Respondents Brief — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro
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Office -Surreme Court. US
FILED
No. 83-558 MAR 2@ ae
7 ALL AANODER LL. STEWASs
IN THE soviet |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
v.
Petitioner,
HENRI and MARY TATRO, individually and as
Next Friends of AMBER TATRO, a Minor,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Court
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
James C. Todd
ADVOCACY, INCORPORATED
1006 East 50th Street
Austin, Texas 78751
{512) 475-5543
March 23, 1984 Attorney for Respondents
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child
such as Amber Tatro is a “related service’ within the mean-
ing of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended.
2. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child
such as Amber Tatro is a ‘supplementary aid or service”’
within the meaning of Section 612(5)B) of the Education of
the Handicapped Act, as amended.
3. Whether the requirement of clean intermittent cath-
eterization as a related or supplementary service for a child
such as Amber Tatro is a reasonable condition imposed on
Petitioner for the receipt of federal funds under the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act, as amended.
4. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child
such as Amber Tatro is a reasonable accommodation pur-
suant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRE-
TNS in 5s gin a Reh ens sae need naa eee
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY ...................
I. DENIAL OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATH-
ETERIZATION WOULD RESULT IN THE ExX-
CLUSION AND SEGREGATION OF AMBER
TATRO AND SIMILARLY SITUATED HANDI-
CAPPED CHILDREN FROM THE FREE PUBLIC
Page
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
V. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS
A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION PUR-
SUANT TO SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITA-
Cr er ae ee Serer 33
to the instant case ...................0.00.. 33
| sppropriate public education in the least restrictive
C. Petitioner’s refusal of clean intermittent catheteri-
zation to Amber Tatro would have the effect of ex-
cluding her from participation in, denying her the
benefits of and subjecting her to discrimination by
Petitioner's program solely on the basis of her
D. Clean intermittent catheterization for Amber Tatro
does not impose an undue burden on Petitioner 41
ALD. 50's Gl ca ah op « skineg chal: vx. 45
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) 21
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) 34
Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) 29, 41
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. -
3034 (1982) ....... 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 44
Campbell v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F.
Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1961) .................66. 15
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) 33
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. LeStrange, __. U.S. —__.,
52 U.S.L.W. 4301 (No. 82-862, February 28, 1984)
eee eh ON ee ar pe ee 21, 33, 35
Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981),
rev. and rem., 708 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983)... .. 15
Georgia Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 706
F.2d 1866 (llth Cir. 1963).................... 36
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, —_ U.S.
pee 2 RO 21, 34
Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va.
ROUGE od as veo ak etek ens Fab see 12, 19, 27, 41
Heims v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 946 (1982) ..... 6... eee ne 6
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
GOED a ks oa SE ales 0 4 nike vs Sees Ve 34
Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) . 34
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).............. 21
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mezx-
ico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982) ............. 36
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451
US 3 OBE ed Lira. tee Tie eo 27, 30, 31, 32
Roncker v. Waiter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom. Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Roncker, _. U.S. —___., 52 U.S.L. W. 3266
(No. 82-1890, October 3, 1983) ................ 15, 19
Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .. 36
Smith v. Cumberiand School Committee, 703 F.2d 4
(1st Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v.
Robinson, _.. U.S. ___., 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (No.
wen" \ SG Sere. 2 ae wa eet 48 eo ee Ps “ie ee ee t
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied __. U.S. ___., 103 S.Ct. 2086
CO BN we aod 6 SO cade Dok piece okie. hk os 15, 19
Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983) (Tatro IJ)
De ae AY Se ar Cie) ee. Qe 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 20, 35, 36
Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981) .
5 Vn cian a v's + 6 dae UA 3 a CN 1, 2, 7, 22, 24, 35
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tatro J)
Pn acti nds Hides COE e Eee 4, 6, 7, 17, 20, 21, 22, 36
Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979) 6
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443
(8rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Scanion v.
Tokarcik, 458 U.S. ___., 102 S.Ct. 3508 (1982) ..
ey ey Aa ee et 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, C.A. No.
79-338 (W.D. Pa. October 31, 1980), reprinted at 3
EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED LAW
REPORTS (E.H.L.R.) 552:427 (1980).......... 9, 16, 20
United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) . 35
United States Statutes
The Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended
by the Education of the Handicapped Amendments
of 1974, £0 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.
Bh Ne ROE ae ap ca Ry eae mee Tae 27
The Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended
by the Education For All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.
DOD on ok 0 84k kd oi Deo es ce ao. ll
DME. ada0 ss OKs oa b ecalle Peebine sarees 1
REDOING. © a sibic sid ped ee ca peek OeRaN 16, 23, 33
i tan sate ea cates «ob eee myer ee
SS ee ee eee ele ee 16, 18, 23, 33
SU EE: GUMIc <0. crwie.« 6.4.0 0 wnie trol o Grats Slalean Ene 23, 30, 33
IE Ba CK: b ev Were chico CUS He 0. SueeE ee ln 32
SIDS 4 i 9's ait/dte 6 0 ib ewe inne be ebbaes 16
EOD 0.» Ss ae) ic peeadeweeas Dewees 2
DT NED sv nd ons ob cede eee e ets 8, 17, 26, 27
RAN ——
siti
vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
een das etael Shes _... 30, 32
§ 1413 (a4)... Se eee 12
SS pi ee 32
§ 1414 (aX1NC)........... Ms Pins he)
MI So 55 dc Su « hivs os SRR bPSa ca eee 30, 32
Se ee ph eee ey 5
Re ERAS ORE "ee Sees vine ee, 5
TS ASME TIRES SS Alte eed Me .
SO ee, eee eee See. 21
The Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20
FE Re eee 34
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 7 (7), 29 U.S.C.
I A a oe diek Pe daniel ad end so ah aie nd
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, 29 U.S.C.
Oe as so cass 7, 9. 11, 13, 15, 27, 33 et seq.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 505(aX2), 29
SUED, gS. 9.3-s d's pb alta Oiaca Caen © Mite oka
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
GN a a0. nals 6s condi Rca ease ant Badion
’ The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U:S.C. § 3601 et seq.
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 et seg............ 31,
35
34
34
34
34
34
32
Or OR RMR sage Lo tiey : em eRe 2 32
32
32
32
32
32
32
FY 1984 Appropriations for Depertments of Health
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
United States Regulations
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(kN2).......... 7 a . 36
OG Ge Is bi vce cker ier vedine 36
ge 6 4 ree ae 36
ek eS ere 35
eet ee err eee er ee 12
dS er ee 35
34 C.F.R. Part 104 Appendix A Comment 23 .. 36
of El UR ere 1
Se 1
Re ee eee 24
34 C.F.R. § 300. 13(bM1Miii)......... 2... 24
34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bHIMiv).................. 23, 24
OU te IIs 5 ox tins eve ccc cccess 21, 44
ok AO 24
ek A 8 en 22, 23
34 C.F.R. § 300.13 Comment................ 23, 33
a db: ks 5.0 vn vo ne's's bem 12
34 C.F.R. § 300.340-300.349................. 5
34 C.F.R. § 300.550-300.554................. 5
Re RS eee eee 36
Texas Statutes
Hearing Aids, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 4566 et
Ss ier conch i250 s Med cele’: o.cidbe bavels Cae b ree
Comprehensive Special Education Program for Handi-
capped Students, TEX. EDUC. CODE § 16.104(c}1) 2
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004 .................. 2, 13
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.081 ..................
ALA. CODE § 34-2¢217.......................
ALASKA STAT. § 08.84.160...................
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1328(b) ................
D.C. CODE ANN.
om
:
=
BSS8S BSB.
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2901 23
KY. REV. STAT. § 327.010 a 23
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3002 23
MINN. STAT. ANN.
eee Ea a 23
ff er ee ETE OP ware 23
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-A:9.............. 23
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531 (McKinney)........... 23
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4755.48(F) .......... 23
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 688.130... ee 23
I, oes ov os een ues» 23
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1309 ........... 23
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 459.035.......... 23
VA. CODE
§ 54-273(9) om a : ¥ 23
§ 54-281-2 . peepee Gere akg Ula Shed Catabe a hit 23
Texas Administrative Rules
ie Teg SE 24
i9 TAC. $60.217 ....... ir ¢.o Ct taka 24
Pe I Fo bg is hk boinc ohio owes seen 2
19 T.A.C. § 89.235(aN3NCiix) ....... 7 24
19 T.A.C. § 89.235(d) ..... ce abs are as Caras 2, 13
BO FPS GI icc cc ete tccens Fate 13
19 T.A.C. Chapter 157, subchapter D....... 6
Miscellaneous Authority
Legislative History
118 Congressional Record 525 (January 20, 1972). . 14
121 Congressional Record 19494 et seq.
IN de ess willie is we eee 14, 15, 18
I 3: Sie ss ce» vale «aw ee kee at's 14, 15, 18
INLD 28 cis clack Posh ou yy oes eeu 15, 18
ee pees 15, 28
RR ROU 6. nk rrdde ce Biotec pave 15, 18
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Office of
Civil Rights Decisions
Kansas City U.S.D. #50, OCR Ref. No. 07831094,
reprinted at E.H.L.R. 257:455 Curr. Dec. (May 2,
Rss & Sapte a bis Kab obs Oke eae te’ eee
North Kansas City (Mo.) School District, 3 E.H.L.R.
257:04 (November 29, 1978) ..................
Books &
Periodicals
A. Abeson, et al Access to Opportunity, in 2 HOBBS
(ed.), ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF
eo RB DL Pens a ee
A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSI-
GEE Get. bs a has die cs pte s DE
J. LUCKMAN & R. SORENSEN, MEDICAL-SUR-
GICAL NURSING (1960)....................
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, A
SURVEY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION COSTS IN
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1979).. .......
T. Nevins & S. Maver, Dialysis, in S. GELLIS & B.
KAGAN (eds.), CURRENT PEDIATRIC THER-
"ioe ab ee ee
D. Stauffer, Catheterization—A Health Procedure
Schools Must be Prepared to Provide, 54 JOURNAL
OF SCHOOL HEALTH 37 (1984).............
L. WHALEY & D. WONG, NURSING CARE OF IN-
FANTS AND CHILDREN (1983) .............
Other
Board of Education v. Rowley, Brief of Petitioner, re-
printed at 3 E.H.L.R. 553:323 (1982)...........
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ......
Page
39
35
38, 39
26
26
12, 13
19
&S
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amber Tatro is a mentally and emotionally normal' female
child who is disabled by the birth defect of myelodysplasia,
more widely known as ‘‘spina bifida’ (‘open spine’’). Record,
Trial Transcript (‘‘Tr.'’) at 13-14, 95-96, and elsewhere. Amber
was three and a half years old at the time of the June 19,
1979 Impartial Hearing— Record, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5b (Tr.
137), Impartial Hearing Transcript (‘I.H.Tr.") at 67—five
at the time of trial, 516 F.Supp. 970; seven at the time of
the Court of Appeals’ second decision, 703 F.2d 825, and is
now eight years old. Amber is agreed to be ‘‘orthopedically
handicapped” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), 34
C.F.R. § 300.5(bi6). Further, she was found by the Impar-
tial Hearing Officer to be ‘‘other health impaired’’ within the
meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(bX7). PL
Exh. 5, supra, Decision of the Hearing Officer at 6-7.
Among the effects of Amber's handicapping condition are
speech impediments, mobility impairment and a ‘neurogenic
bladder."’ If Amber's bladder dysfunction, which includes
an inability to empty her bladder voluntarily, is left chron-
ically unattended, it will result in ‘‘reflux’’ pressure on the
kidneys, causing infection and kidney damage. Pl. Exh. 5b,
supra, I. H. Tr. 14-15; Tr. 234-235, and elsewhere. To avoid
the harmful consequences described, it is necessary for
Amber to be ‘‘catheterized” every three to four waking hours,
by a process known as ‘‘clean intermittent catheterization”
(“CIC”). PL. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 27-28, 34-37, 65-67; Tr.
111, 238-239, 244; 516 F.Supp. 971, 974. She must be cath-
eterized at least once during the ‘school day'” in order to
‘It is not contested that Amber is intellectually normal. nor has the
school district or anyone eise on record in this case asserted that she is
emotionally disordered.
Slee ceenntn ene tae te denen Sen astne
(ARD) Committee had determined, with the parents’
two-end-a-half-hour day program was coat abhsee oa aay
1979. Tr. 318. However, that
in Amber's individual education pian Tr S88. "Barty Childhood
oy
for ("Pet. Brief”) at 3. are eligible for
2
attend school safely. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 29-30; Tr.
239-240, 244-245; 516 F.Supp. 977. Amber has been provided
CIC since she was thirteen months old. Tr. 79. Prior to CIC,
Amber had bladder infections approximately once every two
months, lasting about six weeks on one occasion. Pl. Exh.
5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 67. Since being on CIC, Amber has had
no such infections or other injuries or side effects.’ Jd. at 68;
Tr. 80.
‘Clean intermittent catheterization” (“‘CIC’’) is a very sim-
ple, safe, quick and effective process, capable of being per-
formed by an average layperson with minimal training,
whereby a small hollow tube is inserted about one-inch into
the urethra in order to drain the bladder. 516 F.Supp. 974;
public education at age 3, while five is the age of eligibility for regular
public school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(24B); TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 16.104(ci1),
21.031. At trial, Petitioner's witness Ms. Guy conceded that Amber, then
five years old, might qualify for an educational program extending from
8:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Tr. 326. Subsequently, Petitioner offered Amber
a two-hour-and-forty-five-minute program, attempting to schedule it be-
tween the hours in which Amber usually needs catheterization. This was
the subject of special proceedings on March 13, 1981. Transcript (‘*Tr.
