Petition — Connecticut v. Thompson

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83-846 [FitrD

No. 83- NOV 18 1983

—— eee ee Orr eae ee ee re ee Ce eH -_-CD- -

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NEIL J. THOMPSON, JAMES C. BLACK,

PRANK P. LEPORE, ROBERT E. PARKER, JR.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

CONNECTICUT

FRANCIS M. McDONALD

State's Attorney and Counsel of Record

BRADFORD J. WARD

Assistant State's Attorney

300 Grand Street

P.O. Box 1245

Waterbury, CT 06702

(203) 756-4431

QUESTION PRESENTED

Ba May a state court suppress all

wire interceptions because the police

officers overheard conversations to which

others than the one person named in the

interception order were parties, when the

officers had applied for an order

authorizing such interceptions and the

application was approved without

conditions by the panel of judges issuing

the wiretap order?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.......0cee0eee0e8 A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... ..ccccccccece ALi

OPINIONS BELOW... ..cccccvvccccee ose 2

JURISDICTION... .cccccsvveee coccccces &@

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS........... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......2eeee005 5

DUE Ce ccesccec cd essences osoececoece OD

MBBS BELOW. cc sccccccccce See ewecat

ARGUMENT:

I. The Policies Underlying the

Exclusionary Rule Do Not

Require the Suppression of

All Wire Interceptions Under

the Circumstances of this

Li sash sey soe 6 6 08 err eh wi

oe ae Petre. eee eC:

APPENDIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Berger v. New York,

See Bib. SL (A967) cccrcccseveseveccs 23

Commonwealth v. Sheppard,

387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725

(1982), cert. granted,

* 0.8. -, {03 &.Ct. 35364 (1963)...25

Katz v. United States,

EG OR ER Sy a ay oe Pe 23

Scott v. United States,

a. als ROO CROPPER s cb obs oe eel 19, 24

State v. Thompson,

191 Conn. 360, 464 A.2d 799

65. ° | re 2, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26

iii

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Page

Constitution of the United States,

a, Pre riey rs ae ire~e

Constitution of the United States,

Amendment XIV..... Terre y sre TT ee

STATUTES

ee atl skee SRR C al e5. 62. re ae

No. 83-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Petitioner,

V e

NEIL J. THOMPSON, JAMES C. BLACK,

FRANK P. LEPORE, ROBERT E. PARKER, JR.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

CONNECTICUT

The petitioner, the State of

Connecticut, respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment of the Supreme Court of the

State of Connecticut entered in this

proceeding on September 6, 1983.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Connecticut

Supreme Court is reported at 191 Conn.

360, 464 A.2d 799 (1983), and appears in

the appendix hereto. (Appendix A). The

decision of the Connecticut Superior

Court granting the motions to suppress

appears in the appendix hereto.

(Appendix B).

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Supreme Court of

the State of Connecticut was entered on

September 6, 1983. Motions to reargue

were denied by the Connecticut Supreme

Court on September 21, 1983. This

Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. §1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of the United States,

Amendment IV:

The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing

the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

Constitution of the United States,

Amendment XIV, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the state wherein

they reside. No state shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

FACTS

On March 9, 1973, an application to

intercept telephone conversations over

two public telephones, one inside and one

outside the Austin House Hotel in

Terryville, Connecticut, was filed with

the wiretap panel. The application

recited that large quantities of brown

"Mexican" heroin were being purchased by

police undercover agents from one Albert,

who was using both phones to contact his

source of this drug, and sought to

intercept his communications and those of

others unknown over a period of ten days

for twenty-four hours a day.

(Defendant's Ex. 1A-2E). That

application was approved on March 15,

1973 as wiretap order number (73-03.

(Defendant's Ex. lA-2E).

Before the issuance of the Austin

House order, agents of the Regional

Narcotic Squad had on successive

occasions purchased for large sums of

money wholesale quantities of brown

heroin from Albert. One of these sales

occurred in Plainville, Connecticut, on

Dewey Street where Albert went to obtain

the heroin. This type of heroin had not

previously been found in the area and was

known to have been processed in Mexico.

Albert's activities indicated a steady

supply of this narcotic drug.

(Defendant's Ex. 1A-2E).

Albert himself indicated to- the

agents that he used the public telephones

at the Austin House Hotel, where he then

lived, to contact his source for the

drug. Because of Albert's addiction and

financial status it was apparent that his

source, rather than Albert, had access to

the drugs and the cash to carry on the

international trafficking. Albert had so

Stated to the agents. Joseph LeBlond was

also associated with Albert in

distributing heroin to agents and was

associated with Albert in distributing

heroin from Mexico, getting the heroin

from the same unknown source.

(Defendant's Ex. 1A-2E).

Thereafter from March 15 to March 22,

when a further extension of the order was

sought, the intercepting officers

monitored both telephones for twenty-four

hours a day. All calls were intercepted,

recorded, and entered into a log. This

log was attached to the application to

extend the original order and did reflect

the continuous monitoring to the 22nd of

March. (Defendant's Ex. 1A-2E). The

wiretap extension was granted on March

23, 1973. (Defendant's Ex. 2A).

While the interceptions were being

made, the undercover agents’ purchased

more heroin some of which was supplied to

Albert for resale by one Allen LaFleur,

who at the time was accompanied by

Kathleen Paradis, his girl friend with

whom he was living. (Defendant's Ex. 2E,

p.2, para. 6). The agents also bought

heroin which LaFleur sent to an agent

while refusing to meet directly. The

agents observed that both Albert and

LaFleur were young, had no wealth, and

from conversations were merely runners

and not the suppliers themselves of the

Mexican heroin. (Para. 8). (Defendant's

Ex. 2A).

The wire interceptions also reflected

that involved in the operation were

Albert, LaFleur, “Ron,” “Frank" and “the

old man." (Defendant's Ex. 3A-3E).

In the meantime, the undercover

agents, who were not on the disclosure

list because they were local _ police

officers, had heard Kathleen Paradis

direct an unknown male to call 747-5361

to reach Allen LaFleur from the Austin

House since one of the agents wanted to

buy heroin from LaFleur. That number was

also heard dialed from the interior phone

at the Austin House six times without

answer by the wire intercepting officers

that same day. (Defendant's Ex. 3A-3E).

Telephone number 747-5361 was found

to be listed with the telephone company

to Daniel A. Wrisley, aka Daniel A.

Risley, at 17 Dewey Place, Plainville.

(Defendant's Ex. 3A-3E).

During their previous contacts with

LaFleur, the undercover agents had been

given the telephone number 589-7770 for

Kathleen Paradis. This telephone was

located on Johnny Cake Mountain Road,

Burlington, Connecticut, listed to

Kathleen Paradis, but in a home rented by

a Daniel Wrisley. Wrisley was known to

the State Police to visit Arizona twice a

week by air and to have a record of

marcotics arrests in Connecticut and

Arizona. (Defendant's Ex. 3A, pp.23,

26). The Burlington telephone was

removed on March 19, 1973, but toll

records reflected previous collect calls

from Arizona. (Defendant's Ex. 3A).

The undercover agents also learned in

conversation with Albert that his source

of heroin were two partners, “Danny” an

addict and "Skippy" a non-addict, who

regularly went to Arizona for heroin

which they brought to Connecticut in

large quantities. (Defendant's Ex. 3A).

The continued wire interceptions on

the telephones at the Austin House also

revealed that the telephone (589-7770)

had been removed because of fear of a

wiretap and that "Frank" had taken

"Allen" and “Danny" to the airport to get

more dope. (Defendant's Ex. 3A).

On March 28, 1973, an application to

intercept telephone communications over

the telephone at Wrisley's address in

Plainville was filed with the wiretap

panel and sought to intercept his

communications and others unknown over

ten days for a period of twenty-four

hours day. The application reflected

that Wrisley's associates in narcotics

trafficking were a "Skip" whose last name

and address were unknown, "Frank," last

name and address unknown, LaFleur and

Albert, and that probable cause existed

that they had sold and were selling

narcotics and were using the telephone

for that purpose. (Appendix D at 6d).

The application also requested that the

interceptions continue until the

objective of the interception, the

disclosure of Albert's, Wrisley's, and

LaFleur's source of heroin, was obtained.

(Appendix D at 7d). The application was

approved on March 28, 1973 as wiretap

order number 73-04. (Defendant's Ex.

3A-3F). Thereafter, the wire

interceptions were made of calls over the

telephone at Wrisley's home. All calls

over that facility were intercepted and

recorded by the wire interception

officers. Because the interceptions did

not reveal the supplier of Wrisley and

Parker, an application to extend the

order was filed and granted on April 6,

1973. (Defendant's Ex. 4A-4D).

Thereafter, the interceptions continued

until April 14, 1973. (Defendant's Ex.

9).

While the Austin House wiretaps were

in operation, Trooper Petrowski of the

Connecticut State Police, overall

coordinator between the State Police

monitors and the Regional Narcotic Squad,

reviewed the maintained logs of all

intercepted communications with an eye to

the information developed by the

undercover agents. In reviewing the

intercepted logs for the inside pay phone

at the Austin House, Petrowski found 52%

or 81 of the 149 intercepted calls to be

pertinent to the investigation. Of the

remaining 68 non-pertinent calls, only 8

calls were over two minutes in duration.

Petrowski was unable to detect a pattern

of innocent communications within the

non-pertinent calls intercepted over

either Austin House phone since, in many

cases, it was not possible to detect the

callers’ identities and, therefore,

anticipate their conversations, and, in

other cases, the conversation did not

last long enough to be deemed innocent

before it concluded. (Defendant's Ex.

2A; T-1053-67).

The other monitoring officers who

were asked were also unable to detect

such a pattern of innocent conversations

within the calls they overheard. (T-5ll,

515-16, 747, 755, 903-04, 1314, 1317,

1514, 1554, 1562-63, 1590, 1614-15, 1631,

1651, 1689).

A twenty-four hour wiretap, Order

73-04, was also instituted upon the

telephone at premises occupied by

Wrisley, Parker, Parker's wife, and Allen

LaFleur, as the tap later revealed. Most

of the conversations relating to drugs

over that line were carried on in "drug

Slang" or code. A large scale pattern of

distribution of heroin, through "Ron” in

Bristol, Allen LaFleur, Albert and

LeBlanc in Terryville, and Robert Demicco

in Waterbury, was revealed, and

conversations relating to trips to Mexico

by way of Tuscon, Arizona, to bring back

heroin were monitored. During this tap,

conversations relating to the robbery and

killing of an undercover agent, whose

true identity was suspected, were

intercepted by the State Police officers.

(Defendant's Ex. 9; T-511, 515-16).

Trooper Petrowski again reviewed the

logs of intercepted communications at the

Plainville number and related those

conversations to the Austin House tap and

to the Regional Narcotic Squad

investigation. His analysis of the tapes

revealed that of the 298 intercepts under

Order 73-04, 265 or 88% were pertinent to

the investigation. Of the 33

non-pertinent calls, only 1 call was

longer than two minutes. (Defendant's

Ex. 9; T-1092-99, 1105). Again,

Petrowski and the intercepting officers

inquired of could detect no pattern of

innocent communications. (Defendant's

Ex. 9; T-1092-99, 1105). (T-511, 515-16,

747, 755, 1314, 1317, 1554, 1562-63,

1590, 1614-15, 1631, 1651, 1689).

Trooper Petrowski found that a

pattern of coded and occasional

references to drug trafficking developed

within the course of otherwise innocent

conversations. Such conversations showed

a far-flung operation involving many

persons, both male and female; involving

Mexico and Arizona, with airline trips

and auto rentals to bring large amounts

of heroin to Connecticut; and involving

distribution of heroin in various

Connecticut cities and towns. It was

also discovered during the wiretap that

"Skip" was the defendant Parker, a former

police officer. The interceptions

themselves showed that the principals

were fearful of a wiretap and had removed

telephones from another premises to avoid

the tap. (T-1068-90, 1093-98, 1176-99).

Conversations in which Wrisley,

Parker, and Thompson were participants

were overheard under Order 73-04, and

conversations in which Black and Lepore

were participants were overheard under

Order 73-03. No conversations in which

Wrisley or Parker were participants were

overheard under Order 73-03.

(Defendant's Ex. 2A; Defendant's Ex. 9).

However, there were intercepted

conversations that took place upon

Wrisley and Parker's premises under the

Austin House tap. (T-252).

RULINGS BELOW

Once the defendants were arrested

upon bench warrants alleging narcotic

violations, they filed motions to

suppress. After a lengthy evidentiary

hearing, the motion in the Parker case

was granted by the trial court.

The court entered an order

suppressing intercepted communications

upon the failure of the monitoring

officers to minimize the interception of

communications not subject of the

electronic surveillance order. The

court's memorandum of decision related

that the monitoring officers were not

instructed with respect to the

minimization requirement except for

privileged calls involving an attorney, a

physician or a clergyman, and the

officers did monitor nearly 100% of the

calls over the subject of the order

telephones. (Appendix B at 15b-17b).

The ruling on the motion to suppress

was the basis for the granting of a

motion to dismiss in each file, there

being no trial. Thereafter, the State

took an appeal to the Connecticut Supreme

Court, claiming that the trial court

misapplied the principles of Scott v.

United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

The Connecticut Supreme Court

affirmed the trial court on a difterent

basis as appears in its opinion found in

Appendix A to this petition.

In its reply brief in the Connecticut

Supreme Court, the State had argued that

the officers were justified in listening

to others than those named as_- the

Subscriber to the telephone in the wire

interception order, as the officers had

requested a wider authorization (Appendix

D at ld-par. 2, 2d-par. 7, 6d-par. 18-1,

9d-par. 5) and their application had been

approved without condition (Appendix D

at 20d-par. C). This argument was also

urged on the Connecticut Supreme Court in

support of the State's motions’ to

reargue. (Appendix C).

The Connecticut Supreme Court

rejected that argument. State v.

Thompson, 191 Conn. 360, 377, 464 A.2d

799, 810 (1983). (Appendix A at 17a).

