Respondents Brief — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro

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Office -Surreme Court. US

FILED

No. 83-558 MAR 2@ ae

7 ALL AANODER LL. STEWASs

IN THE soviet |

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

v.

Petitioner,

HENRI and MARY TATRO, individually and as

Next Friends of AMBER TATRO, a Minor,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Court

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

James C. Todd

ADVOCACY, INCORPORATED

1006 East 50th Street

Austin, Texas 78751

{512) 475-5543

March 23, 1984 Attorney for Respondents

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child

such as Amber Tatro is a “related service’ within the mean-

ing of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended.

2. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child

such as Amber Tatro is a ‘supplementary aid or service”’

within the meaning of Section 612(5)B) of the Education of

the Handicapped Act, as amended.

3. Whether the requirement of clean intermittent cath-

eterization as a related or supplementary service for a child

such as Amber Tatro is a reasonable condition imposed on

Petitioner for the receipt of federal funds under the Educa-

tion of the Handicapped Act, as amended.

4. Whether clean intermittent catheterization for a child

such as Amber Tatro is a reasonable accommodation pur-

suant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRE-

TNS in 5s gin a Reh ens sae need naa eee

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY ...................

I. DENIAL OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATH-

ETERIZATION WOULD RESULT IN THE ExX-

CLUSION AND SEGREGATION OF AMBER

TATRO AND SIMILARLY SITUATED HANDI-

CAPPED CHILDREN FROM THE FREE PUBLIC

Page

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

V. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS

A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION PUR-

SUANT TO SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITA-

Cr er ae ee Serer 33

to the instant case ...................0.00.. 33

| sppropriate public education in the least restrictive

C. Petitioner’s refusal of clean intermittent catheteri-

zation to Amber Tatro would have the effect of ex-

cluding her from participation in, denying her the

benefits of and subjecting her to discrimination by

Petitioner's program solely on the basis of her

D. Clean intermittent catheterization for Amber Tatro

does not impose an undue burden on Petitioner 41

ALD. 50's Gl ca ah op « skineg chal: vx. 45

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) 21

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) 34

Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) 29, 41

Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. -

3034 (1982) ....... 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 44

Campbell v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F.

Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1961) .................66. 15

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) 33

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. LeStrange, __. U.S. —__.,

52 U.S.L.W. 4301 (No. 82-862, February 28, 1984)

eee eh ON ee ar pe ee 21, 33, 35

Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981),

rev. and rem., 708 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983)... .. 15

Georgia Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 706

F.2d 1866 (llth Cir. 1963).................... 36

Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, —_ U.S.

pee 2 RO 21, 34

Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va.

ROUGE od as veo ak etek ens Fab see 12, 19, 27, 41

Heims v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied 455 U.S. 946 (1982) ..... 6... eee ne 6

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.

GOED a ks oa SE ales 0 4 nike vs Sees Ve 34

Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) . 34

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).............. 21

New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mezx-

ico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982) ............. 36

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451

US 3 OBE ed Lira. tee Tie eo 27, 30, 31, 32

Roncker v. Waiter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied sub nom. Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Roncker, _. U.S. —___., 52 U.S.L. W. 3266

(No. 82-1890, October 3, 1983) ................ 15, 19

Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .. 36

Smith v. Cumberiand School Committee, 703 F.2d 4

(1st Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v.

Robinson, _.. U.S. ___., 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (No.

wen" \ SG Sere. 2 ae wa eet 48 eo ee Ps “ie ee ee t

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir.

1982), cert. denied __. U.S. ___., 103 S.Ct. 2086

CO BN we aod 6 SO cade Dok piece okie. hk os 15, 19

Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983) (Tatro IJ)

De ae AY Se ar Cie) ee. Qe 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 20, 35, 36

Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981) .

5 Vn cian a v's + 6 dae UA 3 a CN 1, 2, 7, 22, 24, 35

Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tatro J)

Pn acti nds Hides COE e Eee 4, 6, 7, 17, 20, 21, 22, 36

Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979) 6

Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443

(8rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Scanion v.

Tokarcik, 458 U.S. ___., 102 S.Ct. 3508 (1982) ..

ey ey Aa ee et 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23

Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, C.A. No.

79-338 (W.D. Pa. October 31, 1980), reprinted at 3

EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED LAW

REPORTS (E.H.L.R.) 552:427 (1980).......... 9, 16, 20

United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) . 35

United States Statutes

The Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended

by the Education of the Handicapped Amendments

of 1974, £0 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.

Bh Ne ROE ae ap ca Ry eae mee Tae 27

The Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended

by the Education For All Handicapped Children Act

of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.

DOD on ok 0 84k kd oi Deo es ce ao. ll

DME. ada0 ss OKs oa b ecalle Peebine sarees 1

REDOING. © a sibic sid ped ee ca peek OeRaN 16, 23, 33

i tan sate ea cates «ob eee myer ee

SS ee ee eee ele ee 16, 18, 23, 33

SU EE: GUMIc <0. crwie.« 6.4.0 0 wnie trol o Grats Slalean Ene 23, 30, 33

IE Ba CK: b ev Were chico CUS He 0. SueeE ee ln 32

SIDS 4 i 9's ait/dte 6 0 ib ewe inne be ebbaes 16

EOD 0.» Ss ae) ic peeadeweeas Dewees 2

DT NED sv nd ons ob cede eee e ets 8, 17, 26, 27

RAN ——

siti

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

een das etael Shes _... 30, 32

§ 1413 (a4)... Se eee 12

SS pi ee 32

§ 1414 (aX1NC)........... Ms Pins he)

MI So 55 dc Su « hivs os SRR bPSa ca eee 30, 32

Se ee ph eee ey 5

Re ERAS ORE "ee Sees vine ee, 5

TS ASME TIRES SS Alte eed Me .

SO ee, eee eee See. 21

The Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20

FE Re eee 34

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 7 (7), 29 U.S.C.

I A a oe diek Pe daniel ad end so ah aie nd

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, 29 U.S.C.

Oe as so cass 7, 9. 11, 13, 15, 27, 33 et seq.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 505(aX2), 29

SUED, gS. 9.3-s d's pb alta Oiaca Caen © Mite oka

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

GN a a0. nals 6s condi Rca ease ant Badion

’ The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U:S.C. § 3601 et seq.

The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 et seg............ 31,

35

34

34

34

34

34

32

Or OR RMR sage Lo tiey : em eRe 2 32

32

32

32

32

32

32

FY 1984 Appropriations for Depertments of Health

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States Regulations

34 C.F.R. § 104.3(kN2).......... 7 a . 36

OG Ge Is bi vce cker ier vedine 36

ge 6 4 ree ae 36

ek eS ere 35

eet ee err eee er ee 12

dS er ee 35

34 C.F.R. Part 104 Appendix A Comment 23 .. 36

of El UR ere 1

Se 1

Re ee eee 24

34 C.F.R. § 300. 13(bM1Miii)......... 2... 24

34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bHIMiv).................. 23, 24

OU te IIs 5 ox tins eve ccc cccess 21, 44

ok AO 24

ek A 8 en 22, 23

34 C.F.R. § 300.13 Comment................ 23, 33

a db: ks 5.0 vn vo ne's's bem 12

34 C.F.R. § 300.340-300.349................. 5

34 C.F.R. § 300.550-300.554................. 5

Re RS eee eee 36

Texas Statutes

Hearing Aids, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 4566 et

Ss ier conch i250 s Med cele’: o.cidbe bavels Cae b ree

Comprehensive Special Education Program for Handi-

capped Students, TEX. EDUC. CODE § 16.104(c}1) 2

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004 .................. 2, 13

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.081 ..................

ALA. CODE § 34-2¢217.......................

ALASKA STAT. § 08.84.160...................

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1328(b) ................