(3-13-81)"") at 18-20. At that time it was announced, and noted by Judge
Higginbotham as a ‘positive sign.’ that Amber would go to kindergarten
the following September. Tr. (3-13-81) 34. At oral arguments before the
Court of Appeals on November 16, 1962. it was not disputed that Amber,
then seven years old. was in a regular first grade class. She now in fact
attends a regular second grade class. (Amber's current IEP is attached
as an Appendix to this Brief.) There. she is entitled by law to a minimum
seven-hour day. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004. State Board of Education
3
Tr. 125-126, 128-130 (testimony of Phalia Findley), 144-146
(Dr. George Williamson),‘ 235-238, 241-245, 252, 268-269 (Dr.
George Hurt);* Joint Appendix (J. A.'’) at lla (§ 2j). CIC
was pioneered in the early 1970's, to replace ‘‘sterile
catheterization."’ J. A. 9a (§ 2f); Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr.
15-16. “Sterile catheterization’’ was ‘‘prohibitive’’ in cost,
requiring an autoclave, an expensive piece of medical equip-
ment, and not permitting the re-use of the catheters. Jd. at
48, 144-147; Tr. 240-241. However, it has been established
that CIC is as effective as sterile catheterization and entails
no greater risk of infection. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. at
17, 48; Tr. 240-241. The contrasting simplicity of CIC* was
well described by the Court of Appeals below:
CIC is a very simple procedure which can be performed
within five minutes. The catheter is washed with soap
and water; the urethral area is wiped clean; the catheter
is introduced approximately one and one-half inches into
the urethra and the bladder contents drained; the
catheter is withdrawn; and the amount of urine collected
‘Director of Pediatric Rehabilitation, John F. Kennedy Medical Ce cer.
Addison, New Jersey: a member of the medical faculties of Columbia
University and the State University of. New York: author of publications
and consultant to state education agencies concerning the education of
handicapped children (especially children with spina bifida): Dr. William-
son has had extensive experience with CIC. Tr. 137-142.
‘A licensed physician, board-certified in urology. with a special interest
in the neurogenic bladder: a member of the Texas Association of Genito
uinary Surgeons, American and Texas Urological Associations, American
Pediatric Urology Association, American Academy of Pediatric Urology
(serving on the Myelodysplasia Action Committee of the latter}: Dr. Hurt
has served hundreds of spina bifida children, specifically in CIC. Pl. Exh.
Sb, supra, |. H. Tr. 1612, 17; Tr. 233.
“In CIC, it is not necessary to sterilize the catheter. It is sufficient to
emg AP ye water and rinse it before use anc Lo wipe
it off after use. Pi. Exh. 5b, supra, |. H. Tr. 18-19. Gloves do not have
to be used and it is not necessary to touch the part of the catheter used
for the catheterization. /d. at 18. The bacteria introduced through CIC
are of the same type that already reside in the urethral anyway.
Id. Dr. Hurt testified that of hundreds of children on CIC in
none had ever suffered a perforated urethra due to catheterization. as
speculated by Petitioner. /d at 42.
4
is measured and noted. The procedure can be taught to
anyone after a training session of approximately thir-
ty minutes, and it need not be performed by a doctor
or nurse. Currently, Amber is catheterized at home by
her parents, teenage sibling, and babysitter. However,
when Amber is eight or nine years-old, she will be able
to perform CIC upon herself.
625 F.2d 559 n.3.
A physician or nurse does not have to perform CIC—any-
one can be trained to do it. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. at
19. Parents are taught to catheterize their children. Jd. at
19, 60; J. A. lla (§ 2j). Training to do CIC requires one ses-
sion of approximately 30 minutes. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H.
Tr. 19, 29. Mrs. Tatro has trained her husband, her thirteen-
year-old son, her other daughter, Amber's babysitter, and
the personnel of Amber's private pre-school (including the
cook), to perform CIC. Jd. at 64-65; Tr. 78-79. (While thirty
minutes is the time usually required for training, Mrs. Tatro
has been able to train people in less time than that. Tr. 79.)
The actual procedure takes about five minutes to perform
and can be done safely and effectively with even fewer steps
than the simple process outlined in the Pretrial order, J. A.
Qa-10a. Tr. 81-83, 241-242, 254-255.
Most children of normal intelligence with Amber's han-
_ dicap eventually learn to catheterize themselves. Pl. Exh.
5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 1920; Tr. 144-146, 242-243; J. A. lla
5
After Amber reached three years of age in October of 1978,
the Tatros met with Irving school personnel in January and
April of 1979, to advise the school district of Amber's need
for CIC in order to attend school when she became eligible
in September of 1979. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 62-64. In
May of 1979, an Admissions, Review, and Dismissal (ARD)
Committee’ met to consider an educational program and
placement for Amber. Although the Committee did not
disagree that CIC was necessary in order for Amber to at-
tend school, the Committee, over the parents’ objections,
refused to include CIC in Amber’s individualized educational
program (IEP), on the grounds that the provison of CIC
would be contrary to school board policy.* Tr. 65-66.
Pursuant to their rights under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b\(2),
Amber and her parents complained to an Impartial Hear-
ing Officer of the failure of Irving I.S.D. to include CIC as
a “related service’ in Amber’s IEP. Pl. Exh. 5, supra. The
Impartial Hearing Officer ruled that Amber is entitled to
CIC as a related service needed to assist her to benefit from
special education, which ruling was adopted as the Decision
of the State Commissioner of Education in Amber T. bnf
Mary T. v. Irving Independent School District, Texas Educa-
tion Agency Docket No. 115-SE-579 (August 6, 1979).* PI.
‘The ARD Committee is the entity identified in Texas Education
Agency rules as responsible for implementing the requirements of 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.340-300.349, 300.550-200.554.
“At that time. the Irving I.S.D. Director of School Health Services, a
registered nurse, was not acquainted with CIC, but only with sterile
catheterization, which was preferred by the hospital with which she was
most familiar. P!. Exh. 5b, supra.i. H. Tr. 140-147. That hospital had not
revised its cathererization policies since May of 1977, although the
‘American Academy of Pediatrics had adopted an official position in Octo-
ber of 1978 favoring CIC over sterile catheterization. Jd. at 151. Com-
pare the views expressed by Dr. Bates, who did not specialize in urology,
who had not practiced medicine since 1978, and who had no patients on
CIC, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 127: Tr. 368, 373; and Dr. Ware, who
was not a pediatric urologist, seldom treated children, and had no ex-
perience with CIC, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 49, 60.
*This Court has indicated in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1962), that great weight and deference should be given
it ta
a ae
6
Exh. 5, supra. Although precluded by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1)
from reviewing the decision of the Impartial Hearing
Officer,'* the State Board of Education nevertheless reversed
the Commissioner and Impartial Hearing Officer and upheld
Irving I.S.D.'s refusal to provide CIC to Amber Tatro.
Following the unauthorized action of the State Board of
Education, the Tatros filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
against the State of Texas, members of the State Board of
Education, the Irving Independent School District, and the
Irving I.S.D. superintendent and school board, seeking, in-
ter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On
December 21, 1979, Hon. Patrick Higginbotham, U. S.
District Judge, entered an order denying a preliminary in-
junction to require Defendant (Petitioner herein) to provide
CIC to Amber."' Tatro v. Texas, 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex.
1979). The Tatros appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
to the decision of the Impartial Hearing Officer. Jd. at 3051. Accord: “I
believe that the District Court and Court of Appeals should have given
greater deference than they did to the findings of the . . . impartial hear-
ing officer and the State's Commissioner of Education...’ /d. at 3053
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
“Tatro II, infra, at 703 F.2d 833-834 n. 10, citing Helms v. McDaniel,
657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981) at 805-806 & n. 9, cert. denied 455 U.S. 946
(1982). Since its participation in this case, the State Board of Education
has removed itself from ihe impartial hearing process. 6 Texas Register
4265 {November 20, 1981), umending 19 T.A.C. Chapter 157, subchapter
D. Under current rules in Texas, the Impartial Hearing Officer's decision
is final.
‘In response to the request of Plaintiffs (Respondents herein) for a
preliminary injunction, Judge Higginbotham, instead of receiving the
record of the administrative proceedings pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415/eX2),
requested stipulations of fact. When Defendant Irving [.S.D. (Petitioner
herein) refused either to agree to the Tatros’ proposed stipulations or to
submit proposed stipulations of its own, the Plaintiff Tatros submitted
their proposed stipulations by the Court's deadline. The District Court
based its first decision in the case on Plaintiff's proposed stipulations.
625 F.2d 568 n. 1, 516 F.Supp. 971. The District Court's ruling was
equivalent to summary judgment or granting of a motion to dismiss,
holding in effect that, as a matter of law, even if the facts were as Plain-
tiffs alleged, Amber was not legally entitled to the relief sought for her.
7
Because of the confusion surrounding the proposed stipula-
tions solicited by the District Court and submitted by Plain-
tiffs, the Court of Appeals had no facts before it on appeal.
However, the Court held as a matter of law that CIC is a
valid related service, under 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seg. and 29
U.S.C. § 794, which Petitioner is required to provide to a child
such as Amber Tatro, to the extent that she needs such in
order to attend school so that she can benefit from special
education. Tatro v. Texas (‘‘Tatro I’), 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1980). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether the facts of the case were
as assumed by the Circuit Court, based on the proposed
stipulations, and whether any other material facts not
previously considered should alter the result. Jd. at 558 n.
1. Subsequently, the parties entered into stipulations in a
Pre-Trial Order, J. A. 5a, and the District Court below took
evidence at trial and in subsequent evidentiary hearings, on
the basis of which Judge Higginbotham made findings of
fact consistent with those assumed by the Court of Appeals
on the prior appeal, ordered Defendants to provide CIC to
Amber Tatro, and awarded limited damages and attorneys’
fees to Plaintiffs. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex.
1981). From the subsequently modified final order, Appen-
dix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Pet. App."’) at 55a,
62a, Defendants Irving I.S.D. and the State Board of Educa-
tion appealed. On April 25, 1983, the Court of Appeals
rendered its second decision in the case, Tatro v. Texas
(““Tatro II’’), 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), holding that neither
its prior decision nor the District Court’s subsequent deci-
sion were clearly erroneous and affirming the District Court
decision. After its request for rehearing en banc was denied,
Appellant Irving Independent School District petitioned this
Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was granted December
5, 1983. (The State Defendants did not argue against CIC
for Amber at trial or on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and did
peti Fab rom tae pe Se a
Appeals’ decision.)
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Reversal of the legal requirement that public schoo!s pro-
vide CIC to handicapped children such as Amber Tatro in-
evitably will result in the exclusion and segregation of such
children from a free public school education. Those spina
bifida children whose parents could not find, or afford to
employ, a third party to travel to school each day to pro-
vide CIC to them, would be forced either to be segregated
in separate schools exclusively for handicapped children or
to receive educational services at home. Either alternative
would deprive the child of the benefits of interaction with
non-handicapped children in the normal public school set-
ting, and each would be costlier to the taxpayers.
CIC is a ‘related service’’ needed to assist Amber to benefit
from special education in that: (1) without CIC, Amber can-
not be present in any school placement to receive and benefit
from specialized instruction; (2) CIC is needed to enable
Amber to realize the intended benefits of instruction in an
integrated regular public school setting; and (3) CIC is essen-
tial to achieving the appropriate educational goal of self-
catheterization, as identified in her current IEP (attached
as an Appendix to this Brief). CIC is not an excluded
‘medical service” as that term is used in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17),
since all the features identified to characterize CIC as
‘medical treatment” are equally or more typical of other
expressly designated related services.
Further, CIC is a special supplementary aid or service to
enable Amber to be educated in, and preclude her removal
from, the regular educational environment, as required by
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5B). The requirement of CIC for a handi-
capped child such as Amber is reasonably ascertainable from
the terms of the EHA, which unambiguously imposes con-
ditions for the receipt of federal funds under the Act.
Finally, CIC is a reasonable accommodation, which does
not require fundamental alterations in Petitioner's program
nor impose undue financial or administrative burdens. It is
needed so that Amber Tatro, an otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual, will not be excluded from participation
\
A oops
et
rr
9
in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination by
Petitioner's federally assisted program, solely on the basis
of her handicap, in contravention spf Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, as amended.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
I. DENIAL OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZA-
TION WOULD RESULT IN THE EXCLUSION AND
SEGREGATION OF AMBER TATRO AND SIMILARLY
SITUATED HANDICAPPED CHILDREN FROM THE
FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
No party to this dispute must be under any illusion as to
the consequences of rescinding the legal requirement that
a public school system provide CIC to children such as
Amber Tatro. Inevitably, denial of CIC will result in the ex-
clusion and segregation of such children from the free public
schools. The District Courts in both the instant case and in
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, C.A. No. 79-338
(W.D. Pa. October 31, 1980), reprinted at 3 E.H.L.R. 552:429
(1980), affirmed 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Scanion v. Tokarcik, 458 U.S. ____., 102 S.Ct. 3508
(1982), found as a fact that a spina bifida child such as Amber
cannot safely attend public school class through the school
day without the availability of CIC. 516 F.Supp. at 971, 974,
977; 3 E.H.L.R. 552:428-429. The Third and Fifth Circuit
- Courts of Appeals affirmed these findings as facts of the case,
entitled to deference as not clearly erroneous. 703 F.2d at
825, 829, 831; Tokarcik, supra, 665 F.2d at 444, 446, 456.