It also refused to consider the question

of the good faith of the officers as to

continuous monitoring of the subject

telephones. 191 Conn. at 372, 464 A.2d

at 807. (Appendix A at 12a). The

Connecticut court then applied the fourth

amendment and the exclusionary rule to

Suppress ali wire interceptions under all

wire interception orders. 191 Conn. at

374-84, 464 A.2d at 809-13. (Appendix A

at 14a-23a).

The State respectfully petitions this

Court to review the Connecticut Supreme

Court's decision as it pertains to order

number 73-04, the Wrisley order.

ARGUMENT

The Policies Underlying the Exclusionary

Rule Do Not Require the Suppression of

All Wire Interceptions Under the

Circumstances of this Case.

the officers in this case sought

authorization to intercept the

communications of a number of individuals

involved in a wide-ranging heroin

trafficking enterprise and of those

unknown. (Appendix D, Application for

Order 73-04, at Ild-par. 2, 2d-par. 7,

6d-par. 18-1, 12d-l16d-par. 13-27, 31-33).

The application was approved without

reservation by a panel of three judges

required by Connecticut law. However,

the order for interceptions also stated

the interceptions were to be of the

person identified as the subscriber of

the subject telephone. (Appendix 0D,

Order 73-04, at 20da-21d). In

implementing the wire interceptions, the

officers listened to every telephone call

directed to and from the subject

telephone located in a house which was

the center of the heroin ring.

The individuals involved in the

Criminal activity were listed in the

application as those engaged in heroin

trafficking, when their identities were

known. (Appendix D, Application for

Order 73-04, at 6d-par. 18-1). The trial

court had suppressed all the

interceptions because the police officers

were not instructed with regard to

minimization (Appendix B at 15b-17b),

and the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld

that action because the officers did not

limit their interception to the one

individual named in the wire interception

Order as the subscriber of the telephone,

see State v. Thompson, 191 Conn. 360,

374-80, 464 A.2d 799, 809-11

(1983)‘Appendix A at 14a-20a). In the

opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court,

this violated the fourth amendment's

requirement that electronic surveillance

be authorized by a warrant issued by a

neutral judicial officer. The

Connecticut court cited Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger

v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), to this

effect. See State v. Thompson, 191 Conn.

at 376, 464 A.2d at 809-10. (Appendix A

at 15a-l6a). |

The Connecticut Supreme Court further

treated the panel's order that’ the

application was approved without

conditions as of no significance since

the order mentioned the one person, the

subscriber of the telephone as the person

whose communications were to be

intercepted. See State v. Thompson, 191

Conn. at 377, 464 A.2d at 810. (Appendix

A at 17a).

Avoiding the clear intent and

language of Scott v. United States, 436

U.S. 128 (1978), as no showing that a

pattern of innocent communications arose

which would allow for intelligent

minimization of interceptions, the

Connecticut Supreme Court limited the

interceptions in what was obvious from

the application and the submitted wire

interception logs a wide-ranging heroin

trafficking enterprise to that of one

individual whose phone was to be the

Subject of the order and called listening

to others a failure to minimize

interceptions calling for total

Suppression of the fruits of those

intercepts.

No others, even those unknown to the

applicants and those named using the

telephone to traffick in narcotics could

be overheard since the form, a copy of

which is set forth in Appendix D, failed

to include “and others unknown" in the

order, even though the officers sought

such authority in their application which

was approved.

In Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387

Mass. 488, 441 NE 2d 725 (1982), the

officer acting in good faith reliance

upon a defective search warrant seized

evidence in a homicide investigation.

This Court granted certiorari to consider

the issue whether the evidence should

have been suppressed. Massachusetts v.

Sheppard, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3534

(1983). In this case, the officers

received what the State submits was at

least an ambiguous direction to seize

evidence. The Connecticut Supreme Court

Stated it was not ambiguous, “regardless

of its [the approval of the application

without conditions] actual meaning," and

suppressed all the evidence so

seized.

See State v. Thompson, 191 Conn. at 377,

464 A.2d at 810. (Appendix A at 17a).

The State of Connecticut respectfully

Submits under these circumstances no

policy supposedly served by the

exclusionary rule under the fourth

amendment requires such a drastic result.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the State of

Connecticut asks this Court to grant a

writ of certiorari to review the decision

of the Connecticut Supreme Court.

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

State's Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

BY S/

Bradford J. Ward

Assistant State's Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A -

APPENDIX B -

APPENDIX C -

APPENDIX D -

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Decision of the

Connecticut Supreme Court

Decision of the Superior Court

(Trial Court )

Motions To Reargue and Orders

of the Connecticut Supreme Court

Denying Reargument

Application for Authority to

Intercept Wire Communications

and Order (73-04)

Page

la-23a

1b-18b

lc-8c

1d-21d

APPENDIX A

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. NEIL J. THOMPSON

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT E. PARKER, JR.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES C. BLACK

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANK P. LEPORE

(8359)

(8360)

(8362)

(8363)

SPEZIALE, C. J., PETERS, SHEA, GRILLO and COVELLO, Js.

Argued May 4—decision release’ September 6, 1983

Information in each case charging the defendant with the crime

of conspiracy to distribute, sell, dispense, compound, and transport

with intent to sell and dispense heroin, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the trial court,

McGrath, J., granted in each case the defendant's motion to sup-

press intercepted wire communications, and the court, O’Brien, J.,

rendered judgment in each case dismissing the information, from

which the state, on the granting of permission, appealed to this

court. No error.

Francis M. McDonald, state's attorney, with whom were

Bradford J. Ward, assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief,

Austin J. McGuigan, chief state's attorney, for the appellant in

each case (state).

Maxwell Heiman, with whom were Louis S. Avitabile, John D.

Jessep, Robert M. Richards and, on the brief, William J. Tracy, Jr.,

for the appellee (defendant Parker).

Louis S. Avitabile, for the appellee (defendant Thompson).

PETERS, J. These appeals concern the extent to which the state

police are required to minimize electronic surveillance when con-

ducting telephone wiretaps pursuant to General Statutes § 54-

wi}

41a et seq. (wiretap statute), in the course of a narcotics investiga-

tion. In each case, the trial court dismissed informations charging

the defendants Neil J. Thompson, Robert E. Parker, Jr., James C.

Black, and Frank P. LePore with conspiracy to possess and dis-

tribute narcotics, after the defendants successfully moved, on the

basis of inadequate minimization, to suppress evidence obtained

from the wiretaps.' From the judgments of dismissal, the state

has appealed.*

1. The defendants and others were charged by a single information with

conspiracy to distribute, sell, dispense, compound, and transport with

intent to sell and dispense heroin, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-

48 and 19-480a (now § 21a-278). The defendant Parker's motion to

suppress the contents of intercepted wire communications was granted

by the trial court, McGrath, J., on September 6, 1974, after an extensive

evidentiary hearing. The trial court based its suppression order entirely

on the state’s failure to minimize, and rejected the defendant's claims

(a) that General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. violates the fourth amend-

ment to the United States constitution and (b) that the police failed to

make timely return of the tape recordings to the issuing panel, in viola-

tion of General Statutes $ 54-41i. The state’s motion to reargue the

suppression motion was denied by the court, Levine, J., on July 22, 1976.

Thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that

the facts alleged in the affidavit supporting the bench warrant for his

arrest were based on the suppressed evidence. The motion to dismiss

was granted by the trial court, O’Brien, J., on July 28, 1976.

Also on July 28, 1976, the trial court O’Brien, J., granted the motions

of the defendants Thompson, Black and LePore to suppress evidence

obtained in the same wiretaps, besed on the suppression order in the

Parker case. Accordingly, the informations in those cases were dismissed

as well. The state thereafter obtained permission to file a single brief

for all four appeals, having conceded that the prosecutions arose from

the same factual situation. Of the defendants, only Parker and Thompson

filed briefs; Thompson, Black and LePore indicated their willingness to

rely on the Parker brief.

2. The delay in the filing of the state’s brief in these cases prompted this

court to issue, sua sponte, a decree nisi on October 2, 1979, dismissing

the state's appeal for failure to prosecute with proper diligence, to take

The trial court, McGrath, J., in its memorandum of decision,

found the following facts, now undisputed, concerning the wire-

taps at issue in this case: On March 9, 1973, the state’s attorneys

for Litchfield county and New Haven county at Waterbury applied

to a three judge panel for permission to intercept wire communi-

cations, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-41b.2 The application

sought authorization to tap two public pay telephones, one located

in the lobby of the Austin House Hotel in Terryville and one

located just outside the hotel, in order to overhear the conversations

of Arnold Albert “and others unknown.” The application con-

tained an affidavit purporting to establish the necessity for the pro-

effect unless the state filed its brief by November 15, 1979. The state

complied with the decree, explaining the delay as the result of prepara-

tion of the transcript from the lengthy suppression hearing.

The case files disclose no attempt by the defendants to have the appeals

dismissed due to the delay. After the state submitted its brief, the de-

fendants obtained numerous extensions to file their own briefs. On

December 2, 1980, this court, sua sponte, issued a nisi order, subse-

quently rescinded, directing judgment against the defendant LePore for

failure to defend the appeal with proper diligence.

At oral argument, we voiced a concern that the time which has elapsed

since the investigative phase of these matters might render unlikely a

prosecution at this late date. The state offered assurance, however, that

in the event the present appeals are resolved in its favor, the state in-

tends to proceed in its prosecution of the defendants.

3. “[ General Statutes] Sec. 54-41b. APPLICATION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZ-

ING INTERCEPTION. The state's attorney for the judicial district in

which the interception is to be conducted may make application to a

panel of judges for an order authorizing the interception of any wire

communication by investigative officers having responsibility for the

investigation of offenses as to which the application is made when such

interception may provide evidence of the commission of offenses in-

volving gambling, bribery, violations of section 53-395, violations of

section 21a-277 or felonious crimes of violence.”

posed wiretap.* This affidavit alleged: that Albert and others, in-

cluding Albert’s partner Joseph LeBlond, were importing Mexican

heroin into the state and selling it; that Albert and LeBlond were

residing at the Austin House Hotel; that Albert used its two public

telephones for narcotics transactions; and that the records of calls

made from the lobby telephone indicated a continuous pattern of

long distance calls to persons in Connecticut known to be heroin

dealers and users. The application asked, therefore, for a ten day

tap, for twenty-four hours each day, of both public telephones in

order to discover the source of Albert’s heroin and the extent of his

heroin trafficking. The affidavit stated in an amendment, filed on

March 14, 1973, that those officers who would conduct the wiretap

had been trained in electronic surveillance by the Connecticut,

New York or New Jersey state police departments.

The panel, on March 15, 1973, issued order 73-03 “to intercept

the telephone communications of Arnold Albert residing/having

his place of business at: Austin Hotel, Plymouth, Conn., from 5

p.m. on 15 March 1973 to 5 p.m. on 25 March 1973.” The order

contained the statutory requirement that the surveillance be “con-

4. “[General Statutes] Sec. 54-41c. INFORMATION IN APPLICATION.

Each application for an order authorizing the interception of a wire

communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a

panel of judges. Each application shall include the following informa-

tion: ... (2) the identity and qualifications of the investigative officers

or agency for whom the authority to intercept a wire communication is

sought; ... (5) ... (A) details as to the particular offense that has

been or is being committed, (B) a particular description of the nature

and location of the facilities from which or the place where the com-

munication is to be intercepted, (C) a particular description of the type

of communications sought to be intercepted, (D) the identity of the

person, if known, who has committed or is committing the offense and

whose communications are to be intercepted.”

ducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communi-

cations not otherwise subject to interception . . . .”*

In the order itself and in the documents accompanying the

order,© only Albert was identified as the person whose conversa-

tions were to be intercepted. Although the order indicated gen-

erally that the state’s application had been approved without con-

dition, the order did not expressly authorize interception with

respect to “others unknown,” which the state’s application had

sought.

The wiretap operations pursuant to the authorized interception

of the public telephones at the Austin House Hotel led to a request

for a ten day extension of order 73-03. The wiretap panel author-

ized an extension on the same terms as the original order. There-

after, on the basis of intercepted evidence that a telephone in

5. “[ General Statutes] Sec. 54-4le. STATEMENT BY PANEL ON ISSUANCE

OF ORDER. CONTENTS OF ORDER. Each order authorizing the intercep-

tion of any wire communication shall be accompanied by a written

statement of the issuing panel setting forth in detail its determination

made in accordance with the provisions of section 54-41ld and the

grounds therefor and shall specify: (1) The identity of the person, if

known, whose communications are to be intercepted; (2) the nature

and location of the communication facilities as to which or the place

where authority to intercept is granted; (3) a particular description of

the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of

the particular offense to which it relates; ... (11) ... Every order and

extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to in-

tercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in

such away as to minimize the interception of communications not other-

wise subject to interception in accordance with the provisions of this

chapter, and shall terminate upon attainment of the authorized objec-

tive, or in any event within fifteen days next succeeding the date of

issuance of such order.” (Emphasis added. )

6. In addition to the order itself, the panel is required to prepare a state-

ment pursuant to Genera! Statutes § 54-4le (see footnote 5, supra) and

a report to be submitted to the chief court administrator. General

Statutes § 54-41n.

Plainville was being used to conduct narcotics operations, the state

applied for a second wiretap order. In this application, the state

sought “to intercept the wire communications of Daniel A.Wrisley,

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley and others unknown” over the telephone

listed in his name, in light of evidence procured from the 73-03

wiretap, and elsewhere, which ind: ated that Wrisley’s telephone

was being used for narcotics transactions. The application again

stated, as had the application for 73-03, that the monitoring

officers for the proposed wiretap had been trained in electronic

surveillance by the Connecticut, New York or New Jersey state

police. The three judge panel approved the application and issued

wiretap order 73-04 but again restricted its operation to Wrisley

personally, furnishing express authority only “to intercept the

telephone communications of (subscriber): Daniel A. Risley

residing/having his place of business at: 17 Dewey Place, Plain-

ville, Conn., from 6 p.m. on 28 March 1973 to 6 p.m. on 7 April

1973, inclusive, during 24 hours of each day.” Surveillance pur-

suant to order 73-04 resulted in a successful application to the wire-

tap panel for a ten day extension of that order. In its extension

application, the state relied in part on potentially incriminating

conversations, to which Wrisley was not a party, of another person

(defendant Parker) who was using the Wrisley telephone to con-

duct narcotics trafficking. The extension of order 73-04 modified

only its date of expiration.