D.C. CODE ANN.

om

:

=

BSS8S BSB.

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2901 23

KY. REV. STAT. § 327.010 a 23

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3002 23

MINN. STAT. ANN.

eee Ea a 23

ff er ee ETE OP ware 23

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-A:9.............. 23

N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531 (McKinney)........... 23

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4755.48(F) .......... 23

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 688.130... ee 23

I, oes ov os een ues» 23

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1309 ........... 23

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 459.035.......... 23

VA. CODE

§ 54-273(9) om a : ¥ 23

§ 54-281-2 . peepee Gere akg Ula Shed Catabe a hit 23

Texas Administrative Rules

ie Teg SE 24

i9 TAC. $60.217 ....... ir ¢.o Ct taka 24

Pe I Fo bg is hk boinc ohio owes seen 2

19 T.A.C. § 89.235(aN3NCiix) ....... 7 24

19 T.A.C. § 89.235(d) ..... ce abs are as Caras 2, 13

BO FPS GI icc cc ete tccens Fate 13

19 T.A.C. Chapter 157, subchapter D....... 6

Miscellaneous Authority

Legislative History

118 Congressional Record 525 (January 20, 1972). . 14

121 Congressional Record 19494 et seq.

IN de ess willie is we eee 14, 15, 18

I 3: Sie ss ce» vale «aw ee kee at's 14, 15, 18

INLD 28 cis clack Posh ou yy oes eeu 15, 18

ee pees 15, 28

RR ROU 6. nk rrdde ce Biotec pave 15, 18

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Office of

Civil Rights Decisions

Kansas City U.S.D. #50, OCR Ref. No. 07831094,

reprinted at E.H.L.R. 257:455 Curr. Dec. (May 2,

Rss & Sapte a bis Kab obs Oke eae te’ eee

North Kansas City (Mo.) School District, 3 E.H.L.R.

257:04 (November 29, 1978) ..................

Books &

Periodicals

A. Abeson, et al Access to Opportunity, in 2 HOBBS

(ed.), ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF

eo RB DL Pens a ee

A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSI-

GEE Get. bs a has die cs pte s DE

J. LUCKMAN & R. SORENSEN, MEDICAL-SUR-

GICAL NURSING (1960)....................

NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, A

SURVEY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION COSTS IN

LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1979).. .......

T. Nevins & S. Maver, Dialysis, in S. GELLIS & B.

KAGAN (eds.), CURRENT PEDIATRIC THER-

"ioe ab ee ee

D. Stauffer, Catheterization—A Health Procedure

Schools Must be Prepared to Provide, 54 JOURNAL

OF SCHOOL HEALTH 37 (1984).............

L. WHALEY & D. WONG, NURSING CARE OF IN-

FANTS AND CHILDREN (1983) .............

Other

Board of Education v. Rowley, Brief of Petitioner, re-

printed at 3 E.H.L.R. 553:323 (1982)...........

Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ......

Page

39

35

38, 39

26

26

12, 13

19

&S

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amber Tatro is a mentally and emotionally normal' female

child who is disabled by the birth defect of myelodysplasia,

more widely known as ‘‘spina bifida’ (‘open spine’’). Record,

Trial Transcript (‘‘Tr.'’) at 13-14, 95-96, and elsewhere. Amber

was three and a half years old at the time of the June 19,

1979 Impartial Hearing— Record, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5b (Tr.

137), Impartial Hearing Transcript (‘I.H.Tr.") at 67—five

at the time of trial, 516 F.Supp. 970; seven at the time of

the Court of Appeals’ second decision, 703 F.2d 825, and is

now eight years old. Amber is agreed to be ‘‘orthopedically

handicapped” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), 34

C.F.R. § 300.5(bi6). Further, she was found by the Impar-

tial Hearing Officer to be ‘‘other health impaired’’ within the

meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(bX7). PL

Exh. 5, supra, Decision of the Hearing Officer at 6-7.

Among the effects of Amber's handicapping condition are

speech impediments, mobility impairment and a ‘neurogenic

bladder."’ If Amber's bladder dysfunction, which includes

an inability to empty her bladder voluntarily, is left chron-

ically unattended, it will result in ‘‘reflux’’ pressure on the

kidneys, causing infection and kidney damage. Pl. Exh. 5b,

supra, I. H. Tr. 14-15; Tr. 234-235, and elsewhere. To avoid

the harmful consequences described, it is necessary for

Amber to be ‘‘catheterized” every three to four waking hours,

by a process known as ‘‘clean intermittent catheterization”

(“CIC”). PL. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 27-28, 34-37, 65-67; Tr.

111, 238-239, 244; 516 F.Supp. 971, 974. She must be cath-

eterized at least once during the ‘school day'” in order to

‘It is not contested that Amber is intellectually normal. nor has the

school district or anyone eise on record in this case asserted that she is

emotionally disordered.

Slee ceenntn ene tae te denen Sen astne

(ARD) Committee had determined, with the parents’

two-end-a-half-hour day program was coat abhsee oa aay

1979. Tr. 318. However, that

in Amber's individual education pian Tr S88. "Barty Childhood

oy

for ("Pet. Brief”) at 3. are eligible for

2

attend school safely. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 29-30; Tr.

239-240, 244-245; 516 F.Supp. 977. Amber has been provided

CIC since she was thirteen months old. Tr. 79. Prior to CIC,

Amber had bladder infections approximately once every two

months, lasting about six weeks on one occasion. Pl. Exh.

5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 67. Since being on CIC, Amber has had

no such infections or other injuries or side effects.’ Jd. at 68;

Tr. 80.

‘Clean intermittent catheterization” (“‘CIC’’) is a very sim-

ple, safe, quick and effective process, capable of being per-

formed by an average layperson with minimal training,

whereby a small hollow tube is inserted about one-inch into

the urethra in order to drain the bladder. 516 F.Supp. 974;

public education at age 3, while five is the age of eligibility for regular

public school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(24B); TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 16.104(ci1),

21.031. At trial, Petitioner's witness Ms. Guy conceded that Amber, then

five years old, might qualify for an educational program extending from

8:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Tr. 326. Subsequently, Petitioner offered Amber

a two-hour-and-forty-five-minute program, attempting to schedule it be-

tween the hours in which Amber usually needs catheterization. This was

the subject of special proceedings on March 13, 1981. Transcript (‘*Tr.

(3-13-81)"") at 18-20. At that time it was announced, and noted by Judge

Higginbotham as a ‘positive sign.’ that Amber would go to kindergarten

the following September. Tr. (3-13-81) 34. At oral arguments before the

Court of Appeals on November 16, 1962. it was not disputed that Amber,

then seven years old. was in a regular first grade class. She now in fact

attends a regular second grade class. (Amber's current IEP is attached

as an Appendix to this Brief.) There. she is entitled by law to a minimum

seven-hour day. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004. State Board of Education

3

Tr. 125-126, 128-130 (testimony of Phalia Findley), 144-146

(Dr. George Williamson),‘ 235-238, 241-245, 252, 268-269 (Dr.

George Hurt);* Joint Appendix (J. A.'’) at lla (§ 2j). CIC

was pioneered in the early 1970's, to replace ‘‘sterile

catheterization."’ J. A. 9a (§ 2f); Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr.

15-16. “Sterile catheterization’’ was ‘‘prohibitive’’ in cost,

requiring an autoclave, an expensive piece of medical equip-

ment, and not permitting the re-use of the catheters. Jd. at

48, 144-147; Tr. 240-241. However, it has been established

that CIC is as effective as sterile catheterization and entails

no greater risk of infection. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. at

17, 48; Tr. 240-241. The contrasting simplicity of CIC* was

well described by the Court of Appeals below:

CIC is a very simple procedure which can be performed

within five minutes. The catheter is washed with soap

and water; the urethral area is wiped clean; the catheter

is introduced approximately one and one-half inches into

the urethra and the bladder contents drained; the

catheter is withdrawn; and the amount of urine collected

‘Director of Pediatric Rehabilitation, John F. Kennedy Medical Ce cer.

