
36. Paragraph omitted.
a7 Paragraph omitted.
38. Paragraph omitted.
39. Paragraph omitted.
40. Paragraph omitted.
A-38
THE LAW
41. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42
U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), requires a federal
agency to prepare an environmental
impact statement ("EIS") for every major
federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment.
No EIS is required, however, unless the
major federal action is "significant"
within the meaning of NEPA, see 42
U.S.C. §4332(2)(C); Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 908 (1973)
("Hanly II"); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460
F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Hanly
I*). .
42. In order to prevail, plaintiff
must prove that the EPA's decision not
to prepare an EIS was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law” or
"without observance of procedure re-
A-39
quired by law," see Cross-Sound Ferry
Service, Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d
725, 731 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Rucker v.
Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanley II), 471
F.2d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also 5
U.S.C. §701 et seg.
43. This is a “highly deferential
standard" which "presumes agency action
to be valid." Ethyl Corp. Vv.
Environmental Protection Agency, 541
P.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
supra, 401 U.S. at 415.
44. In determining whether a major
federal action significantly affects the
environment, the district court should
review whether the agency, in exercising
A-40
its broad discretion considered factors
such as
(1) the extent to which
the action will cause adverse
environmental effects in
excess of those created by
existing uses in the area
affected by it, and (2) the
absolute quantitative adverse
environmental effects of the
action itself, including the
cumulative harm that results
from its contribution to
existing adverse conditions or
uses in the affected area.
Hanly v. Kleindienst, supra,
471 F.2d at 830.
45. EPA is presumed to have con-
Sidered all the material before it prior
to the award of the challenged Step II
grant. See Natural Nutritional Food
Association v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141,
1145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 874 (1974). See also Yaretsky v.
Blum, 629 F.2d 817, 823 n.4 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted, U.S.
(1981).
46. Thus, the court's role is to
insure that EPA has taken a "hard look"
A-41
at the environmental consequences which
are likely to result from the project,
determine whether EPA has identified
"the relevant areas of environmental
concern” and whether the agency has
convincingly supported its determination
that any impacts are insignificant or
that program changes have rendered
potentially significant impacts insig-
nificant.
47. Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on each of these issues. Sierra
Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 52 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994
(1975); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v.
Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973);
Simmons v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12
(S.D. Tex 1974).
48. Finally, in its review, the
district court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
A-42
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410
n. 21 (1976).
49, If EPA has considered the
relevant factors and reached a con-
clusion that is not a clear error of
judgment, its action must be affirmed.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 416-18.
50. In cases arising under NEPA,
the meaning of "significantly" in the
phrase "significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment"
presents a mixed question of law and
fact. Hanly v. Kleindienst, supra, 471
F.2d at 828.
MIXED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
51. The analysis of wetlands,
floodplains, land use impacts, sewage
treatment plan design, benefits to
A-43
landowners, and sludge handling pro-
cedures contained in the administrative
record demonstrates that EPA considered
the relevant factors in determining
whether the project would have a sig-
nificant impact on the environment.
52. The issuance of the FNSI by EPA
was an appropriate exercise of adminis-
trative discretion and was not arbitrary
and capricious.
53. The EA is in compliance with
the requirements of NEPA and 40 C.F.R.
§6.507(c), and incorporated within it is
an assessment of impacts on floodplains
and wetlands in accordance with the
requirements of 40 C.F.R. §6.302(a) and
(b) and 40 C.F.R. Part 6 Appendix A.
54. EPA complied with the public
hearing requirements of NEPA and the
Clean Water Act and the applicable
A-44
regulations including 40 C.F.R. Part 25;
40 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart F; 40 C.F.R.
§6.400(a), and §6504(a); and 40 C.F.R.
§35.917-5.
55. The administrative record
reflects that the EPA considered those
elements of the project required to be
analyzed by 40 C.F.R. §35.925. Although
there is no separate document listing
specific determinations with respect to
every element specified in 40 C.F.R.
35.925, taken as a totality the admini-
Sstrative record reflects that the
objectives of 40 C.F.R. §35.925 were
accomplished and therefore EPA complied
with its terms.
56. In any event, given the funda-
mental fairness and public consequence
test applicable here, Sierra Club v.
Hennessy, Dkt. No. 82-6175 (2d Cir. Dec.