The inevitable exclusion and segregation of children such as
Amber, as a consequence of the denial of CIC, is the begin-
ning point for analysis of Amber's rights herein under both
the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended by the
Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20
U.S.C. § 1401 et seg. (“EHA"), and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (‘Section 504”’).
Although at the May 1979 original ARD Committee
meeting, the school district offered the Tatros no alternatives
to the provision of CIC to Amber at school by school per-
sonnel, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 69; Tr. 109, Petitioner
10
since has offered Amber and her family three options, each
of which would result in exclusion and segregation of many
handicapped children from public school.
First, Petitioner has proposed that the Tatros find and hire
a third party to go into the classroom during the day and
provide the CIC service to Amber. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H.
Tr. 130; Tr. 86-87, 104-111. The expense to the family would
not be trivial. Because the times at which the service is
needed by Amber might vary somewhat from one day to the
next—Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 34, 37, 66; Tr. 92—the
parents’ agent, to be available when needed, might have to
remain on call (and thus at parents’ expense) throughout
much or most of each school day—not just for the five or
ten minutes per day needed for the catheterization itself.
Both of Amber's parents work during the day, so neither
of them could go to Amber's school each day to catheterize
her. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 63; Tr. 72-73. (In Tokarcik,
supra, a member of the child's family had to go to school
each day to provide the service. 665 F.2d 445.) Another
mother proposed by the school district as one who could do
the job in fact was not available. Tr. 86-87. The Tatros’ high
school age son had no means of getting from his school to
Amber's each day. Tr. 105. Amber's babysitter was not will-
ing to go to school to do the job. Tr. 104-105, 110-111. And
the cost of a visiting nurse was prohibitive ($33 per visit,
twice a day). Tr. 106.
ll
public school with ‘‘normal"’ children. Those not so fortunate
will be excluded.
Congress, however, clearly mandated by its passage of the
Education of the Handicapped Act that the right of handi-
capped children to be educated in the public schools was no
longer to be dependent upon the parents’ ability privately
to accommodate the child's handicap-related access needs.
Congress expressly identified, as one of the evils the EHA
was enacted to correct, the following situation:
[Bjecause of the lack of adequate services within the
public school system, families are often forced to find
services outside the public school system, often at great
distance from their residence and at their own expense.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(bx6). It makes no sense to imagine that Con-
gress would seek to achieve that objective through passage
of the Act and at the same time contemplate that parents
such as the Tatros would be responsible for such services
as CIC. As will be discussed further in section V-C below,
CIC is closely analogous to assistance by school personnel
for children who, due to their handicaps, cannnot eat inde-
pendently, or cannot toilet independently, or cannot dress
independently. Surely, the EHA and Section 504 would not
sanction the requirement that parents be responsible for
sending a person at their expense to school, to spoon feed
their child, to help their child to the bathroom, or to help
their child take off and put on her coat.'*
‘In one of the earliest cases arising under the EHA and Section 504,
the school district offered a spina bifida child of normal intelligence three
options: (1) “homebound instruction." (2) placement in a segregated school
for the handicapped only, or (3) “that the child could be enrolled at {a
regular public school] if her mother would go to school two or three times
a day to attend to the child.’ The court found all three alternatives un-
acceptable. The child's mother in fact was unable to go to school during
the day. “The requirement of the plaintiff mother's intermittent presence
at |the| School as a condition to her child's being permitted to attend
lreguiar public| school. coupled with the impossibility of this request upon
the plaintiff |mother| constituted an exclusion of the plaintiff child from
|public| School. Further. even if the mother's presence were circumstan-
tially feasible. the right of the child to attend school cannot be legally
12
The second alternative for Amber, if CIC is withheld from
her by the school district, is to be placed in a separate school
for the handicapped, at Petitioner's expense. 703 F.2d 829;
cf. Tokarcik, supra, at 665 F.2d 446. Petitioner's chief ex-
pert witness, the school district’s medical consultant and
former school board trustee, testified:
Well, of course, the obvious [alternative] would be a con-
tracting basis. That she would be contracted out to some
other agency, that was able to handle this [CIC]
function.
Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 128. In its Brief, Petitioner
declares that because of Amber’s inability to attend public
school safely without CIC, ‘‘an alternative placement must
be selected.’ Pet. Brief at 33. In that event, Petitioner would
be responsible for the cost of such a placement (except for
the negligible cost of the CIC, if Petitioner's other arguments
prevail). 20 U.S.C. § 1413(aN4); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33(b)3),
300.302. The willingness of Petitioner even to suggest the
second option, necessarily implying a contract placement in
a private school for the handicapped, belies its putative con-
cern with cost and ‘undue burden."’ The fact is that the
Tatros have not been able to find a non-public school for the
handicapped in the Dallas area for which Amber (who is
neither mentally retarded nor emotionally disturbed) would
be eligible. Tr. 72. If a school could be found anywhere at
all, it likely would be so far from home as to require residen-
tial placement. Ironically, Amicus National School Board
Association has complained extensively about the high cost
of residential and other contract placements of handicapped
students."
conditioned upon the mother's presence at school."’ Hairston v. Drosick,
423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976) at 182-183.
‘**In general, non-residential [non-public] placement doubles the cost of
educating a handicapped pupil. Residential placements cost about four
times as much as educating in the school district or if placed in relation
to the cost of educating a non-handicapped student, it cost eight times
as much to educate a handicapped student in a residential setting as a
non-handicapped student in a school district.” NATIONAL SCHOOL
BOARDS ASSOCIATION, A SURVEY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
13
Petitioner's third option is for Amber to be educated at
home—what Texas Education Agency rules refer to as
‘‘homebound"’ placement, in which instructional and related
service personne! would go to the Tatro residence to serve
Amber there. 19 Tex. Adm. Code § 89.242(b)(6); Pl. Exh. 5b,
supra, I. H. Tr. 128; 703 F.2d 829; Tokarcik, supra, at 665
F.2d 446. The third alternative, like the second, also is not
cost-effective. Petitioner has agreed in the IEP that an appro-
priate education for Amber requires the services of a teacher,
a physical therapist, an occupational therapist, and a speech
therapist. To enable Amber to receive via a ‘‘homebound”’
program the amount of educational benefit intended by her
IE P—much less the seven hours per day promised to her by
state law and regulation, TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004, 19
T.A.C. § 89.235(d)—it would be necessary for Petitioner to
divert at least four valuable professionals from availability
to other children, for several hours a week, to work one-to-
one with Amber. Such an allocation of personnel resources
does not square well with Amicus NSBA's professed con-
cern about the public school’s dearth of qualified personnel
needed to comply with the EHA. NSBA Brief at 31-34. And
it would deprive Amber of the many educational benefits of
integration with non-handicapped children.
The second alternative—contract placement—would segre-
gate Amber from her non-handicapped peers (in age and intel-
lect), while the third course—homebound placement— would
isolate her from other children altogether. Beyond their
costliness and of more importance legally, all three options
violate the EHA’s “mainstreaming preference,’ Board of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982)
at 3049. A major purpose behind the passage of both Sec-
tion 504 and the amended EHA was to insure maximum feas-
ible access to and participation in regular public school
classes by handicapped children.
The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the
invisibility of the handicapped in America. I am talk-
COSTS IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1979) at 26 (attached as an
Appendix to the amicus curiae brief of the Texas Association of School
Boards before the Court of Appeais).
14
ing about over 1 million American children who are ex-
cluded from school. ... [T]oo often we keep children,
whom we regard as ‘‘different’’ or a ‘‘disturbing influ-
ence,’’ out of our schools and community activities
altogether, rather than help them deveiop their abilities
in special classes and programs. ... Where is the cost
effectiveness in consigning them to... “terminal” care
in an institution? ... Every child—gifted, normal, and
handicapped—has a fundamental right to educational
opportunity. ... But more than 1 million children are
denied entry into public schools, even to participate in
special classes.... We do not even have adequate
statistical information on the great number of physically
handicapped children who have the mental ability to
attend school but are denied that right. The variety of
explanations for this denial include problems of
transportation and architectural barriers. But the injus-
tice of exclusion remains.
118 Cong. Rec. 525 (January 20, 1972, remarks of Sen. Hum-
phrey, principal author of the bill which ultimately became
Section 504) (emphasis added).
For far too long handicapped children have been deniéd
access to the regular school system because of an in-
ability to climb the steps to the schoolhouse door, and
not for any other reason. This has led to segregated
classes for those children with physical handicaps. This
is an isolation that in many cases is unnecessary.
121 Cong. Rec. 19483, 19484 (June 18, 1975, remarks of Sen.
Stafford—one of the principal co-authors of the bill that was
enacted as the Education For All Handicapped Children Act,
as well as the ranking minority member of the committee
which drafted the legislation).
Lastly, I would like to mention the concept of main-
not believe the burden of proof should be upon that
administrator or teacher who seeks to permit the handi-
15
capped child to remain in a normal classroom with his
peers. Rather, I believe the burden of proof in terms of
effectiveness of a program ought to rest with that
administrator or teacher who seeks to remove a child
from a normal classroom, to segregate him or her from
non-handicapped children.
Id. at 25539, 25540 (Rep. Miller). See also id. at 19503 (Sen.
Cranston), 19505 (Sen. Humphrey), 23709 (Rep. Biaggi),
37026 (Rep. Quie), 37030 (Rep. Daniels), 37412 (Sen. Staf-
ford), 37419 (Sen. Cranston). The Congressional purpose is
echoed in federal court decisions interpreting the EHA. Ron-
cher v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) at 1063, cert.
denied sub nom. Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
uv. Roncker, __. U.S. ___, 52 U.S.L.W. 3266 (No. 82-1890,
October 3, 1983); Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d
41 (8th Cir. 1982) at 43, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___., 103 S.Ct.
2086 (1983); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., supra, at
665 F.2d 455; Campbell v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ.,
518 F.Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981) at 55; Espino v. Besteiro,
520 F.Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981) at 911-913, denial of
planitiffs’ attorneys’ fees rev. and rem. 708 F.2d 1002 (5th
Cir. 1983).
It follows from the foregoing that children such as Amber
Tatro should not be excluded or segregated from the regular
public school program without the most compelling of educa-
tional justifications. Yet, clearly, the denial of the simple ser-
vice of CIC will have precisely the exclusionary,
segregating
effect which Congress sought through Section 504 and the
EHA to preclude. Not only would that result be detrimen-
tal to Amber's education, but (ironically) it would increase
the financial burden of the public school system.
II. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHERIZATION IS A
RELATED SERVICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
EDUCATION OF THE aimee Pligy ACT.
A. Clean intermittent catherization is needed to assist Amber
Tatro to benefit from special education.
The Education of the Handicapped Act is a program of
cooperative federalism designed to assist states and local
16
school districts in providing education programs to handi-
capped children. A state which elects to receive money under
the EHA must provide to each of its school-aged handi-
capped children, inter alia, a ‘‘free appropriate public educa-
tion.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). Local educational agencies, such
as Petitioner, have parallel obligations. 20 U.S.C. §
1414(aX1C)ii). A ‘free appropriate public education”’ is
defined in pertinent part as “special education and related
services.’ § 1401(18). Each of these terms is then further
defined. Special education is ‘‘specially designed instruction
. to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,’’ §
1401(16), while related services are:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services (including speech pathology
and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and coun-
seling services, except that such medical services shall
be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may
be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (emphasis added).
The District Court and the Court of Appeals below held
that, for Amber, CIC is a valid related service which the Peti-
tioner must provide so that she can attend school and benefit
from the special education program offered there. The Dis-
trict and Circuit Courts in the instant case and in Tokarcik
uv. Forest Hills School District, supra, found as a fact that,
due to factors relating to the handicap, a spina bifida child
such as Amber cannot safely attend and participate in the
educational program offered in a public school classroom
without the provision of CIC. Wherever she happens to be
placed for her education, Amber, because of her handicap,
cannot safely remain through the school day and partake of
the instruction presented during that time without receiv-
ing CIC at least once and usually twice. A special education
program which Amber cannot be present to receive cannot
be of any ‘“‘benefit” to her. “Quite simply put, without the
~
o
en ee ER
a
17
provision of CIC, Amber cannot benefit from the special edu-
cation to which she is entitled, for, without CIC, she cannot
be present in the classroom at all.’ Tatro J, supra, at 625
F.2d 562.
In Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, this Court con-
cluded that the purpose and intent of the EHA is first ‘‘to
make public education available to handicapped children”’
and next ‘‘to make such access [to public education] mean-
ingful.’’ Jd. at 3037. Consequently:
The statutory definition of ‘free appropriate public
education,” in addition to requiring that the State pro-
vide each child with ‘specially designed instruction,”
expressly requires the provision of ‘‘such ... suppor-
tive services . . . as may be required to assist a child to
benefit from special education." § 1401(17) (emphasis
added).
Id. at 3048 (emphasis supplied in the opinion). See also id.
at 3041, 3042, 3046, 3049.
Clearly, for a child such as Amber, questions of ‘‘access”’
and ‘‘placement’’ cannot be arbitrarily distinguished from
‘“benefit,’’ as suggested by Amicus NSBA on its Brief at
20-21. Amber cannot benefit from a program to which she
does not have meaningful (safe) access. A ‘related service,"’
as stressed by this Court in the references above, is one which
is needed to assist the child to benefit from special educa-
tion. The above-cited passages also emphasize ‘educational
benefit” as the determining factor for an ‘‘appropriate educa-
tion."’ In that same opinion, this Court further recognized
that ‘appropriateness (i.e., educational benefit) often is
linked to placement. To the statement that ‘‘an ‘appropriate
education’ is provided when personalized educational services
are provided,’’ the decision attached a footnote explaining:
The use of ‘‘appropriate’’ in the language of the Act,
although by no means definitive, suggests that Congress
used the word as much to describe the settings in which
handicapped children should be educated as to prescribe
the substantive content or supportive services of their
education. For example, § 1412(5) requires that handi-
/
” <a 4
2
ea
18
capped children be educated in classrooms with non-
handicapped children ‘‘to the maximum extent appro-
priate.’’... In addition, the definition of ‘free appro-
priate public education” itself states that instruction
given handicapped children should be at an “appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school”’ level.