Addison, New Jersey: a member of the medical faculties of Columbia

University and the State University of. New York: author of publications

and consultant to state education agencies concerning the education of

handicapped children (especially children with spina bifida): Dr. William-

son has had extensive experience with CIC. Tr. 137-142.

‘A licensed physician, board-certified in urology. with a special interest

in the neurogenic bladder: a member of the Texas Association of Genito

uinary Surgeons, American and Texas Urological Associations, American

Pediatric Urology Association, American Academy of Pediatric Urology

(serving on the Myelodysplasia Action Committee of the latter}: Dr. Hurt

has served hundreds of spina bifida children, specifically in CIC. Pl. Exh.

Sb, supra, |. H. Tr. 1612, 17; Tr. 233.

“In CIC, it is not necessary to sterilize the catheter. It is sufficient to

emg AP ye water and rinse it before use anc Lo wipe

it off after use. Pi. Exh. 5b, supra, |. H. Tr. 18-19. Gloves do not have

to be used and it is not necessary to touch the part of the catheter used

for the catheterization. /d. at 18. The bacteria introduced through CIC

are of the same type that already reside in the urethral anyway.

Id. Dr. Hurt testified that of hundreds of children on CIC in

none had ever suffered a perforated urethra due to catheterization. as

speculated by Petitioner. /d at 42.

4

is measured and noted. The procedure can be taught to

anyone after a training session of approximately thir-

ty minutes, and it need not be performed by a doctor

or nurse. Currently, Amber is catheterized at home by

her parents, teenage sibling, and babysitter. However,

when Amber is eight or nine years-old, she will be able

to perform CIC upon herself.

625 F.2d 559 n.3.

A physician or nurse does not have to perform CIC—any-

one can be trained to do it. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. at

19. Parents are taught to catheterize their children. Jd. at

19, 60; J. A. lla (§ 2j). Training to do CIC requires one ses-

sion of approximately 30 minutes. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H.

Tr. 19, 29. Mrs. Tatro has trained her husband, her thirteen-

year-old son, her other daughter, Amber's babysitter, and

the personnel of Amber's private pre-school (including the

cook), to perform CIC. Jd. at 64-65; Tr. 78-79. (While thirty

minutes is the time usually required for training, Mrs. Tatro

has been able to train people in less time than that. Tr. 79.)

The actual procedure takes about five minutes to perform

and can be done safely and effectively with even fewer steps

than the simple process outlined in the Pretrial order, J. A.

Qa-10a. Tr. 81-83, 241-242, 254-255.

Most children of normal intelligence with Amber's han-

_ dicap eventually learn to catheterize themselves. Pl. Exh.

5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 1920; Tr. 144-146, 242-243; J. A. lla

5

After Amber reached three years of age in October of 1978,

the Tatros met with Irving school personnel in January and

April of 1979, to advise the school district of Amber's need

for CIC in order to attend school when she became eligible

in September of 1979. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 62-64. In

May of 1979, an Admissions, Review, and Dismissal (ARD)

Committee’ met to consider an educational program and

placement for Amber. Although the Committee did not

disagree that CIC was necessary in order for Amber to at-

tend school, the Committee, over the parents’ objections,

refused to include CIC in Amber’s individualized educational

program (IEP), on the grounds that the provison of CIC

would be contrary to school board policy.* Tr. 65-66.

Pursuant to their rights under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b\(2),

Amber and her parents complained to an Impartial Hear-

ing Officer of the failure of Irving I.S.D. to include CIC as

a “related service’ in Amber’s IEP. Pl. Exh. 5, supra. The

Impartial Hearing Officer ruled that Amber is entitled to

CIC as a related service needed to assist her to benefit from

special education, which ruling was adopted as the Decision

of the State Commissioner of Education in Amber T. bnf

Mary T. v. Irving Independent School District, Texas Educa-

tion Agency Docket No. 115-SE-579 (August 6, 1979).* PI.

‘The ARD Committee is the entity identified in Texas Education

Agency rules as responsible for implementing the requirements of 34

C.F.R. §§ 300.340-300.349, 300.550-200.554.

“At that time. the Irving I.S.D. Director of School Health Services, a

registered nurse, was not acquainted with CIC, but only with sterile

catheterization, which was preferred by the hospital with which she was

most familiar. P!. Exh. 5b, supra.i. H. Tr. 140-147. That hospital had not

revised its cathererization policies since May of 1977, although the

‘American Academy of Pediatrics had adopted an official position in Octo-

ber of 1978 favoring CIC over sterile catheterization. Jd. at 151. Com-

pare the views expressed by Dr. Bates, who did not specialize in urology,

who had not practiced medicine since 1978, and who had no patients on

CIC, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 127: Tr. 368, 373; and Dr. Ware, who

was not a pediatric urologist, seldom treated children, and had no ex-

perience with CIC, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 49, 60.

*This Court has indicated in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.

176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1962), that great weight and deference should be given

it ta

a ae

6

Exh. 5, supra. Although precluded by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1)

from reviewing the decision of the Impartial Hearing

Officer,'* the State Board of Education nevertheless reversed

the Commissioner and Impartial Hearing Officer and upheld

Irving I.S.D.'s refusal to provide CIC to Amber Tatro.

Following the unauthorized action of the State Board of

Education, the Tatros filed suit in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,

against the State of Texas, members of the State Board of

Education, the Irving Independent School District, and the

Irving I.S.D. superintendent and school board, seeking, in-

ter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On

December 21, 1979, Hon. Patrick Higginbotham, U. S.

District Judge, entered an order denying a preliminary in-

junction to require Defendant (Petitioner herein) to provide

CIC to Amber."' Tatro v. Texas, 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex.

1979). The Tatros appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit.

to the decision of the Impartial Hearing Officer. Jd. at 3051. Accord: “I

believe that the District Court and Court of Appeals should have given

greater deference than they did to the findings of the . . . impartial hear-

ing officer and the State's Commissioner of Education...’ /d. at 3053

(Blackmun, J., concurring).

“Tatro II, infra, at 703 F.2d 833-834 n. 10, citing Helms v. McDaniel,

657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981) at 805-806 & n. 9, cert. denied 455 U.S. 946

(1982). Since its participation in this case, the State Board of Education

has removed itself from ihe impartial hearing process. 6 Texas Register

4265 {November 20, 1981), umending 19 T.A.C. Chapter 157, subchapter

D. Under current rules in Texas, the Impartial Hearing Officer's decision

is final.

‘In response to the request of Plaintiffs (Respondents herein) for a

preliminary injunction, Judge Higginbotham, instead of receiving the

record of the administrative proceedings pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415/eX2),

requested stipulations of fact. When Defendant Irving [.S.D. (Petitioner

herein) refused either to agree to the Tatros’ proposed stipulations or to

submit proposed stipulations of its own, the Plaintiff Tatros submitted

their proposed stipulations by the Court's deadline. The District Court

based its first decision in the case on Plaintiff's proposed stipulations.

625 F.2d 568 n. 1, 516 F.Supp. 971. The District Court's ruling was

equivalent to summary judgment or granting of a motion to dismiss,

holding in effect that, as a matter of law, even if the facts were as Plain-

tiffs alleged, Amber was not legally entitled to the relief sought for her.

7

Because of the confusion surrounding the proposed stipula-

tions solicited by the District Court and submitted by Plain-

tiffs, the Court of Appeals had no facts before it on appeal.