6, 1982) (Slip Op. at 11); see aiso
A-45
Weinberger Vv. Romero-Barcelo, 50
U.S.L.W. 4434, 4435 (April 27, 1982). I
find that the issuance of an injuction
would be wholly inappropriate in this
case. The existing RCSD plant is
overloaded, and expansion is necessary
to protect local water quality and
eliminate harmful characteristics from
the effluent discharged by the County
into the Hudson; the expanded STP will
contain a wide variety of equipment to
control odors inherent in the operation
of the plant, thus7 benefiting the
residents of Rockland County as a whole,
and those of the Town of Orangetown in
particular; substantially all of the new
RCSD interceptors and the Ramapo
collection system have been routed along
existing rights-of-way in a manner
minimicing wetlands and floodplains
erfects; grant conditions prohibit
hook-ups in the Rockland County sewer
A-46
system that have the potential for
environmental damage; the expansion of
the current RCSD plant appears to be the
only economically feasible method for
addressing the area's needs; and
finally, the wetlands and associated
areas to be used in the expansion are
not substantial.
aT s Paragraph omitted.
v8. Paragraph omitted.
59. Any testimony of Plaintiff's
witnesses, Arnold Fleming and Donald
Brenner inconsistent with any findings
herein is rejected by the Court.
60. The foregoing constitutes the
District Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. 3. 32s
61. Plaintiff's request for de-
Cclaratory and injunctive relief is
denied and the complaint is dismissed
A-47
with costs and disbursements. Submit
judgment on notice.
Dated: New York, New York
January 24, 1983
SO ORDERED:
U.S.D.J.
A-48
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Defendants.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
A-49
The following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law relate to plaintiff
Town of Orangetown's fourth claim for
relief against the county defendants
(Rockland County Sewer District No. l,
the County of Rockland and the Town of
Ramapo) in the above-entitled action,
and the county defendants' first
counterclaim against plaintiff. These
claims are the contentions by each party
that the sewage treatment plant operated
by the opposing party creates a nui-
sance. The Court in reaching’ the
determination herein has considered the
evidence adduced at trial from October
12, 1982 until October 27, 1982.
Parties were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, to present evidence
bearing on the issue, to argue on the
evidence and the law. The Court has
A-50
fully considered the complaint, answer,
evidence, argument and briefs of
counsel. Upon the entire record, the
Court makes the following supplemental
findings of fact and conclusions of law
in addition to those already in the
record.
FINDINGS OF FACT*
i The Rockland County Sewer
District No. l operates a sewage treat-
ment plant (hereinafter "County Plant")
located in Orangetown, New York. The
Town of Orangetown also operates a
sewage treatment plant (hereinafter
"Town Plant"), located in O%rangetown,
* The fact that certain findings are
excised does not mean they are rejected,
but merely that they were not deemed
necessary to the resolution of the
issues on these claims.
A-51
approximately 1800 feet away from the
County Plant.
2. Persons who reside or work in
Orangetown have experienced sewage
odors, emanating from the vicinity of
the two sewage treatment plants in the
applicable period, 1978 to the present.
36 Sewage treatment plants’ in
general may be expected on occasion to
generate unpleasant odors by virtue of
the material they process.
4. Several witnesses testified that
they were not prepared to identify with
certainty which of the two plants was
the source of the odors they exper-
ienced.
5. Other witnesses who were able to
trace odors to the County Plant did not
demonstrate a frequency or intensity of
odors beyond that to be expected of a
sewage treatment plant.
A-52
6. The odor complaint file kept by
the County Sewer District reveals
relatively few odor complaints’ since
1978. The file also demonstrates that
many odor incidents have not’ been
attributed to any definite source;
attirbutable odors have been traced both
to the County Plant and the Town Plant.
Te Paragraph omitted.
8. Paragraph omitted.
9. Other odors have been traced
specifically to the gate of the Town
Plant, and on one ocassion the odor was
found to be emanating from the primary
clarifiers of the Town Plant.
10. Paragraph omitted.
ll. Paragraph omitted.
12. An odor study found that the
odor control equipment at the Town Plant
for the primary clarifier area is not
always adequate.
A-53
13. The odor study performed by the
firm of Hazen and Sawyer in 1975 made
recommendations for improvements in odor
control at both plants.
14. The County Sewer district
demonstrated that, in response to the
Hazen and Sawyer recommendations, it has
made structural changes in the plant for
odor control, and equipment improve-
ments. It has taken steps of its own
initiative to improve odor handling,
including covering the wetwell.
15. There was no credible evidence
of personnel incompetence or failure to
employ best efforts to achieve proper
Operation and maintenance in the County
Plant.
16. The failure of a sewage treat-
ment plant to meet its BOD and SS permit
requirements is not by itself evidence
that odors are being created. Both the
A-54
County Plant and the Town Plant have
from time to time failed to meet their
permit requirements.
y The evidence in the aggregate
shows that both plants have had the
potential to generate some unpleasant
odors in the past, and both plants have
from time to time generated odors in the
years since 1978.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A conclusion that the operation
of the County Plant constituted a
nuisance would require a finding that
the County Plant has caused an unreason-
able and significant interference with
the general rights of the public
including public health, safety or
comfort.