§1401(18)(C).
Id. at 3046 n. 21 (emphasis added). Educationally, for Amber
a regular public elementary school is the appropriate setting,
suitable for her participation. Educational services would not
be appropriately ‘‘personalized” for her unless delivered in
that setting.
As the discussion in Part I, supra, makes clear, Congress
and a majority of courts addressing the question have rec-
ognized that the ‘‘benefits’’ of specialized instruction in a
public school setting include not only the instruction itself
but the benefits of the least restrictive environment. For
those handicapped children educationally able to benefit from
the instruction therein, placement in an integrated public
school environment offers the benefits of, inter alia, interac-
tion with non-handicapped children, role models for socially
appropriate behavior, and avoidance of the stigma associated
with separate special placement. These benefits contribute
substantially to the handicapped child's future independence
and productivity in society (within the limits otherwise im-
posed by his/her handicap), which was recognized by this
court as an important aspect of ‘‘educational benefit.’’ Board
of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3048 n. 23, and legislative
history recited therein. '*
It follows from the foregoing that for a child who is intellec-
tually and emotionally capable of being educated in or near
the ‘‘mainstream,”’ specialized instruction which is offered
in a setting other than a regular.public school classroom
‘*In addition to the passages cited in Rowley, supra, see also 121 Cong.
Rec. 19494 (June 18, 1975, remarks of Sen. Javits), 19604 (Sen. Mondale),
19605 (Sen. Beal), 23702, 23703 (July 21, Rep. Brademas), 23709 (Reps.
Biaggi, Minish), 25538, 25539 (July 29, Rep. Harris), 37411 (November
19, Sen. Humphrey), 37417 (Sen. Javits), 37418 (Sen. Biden), 37419 (Sen.
19
would deprive the child of important educational benefits.
Thus, for a child such as Amber, specialized instruction in
a segregated setting does not confer the benefit of the very
same instruction in an integrated environment. In Roncker
v. Walter, supra, and Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, supra,
the Courts of Appeals held that the educational benefits of
merely adequate instruction in an integrated public school
setting outweigh the benefits of a superior academic program
in a segregated environment. CIC is needed specifically to
permit a child such as Amber to be placed in a regular public
school classroom, rather than a separate facility exclusive
ly for the handicapped. Thus, in this further sense, CIC is
a service needed by Amber, on account of her handicap, to
assist her to benefit from special education—i.e., to ‘‘benefit’’
from the specialized instruction in the sense of being able
to receive it in the educationally beneficial integrated
classroom, which is the least restrictive environment appro-
priate to Amber's educational needs and abilities. Specifically
regarding spina bifida childen, see Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., supra, at 665 F.2d 455-456; Hairston v. Drosick,
423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976) at 183.
In addition to its related service “‘access’’ role, CIC also
has special instructional value for Amber. Since 90-95% of
spina bifida children learn to self-catheterize eventually —
Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 20; Tr. 243—and since self-
catheterization is obviously an important self-help skill,
which will enhance the child's independence in society, learn-
ing to self-catheterize is an essential goal of an appropriate
education for a child such as Amber. D. Stauffer, Catheteri-
zation—A Health Procedure Schools Must Be Prepared to
Provide, 54 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL HEALTH 37 (1984)
at 38. In reality, it is a form of toilet-training (an essential
area of instruction for many handicapped children), since for
a child with Amber's disability, CIC substitutes for normal
voluntary urination. The first IEP developed for Amber in
May of 1979 noted her ‘spina bifida’ under ‘Special Alert”
and her inability to toilet herself under ‘Self-Care Skills.”’
Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 135. Amber's current IEP, at-
tached to this Brief as an Appendix, shows that Petitioner
20
and Respondent have agreed that the ability to self-
catheterize is an appropriate educational goal for Amber. /d.,
Addendum to O.T. Goals, following p. 6. It defies reason to
suggest that having Irving school personnel perform CIC
with Amber could be in no way related to, nor needed to
assist Amber to benefit from, the IEP goal of self-
catheterization.'* CIC thus unquestionably is ‘‘required
because [it has] a direct relationship to the education of the
child ... as a teaching tool.’’ NSBA Brief at 14.'*
B. Clean intermittent catheterization is not an excluded
“medical service’ within the meaning of the Education of
the Handicapped Act.
The EHA excludes from the ambit of ‘‘related services”
any ‘‘medical services’’ other than those ‘for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). Consistent with
the language and purpose of the EHA, the Court of Appeals
below carefully circumscribed the scope of public school
responsibility for ‘‘life support’ services such as CIC—as
did the Third Circuit in Tokarcik, supra—so as to insure that
requiring CIC for a child such as Amber would not lead to
the inclusion of services Congress did not intend. Tatro J at
625 F.2d 562-563; Tatro IJ at 703 F.2d 827-831.
To discern the boundary between included ‘related ser-
vices’ and excluded ‘‘medical services,"’ so as to locate CIC
with respect thereto, the Court of Appeals below was guided,
first, by the interpretation of the U. S. Department of H.E.W.
‘In Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, supra, the District Court
was persuaded that assisting Amber to achieve the skill of self-
catheterization fit within the federal definition of 6ccupational therapy
under the EHA at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bN5): * fear pty slag ing or
restoring functions impaired or lost through illness {or| injury. . . Improv-
are impaired or lost. . . . Preventing . . . further impairment or loss of func-
tion.” 3 E.H.L.R. 552:429-450; 665 F.2d 458-459.
“Consequently, even if the decision below is held to be erroneous, which
Respondents emphatically do not concede, this Court should do no more
than remand for further factual findings as to Amber's IEP. However,
since the reasoning of the Court of Appeals is correct, further expenditure
of scarce judicial resources on this case should not be required.
Way
21
(now Education), the federal executive department charged
with promulgating the regulations to implement and enforce
the EHA. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b). As such, the Office (now
Department) of Education's initial interpretation of the
statute is entitled to great weight and deference.'’
The Department defined the term ‘‘medical services” as
used in the EHA to mean the “services provided by a licensed
physician” (permitting only those provided to ‘‘determine
a child's medically related handicapping conditions which
results in the child's need for special education and related
services’). 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bi4). The Fifth Circuit found
this definition to impose an important limitation on the
requirement of “life support’ services such as CIC as
‘related services’’ under the EHA. Tatro IJ at 625 F.2d
562-563. The Third Circuit noted that ‘‘the regulations them-
selves place realistic limitations on the nature of the school
services to be provided under the EAHCA," so that ‘‘the
drastic medical services . . . which the school authorities fear
they will by asked to furnish in the future are by definition
excluded.'’ Tokarcik uv. Forest Hills School District, supra,
at 665 F.2d 456. Since the direct non-diagnostic/non-
evaluative services of the physician, which are excluded, are
the most expensive on the continuum of medical costs, this
limitation operates to insulate Petitioner and the NSBA,
TASB school official amici from the largest part of the costs
they purport to fear.
A second line between permissible related services and
excluded ‘‘ medical services’’ was discerned by the Fifth Cir-
cuit from the essential purpose of related services, i.e. to
assist the handicapped child to benefit from special educa-
tion. It follows that a ‘‘life support’’ service would not be
a “related service” under the EHA if it is not needed by the
child in order to be present in the educationally appropriate
least restrictive placement throughout the school day. Thus,
"Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) at 569-570, cited with approval
by the majority opinion in Guardians Ass‘n. v. Civil Service Comm'n,
U.S. __. 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983) at 3226-3227; Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Cf, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. La Strange,
——._ U.S. ___., 52 U.S.L.W. 4301 (No. 82-862, February 28, 1984) at 4304.
~6
&
.
7
ane
- y ys
ay :
22
if the child could safely remain in the educationally appro-
priate setting throughout the school day without receiving
the service, and then receive the service outside of the school
setting and school hours, the school district would not be
responsible for the procedure as a ‘‘related service.'’ Tatro
I at 625 F.2d 563. This important feature, drawn from the
words of the Act itself, serves to remove even more physician-
prescribed services from the category of those for which a
school district might become responsible under the EHA.
Note that Amber’s handicap also results in dysfunction of
the bowels, requiring periodic enemas. However, since these
only are needed twice a week, and can be performed at night,
by Mrs. Tatro at home, Respondents do not need to seek this
service in order for Amber to be educated in public school.
Tr. 97-99.
Third, in order to be a related service, the life support ser-
vice must be one which a nurse or other qualified person can
perform. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10). Tatro J at 625 F.2d 563.
The amicus curiae brief of the Texas Medical Association
and Dallas Medical Society, at the District Court level,
attached as an Appendix to Judge Higginbotham's decision,
indicated that CIC could be provided ‘by nurses,
teachers, or others .. .". 516 F.Supp. 989 (emphasis added).
In the case of CIC, the technical aspects of the procedure
are not complicated and can be performed successfuly
by children on themselves after appropriate training
(boys by age 8 and girls by age 10)... . CIC appears to
be a procedure which can be safely performed while
neither a physician or nurse is present. CIC can be done
safely when a patient or other person is trained to per-
form it properly and is taught to recognize conditions
which should be brought to the physician’s attention.
Id. at 990. A service such as CIC which can be performed
safely and effectively, with minimal training, by an average
lay person, an ordinary parent, or an elementary school age
handicapped child, clearly fits within the array of permis-
sible “related services’’ and is not an excluded ‘‘medical ser-
vice” that must be provided by a licensed physician.
23
Further analysis shows that CIC could not be an excluded
medical service, because it is so closely analogous to other
related services which are expressly listed.'* Even thotigh
CIC seems medical in that it requires a physician's prescrip-
tion, so does fitting a hearing aid,'® 34 C.F.R. §
300.13(b1)vi), and physical therapy.” In fact, Petitioner
Irving I.S.D.’s own policies authorize a school nurse to
dispense oral medications and administer emergency injec-
tions, two procedures requiring physician prescriptions.” PI.
Exh. 2 (Tr. 38).
"The list of services in § 1401(17) is illustrative but not exhaustive.
34 C.F.R. § 300.13 Comment; Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District,
supra, at 665 F.2d 457. As noted above, ‘related services’’ are those ser-
vices which are “required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). “The term ‘special education’
means specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique needs of a
handicapped child,’ through an ‘individualized education program." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(16), 418), 419) (emphasis added). Congress did not purport
to predict all of the special services that would be needed to assist in
meeting the unique educational needs of eight million handicapped chil-
dren on an individual basis. The task would have been staggering and
would not have left room for inclusion of future technological innovations
which could introduce services not known to Congress in 1975. Thus, it
is only reasonable to conclude that Congress sought to describe and illus-
trate the types of services to be included, rather than to specify every
particular service. This Court has described the list in § 1401(17) as
‘Examples.'’ Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3041 n. 10. Conse-
quently, the U. S. Department of Education (formerly Health, Education
and Welfare) did not abuse its discretion when it expanded the list of
“related services” to include “school health services’’ and when it fur-
ther commented that even its extended list was ‘‘not exhaustive.” 34
C.F.R. § 300.13(bK10) & Comment.
‘For example: D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4005(aX9XB); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 145.43, 145.44; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 459-035.
“For example: ALA. CODE § 34-24-217; ALASKA STAT. § 08.84.160;
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1328(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4001(4)*(5); GA.
CODE ANN. § 43-33-18(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2901, 66-2914; KY.
REV. STAT. § 327-010; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3002; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 328-A:9; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4755.48(F); OR. REV. STAT. § 688.130-140; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63 § 1309; VA. CODE §§ 54-273(9), 54-281-2.
"Amicus Texas Association of School Boards acknowledges in its Brief
at 6 that “dispensing medication prescribed by doctors"’ is among ‘those
services routinely provided by school nurses."
aa
24
Similarly, CIC seems ‘‘medical”’ in that it must be ‘‘super-
vised’’ by a physician but it requires no more supervision
than does the listed related service of physical therapy. The
physician need not be physically present to supervise the ser-
vice (516 F.Supp. at 975-976, 990); may monitor the service
indirectly through examination of the child outside of school
hours; and may monitor through periodic reports from the
school and/or parents. CIC also appears to promote a medical
objective (in addition to its educationally-related benefits)
in that it “‘treats’’ Amber's neurogenic bladder. But by the
same token, physical therapy” fulfills a medical treatment
goal of preventing atrophy of muscle tissue; audiology might
include the goal of prevention of hearing loss, 34 C.F.R. §
300.13(b)1)iii), (iv); and counseling services might treat a
neurosis or prevent the development of a more acute disorder.
34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b8).
Nothing in law, logic, medicine or education decrees that
the same service cannot be both medically and educationally
beneficial at the same time. A service which performs an
education-related function does not become an excluded
medical service simply because it happens to play a
‘“‘medical’’ role as well.
Finally, because CIC itself obviously does not entail much
cost or burden, Petitioner and the school board amici have
sought to have it excluded not on its own merits but on the
"The former state implementing rule on physical therapy as a related
service, on which Petitioner sought to rely in arguments to the Court of
Appeals, Petitioner's Reply Brief at 14-17? (5th Cir.), physical
therapy as “the art and science of evaluation, program and
implementation of physical or corrective conditions resulting from birth,
illness, or injury.” 19 T.A.C. former § 89.235(aX3NC\x) (emphasis added).
