Amicus Brief — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro

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FIL I.

No. 83-558 —

IN THE —.—

Supreme dum uf the Anited States

October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District,

Petitioner,

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and

Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,

Respondents .

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY

Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W., #600

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER

Associate Executive Director and

Legal Counsel

National School, Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON

Executive Director

National School Boards Association

Office Supreme Court, U.S.

5

JAN 19 aa

>

— —

NO. 83-558

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District

Petitioner

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and

Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor

Respondents

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY

Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N. M., #600

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER ‘

Associate Executive Director and

Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON

Executive Director

National School Boards Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS e@eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee 1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW eeeeseeoeeaeeeoeeeee8 2

ARGUME NT e@eeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeese 3

I.

Il.

III.

IV.

VI.

Int roduct ſon „eee 3

The Lower Court's Requirement

is Contrary to the Statute

and the Intent of Congress ..... 6

The Department of Education

Regulation Under the Act

May Require No More Than

That Schools Provide To

Handicapped Children Those

“Health Services," If Any,

Provided to Non-handicapped

Children eeeeeeeeaeeeeeeeeeeaee ee 15

While State Law Should

Control Questions of

Educational Methodology,

Such Laws Should Not e

Used in Defining Standards

Intended to Apply Nation-

wide @eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 18

Whether or not a Service

is a "Related Service" is

Not Dependent On the Setting

of the Child's Placement ...... 20

This Court's Interpretations

of § 504 do not py

“Health Services" To Be

Provided to Handicapped

Children Unless Provided

to Non-handicapped eeeeeeeeeeee 22

13

„

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee@ 1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW NW . 2

ARGUME NT — · ae 3

Le Introduction eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3

The Lower Court's Requirement

is Contrary to the Statute

and the Intent of Congress .. 6

III. \The Department of Education

egulation Under the Act

Require No More Than

That Schools Provide To

Handicapped Children Those

“Health Services," If Any,

to /Non-handicapped

544 „„%%%%%%%%%„„„„4„„ ĩ) 15

IV. While State Law Should

„„ „„ 18

V. Whether or not a Service

is a “Related Service" is

t Dependent On the Setting

of the Child's Placement ... 20

VI. re Court's Interpretations

§ 504 do not 2 be

Ante Services“ To Be

Provided to Handicapped

ildren Unless Provided

to Non-handicapped . 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

VII. The Decision Below was

Designed for a Large

Suburban District, But

Will Affect All Districts,

Regardless of Size and

eee eee 27

VIII. Conclusion @eeeeeeeeseeoeeeeeeeed 36

APPENDIX @eeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 39

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Hawaii 50 ne of Education >

V. Vorr, pp.

(0. in 1982), affirmed,

32-4096, s1Tp op Op. (9th Cir.

Nov. 7, 1983) @eeeeoeaeaeoeoee ee eoeee ee 33, 35

Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley, 102

* . 198 „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „ „ * 18

ec State School and Hospital

. Halderman, 451 U.S. 5

Tor J. tt. 1531 (1981) 6629259252554 „4„%!1.ꝓ 24, 25

Southeastern Community College

v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397

eeeeeeeeeeeoeeee ee eee 22, 23, 24 9

Tat ro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557

. 1980) (Tatro I) 3, 11

Tat ro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823

F. 1983) (Tatro II).. ..v e 3, 11

Tatro v. Texas, 481 F.Supp.

— * Tex. eee eee 36

Statutes:

Education for All Handicapped

Children Act, 20 U.S.C

§ 1401 . 49 passim

Statutes (continued):

Page

Section 504 cf the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 794(b) @eeeeoeceeoeoe eee eee eeeeee@ passim

Other Authorities:

American Nurses Association,

School Nurses Working with

Handicapped Children (1980) ....... 33

Appendix A, Paragraph 36, Section 504

Regulation, 45 C.F.R. §84, 42

Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) 19

34 C. F. R. § 104.44(A) e@eeeeeeoeeoeoeeeeeeee ee 23

45 C. F. R. § 121.a13(B) (10)

(now 34 C. F. R. 5300. 13 (b) (10) ....15, 16

121 Cong. Rec. S 10956, 10960

(June 18, 1975) Ceoeeeeeeeseseseeeeces 6,9

41 Fed. Reg. 56,977 (Dec. 30, 1976) 16

42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) 27

47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982) 27

H. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., Ist

Sess. 9 (1975) e@eeeeeeceoeaeoeeaeeeeeoee eee 11

5. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong.,

lst Sess. 12, 13 (1975) cocccccce Ll, 12

W. White, “Are You Ready to Provide

the Health Services Demanded “4

of the School?" American 3

School Board Journal 25

No. 83-558

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District

Petitioner

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and

Next Friend of Amber ſat ro, A Minor

Respondents

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARUS ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS

This brief is filed with consent of both

parties. Letters of consent are on file with

the Clerk of this Court.

Amicus curiae, National School Boards

Association (NSBA), is a nonprofit federation

of this nation's state school board

associations, the District of Columbia school

board and the school boards of the offshore

flag areas of the United States. Established

2

in 1940, NSBA is the only major national

educational organization representing school

boards and their anders. Its membership is

responsible for the education of more than

ninety-five percent of this nation's public

school children.

Each of the 16,000 school districts which

NSBA represents receives or is eligible to

receive financial assistance under the

Education for All Handicapped Children Act of

1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (the Act).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether defining “related services“ under

the Act to include clean intermittent

catheterization (CIC) is consistent with the

language of the Act and its legislative

history.

3

ARGUMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the Fifth Circuit in both

Tatro I, 625 F.2d 557 (1980) and Tatro II, 703

F.2d 823 (1983) is founded on a premise which

has little or no basis in either the statute

itself or its legislative history.

Under the ruling below, a school district

is responsible for the provision of every

health service required by a handicapped child

if it must be administered during the school

day and if it can be administered by someone

other than a licensed physician. According to

the lower court's rationale, a service is

related“ to the special education of the

child merely if the child needs the service

during the school day, regardless of whether

the service is educational in nature. Amicus

agrees that the Congress intended to require

the provision of all educational services

necessary for the child to benefit from 4

4

special education, even though some of those

educational services have medical or health

overtones. But the Congress also intended to

exempt services which are solely medical or

health services.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) defines “related

services” as:

transportation, and such

developmental, corrective, and other

supportive services (including

speech pathology and audiology,

psychological services, physical and

occupational therapy, recreation,

and medical and counseling services,

except that such medical services

shall be for diagnostic and

evaluation purposes only) as may be

required to assist a handicapped

child to benefit from special

education, and includes the early

identification and assessment of

handicapping conditions in children.

In order to avoid the express statutory

exemption of medical services, the lower court

narrowly defines such services as those which

can only be provided by a physician. Thus,

any service which can be provided by someone

other than a physician could come within the

fr

„

5

rubric of the lower court's strained

definition. While the Congress included a

requirement that districts provide diagnostic

and evaluation services (even though such

services can be considered "“medical,") the

primary purpose of this type of medical

service is to assist in the education of the

child rather than to sustain the child's life.

The decision below goes beyond the intent

of Congress in its attempt to fund education

services for handicapped children. It

misapplies the exemption in the Act of

“medical services." It results in a different

standard of compliance in each state, based on

the vagaries of the laws on the practice of

medicine. It confuses the “related services"

requirement with the requirement of “least

restrictive environment." Finally, the

decision below turns the non-discrimination

requirement of the Act into an independent

requirement that schools provide health

services to handicapped children, even when

such services are not available to

non-handicapped children.

II. THE LOWER COURT'S REQUIREMENT IS CONTRARY

TO THE STATUTE AND THE INTENT OF

CONGRESS .

Mandating that schools provide CIC,

and other services related exclusively to the

health of the child as “related services"

under the Act is contrary to the intent of

Congress in passing the Act.

Senator Jennings Randolph, the Senate

sponsor of the Act, in his opening remarks

during Senate debate on the Act, summarizes

the purposes of the Act:

First, all handicapped children

living in a State who are in need of

- special education are identified,

located, and evaluated; second, a

goal is established to provide full

educational opportunities to all

handicapped children; third,

priorities for services are

established first with respect to

handicapped children not receiving

an education and second with respect

to severely handicapped children

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7

receiving an inadequate education;

fourth, procedures are established

to safeguard the rights of

handicapped children and their

parents in decisions relating to

identification, evaluation, and

educational placement; fifth, a free

appropriate public education be

available for all handicapped

children between the ages of 3 and

18 within a State. 121 Cong. Rec. S

10960 (June 18, 1975).

