Petition — Town of Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus

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a

83-857

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Petitioner.

V.

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually and as Administrator

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency:

RICHARD DEWLING, Individually and as Regional

Administrator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency: ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1: COUNTY OF ROCKLAND:

TOWN OF RAMAPO: TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN;:

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION: and ROBERT FLACKE.,

as Commissioner of the New York State Department

of Environmental Conservation,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DAVID SIVE

DAVID PAGET

(Counsel of Record)

Laurence B. Jones

Winer, Neuburger & Sive, P.C.

Attorneys for Petitioner

425 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

(212) 421-2150

November 18, 1983

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Ru Did the Administrator and Regional

Administrator ("RA") of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency

("EPA" or “Federal defendants") fail to

make the determinations required under

33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and 1284 of the Clean

Water Act ("CWA") (33 U.S.C. §1251 et

seg.), and 40 C.F.R. Part 35.925 (‘tie

"EPA Regulations"), in making the grants

which are the subject of this action,

and did any such failure render the

grants unlawful?

ra May determinations of the nature of

those required under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283

and 1284 of the CWA, and 40 C.F.R. Part

35.925 be in some form other than in

writing?

(ii)

3 In weighing the controversial

aspects of a major federal action to

determine whether under 42 _ £4U.S.C.

§4322(2)(c), Section 102(2)(c) of the

National Environmental Policy Act

("NEPA") (42 U.S.C. §4321 et seg.), an

Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")

should be prepared, does the signifi-

cance of opposition to the action depend

upon whether it is extraordinary in

nature?

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

REFERENCE TO OPINIONS

JURISDICTION

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Factual and Legal Background

The Proceedings Below

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

Court of Appeals Opinion

District Court Findings

of Fact and Conclusions

of Law dated January 24,

1983

District Court Findings

of Fact and Conclusions

of Law dated January 25,

1983

24

60

A-29

A-48

(iv)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

District Court Opinion

and Order dated July 26,

1982

District Court Order

dated September 7, 1983

District Court Order

dated January 24, 1983

District Court Judgment

Finding of No Significant

Impact dated August 29,

1980

Clean Water Act §§ 1283

and 1284

Environmental Protection

Agency regulations 40

C.FR. 935.925

National Environmental

Policy Act 42 U.S.C.

§4332(c)

A-57

A-72

A-77

A-78

A-86

A-90

A-100

A-120

(v)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Asarco, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A.,

616 F 5a 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) 39,40

Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co.

Ltd. v. "Federal Maritime Com'n,

310 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1962) 33

Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co. v.

United States, 295 U.S. 193

(1935) 32

Bell Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 363 F. Supp. 40

(S.D.W.Va. 1967) 33

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System

Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (L575) 22,28,

29-30 ’

31

California v. Federal Power

Commission, 345 F. I

(9th Cir.), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 941 (1965) 33

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.

(1973) 38-39

Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

(1971) 34,35

36,37-

38,41,

49,54

(vi)

Clermont National Bank v.

Citizens Bank Nat'l Ass'n,

329 F.Supp. 1331 (S.D. Ohio

1971)

Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

v. Federal Power Commission,

324 U.S. 581 (1945)

County of Suffolk v. Secretary

of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368

(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 1064 (1978)

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.

569 (1975)

Florida v. United States, 282

U.S. 194 (1930)

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.

254 (1340)

Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town

of Ramage. 30 N.Y.20 359, 3234

> e *

138 (1972)

Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471

F. 823 (2d Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908

subsequent appeal, 484 F.2d

a3 ), cert.

denied sub nom. Hanly v.

Saxbe, 416 U.S. 1974)

Joseph v. F.C.C., 404 F.2d

207 .c. Cir. 1968)

54

30

39,40

43-44

32

44

56

54

(vii)

Joseph v. F.C.C., 404 F.2d

207 Bc. Cir. 1968)

Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.

v. United States, 203 F. Supp.

629 (E.D. Mo. 1962)

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association of the United

States v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co.,

U.S. » 20S Bette

2856 (1983)

Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045

(D.C. Cir. 1975)

Rucker v. Willis 484 F.2d

158 (4th Cir. 1973)

Sterling National Bank of

Davie v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514

(5th Cir. 0), cert.

denied, 401 U.S. 375 (1971)

United States v. Baltimore

& O.R. Co., 293 U.S. 454

United States v. Chicago

x sc. ©. & Poe. COce 354

U.S. 499 (1935)

33

41-42,

54

54

56

54

32

32

(viii)

Page

United States v. Fish,

268 U.S. 607 (1925) 31

United States v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683 (1974) 34

USU Pharmaceutical Corp. v.

Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d

455 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 54

Wasson v. Securities Exchange

Commission, 558 F.2d 879 (8th

Cir. 1977) 30

Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d

157 (4th Cir. 1983) 39,40

Wichita R. & Light Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission,

260 U.S. 48 (1922) 31

Federal Statutes:

Administrative Procedure Act

5 U.S.C. §555(e) 53

5 U.S.C. §557(c) 53

5 U.S.C. §557(c) (3) (A) 32

5 U.S.C. §555(e) 53

28 U.S.C §1254(1) 3

28 U.S.C. §1331 12

(ix)

28 U.S.C. §1361

28 U.S.C. §2201

28 U.S.C. §2202

29 U.S.C. §482 (a)

Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. $1251 et seq.

33 U.S.C. §1283

33 U.S.C. §1283(a)

33 U.S.C. §1284

33 U.S.C. §1284 (a)

33 U.S.C. §1284(b) (1)

National Environmental Policy

Act

42 U.S.C. §4321 et seg.

42 U.S.C. §4322(2) (c)

49 U.S.C. §1653(f)

40 C.F.R. Part 6

40 C.F.R. Part 35

Chapter C

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

(x)

§35.917-5 (b) (5)

§35.917-5(b) (6)

§35.917-5(b) (7)

§35.917-8

§35.920-3

Part 35.925

§§ 35.925-1

40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1

through 35.925-21

40

40

40

40

40

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

C.F.R.

§35.925-5(b)

§35.925-7

§35.925-8

§35.925-10

Part 1500

11-12

(xi)

State Statute:

McKinney's Consolidated

Laws of N.Y., Environmental

Conservation Law §8-0101 et

seg. (New York State Envi-

ronmental Quality Review

Act)

Secondary Authorities:

R.M. Anderson, New York Zonin

Law and Practice, §7.20 (2d Ed.

1973)

K. Davis, Administrative Law

Treaties (1982 supplement)

K. Davis, Discretionary

Justice: A ee hiner

Inquiry, :

W. Gellhorn, C. Bayse and P.

Strauss, Administrative Law

Cases and Comments (7th Ba.

1979)

Legislative History of the

Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of

1972, Environmental Policy

Division of the Library of

Congress (January 1973)

14

40

46

36-37

25

(xii)

Necessity, Form and Contents

of Express Findings of Fact

to Support Administrative

Determination, Annot., 146

A.L.R. 209 (1943)

Note, Violation by Agencies

of Their Own Regulations,

87 Harv. L. Rev. 74)

3 N. Williams, American Land

Planning Law, §73.10 (1975)

A. Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and

Planning, §11.03 (4th Ed. 82)

Sofaer, Judicial Control of

Informal Discretionary Adjudi-

cation And Enforcement, 7

Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (1972)

Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.Pa.

L. Rev. 1267 (1

Verkuil, A Study of Informal

Adjudication Procedures, 43

hi. L. Rev. 739 (1976)

32

34

44-45

45

ole

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

NO. 83-

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Petitioner,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

REFERENCE TO OPINIONS

The opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

dated September 21, 1983, is reproduced

in the Appendix ("A-") at pages A-l -

A-28. The opinion is not yet reported.

The findings of fact and conclusions of

law of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York,

rendered in two parts, are reproduced in

the Appendix* at pages A-29 - A-56.

* The reproduction in the Appendix is a

retyping. The findings of fact and

conclusions of law, as rendered by the

District Court, were essentially those

submitted by defendants, with certain

(footnote continued on next page)

»3e

The District Court also rendered an

opinion on July 26, 1982, which is not

reported and which is reproduced in the

Appendix at pages A-57 - A-71.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

was entered on September 21, 1983. This

Court has jurisdiction to review the

Court of Appeals decision pursuant to 28

U.8.C. $31254(3).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The statutes and regulations involved

in this case are 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and

1284 and 40 C.F.R. Part 35.925 and 42

U.S.C. 4332(2)(c), Section 102(2)(c) of

(footnote continued from previous page)

portions crossed out and certain changes

and additions written in by the District

Court. Copies of the findings and

conclusions as originally rendered are

transmitted separately to this Court.

NEPA. They are reproduced at pages

a-f00 - A-120.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Factual and Legal Background

Rockland County is part of the

metropolitan New York area, in which

sewage treatment facilities and related

collector systems are indispensable to

suburban growth.* In the course of such

growth, communities often seek clean

* Rockland County's suburban growth was

one of the most rapid of all suburban

areas in the countrv. It was particu-

larly explosive in Ramapo. Its growth,

and efforts to moderate and contain it,

led to the enactment of the historic

Ramapo Zoning Ordinance, under which the

availability of sewage collection and

treatment facilities was given tag

importance. See Golden v. Plannin

of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, Er

~¥.S. ; A. Rathkopf, Law of

Zoning and Planning, §11.03 (4th Ed.

1962); 3 N. Witlions, American Land

Planning Law, §73.10 (1575); °#¥&.M.

Anderson, New York Zonin Law and

Practice §7. oo (2d Ed. 1973).

residential and commercial development

and to be able to send to other communi-

ties that growth's less desirable

aspects, such as their sewage.

Orangetown, one of the three mostly

suburban towns of the County, has always

collected its own domestic and indus-

trial sewage, and treated it at its own

plant in Orangetown, at Orangeburg. In

the early 1960's, over the vigorous

opposition of Orangetown, the Rockland

County Sewer District No. 1 (the

"District"), consisting of the other two

mostly suburban towns of the County,

Clarkstown and Ramapo, and Orangetown,

was created. The District is governed

by a board of seven Commissioners, only

one of whom is selected by Orangetown.

The District thereafter built its own

treatment plant (the "County plant") in

Orangetown, close to Orangetown's own

plant. At all times since, Clarkstown

and Ramapo have sent the bulk of their

sewage to the County plant. This has

helped them to retain their character as

"bedroom" communities. The County plant

has for many years suffered numerous

breakdowns and failures, causing massive

odor problems, which’ seriously and

adversely affected the lives of the

people residing and working in the

nearby areas of Orangetown.

In the early 1970's, Ramapo and

Clarkstown determined that, in order to

grow as they desired, they needed

additional interceptors and a doubling

of their capacity to treat their sewage.

Never seriously considering aiterna-

tives, and over Orangetown's objections,

they decided to double the capacity of

the County plant in Orangetown. That

decision, if implemented by the neces-

sary financing, would mean that for at

least another generation Clarkstown and

Ramapo would be able to grow by sending

their sewage to Orangetown.

The expanded facilities were to cost

more than $100,000,000. Grants under

Subchapter II of the CWA and its imple-

menting regulations were to provide the

great bulk of the funding.

The grant process, under that Sub-

chapter and the EPA Regulations, 40

C.F.R. Part 35 Subchapter C., consists

of three steps -- planning (Step 1),

design (Step 2) and construction (Step

3). The process focuses in large part

upon development and approval of a

"facilities plan"”.*

* The term "facilities planning" is

(footnote note continued on next page)

The CWA itself outlines some aspects

of the grant process. 33 U.S.C. §1283

(a) requires submission of a facilities

plan to the Administrator of EPA who

"shall act upon [it]", whose "approval

[thereof] shall be deemed a contractual

obligation of the United States for the

payment of its proportional contribution

to such project." 33 U.S.C. §1284 (a)

requires further that the Administrator

make a number of specific determina-

tions, "“[{bJefore approving grants for

any project for any treatment works

bween §1284(b) (1) directs that, "the

(footnote from previous page)

used in the EPA Regulations. It is

defined in 40 C.F.R. §35.925-1. The CWA

speaks of "plans, specifications, and

estimates ...." 33 U.S.C. §1283(a). The

term “facilities plan” or “planning” is

used hereinafter in reference to both

the CWA and the EPA Regulations.

Administrator shall not approve = any

grant for any treatment works ... unless

he shall first have [made a number of

other determinations].”

Much of the grant process consists of

facilities planning. Implementina 33

U.S.C. §1283, approval of the facilities

plan by both the State and the EPA

Administrator, acting by the RA, is

required, (40 C.F.R. §§ 35.920-3, and

35.917-8). Implementing 33 U.S.C.

§1284, 40 C.F.R. §35.925 mandates that:

Before awarding initial grant

assistance for any project for

a treatment works through a

grant or grant amendment, the

Regional Administrator shall

determine that all of the

applicable requirements of

§35.920-3 have been met. He

~e. shall also determine the

following.” 40 C.F.R. §35.925

(emphasis supplied).

There follow twenty-one paragraphs of

separate determinations which must be

@10=

made by the RA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1

through 35.925-21.

Many of the determinations required

by both the CWA and the EPA Regulations

concern critical aspects of the pro-

ject's funding. The RA must determine,

among other things, that the applicant

has "(tjhe legal, institutional, mana-

gerial, and financial capability to

insure adequate construction, operation

and maintenance of the treatment

works..." (40 C.F.R. §35.925-5(b)); that

the design of the works complies with

certain requirements (40 C.F.R. §35.

925-7); that the environmental review

reguirements for the project have been

met (40 C.F.R. §35.925-8); and that the

applicant "has made satisfactory provi-

sion to assure proper and efficient

aijie

operation and maintenance of the treat-

ment works...." (40 C.F.R. §35-925-10).

Essential to the grant process is

"public participation" at all principal

stages of the facilities planning and

environmental processing. There must

be: consultation with the public "before

selecting alternatives" (40 C.F.R. §35.

917-5(b) (5))3 a public meeting "when

alternatives are largely developed but

before an alternative or plan has been

selected" (40 C.F.R. §35.917-5(b) (6));

and a public hearing "before final

adoption of the facilities plan."

(40 C.F.R. §35.917-5(b) (7)).

The public participation requirements

concerning the alternatives to the

project stem from the environmental

processing requirements under NEPA and

the regulations of the Council on

Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), 40 C.F.R.

@12<

Part 1500, together with EPA's regula-

tions implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. Part

6. The NEPA processing is integrated

with the CWA processing.

The Proceedings Below

This action was commenced on February

21, 1981. Jurisdiction is based upon 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 2201 and 2202; 42

U.S.C. §4321 et seg. (and its implement-

ing regulations), 33 U.S.C. §1251 et

seg. (and regulations promulgated there-

under) and the principles of pendent

jurisdiction.

Orangetown has sought judgment

declaring unlawful Step 2 and Step 3

grants of approximately $10,000.000* by

* Step 3 grants for $30,000,000 for

major construction costs have been

awarded since the District Court

judgment in this action and are the

subject of a subsequent federal court

action and state court proceeding.

-13-

EPA and the New York State Department of

Environmental Conservation (the "DEC" or

the "State defendants") to the District,

for the design and for a small portion

of the construction costs of the

project. Orangetown claims that EPA, in

making the grants, acted arbitrarily,

capriciously and otherwise contrary to

law, by failing to make most of the

determinations required before the

grants might lawfully be made, and

otherwise.

The action also challenges EPA's

environmental processing of the project,

charging that an EIS was required to be

prepared, and that a short and shallow

Environmental Assessment ("EA"), upon

which a preliminary finding of no

significant impact ("FNSI") was based,

was inadequate.

@14-

Claims are also made under the New

York State Environmental Quality Review

Act ("SEQRA"), Environmental Conserva-

tion Law ("ECL"), §8-0101 et _ seq.

Orangetown also alleges that the opera-

tion of the County plant and its emis-

sion of foul and noxious odors consti-

tutes a nuisance which will be continued

and aggravated if the project proceeds.

Each defendant has denied the

material allegations of the complaint as

to the illegality of the grants and as

to the operation of the County plant

constituting a nuisance.