The trial court found that surveillance pursuant to the authorized

wiretaps took the form of indiscriminate listening to all communi-

cations on the tapped telephones. Although the monitoring equip-

ment could have been shut off or turned down upon a determina-

tion that an ongoing conversation was innocent, the police officers

assigned to the wirtaps had received little or no instruction with

respect to the statutory requirement of minimization. At most,

some officers were instructed not to monitor privileged conversa-

tions in which one party was a clergyman, doctor or lawyer.”

Consequently, with the exception of a single call involving a

doctor, every call made over the tapped telephones, the public

telephones under order 73-03 and the private telephone under

order 73-04, was overheard and recorded in full. All calls were

summarized in written logs maintained by the monitoring officers.

Although the state argued that narcotics investigations require

unlimited interceptions because initially innocuous conversations

may subsequently turn to narcotic related subjects and may use

narcotic related code words, the trial court concluded that the sur-

veilling agents had failed to comply with the minimization man-

dates of the wiretap orders themselves and of the statute. The court

acknowledged that assessment of minimization depended “upon

the facts and circumstances of each case.” It recognized the prac-

tical difficulties of minimization but refused nonetheless to limit

the responsibility to minimize to privileged communications. Be-

cause a communication once seized, no matter how wrongly, can

never be given back, the court noted that “the right of privacy

protected by the fourth amendment has been more invaded where

a conversation which can never be returned has been seized than

where a physical object which can be returned has been seized.”

On this basis, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions to

suppress the evidence obtained through the state’s electronic sur-

7. “[ General Statutes} Sec. 54-4lh. PRIVILEGED WIRE COMMUNICATIONS;

ISSUANCE OF ORDER AND INTERCEPTION PROHIBITED. If the facilities

from which, or the place where, the wire communications are to be

intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, or are leased 0,

listed in the name of, or commonly used by, a licensed physician, an

attorney-at-law or a practicing clergyman, no order shall be issued and

no wire communications shal] be intercepted over such facilities or in

such places. No otherwise privileged wire communications intercepted

in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall

lose their privileged character, nor shall any evidence derived therefrom

be used for any purpose.”

veillance. The informations against the defendants were thereafter

The state raises three issues on appeal. First, it argues that, in

determining that the monitoring officers failed to comply with the

minimization requirement, the trial court applied an incorrect

standard, focusing on the subjective intent of the officers rather

than on the objective reasonableness of their conduct under all the

circumstances. Second, it argues that, under the circumstances of

the present case, it was not objectively unreasonabie for the officers

to listen to all conversations during the conduct of the wiretaps.

Third, it argues that even if the wiretaps were conducted in viola-

tion of the minimization requirement, the proper remedy was the

suppression only of those conversations which would not have

been overheard had proper minimization been effected. We find

no error.

The state’s first claim of error addresses the standard by which

compliance with the minimization required is to be measured. The

state maintains that the trial court mistakenly relied on a subjective

federal standard which the United States Supreme Court subse-

quently rejected in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.

Ct. 1717, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, reh. denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Cr.

3127, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978). Interpreting the minimization

requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5) (1976 Ed.),® Scott held

that the federal statute was not necessarily violated by failure to

make good faith efforts to comply with the statute’s requirement

8. 18 US.C. § 2518(5) provides in relevant part: “Every order [ entered

under this section] and extension thereof shall contain a provision that

the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable,

shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of

communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chap-

ter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective,

Or in any event in thirty days.”

for minimization. Id., 135-36. Although the record in Scott

showed that all conversations over the tapped telephones were

recorded and only 40 percent were related to the stated subject of

the investigation, the Supreme Court held that: “The statute does

not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but

rather instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a

manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such conversations.

Whether the agents have in fact conducted the wiretap in such a

manner will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Id., 140.

The state argues that the trial court failed to follow the rule in

Scott because it attributed dispositive weight to the police officers’

indiscriminate listening to all intercepted communications over the

tapped telephone lines. We note that the trial court also stated

that resolution of the minimization question depended upon the

facts and circumstances of each case. We are not persuaded that

these divergent strands in the memorandum of decision necessarily

signal that the trial court applied an incorrect standard.

The trial court was entitled to give some weight to the failure

of the state's agents to attempt minimization. It is true that the

case law after Scott counsels us that it may be difficult to screen

intercepted conversations for pertinency, especially when the in-

vestigation focuses on a widespread conspiracy and when the in-

vestigation has not yet proceeded to establish patterns of conversa-

tions. United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Sup. 465, 476 (S.D.

N.Y. 1982); see Scott v. United States, supra, 140-42; United

States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied sub nom. United States v. Zalmonowski, 445 U.S. 961,

100 S. Cr. 1648, 64 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1980); United States v. Dorf-

man, 542 F. Sup. 345, 390 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 690 F.2d 1217

(7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Webster, 473 F. Sup. 586, 597

(D. Md. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 639

F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd and modified, 669 F.2d 185

(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935, 102 S. Cr. 1991,

72 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1982); accord, United States v. Hyde, 574 F.

2d 856, 869-70 (5th Cir.), reh. and reh. en banc denied (5th Cir.

1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716-18 (4th

Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Shade v. United States, 436

U. S. 930, 98 S. Ct. 2830, 56 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1978); United States

v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 873-76 (7th Cir. 1975); see also

Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, $$ 152-155 (1978);

Fishman, “The ‘Minimization’ Requirement in Electronic Sur-

veillance: Title III, The Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott

Decision,” 28 Am. U. L. Rev. 315, 338-43 (1979). Recent federal

cases, however, permit inquiry into the good faith of the monitor-

ing agents as a relevant although not a dispositive factor in mini-

mization. United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th

Cir.) , modified, 609 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.

Suquet, 547 F. Sup. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1982); contra, United

States v. Feldman, supra, 678 n.10; United States v. Dorfman,

supra, 390 n.49. Total failure to attempt minimization is also

implicitly discountenanced by those federal cases that insist that

“[blefore evidence seized under [18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5) (1976)]

may be admitted, the court must be ‘!eft with the conviction that

on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right

of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to avoid un-

necessary intrusion.’ United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764,

784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S. Ce. 63, 38 L.

Ed. 2d 86 (1973).” United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Sup. 800,

817 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (decided after Scott); see United States v.

Clerkley, supra, 716. Furthermore, we note that Scoét itself in

dictum states that the motive of the officers may be relevant in

designing a remedy once the illegality of the wiretap is otherwise

established. Scott v. United States, supra, 139 n.13. In our view,

therefore, federal law does not preclude all inquiry into whether

the conduct of police officers constituted indiscriminate listening.

Even more important, it is clear that the federal standard, while

it establishes minimum guidelines for safeguarding individual free-

dom from unlawful electronic surveillance; see U.S.C. § 2516 (2)

(1976); in no way prevents states from enacting stricter safe-

10a

guards; State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873 (1978);

see Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal. App. 3d 805, 810, 160 Cal. Rptr.

471 (1979); State v. Ayers, 118 N.H. 90, 91, 383 A.2d 87

(1978); State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 436, 427 A.2d 537

(1981); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y. 2d 41, 46, 396 N.Y.S. 2d

629, 364 N.E. 2d 1322 (1977); “and courts may construe their

own state’s wiretap law so as to afford their citizens additional

protection.” State v. Catania, supra, 436; see People v. Brenes,

supra, 46. The New York Court of Appeals, construing a statutory

minimization requirement identical to that of our own state, has

required the government to demonstrate “that procedures were

established to minimize interception of nonpertinent communica-

tions and that a conscientious effort was made to follow such pro-

cedures.” People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y. 2d 245, 250, 392 N.Y.S. 2d

257, 360 N.E. 2d 935 (1976); see United States v. Lilla, 534

F. Sup. 1247, 1266-67 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); People v. Brenes, supra.

The New Jersey Supreme Court, similarly, has held “that subjec-

tive good faith will be required in addition to actual objective

reasonableness in all minimization efforts.” State v. Catania, supra,

436.

We have previously recognized that our own wiretap statute

is in many ways more stringent than the federal act. State v.

Grant, supra, 25, 25 n.3; see 14S. Proc., Pt. 2, 1971 Sess., pp. 849

(remarks of Sen. Jay Jackson), 855 (remarks of Sen. James

Macauley). While the federal minimization language is sub-

stantially identical to Connecticut’s,? the state minimization pro-

vision now requires that surveillance orders terminate within fifteen

days. The more permissive federal act, on the other hand, allows

9. See footnote 5, supra, for relevant portion of General Statutes § 54-4le

(11). See footnote 8, supra, for text of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).

lla

thirty days of surveillance. The fifteen day limit is itself a form of

extrinsic minimization'® evidencing a strict approach on the part

of our legislature with respect to the rainimization question.

Resolution of the appropriate weight to be assigned good faith

can wait another day, however. The record in the present appeal

does not require us to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the trial

court's memorandum of decision.'' Whatever standard the trial

court adopted, or should have adopted, the present record demon-

strates, for the reasons set out below, that the state police violated

the minimization mandate of the wiretap statute and of orders 73-

03 and 73-04.

10. “Extrinsic minimization involves limiting the time period during

which monitoring is conducted.” Fishman, Wiretapping and Eaves-

dropping, § 151 (1978). “[T]here is some reason to think that res-

tricting the time of listening in was thought by Congress to be the, or

at least a, principal method of minimizing. See, e.g., Senate Report

No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess, Judiciary Committee, Apr. 29, 1968,

to accompany S. 917 reproduced in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News, p. 2112, at p. 2190, 2192-93." Unmited States v. Chavez, 533

F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 US. 911, 96 S. Cr. 2237,

48 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1976).

11. Because of the death of the trial court judge while this appeal was

pending, we cannot remand for further articulation to ascertain the

weight given to the monitoring officer's failure to attempt minimiza-

tion. We note, however, that, in response to the state's motion to re-

argue, the trial court, Levine, J., found no inconsistency between the

memorandum of decision of McGrath, J., and the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751

(DC. Cir. 1975), reh. and reh, en banc denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C.

Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917, 96 S, Cr. 1519, 47 L. Ed. 2d

768 (1976). The Court of Appeals decision was approved by the

United States Supreme Court in the principal case of Scott v. United

States, 436 US. 128, 98 S. Cr. 1717, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, reh. denied, 438

US, 908, 98 S. Cr. 3127, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978).

12a

The state contends as a matter of fact that overhearing every

telephone conversation in the present case was objectively reason-

able because it was impossible to determine the pertinency of each

call until the call terminated. The state supports this factual claim

by alleging the high percentage of conversations pertinent to the

complex narcotics conspiracy under investigation, and the brevity

of the nonpertinent calls.

It is not the function of this court to make full-scale factual

findings de novo. Thus our review of the state’s allegations is

limited to determining whether, during the suppression hearing,

the state met its burden of making a prima facie showing of com-

pliance with the minimization requirement.'* If the state met its

burden of demonstrating the impossibility of effecting further

minimization, then the burden shifted to the defendant to demon-

strate the state’s failure to minimize. United States v. Rizzo, 491

F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990, 94 S. Cr.

2399, 40 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1974); United States v. Suquet, 547 F.

Sup. 1034, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Cale, 508 F.

Sup. 1038, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). We conclude that, even

under the minimization standard it urges us to adopt, the state did

not meet its burden.

It is true that many officers at the suppression hearing testified

to the impossibility of ascertaining pertinency prior to the termina-

tion of calls, and to the absence of any “pattern of innocent calls”

which might have established a basis for excluding from surveill-

ance calls falling within that pattern.'* Furthermore, State

12. Since there are no issues of credibility in such a determination, it may

appropriately be made by a reviewing court. See Ivey, Barnum &

O'Mara tv. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 190 Conn. 528, 530 n.2,

A.2d (1983); Drazen v. Drazen, 180 Conn. 572, 573 n.3, 430

A 2d 1288 (1980).

13. This same testimony did not claim that any attempt was made to mini-

mize. Rather, the testimony was to the effect that, even if such an

attempt had been made, no calls could have been excluded from sur-

veillance.

13a

Trooper John Petrowski, who supervised the surveillance, sub-

mitted to the trial court a pertinency analysis of overheard calls,

based on his review of the logs prepared, contemporaneously with

the surveillance, by the monitoring officers. That analysis alleged

that of the 149 calls overheard on the Austin House Hotel lobby

telephone during the first six days of wiretap order 73-03, 52 per-

cent were pertinent to the investigation. Of the 68 nonpertinent

calls, only eight exceeded two minutes in length. Of the 298 calls

intercepted pursuant to order 73-04, 88 percent were pertinent.

Of the 33 nonpertinent calls under order 73-04, only one exceeded

two minutes in length. While the deiinition of pertinency was the

subject of some disagreement among the officers who testified at

the hearing, Trooper Petrowski deemed pertinent any narcotics-

related conversation and any conversation to which a person under

investigation was a patty.

Our assessment of the state’s case is hampered by the state’s

failure to offer a pertinency analysis of the great majority of calls

made pursuant to order 73-03.'* Without such an analysis, the

trial court was not bound to credit the state’s conclusory claim that

only a small percentage of innocent calls exceeded two minutes in

length.