2. In view of the finding that both
the Town and County Plants have gener-
A-55
ated offensive odors in the area, a
conclusion that either plant is a
muisance would require a finding that
the odors emanating from that plant
alone creates a* significant and un-
reasonable interference with public
rights.
36 The evidence presented does not
permit a finding of such interference.
Consequently, I do not conclude that the
Rockland County Sewage Treatment Plant
constitutes a nuisance.
4. The evidence pesented does not
permit a finding of such interference by
the Orangetown Sewage Treatment Plant
either. I therefore do not conclude
that it constitutes a nuisance.
5. Plaintiff's fourth claim for
relief and the County Defendants' first
counterclaim are hereby dismissed.
A-56
Dated: New York, New York
January 25, 1983
SO ORDERED:
Hon. Richard Owen
A-57
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE M. GORSUCH, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
OWEN, District Judge
Defendant moves to dismiss plain-
tiff's complaint for failure to state a
Claim. Except as to plaintiff's third
Claim for relief, defendant's motion is
denied. As to plaintiff's third claim,
defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiff, the Town of Orangetown
("Orangetown"), iS a municipality in
Rockland County. A sewage treatment
A-58
plant is located there. By this suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief,
plaintiff seeks to prevent the expansion
of that plant.
Plaintiff has named as defendants in
this action a number of local, state,
and federal parties who play a role in
the expansion of the plant. The motion
before me today has been brought by only
one of those defendants, Robert Flacke,
the Commissioner of the New York Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation (the
"state defendant"). Pursuant to a
Stipulation endorsed by this court on
July 9, 1981, Commissioner Flacke is now
before me only in his official capacity.
The sewage treatment plant in Orange-
town presently services not only Orange-
town itself but also the neighboring
Rockland County communities of Ramapo
and Clarkstown. Domestic commercial,
A-59
and industrial sewage from these three
communities flows across the County to
the plant in Orangetown where it is
treated. Plaintiff contends that the
existing plant is already a public
nuisance and that the expansion of the
plant will only aggravate that nuisance
by encouraging further development in
the County and thereby increasing the
burden on the Orangetown plant and its
environs.
Plaintiff's attack challenges’ the
funding of the proposed expansion.
Construction of sewage treatment facil-
ities is a costly undertaking. Plain-
tiff estimates that the total cost of
the Orangetown expansion will reach
approximately $120 million with funding
to be provided from federal, state, and
local revenues. Combined, the federal
A-60
and local contributions to the plant
will total $100 million.
The Environmental Protection Agency
will administer the federal contribution
to the Orangetown plant. Where the EPA
administers a program such as_- the
Orangetown expansion, it provides money
in three stages. At Stage One a grant
is provided for facilities planning;
Stage Two funds the preparation of
construction drawings and _ specifica-
tions; construction funds are provided
by a Stage Three grant. Plaintiff seeks
to cut off the expansion of the Orange-
town plant at Stage Two.
The essence of this lawsuit, thus, is
the allegation that defendants cannot
move forward with the expansion of the
plant because defendants have not
complied with the requisite federal and
state environmental requirements’ and
A-61
because the plant constitutes a con-
tinuing public nuisance.
Plaintiff asserts four claims for
relief. First, plaintiff alleges that
defendant violated the National Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C.
§4331, et seq.; second plaintiff alleges
a violation of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §1281, et seg.; plaintiff's third
claim alleges a violation of the New
York State Environmental Quality Review
Act, ECL §8-0101, et seg.; plaintiff's
final claim alleges that the proposed
expansion of the plant will constitute a
public nuisance.
Before me is the state defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's suit as it
applies to him in his official capacity.
Flacke contends that the Eleventh
Amendment bars the prosecution of all of
plaintiff's claims in federal court and,
moreover, that plaintiff is prohibited
from bringing any of its claims as
parens patriae for its residence. As to
plaintiff's individual claims for
relief, the state defendant contends:
first, that plaintiff's first and second
claims must be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6); second, that plaintiff's
third claim for relief must be dismissed
because it was filed beyond the appli-
cable four-month limitations period set
forth in Section 217 of che New York
Civil Procedure Law and Rules; and,
third, that plaintiff's fourth claim for
relief must be dismissed because the
alleged public nuisance has been caused
not by the proposed expansion but by the
past operation of the existing plant. I
consider each of state defendant's
arguments seriatim.
A-63
A. The Eleventh Amendment does
not bar equitable relief as
against the state defendant.
In Flacke's motion papers as first
filed with this court, he contended that
the Eleventh Amendment barred all of the
remedies sought by plaintiff, e.g.,
money damages, and injunctive and
declaratory relief. Since that date,
however, the parties have agreed to drop
the fifth claim alleging money damages,
thus limiting plaintiff's claims against
the state defendant to those alleging
equitable relief. Flacke nevertheless
continues to contend that the Eleventh
Amendment bars relief.