In April, 1981, the State defendants

moved, upon sovereign immunity and

Statute of Limitations grounds, to

dismiss the complaint as against them.

The motion was heard on July 17, 1981.

Decision was reserved.

=] S=

The State defendants' motion was

still sub judice in July 1982, when the

District, County of Rockland and Ramapo

(collectively the "County defendants")

moved to dismiss for plaintiff's alleged

failure to prosecute, or in the alter-

native, for an immediate trial. The

District Court thereupon scheduled the

trial for October 12, 1982. Shortly

thereafter, the Court granted, in part,

the State defendants' motion of April

1981, by dismissing, on Statute of

Limitations grounds, plaintiff's claim

under SEQRA.

Plaintiff sought discovery beginning

in May 1981. It attempted to depose EPA

by Delmar Karlen, Jr., Esq., the officer

furnished by EPA. The deposition was

not permitted by the Court except as to

some aspects of the determination of

-16-

what was in the administrative record.

The administrative record, of approxi-

mately 45 files, was first produced and

certified by EPA in the fall of 1981.

On September 9 and 22, 1982, with trial

imminent, they found and produced some

20 additional files. On October 7,

1982, EPA found and produced an addi-

tional 20 files. Trial began on October

12, as scheduled, and continued until

October 27. At its conclusion, the

District Court dismissed plaintiff's

nuisance claims and reserved judgment on

its other claims. It directed the

parties to prepare findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

On January 24 and 25, 1983, the Court

essentially adopted the defendants'

findings and conclusions. It dismissed

a} Fa

the complaint. Judgment was entered on

February 4, 1983.

Plaintiff appealed on February 10,

1983. On motion by the County defen-

dants, the Court of Appeals expedited

the briefing and argument of the appeal.

Argument was set down for, and held on,

April 22, 1983.*

Approximately four months after the

oral argument, a highly unusual and

unorthodox sequence of events took

place, relating to the first question

presented by this petition. On or about

August 8, 1983, the Clerk of the Court

of Appeals, without informing peti-

tioner's counsel, requested of EPA

bd Seventeen days after argument EPA

counsel, without any request therefore

by the Court of Appeals, supplemented

its brief and oral argument, regarding

aspects of the impact of the project

upon wetlands, in and by a three page

letter to the panel of judges.

-18-

counsel that it forward to the Court of

Appeals for its review so much of the

administrative record as related to

EPA's administrative actions pursuant to

40 C.F.R. §35.925. On August 9, 1983

EPA's counsel responded, forwarding

portions of the record, and stating, by

letter dated August 9, 1983, the fol-

lowing:

We are herewith transmitting

the portions of the record

cited in pages 36-41 of our

brief, together with a copy of

the index to the administra-

tive record. The administra-

tive record was introduced at

trial as EPA Exhibit D, and

each sequentially numbered

folder in the administrative

record ("A.R.") was given a

corresponding number in EPA

Exhibit D (i.e., Folder "A.R.

2" was introduced as_ EPA

Exhibit D 2, Folder "A.R. 3"

was introduced as EPA Exhibit

D 3, etc.).

Plaintiff's counsel learned of the

request and response upon receipt of a

copy of the letter of August 9, 1983.

~19=

On or about August 15, 1983, the

Court of Appeals was evidently still

unable to locate the determinations in

the amorphous 86 volume record. The

Deputy Clerk of the Court of Appeals

called EPA counsel a second time and

requested that EPA identify those

portions of the administrative record

constituting its determinations pursuant

to 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1 through 35.925-

Zi. Plaintiff's counsel were not

informed of this second request.

EPA counsel responded approximately

one week later. The response was a 27

page letter-brief to the Court of

Appeals, in which it presented argu-

ments, supplementing, and in some

respects differing from, the arguments

in its brief and oral argument, as to

what the administrative record set forth

=-20-

in lieu of most of the findings re-

quired. It also argued that it "never

expressly or implicitly consented to

trial of such claims and could have

offered other evidence if there had been

adequate notice that all 21 subdivisions

[of 40 C.F.R. §35.925] were in issue."

(August 23, 1983 letter at page 3).

Plaintiff's counsel learned of the

Court of Appeals' second request and the

27 page response thereto upon receipt of

a copy of it. Plaintiff thereupon moved

the Court of Appeals for an order

striking the response, as an authorized

poet-dieuaunt brief, or, in the alterna-

tive, for five (5) working days to

respond thereto if the motion to strike

were not granted. Plaintiff's motion

was denied by the Court of Appeals,

without any reason given or any state-

=2i-

ment as to time for response. Plain-

tiff's counsel thereupon interposed a

letter answering some of the points made

by EPA counsel in their post-argument

letter-brief.

On September 21, 1983, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the District Court's

judgment in all respects, with each

party to bear its own costs. It upheld

the District Court with respect to EPA's

"Finding of No Significant Impact" and

its "Procedural Compliance with Con-

struction Grants Program". With respect

to Orangetown's contention that EPA

failed to assess and make the specific

findings required by 40 C.F.R. §§

35.925-1 through 35.925-21, the Court of

Appeals stated:

We note, however, that while a

clear and -concise document

outlining seriatim the agen-

cy's response to the demands

-22-

of Section 35.925 would be of

considerable assistance to a

court's review of EPA's

actions, the regulations do

not require that the agency's

actions be set down in any

particular order or form, or

even that its determinations

be made in writing. All that

is necessary is that a review-

ing court be able to trace

from the written record the

path followed by the agency in

deciding to take a particular

action. See generally Bowman

Transportation, Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System,

Inc. ["Bowman"], 419 U.S. 281,

285-86 (1974). (A-25 - A-26).

Annotating (A-24 n. 10) its ruling

concerning the determinations question,

the Court of Appeals stated that "only

three of the 21 determinations were

contested in the district court.” This

statement was based upon its implied

affirmance of the District Court's

denial of plaintiff's motion under "Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15 (b) to conform its

=23<

pleadings to the proof adduced at

trial...." Id.

Petitioner submits that the issue of

the "17 remaining determinations" was,

however, before the District Court. Id.

Whether or not all or any of the re-

quired determinations were made is

determined by the administrative record.

EPA put the entire administrative record

in evidence and submitted no other

evidence. EPA was not denied any

Opportunity to "offer any additional

evidence", because no other evidence

could have been adduced to prove what

was in the record. EPA fought through-

out the trial and pretrial proceedings

to bar any evidence outside of the

administrative record. (A-24 n.10).

The unusual sequence of events dealing

with the 40 C.F.R. §35.925 determina-

o24@

tions that took place four months after

argument of the appeal also enabled EPA

counsel to do more than would a party

litigating, in the ordinary fashion in

the District Court, the issue of the

requirements of the said determinations.

The District Court's denial of Orange-

town's motion to conform the pleadings

to the proof is plainly erroneous.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. This case involves important issues,

going to the heart of the administrative

process, concerning the enforceability

of statutory and regulatory requirements

that an agency make specific determina-

tions and findings* as the basis of non-

adjudicative agency action.

* The terms "determinations" and

"determine" are used in this petition,

as did all parties in the proceedings

below, interchangeably or together with

the terms "findings" and "find".

=25-

Both 33 U.S.C. §§ 1283 and 1284 of

the CWA, and EPA's own regulations

direct that before the making of the

grants a number of important explicit

factual and legal determinations be

made. Many of the determinations were

directly related to important* statutory

conditions precedent for the grants.

Only two of the determinations can even

arguably be said to appear in the

administrative record, placed in

evidence, in its entirety, by the

Federal defendants. (EPA Ex. D1-86).**

Positions taken by the Federal defen-

dants to explain the absence of the

* See generally a Legislative History

of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, Environmental

Policy Division of the Library of

Congress (January 1973).

** This reference is to the exhibits

entered at the trial in the District

Court.

=26

findings took an erratic course before

the District Court and Court of Appeals.

At the deposition of EPA, by Delmar

Karlen, Jr.,* plaintiff's counsel asked

him what documents constituted the

determinations required by 40 C.F.R.

§35.925. Counsel for EPA agreed to deem

that question an interrogatory and to

respond thereto. EPA's answer, by

letter dated October 14, 1982, stated:

You have asked for a statement

of the documents in the record

that relate to 40 C.F.R.

§ 925. As the federal defen-

dants explained previously

(Karlen Affidavit, para. 11),

award of the Rockland County

Sewer District No. 1 ("R.C.

S.D. No. 1") and Town of

Ramapo grants by EPA, after

review of the facilities plan,

constituted EPA's determina-

tions regarding the require-

* The District Court limited questions

asked at that deposition to the steps

taken by EPA to assemble its administra-

tive record.

@27=

ments of 40 C.F.R. §35.925.

As the federal defendants also

noted, the administrative

record may contain additional

evidence of these determina-

tions. . « «

Additionally, the administra-

tive record contains numerous

letters approving various sets

of plans and specifications

and subagreements. (emphasis

supplied).

The interrogatory and answer were

read into the record of the trial

without objection. At trial, EPA's

counsel placed the entire administrative

record in evidence but did not identify

where in that record any of the deter-

minations appeared.

In their post-trial brief, defendants

argued that the subject matter of the

items was analyzed thoroughly by DEC and

EPA and that the EA, not the “award of

the ... grants", constituted most of

EPA's determinations. The District

-28-

Court's finding with respect to the

subject matter was:

The Administrative record

reflects that the EPA con-

sidered those elements of the

project required to be anal-

yzed by 40 C.F.R. §35.925.

Although there is no separate

document listing specific

determinations with respect to

every element specified in 40

C.F.R. 35.925, taken as a

totaling the administrative

record reflects that the

objectives of 40 C.F.R.

§35.925 were accomplished and

therefore EPA complied with

its terms. (A-44).

In the Second Circuit, defendants

relied upon the EA as the place to find

the determinations. They argued at page

36 of their brief, citing Bowman, that

"the administrative record is more than

sufficient for a reviewing court to

follow the path the agency took in

discharging its statutory duties."

Four months after oral argument of

the appeal, EPA furnished in its post-

=29-

hearing brief the details of the evi-

dence that allegedly would support the

findings, had they been made.

The Court of Appeals adopted defen-

dants' argument about "the path the

agency took", citing Bowman. That case,

plaintiff submits, does not stand for

the proposition that statutory and

regulatory requirements for specific

findings need not be followed, and that

"a decision of less than ideal clarity"

may be upheld, “if the agency's path may

reasonably be discerned." Bowman, 419

U.S. at 286.

The "agency path" language of the

Supreme Court in Bowman appears at the

conclusion of a paragraph of the opinion

of this Court in Bowman, per Mr. Justice

Douglas, discussing in general terms the

"arbitrary and capricious' standard" of

-30-

judicial review of agency action. Id.

at 285. The paragraph immediately

preceding the paragraph in which that

quotation appears is the specific

recital by this Court of the fact that

the agency involved, the Interstate

Commerce Commission, had "made both

findings" required by its organic act.*

* The "path followed" phrase appears in

an earlier opinion by Mr. Justice

Douglas, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S.

581, 584 (1945) in which Orders under

"§5 of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52

Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. §717d, 15 U.S.C.A.

§717da", were reviewed and affirmed by

the Tenth Circuit. In affirming the

ruling of the Tenth Circuit, this Court

Giscussed the sufficiency of detail of

the Federal Power Commission's findings.

The findings were said to be "quite

summary” incorporating by reference

Commission exhibits, but, the Court

stated, "the path which it followed can

be discerned.” Id. at 595. Accord,

Wasson v. Securities Exchange Commis-

Sion, 558 F.2q 879 (8th Cir. 1977).

=3le

Bowman accordingly, cannot be deemed to

be this Court's answer to the question

of the effect of the failure of an

agency to render findings required by

statute or by its own regulation as the

basis of non-adjudicative agency action.

In a number of earlier cases, con-

cerned with more formal agency action,

the Supreme Court has held that such an

agency failure invalidates its deter-

mination. See Wichita R. & Light Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48

(1922) (rate order); Mahler v. Eby, 264

U.S. 32 (1924) (deportation of an

alien); United States v. Fish, 268 U.S.

607 (1925) (order of board of general

appraisers). In a number of cases

involving the ICC, this Court has also

held that, apart from specific statutory

requirements, determinations y that

agency could not be sustained unless

=32-

supported by express findings of the

basic or jurisdictional facts. United

States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 293 U.S.

454 (1935); United States v. Chicago,

Me, St. 7 & 4 ee Co. , 294 U.S. 499

(1935); Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co. v.

United States, 295 U.S. 193 (1935);

Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194

(1931).*

Perhaps the most pervasive findings

requirement is that of the Administra-

tive Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.

$557 (c) (3) (A), which requires that in

every on the record proceeding the

agency rendering a decision include a

statement of “findings and conclusions,

and the reasons or basis therefore, on

* See Necessity, form and contents of

findings of fact to rt

-33-

all the material issues of fact, law, or

discretion presented in the _ record."

This requirement is rigorously enforced,

although there are varying rulings, from

case to case, as to the exact degree of

particularity of the findings required.

See, e.g., California v. Federal Power

Commission, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.),

cert. den., 382 U.S. 941 (1965); Anglo-

Canadian Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Federal

Maritime Comm'n, 310 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.

1962); Bell Lines, Ince. v. United

States, 263 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.W. Va.

1967); Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.

United States, 203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D.

Mo. 1962).

Should the determinations require-

ments, statutory and regulatory,* for

* Enforcement of an agency's regulatory

(footnote continued on next page)

-34-

grants under the treatment works program

of the CWA be enforced at least as

rigorously as those of the APA? This

Court has not ruled on the question.

Nor, so far as petitioner's counsel have

been able to discover, does any decision

of this Court answer the same question

in the context of agency grant making

action or other informal agency action.

The function and importance of

findings requirements is a principal

subject of Overton Park. This Court,

after holding that action of the Secre-

(footnote continued from previous page)

requirement of specific determinations

is consistent with the more general rule

that an agency must adhere to "a strict

standard of compliance" with its own

regulations and procedures. Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park ("Overton Park"),

71 U.S. FO2 (i97i). See also United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 554256

(1574). See Note, Violation by Agencies

of Their Own Regquiations, 6) Harv. L.

Rev. 629, 630 (1 4).

=-35-

tary of Transportation under Section

4(f) of the Department of Transportation

Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. §1653(f)) was

reviewable, began discussion of the

review process by observing that:

Undoubtedly, review of the

Secretary's action is hampered

by his failure to make such

findings, but the absence of

formal findings does not

necessarily require that the

case be remanded to the Secre-

tary. Neither the Department

of Transportation Act nor the

Federal-Aid Highway Act re-

gquire[d] such formal findings.

Moreover, the Administrative

Procedure Act requirements

that there be formal findings

in certain rulemaking’ and

adjudicatory proceedings do

not apply to the Secretary's

action here. See 5 U.S.C. §§

553(a) (2), 554(a) (1964 ed.,

Supp. V).* Overton Park, 401

U.S. at 417.

* The Court further noted that:

And, although formal findings

may be required in some cases

(footnote continued on next page)

=36-

The Court went on to hold that the

lower court review of the Secretary's

action, "based ... on the litigation

affidavits that were presented" was

inadequate because "(those]) affidavits

were merely ‘post hoc' rationalizations

eee" Overton Park at 419. This Court

remanded the action to the district

court for review "based on the full

administrative record".* In that review

(footnote continued from previous page)

in the absence of statutory

directives when the nature of

the agency action is ambig-

uous, those situations are

rare. See City of Yonkers v.

United States, 344 U.S. 298,

320 (1953). Overton Park, 401

U.S. at 417.

® Subsequent proceedings in the

district court are described in W.

Gelhorn, CC. Bayse and P. Strauss,

(footnote continued on next page)

=37-

the district court might "require the

administrative officials who partici-

(footnote continued from previous page)

Administrative Law Cases and Comments

(7th Ed. 1979):

The remand in Overton Park was

indeed arduous; it produced a

25-day hearing in district

court following extensive (and

disruptive) pre-trial discov-

ery, all seeking to ‘'prove'

the Secretary's reasoning

process for the purpose of

permitting Section 706(2) (A)

review to occur. The process

threatened to bring into

public view pre-decisional

advice to the Secretary

ordinarily regarded as priv-

ileged, as part of the ‘full

administrative record that was

before the Secretary at the

time he made his decision.'