Senator Randolph's remarks evidence the

intent of Congress to tie all requirements in

the Act to the educational needs of

handicapped children. It was not designed to

address all the needs of handicapped children.

As this Court stated in the landmark case

under the Act of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley,

102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982):

We therefore conclude that the

‘basic floor of opportunity

provided by the Act consists of

access to specialized instruction

and related services which are

individually designed to provide

educational benefit to the

handicapped child.

Respondents have not contended that Amber

Tatro is not receiving an educational benefit

N * 10 l ee

8

from the specialized instruction provided to

her. Demands for CIC, a health service, are

completely extraneous to the quality of

Amber's education.

The Act defines “handicapped children” as

those who “because of their impairments

require special education and related

services." Thus, if Amber's only handicap“

were her neurogenic bladder condition, she

would not be “handicapped” under the Act

because that condition alone does not give

rise to a need for specialized instruction.

The only reason the Act applies here at all is

because of Amber's additional handicap which

results in her need for specialized

educational services. Congress was not

attempting in the Act to fund or to require

school districts to fund, any services for

handicapped children other than those

directly related to the special educational

needs of the child.

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9

In order to discern the intent of

Congress, the Court's attention is directed to

the original version of the Act as passed by

the Senate. 121 Cong. Rec. S 10956 (June 18,

1975). That version did not, in its

definition of “related services," include

either medical or counseling services. The

House version, however, did include such

services but provided that the services were

limited to those required for diagnosis and

evaluation purposes only. The final version

includes the House requirement and the

limitation on the requirements.

Thus, Congress clearly expressed its

intent to require the provision of medical

services only where they are necessary for

diagnosis or evaluation of the child.

Apparently it was felt that diagnostic and

evaluation services might not be provided by

school districts unless expressly included in

the statute. However, to clarify its intent

*

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10

the Congress stated explicitly that the

“medical” requirement goes no further than

just diagnosis and evaluation.

The lower courts' attempt to avoid the

express statutory limitation by defining

“medical” in terms of who provides the service

rather than the nature of the service, has no

basis in the statute. The term medical“ in

the statute was intended by the Congress to do

nothing more than differentiate between

services which are educational (although

including health components) and services

which are strictly health services. There is

nothing in the statute or its history to

support an argument that the Congress used the

term “medical” to differentiate between health

services provided by someone other than a

physician and health services provided by a

5 physician.

We direct this Court's attention to the

description in the lower court's opinion of

3

the CIC procedures, 703 F.2d 823, 829. See

Appendix. The description clearly shows that

the procedure is à2 “medical procedure"

designed solely to meet physical health needs

rather than a diagnostic or evaluation device.

The lower court points out in a footnote,

625 F.2d at 564, n. 17, that the statutory

definition of "related services" includes

“physical and occupational therapy and

recreation" as examples of “related services."

The court states that it fails “to see how

these services ‘arise from the effort to

educate any more than CIC'." A reading of the

legislative history will elucidate.

In the debate on the Act, Congress

expressed its concern that handicapped

children have an opportunity to receive

extra-curricular services, in addition to the

curriculum designed to meet their unique

educational needs. 8. Rep. No. 168, 94th

Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1975); H. Rep. No. 332,

12

94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975). Thus, for

example, the legislative history discusses

physical education courses and the fact that

such courses should be modified so that

handicapped children can participate either

along with non-handicapped children or, if |

appropriate, participate in a separate

setting. Id. It also discusses the fact that

handicapped children have a right to “health

screening, transportation services and all

other services which are provided to all

children within the school system." S. Rep.

No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1975).

Members of both houses expressed concern

that handicapped children be provided the

opportunity to participate in extra-curricular

activities, particularly physical education.

"The Committee is concerned, although these

services are available to and required of all

children in our school system, they are often

viewed as a luxury for handicapped children.”