The Eleventh Amendment however, does
not bar a federal court from granting
prospective equitable relief as against
a state official. See Edelman. v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Moreover,
A-64
"(ijt has long been familiar doctrine
- « « that the Eleventh Amendment does
not prevent a federal court from
directing a State official to bring his
conduct into conformity with federal
law." Byram River v. Village of Port
Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) .+/
B. While Plaintiff may not assert
any claims as parens patriae,
it may still maintain this
action in order to vindicate
its own proprietary rights.
As a second ground for dismissing
this action as to him entirely, Flacke
lists plaintiff's inability to bring
Suit as parens patriae. While I agree
* State defendant has mistakenly relied
on the broad principle as repeated in
the Byram River case that, "In an action
against a State the Eleventh Amendment
acts as an absolute bar to suit unless
the State has waived its immunity."
Byram River , supra at 624. While that
amendment is undeniably true it makes’
no comment about suits brought against
state officials. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
A-65
that plaintiff may not maintain this
action as parens patriae it may do so to
protect its own proprietary rights.
Under the common law concept of
parens patriae, the federal and state
governments have traditionally been
vested with the power and duty to bring
suits in order to vindicate interests of
their citizens. Conversely, “political
subdivisions such as cities and coun-
tries, whose power is derivative and not
sovereign, cannot sue as parens patriae
ee a In re Multi-district Vehicle
Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d
122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). State
defendant is therefore correct that
plaintiff cannot maintain this action as
parens patriae, but plaintiff is not
thereby totally disabled from
maintaining this action. Paragraph
Three of the complaint states that
"Orangetown brings this suit acting
A-66
on its own behalf and as parens patriae
for its residents.” Thus, even assuming
that plaintiff cannot bring this action
on behalf of its residents, plaintiff's
claims nevertheless survive because
political subdivisions such as cities
and counties may "sue to vindicate such
of their own proprietary interests as
might be congruent with the interests of
their inhabitants."
C. Plaintiff's first and
second claims state
claims upon which re-
lief can be granted.
Defendant next argues that plain-
tiff's first and second claims must be
dismissed because the relief sought can
be provided only by the federal defen-
Gants. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,
1139 (4th Ciz. 1971).
On the contrary, "[{iJt is well
settled that non-federal parties may be
A-67
enjoined, pending completion of an EIS,
where those entities have entered into a
partnership or joint venture with the
Federal Government, and are this reci-
pients of federal funding.” Biderman v.
Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir.
1974). The state defendant is such a
partner of the federal defendants in the
sewage treatment plant; it is a reci-
pient of federal funds for the com-
pletion of the plant. - Adequate relief
for plaintiff, if it is to be granted,
necessarily must reach all members of
the Orangetown venture. Therefore, I
conclude that plaintiff may maintain its
first and second claims for relief
against state defendant.
D. Plaintiff's state law
claims are barred by the
statue of limitations.
State defendant next contends that
plaintiff's third claims for relief
A-68
pursuant to SEQRA should be dismissed
because under the applicable four-month
limitations period plaintiff's claim is
time-barred. I concur both with defen-
dant's choice of a limitations period
and with the conclusion that plaintiff
has failed to timely assert this claim.
Plaintiff's third claim for relief
raises a state law issue. Where
stated-created rights are being con-
tested, the limitations period is
governed by state statute. See, e.g.,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945). In this instance, the appro-
priate statute is Section 217 of the New
York Civil Procedure Law and Rules which
allows that proceedings against a state
officer must be commenced "within four
months after the determination to be
reviewed becomes final and binding...."
A-69
Qn September 11 and 12, 1980, the
State defendant submitted and certified
the application attendant to the Orange-
town plant to the Grants Administration
Branch of the EPA. That activity
concluded the state defendant's obli-
‘gations pursuant to SEQRA, and the
commencement of the action in February,
1981, was beyond the statute of limi-
tations. The claim is therefore barred.
Reisel, Inc. Vv. Exxon Corp., 349
N.¥.S.2d 14, 20 (2d Dept. 1973), aff'd
36 N.Y¥.2d 888 (1975).
Finally, defendant contends that
plaintiff's fourth claim for relief must
be dismissed because the challenged
conduct cannot be attributed to the
state defendant and because a town "may
not bring an action to Yestrain a public
nuisance which causes damage to _ the
private property of its citizens." New
A-70
York Trap Rock v. Town of Clarkstown,
299 N.Y. 77, 83, (Ct. App. 1949) (em-
phasis in original).