Whether or not ‘formal find-

ings' were ‘'required', surely

there was profound impetus to

making them in the Court's

observation that, ‘where there

are administrative findings

that were made at the same

time as the decision, as was

-38- ~

pated in the decision to give testimony

[by deposition or on trial] explaining

their action." Overton Park, 401 U.S.

at 420.

The availability of discovery to

supplement the administrative record, as

well as the propriety of the Court's

receiving evidence -- on summary judg-

ment motion or at trial -- beyond the

administrative record, has become a

problem of increasing import’ since

Overton Park. The problem was before

this Court in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.

138, 142 (1973), in which it held that

(footnote continued from previous page)

the case in [United States v.

Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)]),

there must be a strong showing

of bad faith or improper

behavior before such inquiry

may be made.' See also Cam

Id.

v. Pitts, p. 338 above.

at 368-69 (footnotes omitted).

=39-

"the focal point for judicial review [of

administrative action] should be the

administrative record already in

existence, not some new record made

initially in the reviewing court.”

Since Camp v. Pitts, supra, a large

number of cases have dealt with the

problem of whether in review of infor-

mal agency action the administrative

record may be supplemented.

The problem is acute in review of

environmental agency action and in a

number of cases,* particularly those

involving review of the sufficiency of

EAs or EISs, it has been held that

* See, e.g., Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d

157 (4th Cir. 1983); Asarco, Inc. v.

U.S.E.P.A. ("Asarco"), 616 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1980); County of Suffolk v.

Secretar of Interior ("Count of

Suffolk}, 562 F.og 1368 (2a Cir. toTTT,

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).

-40-

supplementation of the administrative

record should be permitted and discovery

should be available.* The District

Court held to the contrary herein. It

forbade inquiry, on discovery and at

trial, into what constituted the

findings and where they were, = and

precluded virtually all other discovery.

The importance of findings can hardly

be overstated. Findings are not some

formal tidying up of administrative

agency decisionmaking, on the record or

informal. Whether they exist or not is

the first and fundamental inquiry in the

judicial review process. They are the

clearest indication of the bases of the

administrative action. If findings do

* See, Webb v. Gorsuch, supra; Asarco,

supra, County of Suffolk, supra. K.

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise at

570-74 (1982 Supplement).

o4]<

not appear in the record and the bases

of the decisionmaking are not otherwise

clear, the court reviewing the action

may require discovery.

Twenty-one years after Overton Park,

in its most recent statement of general

principles of the scope and manner of

judicial review of the administrative

action, this Court again referred to

findings as an essential aspect of such

review. The duty of the agency, as

stated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association of the United States v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Co. ("Motor Vehicle"), v.38. , 103

S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1973), quoting

Burlington Truck Lines v. United States,

371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), is to “examine

the relevant data and articulate a

satisfactory explanation for its action

-42-

including a ‘rational connection between

the facts found and the choice made.'"

In Motor Vehicle the facts to be

found were not specifically mandated by

statute or regulation. In this case

they are. It is not the function of the

reviewing court to find the facts. Nor

when specific determinations are man-

dated by the very statute that defines

the power and duty of the agency to act,

and by the agency itself, should it be

permitted to tell the reviewing court:

"You trace our path to find the ‘facts

[we] found'. We assure you they are

there somewhere.”

Findings are closely related to a

statement of reasons. Both enable a

reviewing court to examine into the

bases of the agency decisionmaking to

determine whether it is rationally

-43-

connected to the facts. In Dunlop Vv.

Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), this

Court construed §401 of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §482(a), to

require a detailed statement of reasons

by the Secretary of Labor for his

non-adjudicative action of denying a

complaint by an unsuccessful candidate

for union office. The Court stated:

[W]hen action is taken by [the

Secretary] it must be such as

to enable a reviewing Court to

determine with some measure of

confidence whether or not the

discretion, which still

reamins in the Secretary, has

been exercised in a manner

that is neither arbitrary nor

Capricious ocee {I]t is

necessary for [him] to delin-

eate and make explicit the

basis upon which discretionary

action is taken... [W]w may

reasonably infer that Congress

intended that the Secretary

supply the member with a

reasoned statement why he

determined not to proceed ...

Finally, a ‘reasons' require-

~44-

ment promotes thought by the

Secretary and compels him to

cover the relevant points and

eschew irrelevancies... Id.

at 571-72 (citations

omitted) .*

The Court ruled insufficient the

statement by Secretary Dunlop that:

[b]ased on the investigative

findings, it has been deter-

mined ... that civil action to

set aside the challenged

election is not warranted. Id

eat 363.

EPA's failure to make virtually all

of the determinations required by the

* Whether and when formal findings or

statements of reasons may be required as

a matter of procedural due process has

been a subject of increasing attention

since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970). In Some Kind of Hearing, 123

U.Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975), Judge

Friendly has stated:

A written statement of rea-

sons, almost essential if

there is to be judicial

review, is desirable on many

other grounds. The necessity

(footnote continued on next page)

~45-

CWA and its own Regulations left its

grantmaking decisions virtually without

(footnote continued from previous page)

for justification is a power-

ful preventive of wrong

decisions. Id. at 1292.

In A Study of Informal Adjudication

Procedures, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73

(1976), Professor Verkuil states:

A statement of reasons for a

decision has long been an

essential predicate to judi-

cial review and a concern of

due process. Failure by an

agency to provide some con-

temporary statement of reasons

for informal decision making

places the reviewing court in

an unseemly dilemma. The

court must either exercise

weak review over the informal

process and affirm even when

in doubt about the basis for

the decision or engage in

strict review that can involve

an unwarranted intrusion into

the decision maker's mental

processes. Id. at 739

(footnotes omitted).

(footnote continued on next page)

-46-

findings or a statement of reasons. The

burden of searching for findings and

reasons was cast upon the reviewing

court, and thereby on the plaintiff

charged with the burden of proof.

The thwarting of plaintiff on both

discovery and trial rendered the

imposition upon the plaintiff of

finding-the findings task especially

egregious in this case. In weighing the

Significance of the absence of the

required findings this Court must, of

course, consider the nature of the

administrative action brought before the

District Court for review. It was

(footnote continued from previous page)

See also kK. Davis, Discretionar

Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, EE

; oafer, Judicial Control of

Informal Discretionary Adjudication and

Enforcement, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1293

o47@

non-adjudicative, non-adversarial. The

District was the applicant for the

grants and EPA the grantor. Orangetown

was in essence an intervenor.

Intervenors have important rights,

however. Orangetown's interest in

opposing use of over $100,000,000 of

federal grants, to compel it to suffer

Clarkstown's and Ramapo's sending their

sewage to Orangetown for at least

another generation (the "transaction

which [was] the subject of the [admin-

istrative] action..." ), was at least

equal to the interests of a party

entitled to intervention as of right or

permissive intervention in ae civil

action, under Rule 24 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

The burden of searching for the

findings was, of course, added to the

~48-

David versus Goliath type burdens

ordinarily cast upon small communities

attempting to assert their interests and

rights before comparatively massive

federal agencies and their grantees.

The imposition of the additional burdens

was unlawful and unjust.

2. The Court of Appeals ruling that the

determinations required by 40 C.F.R. §§

35.925-1 through 35.925-21 may be in a

form other than in writing, is in

conflict with applicable decisions of

this Court.

The Court of Appeals held that the

EPA Regulations "do not require that the

agency's actions be set down in any

particular order or form, or even that

its determinations be made in

writing..." (A-24).

It is correct that no particular form

is required. The holding that the

-49-

determinations need not be in writing

must mean, however, that (1) they may be

oral or (2) they may be implied by the

agency and inferred by a reviewing

court.

If they are oral they would appear in

the administrative record. They would

have to be proven by oral testimony from

an official, presumably, testifying

"Yes, we made those §§ 35.925-1 through

35.925-21 determinations". Thereupon

the official would be subject to cross-

examination as to when and by whom they

were rendered and other details. The

same matters would be within the scope

of discovery, by deposition and other-

wise, which would be permitted because

the bases of the agency's decisionmaking

would not be clear from the record. See

Overton Park, supra.

-50-

The foregoing scenario might be a

feasible one in some cases. Plaintiff

was not permitted any such inquiry in

this case. The District Court forbade

such inquiry both on discovery and

trial.*

ad The barring of such discovery is

discussed above. At the trial, the

following colloquy between plaintiff's

counsel and the court occurred:

The regulations call for

specifically certain deter-

minations and rulings by EPA.

We have been told that all of

those determinations and

rulings luck somewhere in all

of these boxes.

We have been trying, since the

beginning of this action to

determine where is which. If

no evidence comes out with

respect to that, then for your

Honor to determine whether

those rulings and determin-

ations have been made, your

Honor must at the close of

(footnote continued on next page)

=§)-

If determinations or findings may be

implied by the agency, the requirement

of determinations or findings may, for

all practical purposes, be deemed

stricken from statute and the regula-

tion. The reviewing court would have to

(footnote continued from previous page)

this case or at some time go

through all of those docu-

ments.

THE COURT: No. I am not

going through all of the

documents. I am relying on

counsel for the government to

point out to me where in the

documents these rulings, the

requirement that there be

determinations have been

complied with.

MR. SIVE: And that is, your

Honor, if they are to point

that out to you, then I submit

that that should be pointed

out to us as part of the case

(footnote continued on next page)

~52=

search through each document in the

administrative record for its impli-

cations. In this case, four months

after argument of the appeal, the Court

of Appeals had to ask EPA counsel to

assist it in finding the determinations.

EPA's 27 page post-argument letter-brief

purported to explain their absence.

(footnote continued from previous page)

so that we may look at those

which they point out and then

argue to your Honor they are

or are not.

THE COURT: Look, that's not

before me at this moment.

What's before me at this

moment is whether this witness

is to be asked what documents,

I take it, he considers to be

those. That's what you want

to ask him?

MR. SIVE: That's correct.

THE COURT: I already ruled I

won't permit that question.

=-§3<

If determinations may be implied by

the agency, any requirement by statute

or by the agency itself that it make

them would have less force than a

requirement of a statement of reasons.

The requirement of §555(e) of the APA,

applicable to on the record and informal

agency action, woud have greater force

than that of §557(c) requiring findings

and conclusions in on the record

proceedings. The premise leading to

such a result must be rejected.

Whether the Court of Appeals holding

is deemed to mean that the required

determinations may be implied by EPA or

may be oral, petitioner submits that it

is inconsistent with the rulings of this

-54-

Court in Overton Park and Motor Vehicle

and other cases.*

3. The Court of Appeals' ruling con-

cerning public controversy decides an

important question of federal law which

has not been, but should be, settled by

this Court.

The District was born in the contro-

versy inherent in one community's

sending its sewage to another. The

controversy deepened through the years

as the County plant emitted massive

odors, reshaping life in the areas of

* See also Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045

(D.C. Cir. 1975); USU Pharmaceutical

Corp. v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455,

46 Betis Gare iS73y3 Joseph v. F.C.C.,

404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1566) . Compare

with Clermont National Bank v. Citizens

Bank National Ass'n, 329 F. Supp. 1331,

1336 (S.D. Ohio 1971) and Sterlin

National Bank of Davie v. Corp., rei

F. 9 (5th Cir. 1970} cert.

denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).

-55-

Orangetown around it. As the District,

controlled by Clarkstown and Ramapo,

developed its plans, never’ seriously

considering alternatives of treating

their own sewage in their own communi-

ties, the controversy deepened and

broadened. When the District, in or

about 1974, determined to double its

plant's capacity by using over

$100,000,000 of federal monies, long

before the first public meeting held by

it concerning the project, the contro-

versy was further aggravated.

The Court of Appeals considerd and

ruled upon the "Pubic controversy"

aspect of the project. It referred to

the rule that the term refers to

instances where "a substantial dispute

exists as to the size, nature or effect

of the major federal action rather than

-86-

to the existence of opposition to a

use." Hanly v. Kleindienst ("Hanly II"),

471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 412 U.S. 908, subsequent appeal,

484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

denied sub nom. Hanly v. Saxbe, 416 U.S.

936 (1974).

The Court of Appeals then, however,

applied a different standard for

evaluating controversy, ruling that:

"The record lacks a sufficient basis to

indicate that the cpposition to this

project was of such an extraordinary

nature as to require an EIS." (A-22).

Neither Hanley II nor _ Rucker vy.

Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.

1973) holds that opposition to a project

need be “extraordinary in nature” in

order to be a factor in determining

whether a major project significantly

o§ Je

affects the human environment, thereby

requiring an EIS. What is meant by that

phrase is also unclear. If it means

that the opposition to a project, in

order to be a factor in determining

whether an EIS should be prepared, must

use some unusual means or methods, or

arise in some groups of people who would

not ordinarily oppose a project, or who

are members of some small elite

constitutency, the "extraordinary"

requirement would indeed be counter to

decided cases and to sound public

policy.

The fact is that the opposition of

Orangetown to the project is ordinary in

the sense that it is the logical

reaction by one community to that of

others who want their development but

not their sewage, and seek massive

federal monies to indulge such wants.

-58-

Sewage treatment plants are, of course,

inherently undesirable. (A-51). Under

the best of circumstances they create

problems, including, at times, odors.

The opposition of Orangetown has not

used any unusual means or methods to

render it extraordinary. It has

petitioned the agency, appeared before

it, albeit not before the alternative to

which it objected was selected by the

District, because no opportunity to do

sO was provided. It has made its case

in court. The opposition may be deemed

extraordinary in the sense of the

numbers and varied groups united in

opposition, represented by the Town

government exercising its lawful

governmental powers.

The Court of Appeals, petitioner

submits, applied a criterion not

recognized by the prior cases or by the

=§9-

CEQ Regulations and incompatible with

sound public policy.

No Supreme Court case has ruled on

the nature or degree of the controversy

that may be relevant to the determin-

ation of whether an EIS is required.

Every litigated proceeding adminis-

trative or judicial, raising the issue

of the requirement of an EIS reflects

controversy. This Court should rule on

the matter of public controversy under

NEPA.

~¢0-

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court

should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID SIVE

DAVID PAGET

(Counsel of Record)

Laurence B. Jones

Winer, Neuburger &

Sive, P.C.

Attorneys for Petitioner

425 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Tel. (212) 421-2150

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

—

No. 1260—August Term, 1982

(Argued April 22, 1983 Decided September 21, 1983)

Docket No. 83-6035

—-

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—_—Yo=

ANNE GorsucH, Individually and as Administrator of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individually and as Regional Ad-

ministrator of the United States Environmental Pro-

tection Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER DISTRICT

No. 1; COUNTY OF ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; and ROBERT FLACKE, as Com-

missioner of the New York State Department of En-

vironmental Conservation,

Defendants-Appellees.

6617

Before:

OAKES, PIERCE and PEcCK,*

Circuit Judges.

<-

Appeal from a final judgment of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Owen, J.) which dismissed plaintiff’s action seeking

declaratory, injunctive and other relief under the National

Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the State Environ-

mental Quality Review Act.

Affirmed.

aoe

DaviD SivE, New York City (Laurence B.

Jones, Winer Neuburger & Sive, PC.,

New York City, of counsel) for Plaintiff-

Appellant Town of Orangetown.

PETER A.A. BERLE, New York City (Carol A.

Buckler, Berle, Butzel, Kass & Case, New

York City, of counsel) for Defendant-Ap-

pellees Rockland County Sewer District

No. 1, et al.

GAINES GWATHMEY, Assistant United States

Attorney, Southern District of New York

(John S. Martin, United States Attorney

for the Southern District of New York;

° Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

6618

Thomas D. Warren, Assistant United

States Attorney, Southern District of New

York; Gary M. Rowan, Assistant Re-

gional Counsel of U.S.E.PA., of coun-

sel) for Defendant-Appellee U.S. En-

vironmental Protection Agency.