13

S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 12

(1975). They cite the Special Olympics, the

dance and drama programs at Gallaudet College

and other examples of the arts and physical

education as viable teaching tools. Id. at

13. Nothing in the legislative history

implies, however, that health services nat

provided to non-handicapped children and not_

educationally necessary must be provided to

handicapped children. All of the discussion

on extra-curricular activities and physical

education and health services (not evaluative

or diagnostic) revolves around the

non-discrimination core of the Act. These

requirements do not stand alone.

Further, the definition of “special

education” includes “instruction in physical

education” so it is certainly appropriate to

include a reference to “physical therapy" in

the definition of “related services" to

conform to the special education definition.

L

All of the services set forth in the

definition of “related services" are required

because they have a direct relationship to the

education of the child, either as a teaching

tool or as a means of evaluating the child to

determine his educational needs.

To the same extent, as discussed below,

where school health services are provided to

non-handicapped children they should also be

provided to handicapped children, even though

some modifications may have to be made to

accommodate the unique needs of the

handicapped child. However, the average:

school health service is nothing more than

basic first aid and in some instances, simple

physical examinations and immnization shots.

The existence of such a health clinic should

not automatically give rise to a requirement

that the school mst provide to handicapped

children every health service which a school

nurse is qualified to provide under

4

15

supervision of a physician. Further, not

every school has a full-time health clinic or

even a part-time nurse and yet, under the

decision below, life-saving services which are

capable of being provided by a nurse must be

provided.

III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REGULATION

UNDER THE ACT MAY REQUIRE NO MORE THAN

THAT SCHOOLS PROVIDE TO HANDICAPPED

CHILDREN THOSE “HEALTH SERVICES,” IF ANY,

PROVIDED TO NON-HANDICAPPED CHILDREN.

The lower court sets forth its standards

as to when a “life support“ service must be

provided as a “related service": (1) the

child must be handicapped so as to require

special education; (2) the services must be

required by the child during the school day;

and (3) it must be one which a nurse or other

qualified person can perform.

The lower court cites Department of

Education regulation 45 C. F. K. 121.a13(8)(10)

(now 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10)) as authority

for the third part of its test. That

s

3

-

16

provision defines “related services" and

states in part: “the term also includes

school health services, social work services

in schools, and parent counseling and

training." The Department's regulation

defines “school health services" as those

which are “provided by a qualified school

nurse or other qualified person.“ 34 C. F. R. 5

300. 1305) (10).

It is unclear from the commentary in the

regulation why the Department chose to add

“school health services" to the statutory

definition of "related services." Such

services were not included in the earlier

proposed regulation, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,977

(dec. 30, 1976), 1 and the Department of

Education removed the services from the

definition in its proposed regulatory changes.

: Further, the proposed regulation

defined “medical services": as “procedures

af a Ne agg physician to determine

‘eon education and

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4

17

47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982). (That

propos al was subsequently withdrawn.)

As discussed earlier, Congress intended

to require school districts to provide to

handicapped children services which are being

provided to non-handicapped children, even

though in the former instance it may be sore

difficult or more expensive. Thus, if the

Department intended by its regulatory

reference to “school health services" merely

to assure that handicapped children would have

access to school health services, that

requirement is authorized by the statute.

However, the effect of the lower court

interpretation of the regulation is to make an

independent requirement that school districts

must provide health services to handicapped

children regardless of whether those services

are also provided to non-handicapped children.

If that interpretation is correct, the K

Department s regulation is ultra vires. 4

, 44 § N * ö sigs * 1

e 4 * 3 3 5 et a ts

18

IV. WHILE STATE LAW SHOULD CONTROL QUESTIONS

OF EDUCATIONAL METHODOLOGY, SUCH LAWS

SHOULD NOT BE USED IN DEFINING STANDARDS

INTENDED TO APPLY NATIONWIDE.

The district court below recognized the

anomaly caused by the reliance on state law in

determining whether a medical procedure is a

“related service“ or an exempt “medical

service.“ 516 F. Supp. 968, 975 (1981). In

matters of educational methodology we would

certainly agree that state law should control.

The “courts must be careful to avoid imposing

their view of preferable educational methods

upon the States." Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3051.

However, in matters involving basic rights of

the handicapped, there should be but one

judicial standard. This is particularly true

since the state laws on which the courts are

to rely in this case are designed to guide

medical practitioners and others as to what is

or is not the practice of medicine. They are

not designed to confer substantive rights.