However, the Court held as a matter of law that CIC is a

valid related service, under 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seg. and 29

U.S.C. § 794, which Petitioner is required to provide to a child

such as Amber Tatro, to the extent that she needs such in

order to attend school so that she can benefit from special

education. Tatro v. Texas (‘‘Tatro I’), 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.

1980). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the

District Court to determine whether the facts of the case were

as assumed by the Circuit Court, based on the proposed

stipulations, and whether any other material facts not

previously considered should alter the result. Jd. at 558 n.

1. Subsequently, the parties entered into stipulations in a

Pre-Trial Order, J. A. 5a, and the District Court below took

evidence at trial and in subsequent evidentiary hearings, on

the basis of which Judge Higginbotham made findings of

fact consistent with those assumed by the Court of Appeals

on the prior appeal, ordered Defendants to provide CIC to

Amber Tatro, and awarded limited damages and attorneys’

fees to Plaintiffs. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex.

1981). From the subsequently modified final order, Appen-

dix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Pet. App."’) at 55a,

62a, Defendants Irving I.S.D. and the State Board of Educa-

tion appealed. On April 25, 1983, the Court of Appeals

rendered its second decision in the case, Tatro v. Texas

(““Tatro II’’), 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), holding that neither

its prior decision nor the District Court’s subsequent deci-

sion were clearly erroneous and affirming the District Court

decision. After its request for rehearing en banc was denied,

Appellant Irving Independent School District petitioned this

Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was granted December

5, 1983. (The State Defendants did not argue against CIC

for Amber at trial or on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and did

peti Fab rom tae pe Se a

Appeals’ decision.)

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Reversal of the legal requirement that public schoo!s pro-

vide CIC to handicapped children such as Amber Tatro in-

evitably will result in the exclusion and segregation of such

children from a free public school education. Those spina

bifida children whose parents could not find, or afford to

employ, a third party to travel to school each day to pro-

vide CIC to them, would be forced either to be segregated

in separate schools exclusively for handicapped children or

to receive educational services at home. Either alternative

would deprive the child of the benefits of interaction with

non-handicapped children in the normal public school set-

ting, and each would be costlier to the taxpayers.

CIC is a ‘related service’’ needed to assist Amber to benefit

from special education in that: (1) without CIC, Amber can-

not be present in any school placement to receive and benefit

from specialized instruction; (2) CIC is needed to enable

Amber to realize the intended benefits of instruction in an

integrated regular public school setting; and (3) CIC is essen-

tial to achieving the appropriate educational goal of self-

catheterization, as identified in her current IEP (attached

as an Appendix to this Brief). CIC is not an excluded

‘medical service” as that term is used in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17),

since all the features identified to characterize CIC as

‘medical treatment” are equally or more typical of other

expressly designated related services.

Further, CIC is a special supplementary aid or service to

enable Amber to be educated in, and preclude her removal

from, the regular educational environment, as required by

20 U.S.C. § 1412(5B). The requirement of CIC for a handi-

capped child such as Amber is reasonably ascertainable from

the terms of the EHA, which unambiguously imposes con-

ditions for the receipt of federal funds under the Act.

Finally, CIC is a reasonable accommodation, which does

not require fundamental alterations in Petitioner's program

nor impose undue financial or administrative burdens. It is

needed so that Amber Tatro, an otherwise qualified handi-

capped individual, will not be excluded from participation

\

A oops

et

rr

9

in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination by

Petitioner's federally assisted program, solely on the basis

of her handicap, in contravention spf Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, as amended.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

I. DENIAL OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZA-

TION WOULD RESULT IN THE EXCLUSION AND

SEGREGATION OF AMBER TATRO AND SIMILARLY

SITUATED HANDICAPPED CHILDREN FROM THE

FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

No party to this dispute must be under any illusion as to

the consequences of rescinding the legal requirement that

a public school system provide CIC to children such as

Amber Tatro. Inevitably, denial of CIC will result in the ex-

clusion and segregation of such children from the free public

schools. The District Courts in both the instant case and in

Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, C.A. No. 79-338

(W.D. Pa. October 31, 1980), reprinted at 3 E.H.L.R. 552:429

(1980), affirmed 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub

nom. Scanion v. Tokarcik, 458 U.S. ____., 102 S.Ct. 3508

(1982), found as a fact that a spina bifida child such as Amber

cannot safely attend public school class through the school

day without the availability of CIC. 516 F.Supp. at 971, 974,

977; 3 E.H.L.R. 552:428-429. The Third and Fifth Circuit

- Courts of Appeals affirmed these findings as facts of the case,

entitled to deference as not clearly erroneous. 703 F.2d at

825, 829, 831; Tokarcik, supra, 665 F.2d at 444, 446, 456.

The inevitable exclusion and segregation of children such as

Amber, as a consequence of the denial of CIC, is the begin-

ning point for analysis of Amber's rights herein under both

the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended by the

Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20

U.S.C. § 1401 et seg. (“EHA"), and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (‘Section 504”’).

Although at the May 1979 original ARD Committee

meeting, the school district offered the Tatros no alternatives

to the provision of CIC to Amber at school by school per-

sonnel, Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 69; Tr. 109, Petitioner

10

since has offered Amber and her family three options, each

of which would result in exclusion and segregation of many

handicapped children from public school.

First, Petitioner has proposed that the Tatros find and hire

a third party to go into the classroom during the day and

provide the CIC service to Amber. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H.

Tr. 130; Tr. 86-87, 104-111. The expense to the family would

not be trivial. Because the times at which the service is

needed by Amber might vary somewhat from one day to the

next—Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 34, 37, 66; Tr. 92—the

parents’ agent, to be available when needed, might have to

remain on call (and thus at parents’ expense) throughout

much or most of each school day—not just for the five or

ten minutes per day needed for the catheterization itself.

Both of Amber's parents work during the day, so neither

of them could go to Amber's school each day to catheterize

her. Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 63; Tr. 72-73. (In Tokarcik,

supra, a member of the child's family had to go to school

each day to provide the service. 665 F.2d 445.) Another

mother proposed by the school district as one who could do

the job in fact was not available. Tr. 86-87. The Tatros’ high

school age son had no means of getting from his school to

Amber's each day. Tr. 105. Amber's babysitter was not will-

ing to go to school to do the job. Tr. 104-105, 110-111. And

the cost of a visiting nurse was prohibitive ($33 per visit,

twice a day). Tr. 106.

ll

public school with ‘‘normal"’ children. Those not so fortunate

will be excluded.

Congress, however, clearly mandated by its passage of the

Education of the Handicapped Act that the right of handi-

capped children to be educated in the public schools was no

longer to be dependent upon the parents’ ability privately

to accommodate the child's handicap-related access needs.

Congress expressly identified, as one of the evils the EHA

was enacted to correct, the following situation:

[Bjecause of the lack of adequate services within the

public school system, families are often forced to find

services outside the public school system, often at great

distance from their residence and at their own expense.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(bx6). It makes no sense to imagine that Con-

gress would seek to achieve that objective through passage

of the Act and at the same time contemplate that parents

such as the Tatros would be responsible for such services

as CIC. As will be discussed further in section V-C below,

CIC is closely analogous to assistance by school personnel

for children who, due to their handicaps, cannnot eat inde-

pendently, or cannot toilet independently, or cannot dress

independently. Surely, the EHA and Section 504 would not

sanction the requirement that parents be responsible for

sending a person at their expense to school, to spoon feed

their child, to help their child to the bathroom, or to help

their child take off and put on her coat.'*

‘In one of the earliest cases arising under the EHA and Section 504,

the school district offered a spina bifida child of normal intelligence three

options: (1) “homebound instruction." (2) placement in a segregated school

for the handicapped only, or (3) “that the child could be enrolled at {a

regular public school] if her mother would go to school two or three times

a day to attend to the child.’ The court found all three alternatives un-

acceptable. The child's mother in fact was unable to go to school during

the day. “The requirement of the plaintiff mother's intermittent presence

at |the| School as a condition to her child's being permitted to attend

lreguiar public| school. coupled with the impossibility of this request upon

the plaintiff |mother| constituted an exclusion of the plaintiff child from

|public| School. Further. even if the mother's presence were circumstan-

tially feasible. the right of the child to attend school cannot be legally

12

The second alternative for Amber, if CIC is withheld from

her by the school district, is to be placed in a separate school

for the handicapped, at Petitioner's expense. 703 F.2d 829;

cf. Tokarcik, supra, at 665 F.2d 446. Petitioner's chief ex-

pert witness, the school district’s medical consultant and

former school board trustee, testified:

Well, of course, the obvious [alternative] would be a con-

tracting basis. That she would be contracted out to some

other agency, that was able to handle this [CIC]

function.

Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 128. In its Brief, Petitioner

declares that because of Amber’s inability to attend public

school safely without CIC, ‘‘an alternative placement must

be selected.’ Pet. Brief at 33. In that event, Petitioner would

be responsible for the cost of such a placement (except for

the negligible cost of the CIC, if Petitioner's other arguments

prevail). 20 U.S.C. § 1413(aN4); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33(b)3),

300.302. The willingness of Petitioner even to suggest the

second option, necessarily implying a contract placement in

a private school for the handicapped, belies its putative con-

cern with cost and ‘undue burden."’ The fact is that the

Tatros have not been able to find a non-public school for the

handicapped in the Dallas area for which Amber (who is

neither mentally retarded nor emotionally disturbed) would

be eligible. Tr. 72. If a school could be found anywhere at

all, it likely would be so far from home as to require residen-

tial placement. Ironically, Amicus National School Board

Association has complained extensively about the high cost

of residential and other contract placements of handicapped

students."

conditioned upon the mother's presence at school."’ Hairston v. Drosick,

423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976) at 182-183.

‘**In general, non-residential [non-public] placement doubles the cost of

educating a handicapped pupil. Residential placements cost about four

times as much as educating in the school district or if placed in relation

to the cost of educating a non-handicapped student, it cost eight times

as much to educate a handicapped student in a residential setting as a

non-handicapped student in a school district.” NATIONAL SCHOOL

BOARDS ASSOCIATION, A SURVEY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION

13

Petitioner's third option is for Amber to be educated at

home—what Texas Education Agency rules refer to as

‘‘homebound"’ placement, in which instructional and related

service personne! would go to the Tatro residence to serve

Amber there. 19 Tex. Adm. Code § 89.242(b)(6); Pl. Exh. 5b,

supra, I. H. Tr. 128; 703 F.2d 829; Tokarcik, supra, at 665

F.2d 446. The third alternative, like the second, also is not

cost-effective. Petitioner has agreed in the IEP that an appro-

priate education for Amber requires the services of a teacher,

a physical therapist, an occupational therapist, and a speech

therapist. To enable Amber to receive via a ‘‘homebound”’

program the amount of educational benefit intended by her

IE P—much less the seven hours per day promised to her by

state law and regulation, TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.004, 19

T.A.C. § 89.235(d)—it would be necessary for Petitioner to

divert at least four valuable professionals from availability

to other children, for several hours a week, to work one-to-

one with Amber. Such an allocation of personnel resources

does not square well with Amicus NSBA's professed con-

cern about the public school’s dearth of qualified personnel

needed to comply with the EHA. NSBA Brief at 31-34. And

it would deprive Amber of the many educational benefits of

integration with non-handicapped children.

The second alternative—contract placement—would segre-

gate Amber from her non-handicapped peers (in age and intel-

lect), while the third course—homebound placement— would

isolate her from other children altogether. Beyond their

costliness and of more importance legally, all three options

violate the EHA’s “mainstreaming preference,’ Board of

Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982)

at 3049. A major purpose behind the passage of both Sec-

tion 504 and the amended EHA was to insure maximum feas-

ible access to and participation in regular public school

classes by handicapped children.

The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the

invisibility of the handicapped in America. I am talk-

COSTS IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1979) at 26 (attached as an

Appendix to the amicus curiae brief of the Texas Association of School

Boards before the Court of Appeais).

14

ing about over 1 million American children who are ex-

cluded from school. ... [T]oo often we keep children,

whom we regard as ‘‘different’’ or a ‘‘disturbing influ-

ence,’’ out of our schools and community activities

altogether, rather than help them deveiop their abilities

in special classes and programs. ... Where is the cost

effectiveness in consigning them to... “terminal” care

in an institution? ... Every child—gifted, normal, and

handicapped—has a fundamental right to educational

opportunity. ... But more than 1 million children are

denied entry into public schools, even to participate in

special classes.... We do not even have adequate

statistical information on the great number of physically

handicapped children who have the mental ability to

attend school but are denied that right. The variety of

explanations for this denial include problems of

transportation and architectural barriers. But the injus-

tice of exclusion remains.

118 Cong. Rec. 525 (January 20, 1972, remarks of Sen. Hum-

phrey, principal author of the bill which ultimately became

Section 504) (emphasis added).

For far too long handicapped children have been deniéd

access to the regular school system because of an in-

ability to climb the steps to the schoolhouse door, and

not for any other reason. This has led to segregated

classes for those children with physical handicaps. This

is an isolation that in many cases is unnecessary.

121 Cong. Rec. 19483, 19484 (June 18, 1975, remarks of Sen.

Stafford—one of the principal co-authors of the bill that was

enacted as the Education For All Handicapped Children Act,

as well as the ranking minority member of the committee

which drafted the legislation).

Lastly, I would like to mention the concept of main-

not believe the burden of proof should be upon that

administrator or teacher who seeks to permit the handi-

15

capped child to remain in a normal classroom with his

peers. Rather, I believe the burden of proof in terms of

effectiveness of a program ought to rest with that

administrator or teacher who seeks to remove a child

from a normal classroom, to segregate him or her from

non-handicapped children.

Id. at 25539, 25540 (Rep. Miller). See also id. at 19503 (Sen.

Cranston), 19505 (Sen. Humphrey), 23709 (Rep. Biaggi),

37026 (Rep. Quie), 37030 (Rep. Daniels), 37412 (Sen. Staf-

ford), 37419 (Sen. Cranston). The Congressional purpose is

echoed in federal court decisions interpreting the EHA. Ron-

cher v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) at 1063, cert.

denied sub nom. Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.

uv. Roncker, __. U.S. ___, 52 U.S.L.W. 3266 (No. 82-1890,

October 3, 1983); Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d

41 (8th Cir. 1982) at 43, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___., 103 S.Ct.

2086 (1983); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., supra, at

665 F.2d 455; Campbell v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ.,

518 F.Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981) at 55; Espino v. Besteiro,

520 F.Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981) at 911-913, denial of

planitiffs’ attorneys’ fees rev. and rem. 708 F.2d 1002 (5th

Cir. 1983).

It follows from the foregoing that children such as Amber

Tatro should not be excluded or segregated from the regular

public school program without the most compelling of educa-

tional justifications. Yet, clearly, the denial of the simple ser-

vice of CIC will have precisely the exclusionary,

segregating

effect which Congress sought through Section 504 and the

EHA to preclude. Not only would that result be detrimen-

tal to Amber's education, but (ironically) it would increase

the financial burden of the public school system.

II. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHERIZATION IS A

RELATED SERVICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE

EDUCATION OF THE aimee Pligy ACT.

A. Clean intermittent catherization is needed to assist Amber

Tatro to benefit from special education.