MARY LYNDON, Assistant Attorney General

for the State of New York (Robert

Abrams, Attorney General for the State

of New York, of counsel) for Defendant-

Appellee Flacke.

VINCENT J. ACESTE, Harrison, New York (AI-

fred E. Page, Clune, White & Nelson,

Harrison, New York, of counsel) for De-

fendant-Appellee Town of Clarkstown.

-

PIERCE, Circuit Judge:

The Town of Orangetown appeals from a final judg-

ment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York, Richard Owen, Judge, dismissing

plaintiff’s challenge to the approval by the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) of construction grants for the

design and expansion of the Rockland County Sewer

District No. 1 (RCSD) sewage treatment system, and for a

portion of the construction costs of said expansion. At

the heart of this appeal is the issue of the appropriate

scope of judicial review of an administrative agency’s

decision-making process and the standard against which

such decisions are to be measured.'

! For the convenience of the reader, the following abbreviations are

set forth:

6619

A4

On appeal, Orangetown’s principal contentions are: (1)

that the EPA acted unlawfully in failing to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before providing

funds for the expansion and design of the RCSD waste

treatment system, (2) that the agency acted in violation of

its regulations in administering the subject federal con-

struction grant program, (3) that the district court erred

in determining that operation of the RCSD plant did not

constitute a nuisance and, (4) that the court erred in

dismissing plaintiff's New York State Environmental

Quality Review Act (SEQRA) claim as barred by the

statute of limitations. For the reasons stated hereinbelow,

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

FACTS

The proposed project against which this action is

directed involves the expansion of the sewage treatment

plant of the Rockland County Sewer District No. 1. The

project entails the expansion of the plant’s sewage collec-

tion system and the installation of modern odor-control

equipment. The waste treatment plant presently services

the Rockland County Sewer District No. 1 which covers

approximately 80 square miles and provides sewage treat-

CWA — Clean Water Act or Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972

DEC -— State Department of Environmental Conservation

EA — Environmental Assessment

EID — Environmental Information’Document

EIS — Environmental Impact Statement

EPA — Environmental Protection Agency

l/l — Infiltration and Inflow

mgd — million gallons per day

NEPA — National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

RCSD — Rockland County Sewer District

SEQRA — State Environmental Quality Review Act

SSES — Sewer System Evaluation Survey

6620

ment for 160,000 residents in the Towns of Clarkstown

and Ramapo and the Villages of Spring Valley and New

Square. Sewage from the district is piped into and treated

at the plant’s main facility in the Town of Orangetown,

New York. Although the County’s treatment plant is

situated in Orangetown, that town’s sewage is treated in

its own plant, which is located less than one mile from the

County plant.

In recent years, it has become apparent that the RCSD

plant is inadequate to meet the area’s present and future

needs. The already overtaxed plant has experienced

several equipment breakdowns and has been allegedly

associated with foul and noxious odors. After commis-

sioning a number of waste treatment studies of the plant

system, the sewer district sought to expand the capacity of

the RCSD plant’s sewage disposal system and related

piping, modernize its equipment, and repair the present

plant facilities.

The xisting RCSD sewage treatment plant presently

has a design capacity to treat 3,800 cubic meters (10

million gallons per day, or “10 mgd”), but present waste-

water flows substantially exceed this quantity. A large

part of the excessive flow at the plant is due to the

infiltration of groundwater and the inflow of stormwater

into the interceptor and collection system.’ As part of the

2 Infiltration refers to “[wjater other than wastewater that enters a

sewerage system (including sewer service connections) from the ground

through such means as defective pipes, pipe joints, connections, or

manholes.”

Inflow refers to “[wjater other than wastewater that enters a sew-

erage system (including sewer service connections) from sources such

as roof leaders, cellar drains, yard drains, area drains, foundation

drains, drains from springs and swampy areas, manhole covers, cross

connections between storm sewers and sanitary sewers, catch basins,

cooling towers, storm waters, surface runoff, street wash waters, or

drainage.” 40 C.F.R. § 35.905.

6621

A6

project presently being proposed, the RCSD treatment

plant will be expanded to 8,500 cu m (25 mgd) to handle

existing and future sewage flows from the sewer district as

well as the infiltration and inflow from groundwater and

stormwater. The proposed sewerage system expansion will

enable the RCSD to sewer presently unsewered areas of

the RCSD, and relieve the burden on the present RCSD

plant as well as on numerous smaller municipally and

privately owned sewage treatment plants.

In 1976, pursuant to the EPA construction grant pro-

gram, 40 C.F.R. § 35.900-35.970 (1982), the Town of

Ramapo and the RCSD applied to the EPA for funding to

initiate a planning process for the modernization and

expansion of the RCSD waste treatment plant system.’

The requests for funding were made pursuant to a three-

step federal assistance program, the purpose of which is

tO assist municipalities in constructing waste treatment

works. Jd. § 35.903. Step I Funds pay the partial cost of

generating a “Facilities Plan” which outlines the pro-

posed project; Step I] Funds pay the partial cost of .

designing the project; and Step III Funds help defray the

costs of actual construction.

In response to the requests for funding, EPA made a

grant of Step | Funding to the Town of Ramapo and the

RCSD in 1976. During the next four years, a number of

waste treatment studies or Sewer System Evaluation Sur-

3 Due to an already overburdened sewerage system, the Town of

Ramapo proposes to retire its municipal sewerage facilities and con-

struct a system of gravity and pressure sewer lines to feed into the

RCSD system. In this way, the town will provide the sewerage services

needed to sewer approximately one third of the town which is presently

unsewered. Although the Town of Ramapo has submitted a separate

construction grant application for state and federal funding, the

town’s proposal is a joint undertaking with the RCSD. For purposes of

this opinion, the construction projects proposed by the Town of

Ramapo and the RCSD will be considered as one project.

6622

A-7

veys (SSES) were conducted and a nine-volume Facilities

Plan was prepared by the RCSD and the Town of Ram-

apo. During the development of the various drafts of the

Facilities Plan, coordination and exchanges of informa-

tion were made with consulting engineering firms directly

through the RCSD or through various federal and state

agencies. Other data used in the planning process were

obtained from the Rockland County Planning Board,

local municipalities, and surveys of the sewer district and

sewer system previously sponsored by state and federal

agencies. During the same period, the RCSD held public

information meetings and a formal public hearing so that

pertinent documentation could be presented for review by

the public and various environmental groups.‘ Based on

data derived at the information meetings and public

hearing, adjustments to the planning were made. Still

further input to the planning process was provided

through frequent negotiations between the RCSD, the

New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-

tion (State DEC) and the Regional Administrator of the

EPA. Due to this interaction of parties, the Facilities Plan

was the subject of numerous amendments, and other

subsequent modifications were incorporated into the fa-

cility’s design. The record shows exchanges of correspon-

dence indicating that specific proposals were made to

both the State DEC and EPA and were given careful

4 The record reveals that RCSD conducted several public information

meetings between February 14, 1978 and June 4, 1979 in various towns

located within the district. Input was sought from the public, environ-

mentalists and various agencies of the town governments within the

sewer district. On January 28, 1980, RCSD conducted a formal public

hearing. At the hearing, testimony was presented by eight speakers

from the Sewer District, local legislators and local officials before the

floor was opened for public discussion. Materials received from the

public information meetings were incorporated into the facilities plan-

ning process.

6623

consideration. For example, the initial location of the

administration building was changed to another site to

overcome environmental concerns about protecting

wetlands. Also, a meeting held August 6, 1980, between

the agencies and RCSD led to deletion of a rear access

road from the Facilities Plan, while a proposal to build

prefabricated ventilated buildings over the first stage of

rotating biological disks was included in the Facilities

Plan to minimize adverse environmental effects.

The Facilities Plan and related documents were submit-

ted to the State DEC for its review and approval by late

summer of 1980, and the State DEC, having worked in

concert with the EPA and the applicants to conform the

project to federal and state agency standards, certified the

Facilities Plan to the Grants Administration Branch of

the EPA on August 29, 1980.

Upon receipt of the Step II grant applications from the

RCSD and Ramapo, the EPA performed an environmen-

tal review of the project. On the same date, the EPA

issued a public statement which concluded that the agency

had determined that “no significant impact will result

from the proposed action.”* Consequently, the agency

determined not to prepare an Environmental Impact

Statement (EIS) before granting construction funds for

the project. Instead, the EPA attached to the public

notice of “no significant impact,” a thirty-four page

Environmental Assessment (EA), which described the

facilities planning area of the project, set forth the pur-

pose of and need for the project, identified the selected

plan and its costs, evaluated the environmental conse-

$ The EPA was able to issue its finding of no significant impact on the

same day as the state certification because RCSD had already submit-

ted its preliminary grant application for consideration pursuant to 40

C.F.R. § 35.920-2(b).

6624

quences of the various alternatives to expanding the

present plant system and listed, inter alia, the projected

effects on wetlands, floodplains, vegetation, and sedi-

mentation. The EA also outlined the steps taken to

minimize adverse environmental consequences and listed

the Special Grant Conditions which would be attached to

any federal construction grants in order to protect en-

vironmentally sensitive areas from development.

On September 30, 1980, the EPA offered a Step II

design grant to the RCSD in the amount of $2,858,627

and to Ramapo in the amount of $505,950. The grants

were accepted by both applicants in November, 1980.

However, before the RCSD could apply for Step III

construction funding, the Town of Orangetown com-

menced the instant action challenging the EPA’s environ-

mental processing of the applications. Plaintiff’s

amended complaint asserted five causes of action primar-

ily seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The first

claim alleged that the environmental processing of the

RCSD project violates the National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA); the second claim alleged that the award of

Step II grants violates the Clean Water Act (CWA); the

third claim alieged that the state and local defendants

violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act

(SEQRA) by unlawfully treating the project as excluded

from the requirements of that Act; and the fourth and

fifth claims sought injunctive and monetary relief for the

improper operation of the County plant, which plaintiff

alleged to be a nuisance.® In their answers, RCSD and

6 At the start of trial, Orangetown obtaified leave to amend the

complaint to allege a sixth cause of action which reflected the fact that

during the pretrial proceedings, EPA awarded the project a Step III,

Phase | grant. The sixth claim alleges the same violations as those

alleged with respect to the Step II grants and claims that EPA's

issuance of the Step Ill, Phase I grant violates NEPA and EPA's

regulations.

6625

A-10

Ramapo asserted counterclaims seeking injunctive and

monetary relief and alleged that Orangetown’s own se-

werage treatment plant constituted the nuisance in the

area.

At pretrial proceedings, the district court granted the

State DEC’s motion to dismiss the third (SEQRA) claim

as barred under the applicable state statute of limita-

tions.’ Trial on the nuisance issues and EPA’s finding of

no significant impact began on October 12 and continued

until October 27, 1982. Upon completion of the plain-

tiff’s case, the district court dismissed the fifth claim as

against the County Defendants and EPA, and the fourth

claim as against the State DEC and EPA for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted.*

On January 24 and 25, 1983, the district court issued

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the NEPA,

CWA and nuisance claims before dismissing the counter-

claims and plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Specifi-

cally, the court denied the relief sought after finding that,

based upon the administrative record, the EPA had con-

sidered the relevant environmental factors in determining

that the project would not have a significant impact on

the environment. The court also concluded that EPA’s

action in approving the Step II and Step III, Phase I

grants fully complied with NEPA and CWA provisions, as

well as the EPA’s construction grant regulations. In ad-

dressing the nuisance claims, the court found that the

At the completion of the plaintiff's case, the district court granted a

similar motion by the County Defendants and dismissed the third

cause of action in its entirety.

evidence presented did not support a finding that either

plant constituted a public nuisance.

DISCUSSION

On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Pol-

icy Act (NEPA) was enacted to promote a national policy

which would “encourage productive and enjoyable har-

mony between man and his environment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4321 (1976). To achieve this national policy, NEPA

requires that federal agencies proposing “major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment” include in their proposals or recommenda-

tions an EIS which provides an assessment of the benefi-

cial and adverse environmental impacts of the proposed

action. Jd. § 4332(2)(C). An EIS is evidence that an

agency has considered the reasonably foreseeable environ-

mental effects of a proposed major action before making

a decision to take the action. However, no EIS is required

where the major federal action is not “significant” within

the meaning of NEPA. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d

823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)

(“Hanly II”); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (“Hanly I”).

Essential to the outcome herein is the determination

whether the EPA erred in deciding that providing partial

funding for the modernization and expansion of the

RCSD sewage treatment system will not “significantly”

affect the quality of the human environment in Rockland

County Sewer District No. 1 and, in particular, in the

Town of Orangetown.

A-12

Scope Of Review

The issue of whether a particular agency’s action will

have a “significant” effggt on the environment is a sub-

stantive issue which has traditionally been left to the

informed discretion of the agency proposing the action or

project. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983). See also

Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power

Commission, 453 F.2d 463, 480 (2d Cir. 1971)(“[T]he

resolution of highly complex technological issues such as

these was entrusted by Congress to the [agency] and not

to the courts.”), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). NEPA

does, however, provide a procedural framework within

which substantive judgments must be made. The courts

must ensure that agencies comply with the “procedural

duties” mandated by NEPA, Kileppe v. Sierra Club, 427

U.S. 390, 406 & n.15 (1976), while still assuring com-

pliance with the substantive purposes of that Act.

Orangetown argues that the EPA is required to prepare

an EIS which would highlight what Orangetown perceives

to be the significant environmental impacts of that

agency’s decision to grant funds for the RCSD moderni-

zation and expansion project. Orangetown contends that

the EPA has not adhered to the procedural framework

dictated by NEPA, and that its finding of “no significant

impact” was arbitrary and capricious.

EPA’s determination of “no significant impact” is

neither a rulemaking nor an adjudicatory function, but

rather a factual finding made by an agency with particu-

lar expertise in environmental matters. The appropriate

scope of review is therefore prescribed by the Administra-

tive Procedure Act (APA), which provides that agency

action may be overruled by a court only if the agency

action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

A-13

or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (1976); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); City of

New York vy. United States Department of Transporta-

tion, slip op. at 5730 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 1983); Cross-

Sound Ferry Service, Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725,

729 (2d Cir. 1978); Hanly I], 471 F.2d at 828-29.

In Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.

Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam), the Supreme

Court addressed the question of the scope of review of

agency decisions on environmental issues. Although the

holding of the case is limited to the question of whether

NEPA requires the agencies to elevate environmental

concerns over other legitimate concerns, the Court quoted

from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558

(1978), in finding that, under NEPA, the judicially re-

viewable duties that are imposed on agencies are “essen-

tially procedural,” and that “once an agency has made a

decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the

only role for a court is to insure that the agency has

considered the environmental consequences.” 444 U.S. at

227. The court cannot “interject itself within the area of

discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to

be taken.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21

(quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Recognizing the limits of our review herein, we under-

stand the “procedural” requirements of NEPA to be the

guidelines with which this court must assess the kinds of

relevant environmental factors that must be weighed. We

must, therefore, look to see whether the environmental

impact assessment contains the type of reasoned elabora-

tion required to support the agency’s determination of no

6629

A-14

significant impact. In short, the appropriate role of the

court is to ensure that EPA has taken a “hard look” at the

environmental consequences which are likely to result

from the RCSD modernization and expansion program,

to be attuned to whether the EPA has considered the

relevant areas of environmental concerns, and to assess

whether the agency has convincingly documented its de-

termination of “no significant impact.” See e.g., Mary-

land-National Capitol Park & Planning Commission v.

U.S. Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

1. Finding of No Significant Impact

Orangetown contends that an EIS should have been

prepared by EPA because of specific impacts which it

believes federal funding will have in causing a significant

effect on the environment. It claims that the EPA’s failure

to assess, Or in some instances, to more adequately assess,

these impacts constituted an abuse of discretion. Specifi-

cally, Orangetown points to several matters which it

claims were not given adequate consideration by the EPA: -

the project’s impact on wetlands, floodplains, and land

use; the project’s alleged inadequate design; and consider-

ation of the controversial nature of the project. These

claims will be examined seriatim.