State law should govern as to who

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19

provides a “related service." See Comment to

Department of Education Regulation 34 C. F. R. 5

300.13. However, the question as to the

nature of the service, I. e:, whether it is a

health or educational service, and, thus,

whether it is required to be provided, should

be answered through resort to the statute

itself or its legislative history.

The identification process may even be

affected if the reasoning of the lower court

is to become the law of the land. At the

present time handicapped children are

identified by their need for specialized

education. If they are now to be identified

by their need for a medical service as

defined by state medical statutes - the number

of handicapped children will be increased and

the quality of the education services to be

provided to all children may decrease.

Additionally, even though their child is

being provided with an “appropriate” education

. * * 3

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20

as defined in Rowley, parents may move from

state-to-state depending on which state's

regulation of the practice of medicine results

in more free health services being provided by

school districts in the state.

There are only so many responsibilities

which society can place on school systems

before their main mission - to educate -

begins to be seriously jeopardized.

V. WHETHER A SERVICE IS A “RELATED SERVICE"

IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE SETTING OF THE

CHILD'S PLACEMENT.

The lower court resorts to the

tautological argument that because Amber

Tatro's Individual ized Education Program (IEP)

calls for her education in the regular

classroom and because she needs CIC during the

school day, the school district must provide

the CIC.

Since Amber needs CIC during the school

day regardless of where she is placed, the

issue is not where she is educated but who

EC ĩ 5i—s?7' ß. r

21

pays for the CIC. Amber Tatro does not need

CIC in order to be educated in a regular

class room. She needs CIC in order to live,

regardless of the setting of the education.

Although Congress did evidence a

preference in the Act for mainstreaming (i.e.

education in the least restrictive

environment, preferably the regular

classroom) of handicapped children, the

question of what is a "related service” does

not depend on whether the child is in a

regular classroom or in a separate setting.

Even if the school district had determined

that the appropriate setting for Amber was in

a special school or institution, the district

would remain liable for assuring that the

child receives special education and related

services, either by providing the services

itself or by remaining financially responsible

for the education and "related services."

22

VI. THIS COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF 5 504 DO

NOT REQUIRE ‘HEALTH SERVICES’ TO KE

PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN UNLESS

PROVIDED TO NON-HANDICAPPED.

The courts below, in order to allow

attorneys ' fees to the “prevailing”

plaintiffs, also found a violation of § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. That Act

provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped

individual in the United States ...

shall, solely by reason of his

handicap, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or de subjected

to discrimination under any program

or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance ... 29 U.S.C. §

794,

In the case of Southeastern Community

College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), this

Court considered its first case brought under

§ 504. The question in that case was how far

an institution of higher education must go to

accommodate the handicap of a deaf applicant

to its nursing program. The Fourth Circuit ;

had ruled that § 504 required “affirmative 1

23

conduct" on the part of Southeastern to modify

its program to accommodate the disabilities of

applicants, “even when such modifications

become expensive."

The Department of Health, Education and

Welfare, in its regulation implementing

§ 504, requires “modifications to (a

college's] academic requirements * are

necessary to ensure that such requirements do

not discriminate on the basis of handicap

coos” 34 C. F. R. § 104. 44 (A). But this Court,

in Davis, held that:

[ir these regulations were to

require substantial adjustments in

existing programs beyond those

necessary to eliminate

discrimination against otherwise

qualified individuals, they would do

more than clarify the meaning of §

504. Instead, they would constitute

an unauthorized extension of the

obligations imposed by that statute.

The language and structure of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflect a

recognition by Congress of the

distinction between the evenhanded

treatment of qualified handicapped

persons and affirmative efforts to

overcome the disabilities caused by

handicaps. Id. at 410.

=a

2 OS Se ae

24 4

The court dismissed the contention of the

Government which argued in its amicus brief

that § 504 requires affirmative action.

[IR is undisputed that respondent

could not participate in

Southeastern's nursing program

unless the standards were

substantially lowered. Section 504

imposes no requirements upon an

educational institution to lower or

effect substantial moodifications of

standards to accommodate a

handicapped person. Id. at 413.