While plaintiff's fourth claim for
relief, as it applies to the state
defendant, is not a model of drafting
expertise, plaintiff does allege that
"The operation of the County plant
constitutes and will continue to con-
stitute constitute, a public nuisance.”
Complaint 494. Specifically, plaintiff
alleges that the operation of the plant
is causing both injury to the health of
its citizens, (491), and diminution of
property values. (492).
State defendant correctly relies on
New York Trap Rock, supra, as grounds
for dismissal of the fourth claim to the
extent it asserts a diminution of
private property values as distinguished
from a diminution of the value of its
A-71
own properties. New York Trap _ Rock
Clearly acknowledges, however, that a
municipality's right to sue does extend
to an action grounded upon public
nuisance law asserting injury to the
health of its citizens.
An order may be submitted effec-
tuating all the foregoing.
United States District Judge
Dated: July 26, 1982
New York, New York
A-72
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON=-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Defendants.
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
Defendants New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation ("DEC")
/ A-73
and Robert Flacke, individually and as
Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conser-
vation, having moved this Court for an
order dismissing the complaint as
against them, pursuant to Rules
12(b) (1), (3) and (6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and defendants
New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation and Robert Flacke
having entered into a stipulation with
plaintiff Town of Orangetown dated July
8, 1981, and endorsed by this Court on
July 9, 1981, which provided, among
other things, that:
l. Plaintiff will voluntarily
discontinue the fifth claim asserted in
the complaint as against the state
defendants, and will voluntarily dis-
continue the first, second, third and
fourth claims asserted in the complaint
as against both DEC and Robert Flacke,
Individually; and plaintiff will, at an
appropriate time, formally amend or
supplement the Complaint to implement
such discontinuances.
A-74
Ze In light of the discontinuances
described in Paragraph 1 above, the
state defendants have agreed to withdraw
so much of their motion as (i) relates
to the fifth claim for relief; and (ii)
relates to the first, second, third and
fourth claims for relief against DEC or
Robert Flacke, Individually;
3. The motion before the Court will
be limited to the sufficiency of the
claims asserted in the first four claims
for relief against defendant Robert
Flacke, as Commissioner of the DEC;
and upon reading the summons and com-
plaint, dated February 2, 1981; the
notice of notice to dismiss, dated April
15, 1981; the memorandum in support of
the motion to dismiss, dated April 15,
1981; plaintiff's memorandum of law in
opposition to motion to dismiss; and the
Stipulation dated July 8, 1981; and the
Court having heard argument of counsel
for the respective parties on July 17,
1981; and the Court after due deliber-
ation having filed its opinion and order
dated July 26, 1982 which granted the
A-75
motion, as limited by the stipulation,
in various respects; it is
ORDERED, that plaintiffs third claim
for relief be and the same is hereby
dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiff's claims for
relief as parens patriae be and the same
are hereby dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiffs fourth claim
for relief is dismissed to the extent
that it seeks to recover for diminution
of the value of properties not owned by
plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED, that the motion of the New
York State Department of Environmental
Conservation and Robert Flacke is in all
other respects denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiff Town of
Orangetown serve an amended complaint in
accordance with the stipulation dated
July 8, 1981 within five (5) days of
A-76
entry of this order, and that defendants
serve answers within ten (10) days of
receipt of said amended complaint.
Dated: New York, New York
September 7, 1982
United States District Judge
A-77
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Defendants.
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
Except to the limited extent there is
consent, the motion is denied.
SO ORDERED
1/24/83 HON. RICHARD C. OWEN
U.S.D.J.
A-78
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ANNE GORSUCH, Individually
and as Administrator of
the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency;
RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-
ly and as Regional Admini-
strator of the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER
DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF
ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;
TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSERVATION; and
ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-
er of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental
Conservation,
Defendants.
81 Civ. 1147 (RO)
JUDGMENT
This action came on for trial before
the Court without a jury, Honorable
A-79
Richard Owen, District Judge, presiding
on October 12, 1982 until October 27,
1982, and was argued by counsel.
On October 13, 1982, during the
course of the trial, the court dismissed
the fourth and fifth claims of plaintiff
as against defendant Town of Clarkstown.
On October 21, 1982, at the con-
clusion of plaintiff's direct case, the
court dismissed plaintiff's third claim,
relating to the State Environmental
Quality Review Act as against all
defendants; dismissed plaintiff's fourth
claim, for injunctive relief due to
muisance, as against the federal and
state defendants; and dismissed plain-
tiff's fifth claim, for monetary damages
due to nuisance, as against all defen-
dants.