A. Wetlands

Orangetown claims that the sewage treatment plant

modernization and expansion project will have a “signifi-

cant adverse effect” on wetlands and floodplains in the

area of the plant expansion and along the system of

piping where new interceptors and collector sewers will be

placed. In support of Ms contention that an EIS is

required, Orangetown cites the EPA’s own Review Proce-

6630

A-15

dures for Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants

Program, 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(2), which requires the

responsible official of the EPA to ensure that an EIS will

be issued when “[t]he treatment works or collector system

will have significant adverse effects on wetlands, includ-

ing indirect effects, or any major part of the treatment

works will be located on wetlands.” Id. (emphasis added).

Orangetown contends that the administrative record con-

tains no reference to the fact that a major part of the new

construction for the project, including the grit tanks and

chambers, digested sludge storage, sludge and grit han-

dling buildings, new primary settling tanks and pumping

Stations, will be on land which appellant’s expert claims

to be wetlands.

However, the proposed area to be affected by construc-

tion of the plant expansion has not been designated as a

“wetlands” area by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. Part 6 App. A

§ 6(a)(1) provides in relevant part:

(1) Floodplain/Wetlands Determination—Before

undertaking an Agency action, each program office

must determine whether or not the action will be

located in or affect a floodplain or wetlands. The

Agency shall utilize maps prepared by the Federal

Insurance Administration ... Fish and Wildlife

Service . . . and other appropriate agencies to deter-

mine whether a proposed action is located in or will

likely affect a floodplain or wetlands.

Id. (emphasis added). Under New York State law, the

State DEC is the responsible “agency” for the supervision

and protection of wetlands and is charged with preparing

detailed maps of wetlands as part of this responsibility.

See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 664.1, 664.7 (1980). As the Facilities

Plan indicates, the State DEC has not designated the

6631

A-16

affected area as a “wetlands.” Thus, the EPA did not err

in not issuing an EIS since a major part of the proposed

addition to the RCSD treatment works will not be located

on “wetlands” as defined by an appropriate federal or

state agency.

Orangetown contends that regardless of whether the

State DEC has designated the area to be a wetlands, the

proposed area, populated with reeds, flooded shrubs and

wooded live deciduous trees, is nonetheless a wetlands

area. Orangetown further suggests that the State DEC has

not designated the area as a wetlands because the affected

area will be less than 12.4 acres and has not been defined

as an area of “unusual local importance,” both factors to

be considered by the State DEC in designating areas as

wetlands. See 6 Id. §§ 662.2(a), 662.4(b) (1976). However,

our review of the administrative record reveals that the

EPA was notified in the Facilities Plan of the “wetlands

species” in the area, as well as of the relatively small size

of the affected area. See EPA exh. D4, VII-2. Under these

circumstances, and in light of the fact that the State DEC

has not found the area to be of “unusual local impor-

tance,” and did not designate the area as a wetlands, EPA

cannot be faulted for failing to issue an EIS solely

because of the wetlands effect.

We note that the Facilities Plan also indicates that a

substantial area surrounding the plant has already been

“disturbed” by the existing RCSD plant. As this court

stated in Hanly IJ, while both the absolute and compara-

tive effects of an agency’s actions must be evaluated, it

must be recognized that “[w]here conduct conforms to

existing uses, its adverse consequences will usually be less

significant than when it represents a radical change. . . .

One more highway in an area honeycombed with roads

usually has less of an adverse impact than if it were

6632

A-17

constructed through a roadless public park.” 471 F.2d at

831. Moreover, the administrative record herein indicates

that principally, new interceptors were routed to follow

existing rights of way and are to be placed along routes

already disturbed by roadways or existing piping. See,

e.g., EPA exh. D3, Plates V-12, V-13. In this way, the

project was designed to minimize the wetlands impact due

to expansion of the sewerage system.

Finally, the record reveals that the RCSD redesigned

the plant’s specifications to comply with the EPA’s insis-

tence on reducing wetlands impacts. See Memorandum of

EPA Life Scientist Peter Gruber, May 27, 1980, EPA exh.

D36; see also EA at 9, Plaintiff’s exh. 4. In short, EPA

specifically analyzed the wetlands impact of the entire

project, and then determined that the wetlands affected

would not be significant enough to mandate preparation

of an EIS. We do not find this to be an arbitrary or

capricious decision.

B. Floodplains

Orangetown contends that no consideration was given

by EPA to encroachment of the county plant on a nearby

floodway, and that pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(4),

issuance of an EIS was required. That section provides

that an EIS is reqisired where implementation of a project

may directly cause or induce changes that significantly

“[a]dversely affect a floodplain.” This argument is devoid

of merit. The EPA administrative record reveals that the

actual encroachment on the floodway involves only a

small portion of two buildings. See EPA exh. D6. It

would be difficult to conclude that this de minimis intru-

sion onto the floodway could “significantly adversely

affect a floodplain.” The EA also indicates that EPA

considered the project’s effect on floodplains, and noted

6633

A-18

with approval RCSD’s efforts to route the interceptors

and collectors in such a way as to avoid nearby flood-

plains. See EA at 8, Plaintiff’s exh. 4. These circum-

stances do not suggest that EPA ignored the project’s

effect on floodplains and wetlands, or that the EPA

abused its discretion by determining that the wetlands and

floodplains impact of this project did not warrant prepa-

ration of an EIS. See Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,

503 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d mem., 639 F.2d 776

(3d Cir. 1980).

C. Land use impacts

Orangetown argues further that the land use impacts of

the project are so significant that an EIS should have

been prepared. EPA’s regulations require that an EIS be

issued if the treatment works will “induce significant

changes. ..in. . . residential land use concentration

and distribution.” 40 C.F.R. § 6.506(a)(1). Apparently,

Orangetown contends that expansion of the RCSD sew-

age treatment plant will automatically provide pressure

for development in what is now undeveloped lands in the

Town of Ramapo. Appellant’s assertion lacks a substan-

tial basis in the record and does not provide a ground to

require the issuance of an EIS.

The Facilities Plan reviewed by the EPA defined in

detail the scope of the project within the constraints of

existing zoning regulations and contains zoning maps for

the communities affected by either the plant expansion or

the routing of interceptors, collectors and pipes. The

Facilities Plan also contains a review of the demographic

characteristics of the affected area and projected antici-

pated growth of the communities. Based on this informa-

tion, the EPA found that the project was designed only to

meet population growth expected to occur in the sewer

6634

A-19

district, and noted in the EA that sewers were to be

installed only in places where development was already

taking place or was anticipated. The EA states that:

[t]he population of the planning area is projected to

increase from approximately 160,000 to 201,000 over

the 20 year design period of the proposed sewerage

facilities. The population projections are based on

recent development plans, zoning, and a constraints

analysis which excluded environmentally sensitive

areas (such as wetlands, floodplains, agricultural

lands and step [sic] slopes) from development.

EA at 2, Plaintiff's exh. 4. Based on the available

information, the EPA concluded in the EA that although

the project “may” cause an increase in the rate of devel-

opment, such an increase was not sufficiently significant

to require the preparation of an EIS.

Appellant has not established that expansion of the

sewage treatment system will encourage a significant

increase in development rather than merely meet the

district’s presently overburdened needs and anticipated

growth. It is possible that Orangetown’s position would

have been stronger had it established at trial that the

projected capacity of the new sewage collection system

greatly exceeded the required capacity for anticipated

growth. Appellant might then argue that grossly excessive

capacity would be an inducement to developers to utlilize

the undeveloped lands and to tap into the collection

system. In light of the lack of sufficient evidence to

indicate that there would be excessive capacity under the

approved plan, and that the plant expansion would have

the effect of inducing a significant change in land devel-

opment, EPA did not abuse its discretion in not issuing an

EIS. See City of New York v. United States Department

6635

A-20

of Transportation, slip op. at $726 n.14 (“The fact that

effects are only a possibility does not insulate the pro-

posed action from consideration under NEPA, but it does

accord an agency some latitude in determining whether

the risk is sufficient to require preparation of an EIS.”);

See also Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,

503 F. Supp. at 324.

é

‘D. Sewage Treatment Plant Design

Orangetown argues that the capacity of pipes carrying

effluent to the sewage treatment plant (inflow) and the

capacity of the discharge pipe which carries treated ef-

fluent from the plant to the Hudson River (outflow) are

insufficient, and that this state of affairs will cause raw

sewage to spew into the streets and streams of Orange-

town. This alleged miscalculation has been criticized by

appellant as further proof that EPA’s finding of no

significant impact was arbitrary and capricious. However,

both claims are without merit.

The Facilities Plan contemplates peak flow through the

plant of 53 mgd by the year 2000. However, an interim

SSES study commissioned by the RCSD, and completed

before issuance of the finding of no significant impact,

estimated that the maximum influent in the year 2000

could reach 54.6 to 57.6 mgd. As the Facilities Plan

explains, the estimated amount of a sewer pipe flow is

composed of numerous variables including projected

elimination of infiltration and inflow, demographic pat-

terns and the constantly changing ways in which a com-

munity uses its water. Under these circumstances, EPA’s

utlilization of the $3 mgd figure at the Facilities Planning

Stage cannot be said to be arbitrary given the relatively

small difference between the two estimates of maximum

6636

A-21

flow in the year 2000 (53 mgd as against 54.6-57.6 mgd,

or 2.6% to 8.7% variance).

With regard to the outfall pipe, Orangetown contends

that the 102 mgd capacity of the outfall pipe, which is

shared by the Orangetown and RCSD plants, is insuffi-

cient. However, examination of the administrative record

and testimony at trial reveals appellant’s argument to be a

non-issue.

The Facilities Plan states that the joint outfall pipe has

a capacity of 102 mgd. By contract, 42 mgd is allotted to

the Orangetown plant and 60 mgd to RCSD. As Orange-

town correctly states, a 1982 study commissioned by

RCSD estimates that projected flow in the year 2030

could, under certain circumstances, exceed the outfall

pipe’s capacity of 102 mgd, and could reach as high as

104 mgd. However, this state of affairs seems unlikely to

occur since the record reveals that Orangetown’s total

plant overflow is currently 6.95 mgd, and the projection

for maximum outflow is 15.5 to 17 mgd in the year 2000.

Without a significant expansion of Orangetown’s own

sewage treatment plant, the outflow pipe will not reach its

designed capacity. Moreover, an expert in wastewater flow

whose firm conducted the 1982 study testified at trial

that, based on the projected flows from the Orangetown

plant, there was no possibility of excess flow until at least

the year 2030. Under these circumstances, we do not find

that EPA acted arbitrarily in concluding that the project’s

design would not significantly affect the environment.

E. Public Controversy

Orangetown argues that an EIS is required because of

local opposition to the plant expansion project. Opposi-

tion and a high degree of controversy, however, are not

synonymous. It is to be expected that expansion of an

6637

A-22

unpopular sewage treatment plant would generate a con-

siderable degree of opposition; however, the term “highly

controversial” as found in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4)

(which outlines factors to be assessed in determining the

“intensity” of a project, including “[t]he degree to which

the effects on the quality of the human environment is

likely to be highly controversial”) refers to instances

where “a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature

or effect of the major federal action rather than to the

existence of opposition to a use.” Hanly I], 471 F.2d at

830. To hold otherwise “would require an impact state-

ment whenever a threshold determination dispensing with

one is likely to face a court challenge [and would] surren-

der the determination to opponents of a federal action,

no matter whether [the project is] major or not, nor how

insignificant its environmental effects might be.” Rucker

v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Hanly

I], 471 F.2d at 830 n.9A; Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, -

$30 F.2d 982, 988-89 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In light of the

evidence herein supporting a finding of no significant

impact, something more than the mere speculation that

the plant expansion will increase odor problems, rather

than alleviate such existing problems, is necessary before

a project can be called “highly controversial.” The record

lacks a sufficient basis to indicate that the opposition to

this project was of such an extraordinary nature as to

require an EIS.

Upon examination of the administrative record relied

upon by the EPA, and that agency’s findings as published

in the EA, we find that the EPA considered the relevant

data, investigated the relevant environmental concerns,

and concisely documented the evidence supporting its

conclusion that funding for the RCSD system expansion

would not have a significant effect on the environment.

6638

A-23

Since the challenged findings are supported by substantial

evidence, are not arbitrary and capricious, and do not

represent an abuse of discretion, it is not within the

competence of this court to overrule the agency’s deter-

mination. See City of New York v. United States Depart-

ment of Transportation, slip op. at 5723, 5730;

Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. United States

Atomic Energy Commission, 482 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir.

1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal

Power Commission, 453 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).

Il. Procedural Compliance With Construction Grant

Program

Orangetown next contends that EPA violated its regula-

tions governing the construction grant program by omit-

ting certain procedural steps and by not requiring

compliance with the procedural aspects of the program

prior to issuance of the Step II and Step III, Phase I

grants. Upon careful examination of the record, we find

that RCSD, as grantee, complied with the “public partici-

pation” requirements of 40.C.F.R. § 35.917-5 (1977) by

holding timely public information meetings and a formal

hearing; that the public had adequate opportunity to

participate in the planning process; that the Facilities

Plan was submitted to the State DEC, and that the State

certified the Facilities Plan prior to submitting the Plan to

the EPA pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.917-7, 35.917-8;

that the EA contains a wetlands/floodplains assessment;

that since the Facilities Plan was commenced prior to

December 15, 1979, an Environmental Information Doc-

ument (EID) was not required to be prepared; that the

®

° See 40 C.F.R. § 6.102(cK2).

6639

A-24

Facilities Plan had been approved by the EPA prior to the

grant of Step II Funds; that the Step II grant applications

from RCSD and the Town of Ramapo were filed with the

EPA; and that the EPA reviewed these applications and

awarded Step II Funds to the applicants.

Orangetown contends that EPA failed to assess and

make specific findings required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.925-1

through 35.925-21.'° These sections set forth a series of

conditions that EPA must find to exist prior to the award

of a grant under the construction grants program for

sewage treatment works. We note, however, that while a

clear and concise document outlining seriatim the

agency’s response to the demands of Section 35.925

would be of considerable assistance to a court’s review of

EPA’s actions, the regulations do not require that the

agency’s actions be set down in any particular order or

form, or even that its determinations be made in writing.

10 Only three of the 21 determinations were contested in the district

court. Plaintiff's amended complaint only challenged compliance with

subdivisions 35.925-7 (“Design”), 35.925-8 (“Environmental Review”),

and 35.925-13 (“Sewage Collection System”), as determinations which

the Regional Administrator had failed to properly address prior to an

award of construction grant funds. These three issues were among

Orangetown’s claims as the action proceeded to trial. More than two

months after completion of the trial, on January 6, 1983, Orangetown

moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) to conform its pleadings to

the proof adduced at trial to place in issue the claim that EPA “did not

make the determinations required by 40 C.F.R. § 35.925.” On January

24, 1983, the district court denied the motion. Since inclusion of the 17

remaining determinations of Section 35.925 were not tried by the

parties’ express or implied consent, and were not presented in such a

way that the defendants could fairly “defend. . . [and] offer any

additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory,”

Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., $60 F.2d 1078,

1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice { 15.13{2), at

993 (2d ed. 1966)), we find the district court did not abuse its broad

discretion in denying the motion. “The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to

allow the pleadings to conform to issues actually tried, not to extend

the pleadings to introduce issues inferentially suggested by incidental

evidence in the record.” Browning, 560 F.2d at 1086.

6640

A-25

All that is necessary is that a reviewing court be able to

trace from the written record the path followed by the

agency in deciding to take a particular action. See gener-

ally Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas Best

Freight System,. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Our

review of the EPA administrative record supports the

district court’s finding that “[t]Jaken as a totality the

administrative record reflects that the objectives of 40

C.F.R. § 35.925 were accomplished and [that] therefore

EPA complied with its terms.”

Ill. Nuisance Claim

Orangetown claims that the district court committed

clear error in dismissing its public nuisance claim against

the County defendants. We find the district court cor-

rectly dismissed appellant’s nuisance claim.