On April 20, 1981, this Court handed down

an opinion in the case of Pennhurst State

School_and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1.

101 S. ct. 1531 (1981), which © although

interpreting a law which is distinguishable

from the Act at issue here, contains important

language relating to interpreting the intent

of Congress in passing such laws. |

Plaintiffs sought the closing of

Pennsylvania's Pennhurst State School and

treatment of the mental ly retarded, and urged

that “community living arene, de

25

estab] ished for its residents. The district

court held that conditions at Pennhurst

violated the federal constitutional right to

be provided with “minimally adequate

habilitation” in the “least restrictive

environment," and also found violations of the

Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment

and § 504. Pennhurst was ordered closed and

suitable “community living arrangements"

provided for all Pennhurst residents. A

Special Master was appointed to supervise the

implementation of the order.

The court of appeals affirmed the

appointment of a Special Master, but declined

to reach the constitutional claims, instead

resting its order on its construction of the

Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 38111

of Rights Act. This Act was raised on the

court's own initiative; none of the Plaintiffs

having raised it.

This Court in Pennhurst noted that the

26

Act in question was passed by the Congress

pursuant to its Spending Power rather than

under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,

the legitimacy of the Congress

power to legislate ... rests on

whether the State voluntarily and

. accepts the terms of the

‘contr „ 0 There can, of

course, be no knowing acceptance if

a State is unaware of the conditions

or is unable to ascertain what is

expected of it. Accordingly, if

Congress intends to impose a

condition on the grant of federal

moneys, it must do so unambiguously.

101 S. Ct. at 1539-40.

When the State of Texas and the Irving

School District accepted funding under P.L.

94-142 and the requirement of providing a

“free appropriate education,” they did not

knowingly accept a requirement that they must

provide life-saving devices needed by each

handicapped child during the school day.

The question is not, as opined by the

court below, whether or not it would be

burdensome for the school district to provide — 7

the service - but whether it 1s discrtmtnetory 1

27

not to provide it. Should handicapped

children have more rights than

non-handicapped?

The comment in the Department of

Education regulation under § 504 provides an

interesting analysis of the duties of health

institutions under § 504.

One common misconception about the

regulation is that it would require

specialized hospitals and other

health care providers to treat al!

handicapped persons. The regulation

makes no such requirement. Thus, a

burn treatment center need not

provide other types of medical

treatment to handicapped persons

unless it provides such medical

services to nonhandicapped persons.

It could not, however, refuse to

treat the burns of a deaf person

because of his or her deafness.

Appendix A, Paragraph 36, Section

504 Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 84, 42

Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977).

VII. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DESIGNED FOR A

LARGE SUBURBAN DISTRICT, BUT WILL AFFECT

ALL DISTRICTS, REGARDLESS OF SIZE AND

RESOURCES.

In the fall of 1982, the Department of

Education published for comment a Notice of

28

Proposed Rulemaking uner the Act. 47 Fed.

Reg. 33,836. Section 300.4(b)(10) of that

notice suggested that the provision of related

services be limited to non-medical services as

designated by state law. In response to that

notice, amicus surveyed its member school

districts in order to provide the Department

with a clear picture of the problems school

districts are having with the regulations as

they presently stand. School districts in 19

states, with student populations ranging from

nearly one million to less than 700,

een. One main theme soon became

apparent in their comments : — nearly all

districts expressed their dismay that, given

their limited educational budgets, they are

being required to take on responsibilities

better placed with other social agencies. As

one survey respondent stated, “Schools in

{this state] have become, by default, the

major social agency servicing the health, 3

. $i —

> s 4 ~ — 4 4 x

Pees, * al aS

29

psychological, respite and custodial care

needs of children."

Should the school districts be forced to

take on these multiple roles? The answer is a

most definite no. It is impossible for one

body to be all things to all people. In

trying to solve one portion of a problem, it

is important not to overlook the needs and

constraints of the whole. Judicially

formulated requirements pertaining to related

services are one of the most difficult, if not

the single most difficult, expenditure to

justify to those who are complaining about the

dwindling funds available for the education of

all. public school children.