The Education of the Handicapped Act is a program of

cooperative federalism designed to assist states and local

16

school districts in providing education programs to handi-

capped children. A state which elects to receive money under

the EHA must provide to each of its school-aged handi-

capped children, inter alia, a ‘‘free appropriate public educa-

tion.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). Local educational agencies, such

as Petitioner, have parallel obligations. 20 U.S.C. §

1414(aX1C)ii). A ‘free appropriate public education”’ is

defined in pertinent part as “special education and related

services.’ § 1401(18). Each of these terms is then further

defined. Special education is ‘‘specially designed instruction

. to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,’’ §

1401(16), while related services are:

transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and

other supportive services (including speech pathology

and audiology, psychological services, physical and

occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and coun-

seling services, except that such medical services shall

be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may

be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from

special education, and includes the early identification

and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (emphasis added).

The District Court and the Court of Appeals below held

that, for Amber, CIC is a valid related service which the Peti-

tioner must provide so that she can attend school and benefit

from the special education program offered there. The Dis-

trict and Circuit Courts in the instant case and in Tokarcik

uv. Forest Hills School District, supra, found as a fact that,

due to factors relating to the handicap, a spina bifida child

such as Amber cannot safely attend and participate in the

educational program offered in a public school classroom

without the provision of CIC. Wherever she happens to be

placed for her education, Amber, because of her handicap,

cannot safely remain through the school day and partake of

the instruction presented during that time without receiv-

ing CIC at least once and usually twice. A special education

program which Amber cannot be present to receive cannot

be of any ‘“‘benefit” to her. “Quite simply put, without the

~

o

en ee ER

a

17

provision of CIC, Amber cannot benefit from the special edu-

cation to which she is entitled, for, without CIC, she cannot

be present in the classroom at all.’ Tatro J, supra, at 625

F.2d 562.

In Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, this Court con-

cluded that the purpose and intent of the EHA is first ‘‘to

make public education available to handicapped children”’

and next ‘‘to make such access [to public education] mean-

ingful.’’ Jd. at 3037. Consequently:

The statutory definition of ‘free appropriate public

education,” in addition to requiring that the State pro-

vide each child with ‘specially designed instruction,”

expressly requires the provision of ‘‘such ... suppor-

tive services . . . as may be required to assist a child to

benefit from special education." § 1401(17) (emphasis

added).

Id. at 3048 (emphasis supplied in the opinion). See also id.

at 3041, 3042, 3046, 3049.

Clearly, for a child such as Amber, questions of ‘‘access”’

and ‘‘placement’’ cannot be arbitrarily distinguished from

‘“benefit,’’ as suggested by Amicus NSBA on its Brief at

20-21. Amber cannot benefit from a program to which she

does not have meaningful (safe) access. A ‘related service,"’

as stressed by this Court in the references above, is one which

is needed to assist the child to benefit from special educa-

tion. The above-cited passages also emphasize ‘educational

benefit” as the determining factor for an ‘‘appropriate educa-

tion."’ In that same opinion, this Court further recognized

that ‘appropriateness (i.e., educational benefit) often is

linked to placement. To the statement that ‘‘an ‘appropriate

education’ is provided when personalized educational services

are provided,’’ the decision attached a footnote explaining:

The use of ‘‘appropriate’’ in the language of the Act,

although by no means definitive, suggests that Congress

used the word as much to describe the settings in which

handicapped children should be educated as to prescribe

the substantive content or supportive services of their

education. For example, § 1412(5) requires that handi-

/

” <a 4

2

ea

18

capped children be educated in classrooms with non-

handicapped children ‘‘to the maximum extent appro-

priate.’’... In addition, the definition of ‘free appro-

priate public education” itself states that instruction

given handicapped children should be at an “appropriate

preschool, elementary, or secondary school”’ level.

§1401(18)(C).

Id. at 3046 n. 21 (emphasis added). Educationally, for Amber

a regular public elementary school is the appropriate setting,

suitable for her participation. Educational services would not

be appropriately ‘‘personalized” for her unless delivered in

that setting.

As the discussion in Part I, supra, makes clear, Congress

and a majority of courts addressing the question have rec-

ognized that the ‘‘benefits’’ of specialized instruction in a

public school setting include not only the instruction itself

but the benefits of the least restrictive environment. For

those handicapped children educationally able to benefit from

the instruction therein, placement in an integrated public

school environment offers the benefits of, inter alia, interac-

tion with non-handicapped children, role models for socially

appropriate behavior, and avoidance of the stigma associated

with separate special placement. These benefits contribute

substantially to the handicapped child's future independence

and productivity in society (within the limits otherwise im-

posed by his/her handicap), which was recognized by this

court as an important aspect of ‘‘educational benefit.’’ Board

of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3048 n. 23, and legislative

history recited therein. '*

It follows from the foregoing that for a child who is intellec-

tually and emotionally capable of being educated in or near

the ‘‘mainstream,”’ specialized instruction which is offered

in a setting other than a regular.public school classroom

‘*In addition to the passages cited in Rowley, supra, see also 121 Cong.

Rec. 19494 (June 18, 1975, remarks of Sen. Javits), 19604 (Sen. Mondale),

19605 (Sen. Beal), 23702, 23703 (July 21, Rep. Brademas), 23709 (Reps.

Biaggi, Minish), 25538, 25539 (July 29, Rep. Harris), 37411 (November

19, Sen. Humphrey), 37417 (Sen. Javits), 37418 (Sen. Biden), 37419 (Sen.

19

would deprive the child of important educational benefits.

Thus, for a child such as Amber, specialized instruction in

a segregated setting does not confer the benefit of the very

same instruction in an integrated environment. In Roncker

v. Walter, supra, and Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, supra,

the Courts of Appeals held that the educational benefits of

merely adequate instruction in an integrated public school

setting outweigh the benefits of a superior academic program

in a segregated environment. CIC is needed specifically to

permit a child such as Amber to be placed in a regular public

school classroom, rather than a separate facility exclusive

ly for the handicapped. Thus, in this further sense, CIC is

a service needed by Amber, on account of her handicap, to

assist her to benefit from special education—i.e., to ‘‘benefit’’

from the specialized instruction in the sense of being able

to receive it in the educationally beneficial integrated

classroom, which is the least restrictive environment appro-

priate to Amber's educational needs and abilities. Specifically

regarding spina bifida childen, see Tokarcik v. Forest Hills

School Dist., supra, at 665 F.2d 455-456; Hairston v. Drosick,

423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976) at 183.

In addition to its related service “‘access’’ role, CIC also

has special instructional value for Amber. Since 90-95% of

spina bifida children learn to self-catheterize eventually —

Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 20; Tr. 243—and since self-

catheterization is obviously an important self-help skill,

which will enhance the child's independence in society, learn-

ing to self-catheterize is an essential goal of an appropriate

education for a child such as Amber. D. Stauffer, Catheteri-

zation—A Health Procedure Schools Must Be Prepared to

Provide, 54 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL HEALTH 37 (1984)

at 38. In reality, it is a form of toilet-training (an essential

area of instruction for many handicapped children), since for

a child with Amber's disability, CIC substitutes for normal

voluntary urination. The first IEP developed for Amber in

May of 1979 noted her ‘spina bifida’ under ‘Special Alert”

and her inability to toilet herself under ‘Self-Care Skills.”’

Pl. Exh. 5b, supra, I. H. Tr. 135. Amber's current IEP, at-

tached to this Brief as an Appendix, shows that Petitioner

20

and Respondent have agreed that the ability to self-

catheterize is an appropriate educational goal for Amber. /d.,

Addendum to O.T. Goals, following p. 6. It defies reason to

suggest that having Irving school personnel perform CIC

with Amber could be in no way related to, nor needed to

assist Amber to benefit from, the IEP goal of self-

catheterization.'* CIC thus unquestionably is ‘‘required

because [it has] a direct relationship to the education of the

child ... as a teaching tool.’’ NSBA Brief at 14.'*

B. Clean intermittent catheterization is not an excluded

“medical service’ within the meaning of the Education of

the Handicapped Act.