Orangetown alleged at trial that operation of the

County plant constituted a nuisance by virtue of its

frequent equipment failures, which allegedly caused foul

and noxious odors to permeate the air. After conducting a

non-jury trial, the district judge concluded that both the

Town and County waste treatment plants had generated

offensive odors. Since the two plants are situated within

1800 feet of each other, the district judge found he could

not conclude that the odors emanating from one plant

alone created a “significant and unreasonable interference

with public rights.” See, e.g., Copart Industries, Inc. v.

Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d

968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977); New York Trap Rock Corp.

v. Town of Clarkstown, 299 N.Y. 77, 85 N.E.2d 873

(1949).

Both parties offered evidence at trial from lay and

expert witnesses that the other party’s waste treatment

plant was poorly operated and emitted foul odors.

664 |

A-26

Further, several witnesses testified that they were not

prepared to identify which of the plants was the source of

the odors they had experienced. The district court cred-

ited this testimony and concluded that it could not make

an unequivocal finding of causation. Therefore, the dis-

trict judge dismissed plaintiff’s nuisance claim. From our

review of the evidence presented at trial, we find no basis

for overturning the district court’s ruling that Orange-

town’s evidence, taken as a whole, failed to prove by a

preponderance that the county plant operation resulted in

a public nuisance.

IV. SEQRA Claim

Orangetown contends that the district court erred in

dismissing its third cause of action which sought to enjoin

the State DEC from granting the state portion of con-

struction funding for the RCSD sewage treatment plant

expansion. Appellant’s third cause of action alleges that

the State DEC did not comply with the requirements of

SEQRA by granting state funds and certifying the project

for federal funding, without requiring that an EIS be

prepared.

The district court found that Orangetown’s SEQRA

challenge was a claim against a New York State agency

and thus was governed by the statute of limitations as set

forth in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217 (McKinney 1972)."'

" N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217 provides:

Uniess a shorter time is provided in the law authorizing the

proceeding, @ proceeding againsi a body or officer must be com-

menced within four months after the determination to be reviewed

becomes final and binding upon the petitioner or the person whom

he represents in law or in fact, or after the respondent's refusal,

upon the demand of the petitioner or the person whom he repre-

sents, te perform its duty; or with leave of the court where the

A-27

The court dismissed the SEQRA claim against the State

DEC on July 26, 1982, and wrote:

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief raises a state law

issue. Where state created rights are being contested,

the limitations period is governed by state statute.

See, e.g., Guaranty ,Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99

(1945). In this instance, the appropriate statute is

section 217 of the New York Civil Procedure Laws

and Rules which allows that proceedings against a

state officer must be commenced “within four

months after the determination to be reviewed be-

comes final and binding. . . .”

On September 11 and 12, 1980, the state defen-

dants submitted and certified the application atten-

dant to the Orangetown plant to the Grants

Administration Branch of the EPA. That activity

concluded the state defendant’s obligations pursuant

to SEQRA, and the commencement of the action in

February, 1981, was beyond the statute of limita-

tions. The claim is therefore barred. Reisel, Inc. v.

Exxon Corp., 349 N.Y.S.2d 14, 20 (2d Dept. 1973),

aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 888 (1975).

Because we find the determination of the district court to

be correct, we affirm the dismissal of appellant’s third

cause of action against the State DEC.

Appellant’s complaint, filed February 26, 1981, was

filed approximately five months after the State DEC’s

approval of RCSD’s Step II grant application. Orange-

town argues, however, that its late filing should be no bar

since a challenge to a SEQRA determination is not

such refusal, was under a disability specified in section 208, within

two years after such time.

(emphasis added).

6643

reviewable under a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. Appel-

lant further contends that the district court misinterpreted

its third cause of action, which it alleges is actually a

claim for injunctive and declaratory relief, and that thus,

a six-year statute of limitation should be applied. This

argument is without foundation or merit.

CPLR Section 217, or Article 78 proceedings, are

applicable to final state determinations under SEQRA.

See, e.g., In re Town of Yorktown v. New York State

Department of Mental Hygiene, 92 A.D.2d 897, 459

N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dept. 1983); Jn re State of New York

Northeastern Queens Nature and Historical Preserve

Commission v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 928, 453 N.Y.S.2d 773

(2d Dept. 1981). Therefore, Orangetown’s challenge to

the State DEC certification was required to be made

within four months of that agency’s final determination.

Orangetown also errs in assuming that it can avoid the

applicable bar by labeling its action as one seeking de-

claratory or injunctive relief. New York law requires its

courts to look to the substance of a claim to determine

which statute of limitations applies. If this examination

reveals that a claim for declaratory relief could have been

resolved through another form of action which has a

specific limitations period, the specific period of time will

govern. See Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695,

409 N.E.2d 870, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1980); Solnick v.

Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 401 N.E.2d 190, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68

(1980). Therefore, we find appellant has not complied

with the applicable specific four month statute of limita-

tions period provided in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 217, and

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the third cause

of action accordingly.

The judgment is affirmed in all respects. Each party

shall bear its own costs.

6644

700—9-27-83 * USCA—30208

RECORD PRESS, INC., 1$7 Chambers St., N.Y. 10007 (212) 243-5775

A-29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Defendants.

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A-30

FINDINGS OF FACT*

i. This is an action brought by the

Town of Orangetown against Rockland

County, the Rockland County Sewer

District No. 1 ("RCSD"), the Town of

Ramapo, the New York State Department of

Envioronmental Conservation ("DEC") and

the United States Environmental

Protection Agency ("EPA") to enjoin the

expansion of a sewage treatment plant

and related sewage piping.

y The objectives of the project,

which has been undertaken by RCSD with

EPA grant assistance, are the improve-

ment of water quality in the area, the

decrease of harmful characteristics of

* The fact that certain proposed

findings herein were excised by the

Court does not mean that they were

rejected or that there was no evidence

to support them but merely that they

were not deemed necessary for the dis-

position in the case.

A-31

effluent discharged into the Hudson

River, and the upgrading of RCSD's plant

in Orangetown.

36 RCSD comprises appriximately 80

square miles in area and constitutes

approximately one half of the County.

The population of the area served by the

district is approximately 160,000. RCSD

provides sewage service to residents in

the townships of Clarkstown and Ramapo

and the Villages of Spring Valley and

New Square.

4. Paragraph omitted.

5. It has been apparent for a

number of years that the capacity of the

RCSD plant is insufficient to meet the

area's present and future needs.

6. Paragraph omitted.

T 6 The plant also experienced odor

problems and other operational diffi-

culties.

A-32

8. Paragraph omitted.

9. Because of the foregoing, RCSD

has needed to expand the capacity of its

sewage disposal system and related

piping and update its facilities.

10. RSCD and the Town cf Ramapo

applied to EPA for funding to initiate a

planning process for an expanded waste-

water treatment work, interceptor system

and collection system in 1976. Facil-

ities planning grants to both applicants

were made later that year.

ii. The process by which facilities

plans were prepared extended over a

four-year period and involved EPA, DEC

and RCSD. RCSD and the Town of Ramapo

hired a number of consultants to aid in

the accomplishment of this task. The

administrative record contains Facil-

ities Plans, a Sewer System Evaluation

A-33

Survey, and studies of engineering and

environmental aspects of the project.

12. The Facilities Plans were

submitted to EPA in draft. Thereafter,

numerous amendments of the proposal were

accomplished. A number of design

changes were instituted specifically to

answer EPA's concerns relating to

environmental impacts.

ide Between 1976 and 1980, public

meetings and one public hearing con-

cerning the project were held. Plain-

tiff participated actively in this

process.

14. Paragraph omitted.

15. The New York State Department

of Environmental Conservation approved

the Facilities Plan on August 29, 1980.

16. EPA notified the public that,

in accordance with the procedures for

the preparation of environmental impact

A-34

statements (under the National Environ-

mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4332), it

had reviewed the project, and issued a

Finding of No Significant Impact

("FNSI"). Attached to the public notice

was the agency's Environmental Assess-

ment ("EA"). The agency further stated

that no action would be taken on the

project for at least 30 days after the

date of the FNSI.

a7. The EA described the facilities

planning area and the project in detail,

set forth the purpose of and need for

the project, identified the selected

plan and its costs, evaluated various

alternatives, described the environment-

al consequences of the plan and the

steps to minimize adverse environmental

effects and stated various grant condi-

tions to accomplish minimization of

environmental consequences.

A-35

18. The EA evaluated whether the

project would induce significant popu-

lation changes and concluded only that

the proposed project "may" cause an

increase in the rate of development,

however of serving that the plan calls

for sewers in areas already developed or

with an already strong potential for

development. The EA concluded that

there would be no significant land use

effects (and no significant secondary

air, water and wildlife effects through

induced development). Special grant

conditions eliminating adverse land use

consequences were listed. Wetlands

effects were evaluated with grat care as

were issues relating to interbasin

transfer and odor control.

19. On September 12, 1980, RCSD and

Ramapo submitted their formal Step II

A-36

grant applications to EPA and the agency

approved them on September 30, 1980.

20. Paragraph omitted.

ai. Paragraph omitted.

as Paragraph omitted.

23. Paragraph omitted.

23. Paragraph omitted.

25. Paragraph omitted.

26. Paragraph omitted.

29. Paragraph omitted.

30. Paragraph omitted.

31. Paragraph omitted.

st All sewage treatment plants can

be expected to generate some _ local

opposition. This proposed plant was no

exception. I do not, however, find it

to be controversial in the legal sense.

33. Paragraph omitted.

34. The administrative record

demonstrates that EPA appropriately con-

sidered whether the project provides for

the best practicable waste treatment

A-37

technology, whether the project has

sufficient reserve capacity, whether the

design, size and capacity of the project

are cost effective, whether the sewer

collection system is subject to ex-

cessive infiltration, whether the sewage

collection system has sufficient capa-

city as planned to adequately treat the

collected sewage, whether the sewage

collection system is cost effective,

whether the sewage compositing proposed

was appropriate and whether the environ-

mental review of the project complied

with the requirements of NEPA.

35. Paragraph omitted.

36. Paragraph omitted.

a7 Paragraph omitted.

38. Paragraph omitted.

39. Paragraph omitted.

40. Paragraph omitted.

A-38

THE LAW

41. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42

U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), requires a federal

agency to prepare an environmental

impact statement ("EIS") for every major

federal action significantly affecting

the quality of the human environment.

No EIS is required, however, unless the

major federal action is "significant"

within the meaning of NEPA, see 42

U.S.C. §4332(2)(C); Hanly v. Klein-

dienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir.

1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 908 (1973)

("Hanly II"); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460

F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Hanly

I*). .

42. In order to prevail, plaintiff

must prove that the EPA's decision not

to prepare an EIS was "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law” or

"without observance of procedure re-

A-39

quired by law," see Cross-Sound Ferry

Service, Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d

725, 731 (2d Cir. 1974); see also

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Rucker v.

Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973);

Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanley II), 471

F.2d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also 5

U.S.C. §701 et seg.

43. This is a “highly deferential

standard" which "presumes agency action

to be valid." Ethyl Corp. Vv.

Environmental Protection Agency, 541

P.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

supra, 401 U.S. at 415.

44. In determining whether a major

federal action significantly affects the

environment, the district court should

review whether the agency, in exercising

A-40

its broad discretion considered factors

such as

(1) the extent to which

the action will cause adverse

environmental effects in

excess of those created by

existing uses in the area

affected by it, and (2) the

absolute quantitative adverse

environmental effects of the

action itself, including the

cumulative harm that results

from its contribution to

existing adverse conditions or

uses in the affected area.

Hanly v. Kleindienst, supra,

471 F.2d at 830.

45. EPA is presumed to have con-

Sidered all the material before it prior

to the award of the challenged Step II

grant. See Natural Nutritional Food

Association v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141,

1145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419

U.S. 874 (1974). See also Yaretsky v.

Blum, 629 F.2d 817, 823 n.4 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. granted, U.S.

(1981).

46. Thus, the court's role is to

insure that EPA has taken a "hard look"

A-41

at the environmental consequences which

are likely to result from the project,

determine whether EPA has identified

"the relevant areas of environmental

concern” and whether the agency has

convincingly supported its determination

that any impacts are insignificant or

that program changes have rendered

potentially significant impacts insig-

nificant.

47. Plaintiff bears the burden of

proof on each of these issues. Sierra

Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 52 (5th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994

(1975); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v.

Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973);

Simmons v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12

(S.D. Tex 1974).

48. Finally, in its review, the

district court is not empowered to

substitute its judgment for that of the

agency, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

A-42

Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410

n. 21 (1976).

49, If EPA has considered the

relevant factors and reached a con-

clusion that is not a clear error of

judgment, its action must be affirmed.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.

Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 416-18.

50. In cases arising under NEPA,

the meaning of "significantly" in the

phrase "significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment"

presents a mixed question of law and

fact. Hanly v. Kleindienst, supra, 471

F.2d at 828.

MIXED FINDINGS OF FACT

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

51. The analysis of wetlands,

floodplains, land use impacts, sewage

treatment plan design, benefits to

A-43

landowners, and sludge handling pro-

cedures contained in the administrative

record demonstrates that EPA considered

the relevant factors in determining

whether the project would have a sig-

nificant impact on the environment.

52. The issuance of the FNSI by EPA

was an appropriate exercise of adminis-

trative discretion and was not arbitrary

and capricious.

53. The EA is in compliance with

the requirements of NEPA and 40 C.F.R.

§6.507(c), and incorporated within it is

an assessment of impacts on floodplains

and wetlands in accordance with the

requirements of 40 C.F.R. §6.302(a) and

(b) and 40 C.F.R. Part 6 Appendix A.

54. EPA complied with the public

hearing requirements of NEPA and the

Clean Water Act and the applicable

A-44

regulations including 40 C.F.R. Part 25;

40 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart F; 40 C.F.R.

§6.400(a), and §6504(a); and 40 C.F.R.

§35.917-5.

55. The administrative record

reflects that the EPA considered those

elements of the project required to be

analyzed by 40 C.F.R. §35.925. Although

there is no separate document listing

specific determinations with respect to

every element specified in 40 C.F.R.

35.925, taken as a totality the admini-

Sstrative record reflects that the

objectives of 40 C.F.R. §35.925 were

accomplished and therefore EPA complied

with its terms.

56. In any event, given the funda-

mental fairness and public consequence

test applicable here, Sierra Club v.

Hennessy, Dkt. No. 82-6175 (2d Cir. Dec.

6, 1982) (Slip Op. at 11); see aiso

A-45

Weinberger Vv. Romero-Barcelo, 50

U.S.L.W. 4434, 4435 (April 27, 1982). I

find that the issuance of an injuction

would be wholly inappropriate in this

case. The existing RCSD plant is

overloaded, and expansion is necessary

to protect local water quality and

eliminate harmful characteristics from

the effluent discharged by the County

into the Hudson; the expanded STP will

contain a wide variety of equipment to

control odors inherent in the operation

of the plant, thus7 benefiting the

residents of Rockland County as a whole,

and those of the Town of Orangetown in

particular; substantially all of the new

RCSD interceptors and the Ramapo

collection system have been routed along

existing rights-of-way in a manner

minimicing wetlands and floodplains

erfects; grant conditions prohibit

hook-ups in the Rockland County sewer

A-46

system that have the potential for

environmental damage; the expansion of

the current RCSD plant appears to be the

only economically feasible method for

addressing the area's needs; and

finally, the wetlands and associated

areas to be used in the expansion are

not substantial.

aT s Paragraph omitted.

v8. Paragraph omitted.

59. Any testimony of Plaintiff's

witnesses, Arnold Fleming and Donald

Brenner inconsistent with any findings

herein is rejected by the Court.

60. The foregoing constitutes the

District Court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. 3. 32s

61. Plaintiff's request for de-

Cclaratory and injunctive relief is

denied and the complaint is dismissed

A-47

with costs and disbursements. Submit

judgment on notice.

Dated: New York, New York

January 24, 1983

SO ORDERED:

U.S.D.J.