The state's case is marred, however, by a deficiency more grave

than this. The state contends that in determining, for minimization

purposes, whether a call should have been excluded from surveil-

lance, the inquiry is whether the call was germane to the overall

investigation. Such is not the case: “The term minimization is a

shorthand expression which represents the government's obligation

to reduce to the extent possible interceptions of conversations which

are not the subject of the court order.” (Emphasis added.) United

14. As we have noted, two public telephones were tapped at the Austin

House Hotel pursuant to order 73-03. One was located in the lobby

and one outside the hotel. The taps lasted twenty days each. The state's

call analysis is restricted to calls overheard on the inside phone during

the first six days of the tap.

l4a

States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Sup. 345, 390 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 690

F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982). Court orders 73-03 and 73-04 were

for the interceptions of calls of Arnold Albert and Daniel Wrisley,

respectively, not of the calls of their alleged coconspirators. Con-

cededly, orders such as were issued in the present case permit the

overhearing of unnamed individuals who are parties to the con-

versations of those named in the order. United States v. Kahn, 415

U.S. 143, 156, 94 S. Ct. 977, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1974). Before

an order can be said to permit surveillance of persons who are

neither named in the order nor conversing with persons named in

the order, however, the language “and conversations of others un-

known,” or some clear equivalent thereto, must appear on the face

of the order.'®

Any other interpretation of the order’s language would, we

believe, vest the executing officer with discretion to determine the

scope of the surveillance, in contravention of requirements con-

tained in the fourth amendment to the United States constitution,

in article first, § 7 of the constitution of Connecticut, and in the

wiretap statute itself. “[T]he Fourth Amendment confines an

15. The state contends that United States v. Kahn, 415 US. 143, 154-55,

94 S. Ct. 977, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1974) holds “that the interception

of conversations between persons unnamed in the order is proper so

long as the conversations pertained to the subject matter within the

purpose of the wire interception.” We disagree with the state's inter-

pretation. United States v. Kahn, upheld the validity of an order per-

mitting surveillance of a named subject “and others as yet unknown.”

Id., 156. In determining the permissible scope of the warrant, the

Supreme Court found the quoted language dispositive; id.; and inter-

preted its meaning exactly as we do. Id.; accord, Umited States v.

O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020, 1022-23, (6th Cir. 1974). Compare United

States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420

US. 990, 95 S. Cr. 1424, 43 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1975) (requiring sup-

pression of conversations of party who was neither named in order nor

conversing with named party, when order permitted only “the intercep-

tion of telephone communications of [named suspect] with co-con-

spirators, accomplices and agents”; id. 273) with United States v.

15a

officer executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by

the warrant.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

403 U. S. 388, 394 n.7, 91 S. Ce. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971);

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ce. 74, 72 L.

Ed. 231 (1927); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1260

(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Hubbard,

456 U.S. 926, 102 S. Cr. 1971, 72 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1982). To

permit the executing officer to exceed those bounds would evis-

cerate the fourth amendment’s requirement that electronic sur-

veillance be authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral judicial

officer. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59, 88 S. Cr.

507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.

41, 54-55, 87 S. Cr. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967).

We emphasize that in construing the orders the issue is not

whether the three judge panel could reasonably have issued broader

ones. We assume arguendo that a broader order might well have

issued for each wiretap. The scope ef the wiretaps was for the

panel to decide. In shaping its orders, the panel had discretion to

narrow the permitted ficld of surveillance as it did. See General

Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430

US. 905, 97 S. Cr. 1173, 51 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1977) (refusing to

suppress conversations between two unnamed parties when order per-

mitted interception of “the telephone communications of [named

suspect], his co-conspirators, agents and associates”; id. 1135); see

generally Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping (1978) §§ 49,

50 and esp. 110. Contra, People v. Palozzi, 44 App. Div. 2d 224, 227,

353 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1974). In Palozzi the trial court suppressed con-

versations between two persons, neither of whom was the subject

named in the warrant. People v. Palozzi, 74 Misc. 2d 774, 778, 346

N.Y.S.2d 595 (1973). The appellate division reversed on the ground

that the express language of the warrant permitted “interception of the

target phone to secure supervision of the persons involved in gambling

activities”; People v. Palozzi, 44 App. Div. 2d 224, 226, 353 N.Y.S.2d

987 (1974); but also implied that, under United States v. Kahn, a

narrower order would also have permitted interception of the conver-

sations in question. Id., 226-27.

16a

Statutes § 54-41d; cf. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 272 § 99 (I) (3)

(1980).

The state contends that the surrounding circumstances and cer-

tain language in the orders, however, indicate that the three judge

panel approved the interception of all calls. This argument, which

we find unpersuasive, consists of three parts.

First, noting that the wiretap applications sought to intercept

the calls “of others unknown” in addition to Albert and Wrisley,

the state argues that the panel’s designation of the “approved” box

on the order forms, instead of the “approved with conditions” box,

had the effect of incorporating by reference the “and others un-

known” language contained in the applications. We read the

panel's designation as merely indicating that the state’s application

required no further amendment. We note that the panel had pre-

viously delayed action on the application pending the submission

of an amendment by the state. Regardless of its actual meaning,

however, the designation of the preprinted box is too ambiguous

to contradict the clear language of the order itself.'”

Second, the state contends that the parenthetical designation of

Wrisley as “subscriber” on application 73-04 indicates that it was

his telephone, and not Wrisley himself, that was the subject of the

wiretap order. We disagree. The word “subscriber” was pre-

printed on the order form. In order 73-03, where it was inappro-

16. The Massachus*tts wiretap statute requires the order to specify the

person to be ovevheard. It omits the “if known” language of the Con-

necticut statute. Mass. Gen..Laws Ann. c. 272 § 99(1) (3) (1980).

See Carr, The Law c‘ Electronic Surveillance § 4.07 [1]. In Connecti-

cut, the question of = ..ether unnamed parties may be overheard is left

to the issuing panel. Of course the greater latitude given the panel by

the Connecticut statute in no way mandates the inclusion of “others

unknown” in the scope of a particular order.

17. The case cited by the state in support of its incorporation-by-reference

argument is United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 781 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 US. 866, 94 S. Cr. 63, 38 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1973). In

17a

bu.

priate, it was simply crossed out. No particular significance, short

of the fact that the subscriber of the telephone may typically be the

subject of the proposed wiretap, should be attached to it. Nor can

it be said, as a matter of law, that a warrant to overhear a sub-

scriber’s conversations constitutes a warrant to overhear the con-

versations of all others who may use that telephone. As the wire-

tap statute explicitly recognizes, the privacy interest of one using

a telephone is distinct from the privacy interest of the owner of the

premises where the telephone is located. General Statutes §§ 54-

41a(10), 54-41m. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d $76 (1967). Of course, the

fact that the wiretap was conducted on a residential telephone may

remain relevant in determining the adequacy of minimization pro-

cedures. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140, 98 S. Ce. 1717,

56 L. Ed. 2d 168, reh. denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 3127, 57

L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978).

Third, noting that the extension applications acknowledged con-

versations, already overheard, which did not include the named

parties, the state argues that the panel’s granting of the extensions

implicitly ratified the state’s manner of executing the wiretaps. We

again disagree. The extension application was not an adversary

that case the greater specificity of the incorporated application cured

the dearth of specificity in the order itself. See also United States v.

Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.

United States v. Hubbard, 456 US. 926, 102 S. Cr. 1971, 72 L. Ed 2d

440 (1982); Hudson v. State, 368 So, 2d 899, 903-904 (Fla. App.

1979). Because we find no incorporation by reference in the present

case we express no opinion regarding the converse proposition ad-

vanced by the state: that a search which exceeds the particularized

scope of the warrant may be justified based on the more general scope

of the incorporated application. We note that this argument has been

rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Moore v.

United States, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

18a

proceeding and the cited conversations were relevant only to deter-

mine the existence of probable cause. There is no reason to think

that the panel, in issuing its ex parte order, even considered, let

alone ratified, the manner in which the wiretaps were being con-

ducted, '®

The minimization issue in the present case may therefore be

stated as follows: Was it possible for the state to minimize sur-

veillance so as to exclude conversations not involving, for order

73-03, Arnold Albert, and for order 73-04, David Wrisley? The

state has made no claim that it was impossible to recognize, or to

learn to recognize, the voices of these individuals. The testimony

of the officers indicates, to the contrary, that it was entirely possible.

For example, for order 73-03, during an eight hour shift on March

18, 1973, ten calls were fully intercepted, none of them involving

Albert; on a March 20, 1973, shift, nineteen calls were intercepted,

none involving Albert. In fact, for a period of several days in-

clusive of these shifts, close to 100 calls were monitored to which

Albert was not a party. Our own examination of the logs of wire-

tap No. 73-04 indicates that the majority of the calls did not in-

volve Wrisley as a party, and that the parties to most calls were

readily identified by the monitoring officer.

In light of these circumstances, we conclude that if the state had

reasonably attempted minimization, a great number of conversa-

tions outside the scope of orders 73-03 and 73-04 could have been

18. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the panel was coguizant of

the unauthorized surveillance in which the police were engaged, it is

doubtful that the panel would have had the authority retrospectively

to enlarge the scope of the search authorized by its prior order. “A

transaction capable of ratification can be ratified if, but only if, the

purported principal can authorize such a transaction at the time of

afirmance ....” 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 86 (1957).

19a

excluded from surveillance.'? The wiretaps were therefore con-

ducted in violation of the minimization requirement. Scott v.

United States, supra, 134.

The state’s final argument is that, even if the conduct of the

wiretap violated the minimization requirement, suppression is

warranted only of those calls which should properly have been

excluded from surveillarice. The issue which the state raises was

expressly reserved in Scott v. United States, supra, 135 n.10; and

remains the subject of controversy in the courts.

One line of cases, which the state urges us to follow, holds that

conversations contemplated by the warrant are admissible even if

conversations extraneous to the warrant have been overheard.

United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301-1302 (8th Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 2623, 41 L. Ed. 2d 223

(1974); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Sup. 345, 394-95

(N.D. Ill), aff'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982); United States

v. Sisca, 361 F. Sup. 735, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503

F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008, 95 S. Cr. 328,

42 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1974). Other courts require the total suppres-

sion of all communications wherever the minimization requirement

is violated. United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Sup. 1033, 1047

(D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d

522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd,

416 U.S. 505, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); United

19. Because we agree with the trial court that the conduct of wiretap

order 73-04 was in violation of the minimization requirement, it is

unnecessary to consider the state's claim that the evidence showing

probable cause for issuance of order 73-04 was obtained independently

of the fruits of wiretap order 73-03. For discussion of such a claim,

see United States v. Giordano, 416 US. 505, 530-33, 94 S. Cr. 1820,

40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

20a

States v. Scott, 331 F. Sup. 233, 248 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated on

other grounds, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also N.J. Stat.

Ann. 2A: § 156A-21 (Cum. Sup. 1983) .2°

We feel the more reasonable rule is that stated by a third line

of cases. Numerous courts, both before and after the decision in

Scott v. United States, have stated that while partial suppression is

the proper remedy when minimization is attempted but fails, total

suppression is necessary when the violation results from a com-

plete disregard of the minimization requirement. United States v.

Santora, 600 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.) , modified, 609 F.2d 433

(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869 (Sth

Cir.), reh. and reh. en banc denied, (5th Cir. 1978); United States

v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

Grimes v. United States, 423 U.S. 996, 96 S. Cr. 426, 46 L. Ed.

2d 371 (1975), and sub nom. Hackett v. United States, 429

U.S. 837, 97 S. Cr. 105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1976); United States

v. Suquet, 547 F. Sup. 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United

States v. Webster, 473 F. Sup. 586, 598 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd in

part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.

1981), aff'd and modified, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.

denied, 456 U. S. 935, 102 S. Cr. 1991, 72 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1982);

United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Sup. 430, 437 (D. Md. 1973);

United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Sup. 929, 932 (M.D. Fla. 1972);

United States v. Leta, 332 F. Sup. 1357, 1360 n.4 (M.D. Pa.

1971); accord, Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping § 290

(1978). Although the rule was stated as dictum in the above

cited cases, the Florida Supreme Court and the New York Court

of Appeals have required the total suppression of wiretap evidence

in accordance with the rule which we adopt. Rodriguez v. State,

20. The New Jersey wiretap statute provides that any minimization viola-

tion must result in the suppression of “the entire contents of all inter-

cepted wire or oral communications ... .” N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A: § 156

A-21 (Cum. Sup. 1983). See State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 426, 427

A.2d 537 (1981).

2la

297 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41,

49-50, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 364 N.E.2d 1322 (1977). Three

considerations, essentially, militate for this approach: (1) recog-

nition of the need for an effective deterrent to unlawful conduct

of wiretaps, (2) appreciation of the exceptional dangers inherent

in overbroad wiretap surveillance, and (3) reluctance to accept as

evidence in the courts of this state materials obtained in disregard

of a court order.*'

The difficulty with suppressing only those conversations outside

the scope of the wiretap order is that a remedy so limited would

remove an incentive to restrict interception to the proper scope of

the order. United States v. Focarile, supra, 1047; State v. Catania,

85 N.J. 418, 426, 427 A.2d 537 (1981); Fishman, “The

‘Minimization’ Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III,

The Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scost Decision,” 28 Am.

ULL. Rev. 315, 352 (1979); note, “Minimizing Minimization,”

59 B.U.L. Rev. 567, 578 n.90 (1979). A court's exclusion of

extraneous evidence constitutes a post facto minimization that

neither remedies the prior invasion of privacy nor burdens those

who conduct surveillance in disregard of the minimization require-

ment.

21. A corollary of our holding today is that persons aggrieved by a par-

ticular wiretap; see General Statutes § 54-41a(10); have standing to

contest the state's failure to minimize its interception of conversations,

overheard in the course of the same wiretap, to which the aggrieved

person was not a party. Accord United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194,

197 (DC. Cir. 1974); United States v. Suquet, 547 F. Sup. 1034,

1038-40 (N.D. Ill. 1982); State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 425-27, 427

A.2d 537 (1981). Determination of the overall reasonableness of

minimization procedures necessitates such an approach. Umited States

v. Scott, supra. In the present case, the state does not dispute that the

defendants are aggrieved persons, nor does it make any other challenge

to the defendants’ standing. We express no opinion, therefore, as to

whether an aggrieved person would have standing to suppress a con-

versation to which he was not a party, upon proof that the conversa-

tion was illegally intercepted. See United States v. Scott, supra, 0.5;

United States v. Suquet, supra.

22a

Furthermore, the purpose of the minimization requirement is to

prevent a wiretap from turning into “a general search and whole-

sale invasion of privacy.” United States v. King, 335 F. Sup. 523,

544-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other

grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Light v.

United States, 414 U.S. 846, 94 S. Cr. 111, 38 L. Ed. 2d 94

(1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920, 94 S. Ct. 2628, 41 L. Ed. 2d

226 (1974); see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11,

96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). The overhearing of

telephone conversations, like a search of documents, poses an in-

herent danger of turning into a general search, due to the difficulty

of ascertaining the relevance of the item to be “seized.” Andresen

v. Maryland, supra. Where disregard of a warrant’s limitations is

flagrant and entire, the otherwise valid warrant may become a

general one in which case the “fruits of the search” must be sup-

pressed. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1259 (D.C. Cir.