Alternately, should it be found necessary

for the schools to take on these many tasks,

the decision is one best made by the state,

not the judiciary. Only the state and local

governments are fully aware of the myriad

considerations that go into allocating scarce

30

fiscal resources. Judicial tampering with

this allocation of responsibility and

resources will only serve to upset the careful

balance that states have reached, and

ultimately, do more harm than good to those it

is attempting to help.

Though the Irving School District is a

moderately large district with about 22,000

students, and might be able to muster the

necessary resources to undertake the lower

court's mandate, it must be noted that it is

not a typical school district. Eighty-seven

percent of the 16,000 school districts in this

country neve less than 5,000 students, and 25%

have less than 300 students. These school |

districts are also under the mandate of the

circuit courts that have ruled that CIC and

other non-educational services mst be

provided to students within their bounds.

‘Although the lower court describes CIC as

a “simple procedure, assuredly non-health

31

personnel such as teachers and administrators

will not be inclined to willingly take on such

a procedure which can result in serious

illness if improperly carried out. It is

difficult for personnel not trained in the

health professions to recognize symptoms and

the failure to do so could have dire results.

Further, unless all personnel in the school

are trained to perform the service, the child

would not have the service available when the

teacher or teacher's aide is absent from

school. Thus, school districts would have to

assure that health professionals are available

at all times. That is an expensive

proposition given the fact that many schools

do not have full-time nurses on staff, and,

given budget cuts, many other schools are

cutting back in the number of non-teaching

personnel, including school nurses.

More than 86,000 facilities are currently

being used in the U.S. to educate public

7

* .

183

* 1 : 8 baat

vi, See * 1 * 4 99 ei a as 1 1 8 — * 1

r J ye

32

school students. Meanwhile, only about 30,000

schoal nurses are employed by public school

systems. In Oconomwoco, Wisconsin for example

one nurse serves 4,900 student in nine

schools. 3 Quincy, Massachusetts has 14

full-time nurses, but they must serve 12,500

students in 26 schools. Some school districts

have no full-time nurses on staff and obtain

emergency care from public health service

agencies. W. White, “Are You Ready to Provide

the Health Services Demanded of the Schools?"

American School Board Journal 25 (June 1981).

These smaller districts, which lack the

specialized staff to perform such tasks, will

incur even higher costs than those faced by

Petitioner. When one considers the full range

of medical services that schools, if the N

decision below is taken to its logical :

conclusion, may soon be forced to provide, the

costs begin to multiply rapidly. Under the

lower court decision, schools would be x

>

Wr r Cs ˙— OOP

33

obligated to provide insulin § injections,

kidney dialysis, and maintain tracheostomies.

Colostomy, ileostomy, and uretherostomy care

may be needed by students. Students may also

require naso-gastric tube feedings, treatment

for pressure sores, or use of a respirator

during the course of the day. American Nurses

Association School Nurses Working with

Handicapped Children 3, (1980). In fact,

courts are requiring such services at the

present time. Hawaii Department of Education

Ve Dorr, F. 2d * No. C. A. 82-4096 slip

op. (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1983). Because of

decisions such as that below, schools of

education are incorporating instruction in

suctioning, CIC and dispensation of medicine

in special education curricula. Education

should not be forced to take on roles better

assumed by school nurses. School Nurses

Working with Handicapped Children, supra at 4.

Yet, given the dearth of school nurses, and

34

funds to hire them, that may be the only

alternative. To provide these services, other

programs -- educational programs -- will have

to be sacrificed, and the original intent of

the Act, to provide an education for

handicapped children, will ultimately suffer.

It is not just the direct costs of

providing the related services, but also the

indirect burdens that attend then that

concern school districts. School boards today

are wide open to tort liability claims. With

insurance costs already sky high, districts

will now be faced with adding an additional

risk — medical services -- to the policies

which try to protect them. Many may find in

the long term that it is more expedient to

hire medical personnel — thus stretching

tight budgets even further -- rather than face

this potential liability.

Additionally, unions across the country

are already beginning efforts to have

35

handicapped children "“triple-counted" for

purposes of determining class size, because of

the extra time and effort these children need.