A-48

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Defendants.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

A-49

The following Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law relate to plaintiff

Town of Orangetown's fourth claim for

relief against the county defendants

(Rockland County Sewer District No. l,

the County of Rockland and the Town of

Ramapo) in the above-entitled action,

and the county defendants' first

counterclaim against plaintiff. These

claims are the contentions by each party

that the sewage treatment plant operated

by the opposing party creates a nui-

sance. The Court in reaching’ the

determination herein has considered the

evidence adduced at trial from October

12, 1982 until October 27, 1982.

Parties were afforded full opportunity

to be heard, to examine and cross-

examine witnesses, to present evidence

bearing on the issue, to argue on the

evidence and the law. The Court has

A-50

fully considered the complaint, answer,

evidence, argument and briefs of

counsel. Upon the entire record, the

Court makes the following supplemental

findings of fact and conclusions of law

in addition to those already in the

record.

FINDINGS OF FACT*

i The Rockland County Sewer

District No. l operates a sewage treat-

ment plant (hereinafter "County Plant")

located in Orangetown, New York. The

Town of Orangetown also operates a

sewage treatment plant (hereinafter

"Town Plant"), located in O%rangetown,

* The fact that certain findings are

excised does not mean they are rejected,

but merely that they were not deemed

necessary to the resolution of the

issues on these claims.

A-51

approximately 1800 feet away from the

County Plant.

2. Persons who reside or work in

Orangetown have experienced sewage

odors, emanating from the vicinity of

the two sewage treatment plants in the

applicable period, 1978 to the present.

36 Sewage treatment plants’ in

general may be expected on occasion to

generate unpleasant odors by virtue of

the material they process.

4. Several witnesses testified that

they were not prepared to identify with

certainty which of the two plants was

the source of the odors they exper-

ienced.

5. Other witnesses who were able to

trace odors to the County Plant did not

demonstrate a frequency or intensity of

odors beyond that to be expected of a

sewage treatment plant.

A-52

6. The odor complaint file kept by

the County Sewer District reveals

relatively few odor complaints’ since

1978. The file also demonstrates that

many odor incidents have not’ been

attributed to any definite source;

attirbutable odors have been traced both

to the County Plant and the Town Plant.

Te Paragraph omitted.

8. Paragraph omitted.

9. Other odors have been traced

specifically to the gate of the Town

Plant, and on one ocassion the odor was

found to be emanating from the primary

clarifiers of the Town Plant.

10. Paragraph omitted.

ll. Paragraph omitted.

12. An odor study found that the

odor control equipment at the Town Plant

for the primary clarifier area is not

always adequate.

A-53

13. The odor study performed by the

firm of Hazen and Sawyer in 1975 made

recommendations for improvements in odor

control at both plants.

14. The County Sewer district

demonstrated that, in response to the

Hazen and Sawyer recommendations, it has

made structural changes in the plant for

odor control, and equipment improve-

ments. It has taken steps of its own

initiative to improve odor handling,

including covering the wetwell.

15. There was no credible evidence

of personnel incompetence or failure to

employ best efforts to achieve proper

Operation and maintenance in the County

Plant.

16. The failure of a sewage treat-

ment plant to meet its BOD and SS permit

requirements is not by itself evidence

that odors are being created. Both the

A-54

County Plant and the Town Plant have

from time to time failed to meet their

permit requirements.

y The evidence in the aggregate

shows that both plants have had the

potential to generate some unpleasant

odors in the past, and both plants have

from time to time generated odors in the

years since 1978.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. A conclusion that the operation

of the County Plant constituted a

nuisance would require a finding that

the County Plant has caused an unreason-

able and significant interference with

the general rights of the public

including public health, safety or

comfort.

2. In view of the finding that both

the Town and County Plants have gener-

A-55

ated offensive odors in the area, a

conclusion that either plant is a

muisance would require a finding that

the odors emanating from that plant

alone creates a* significant and un-

reasonable interference with public

rights.

36 The evidence presented does not

permit a finding of such interference.

Consequently, I do not conclude that the

Rockland County Sewage Treatment Plant

constitutes a nuisance.

4. The evidence pesented does not

permit a finding of such interference by

the Orangetown Sewage Treatment Plant

either. I therefore do not conclude

that it constitutes a nuisance.

5. Plaintiff's fourth claim for

relief and the County Defendants' first

counterclaim are hereby dismissed.

A-56

Dated: New York, New York

January 25, 1983

SO ORDERED:

Hon. Richard Owen

A-57

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE M. GORSUCH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

OWEN, District Judge

Defendant moves to dismiss plain-

tiff's complaint for failure to state a

Claim. Except as to plaintiff's third

Claim for relief, defendant's motion is

denied. As to plaintiff's third claim,

defendant's motion is granted.

Plaintiff, the Town of Orangetown

("Orangetown"), iS a municipality in

Rockland County. A sewage treatment

A-58

plant is located there. By this suit

for declaratory and injunctive relief,

plaintiff seeks to prevent the expansion

of that plant.

Plaintiff has named as defendants in

this action a number of local, state,

and federal parties who play a role in

the expansion of the plant. The motion

before me today has been brought by only

one of those defendants, Robert Flacke,

the Commissioner of the New York Depart-

ment of Environmental Conservation (the

"state defendant"). Pursuant to a

Stipulation endorsed by this court on

July 9, 1981, Commissioner Flacke is now

before me only in his official capacity.

The sewage treatment plant in Orange-

town presently services not only Orange-

town itself but also the neighboring

Rockland County communities of Ramapo

and Clarkstown. Domestic commercial,

A-59

and industrial sewage from these three

communities flows across the County to

the plant in Orangetown where it is

treated. Plaintiff contends that the

existing plant is already a public

nuisance and that the expansion of the

plant will only aggravate that nuisance

by encouraging further development in

the County and thereby increasing the

burden on the Orangetown plant and its

environs.

Plaintiff's attack challenges’ the

funding of the proposed expansion.

Construction of sewage treatment facil-

ities is a costly undertaking. Plain-

tiff estimates that the total cost of

the Orangetown expansion will reach

approximately $120 million with funding

to be provided from federal, state, and

local revenues. Combined, the federal

A-60

and local contributions to the plant

will total $100 million.

The Environmental Protection Agency

will administer the federal contribution

to the Orangetown plant. Where the EPA

administers a program such as_- the

Orangetown expansion, it provides money

in three stages. At Stage One a grant

is provided for facilities planning;

Stage Two funds the preparation of

construction drawings and _ specifica-

tions; construction funds are provided

by a Stage Three grant. Plaintiff seeks

to cut off the expansion of the Orange-

town plant at Stage Two.

The essence of this lawsuit, thus, is

the allegation that defendants cannot

move forward with the expansion of the

plant because defendants have not

complied with the requisite federal and

state environmental requirements’ and

A-61

because the plant constitutes a con-

tinuing public nuisance.

Plaintiff asserts four claims for

relief. First, plaintiff alleges that

defendant violated the National Envi-

ronmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C.

§4331, et seq.; second plaintiff alleges

a violation of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §1281, et seg.; plaintiff's third

claim alleges a violation of the New

York State Environmental Quality Review

Act, ECL §8-0101, et seg.; plaintiff's

final claim alleges that the proposed

expansion of the plant will constitute a

public nuisance.

Before me is the state defendant's

motion to dismiss plaintiff's suit as it

applies to him in his official capacity.

Flacke contends that the Eleventh

Amendment bars the prosecution of all of

plaintiff's claims in federal court and,

moreover, that plaintiff is prohibited

from bringing any of its claims as

parens patriae for its residence. As to

plaintiff's individual claims for

relief, the state defendant contends:

first, that plaintiff's first and second

claims must be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b) (6); second, that plaintiff's

third claim for relief must be dismissed

because it was filed beyond the appli-

cable four-month limitations period set

forth in Section 217 of che New York

Civil Procedure Law and Rules; and,

third, that plaintiff's fourth claim for

relief must be dismissed because the

alleged public nuisance has been caused

not by the proposed expansion but by the

past operation of the existing plant. I

consider each of state defendant's

arguments seriatim.

A-63

A. The Eleventh Amendment does

not bar equitable relief as

against the state defendant.

In Flacke's motion papers as first

filed with this court, he contended that

the Eleventh Amendment barred all of the

remedies sought by plaintiff, e.g.,

money damages, and injunctive and

declaratory relief. Since that date,

however, the parties have agreed to drop

the fifth claim alleging money damages,

thus limiting plaintiff's claims against

the state defendant to those alleging

equitable relief. Flacke nevertheless

continues to contend that the Eleventh

Amendment bars relief.

The Eleventh Amendment however, does

not bar a federal court from granting

prospective equitable relief as against

a state official. See Edelman. v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Moreover,

A-64

"(ijt has long been familiar doctrine

- « « that the Eleventh Amendment does

not prevent a federal court from

directing a State official to bring his

conduct into conformity with federal

law." Byram River v. Village of Port

Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618, 628 (S.D.N.Y.

1975) .+/

B. While Plaintiff may not assert

any claims as parens patriae,

it may still maintain this

action in order to vindicate

its own proprietary rights.

As a second ground for dismissing

this action as to him entirely, Flacke

lists plaintiff's inability to bring

Suit as parens patriae. While I agree

* State defendant has mistakenly relied

on the broad principle as repeated in

the Byram River case that, "In an action

against a State the Eleventh Amendment

acts as an absolute bar to suit unless

the State has waived its immunity."

Byram River , supra at 624. While that

amendment is undeniably true it makes’

no comment about suits brought against

state officials. See Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908).

A-65

that plaintiff may not maintain this

action as parens patriae it may do so to

protect its own proprietary rights.

Under the common law concept of

parens patriae, the federal and state

governments have traditionally been

vested with the power and duty to bring

suits in order to vindicate interests of

their citizens. Conversely, “political

subdivisions such as cities and coun-

tries, whose power is derivative and not

sovereign, cannot sue as parens patriae

ee a In re Multi-district Vehicle

Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d

122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). State

defendant is therefore correct that

plaintiff cannot maintain this action as

parens patriae, but plaintiff is not

thereby totally disabled from

maintaining this action. Paragraph

Three of the complaint states that

"Orangetown brings this suit acting

A-66

on its own behalf and as parens patriae

for its residents.” Thus, even assuming

that plaintiff cannot bring this action

on behalf of its residents, plaintiff's

claims nevertheless survive because

political subdivisions such as cities

and counties may "sue to vindicate such

of their own proprietary interests as

might be congruent with the interests of

their inhabitants."

C. Plaintiff's first and

second claims state

claims upon which re-

lief can be granted.

Defendant next argues that plain-

tiff's first and second claims must be

dismissed because the relief sought can

be provided only by the federal defen-

Gants. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,

1139 (4th Ciz. 1971).

On the contrary, "[{iJt is well

settled that non-federal parties may be

A-67

enjoined, pending completion of an EIS,

where those entities have entered into a

partnership or joint venture with the

Federal Government, and are this reci-

pients of federal funding.” Biderman v.

Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir.

1974). The state defendant is such a

partner of the federal defendants in the

sewage treatment plant; it is a reci-

pient of federal funds for the com-

pletion of the plant. - Adequate relief

for plaintiff, if it is to be granted,

necessarily must reach all members of

the Orangetown venture. Therefore, I

conclude that plaintiff may maintain its

first and second claims for relief

against state defendant.

D. Plaintiff's state law

claims are barred by the

statue of limitations.

State defendant next contends that

plaintiff's third claims for relief

A-68

pursuant to SEQRA should be dismissed

because under the applicable four-month

limitations period plaintiff's claim is

time-barred. I concur both with defen-

dant's choice of a limitations period

and with the conclusion that plaintiff

has failed to timely assert this claim.

Plaintiff's third claim for relief

raises a state law issue. Where

stated-created rights are being con-

tested, the limitations period is

governed by state statute. See, e.g.,

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99

(1945). In this instance, the appro-

priate statute is Section 217 of the New

York Civil Procedure Law and Rules which

allows that proceedings against a state

officer must be commenced "within four

months after the determination to be

reviewed becomes final and binding...."

A-69

Qn September 11 and 12, 1980, the

State defendant submitted and certified

the application attendant to the Orange-

town plant to the Grants Administration

Branch of the EPA. That activity

concluded the state defendant's obli-

‘gations pursuant to SEQRA, and the

commencement of the action in February,

1981, was beyond the statute of limi-

tations. The claim is therefore barred.

Reisel, Inc. Vv. Exxon Corp., 349

N.¥.S.2d 14, 20 (2d Dept. 1973), aff'd

36 N.Y¥.2d 888 (1975).

Finally, defendant contends that

plaintiff's fourth claim for relief must

be dismissed because the challenged

conduct cannot be attributed to the

state defendant and because a town "may

not bring an action to Yestrain a public

nuisance which causes damage to _ the

private property of its citizens." New

A-70

York Trap Rock v. Town of Clarkstown,

299 N.Y. 77, 83, (Ct. App. 1949) (em-

phasis in original).

While plaintiff's fourth claim for

relief, as it applies to the state

defendant, is not a model of drafting

expertise, plaintiff does allege that

"The operation of the County plant

constitutes and will continue to con-

stitute constitute, a public nuisance.”

Complaint 494. Specifically, plaintiff

alleges that the operation of the plant

is causing both injury to the health of

its citizens, (491), and diminution of

property values. (492).

State defendant correctly relies on

New York Trap Rock, supra, as grounds

for dismissal of the fourth claim to the

extent it asserts a diminution of

private property values as distinguished

from a diminution of the value of its

A-71

own properties. New York Trap _ Rock

Clearly acknowledges, however, that a

municipality's right to sue does extend

to an action grounded upon public

nuisance law asserting injury to the

health of its citizens.

An order may be submitted effec-

tuating all the foregoing.

United States District Judge

Dated: July 26, 1982

New York, New York

A-72

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON=-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Defendants.

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

Defendants New York State Department

of Environmental Conservation ("DEC")

/ A-73

and Robert Flacke, individually and as

Commissioner of the New York State

Department of Environmental Conser-

vation, having moved this Court for an

order dismissing the complaint as

against them, pursuant to Rules

12(b) (1), (3) and (6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; and defendants

New York State Department of Environ-

mental Conservation and Robert Flacke

having entered into a stipulation with

plaintiff Town of Orangetown dated July

8, 1981, and endorsed by this Court on

July 9, 1981, which provided, among

other things, that:

l. Plaintiff will voluntarily

discontinue the fifth claim asserted in

the complaint as against the state

defendants, and will voluntarily dis-

continue the first, second, third and

fourth claims asserted in the complaint

as against both DEC and Robert Flacke,

Individually; and plaintiff will, at an

appropriate time, formally amend or

supplement the Complaint to implement

such discontinuances.

A-74

Ze In light of the discontinuances

described in Paragraph 1 above, the

state defendants have agreed to withdraw

so much of their motion as (i) relates

to the fifth claim for relief; and (ii)

relates to the first, second, third and

fourth claims for relief against DEC or

Robert Flacke, Individually;

3. The motion before the Court will

be limited to the sufficiency of the

claims asserted in the first four claims

for relief against defendant Robert

Flacke, as Commissioner of the DEC;

and upon reading the summons and com-

plaint, dated February 2, 1981; the

notice of notice to dismiss, dated April

15, 1981; the memorandum in support of

the motion to dismiss, dated April 15,

1981; plaintiff's memorandum of law in

opposition to motion to dismiss; and the

Stipulation dated July 8, 1981; and the

Court having heard argument of counsel

for the respective parties on July 17,

1981; and the Court after due deliber-

ation having filed its opinion and order

dated July 26, 1982 which granted the

A-75

motion, as limited by the stipulation,

in various respects; it is

ORDERED, that plaintiffs third claim

for relief be and the same is hereby

dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiff's claims for

relief as parens patriae be and the same

are hereby dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiffs fourth claim

for relief is dismissed to the extent

that it seeks to recover for diminution

of the value of properties not owned by

plaintiff; and it is further

ORDERED, that the motion of the New

York State Department of Environmental

Conservation and Robert Flacke is in all

other respects denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiff Town of

Orangetown serve an amended complaint in

accordance with the stipulation dated

July 8, 1981 within five (5) days of

A-76

entry of this order, and that defendants

serve answers within ten (10) days of

receipt of said amended complaint.