The rule went on to describe the therapy as including “therapeutic exer-
cise programs designed to develop or restore neuro-muscular and/or
vidual’s capabilities."" Jd. (emphasis added). The present Texas Educa-
tion Agency rules make no attempt to elaborate physical therapy beyond
the federal regulations’ definition of it as ‘services provided by a qualified
~~ therapist.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bX7); 19 T.A.C. §§ 89.215(bN10),
25
basis of other costly and burdensome medical treatment obli-
gations to which they speculate it might lead. Petitioner
asserts that the effect of the lower Court's decision would
be to obligate public school systems to assume “the massive
financial obligations involved in providing all medical treat-
ment physicians may unilaterally choose to prescribe for the
more than eight (8) million children with handicapping con-
ditions."’ Pet. Brief at 22 (emphasis added). In keeping with
that dramatic misrepresentation, Petitioner and Amici
NSBA and Texas Association of School Boards offer a
‘‘shotgun"’ barrage of ‘‘medical treatments’ they allege to
be analogous to CIC and thus required by the Tatro deci-
sions. These ‘‘treatments"’ are offered either with no discus-
sion at all or with only very superficial comment as how and
why they compare with CIC. Pet. Brief at 10; NSBA Brief
at 32-33; TASB Brief at 6. Most of the alleged analogs to
CIC were mentioned for the first time in briefs after the close
of the evidentiary record. Given the:simplicity, safety, and
inexpensiveness of CIC; its necessity to assist Amber to
benefit from special education; and the previously discuss-
ed guidelines by the Court of Appeals below, it should not
be the burden of Respondents to examine and distinguish
each of the ‘treatments’ to which Petitioner and the school
“The absurdity of Petitioner's and the school board amici's attempted
analogies is well illustrated by their comparing CIC to kidney dialysis
(more accurately, kidney hemodialysis). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
9: Pet. Brief at 10 n. 3; NSBA Brief at 33. Kidney hemodialysis (in which
the body's entire blood supply is drained, cleansed, and returned to the
body) cannot be offered at school but must be provided at special dialysis
centers, usually staffed by physicians on the premises for close-at-hand
monitoring. The procedure takes 5-6 hours each time, up to three times
a week. Thus, hemodialysis is not a service needed for access to instruc-
tion in a public school class; rather, it necessarily removes the child from
school for long periods of time. Hemodialysis includes an extraordinarily
high risk of injury and detrimental side effects, and is only employed with
children when certain death is the alternative. Hemodialysis is not a skill
for independent living which the child can be expected to learn to do for
herself eventually. Extraordinarily expensive specialized medical equip-
ment is required for hemodialysis and the personnel who administer the
procedure must receive extensive specialized medical training. Many other
features serve to distinguish a treatment such as hemodialysis from CIC
Ny
26
board amici imagine CIC will lead. Further, Respondents are
reluctant to gratuitously concede the inclusion or exclusion
of other services prior to other plaintiffs’ and defendants’
having the chance to make their respective cases. Each ser-
vice advanced should be examined on its own merits, in light
of the criteria previously discussed. Whatever the outcome
with respect to other hypothesized procedures, CIC cannot
reasonably be excluded for a child such as Amber Tatro.
III. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS A
SUPPLEMENTARY AID OR SERVICE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDI-
CAPPED ACT.
In addition to its related service role, clean intermittent
catheterization also is required for Amber as a ‘‘supplemen-
tary aid [or] service.’’ Section 612 of the EHA requires the
State to:
... assure that, to the maximum extent appropnate,
handicapped children . . . are educated with children who
are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of handicapped children
from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplemen-
tary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactor-
eres
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)B) (emphasis added). The Act then goes
on to make local educational agencies such as Petitioner
responsible for:
... to the maximum extent practicable and consistent
with the provisions of section 1412(5)B) of this title,
and to place dialysis clearly outside the range of services contemplated
by the EHA and the Court of Appeais decision below. See J. LUCKMAN
& R. SORENSEN, MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING (1980), a widely
used text in nursing schools, as well as A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY (1980); L. WHALEY & D. WONG, NURS-
ING CARE OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1983) at 1146-1152,
1174-1180; and T. Nevins and S. Mayer, Dialysis, in S. GELLIS & B.
KAGAN (eds.), CURRENT PEDIATRIC THERAPY (1980).
a tk Sai pe + a A . Sees ot Pa Ss ee
ob SF es a ete ee ae ee OR ee eer ae 2) <P ee st
27
the provision of special services to enable such children
to participate in regular educational programs...
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a1C\iv) (emphasis added). Since Amber
is educationally equipped to benefit from instruction in
regular public school class, then § 1412(5)(B) and its corollary
§ 1414(a1C) require Petitioner to offer the special service
which will enable Amber to be placed and remain in that
environment.
Unlike “‘isolated’’ or ‘‘scattered’’ references in the
legislative history that were found insufficient by this Court
in Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3047, 3049 (con-
cerning ‘maximum potential” and ‘‘equal educational oppor-
tunity’ under the EHA); Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) at 411 n. 11 (with respect to
“affirmative action” under Section 504); and Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) at 20
(regarding equal protection as a basis for 42 U.S.C. § 6010),
insistence that school districts extend the special services
necessary to integrate handicapped children into regular
classes is a consistent theme which runs throughout the legis-
lative history of the EHA, as amended. See the legislative
history surveyed in Part I above. Prior to the ‘related ser-
vices’ requirement, which was added to the EHA by Public
Law 94-142, the Education For All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975,” the ‘supplementary aids and services” require-
ment was part of P.L. 93-380, the Education of the Handi-
capped Amendments of 1974. 20 U.S.C. former § 1413(a)
' (13B). The earliest judicial interpretation of the amended
EHA applied the 1974 ‘supplementary aids and services"
requirement to the provision of services necessary to enable
a girl disabled by Amber's handicap of spina bifida (including
incontinence of the bowels) to attend regular public school
classes:
*P.L. 91-230, the original Education of the Handicapped Act of 1971,
authorized funding to “initiate, expand, or improve programs and projects
... which are designed to meet the special educational and related neecs
of handicapped children . . ." 20 U.S.C. former § 1413 (emphasis added).
28
This educational fact that handicapped children should
be excluded from the regular classroom situation only
as a last resort is recognized in federal law. The federal
statute providing moneys to states for special educa-
tion programs mandates that every state have proce-
dures to assure handicapped children are educated with
children who are not handicapped and that ‘‘removal
of handicapped children from the regular education envi-
ronment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily."’ 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13)B).
Hairston v. Drosick, supra, at 183-184. Petitioner and the
school board amici stress that Amber is able to ‘benefit
educationally"’ from the individualized program offered by
Petitioner. Pet. Brief at 31-32; NSBA Brief at 7-8; TASB
Brief at 11-12. It is precisely because Amber can “benefit
educationaily"’ from instruction in the regular public school
that she should be provided the service which will permit
her access to that program in the regular school environment.
Amber is entitled to be educated in the least restrictive place-
ment appropriate to her individual educational needs and
abilities.
Not only have we guaranteed [handicapped children] a
right to education, but I think we have written adequate
provisions which will protect those rights and guarantee
that a child will not be improperly labeled or placed in
an educational setting which will not suit his or her edu-
cational needs.
121 Cong. Rec. 37026 (November 18, 1975, remarks of Rep.
Quie) (emphasis added). Petitioner has acknowledged, as it
must, that ‘where a child has average or above-average in-
telligence, the goal of the school system may be to enable
the child to go from one grade to another and graduate with
an average level of success,”’ citing , Supra, at 3049.
Pet. Brief at 30. The NSBA Amicus stresses the im-
portance Congress assigned to enabling handicapped children
to participate in physical education classes and extra
29
curricular activities, id. at 12-14, options that will be fore-
closed to Amber if she must remain at home because CIC
is not available at school.
If Amber were not educationally capable of benefitting
from any program that could be offered in a public school
setting, even with supplementary aids and services, then it
would be permissible to educate Amber in a non-public seg-
regated (by handicap) setting, such as a residential place-
ment. Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983)
at 226-230, relying upon Board of Education v. Rowley,
supra. Amber's neurogenic bladder does not render her educa-
tionally incapable of benefitting from instruction in a regular
public school setting. In fact, it is agreed that Amber is intel-
lectually and emotionally normal. (Even most mentally and
emotionally disabled children are educated in or near the
‘“‘mainstream.'’) Rather, Amber's neurogenic bladder renders
her physically incapable of being educated alongside children
who are not handicapped, without the supplementary aid or
service of CIC. The distinction is significant. To justify place-
ment of Amber outside the regular educational environment,
Petitioner must be able to show that Amber needs a type
of instruction which can only be offered in a separate facil-
ity. Some handicapped children require such separation on
account of their unique educational needs. But once it is
established that the type of instruction Amber needs is the
kind which can be presented in an integrated regular public
school environment, Petitioner must make available the ancil-
lary services necessary to enable Amber to receive such
instruction in that setting.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT
CATHETERIZATION AS A RELATED OR SUPPLE-
MENTARY SERVICE FOR A HANDICAPPED CHILD
SUCH AS AMBER TATRO IS A REASONABLE CON-
because Amber
30
public school, the EHA gives her a right to that service.
Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that:
Any rights created by § 1415, enforceable against the
Petitioner, are limited to a showing Petitioner has
violated the ‘State Plan.’’ This [Respondents] did not
attempt to do. Without a finding that the local educa-
tional agency has violated the provisions of the ‘‘State
Plan” as required by § 1413, any ‘relief may well be
limited to enjoining the federal government from pro-
viding funds to the [State].”
Pet. Brief at 18, relying on Pennhurst State School &
Hospital. v. Halderman, supra. However, this Court has
already disposed of the foregoing contention in Board of
Education v. Rowley, supra, which prescribes a two-fold in-
quiry for judicial review in EHA cases:
First, has the State complied with the procedures set
forth in the Act?*’ And second, is the individualized
educational program developed through the Act's pro-
cedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits?
"This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that
the State has adopted the State plan, policies and assurances re-
quired by the Act, but also to determine that the State has created
an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the require
ments of § 1401 (19).
Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3051 (emphasis
Whatever might be contained in the Texas State Plan and
whatever might be the political decision of the Department
ameemunniy pea cemtiaetiodiat
school district was not to provide them. oko
31
of Education as to whether to approve the State Plan, a Court
still must determine whether the individual program offered
Amber is reasonably calculated to enable her to benefit edu-
‘ cationally. For the reasons discussed in Parts I-III, supra,
that program, taken as a whole, does not, due to its crucial
omission of CIC.
Petitioner next argues that if the EHA mandates CIC for
Amber, then Congress exceeded its authority under this
Court's reasoning in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, supra. In that decision, this Court held that:
[Ljegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legis-
late under the spending power thus rests on whether
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms
of the ‘‘contract."’ There can, of course, be no knowing
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it. According-
ly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we
enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added, citations omitted). A comparison
of the EHA with the statute examined in PennAurst, the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (the “DD Act”), will show
that the State of Texas, and, through it, its political sub-
divisions such as Petitioner, voluntarily and knowingly ac-
cepted the terms of the EHA, which unambigously imposed
conditions from which the State could ascertain
an obligation such as CIC for a child as Amber.
32
stitutions for the mentally retarded and substituting one
mode of treatment (small community-based group homes)
for that state's present method of services through large
isolated institutions. First, this Court found that section 6010
did not by its terms impose conditions for the receipt of
federal funds under the DD Act. The Court stressed that
whereas §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, 6012, 6063 and 6067 of the DD
Act clearly state ‘‘conditions’’ which a state must meet in
order to receive funding under the Act, § 6010 is expressed
in terms 6f Congressional ‘‘findings.’’ Pennhurst, supra, at
13-14, 22-23. By contrast, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1415 clearly
_ state conditions for the receipt of federal funds under the
EHA as amended. A state could not ascertain from the
language of § 6010 that the rights enumerated therein were
enforceable conditions for that state’s receipt of DD Act
funding. However, a state could have no doubt that the
requirements of EHA §§ 612-615, 20 U.S.C. § 1412-1415,
were conditions of EHA Part B funding. Thus’ Congress
spoke with a clear voice, unambiguously imposing conditions
for the grant of EHA moneys.
Second, this Court judged the Act’s requirements, and the
specificity thereof, in relation to the amount of money ap-
propriated by Congress to implement the legislation and the
burden and expense of the requirements to be imposed. The
Court noted that under the DD Act, Pennsylvania received
only $1.6 million in 1976. ‘When Congress does impose af-
firmative obligations, it usually makes a far more substan-
tial contribution to defray costs."’ Pennhurst, supra, at 24.
By contrast, the federal government spends over a billion
dollars per year under the EHA as amended. Texas’ share
alone of the Fiscal Year 1984 EHA Part B appropriation
($67.6 million) exceeds DD Act funding for the entire nation
($62.1 million). P.L. 98-139. In comparing the EHA to the
DD Act in light of the Pennhurst decision, it must be
remembered that while the Pennhurst plaintiffs sought a
massive, costly systemic overhaul, Respondents herein seek
only a service of minimal cost and burden, if any.