On October 26, 1982, at the con-
Clusion of defendants' case, the court
A-80
dismissed the second counterclaim of
defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-
trict No. 1, County of Rockland and Town
of Ramapo, with regard to monetary
damages for nuisance, as against plain-
tiff. At that time, defendants Rockland
County Sewer District No. 1, County of
Rockland and Town of Ramapo, withdrew
their third and fourth counterclaims
relating to industrial pretreatment
requirements, as against plaintiff.
On October 27, 1982, at the close of
trial, upon consideration of argument by
counsel, the court rendered a decision
from the bench dismissing plaintiff's
fourth claim relating to nuisance, as
against all defendants, and dismissing
the first counterclaim of defendants
Rockland County Sewer District No. 1,
County of Rockland, and the Town of
A-81
Ramapo, relating to nuisance, against
plaintiff.
Upon consideration of memoranda of
law submitted by counsel, the court has
filed findings of fact, conclusions of
law and mixed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, with regard to
plaintiff's remaining claims, dated
January 24, 1983.
The court has filed supplemental
findings of fact and conclusions of law
with regard to plaintiff's fourth claim
and defendants' first counterclaim,
dated January 25, 1983. It is therefore
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
le Plaintiff's first claim for
relief, relating to the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act is dismissed on the
merits as against defendants Anne
Gorsuch, individually and as Administ-
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rator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("Gorsuch"); Richard
Dewling, individually and as Regional
Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
("Dewling") ; Rockland County Sewer
District No. 1; County of Rockland; Town
of Ramapo; and Robert Flacke, as
Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation
("Flacke").
y Plaintiff's second claim for
relief, relating to the Clean Water Act,
is hereby dismissed on the merits as
against defendants Gorsuch, Dewling,
Rockland County Sewer District No. l,
County of Rockland, Town of Ramapo and
Flacke.
36 Plaintiff's third claim for
relief relating to the State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act is hereby
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dismissed on the merits as against
defendants Flacke, Rockland County Sewer
District No. 1, County of Rockland and
Town of Ramapo.
4. Plaintiff's fourth claim for
relief, relating to injunctive relief
for nuisance, is hereby dismissed on the
merits as against defendants Gorsuch,
Dewling, Rockland County Sewer District
No. 1, County of Rockland, Town of
Ramapo, Town of Clarkstown and Flacke.
5. Plaintiff's fifth claim for
relief, relating to monetary relief for
nuisance, is hereby dismissed on the
merits as against defendants Gorsuch,
Dewling, Rockland County Sewer District
No. 1, County of Rockland, Town of
Ramapo and Town of Clarkstown.
6. Plaintiff's sixth claim for
relief, related to Step III, Phase I
grants for the project, is hereby
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dismissed on the merits as against
defendants Gorsuch, Dewling, Rockland
County ihiesan District No. 1, County of
Rockland, the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation and
Flacke.
Te The first counterclaim of
defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-
trict No. 1, County of Rockland and the
Town of Ramapo, relating to injunctive
relief for nuisance, is hereby dismissed
on the merits as against plaintiff.
8. The second counterclaim of
defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-
trict No. 1, County of Rockland and the
Town of Ramapo, relating to monetary
relief for nuisance, is hereby dismissed
on the merits as against plaintiff.
9. The complaint is hereby dis-
missed in its entirety, with costs and
Gisbursements to defendants, and all
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counterclaims are dismissed without
costs.
Dated: New York, New York
February 3, 1983
Richard Owen
U.S.D.Jd.
JUDGMENT ENTERED: 2/4/83
Clerk
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY
Region II
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278
August 29, 1980
To All Interested Govern-
ment Agencies and Public
Groups:
In accordance with the procedures for
the preparation of environmental impact
statements, an environmental review has
been performed on the proposed agency
action below:
Project Rockland County Sewer
Name: District No. 1 (RCSD No.
1) sewage tréatment plant
expansion, sludge hand-
ling facilities and in-
terceptor sewers.
Town of Ramapo collection
sewers,
Project C-36-744-03 (Step 2 Grant)
Numbers: RCSD No. 1
C-36-1253-01 (Step 2
Grant) Town of Ramapo
Purpose of The purpose of this pro-
Project: ject is four fold: to
replace failing indivi-
dual septic systems in
Project
Originators:
Project
Location:
Project
Description:
Proposed
Eligible
Project
Costs:
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Ramapo with collection
sewers; to provide inter-
ceptor sewers to convey
sewage from the Towns of
Ramapo and Clarkstown to
the RCSD No. 1 STP; to
expand the overloaded RCSD
No. 1 STP to treat exis-
ting and future flows from
the proposed service area;
to provide facilities to
process sludge from the
RCSD No. 1 STP.
RCSD No. 1
Town of Ramapo
Towns of Ramapo, Clarks-
town and Orangetown, New
York
Preparation of plans and
specifications for con-
struction of collection
sewers, pump stations, STP
expansion and sludge hand-
ling facilities as des-
cribed in detail in Sec-
tion IV of the attached
environmental assessment.