1981); see United States v. Sequet, 547 F. Sup. 1034, 1039-43

(N.D. Ill. 1982).

Finally, we feel the present approach is necessary to ensure the

integrity of the wiretap statute and of the functioning of the

judiciary with respect to it. The remedy which the trial court de-

signed and which we adopt is no more exceptional than the cir-

cumstances which demanded it. The execution of the wiretap in

the present case entirely misconstrued the scope of the order which

authorized it, completely disregarded the minimization require-

ment contained in that warrant, and resulted in the overhearing of

hundreds of conversations, incriminating and innocent alike, which

could have been excluded had proper minimization occurred. Be-

cause of the conjunction of these factors, the remedy of total sup-

pression which the trial court ordered was entirely appropriate.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

23a

APPENDIX B

No. 11442

No. 11481

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPERIOR COURT

VS. ; JUDICIAL District OF WATERBURY

ROBERT PARKER, JR. : SEPTEMBER 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

1. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 9, 1973, John F. Bianchi, state’s attorney for Litch-

field County, and Francis M. McDonald, Jr., state’s attorney for the

Judicial District of Waterbury, executed an application for author-

ity to intercept wire communications pursuant to Connecticut

General Statutes § 54-41b et seq. The allegations contained in the

application signed by Mr. Bianchi and Mr. McDonald alleged,

inter alia, that one Arnold “Tuffy” Albert and others unknown

had committed and were continuing to commit the crime of sale

of narcotics in violation of § 19-480 of the Connecticut General

Statutes. The application sought to intercept the telephone com-

munications of Albert and others unknown. It was further alleged

that telephone communications over two telephone numbers,

which were both public telephones in the town of Terryville,

would constitute material evidence that the offense had been and

was being committed, and would aid in the apprehension of the

perpetrator of such offense. The purpose of the wire interceptions

was to discover the identity of the unknown suppliers and distribu-

tors of heroin and to prosecute them as well as Albert.

On March 9, 1973, John Griffin, who identified himself as a

lieutenant attached to the Waterbury police department, and serv-

ing as head of the vice and intelligence division of that department,

and also acting as head of the Naugatuck Valley regional crime

squad, executed an affidavit in which he sets up in said affidavit

allegations of a number of sal:s of “a brown Mexican heroin” by

Mr. Albert, to undercover Connecticut law enforcement officers.

The allegations of said affidavit were that several purchases had

been made by undercover agents from Albert, the purchases re-

sulting in face to face dealing, as well as telephone conversations

over the subject telephones between the officers and Albert.

The affidavit of Lieutenant Griffin also alleged that information

had been received by an undercover agent that Albert had an in-

dividual supplying him with the heroin which was being sold by

Albert to the undercover agents.

Information was also disclosed in the affidavit of Mr. Griffin

that Albert had told Officer Kelly, a Middlebury undercover agent,

that Albert was using the telephone number 589-9920, which said

phone was located in the lobby of the Austin House Hotel, for

incoming calls with respect to the sale of heroin, and telephone

number 589-9878, which is a public phone located outside the

said hotel, for outgoing calls relating to narcotics transactions.

The affidavit of Mr. Griffin also contained the allegation that

wire interception was required in the investigation “because normal

investigative procedures, such as physical surveillance of Albert

would be too dangerous to employ and would be impossible to

maintain within his present residence, the Austin Hotel, and within

the outside public pay telephone, and since according to the said

agent, Albert has exhibited considerable wariness in trafficking in

heroin, and has not introduced his source of heroin to the under-

cover agent. Future negotiations to purchase large amounts of

heroin would be jeopardized by physical surveillance and efforts

by the undercover officers to, ascertain the principal supplier of

Albert by conversations with Albert, or to have a contact directly

made with the supplier by the agents, have been fruitless. From

the past experience of the affiant, who has directed such investiga-

tions in the past, the middleman is always loath to reveal his

source of drugs for fear of being ‘dealt out’ or deprived of his

commission on the sale of narcotics.”

The application as hereinbefore set forth was filed with the

wiretap panel, which had been created pursuant to the provisions

of the Connecticut General Statutes, and according to Siegbert

Kaufmann, the executive secretary of the wiretap panel, the wire-

tap panel met on said application on March 14, 1973, and ad-

journed without making a decision with respect to the application.

On March 14, 1973, subsequent to the meeting of the wiretap

panel, John Bianchi and Francis M. McDonald filed an amend-

ment to the application, which contained the supplemental affidavit

of Mr. Griffin, and three amendments to the application originally

filed by Mr. Bianchi and Mr. McDonald. The supplemental

affidavit of Lieutenant Griffin set forth that an agent had been with

Mr. Albert when Mr. Albert entered a house in Plainville to obtain

heroin, and the supplemental affidavit was to the effect that the

agent had been unable to observe which house Mr. Albert had

entered at that time.

Also appended to the affidavit was a list of officers permitted

to act as interceptors or monitors of the wiretap, and the allegation

was made in the affidavit filed by Messrs. Bianchi and McDonald

to the effect that all were members of the Connecticut state police

department “and have had either training with that department

or the New York and New Jersey State Police Departments in

electronic surveillance.” On March 15, 1973, by unanimous vote,

the application of Mr. Bianchi and Mr. McDonald was approved

without condition by the wiretap panel, resulting in the issuance .

of order number 73-03 (defendant's exhibit 1D).

The order of the wiretap panel with respect to the interceptions

contained the following language “order the interception of the

wire communications of Arnold Albert who it found probable

cause to believe, had committed or is committing the following

offense: violation of Section 19-480a.” The order of the panel

contained the following language: “5. The panel orders the above

named officers to intercept the telephone communications of

Arnold Albert residing/having his place of business at: Austin

Hotel, Plymouth, Conn., from 5 p.m. on 15 March 1973 to 5 p.m.

on 25 March 1973, inclusive, during twenty four hours of each

day.” The report of the panel recited that the name of the person,

if known, whose communications are to be intercepted, was Arnold

Albert.

The order contained the following language: “7. This order/

extension shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be con-

ducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communi-

cations not otherwise subject to interception in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter 959a, and shall terminate upon attainment

of the authorized objective.”

On March 22, 1973, the same applicants, that is, Francis M.

McDonald, state’s attorney for the Judicial District of Waterbury,

and John F. Bianchi, state’s attorney for Litchfield County, filed

an application with the wiretap panel, requesting an extension of

order number 73-03, requesting that the interceptions be extended

for a period of ten calendar days commencing at the termination

of the original order. Attached to the application was the affidavit

of one Sergeant Lester Forst, as well as the logs of interceptions

already made during the period of the original order.

The extension application sought to extend the order author-

izing the interception of communications of Albert and others

unknown. (Defendant's exhibit 2A, paragraph two). The request

for extension was received and granted on March 23, 1973. (De-

fendant’s exhibit 2B).

The allegations in the affidavits of Messrs. Bianchi and McDonald

with respect to the necessity of intercepting a communication over

a public facility was as follows: ‘18. A special need exists to inter-

cept wire communications from public facilities since Albert is

making extensive use of such facility at or near the Austin Hotel

where he is now staying.”

Also contained in the application by the state’s attorneys was

the following paragraph with respect to the necessity of wire inter-

ceptions: “4. Other normal investigative procedures with respect

to the sale of narcotics had been tried and have failed and reason-

ably appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried, and are too dan-

gerous to employ, such as physical surveillance and direct under-

cover contact with the suppliers of heroin to Albert.”

The affidavit of Sergeant Lester Forst was also appended to the

application for extension. In paragraph six of the affidavit of

Sergeant Forst he reveals that a member of the Naugatuck Valley

regional narcotics squad had met one LaFleur and bought heroin

from LaFleur, who had been accompanied by Kathleen Paradis.

In paragraph seven of that affidavit that undercover officer observed

that from conversation with that LaFleur and his associate Albert,

neither are suppliers but only runners of the smuggled brown

Mexican heroin being sold in the Terryville area.

On March 23, 1973, the wiretap panel unanimously voted to

extend order number 73-03, the extension to commence on 25

March 1973 at 5 p.m. and to conclude on 4 April 1973 at 5 p.m.

during twenty four hours of each day.

The stated purpose of order 73-03 was “to prosecute Albert and

others for selling narcotics, and through interception beyond this

objective to ascertain additional information trom this heavy and

continuing operation implicating suppliers and distributors.”

The order of the wiretap panel remained the same as herein-

before set forth, that is, to intercept telephone communications of

Arnold Albert, and to carry out the order in such a way as to

minimize the interception of communications not otherwise sub-

ject to interceptions.

As with the original order, a list of individuals authorized to

intercept was appended thereto. The allegation was made that all

of the men listed in the exhibit were members o Connecticut

state police department and had had either training with that de-

partment or with the New York or New Jersey state police depart-

ments in electronic surveillance.

On March 28, 1973, John D. LaBelle, state’s attorney for Hart-

ford County, filed an application for authority to intercept wire

communications pursuant to statute, setting forth in his application

that Daniel A. Wrisley |also known as Daniel A. Risley, and here-

inafter referred to as Daniel A. Wrisley], Arnold “Tuffy” Albert,

Alan LaFleur, Kathleen Paradis, Frank and Skippy whose last

names and addresses are unknown, are committing the crime of the

sale of narcotics. The application sought to intercept the communi-

cations of Wrisley and others unknown. Mr. LaBelle further

alleges that telephone communications were made over telephone

747-5361 in the town of Plainville. Mr. LaBelle also alleges that

other normal investigative procedures were tried and had failed,

and reasonably appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried. Also

appended to the application was a statement by Mr. LaBelle that

the allegations of fact contained in the application are not based

upon his personal knowledge, but are based on information and

belief of the matters which were set forth in an affidavit attached

thereto by Sergeant Lester Forst, as well as by the information set

forth in the application previously filed by Messrs. McDonald and

Bianchi which resulted in order number 73-03.

On March 28, 1973, the wiretap panel granted the application

of Mr. LaBelle, and issued order number 73-04 which provided,

inter alia, that the officers were permitted to intercept the telephone

communications of subscriber Daniel A. Wrisley residing/having

his place of business at 17 Dewey Place, Plainville, Connecticut,

from 6 p.m. on 28 March to 6 p.m. on 7 April 1973.

The stated purpose of order 73-04 was “to prosecute Wrisley

and others for sale of narcotics and to conduct further investiga-

tions into the trafficking in narcotics by said persons.”

The order of the wiretap panel also contained a list of the in-

dividuals permitted to make interception, and also provided, as had

the previous orders, that the order was to be executed as soon as

practicable, and was to be conducted in such a way as to minimize

the interception of communications not otherwise subject to inter-

ception in accordance with the provisions of the statute.

On March 29, 1973, after the tap authorized by the wiretap

panel had been instituted, the wiretap panel issued an amendment

to order number 73-04, in which it ordered that its original order

number 73-04 be amended to terminate upon attainment of the

authorized objective or in any event at midnight at 2400 hours on

6 April 1973 rather than at 6 p.m. on 7 April 1973.

On April 6, 1973, John D. LaBelle, state’s attorney for Hartford

County, filed an application with the wiretap panel seeking an

extension of order number 73-04, for an additional period of ten

days, or until such time as the objective or needed information is

first obtained. An affidavit in support of said application, executed

by Sergeant Lester J. Forst on April 5, 1973, was appended there-

to.

On April 6, 1973, the wiretap panel, by unanimous vote, ex-

tended order number 73-04 from April 7, 1973, to April 16,

1973, inclusive, during twenty four hours of each day. The inter-

ceptions under order 73-04 were concluded on April 15, 1973,

at 1:30 a.m.

The order of the panel authorized the officers named in the

order of interception to “intercept telephone communications of

(subscriber): Daniel A. Wrisley residing/having his place of

business at: 17 Dewey Place, Plainville, Connecticut, from 7 April

1973 to 16 April 1973, inclusive, during twenty four hours of

each day.”

The order of the wiretap panel also contained an order with

respect to the issue of minimizing the interceptions of communica-

tions.

Upon completion of the interceptions as permitted by the wire-

tap panel, the tapes which resulted from the interceptions were

delivered to the executive secretary of the wiretap panel. Order

number 73-03 expired on March 25, 1973, and the extension

thereof expired on April 4, 1973. According to Siegbert Kauf-

mann, executive secretary of the wiretap panel, the forty-four

tapes which resulted from number 73-03 and the extension there-

of, were received by him on April 25, 1973, some twenty-one

days subsequent to the expiration of the extension, and approxi-

mately thirty days subsequent to the expiration of the order of

the wiretap panel as originally constituted.

With respect to number 73-04, the original order expired,

according to the amendment made by the wiretap panel, at mid-

night on April 6, 1973, and the extension thereof expired at

midnight on April 16, 1973. According to the testimony of Mr.

Kaufmann, fifteen tapes were delivered to him on April 13, 1973,

which is some seven days subsequent to the expiration of the

original order, and six tapes were delivered to him on April 24,

1973, some eight days after the expiration of the order of the

extension as made by the wiretap panel.

Before those tapes were given to the panel clerk, the state

police were required to make copies of them for discovery use by

defense counsel, since the judicial department had no facilities

to make copies.

Robert E. Parker, Jr., “also known as Skip,” was arrested and

charged by virtue of two bench warrants issued by the Superior

Court for the Judicial District of Waterbury with one count

alleging conspiracy to distribute, sell, dispense, compound, trans-

port with the intent to sell and dispense, heroin, a narcotic sub-

stance, in violation of the statute, in that case made and provided,

and in a second information, with possession of heroin and sale of

heroin.

The conspiracy case affidavit arises out of the fruits of the

electronic surveillance. The second information does not and no

information gained by the electronic surveillance was given to

the undercover agents purchasing the heroin from Parker.