Faced with the prospect of having to provide

medical services, they may seek to raise this

figure even higher, if indeed, their contracts

will even allow them to perform medical

services, a question yet to be answered. Such

fears are not groundiess. In at least one

case, it was noted that school personnel had

filed grievances charging "violation of their

contracts of employment by being required to

perform duties of a medical nature outside the

scope of their contractual duties." See

of Education v. Dorr, 531 F.

Supp. 517 (D. Hawaii 1982). These concerns do

not reflect cold hearted callousness on the

part of school districts and their employees,

but rather legitimate fears --"fears that they

could not perform the medical procedure

correctly ... fear of the personal aspects of

36

the procedure ... and fear of being sued if

something untoward occurred during the

procedure." Id.

VIII. CONCLUSION

As stated by District Judge Higginbotham

in the first district court opinion in this

case,

there is a temptation here to

achieve a humane result. Despite

the limited number of times school

boards may be faced with a child

requiring CIC, the interpretation of

these federal statutes has wide

consequences because it involves

definitions of the duty of hundreds

of school districts to be discharged

in myriad factual patterns. e

limits on this court's institutional

role here gives little play for this

court's humanitarian concern for

Amber and her parents." 481 F. Supp.

1224, 1226.

Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit, in

reversing Judge Higginbotham, stepped out of

its role as interpreter of the law and into

the role of policymaker. Whatever the merits

of the state providing free CIC services to

. : N 8 *

9 a 9 4 + ae ek

iS 3 . K r (( 333 82

F 8 R

37

Amber Tatro, there is no werit in a court

twisting the language of the statute to

achieve that result. The conclusion of the

court of appeals to the effect that the school

district is responsible under federal law for

the provision of any and all health services,

which c ve provided by someone other than a

phySician and which are needed by a

_ handicapped child during the school day,

whether or not the services are educational in

nature, simply has no support under either the

Education for All Handicapped Children Act or

§ 504,

If indeed the court below had requested

policy arguments on the merits of the school

district providing this service, the school

4 district may have convinced the court on

pelicy merits alone that its precedent is

inadvisable. There are limited funds

aveilable for the education of al! children,

handtcanped and non-handtcapped alike. Schoc!

7

4

;

4

™

—

—

38

districts must use great care in deciding

whether to increase educational options for

the children they are charged to educate or to

-step into other fields and attempt to use

limited funds to meet other needs, such as

health needs. Whatever the policy arguments

may be, there is no support for the legal

interpretation devised below.

Respectfully submitted,

GWENDOLYN NM. GREGORY

Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association 1

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N. M., #600 q

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER

Associate Executive Director and

1 Counsel

National School Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON

Executive Director

National School Boards Association

39

APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CATHETERIZATION OF FEMALE

PURPOSE :

To completely empty the bladder at scheduled

intervals in order to decrease the incidence

of urinary tract infection.

Urine that stays stagnant in the bladder is

more likely to become infected. A bladder

that stays full becomes enlarged and

Scheduled emptying of the bladder allows the

patient to become familiar with the difference

in the sensation of a full bladder and an

empty bladder. \

EQUIPMENT NEEDED: |

Clean catheter, metal or rubber. (Metal is

best since it can be boiled repeatedly without

deterioration.)

Soap and Water.

Dish to catch the urine, for example, a

re-usable jar.

Large underpad, to prevent soaking bed linens.

*

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Wash hands with soap and water.

2. Get all of the equipment ready.

3. Get a ready. se oS

at

2 it acer. ‘t tht

height.) Place child on her back.

aah 1

40

GENERAL INSTRUCTION (continued):

3. Spread labia apart with one hand and

wash genitalia with soap and water

with the other hand, al movi

in a downward direction. ver was

in an upward direction since this

will move germs from around the

rectum up yinto the area of the

bladder opesing.)

5. Insert catheter in urethra and let

all urine drain out of the bladder.

“This may ve onger than you think,

30 ve cat het er unt i] the

urine has draining.

6. f you are unable to catheterize,

contact your local Public Health

Nurse or call Texas Scottish Rite

Hospital.

7. Discard urine.

8. Clean catheter. Clean with soap and

warm water after each use. Allow to

dry and place in a clean, dry

envelope.

At least once a day after the catheter has

been washed with soap and water, place it in a 1

pot of water and boil for 20 minutes. Allow

the catheter to air dry and place it in a

clean dry envelope.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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