RCSD No. 1
$ 674,000 -
Town of Ramapo
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EPA Grant $ 2,858,630 -
(75%): RCSD No. 1
$ 506,000 -
Town of Ramapo
Our environmental review of this project
indicates that no significant environ-
mental impacts will result from the
proposed action. Consequently, we have
made a preliminary decision not to
prepare an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) on the project.
This decision is based on a careful
review of the engineering report, the
environmental information document, and
other supporting data. All of these
documents, along with the environmental
assessment, are on file at the EPA
regional office, where they are avail-
able for public scrutiny upon request.
A copy of the environmental assessment
is enclosed for your review.
Both the State of New York and the EPA
recognize that this project is located
in an Air Quality Control Region (AQCR).
This fact has been accounted for in our
review.
Comments supporting or disagreeing with
this decision may be submitted to the
EPA for consideration. All comments
must be received within thirty (30)
calendar days of the date of this
finding of no significant impacts
(FNSI). Please address your comments to
the Chief, New York and Virgin Islands
Section, Environmental Impacts Branch,
Room 400. After evaluating any comments
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received on the project, the EPA will
make a final decision. However, no
administrative action will be taken on
the project for at least thirty (30)
calendar days after the date of this
FNSI.
Sincerely yours,
Charles S. Warren
Regional Administrator
Enclosure
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CLEAN WATER ACT
§1283. Plans, specifications, esti-
mates, and payments
(a) Submission; contractual nature of
approval by Administrator;
combined grants
Each applicant for a grant shall
submit to the Administrator for his
approval, plans, specifications, and
estimates for each proposed project for
the construction of treatment works for
which a grant is applied for under
section 1281l(g)(1) of this title from
funds allotted to the State under
section 1285 of this title and which
otherwise meets the requirements of this
chapter. The Administrator shall act
upon such plans, specifications, and
estimates as soon as practicable after
the same have been submitted, and his
approval of any such plans, specifica-
tions, and estimates shall be deemed a
contractual obligation of the United
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States for the payment of its propor-
tional contribution to such project.
§1284. Limitations and conditions
(a) Before approving grants for any
project or any treatment works under
section 1281l1(g)(1) of this title the
Administrator shall determine -
(1) that such works are included in
any applicable areawide waste treatment
management plan developed under section
1288 of this title;
(2) that such works are in conformity
with any applicable State plan under
section 1313(e) of this title;
(3) that such works’ have been
certified by the appropriate State water
pollution control agency as entitled to
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priority over such other works in the
State in accordance with any applicable
State plan under section 1313(e) of this
title, except that any priority list
developed pursuant to section 1313(e)
(3) (H) of this title may be modified by
such State in accordance with regula-
tions promulgated by the Administrator
to give higher priority for grants for
the Federal share of the cost of pre-
paring construction drawings and speci-
fications for any treatment works
utilizing processes and techniques
meeting the guidelines promulgated under
section 1314(d) (3) of this title and for
grants for the combined Federal share of
the cost of preparing construction
drawings and specifications and the
building and erection of any treatment
works meeting the requirements of the
next to the last sentence of section
1283(a) of this title® which utilizes
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processes and techniques meeting the
guidelines promulgated under section
1314(da) (3) of this title;
(4) that the applicant proposing to
construct such works agrees to pay the
non-Federal costs of such works and has
made adequate provisions satisfactory to
the Administrator for assuring proper
and efficient operation, including the
employment of trained management and
operations personnel, and the mainten-
ance of such works in accordance with a
plan of operation approved by the State
water pollution control agency or, as
appropriate, the interstate agency,
after construction thereof;
(5) that the size and capacity of
such works relate directly to the needs
to be served by such works, including
sufficient reserve capacity. The amount
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of reserve capacity provided shall be
approved by the Administrator on the
basis of a comparison of the cost of
constructing such reserves as a part of
the works to be funded and the
anticipated cost of providing expanded
Capacity at a date when such capacity
will be required, after taking into
account, in accordance with regulations
promulgated by the Administrator,
efforts to reduce total flow of sewage
and unnecessary water consumption. The
amount of reserve capacity eligible for
a grant under this subchapter shall be
determined by the Administrator taking
into account the projected population
na associated commercial and industrial
establishments within the jurisdiction
of the applicant to be served ky such
treatment works as identified in an
approved facilities plan, an areawide
plan under section 1288 of this title,
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or an applicable municipal master plan
of development. For the purpose of this
paragraph, section 1288 of this title,
and any such plan, projected population
shall be determined on the basis of the
latest information available from the
United States Department of Commerce or
from the States as the Administrator, by
regulation, determines appropriate.