In both cases, by application dated May 15, 1973, the defen-

dant Robert Parker, Jr., filed with the panel of judges pursuant to

the provisions of § 54-41k of the Connecticut General Statutes,

applications for inspection and production of intercepted com-

munications, applications and orders. The defendant also sought

an inventory of all communications intercepted, as well as the

communications intercepted or recordings thereof, which was

denied by the panel. Logs used for obtaining the extension of

order number 73-03 were produced, however, on the theory that

they formed a portion of the application for the extension of the

order. No other logs were supplied to the defendant, despite his

request for production.

Il. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE

The defendant has attacked the constitutionality of the statute

authorizing the interception. His primary argument is that the

statute violates the fourth amendment restrictions against unrea-

sonable searches and seizures.

The motions before the court challenge the validity of chapter

959a of the Connecticut General Statutes which establishes the

procedure for the interception of wire and oral communicaticns.

The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States

dictates that people have a right “. . . to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures,...” and that this right “. . . shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath

or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.” The amendment does not

bar all searches and seizures but only those that are unreasonable.

The amendment outlawed the “general warrant,” and its basic

purpose ". . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of indivi-

duals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727,

18 L. Ed 2d 930 (1967).

Thus, the issue is whether chapter 959a of the Connecticut

General Statutes permits unreasonable searches and seizures in

violation of the fourth amendment.

The United States Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388

U.S. 41, 87 S. Cr. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967), held that

the New York permissive eavesdrop statute, N. Y. Code Crim.

Proc. § 813-a, to be unconstitutionally broad in its sweep “. . . re-

sulting in a trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected

area...” and, thus, violative of the fourth and fourteenth amend-

ments.

In the Berger case, the grounds upon which the statute was

held unconstitutional were as follows:

(1) The statute failed to require a showing of probable cause

that a particular offense had been or was being committed.

(2) The statute failed to require that a description be pro-

vided of the particular conversations or communications to be

intercepted.

(3) The statute failed to require particularity as to the dura-

tion of the intrusion. The court held that the intrusion should

not be so long as to be"... . the equivalent of a series of intrusions,

searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable

cause.” Id, 59.

(4) The statute failed to require particularity as to when a

surveillance should be ended after the particular conversation

sought was intercepted. As to this, the court held that discretion

should not be vested in the executing officer.

(5) The statute failed to provide for either notice to the

persons whose conversations were to be intercepted or a showing

of special facts or exigent circumstances necessitating the with-

holding of notice. Id, 58-60.

In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Cr. 507, 19

L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), where the eavesdropping officers had ex-

ercised great restraint and had limited their intrusion, the Court

10b

restated the requirements of Berger, but with special emphasis on

the necessity for a showing of probable cause before an indepen-

dent judicial officer who also would establish the precise limits to

be observed in executing the eavesdropping order.

Chapter 959a represents an attempt by the legislature, inter

alia, to establish a limited system of electronic surveillance within

the framework of the fourth amendment and the guidelines of

Berger, Katz, and other Supreme Court decisions for use by law

enforcement officers in fighting crime. An examination of the

relevant sections of chapter 959a shows that they provide for

particularity in the application and order, judicial supervision, and

other protective procedures whose absence caused the Court to

condemn the electronic surveillance in Berger and Kaéz.

Judicial supervision, emphasized in Katz, is guaranteed. An

application for order authorizing interception must be made to a

panel of judges, § 54-41b, who may require additional testimony

or documentary evidence in support of fact in the application as

the panel of judges may require, § 54-41c(12), and who must

make specific findings of probable cause before authorizing the

interception, § 54-41d.

There must be particularity in the application and order. An

application must contain “a full and complete statement of the

facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his

reasonable belief that the wire communication of a particularly

described person will constitute evidence of a crime enumerated

in section 54-41b that has been or is being committed or that such

communication will materially aid in the apprehension of the

perpetrator of such crime and that an order should be issued,

.... Sec. 54-41c(5). Such statement must include details of

the particular offense that has been or is being committed, § 54-

41c(5A), a particular description of the nature and location of

the facilities from which or the place where the communication

is to be intercepted, § 54-41c(5B), a particular description of the

type of communications sought to be intercepted, § 54-41c(5C),

the identity of the person, if known, who has committed or is

1lb

committing the offense and whose communications are to be inter-

cepted, § 54-41c(5D). Section 54-4le likewise provides that the

order shall specify, among other things, all of the above details.

Section 54-41¢(5G) requires the hours of the day or night during

which wire communication may be reasonably expected to occur,

and § 54-41c(7) requires the application to specify the period of

time for which the interception is required to be maintained.

Section 54-41f provides that any order entered in accordance

with the provisions of chapter 959a may be executed pursuant to

its terms only by the investigative or law enforcement officers

expressly authorized therein. The order may be executed accord-

ing to its terms only during the hours specified therein, and for

the period authorized or part thereof. No order may authorize the

inerception [sic] of any wire communication for any period longer

than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization,

nor in any event longer than ten days.

Section 54-41g permits no more than three extensions of an

order and requires a new showing of probable cause for each ex-

tension, which period of any extension shall be in no event longer

than ten days, and said application for an extension shall be made

in accordance with the provisions of § 54-41c, which shall, in

addition, contain the results of the interceptions conducted thus

far, and findings by the issuing panel as required by the provisions

of § 54-41d.

Section 54-41li requires the recording of all intercepted com-

munications and the presentation of them under the direction of

the panel of judges.

Section 54-41k provides for notice by the panel to the persons

named in the order within a reasonable time after the termination

of an order or extension thereof but not later than ninety days

thereafter.

An examination of the relevant sections of chapter 959a shows

that they provide for particularity in the application and order,

judicial supervision including limits on the duration of the intru-

12b

sion, and other protective procedures whose absence caused the

Court to condemn the electronic surveillance in Berger and Katz.

Therefore, it is the opinion of this court that chapter 959a is

constitutional on its face.

Accordingly, the motions of the defendant to suppress based

upon the alleged unconstitutionality of chapter 959a are denied.

Il]. THE FAILURE OF THE INTERCEPTORS

TO RETURN RECORDINGS TO THE PANEL

ISSUING THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON

EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF THE ORDER

The next issue raised by the defendant is the failure of the inter-

ceptors to return recordings to the panel issuing the order imme-

diately upon expiration of the period of the order.

Connecticut General Statutes § 54-41i provides, inter alia:

“Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or

extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the

panel issuing such order and sealed under its directions and cus-

tody of such recordings shall be wherever the panel so directs.”

The evidence disclosed that the forty-four reels of tape record-

ings of the interceptions under order number 73-03, which covered

the period ending April 4, 1973, were filed with the panel clerk

on April 25, 1973. The first fifteen reels of. the interceptions

under order number 73-04 were filed on April 13, 1973, and the

remaining six reels on April 24, 1973. The interceptions under

73-04 ended April 14, 1973. Before these reels were given to the

clerk for sealing, copies necessary for the use of the applicant and

for use for discovery by defense counsel were made by the state

police since the judicial department has no facilities to make such

copies.

It is the claim of the state that at this time the state police were

very busy making these required copies and, therefore, this is a

satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the tapes.

13b

It is the defendant's contention that the time lapse between the

end of the intercepts and the receipt of the reels per se calls for

suppression of the interceptions. However, the defendant has

shown no prejudice and he has presented no evidence that the

tapes were altered.

In United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1972),

the Court said:

“The failure immediately to present the tapes

to the issuing justice does not require their suppres-

sion. Section 2518(8) (a) [of Title 18, U.S. Code]

provides that in the absence of a seal the tapes

might be used in evidence if ‘a satisfactory explana-

tion for the absence’ is made. A fortiori, where, as

here, the tapes are sealed, a satisfactory explana-

tion for the delay will allow their use in evidence.”

It should be noted that Connecticut law also provides that a

seal . . . or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof,

...” is required under $ 54-41i, General Statutes.

The Poeta holding is in accord with the numerous cases inter-

preting the suppression provisions of the Federal Wiretap Law,

Title 18, U.S.C.A. 2518(10) (a) and § 54-41m, General Statutes,

its Connecticut counterpart. In those cases, it has been held that

the failure to meet some condition subsequent does not invalidate

ab initio the interception and give rise to suppression of the wire

interceptions. United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir.

1973); United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (D.C. Pa.

1972), affirmed, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1973).

For the above stated reasons, the defendant's motions to

suppress on the grounds of the failure of the interceptors to re-

turn recordings to the panel issuing the order immediately upon

expiration of the period of the order are denied.

14b

IV. MINIMIZATION

The court will now consider the actual execution of the inter-

cept, by far the most important issue.

The question is whether the wiretap was in fact conducted in

such a way as to minimize the interception of communications

not otherwise subject to interception as required by § 54-4le and

the judicial order issued in pursuant thereto.

Section 54-4le provides, in pertinent part, that every order and

extension thereof sha!l contain a provision that the authorization

to intercept “. . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize

the interception of communications not otherwise subject to inter-

ception in accordance with the provisions of this chapter [959a]

“The object of minimization, as set forth in

statute relating to procedure for interception of

wire or oral communications, is to prevent a wire-

tap from turning into an unconstitutional general

search and wholesale invasion of privacy; justify-

ing blanket surveillance on the ground that some-

thing relevant might turn up at any moment would

render the requirement of minimization nugatory

and eliminate the right of privacy. U.S.C.A. Const.

Amend. 4; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5).” United

States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971).

s.-sessment of the minimization question necessarily ultimately

depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

The court commences with the observation that the mere fact

that every conversation is monitored does not necessarily render

the surveillance violative of the minimization requirement of the

statute. See United States v. Cox, 462 F. 2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir.

1972); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360, n.4 (M.

D. Pa. 1971). It is also obvious that no electronic surveillance

can be so conducted that innocent conversations can be totally

eliminated.

15b

The verb “minimize” is defined in Webster's New Third Inter-

national Dictionary as meaning, “to reduce to the smallest possible

number, degree, or extent....”

From the testimony elicited from the witnesses, it was quite

apparent that the Connecticut state police, either in their so-called

“on the job training,” or by specific instructions at the time of the

setting up of the plant, were never instructed by anyone in author-

ity with respect to the requirement of the statute, and of the orders

of the wiretap panel, with respect to minimization. As a matter

of fact, it was testified to by most of the witnesses, that no instruc-

tions were ever given them with respect to minimization. When

asked what they understood minimization to mean, the witnesses

answered that they were not to intercept calls originating as to

attorneys, physicians, or clergymen.

With respect to the operation of the equipment, those officers

who were familiar with it, testified that each of the receivers were

equipped with items of equipment which permitted the tape re-

corder to be shut down, and also permitted the loud speaking de-

vice to be shut off so that the calls were neither intercepted by

tape, nor overheard by the monitors.

Each of the witnesses with the exception of one witness testified

that throughout the entire time that they monitored the equip-

ment in both order number 73-03 and order number 73-04, that

they never shut off the equipment, nor did they ever shut off the

loud speaking device which permitted them to overhear each and

every conversation by the automatically activated equipment.

From the testimony of the state troopers, it was quite apparent

that they had never been instructed with respect to the obligation

which was imposed upon them by the mandate of the statute and

by the order of the wiretap panel that they were to minimize the

interception of communications that are not otherwise subject to

interception.

The state argues that in the investigation of an ongoing nar-

cotics conspiracy such as is involved in this case, it is necessary to

16b

intercept and monitor from beginning to end all communications

passing through the tapped telephone because narcotic related

transactions are conducted through code words that are peculiar

to such transactions and conversations that may sound innocuous

in the beginning may end up on a narcotic related subject em-

ploying such code words.

The court recognizes the difficulty that monitoring agents may

have in manning wiretaps in cases of this kind. Nevertheless, that

difficulty cannot authorize indiscriminate listening or permit such

agents to totally disregard an order of the authorizing panel of

judges to conduct the interception ". . . in such a way as to mini-

mize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to

interception ....”

Further, it appears to the court that despite the practical diffi-

culties, the legislature intended minimization under § 54-41le to

involve something more than the mere provision for the limited

attorney-client, doctor-patient and clergy privilege. A communica-

tion once seized can never truly be given back as can a physical

object. The right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment

has been more invaded where a conversation which can never be

returned has been seized than where a physical object which can

be returned has been seized.

It is the opinion of this court that the surveilling agents

failed to comply with the mandate of the order and the statute,

ie., . . . tO minimize the interception of communications not

otherwise subject to interception . . .,” and, therefore, the motions

to suppress as to this issue should be and are granted.

V. CONCLUSION

In view of the decision reached on the minimization issue, the

court does not find it necessary to discuss the remaining issues.

In summary, the motions to suppress based upon the alleged

unconstitutionality of chapter 959a of the Connecticut General

17b

Statutes and upon the failure of the interceptors to return record-

ings to the panel issuing the order immediately upon expiration

of the period of the order are denied, and the motions to suppress

based upon the failure to minimize the interception of communi-

cations. not otherwise subject to interception are granted.

McGrath

Filed September 6, 1974.

18b

APPENDIX C

No. 8359

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

VS. ; STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NEIL J. THOMPSON : SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

MOTION TO REARGUE

Pursuant to Section 3111 of the Practice Book, the State-

Appellant in the above-captioned case respectfully moves this

court for permission to reargue the appeal. The court's opinion

in this case appears at 191 Conn. 360 (September 6, 1983).

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

State’s Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

Service certified:

Louis S. Avitabile, Esq.

182 Grand Street

Waterbury, CT 06702

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

No. 8359

STATE Or CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

v. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NEIL J. THOMPSON : SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

TO REARGUE,

HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENIED.

BY THE COURT,

FRANCIS J. DRUMM, JR.

C. EF CLERK

M.T. Angers

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

Notice to:

Francis McDonald, S.A.

Bradford Ward, A.S.A.

Walter Scanlon, A.S.A.

Louis Avitabile

Clerk, Waterbury J.D.

9/22/83

No. 8360

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

vs. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

ROBERT E. PARKER, JR. : SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

MOTION TO REARGUE

Pursuant to Section 3111 of the Practice Book, the State-

Appellant in the above-captioned case respectfully moves this

court for permission to reargue the appeal. The court’s opinion

in this case appears at 191 Conn. 360 (September 6, 1983).

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

State’s Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

Service certified:

Maxwell Heiman, Esq.