Finally, the State could ascertain from the Act as a whole,
in context, what might be expected of it. By listing such ser-
‘ pit © a! ea
an 8 Le ./ ear tek cuk ve eT) ie ee
33
vices as physical therapy, audiology, psychological services,
etc. in § 1401(17), Congress gave fair notice to the states that
the EHA would require school districts to provide types of
services not traditionally offered in the public schools. By
emphasizing ‘‘individualized"’ services to meet each handi-
capped child's “unique needs,” § 1401(16)-(19), Congress indi-
cated that the list of services in subsection (17) was not—
indeed, could not be—exhaustive. Any doubt as to that point
should have vanished when the implementing federal regula-
tions expanded the illustrative list and expressly declared
that even the expanded list was not exhaustive. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.13 and Comment. From all the foregoing, it is clearly
ascertainable from the EHA, and thus Texas voluntarily and
knowingly accepted as terms of its ‘‘contract,”’ that a child
such as Amber Tatro would be entitled to a physician-
prescribed supportive service which, though not specified by
name in the Act, is needed to enable her to attend public
school and participate without undue risk to her health in
the regular educational environment.
V. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS A
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT.
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is applicable to the in-
stant case
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
requires in relevant part that:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States, as defined in (29 U.S.C. § 706(7)], shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected Batson rwor > gud: gee chal
receiving Federal financial assistance .
29 U.S.C. § 794. The question of whether handicapped plain-
tiffs have a private right of action to enforce Section 504 (Pet.
Brief at 38) was disposed of by this Court in Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. LaStrange, supra. Cf. Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) trecognising a private right of
« fa
oe. =
34
action under the analogous Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Service Comm'n, supra, at 3227-3228 (private right of
action under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d).
As to the assertion that the EHA ‘‘preempts"’ Section 504
in this case (Pet. Brief at 37-38), this Court has granted cer-
tivrari on the principal decision relied upon by Petitioner for
that proposition. Smith v. Cumberland School Committee,
703 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v.
Robinson, __. U.S. —___, 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (No. 82-2120,
October 31, 1983). Thus, the Court probably will resolve the
pre-emption question prior to deciding the instant case. «.
Respondents will not presume to add here to the arguments
already presented to the Court in Smith, supra, as to why
the EHA does not preempt Section 504—especially since
the analysis in other sections of this Brief is necessarily
lengthy. Instead, Respondents respectfully commend to the
Court the arguments and authorities presented in the Smith
uv. Robinson Brief of Petitioners and Brief of Amici Curiae
Association for Retarded Citizens, Advocacy. Inc., et al Cf.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) at 459-460, and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974) at 47-49 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e does not pre-empt
42 U.S.C. § 1981 with respect to employment discrimination);
Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 et seq. does not pre-empt 42 U.S.C. § 1982 with regard
to housing discrimination).
It is the position of Respondents that Section 504 is ap-
plicable to the present case and that Petitioner has violated
that statute. Respondents have established a violation of
Amber's rights under the foregoing statute by showing that
(1) Amber is an “otherwise qualified handicapped individual”
with respect to Petitioner's public school program; (2) the
public school program to which Amber seeks continued ac-
cess is a program receiving federal financial assistance; and
(3) Amber has been excluded from participation in, denied
the benefits of, and subjected to discrimination by Peti-
tioner’s public school program (and would be again if Peti-
Pay om oe il
35
tioner prevails) solely on the basis of her handicap.* The Dis-
trict Court below found as a fact, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, that the public educational program in question
receives federal financial assistance. 516 F.Supp. 977 n. 17;
Pet. App. 60a-61a: 703 F.2d 832. The District Court cannot
be said to have so clearly abused its discretion as to be held
clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. Pro.; United States
vu. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) at 395. Consequently,
the inquiry next turns to the remaining elements of a Sec-
tion 504 violation.
B. Amber Tatro is otherwise qualified to receive a free appro-
priate public education in the least restrictive environment.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra, this
Court illuminated the parameters of the term ‘otherwise
qualified"’ as used in Section 504. In that decision, the Court
held that Francis Davis, a deaf applicant, was not ‘‘other-
wise qualified” for admission to a college's professional nurse
training program. Jd. at 414. Two critical distinctions
between that case and the instant one must be examined in
order to determine the application of Davis to Amber Tatro.
“The U. S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR), the
executive agency charged with administrative enforcement of Section 504,
found in September of 1979 that Petitioner had violated Amber's rights
under Section 504 by withholding CIC. Pl. Exh. 3 (Tr. 42). That ruling
was in line with the consistent position of OCR. North Kansas City (Mo.)
School District, 3 E.H.L.R. 257:04 (November 29, 1978). Cf, Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. LaStrange, supra, at 4304 (the Department of HEW § 504
regulations “particularly merit deference’) & n. 15 (In adopting §
505(aX2) in the amendments of 1978, Congress incorporated the substance
of the Department's regulations into the statute'’). Those
regulations require Petitioner to provide ‘related aids and services that
(i) are designed to meet individual educational needs ofhandicapped per-
sons as adequately as the needs of persons are met;"’ to
‘provide for the education of each qualified person... with
... that the education of the person in the regular environment
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactor-
ily.” 34 C.F.R. $§ 104.33(bM1), 104.34.
36
To be a ‘qualified handicapped person” under U.S. Depart-
ment of Education regulations governing post-secondary
educational and vocational programs, the applicant must
‘‘meet{ ] the academic and technical standards requisite to
admission or participation in the recipient's education pro-
gram...” 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)\(3), cited with approval in
Davis, supra, at 406 (previously codified as 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(k)(3)). By contrast, to be ‘otherwise qualified’’ for pur-
poses of a public pre-school, elementary, or secondary pro-
gram, the handicapped child need only be within the proper
age range.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2).
In the Davis case, this Court found as a fact that, due to
her deafness, Francis Davis could not be trained to perform
some of the essential elements of nursing. Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, supra, at 401-404, 409-410, 413.
Thus, she could not meet the academic/technical require
ments for participation in the professional nurse training pro-
gram (which ultimately amount to the ability to be trained
to serve as a professional nurse). Amber Tatro, by contrast,
is not required to meet any academic or technical standards
in order to be otherwise qualified for a free appropriate public
education. It is sufficient that she is a handicapped child
between the ages of 3 and 21 inclusive and a legal resident
of the Irving Independent School District. Southeastern
Community College was not required to undertake “‘affirma-
tive action’’ in order to prevent the exclusion of a handi-
capped applicant not otherwise qualified; nor was it com-
pelled to fundamentally alter its program in order to render
it one for which the not otherwise qualified handicapped per-
son could qualify. Since Amber meets the essential elements
Amber has the right to ask for more in the way of accom-
modation, to insure that she is not denied benefits and
excluded from participation, than did Francis Davis at the
post-secondary level.
“Further, the child must reside “in the recipient’s jurisdiction.” 34
C.F.R. § 104.33(a) and Appendix A Comment 23.
37
A second distinction, found persuasive by the Fifth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, leads to the same result. As previously
noted, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra,
this Court accepted the lower court's factual finding that Ms.
Davis’ deafness would prevent her from ever being able to
perform certain essential tasks of nursing. Thus, even with
reasonable accommodations, Ms. Davis still could not realize
the principal benefit of the program to which she sought
access—i.e., to be trained to fulfill the role of professional
nurse. Jd. at 401-402, 409-410. By contrast, in the instant
case, the simple modification necessary to enable Amber's
safe participation (CIC) would not prevent her from realiz-
ing the benefits of specialized instruction in public school.
Tatro I, supra, at 564; Tatro II, supra, at 832. Accord New
Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d
847 (10th Cir. 1982) at 853-854; Georgia Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983) at 1580.
Cf. Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1982) at
1201-1202 n. 36. Petitioner has acknowledged that Amber
is educationally capable of benefitting from the instruction
offered in its public school program. Assuming that the pro-
gram offered Amber is otherwise appropriate by this
analysis, but for the contested omission of CIC, the ques-
tion of whether Amber could benefit from that program if
given access to it is foreclosed. Amber thus is presumptive-
ly an otherwise qualified handicapped individual.
C. Petitioner's refusal of clean intermittent catheterization to
Amber Tatro would have the effect of excluding her from
participation in, denying her the benefits of, and subjecting
her to discrimination by, Petitioner's program solely on the
basis of her handicap.
To be permitted access to Petitioner's program, Amber re-
quires a small accommodation of her bodily elimination
needs. A more reasonable accommodation for a handi-
capped person hardly could be imagined than CIC. It takes
only a few minutes twice a day, can be provided safely and
easily, does not entail costly or elaborate equipment, and re-
quires neither highly specialized credentials nor extraor-
dinary training for the person providing the service. This
.
ry
a, ates
tm y oe au )
‘ patigin’s : ie ee -
2 a, ? ’ a « af I ames fe" bs et ee are
38
Court held in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
supra:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal
to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination
against handicapped persons always will be clear. It is
possible to envision situations where an insistence on
continuing past requirements and practices might ar-
bitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped per-
sons of the opportunity to participate in a covered pro-
gram. Technological advances can be expected to
enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped
or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employ-
ment. Such advances also may enable attainment of
these goals without imposing undue financial and ad-
ministrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situations may
arise where a refusal to modify an existing program
might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Jden-
tification of those instances where a refusal to accom-
modate the needs of a disabled person amounts to dis-
crimination against the handicapped continues to be an
important responsibility of HEW.
Id. at 412-413 (emphasis added). As discussed in the State-
ment of the Case, supra, CIC represents a technological ad-
vance which replaced the expensive and burdensome sterile
catheteriation and which allows the needs of handicapped
children such as Amber to be accommodated without undue
financial and administrative burdens on either the State of
Texas or Petitioner. In the exercise of its continuing impor-
tant responsibility. the Office for Civil Rights of the Depart-
ment of HEW and of its successor Department of Educa-
tion has consistently identified the refusal to provide CIC
as an instance of discrimination under Section 504. See foot-
notes 26, supra and 28, infra.
Prior to the passage of Section 504 and the 1975 EHA
amendments, many school systems across the nation, on the
basis of state law or local practice, excluded non-toilet-trained
handicapped children from their free public schools. A.
Abeson, et al, Access to Opportunity, in 2 HOBBS (ed.),
39
ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 270
(1975) at 272. Since the enactment of Section 504 and the
EHA, that exclusion has been discontinued. Obviously,
states have been willing to assume that a handicapped child
must not be excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of the public schools solely on the basis of her
handicap-related inability to toilet appropriately. Conse-
quently, it should come as no surprise now to find public
school personnel assisting handicapped children with their
toileting needs, including physically placing a child on and
removing her from the commode.” A child reasonably can-
not be expected to remain in school through a six-to-eight
hour school day without relieving her bladder or bowels. If,
due to physical or mental disability, the child is unable to
perform this natural function independently, a reasonable
accommodation, in order that her education might proceed,
is for school personnel to assist the child. Due to her or-
thopedic/other-health-impairment, Amber Tatro is unable to
empty her bladder independently. A reasonable accommoda-
tion, so that Amber tnay remain in the most integrated set-
ting in which she is educationally capable of benefitting, is
for school personnel to assist twice a day through CIC to
drain her bladder. If the Court of Appeals decision in this
case is reversed, the clock may be turned back to the time
when public school systems could exclude children who, sole-
ly on account of their handicaps, lacked independent toileting
skills.
Similarly, a child cannot be expected to attend school all
day without eating. Some handicapped children, although
able to benefit educationally from instruction (standardized
or personalized) in public school, are unable, due to a physical
or mental handicap, to eat independently. Such children re-
*In a recent decision, the U. S. Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights found a school district in non-compliance with Section 504
for “‘[flailing to provide related aids and services ... necessary for (the
child] to receive an appropriate education," because the district failed to
implement a two-hour restroom schedule to accommodate the child's
handicap-related bladder problems. Kansas City U.S.D. # 50, OCR Ref.
No. 07831094, reprinted at E.H.L.R. Curr. Dec. 257:455 (May 2, 1983).
40
quire the reasonable accommodation of being spoon fed by
school personnel. Some handicapped children, although able
to benefit educationally from instruction in public school,
are unable, for example due to paralysis of the hands and
arms, to dress and undress. Such a child could not be
expected to remain in school throughout the school day
without removing and putting back on items of clothing, such
as coat and hat, and may need reasonable accommodation
in the form of assistance from school personnel in taking off
and putting on their coats, hats, etc.
All of the foregoing examples have legally relevant aspects
in common with CIC for Amber. CIC is comparable to the
accommodations discussed above in terms of cost, risk, and
physical involvement. In each case, including CIC, a child
educationally capable of benefitting from instruction in
public school would be excluded from participation in and
denied the benefits of the public school program without the
service as a reasonable accommodation.
A key benefit of the educational program offered to non-
handicapped eight-year-olds is second-grade-level academic
and other instruction” in a regular second grade class in a
regular public elementary school. However, without the ac-
commodation of CIC, Amber's educational program would
have to be offered to her in a setting outside the public school
system. (See discussion in Part I above.) This significant
41
public school. The basis for the deviation is not educational.
Amber's age and residence qualify her for a free appropriate
public education in the least restrictive environment ap-
propriate to her educational needs and abilities. In the
absence of CIC, Amber's ‘‘need” for separation from the
public school mainstream arises not from her educational
needs and abilities (as, for example, in the case of Abraham-
son uv. Hershman, supra) but solely from Petitioner's refusal
to accommodate her handicap. ‘“The exclusion of a minimally
handicapped child from a regular public classroom situation
without a bona fide educational reason is in violation of . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794." Hairston v. Drosick, supra, at 184.