Dated: New York, New York

September 7, 1982

United States District Judge

A-77

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Defendants.

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

Except to the limited extent there is

consent, the motion is denied.

SO ORDERED

1/24/83 HON. RICHARD C. OWEN

U.S.D.J.

A-78

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWN OF ORANGETOWN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

ANNE GORSUCH, Individually

and as Administrator of

the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency;

RICHARD DEWLING, Individual-

ly and as Regional Admini-

strator of the United States

Environmental Protection

Agency; ROCKLAND COUNTY SEWER

DISTRICT NO. 1; COUNTY OF

ROCKLAND; TOWN OF RAMAPO;

TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN; NEW YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL CONSERVATION; and

ROBERT FLACKE, as Commission-

er of the New York State De-

partment of Environmental

Conservation,

Defendants.

81 Civ. 1147 (RO)

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before

the Court without a jury, Honorable

A-79

Richard Owen, District Judge, presiding

on October 12, 1982 until October 27,

1982, and was argued by counsel.

On October 13, 1982, during the

course of the trial, the court dismissed

the fourth and fifth claims of plaintiff

as against defendant Town of Clarkstown.

On October 21, 1982, at the con-

clusion of plaintiff's direct case, the

court dismissed plaintiff's third claim,

relating to the State Environmental

Quality Review Act as against all

defendants; dismissed plaintiff's fourth

claim, for injunctive relief due to

muisance, as against the federal and

state defendants; and dismissed plain-

tiff's fifth claim, for monetary damages

due to nuisance, as against all defen-

dants.

On October 26, 1982, at the con-

Clusion of defendants' case, the court

A-80

dismissed the second counterclaim of

defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-

trict No. 1, County of Rockland and Town

of Ramapo, with regard to monetary

damages for nuisance, as against plain-

tiff. At that time, defendants Rockland

County Sewer District No. 1, County of

Rockland and Town of Ramapo, withdrew

their third and fourth counterclaims

relating to industrial pretreatment

requirements, as against plaintiff.

On October 27, 1982, at the close of

trial, upon consideration of argument by

counsel, the court rendered a decision

from the bench dismissing plaintiff's

fourth claim relating to nuisance, as

against all defendants, and dismissing

the first counterclaim of defendants

Rockland County Sewer District No. 1,

County of Rockland, and the Town of

A-81

Ramapo, relating to nuisance, against

plaintiff.

Upon consideration of memoranda of

law submitted by counsel, the court has

filed findings of fact, conclusions of

law and mixed findings of fact and

conclusions of law, with regard to

plaintiff's remaining claims, dated

January 24, 1983.

The court has filed supplemental

findings of fact and conclusions of law

with regard to plaintiff's fourth claim

and defendants' first counterclaim,

dated January 25, 1983. It is therefore

hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

le Plaintiff's first claim for

relief, relating to the National Envi-

ronmental Policy Act is dismissed on the

merits as against defendants Anne

Gorsuch, individually and as Administ-

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rator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency ("Gorsuch"); Richard

Dewling, individually and as Regional

Administrator of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency

("Dewling") ; Rockland County Sewer

District No. 1; County of Rockland; Town

of Ramapo; and Robert Flacke, as

Commissioner of the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation

("Flacke").

y Plaintiff's second claim for

relief, relating to the Clean Water Act,

is hereby dismissed on the merits as

against defendants Gorsuch, Dewling,

Rockland County Sewer District No. l,

County of Rockland, Town of Ramapo and

Flacke.

36 Plaintiff's third claim for

relief relating to the State Environ-

mental Quality Review Act is hereby

A-83

dismissed on the merits as against

defendants Flacke, Rockland County Sewer

District No. 1, County of Rockland and

Town of Ramapo.

4. Plaintiff's fourth claim for

relief, relating to injunctive relief

for nuisance, is hereby dismissed on the

merits as against defendants Gorsuch,

Dewling, Rockland County Sewer District

No. 1, County of Rockland, Town of

Ramapo, Town of Clarkstown and Flacke.

5. Plaintiff's fifth claim for

relief, relating to monetary relief for

nuisance, is hereby dismissed on the

merits as against defendants Gorsuch,

Dewling, Rockland County Sewer District

No. 1, County of Rockland, Town of

Ramapo and Town of Clarkstown.

6. Plaintiff's sixth claim for

relief, related to Step III, Phase I

grants for the project, is hereby

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dismissed on the merits as against

defendants Gorsuch, Dewling, Rockland

County ihiesan District No. 1, County of

Rockland, the New York State Department

of Environmental Conservation and

Flacke.

Te The first counterclaim of

defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-

trict No. 1, County of Rockland and the

Town of Ramapo, relating to injunctive

relief for nuisance, is hereby dismissed

on the merits as against plaintiff.

8. The second counterclaim of

defendants Rockland County Sewer Dis-

trict No. 1, County of Rockland and the

Town of Ramapo, relating to monetary

relief for nuisance, is hereby dismissed

on the merits as against plaintiff.

9. The complaint is hereby dis-

missed in its entirety, with costs and

Gisbursements to defendants, and all

A-85

counterclaims are dismissed without

costs.

Dated: New York, New York

February 3, 1983

Richard Owen

U.S.D.Jd.

JUDGMENT ENTERED: 2/4/83

Clerk

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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-

TECTION AGENCY

Region II

26 Federal Plaza

New York, New York 10278

August 29, 1980

To All Interested Govern-

ment Agencies and Public

Groups:

In accordance with the procedures for

the preparation of environmental impact

statements, an environmental review has

been performed on the proposed agency

action below:

Project Rockland County Sewer

Name: District No. 1 (RCSD No.

1) sewage tréatment plant

expansion, sludge hand-

ling facilities and in-

terceptor sewers.

Town of Ramapo collection

sewers,

Project C-36-744-03 (Step 2 Grant)

Numbers: RCSD No. 1

C-36-1253-01 (Step 2

Grant) Town of Ramapo

Purpose of The purpose of this pro-

Project: ject is four fold: to

replace failing indivi-

dual septic systems in

Project

Originators:

Project

Location:

Project

Description:

Proposed

Eligible

Project

Costs:

A-87

Ramapo with collection

sewers; to provide inter-

ceptor sewers to convey

sewage from the Towns of

Ramapo and Clarkstown to

the RCSD No. 1 STP; to

expand the overloaded RCSD

No. 1 STP to treat exis-

ting and future flows from

the proposed service area;

to provide facilities to

process sludge from the

RCSD No. 1 STP.

RCSD No. 1

Town of Ramapo

Towns of Ramapo, Clarks-

town and Orangetown, New

York

Preparation of plans and

specifications for con-

struction of collection

sewers, pump stations, STP

expansion and sludge hand-

ling facilities as des-

cribed in detail in Sec-

tion IV of the attached

environmental assessment.

RCSD No. 1

$ 674,000 -

Town of Ramapo

A-88

EPA Grant $ 2,858,630 -

(75%): RCSD No. 1

$ 506,000 -

Town of Ramapo

Our environmental review of this project

indicates that no significant environ-

mental impacts will result from the

proposed action. Consequently, we have

made a preliminary decision not to

prepare an environmental impact state-

ment (EIS) on the project.

This decision is based on a careful

review of the engineering report, the

environmental information document, and

other supporting data. All of these

documents, along with the environmental

assessment, are on file at the EPA

regional office, where they are avail-

able for public scrutiny upon request.

A copy of the environmental assessment

is enclosed for your review.

Both the State of New York and the EPA

recognize that this project is located

in an Air Quality Control Region (AQCR).

This fact has been accounted for in our

review.

Comments supporting or disagreeing with

this decision may be submitted to the

EPA for consideration. All comments

must be received within thirty (30)

calendar days of the date of this

finding of no significant impacts

(FNSI). Please address your comments to

the Chief, New York and Virgin Islands

Section, Environmental Impacts Branch,

Room 400. After evaluating any comments

A-89

received on the project, the EPA will

make a final decision. However, no

administrative action will be taken on

the project for at least thirty (30)

calendar days after the date of this

FNSI.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Warren

Regional Administrator

Enclosure

A-90

CLEAN WATER ACT

§1283. Plans, specifications, esti-

mates, and payments

(a) Submission; contractual nature of

approval by Administrator;

combined grants

Each applicant for a grant shall

submit to the Administrator for his

approval, plans, specifications, and

estimates for each proposed project for

the construction of treatment works for

which a grant is applied for under

section 1281l(g)(1) of this title from

funds allotted to the State under

section 1285 of this title and which

otherwise meets the requirements of this

chapter. The Administrator shall act

upon such plans, specifications, and

estimates as soon as practicable after

the same have been submitted, and his

approval of any such plans, specifica-

tions, and estimates shall be deemed a

contractual obligation of the United

A-91

States for the payment of its propor-

tional contribution to such project.

§1284. Limitations and conditions

(a) Before approving grants for any

project or any treatment works under

section 1281l1(g)(1) of this title the

Administrator shall determine -

(1) that such works are included in

any applicable areawide waste treatment

management plan developed under section

1288 of this title;

(2) that such works are in conformity

with any applicable State plan under

section 1313(e) of this title;

(3) that such works’ have been

certified by the appropriate State water

pollution control agency as entitled to

A-92

priority over such other works in the

State in accordance with any applicable

State plan under section 1313(e) of this

title, except that any priority list

developed pursuant to section 1313(e)

(3) (H) of this title may be modified by

such State in accordance with regula-

tions promulgated by the Administrator

to give higher priority for grants for

the Federal share of the cost of pre-

paring construction drawings and speci-

fications for any treatment works

utilizing processes and techniques

meeting the guidelines promulgated under

section 1314(d) (3) of this title and for

grants for the combined Federal share of

the cost of preparing construction

drawings and specifications and the

building and erection of any treatment

works meeting the requirements of the

next to the last sentence of section

1283(a) of this title® which utilizes

A-93

processes and techniques meeting the

guidelines promulgated under section

1314(da) (3) of this title;

(4) that the applicant proposing to

construct such works agrees to pay the

non-Federal costs of such works and has

made adequate provisions satisfactory to

the Administrator for assuring proper

and efficient operation, including the

employment of trained management and

operations personnel, and the mainten-

ance of such works in accordance with a

plan of operation approved by the State

water pollution control agency or, as

appropriate, the interstate agency,

after construction thereof;

(5) that the size and capacity of

such works relate directly to the needs

to be served by such works, including

sufficient reserve capacity. The amount

A-94

of reserve capacity provided shall be

approved by the Administrator on the

basis of a comparison of the cost of

constructing such reserves as a part of

the works to be funded and the

anticipated cost of providing expanded

Capacity at a date when such capacity

will be required, after taking into

account, in accordance with regulations

promulgated by the Administrator,

efforts to reduce total flow of sewage

and unnecessary water consumption. The

amount of reserve capacity eligible for

a grant under this subchapter shall be

determined by the Administrator taking

into account the projected population

na associated commercial and industrial

establishments within the jurisdiction

of the applicant to be served ky such

treatment works as identified in an

approved facilities plan, an areawide

plan under section 1288 of this title,

A-95

or an applicable municipal master plan

of development. For the purpose of this

paragraph, section 1288 of this title,

and any such plan, projected population

shall be determined on the basis of the

latest information available from the

United States Department of Commerce or

from the States as the Administrator, by

regulation, determines appropriate.

Beginning October 1, 1984, no _ grant

shall be made under this subchapter to

construct that portion of any treatment

works providing reserve capacity in

excess of existing needs (including

existing needs of residential, commer-

cial, industrial, and other users) on

the date of approval of a grant for the

erection, building, acquisition, alter-

ation, remodeling, improvement, or

extension of a project for secondary

treatment or more stringent treatment or

new interceptors and appurtenances,

A-96

except that in no event shall reserve

capacity of a facility and its related

interceptors to which this subsection

applies be in excess of existing needs

on October 1, 1990. In any case in

which an applicant proposes to provide

reserve capacity greater than that

eligible for Federal financial

assistance under this title, the

incremental costs of the additional

reserve capacity shall be paid by the

applicant;

(6) that no specification for bids in

connection with such works’ shall be

written in such a manner-as to contain

proprietary, exclusionary, or discrimin-

atory requirements other than _ those

based upon performance, unless such

requirements are necessary to test or

demonstrate a specific thing or to

provide for necessary interchangeability

A-97

of parts and equipment. When in the

judgment of the grantee, it is imprac-

tical or uneconomical to make a clear

and accurate description of the techni-

cal requirements, a “brand name or

equal” description may be used as a

means to. define the performance or other

salient requirements of a procurement,

and in doing so the grantee need not

establish the existence of any source

other than the brand or source so named.

(b) (1) Notwithstanding any other

provision of this subchapter, the

Administrator shall not approve any

grant for any treatment works under

section 1281(g) (1) of this title after

March 1, 1973, unless he shall first

have determined that the applicant (A)

has adopted or will adopt a system of

charges to assure that each recipient of

waste treatment services within the

A-98

applicant's jurisdiction, as determined

by the Administrator, will pay its

proportionate share (except as otherwise

provided in this paragraph) of the costs

of operation and maintenance (including

replacement) of any waste treatment

services provided by the applicant; and

(B) has legal, institutional, manager-

ial, and financial capability to insure

adequate construction, operation, and

maintenance of treatment works through-

out the applicant's jurisdiction, as

determined by the Administrator. In any

case where an applicant which, as of

December 27, 1977, uses a system of

dedicated ad valorem taxes and the

Administrator determines that the

applicant has a system of charges which

results in the distribution of operation

and maintenance costs for treatment

works within the applicant's jurisdic-

tion, to each user class, in proportion

A-99

to the contribution to the total cost of

operation and maintenance of such works

by each user class (taking into account

total waste water loading of such works,

the constituent elements of the wastes,

and other appropriate factors), and such

applicant is otherwise in compliance

with clause (A) of this paragraph with

respect to each industrial user, then

such dedicated ad valorem tax system

shall be deemed to be the user charge

system meeting the requirements of

clause (A) of this paragraph for the

residential user class and such small

non-residential user classes as defined

by the Administrator. In defining small

non-residential users, the Administrator

shall consider the volume of wastes

discharged into the treatment works by

such users and the constituent elements

of such wastes as well as such other

factors as he deems appropriate.

A-100

EPA REGULATIONS

§35.925 Limitations on award.

Before awarding initial grant

assistance for any project for a

treatment works through a grant or grant

amendment, the Regional Administrator

shall determine that all of the

applicable requirements of §35.920-3

have been met. He shall also determine

the following:

§35.925-1 Facilities planning.

That, if the award is for step 2,

step 3, or step 2 + 3 grant assistance,

the facilities planning requirements in

§35.917 et seg. have been met.

§35.925-2 Water quality management

plans and agencies.

That the project is consistent with

any applicable water quality management

(WOM) plan approved under section 208 or

A-101

section 303(e) of the Act; and that the

applicant is the wastewater management

agency designated in any WQM plan

certified by the Governor and approved

by the Regional Administrator.

§35.925-3 Priority determination.

That such works are entitled to

priority in accordance with §35.915, and

that the award of grant assistance for

the proposed project will not jeopardize

the funding of any treatment works of

higher priority.

§35.925-4 State allocation.

That the award of grant assistance

for a particular project will not cause

the total of all grant assistance which

applicants within a State received,

including grant increases, to exceed the

total of all allotments and reallotments

available to the State under §35.910.

A-102

§35.925-5 Funding and other

capabilities.

That the applicant has:

(a) Agreed to pay the non-Federal

project costs, and

(b) The legal, institutional,

managerial, and financial capability to

insure adequate construction, operation,

and maintenance of the treatment works

throughout the applicant's jurisdiction.

(Also see §30.340-3 of this sub-

chapter.)

§35.925-6 Permits.

That the applicant has, or has

applied for, the permit or permits as

required by the national pollutant

discharge elimination system (NPDES)

with respect to existing discharges

affected by the p

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