The EHA excludes from the ambit of ‘‘related services”

any ‘‘medical services’’ other than those ‘for diagnostic and

evaluation purposes.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). Consistent with

the language and purpose of the EHA, the Court of Appeals

below carefully circumscribed the scope of public school

responsibility for ‘‘life support’ services such as CIC—as

did the Third Circuit in Tokarcik, supra—so as to insure that

requiring CIC for a child such as Amber would not lead to

the inclusion of services Congress did not intend. Tatro J at

625 F.2d 562-563; Tatro IJ at 703 F.2d 827-831.

To discern the boundary between included ‘related ser-

vices’ and excluded ‘‘medical services,"’ so as to locate CIC

with respect thereto, the Court of Appeals below was guided,

first, by the interpretation of the U. S. Department of H.E.W.

‘In Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, supra, the District Court

was persuaded that assisting Amber to achieve the skill of self-

catheterization fit within the federal definition of 6ccupational therapy

under the EHA at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bN5): * fear pty slag ing or

restoring functions impaired or lost through illness {or| injury. . . Improv-

are impaired or lost. . . . Preventing . . . further impairment or loss of func-

tion.” 3 E.H.L.R. 552:429-450; 665 F.2d 458-459.

“Consequently, even if the decision below is held to be erroneous, which

Respondents emphatically do not concede, this Court should do no more

than remand for further factual findings as to Amber's IEP. However,

since the reasoning of the Court of Appeals is correct, further expenditure

of scarce judicial resources on this case should not be required.

Way

21

(now Education), the federal executive department charged

with promulgating the regulations to implement and enforce

the EHA. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b). As such, the Office (now

Department) of Education's initial interpretation of the

statute is entitled to great weight and deference.'’

The Department defined the term ‘‘medical services” as

used in the EHA to mean the “services provided by a licensed

physician” (permitting only those provided to ‘‘determine

a child's medically related handicapping conditions which

results in the child's need for special education and related

services’). 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bi4). The Fifth Circuit found

this definition to impose an important limitation on the

requirement of “life support’ services such as CIC as

‘related services’’ under the EHA. Tatro IJ at 625 F.2d

562-563. The Third Circuit noted that ‘‘the regulations them-

selves place realistic limitations on the nature of the school

services to be provided under the EAHCA," so that ‘‘the

drastic medical services . . . which the school authorities fear

they will by asked to furnish in the future are by definition

excluded.'’ Tokarcik uv. Forest Hills School District, supra,

at 665 F.2d 456. Since the direct non-diagnostic/non-

evaluative services of the physician, which are excluded, are

the most expensive on the continuum of medical costs, this

limitation operates to insulate Petitioner and the NSBA,

TASB school official amici from the largest part of the costs

they purport to fear.

A second line between permissible related services and

excluded ‘‘ medical services’’ was discerned by the Fifth Cir-

cuit from the essential purpose of related services, i.e. to

assist the handicapped child to benefit from special educa-

tion. It follows that a ‘‘life support’’ service would not be

a “related service” under the EHA if it is not needed by the

child in order to be present in the educationally appropriate

least restrictive placement throughout the school day. Thus,

"Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) at 569-570, cited with approval

by the majority opinion in Guardians Ass‘n. v. Civil Service Comm'n,

U.S. __. 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983) at 3226-3227; Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Cf, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. La Strange,

——._ U.S. ___., 52 U.S.L.W. 4301 (No. 82-862, February 28, 1984) at 4304.

~6

&

.

7

ane

- y ys

ay :

22

if the child could safely remain in the educationally appro-

priate setting throughout the school day without receiving

the service, and then receive the service outside of the school

setting and school hours, the school district would not be

responsible for the procedure as a ‘‘related service.'’ Tatro

I at 625 F.2d 563. This important feature, drawn from the

words of the Act itself, serves to remove even more physician-

prescribed services from the category of those for which a

school district might become responsible under the EHA.

Note that Amber’s handicap also results in dysfunction of

the bowels, requiring periodic enemas. However, since these

only are needed twice a week, and can be performed at night,

by Mrs. Tatro at home, Respondents do not need to seek this

service in order for Amber to be educated in public school.

Tr. 97-99.

Third, in order to be a related service, the life support ser-

vice must be one which a nurse or other qualified person can

perform. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10). Tatro J at 625 F.2d 563.

The amicus curiae brief of the Texas Medical Association

and Dallas Medical Society, at the District Court level,

attached as an Appendix to Judge Higginbotham's decision,

indicated that CIC could be provided ‘by nurses,

teachers, or others .. .". 516 F.Supp. 989 (emphasis added).

In the case of CIC, the technical aspects of the procedure

are not complicated and can be performed successfuly

by children on themselves after appropriate training

(boys by age 8 and girls by age 10)... . CIC appears to

be a procedure which can be safely performed while

neither a physician or nurse is present. CIC can be done

safely when a patient or other person is trained to per-

form it properly and is taught to recognize conditions

which should be brought to the physician’s attention.

Id. at 990. A service such as CIC which can be performed

safely and effectively, with minimal training, by an average

lay person, an ordinary parent, or an elementary school age

handicapped child, clearly fits within the array of permis-

sible “related services’’ and is not an excluded ‘‘medical ser-

vice” that must be provided by a licensed physician.

23

Further analysis shows that CIC could not be an excluded

medical service, because it is so closely analogous to other

related services which are expressly listed.'* Even thotigh

CIC seems medical in that it requires a physician's prescrip-

tion, so does fitting a hearing aid,'® 34 C.F.R. §

300.13(b1)vi), and physical therapy.” In fact, Petitioner

Irving I.S.D.’s own policies authorize a school nurse to

dispense oral medications and administer emergency injec-

tions, two procedures requiring physician prescriptions.” PI.

Exh. 2 (Tr. 38).

"The list of services in § 1401(17) is illustrative but not exhaustive.

34 C.F.R. § 300.13 Comment; Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District,

supra, at 665 F.2d 457. As noted above, ‘related services’’ are those ser-

vices which are “required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from

special education.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). “The term ‘special education’

means specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique needs of a

handicapped child,’ through an ‘individualized education program." 20

U.S.C. § 1401(16), 418), 419) (emphasis added). Congress did not purport

to predict all of the special services that would be needed to assist in

meeting the unique educational needs of eight million handicapped chil-

dren on an individual basis. The task would have been staggering and

would not have left room for inclusion of future technological innovations

which could introduce services not known to Congress in 1975. Thus, it

is only reasonable to conclude that Congress sought to describe and illus-

trate the types of services to be included, rather than to specify every

particular service. This Court has described the list in § 1401(17) as

‘Examples.'’ Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3041 n. 10. Conse-

quently, the U. S. Department of Education (formerly Health, Education

and Welfare) did not abuse its discretion when it expanded the list of

“related services” to include “school health services’’ and when it fur-

ther commented that even its extended list was ‘‘not exhaustive.” 34

C.F.R. § 300.13(bK10) & Comment.

‘For example: D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4005(aX9XB); MINN. STAT.

ANN. §§ 145.43, 145.44; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 459-035.

“For example: ALA. CODE § 34-24-217; ALASKA STAT. § 08.84.160;

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1328(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4001(4)*(5); GA.

CODE ANN. § 43-33-18(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2901, 66-2914; KY.

REV. STAT. § 327-010; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3002; N.H. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 328-A:9; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531; OHIO REV. CODE

ANN. § 4755.48(F); OR. REV. STAT. § 688.130-140; PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 63 § 1309; VA. CODE §§ 54-273(9), 54-281-2.