Clearly then, Petitioner has discriminated against an other-
wise qualified handicapped individual solely on the basis of
her handicap—by withholding from Amber the reasonable
accommodation she needs, solely on account of her handicap,
in order to participate in and benefit from the educational
program for which she is otherwise qualified. In yet one other
respect, Petitioner has discriminated against Amber under
classical discrimination analysis. Petitioner makes available
to non-handicapped regular students the services of its school
nurses, to administer physician-prescribed medications, oral-
ly or in emergencies by injection. Pl. Exh. 2, supra. Through-
out the public school systems, school nurses routinely
dispense medications prescribed by medical doctors. Brief
for Amicus TASB at 6. School nurses also provide first aid.
Id. Thus, Petitioner makes available to students who do not
have Amber's unique handicap those physician-prescribed
services which are within the competence of 2 school nurse
and which are needed by the children in order to attend school
safely throughout the school day. However, Petitioner seeks
to withhold from Amber the simple physician-prescribed ser-
vice of CIC, which is well within the competence of a school
nurse and which is needed by Amber, solely on the basis of
ee ee ee
D. Clean intermittent catherization for Amber Tatro does not
impose an undve burden on Petitioner.
42
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra, this
Court identified two forms of ‘‘undue burden” which would
relieve a recipient of responsibility for accommodating a
handicapped person: ‘fundamental alteration in the nature
of a program” and undue financial and administrative costs.
Id. at 410, 412. To accommodate Francis Davis, the college
nursing training program would have had to eliminate prac-
tical training in those essential tasks of nursing which Ms.
Davis could never perform (and thus never demonstrate com-
petency in) due to her handicap. Consequently, the recipient
could not accommodate the handicapped plaintiff without
rendering its program in essence something other than a pro-
fessional nursing training program. ‘It is undisputed that
respondent could not participate in Southeastern’s nursing
program unless the standards were substantially lowered."’
Id. at 413. By contrast, Amber does not seek the removal
of any requirement which is relevant to her eligibility to
receive a free appropriate public education. The de facto “'re-
quirement” that she be able to remain in class all day without
catheterization has nothing to do with her age, legal
residence, or educational needs and abilities. Independent
toileting skill is not a criterion for public school eligibility
and the lack of it does not ‘otherwise disqualify’’ Amber.
whereas the requirements imposed on Francis Davis had very
much to do with her academic/technical qualifications for ad-
mission to a post-secondary educational program.
Further, and more important, the addition of CIC to the
total array of services offered by Irving I.S.D. to meet the
unique needs of its handicapped students will not transform
that school district into something it is not already. Peti-
tioner already is, as it is required by the EHA to be, an
health services. It is already a system which includes the ee
medically-related (though not strictly “medical” within the ‘
meaning of the EHA) services of ; 7
i > ‘ ' P a
ok je? Re =. a ee eee a Be ees
43
system.” Requiring Petitioner to provide the simple, inex-
pensive, and safe accommodation of CIC does not legally or
logically obligate Petitioner in the future to offer such
elaborate medical treatment as kidney dialysis to some other
child as a ‘reasonable accommodation." The same factors
discussed in section II-B above, which propel kidney dialysis
and other falsely analogized treatments outside the scope
of ‘‘related services,’ would also serve to preclude such treat-
ment as a “reasonable accommodation."
By use of the qualifier ‘‘undue,”’ this Court signalled in
Davis that not every financial and/or administrative burden
is impermissible in order to accommodate a handicapped per-
son. Consequently, the question of ‘‘undue burden” is a fac-
tual determination, which the trial court obviously resolved
in Respondents’ favor in the instant case. In Davis, the
burden was found to be ‘‘undue"’ because even after exten-
sive modifications in order to render the program one for
which Ms. Davis could qualify despite her handicap, Ms.
Davis still could not realize the intended benefit of the pro-
gram. By contrast, Amber, who is already otherwise qual-
ified, could realize the intended benefit of a public school
education if provided reasonable accommodation to permit
her access to it. The intended benefit of a handicapped
elementary school student's special education program dif-
fers significantly from the intended benefit of a post-
secondary professional training program. The intended
benefit of the latter is to achieve a particular result—i.e., to
be trained to perform the essential tasks of the p..>fession
in question. Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
supra, at 413. However, as this Court has observed, the in-
tended benefit of a free appropriate public education at the
*For handicapped and non-handicapped children alike, tho public schools
perform the incidental role of ‘public babysitter” or “day care” program,
enabling both parents to be employed full time. The fact that the public
school system happens to perform this secondary function does not con-
vert it from a primarily educational to primarily custodial system. Com-
parably, the fact that a reasonable accommodation such as CIC, to enable
a handicapped child such as Amber to be educated in public school, also
serves a health-related purpose, does not transform the school district
into a health care institution.
44
pre-school/elementary/secondary level is not necessarily to
produce a particular outcome, but simply to enable the child
to receive educationa! benefits. Board of Education v.
Rowley, supra, at 3043. With the accommodation of CIC to
permit Amber to remain safely in the public school class-
room, she can benefit educationally from the instruction
offered there.
The financial and administrative ‘‘costs’’ of CIC cannot
be considered undue. None of the courts examining CIC has
been persuaded as a fact that this simple service entails much
cost at all. Since the level of training required to administer
the service is minimal, a school district need not hire new
staff to provide the CIC, unless it chooses to for reasons of
its own. The cost in terms of staff time (perhaps ten minutes
per school day) is negligible. The amount of time that would
have to be spent in consultation with the prescribing physi-
cian is well within tolerable limits—no more so than respon-
sible school personnel would spend for children with other
medically-related handicap needs, e.g., for physical therapy,
audiology, etc. Finally, to the extent that the prescribing/
delegating physician provides diagnostic or evaluation ser-
vices in connection with the child's CIC, the school district
would be financially responsible.”' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17); 34
C.F.R. § 300.13(bN4).
Petitioner virtually concedes that CIC itself is not burden-
some, by placing such heavy reliance on arguments as to the
dire impositions to which upholding CIC might lead. By this
reasoning, Amber must be denied the service she needs in
order to be able to remain in class through the day, not
because serving Amber would burden the district but because
someday some other child might ask for something that real-
ly is burdensome. However, the legal standards for related
(as opposed to purely medical) services and for reasonable
accommodation, as thoroughly examined above, provide
“Note than four of the seven physician functions in CIC that are listed
in Pet. Brief at 25-26 are diagnostic and evaluative in nature: (1), (4), (5),
(7). Respondents have not asked that Petitioner either pay for or hire the
_ physician to perform any of the physician functions.
45
more than adequate safeguards for the public school system
against the future horrors feared by Petitioner.
_ To create the illusion of cost, Petitioner and the school
board emici argue that provision of CIC will increase the risk
of injury and thus necessitate higher liability insurance
premiums for the school district. Two points render this argu-
ment invalid. In the first instance, as previously discussed,
the record shows that CIC is a very safe procedure, with
minimum risk. More importantly, Congress has removed in-
creased risk as a basis for excluding handicapped children
from public school. Opening the public schoolhouse doors to
previously barred children in wheelchairs, with diminished
intelligence, wiih impaired judgment, with deficient motor
coordination, with fragile bodies, with damaged senses, etc.,
cannot help but increase the overall risk of accident or in-
jury. Nevertheless, the EHA’s and Section 504's command
is unmistakable: to include all handicapped children, in the
regular public school environment to the maximum extent
such children can benefit educationally therefrom. The focus
is on the needs and abilities of the children rather than on
school officials’ fears of liability. Congress has made the judg-
ment that the benefit to society of appropriately educating
handicapped children for independence and productivity
outweighs any increased burden on local school systems of
serving previously excluded handicapped children.
Conclusion
In consideration of all the foregoing, Respondents respect-
fully pray that this Court affirm the decision of the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
James C. Todd
ADVOCACY, INCORPORATED
1006 East 50th Street
Austin, Texas 78751
(512) 475-5543
Attorney for Respondents
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IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
ADMISSION, REVIDY, AND DISMISSAL COMMITTEE SUMMARY
spert_As bec Tatre DATE + “2 =
b.0.8. Lol 2/75 - SCHOOL a Ha aoa PROGRAM
>. The committee reviewed the following data:
A. Assessment reports (specify reports and dates)
Bo additional information provided
a Aseesement information presented as documented:
he Pact {| Sie tt it fe oa. taaed des
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B. Assesement date or information from the parent or student:
fo additional information provided
Assessment information presentec as documented:
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Tl. The Committee, after considering al] of the above assessment data, decided thet the
‘pot neet ony specific eLigibiiity @t this time. :
$8 -83-14)
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III. The committee decided that this student:
needs special education services because of the handicapping conditicn(s)
cited above.
Goes not need special education services at this time.
The data ou which this decision was based include asses t as documented:
Peeswus medical re Vo tries Brey Or nope. ¢ ‘
Waretic ay , ite Mecn ASSsSer eed ad. ee bh. = ne fds
tA Gane @ c Wyss.
IV. The committee encures that this student is not assigned to special education
on the basic of criteria which vere Jeveloped solely on the command o! the
English languace. —Yes
The committee ensures that this student was not placed in special education
if the oly deficiencies identified are directly attributable to:
A. w G@ifferent cultural lifestyle xtes No
B. lack of educational opportunities —Yes
Cc. lack of achievement irom previous education experiences
es
Dis ion:
“Tene Friis ws Hales AWE Nero. Se: peers aud
Sc rico! peers Kon.
Vv. Annual review
A. Long-range goals and short-term objectives ingicated by the sorwme:ntei
prorress of the student ore considered appropriate _inepprerwiate
B. The rrocran placement as it relates to student procrese is
appropriate ___ inappropriate
C. The relates services, if any, are _i/ appropriate ____ inappropriate i
D. Referral e4ditional asvessment is consideres necessary ""
unnecessary :
E. A there in the etusent's prorres placenent is ___reeded w_not newse:
(See deliberations)
?. TE? sevelopet or modified with new *onle and objective: (as apprepris‘e’.
“
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TIROIVIDUAL EDUCATIONAL FLAK
A. Present competencies imay reference Stave II! assescment data attached)
1. academic developments. .
Wee Acme & "ie ha 50" Test Seeres S/ae/@3
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&. Instructional and related services goals and objqctives:
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Criteria for evaluation: "Tegidn. . mmeeks Mote, ceass tive . (E ;
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Criteria ‘or evaluation: Teeebse ponte Thefs, Conn ty aan if '
Schedule ‘cr evaluation: a
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Objective #2: iy wail ke atria TO
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Schedule for evaluation:
Implementor: Angle see 2 Z t ? pe
Objective #3: Abin rth no able TU ed dh ak asebtin ef TWP -& 408
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Objective #2: Conte aby cae
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Criteria “or evalsation:
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ochetase for efsluntica:
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Objective #3:
Criterin fur ev aetson:
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Ce. serrice, Ting turt bad : ficatiuns
Rervuler bducwtion
. ‘
ies bducution
Vecuticna! Etucetion
mA Lua
helatey Services
of enmetienal Therapy = 61> Frew
Ben Si?
hysice. Th erepy wr ¥
— yes Me4d Pee oe
2 Ribs fey ai’
rE ="
=z twech/ acuage Therapy Euatoch cn
se. nny ow
>
—“T trensyortation 4
mA ejh> biey
Special Ed. bus
bir. Sus
burent Keisbursed
Viner
For visually handicapped, autistic, of contract students, the committe. hus
completed and attachec additional LEP requirements. ayes te
Fur the steht in 8th grade or age 14 as of September |, on SOMMATKOe fue
con -tvtes une attached @ graduation plan. Ajh ves
Seed j=l eat
vi
Gif ol
Dr. Jonn Townley
Irving Independent School District
901 O'Connor Road
Irving, Texas
Re: C.1.C. Instructions for Amber Leigh Tatro
PRESCRIPTION
Deer Sir:
Amber Tatro nas been placed on a schedule of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization every three to four hours during the waking day.
Amber is to be catheterized at the times listed:
€:30 A.M.
9:30 A.M.
12:30 P.M.
33:30 O.%.
6:30 P.M.
9:30 P.M.
If Amber's diaper ts wet at the time for the scheduled
catheterization, this should be reported to me. Or. Frosts. or
Or. Goldstein at the Spina Bifida Clinic at the Scnottisn Rite
Hospital as the above schedule may need to be modified.
A qualified school nurse or other qualified person can perforr
C.1.C. and attached to these instructions are tne Scottisn Rite
Hospital instructions for catheterization of a female which are
to be tollowed.
A © 10 or # 12 catheter should be used to start out.
The above schedule for catheterization and size of catheter may
be altered upon the direction of myself, Or. Frosts, or
Or. Goldstein from time to time according to Amber's needs.
If there are any questions, I, Nr. Frostg, or Or. Goldstein
may be reached through the Spina Bifias Clinic at Scottish
Rite Hospital).
vii
a. < aba
©62 3) P
703 OF tbe Ge’ “jute
id
Tshw ceue dunt +e tO dleils in ACC. hance wri bt
“Clreet ussctulu av
taphninc
rey face 6 em Ute nO At mrove sheta seoks+ Leaees
- wS re owcle’ — - owtulhun 5 ren
2. (6 teow will pur eu shots vocks + Lvameer. +c’
aol Avsewr wlhin (0 new,
ot /Pare at 5 (mere url at met and Fama Cw SHG wT
a
erleTipanwd
fon bh “ue 16 i |
Q fetes rll wounte Leelee beGuer— Gehl tan “J
OT ne) me QS
a
c Sahat heanadie egies Lerek B or > aes Lape pany 1
© 0 /iaren re / *) fe ow eee. weelk aot 3 pe — ges Ow peveksa ud
Touft .
cup, ees 1 Cher An ae awd am pecaaat a mae
‘
.% aut mt oe
eT ‘ Cur ds nate “Cathie vation pes wen wn bh Pearse
-\ Cyvsepuate, Sota fe ieee be formants hk és
~
viii
Tef a!