43 Bellevue Avenue

P.O. Box 1557

Bristol, CT 06010

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

No, 8360

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

Vv. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

ROBERT E. PARKER, JR. : SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

TO REARGUE,

HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENIED.

BY THE COURT,

FRANCIS J. DRUMM, JR.

CHIEF CLERK

M.T. Angers

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

Notice to:

Francis McDonald, S.A.

Bradford Ward, A.S.A.

Maxwell Heiman

Clerk, Waterbury J.D.

9/22/83

No. 8362

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

VS. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES C. BLACK : SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

MOTION TO REARGUE

Pursuant to Section 3111 of the Practice Book, the State-

Appellant in the above-captioned case respectfully moves this

court for permission to reargue the appeal. The court's opinion

in this case appears at 191 Conn. 360 (September 6, 1983).

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

State’s Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

Service certified:

John Jessep, Esq.

55 Chapel Street

P.O. Box 1698

Bridgeport, CT 06604

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

No. 8362

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

Vv. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

JAMEs C. BLACK : SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

TO REARGUE,

HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENIED.

BY THE COURT,

FRANCIS J. DRUMM, JR.

CHIEF CLERK

M.T. Angers

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

Notice to:

Francis McDonald, S.A.

Bradford Ward, A.S.A.

Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder

Clerk, Waterbury J.D.

9/22/83

No. 8363

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

vs. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

FRANK P. LEPORE : SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

MOTION TO REARGUE

Pursuant to Section 3111 of the Practice Book, the State-

Appellant in the above-captioned case respectfully moves this

court for permission to reargue the appeal. The court's opinion

in this case appears at 191 Conn. 360 (September 6, 1983).

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

State’s Attorney

Judicial District of Waterbury

Service certified:

Robert M. Richards, Esq.

44 Avonwood Road

Avon, CT 06001

Francis M. McDonald

BY S/

Francis M. McDonald

No. 8363

STATE Or CONNECTICUT : SUPREME COURT

Vv. : STATE OF CONNECTICUT

FRANK LEPORE : SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

TO REARGUE,

HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENIED.

BY THE COURT,

FRANCIS J. DRUMM, JR.

CHIEF CLERK

M. T. Angers

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

Notice to:

Francis McDonald, S.A.

Bradford Ward, A.S.A.

Robert Richards

Clerk, Waterbury J.D.

9/22/83

APPENDIX D

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO

INTERCEPT WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

(This form will be prepared by (1) State’s Attorneys, applying for

authority to wiretap, and (2) the panel of Superior Court judges,

acting on the application. It will be prepared in duplicate, and, per

Sec. 54-41n, (Gen. Stat.) submitted by the panel to the Chief

yourt Administrator within 30 days of (a) the expiration of an

order or (b) an extension thereof which was approved by the panel

or (c) the date an application for an order or extension was denied.)

PART | - TO BE COMPLETED BY

STATE’S ATTORNEY

1, John D. Labelle | Esq_, State’s Attorney for _ Hartford

(Name of Applicant)

County, under the, authority granted in Gen. Stat. Sec.

54-41b and pursuant to Sec. 54-41c request per-

mission to intercept the wire communications of:

Daniel A. Wrisley, a/k/a

Daniel A. Risley and others unknown

(Identity of person, if known)

of Plainville, Connecticut who has committed or is

(Address)

committing or is believed to be able to provide evidence per-

taining to the following offense(s) which are listed in Sec.

54-41b and which provide the basis of this

application:

_19-480 (a) Sale of Narcotics

(Stat. Sec.) (Brief Description of Alleged Offenses - ex: Gambling)

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

The facts and circumstances giving the evidence of the

offenses were initially discerned on Mon a 1973___at

in the evening hours

(Tumey

(Note: Per Sec. 54-41¢(7) date must be not more than 15 days next

preceding the date of this application.)

Refer to the attached affidavit of

These facts are as follows: Sgt. Lester Forst which is made a

(Gwe-full end-complete satement of -the

part hereof and attached as Exhibit ‘‘A’’. There is also

evidential facts and cite source. If informant, give basis of his knowledge

incorporated by reference the applications and affidavits

or belief, and estimate of his reliability. Supplementary sheets may be

submitted to this panel for an order of interception and an

extension of said “A xo designated as 73-03. (See sheet attached)

attached.)

The allegations of fact in this application are not based on the per-

sonal knowledge of the applicant, but based on information and

belief from the matters set forth in the aforementioned affidavits

and application.

The intercepted wire communication will constitute material

evidence that pursuant to Sec. 54-4lc (9) can

assist in the apprehension, prosecution, and/or conviction of

the person named in par. 2 above for the following reason(s):

Wrisley, a/k/a

It is anticipated that Risley and his associates in heroin will

discuss the sale of heroin in said communications, which

conversations will be evidence themselves and lead to the

issuance of arrest and search warrants.

The content of intercepted wire communications, or evidence

derived therefrom, will be put in the following use(s):

10.

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

The same will be used as evidence in criminal prosecutions

of Risley and others for the sale of narcotics, to conduct

further investigation into the trafficking in narcotics.

Pursuant to Sec. 54-41c (8) following is a list of

pervious wiretap applications or authorizations bearing the

name of the person(s) listed in par. 2 or related to this case:

Application Auth’zn Pertinent

No. & Date Number Name Facts Panel Action

NONE

CHECK BOX IF PERTINENT:

) No previous taps, to the best of my knowledge.

(X) Name checked against State Police files.

(X)_ Name checked with U.S. Attorney and/or FBI.

I request permission to intercept wire communications made

from/to the following telephone numbers which are believed

to be used by the person(s) listed in par. 2:

Daniel A. Wrisley, a/k/a

747-5361 Daniel A. Risley, 17 Dewey PI., Plainville, Conn.

(Phone Number) (Type of Premises in which located - ex: Apt., office, etc.)

Permission to intercept is sought for the period from 10 days.

from date of order 24 hoursaday_ to

during the hours from

ent thx cntliethted ehieadins or saan adiuaiaien tak

obtained. If interceptions beyond the objective are needed,

give reason(s):

11.

12.

13.

14,

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

_Due to continuing and heavy nature of heroin, trafficking —

by Risley and his associates such is required.

In addition to the authority to wiretap, pursuant to Sec. 3(10)

of PA 68, I also request authority to (CHECK PROPER BOX)

C) make secret entry into the premises of the person(s)

named in this application in order to install an inter-

cepting device which is not otherwise practicable.

install a pen register or similar device to tract telephone

numbers called within the exchange. -

I request that the following parties (ex: SNETCO, landlord,

etc.,) be required to furnish the following assistance:

SNET Co. to supply technical information required to

locate terminals and wires of telephone in application.

This request was initiated by; _ Trooper John F. Petrowski,

(Rank & Name of Official, and

Connecticut State Police Department.

Affiliation (ex: State or local police)

Information obtained by intercept may be disclosed to:

State’s Attorneys Bianchi, McDonald, LaBelle, Markle,

State Police Commissioner Fuessenich, Lieut. Ragazzi,

(Rank, Name, affiliation and Qualifications of investigative or law

et al, as on attached list marked Exhibits ‘‘B’’ and made

a part hereof.

enforcement officer.)

The following investigative or law enforcement officers, on

the basis of their specialized training or experience and

the requirements set forth by Sec. $4-41b and 54-4 1c

meeting

(2) will be making the interceptions:

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

See attached list Exhibit ‘‘C'', made a part hereof, all of

whom are members of the Connecticut State Police De-

partment, and have had either training with that department

or the New York or New Jersey State Police Department

in electronic surveillance.

(Rank, Name, Agency - List Qualifications on separate sheet if necessary)

16. I certify that, for the reasons given below and pursuant to

Sec. 54-41c (6).

a. to the best of my knowledge, other normal investigative

procedures with respect to the offense(s) have been tried

and have failed, are not promising, or are deemed to be

dangerous to employ, and as is set forth in more par-

ticularity in paragraphs 4# of the attached Exhibit ‘‘A’’.

46 ont 37

b. this application does not involve forivileged persons or | s

facilities, as enumerated in Sec. 54-41h and if

privileged wire communications are intercepted they will

not lose their privileged character, and

c. the equipment to be used protects the recordings from

editing or alterations.

17. Following is a list of items attached to this application:

Exhibit ‘‘A’’, Exhibit ‘‘B’’, Exhibit ‘‘C’’.

(ex: Affidavits)

Date of Application Signature & Title of Person Making Application

ond Aflaming the Above laformanion.

18. Wherefore the applicants request the issuing panel by unani-

mous vote, to enter an ex parte order authorizing the inter-

ception of wire communications within the State of Connecti-

cut and make the following finding that on the basis of the

facts submitted by the applicants that there is probable cause

to believe that:

Daniel A. Risley of Plainville and Burlington, Arnold

“Tufty” Albert of Terryville, Allen LaFleur of parts un-

known, Kathleen Paradis, of parts unknown, “Frank”, last

mame and address unknown, “Skippy” last name and

address unknown have committed and are committing

the crime of sale of narcotics in violation of Section 19-

480 of the General Statutes.

Telephone communications over telephones 747-5361 in

the Town of Plainville, Connecticut, will constitute

material evidence that the offense of sale of narcotics, in

violation of 19-480 of the General Statutes, has been and

is being committed and will materially aid in the appre-

hension of the perpetrator of such offense.

Such communications are not otherwise privileged.

Other normal investigative procedures with respect to the

sale of narcotics have been tried and have failed and

reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, and

are too dangerous to employ, such as physical surveillance

and direct undercover contact with the suppliers of heroin

to Albert and Wrisley.

. The telephone facilities and places of such facilities are

not those described in Section 54-41 (h), General Statutes.

. The investigative or law enforcement officers to be author-

ized to intercept the wire communications are qualified

by training and experience to execute the interception

sought.

7. Not more than thirty-four orders authorizing interception

have been previously issued by all panels in the calendar

year 1973.

The applicant further requests that such order continue until

Wrisley’s aka Risley’s JDL

the objective of the interception, the disclosure of Albert’s,/

and LaFleur’s source of heroin and the disclosure of the nature

Albert's aka Wrisley’s JDL

and extent of LaFleur’s, /Risley’s, / and others heroin tra-

fficking in the area, is attained, or for ten days next succeed-

ing the date of issuance of the order, whichever occurs first.

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 28th day of March,

1973.

John D. LaBelle

John D. LaBeile, State’s Attorney

for Hartford County

STATE OF CONNECTICUT Hartford

COUNTY ‘OF HARTFORD

The foregoing instrument was signed, sworn to and acknow-

ledged before me this 28th day of March, 1973 by John D.

Labelle.

Irene L, Kagan

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Mar. 31, 1974

EXHIBIT A.

In the matter of the interception )

of wire communications of an in- )

dividual known as Daniel A. Wrisley )

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

and other ucknown persons engaging )

in a narcotic selling enterprise )

from telephone facility number )

747-5361, listed to Daniel A. Wrisley )

a/k/a Daniel A. Wrisley

17 Dewey Place, Plainville, Conn- )

ecticut, 2nd floor.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

SS HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

COUNTY OF HARTFORD

Sgt. Lester Forst, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and

says:

1. Application is hereby made for an order authorizing the in-

terception of wire communications as hereinafter specified.

2. The affiant, Sgt. Lester Forst, is a member of the Connecticut

State Police Department. In such capacity, he is empowered

to conduct investigations of and make arrests for the offense

of Sale of Narcotics in violation of PA 278 February Session,

1972, Section 24 (19-480A) of the General Statutes. He is

currently responsible for the investigation detailed herein-

after involving the foregoing offense in aid of which investi-

gation this application is made.

3. The interception will be made by means of electronic equip-

ment installed and maiatained by members of the Criminal

Intelligence Division of the Connecticut State Police, each of

whom has undergone at least two weeks of specialized train-

ing in the use of said electronic equipment and the techniques

required for its proper installation. The monitoring of said

communications will be done by other members of the Con-

necticut State Police Department who are responsible with

me for this investigation which has given rise to this applica-

tion and who have been instructed in the procedures required

by the “Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act of

1971”, for the control of such an installation and the preser-

vation of information obtained thereby, and have each par-

ticipated in investigations of offenses of the type described

herein.

. This affidavit of application in its present form, was submitted

to State’s Attorney John D. LaBelle, Hartford County at

Hartford, Connecticut, who has attached his written authori-

zation and application hereto.

. Our investigation has revealed that the individuals committing

the offense specified herein and whose communication is to be

intercepted is Daniel A. Wrisley and other unknown persons

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

engaging in a narcotic selling enterprise.

. The type of communications to be intercepted are telephonic.

The wire communication facility involved is telephone num-

ber 747-5361 and which is the number of the telephone

listed to Daniel A. Wrisley, 17 Dewey Place, Plainville,

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

Connecticut. The telephone is located within the premises

and is accessible to the individuals named herein. It will be

necessary before commencing interception to obtain technical

information from the appropriate common carrier concerning

said facility.

. We know of no previous application made to any court for

authorization to intercept a wire communication involving

any of the same facilities, places or persons specified in this

application.

=_sSlhlU)lC(‘ ~*~ Oo

10.

11.

12.

. The interception is required to be maintained not longer than

ten calendar days and during the hours between 12:01 A.M.

to 12:00 Midnight. Conversations regarding the Sale of

Narcotics are expected to be monitored.

The contents of the intercepted wire communication and

evidence derived therefrom will be utilized in the arrest and

prosecution of Daniel A. Wrisley and other unknown persons

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

and to further investigative process pertaining to the crim-

iM Narcotics

inal activities / of the above mentioned persons.

The facts upon which we rely in support of this application

are as follows.

I, Sgt. Lester Forst, have been a member of the Connecticut

State Police Department for more than ten (10) years. I

have for the past one month been assigned to the Narcotic

Squad of the Detective Division and have participated in

numerous narcotic investigations and arrests. I have received

specialized training and have graduated from the Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Training School, and the

Connecticut State Police. I have while attached to the Nar-

cotic Squad, interviewed informants, undercover investiga-

tors and defendants, all of whom have personally participated

in or witnessed narcotic selling operations. I have also con-

ducted surveillances of locations where narcotics are sold and

stored. From this experience I am familiar with methods

and equipment used by narcotics sellers in Connecticut includ-

ing the techniques used by them to avoid detection by law

enforcement officials.