Beginning October 1, 1984, no _ grant
shall be made under this subchapter to
construct that portion of any treatment
works providing reserve capacity in
excess of existing needs (including
existing needs of residential, commer-
cial, industrial, and other users) on
the date of approval of a grant for the
erection, building, acquisition, alter-
ation, remodeling, improvement, or
extension of a project for secondary
treatment or more stringent treatment or
new interceptors and appurtenances,
A-96
except that in no event shall reserve
capacity of a facility and its related
interceptors to which this subsection
applies be in excess of existing needs
on October 1, 1990. In any case in
which an applicant proposes to provide
reserve capacity greater than that
eligible for Federal financial
assistance under this title, the
incremental costs of the additional
reserve capacity shall be paid by the
applicant;
(6) that no specification for bids in
connection with such works’ shall be
written in such a manner-as to contain
proprietary, exclusionary, or discrimin-
atory requirements other than _ those
based upon performance, unless such
requirements are necessary to test or
demonstrate a specific thing or to
provide for necessary interchangeability
A-97
of parts and equipment. When in the
judgment of the grantee, it is imprac-
tical or uneconomical to make a clear
and accurate description of the techni-
cal requirements, a “brand name or
equal” description may be used as a
means to. define the performance or other
salient requirements of a procurement,
and in doing so the grantee need not
establish the existence of any source
other than the brand or source so named.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this subchapter, the
Administrator shall not approve any
grant for any treatment works under
section 1281(g) (1) of this title after
March 1, 1973, unless he shall first
have determined that the applicant (A)
has adopted or will adopt a system of
charges to assure that each recipient of
waste treatment services within the
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applicant's jurisdiction, as determined
by the Administrator, will pay its
proportionate share (except as otherwise
provided in this paragraph) of the costs
of operation and maintenance (including
replacement) of any waste treatment
services provided by the applicant; and
(B) has legal, institutional, manager-
ial, and financial capability to insure
adequate construction, operation, and
maintenance of treatment works through-
out the applicant's jurisdiction, as
determined by the Administrator. In any
case where an applicant which, as of
December 27, 1977, uses a system of
dedicated ad valorem taxes and the
Administrator determines that the
applicant has a system of charges which
results in the distribution of operation
and maintenance costs for treatment
works within the applicant's jurisdic-
tion, to each user class, in proportion
A-99
to the contribution to the total cost of
operation and maintenance of such works
by each user class (taking into account
total waste water loading of such works,
the constituent elements of the wastes,
and other appropriate factors), and such
applicant is otherwise in compliance
with clause (A) of this paragraph with
respect to each industrial user, then
such dedicated ad valorem tax system
shall be deemed to be the user charge
system meeting the requirements of
clause (A) of this paragraph for the
residential user class and such small
non-residential user classes as defined
by the Administrator. In defining small
non-residential users, the Administrator
shall consider the volume of wastes
discharged into the treatment works by
such users and the constituent elements
of such wastes as well as such other
factors as he deems appropriate.
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EPA REGULATIONS
§35.925 Limitations on award.
Before awarding initial grant
assistance for any project for a
treatment works through a grant or grant
amendment, the Regional Administrator
shall determine that all of the
applicable requirements of §35.920-3
have been met. He shall also determine
the following:
§35.925-1 Facilities planning.
That, if the award is for step 2,
step 3, or step 2 + 3 grant assistance,
the facilities planning requirements in
§35.917 et seg. have been met.
§35.925-2 Water quality management
plans and agencies.
That the project is consistent with
any applicable water quality management
(WOM) plan approved under section 208 or
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section 303(e) of the Act; and that the
applicant is the wastewater management
agency designated in any WQM plan
certified by the Governor and approved
by the Regional Administrator.
§35.925-3 Priority determination.
That such works are entitled to
priority in accordance with §35.915, and
that the award of grant assistance for
the proposed project will not jeopardize
the funding of any treatment works of
higher priority.
§35.925-4 State allocation.
That the award of grant assistance
for a particular project will not cause
the total of all grant assistance which
applicants within a State received,
including grant increases, to exceed the
total of all allotments and reallotments
available to the State under §35.910.
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§35.925-5 Funding and other
capabilities.
That the applicant has:
(a) Agreed to pay the non-Federal
project costs, and
(b) The legal, institutional,
managerial, and financial capability to
insure adequate construction, operation,
and maintenance of the treatment works
throughout the applicant's jurisdiction.
(Also see §30.340-3 of this sub-
chapter.)
§35.925-6 Permits.
That the applicant has, or has
applied for, the permit or permits as
required by the national pollutant
discharge elimination system (NPDES)
with respect to existing discharges
affected by the p
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