TEXAS SCOTTISH RITE HOSP: TAL FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN
In. IONS PA THETERI ZATION OF
Myst, a
« mpletely emoty the bladder at scheduled intervals in ord“: to decrease the
ateecidence cf urinary tract infection.
Usine that 474-8 stagnant in the bladder 18 more likel, to becore anfected. A
Diedder tha: s-ays full becomes enlarged ad chickered.
Scheduleé err: /.7g of the Fliécer alievs the patient to become familiar wits the
@ilference ir the sensation Of « full Eladdér and an empty bladder.
:
Equapment Zeezed:
Clean catheter. metal or robber. (Metal is best since it can be boiled repeatedly
without detericration.)
Soap and warer.
Dash to catch the urine, fcr example, a re-usable jar.
Large underpad. <o preven: soaking bed linens.
i} S228 Fy
i. “eeh hearts with soap ant water.
2. Get all of the equiraert ready.
3. Get ch:id ready. (If possible, jut et table height since it is easier to do this
procedure at th:s height.) Place child or her back
4. Spread labia apart with one hand end wash genitalia with soap and water with the
ether hard. aiveve sovirg in a downward direction. (Never wash in an cpward
@arection 8.57¢ to18 ¥i11 move geres from around the rectum up into the ares
et the blasser o¢ening.)
&. Insert catueter in urpthra and let 91) urine drain out of the bladder. Th.s nay
teke lerger <"e5 you thane. se Go not scemove catheter until che urine has 12. ;res
©. tf yew are wnatle to caetheterise, contact your :ocal Public Nealth Nurse cc cal)
Tenes Secttisnh Rite Mospite. .
®t least once «@ Gay after the catheter hes Been washed with soap ord water piece
it am & pot Gf water en@ bes! fer 20 aenutes. Allow the cetheter to air é:) ori
- Zell
i 6 wag
OPHTHALMOLOGY CONSULTANTS PF A see eees se 8 meee
tveect A Mocoy ™ DO or we Eve
PED ATES CPM THALMOLOGY ome STRAGIGNUS
- 18 & Sermiyr MO
( “ERet OPHTHAL MOLOn.)
EXAMINATION REPORT
A —_
Patient's Lame: Atm ber AALS EG:
Date of Examination: ail Fre ae
1. Usaunosis: Asi Z. sect cienhleg Pare
+ afatony
Il. Treatment:
L“_ Glasses
B. Patching
c. Medications
Ae Exercises
g. Surgery
F. None
Tll. kecommendations for school:
ite Front of class placement
b. Needs visual aids
Sf Needs special materials
li. Visual restrictions
&. : i 7~ WNone of the above
i. Other
f]
Iv. Pataent ais to return: ng aha :
, . : _—
id
Me/..7 Loaf WA Pea Fue tea f Lice: 2
S a2. .
wv Crnetthaliena “Cre att 7 ,
EVERETT A. MOODY, i1.D. 4
se) ecstrensh Gant eee feaa 1000 gees somenen
Dallas, Texas
214:521-3168
Report of Clinic Visit/Return
In response to your request, the following information is provided to you as a
summary of the patient's last visit.
Prtient's Neve Ce et ios) +... °F
’ Sa EO nanPags Ss ak
Clinic “> . IS rela) eS eee re a + Date edlied ov &
Cuief Compluint/Diagnosis tot. TA ok ee. Pe oe ee Oe |
peer remus ’ ay
Interval History We ors Vwi ee faa few t Bes
necomendatioss {\\i, bh: ys 2! bp at et py aes
7, ry
act U > ee eeri rae Tare waar
t
nee ” ara 4 +
‘ &
xi
3 —
Hedy } |
wo beasy .
(itt
PLETED E 4
tubing lef
ad 24
|
post-
has
see her
knee
xii
~N
leased,
today
th how
mother
Time
‘
a
2
xiii
a, 3gate ipa
a, 4 ay : : 2 i
‘ah TF | é tile
Eine ir 308285.
STILLS ELT mete ttt
xiv
— a
[.¢ ef ~
I4VINC INDPYCNDENTUSCIOOL DIsTeicr te “4,
OCCIPATIONAC/OMYSICAL TI SRAPY SCT “.
NAME: oF & 9.0.8, sa/j lym
OATE : o a oc? WA y
Ae Fe ‘ roa Lee) that tt bb. gh. 4 EA TE RES Te eT ae a
ese ‘ PS. te, he o4 off sh fs 4, Pe Fas at | > . suse eh ss ,
4 .
NOE COALS Ce Stee
” : ; oe ,
oi. Le a! Oe Pa?) Mei sd: pil opel as yy eathicss 4s raf a Ay tt, >
sfondi. «5 4s 41, fees i eiiny eh sv lash gel, raver
1 v4
PROGRE>S:
aes ae A ha i OO ta et wD fe ot i gts wry
‘ < se Poe Jv z ; ./
ry “tt Bunt ~ .
wan wet ° asse!
U Ts, Are ahs
la
27 Te ; hid Me ete ( ste the A a. «2
‘ Fis te
gh Aue’ ard. ma OR hey me sbornid aleiw cris
v , .
«3 mses ccs gh 4 ween fur Qu Bue 16 Sua dues. Ja ths wee mites clin ks.
overs tei te ts pital “pneu “ay owt. Ett the ¢ MMe Mh AT Oe
ela) SP a ee ee eee AKtilin-
slit tt ttl LIEN YT ae Re TCE cE Fae | #
. 4 :
es 6 oes: = ideas
! teal
Serretimeattanan” — Shain fl dale a/'F
300: Jacanem Street
Teving, Tenas 75001
&,; Fi as ! “oak 7 P
OD ue “NOH ps eye wat w Clad ae. GF Hl -
‘ , gy on 42 4 — at tu yd fd ’
ARC) UCT? Brice wens t Rees
urhuch Arik a * “ , a op ay
por heapat. a Sly A% ¢
aefianka.
of * wb comd Se uh
Q, ‘. era eet? a? Dhan, «« 2, pee Mf Pec a.
arcs sete ates, KU S ts ness
oe ee ey buh wot Ohm, MAD, Gon ¢
kD eae nt axl ee es See ee oe, See
eer Cee eal uzlt Fly Qe A. wee a® opt.’
ot) ee ery ps wh el dy 60% tial vA, “e?
Ley the atehcot ay = a. Co Ste
soathie wrcwudid Nakl demu
keh ts agent Ofna 06 tA meen,
ee eI -
Sb heen ath srasrtaiad fvkh oitngh of ws’
ty her J muochine
¢ tmbn well vaonTauvn, gor ia berly ¢* nyt )
in ug ae nied arent pega Kot ;
a lod on an ae bras. e
xvi
IS ef 21
VIMC_INDERENOR:T SCHOOL DISTR:
LOCCUPATIONA./PMYSICAL THERAPY REPORT
wage: ' 6 oo. wig 5.0.8. ie 1-1
aes . eat <a eer’ ta +> ars | = ad »
hone RVGE DIA :
ag as » Mae Oe. ahe-ites gos EUr ae. 6: » bh. », he
bad . a! bd
4, - a at vcd wee Pfu: * bon seed (a a Be + 00 en be & fs
> To Tet oe , ay <r ew. ee Oe as
i eo fre Leer aay TS In lt, Buns’. Se oi le Fount. ©
a ai? se aieth /> seleck G fewt a Aer Pires, s- t, ee Lee ee
lett ae a. Seen ae eee cee a ee ar a ow areaayn tit, = =eog
1d rig ot tag tnt Crate hes ae Chm nye Lie weet
ve re oe Ties ft mis- gobi! ee Bk BE EN
" ee «we haha “bite ms oe Stiesegelitn -bew . Cait ne”
apees Spar} one:
; SMart 2 its Sy ae iwet am, * = hws, an) a { oes' of. s
— zs
-
Focematiora’ Me ca Teter —~ oT he ol /
vt. of Of wae ~ecatim v Fe : n
wl. Swat Seem
teow ‘aan
xvii
oft ft * salu
4& ext fe a\e
“ -—+
oh rere. “wort tee Oy
THINKS
7 Wa et *
vlathy ‘%
* wee oo 6. Oe
es wa
. e f .
tr oe end 62 oe-eee Shatin we tire
BR We wrth ree” vag oS. ee
“s wr we. Ck mur fe wher, +6 t baw
tm figdses™ awrlhin Gann
we
“?
;
“a
os
. .
~ .
e<
»
doe on
cet a
~
- Pace
4
ce OC arte Lathes brkieees
es toe OrMe ‘ghmae Lavel ee ied
‘
—asT Cot hae sateen pee sien
- "Bw
e
fe. -
° fee *4.
© bowler
t* osote tal po Ca Ut?
in eet.
we Oe PO aE ADM 4 Ot meet a:
;
ee
vine Seale ‘ve. Bnei
Io h al
xviii
17 of A
August 22, 1983
Adapted Phreical Education Ruport
Amber Teatro received adapted physical education instruction
one day « week during the 1962-83 school year. During this time
improvement was seen in eye-hand coordination. Amber meet the first
and second short range goals which dealt with catching a bounced bell.
The third short range of bouncing and catching was not reached.
During the 1983-84 school year I am recommending that Amber be
mainstreamed into the regular second grade physical education class at
least one day during the week. I will go with her to clases to assist
im any wey possible. Aleo, I wili be available to give suggestions
to the physical education teacher in ways to adapt games and activities
so that Amber may be involwed as auch as possibile.
Sincerely,
Kathie Shaffer
Adapted Physical Education, IISD
ARD Minn. . Auber Tatro Miavds oat ae inas
Present
WaAm¢s Posi aon
nfm y rhe aped
Sih Ape ee ade fubi Jyad -degnedicvin
ry F< em
< eae Abamnes-
nt, Dae - gr Meloy Athan)
- ath Lome
oy Mig ~ Pumas’, Boome
a be
Lunn t 6 Atpeiad wtrt vr & r septate ye 4
ail. Att Ue ken Angheris, « 3 aetlettcanse
sealraliOry and Salhi, Lit shat
apo ‘ [re OTIPT tne ne FE, whine
: ( Gackl A sempsee mene’ smdvoaticn (das sorte)
lat nade tracks wrtecatie
ee: talay wre one way C7259 gan od
¢ wae nlacaal Lt Mrrtith gt Mhle when, “Miles
, beni on nee Ahatli W414 2m OS:
wu mia, areal Aled ade Blin
3 Nitieg 2 Mth an Malle AO thisegy
ike as. Abed. N- at 0 Ing
Me mill Sirniee teen tysinneas —
Se ainan ac ented i uA And Pax lcel,
ee 4 Hhet hel ondduia Tih drier Has
Lasitbn sank, an » wahaate’ eater ae
acd COxte O710T Onde Adapts
Aewawed nn go eect ww ynanng sales
dnd. Ci, Mticees Ecupdes)
wd , O12 hhtectae et
40 Af, and (2:30 PM,
Cimber) ee ~~ On 3.
y Ai WI; Le Fad gadke ees
Praripntatan ua hemimacd/
Wamilio wtr pag tad aa pene
xxi
Page pre) of Zl
VI. SUMMARY OF DELIBFRATIONS
A. Assessment data vas considered LZ Yes Wo
B. Alternative placements revieved: seco nth
ee Me
C. Aé@ditional ye related es discussed:
See TE tr AtwWNies
D. “Recommendations: S44 desman (&.) alr .
xxii
Page 2) of 2!
I have participated in all of the decisions listed on the preceding pages:
VOTING MEMBERS
a «
istration Yes = No * Voc. Admin. Yes No *
Voc. Teacher Yes No *
v.E. Yes No *
A.H. Yes wo *
LPAC Representative Yes No «
* Voting members casting dissenting votes may express objections on bottom of
this fora.
1 give my permission for y to receive the special
: — °
education services described in this p . I wnderstand that ay permission may
be revoked at any tine.
CES Sears race Hnt A
Sk ue BM Vxbeed Hera
‘ yaueke
° . "“@er 4 :
a anne! noccrrer Bache)
Ae
4 3 : - mee
{ (dsenpel®? vis 'S ee Re
08d ~ cistern, Sco
xxiii
so OF. Roe.
068s. <
TEP suPPLiMaD, coals “*SDS-K4 Scheak. - page of
Goal # \
se sepa sats Clitdiinnignitins das,
eet, GOS =
Objective fl:
Ae Hoe. Derma, smn on Rem Berernn orton ond,
Criteria for evaluation: nai,-CcCem’.. 0 148.25.6..
Schedule for evaluation: | - 3“
Implementor: DD.eee “oe
Objective #2: : :
Re +3... Sonme, om err OS,
a OH One Onm~=e.
Criteria for evaluation: maai- <u, tros—c2.,
Schedule for evaluation: A- ¥“4
Implementor: Od-e.22, —~~-2-
Objective #3:
Criteria for evaluation:
Schedule for evaluation:
Laplementor:
2 se A:
Geet @ ’ 3° qs Ay a ate, ro,
Objective fl:
Re Cohen e Sey, ote Ono
Criteria for evaluation: mami. <. «38. ee ee ee
Schedule for evaluation: 4“- 84
criteria for evaluation: ReDs -cems\. @ edad,
Schedule for evaluation: S- 44
laplementor: JacheeQ ~un ro,
Objective #3:
Criteria for evaluation:
Sehedule for evaluation:
Implement or:
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.