The investigation and surveillance referred to in this applica-

tion was, or may be, carried on by the affiant and the follow-

ing State’s Attorneys, Chief Prosecutor of the Circuit Court

and members of the Connecticut State Police Department:

1. State’s Attorney Joseph T. Gormley, Jr.

2. State’s Attorney John F. Bianchi

10d

State’s Attorney John D. LaBelle

State’s Attorney Arnold Markle

. State’s Attorney Francis M. McDonald, Jr.

State's Attorney Edmund W. O’Brien

State’s Attorney Donald B. Caldwell

State’s Attorney Harry S. Gaucher, Jr.

State’s Attorney Vincent Scamporino

Chief Prosecutor Cornelius J. Shea

. Commissioner Cleveland B. Fuessenich

. Lt. Orlando P. Ragazzi

. Sgt. George Potter

. Sgt. Lester J. Forst

. Sgt. James Shay

. Sgt. Leslie Williams

. Cpl. Timothy Murphy

. Cpl. Nicholas Valerio

. Cpl. Robert Root

Cpl. James Smith

. Cpl. Doris Hughes

. Det. Martin Ohradan

. Det. James Smith

. Det. Bruce Haines

. Trp. John Petrowski

Trp. Bernard Deprimo

. Trp. Frank Dlugokinski

. Trp. Cataldo Ventura

. Trp. Curt Peircey

. Trp. George Ryalls

. Trp. Brian Esson

. Trp. Jerry Fucci

. Trp. Ronald Hart

. Trp. David Paige

. Trp. Orlando Moranino

. Trp. Nicholas Barone

. Trp. George Huston

. Trp. Robert Keller

1ld

13.

14.

15.

39. Trp. Douglas Hanahan

40. Trp. Michael Conroy

41. Trp. Daniel Gaslicki

42. Trp. David Carey

43. Trp. Robert Welch

44. SPW Irene Welch

45. Trp. Norman Soucie

46. Trp. Thomas Bennett

47. Assistant State’s Attorney Walter H. Scanlon

That on March 15, 1973, a court ordered wiretap was author-

ized, Order Number 73-03, to monitor telephone facility

589-9878, a public pay telephone located outside the Austin

House Hotel, Main Street, Terryville, Connecticut and tele-

phone facility 589-9920, a public pay telephone located in-

side the Austin House Hotel, Main Street, Terryville, Con-

necticut.

That in the conversations which have been monitored in this

electronic surveillance it is quite apparent that the two tele-

phones are being used to conduct narcotic transactions. The

intercepted communications have been reported to me, as

supervisor of the State Police in this investigation.

That on March 20, 1973, a call was intercepted at 11:38

P.M. during which a male identified as “Frank’’, called James

(Sonny) Black, at telephone facility 748-2479, listed to Miss

Sandy McGarrah, 30 Durant Avenue, Bethel, Connecticut.

In this conversation, Frank told Sonny that he (Frank) spoke

to the “old boy” today (March 20, 1973) and here is what

he had to say. “He says the price you (Sonny) owes is 5500,

it was 7000. Frank told Sonny that the “Man” is laying on

(counting on) the 5500 so he can re-up. Frank told Sonny

that the “Man” said “if you (Sonny) can’t come up with the

bread right away you (Sonny) will have to give him (old

boy) three spoons of dope a day until you get it.” Frank told

Sonny that the “Man” has a three spoon a day habit. Frank

12d

~~!

——ad

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

told Sonny that the “Man” said he wants at least 3000 right

away. Sonny told Frank that the “dude” (Old Boy) is being

unreasonable and that 5500 was a lot of bread. Sonny told

Frank that he would get the “dude” some methadone, about

100 dollars worth. Frank told Sonny to get 2 or 3 hundred

worth. Frank also told Sonny that the “Man” has some

“Super dope” lined up that is better than the last stuff. Frank

told Sonny to get that goddam 3000, now he (Old Boy) has

to depend on you for the dope.

That the affiant knows that a James Black of 6 Durant Street

Danbury, Connecticut, is a known seller of heroin, described

in paragraph 15.

That in a second conversation monitored on March 20, 1973,

this male identified as Frank called Canada and in conversa-

tion with a female known as Dianne, mentioned that he lived

in Burlington.

That in a conversation monitored on March 21, 1973. Frank

called a Doug Maycheck in Darien. Doug asked Frank for

his home phone number and Frank told Doug that he had

the phone in the house yanked out as he was sure it was

tapped.

That on March 22, 1973, Agent Art Fredericks reported to

the affiant that Frank has been identified as Frank Paul

LePore, Date of birth 2/8/50, by police photograph.

That on March 22, 1973 Agent Thomas Hunt reported to the

affiant that in attempting to contact Allen LaFleur to pur-

chase heroin, Hunt overheard Kathleen Paradis direct a un-

known male to call 747-5361 to reach Allen LaFleur from

the telephone 589-9920 in an attempt to contact Allen La-

Fleur to arrange a sale of heroin to Hunt.

That on March 22, 1973, the affiant was advised that tele-

phone number 747-5361 was called six times from 589-9920

but no answer was made to the ringing.

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7 J

23.

24.

25.

26.

That a check of telephone number 747-5361 was made and it

was learned that the number is listed to Daniel A. Wrisley

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

17 Dewey Place, Plainville, Connecticut. This information

was learned from the Southern New England Telephone

Company.

That the affiant on March 22, 1973, learned from Resident

Trooper Thomas Kenny of Burlington, Connecticut that tele-

phone number 589-7770, listed to Kathleen Paradis, Johnny

Cake Mountain Road, Burlington was up to March 19, 1973

located at a home rented by a Daniel Wrisley. This home is

a/k/a Daniel Risley

nightly visited by a great number of cars and Risley is known

by the Connecticut State Police at Bradley Field to visit

Arizona twice a week. Wrisley has a record of past narcotics

a/k/a Risley

arrests both in Connecticut and Arizona.

That the affiant was also told by Agent Hunt that he is now

(as of 3/22/73) negotiating a purchase of brown heroin

for over $1,000.00 from Allen LaFleur.

That with respect to paragraph 22, a purchase of heroin took

place between Agent Kelley and Arnold “Tuffy” Albert in

Plainville, outside of a residence type structure on Dewey

Place.

That electronic surveillance is requested in this case because

normal surveillance techniques would probably not lead the

investigators to the “old Guy.” Although the “Old Guy”

is a narcotic addict himself, he is and has been well insulated

from the persons who have been the cause of this investiga-

tion. The ongoing trafficking in brown heroin, narcotics, con-

trolled drugs and cannabis type drugs is over the telephone

facility 747-5361 listed to Daniel A. Wrisley, 17 Dewey

a/k/a Daniel A. Risley

Place, Plainville, Connecticut. In addition an undercover

14d

27.

28.

29.

investigation is presently under way, where undercover agents

have purchased a large amount of brown heroin from one,

Allen R. LaFleur who is associated with Joseph LaBlond and

Arnold “Tuffy” Albert in the brown heroin business but have

been unable to locate the source of drugs supplying Allen

LaFleur and Arnold Albert, which source has remained in the

background of the heroin transactions. Allen LaFleur was

accompanied by one Kathleen Paradis when LaFleur sold

brown heroin to the undercover agent and the said telephone

of said Paradis, (589-7770) as given to the undercover agent

at Johnny Cake Mountain Road, Burlington, Connecticut has

been disconnected on March 19, 1973.

A Frank P. LePore who on March 21, 1973 was observed

in the company of Allen LaFleur, has indicated in an inter-

cepted communication that the telephone was removed for

fear of a wire tap. This communication was intercepted over

telephone facility 589-9920, the facility which was the sub-

ject of the original order 73-03.

Because of the continuing nature of an illegal narcotic opera-

tion of the type described herein and because of the informa-

tion outlined in this affidavit regarding the individuals in-

volved, the affiant knows from his experience that an illegal

narcotic operation will continue to occur over telephone facili-

ty 747-5361 and therefore it is necessary to continue monitor-

ing for a period beyond the interception of the first evidentiary

conversation overheard in order to lead us to the “Old Guy”

who is the supplier of brown heroin to the subjects mentioned

previously in this application.

In complying with this wiretap statute, it is hereby requested

that Mary Margaret Nolan, a typist employed by the Con-

necticut State Police Department, be given permission to

transcribe the taped conversation obtained from these wire-

taps.

Per Section 4, item 3 of this Public Act, such communications

are not legally privileged as the phone number mentioned

15d

30.

31.

5a.

33.

on Page | is not leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly

used by a licensed physician, an attorney at Law, or a prac-

ticing cleryman [ Sic).

Not more than thirty four orders authorizing intercepted

have been previously issued by all panels in the calendar

year, 1973.

That the afhant on March 23, 1973, was advised by Agent

Hunt while in conversation with Arnold “Tuffy” Albert on

March 22, 1973, during a purchase of $975.00 worth of

brown heroin, Albert told Agent Hunt that his suppliers were

two partners, one who he knew as “Danny”, who is an addict

and a man named “Skippy” who is a non-addict. Agent Hunt

stated he was also told that these two men go regularly to

Arizona for heroin which they bring back to Connecticut in

large quantities.

That the affiant upon checking the toll slips of 589-7770, the

telephone which was located at Johnny Cake Mountain Road,

Burlington, Connecticut, and which is the phone that was

disconnected on March 19, 1973, for fear of a wiretap, and

which is the home rented by Daniel Wrisley on Johnny Cake

Mountain Road, Burlington, the tolls reflected collect calls

from Tuscon, Arizona.

That the affiant, was advised on March 26, 1973, that in a

intercepted phone conversation that Frank while speaking

with a female known as Diane, stated to Diane that he

(Frank) had just taken Danny and Allen to the airport. The

purpose Frank told Diane was to get more dope.

16d

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 27th. day of March, 1973.

Lester Forst

Sgt. Lester Forst

STATE OF CONNECTICUT HARTFORD

COUNTY OF HARTFORD MARCH 27, 1973

The foregoing instrument was signed, sworn to and acknowledged

before me, this 27th. day of March, 1973, by Sgt. Lester Forst.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Mar. 31, 1978

17d

EXHIBIT “B”

The contents of intercepted communication may be disclosed to

the following:

State’s Attorney Joseph T. Gormley, Jr.

State’s Attorney John F. Bianchi

State’s Attorney John D. LaBelle

State’s Attorney Arnold Markle

State’s Attorney Francis M. McDonald, Jr.

State’s Attorney Edmund W. O’Brien

State’s Attorney Donald B. Caldwell

State’s Attorney Harry S. Gaucher, Jr.

State’s Attorney Vincent Scamporino

Chief Prosecutor Cornelius J. Shea

. Commissioner Cleveland B, Fuessenich, Conn. State Police

VP HWA Py PS

N ©

Lieut. Orlando P. Ragazzi, Conn. State Police

. Sgt. Lester J. Forst, Conn. State Police

. Trp. John Petrowski, Conn. State Police

. Trp. Norman A. Soucie, Conn. State Police

. Assistant State’s Attorney Walter H. Scanlon

Pe oe

nm! wR Ww

EXHIBIT “C”

Officers W orking Interception J.D.L.

1. Commissioner Cleveland B. Fuessenich

2. Lt. Orlando P. Ragazzi

3. Sgt. George Potter

4. Sgt. Lester J. Forse

5. Sgt. James Shay

6. Sgt. Leslie Williams

7. Cpl. Timothy Murphy

18d

Cpl. Nicholas Valerio

Cpl. Robert Root

. Cpl. James Smith

. Cpl. Doris Hughes

. Det. Martin Ohradan

. Det. James Smith

. Det. Bruce Haines

. Trp. John Petrowski

. Trp. Bernard Deprimo

. Trp. Frank Dlugokinski

. Trp. Cataldo Ventura

. Trp. Curt Peircey

Trp. George Ryalls

. Trp. Brian Esson

. Trp. Jerry Fucci

. Trp. Ronald Hart

. Trp. David Paige

. Trp. Orlando Moranino

Trp. Nicholas Barone

Trp. George Huston

. Trp. Robert Keller

Trp. Douglas Hanahan

. Trp. Michael Conroy

. Trp. Daniel Gaslicki

. Trp. David Carey

. Trp. Robert Welch

. SPW Irene Welch

. Trp. Norman Soucie

. Trp. Thomas Bennett

19d

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

PART 1A -

TO BE COMPLETED BY PANEL OF JUDGES

. Application Number: 2373-5

. Date on which application was heard: 28 March 1973

. Action Taken: [%) Approved

L) Approved Conditionally

CL) Denied

. Authorization Number: 73-04

. Request(s) for amendment of authorization received on: __1/a

L) Approved

CL) Denied

. Request(s) for extension of authorization received on: _1/a_

LJ Approved

L) Denied

Therefore, the panel directs the officers named in the order to

intercept the telephone communications of (subscriber):

Daniel A Risley residing at (address):

17 Dewey Pl, Plainville, Conn., from 6 pm on foo

28 March 19_73_ to 6 p.m., 7 April 19 73 inclusive. In

furtherance of this interception, the Southern New England

Telephone Company is ordered to supply __John D LaBelle

state's attorney for __Hartford County _, or his duly authorized

20d

CONFIDENTIAL

(When entries have been made on this form)

agent forthwith all information, facilities and technical assistance

necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a

minimum of interferenge with the services that Southern New

England Telephone Company is according the person whose com-

munications are to be intercepted, namely said subscriber

Daniel A Risley __ who normally uses the telephone number

747-5361

Anthony ]. Armentano

Paul J. Driscoll

John J. Bracken

Signatures of Judges

NOTE: THIS ORDER/AMENDMENT/EXTENSION OF AN

AUTHORIZATION TO INTERCEPT SHALL BE EXECUTED AS

SOON AS PRACTICABLE, SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH

A WAY AS TO MINIMIZE THE INTERCEPTION OF COM-

MUNICATIONS NOT OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO INTERCEP-

TION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS

ACT, AND SHALL TERMINATE UPON ATTAINMENT OF

THE AUTHORIZED OBJECTIVE.

21d

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.