"Amicus Texas Association of School Boards acknowledges in its Brief

at 6 that “dispensing medication prescribed by doctors"’ is among ‘those

services routinely provided by school nurses."

aa

24

Similarly, CIC seems ‘‘medical”’ in that it must be ‘‘super-

vised’’ by a physician but it requires no more supervision

than does the listed related service of physical therapy. The

physician need not be physically present to supervise the ser-

vice (516 F.Supp. at 975-976, 990); may monitor the service

indirectly through examination of the child outside of school

hours; and may monitor through periodic reports from the

school and/or parents. CIC also appears to promote a medical

objective (in addition to its educationally-related benefits)

in that it “‘treats’’ Amber's neurogenic bladder. But by the

same token, physical therapy” fulfills a medical treatment

goal of preventing atrophy of muscle tissue; audiology might

include the goal of prevention of hearing loss, 34 C.F.R. §

300.13(b)1)iii), (iv); and counseling services might treat a

neurosis or prevent the development of a more acute disorder.

34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b8).

Nothing in law, logic, medicine or education decrees that

the same service cannot be both medically and educationally

beneficial at the same time. A service which performs an

education-related function does not become an excluded

medical service simply because it happens to play a

‘“‘medical’’ role as well.

Finally, because CIC itself obviously does not entail much

cost or burden, Petitioner and the school board amici have

sought to have it excluded not on its own merits but on the

"The former state implementing rule on physical therapy as a related

service, on which Petitioner sought to rely in arguments to the Court of

Appeals, Petitioner's Reply Brief at 14-17? (5th Cir.), physical

therapy as “the art and science of evaluation, program and

implementation of physical or corrective conditions resulting from birth,

illness, or injury.” 19 T.A.C. former § 89.235(aX3NC\x) (emphasis added).

The rule went on to describe the therapy as including “therapeutic exer-

cise programs designed to develop or restore neuro-muscular and/or

vidual’s capabilities."" Jd. (emphasis added). The present Texas Educa-

tion Agency rules make no attempt to elaborate physical therapy beyond

the federal regulations’ definition of it as ‘services provided by a qualified

~~ therapist.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(bX7); 19 T.A.C. §§ 89.215(bN10),

25

basis of other costly and burdensome medical treatment obli-

gations to which they speculate it might lead. Petitioner

asserts that the effect of the lower Court's decision would

be to obligate public school systems to assume “the massive

financial obligations involved in providing all medical treat-

ment physicians may unilaterally choose to prescribe for the

more than eight (8) million children with handicapping con-

ditions."’ Pet. Brief at 22 (emphasis added). In keeping with

that dramatic misrepresentation, Petitioner and Amici

NSBA and Texas Association of School Boards offer a

‘‘shotgun"’ barrage of ‘‘medical treatments’ they allege to

be analogous to CIC and thus required by the Tatro deci-

sions. These ‘‘treatments"’ are offered either with no discus-

sion at all or with only very superficial comment as how and

why they compare with CIC. Pet. Brief at 10; NSBA Brief

at 32-33; TASB Brief at 6. Most of the alleged analogs to

CIC were mentioned for the first time in briefs after the close

of the evidentiary record. Given the:simplicity, safety, and

inexpensiveness of CIC; its necessity to assist Amber to

benefit from special education; and the previously discuss-

ed guidelines by the Court of Appeals below, it should not

be the burden of Respondents to examine and distinguish

each of the ‘treatments’ to which Petitioner and the school

“The absurdity of Petitioner's and the school board amici's attempted

analogies is well illustrated by their comparing CIC to kidney dialysis

(more accurately, kidney hemodialysis). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at

9: Pet. Brief at 10 n. 3; NSBA Brief at 33. Kidney hemodialysis (in which

the body's entire blood supply is drained, cleansed, and returned to the

body) cannot be offered at school but must be provided at special dialysis

centers, usually staffed by physicians on the premises for close-at-hand

monitoring. The procedure takes 5-6 hours each time, up to three times

a week. Thus, hemodialysis is not a service needed for access to instruc-

tion in a public school class; rather, it necessarily removes the child from

school for long periods of time. Hemodialysis includes an extraordinarily

high risk of injury and detrimental side effects, and is only employed with

children when certain death is the alternative. Hemodialysis is not a skill

for independent living which the child can be expected to learn to do for

herself eventually. Extraordinarily expensive specialized medical equip-

ment is required for hemodialysis and the personnel who administer the

procedure must receive extensive specialized medical training. Many other

features serve to distinguish a treatment such as hemodialysis from CIC

Ny

26

board amici imagine CIC will lead. Further, Respondents are

reluctant to gratuitously concede the inclusion or exclusion

of other services prior to other plaintiffs’ and defendants’

having the chance to make their respective cases. Each ser-

vice advanced should be examined on its own merits, in light

of the criteria previously discussed. Whatever the outcome

with respect to other hypothesized procedures, CIC cannot

reasonably be excluded for a child such as Amber Tatro.

III. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS A

SUPPLEMENTARY AID OR SERVICE WITHIN THE

MEANING OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDI-

CAPPED ACT.

In addition to its related service role, clean intermittent

catheterization also is required for Amber as a ‘‘supplemen-

tary aid [or] service.’’ Section 612 of the EHA requires the

State to:

... assure that, to the maximum extent appropnate,

handicapped children . . . are educated with children who

are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate

schooling, or other removal of handicapped children

from the regular educational environment occurs only

when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that

education in regular classes with the use of supplemen-

tary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactor-

eres

20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)B) (emphasis added). The Act then goes

on to make local educational agencies such as Petitioner

responsible for:

... to the maximum extent practicable and consistent

with the provisions of section 1412(5)B) of this title,

and to place dialysis clearly outside the range of services contemplated

by the EHA and the Court of Appeais decision below. See J. LUCKMAN

& R. SORENSEN, MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING (1980), a widely

used text in nursing schools, as well as A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF

MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY (1980); L. WHALEY & D. WONG, NURS-

ING CARE OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1983) at 1146-1152,

1174-1180; and T. Nevins and S. Mayer, Dialysis, in S. GELLIS & B.

KAGAN (eds.), CURRENT PEDIATRIC THERAPY (1980).

a tk Sai pe + a A . Sees ot Pa Ss ee

ob SF es a ete ee ae ee OR ee eer ae 2) <P ee st

27

the provision of special services to enable such children

to participate in regular educational programs...

20 U.S.C. § 1414(a1C\iv) (emphasis added). Since Amber

is educationally equipped to benefit from instruction in

regular public school class, then § 1412(5)(B) and its corollary

§ 1414(a1C) require Petitioner to offer the special service

which will enable Amber to be placed and remain in that

environment.

Unlike “‘isolated’’ or ‘‘scattered’’ references in the

legislative history that were found insufficient by this Court

in Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3047, 3049 (con-

cerning ‘maximum potential” and ‘‘equal educational oppor-

tunity’ under the EHA); Southeastern Community College

v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) at 411 n. 11 (with respect to

“affirmative action” under Section 504); and Pennhurst State

School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) at 20

(regarding equal protection as a basis for 42 U.S.C. § 6010),

insistence that school districts extend the special services

necessary to integrate handicapped children into regular

classes is a consistent theme which runs throughout the legis-

lative history of the EHA, as amended. See the legislative

history surveyed in Part I above. Prior to the ‘related ser-

vices’ requirement, which was added to the EHA by Public

Law 94-142, the Education For All Handicapped Children

Act of 1975,” the ‘supplementary aids and services” require-

ment was part of P.L. 93-380, the Education of the Handi-

capped Amendments of 1974. 20 U.S.C. former § 1413(a)

' (13B). The earliest judicial interpretation of the amended

EHA applied the 1974 ‘supplementary aids and services"

requirement to the provision of services necessary to enable

a girl disabled by Amber's handicap of spina bifida (including

incontinence of the bowels) to attend regular public school

classes:

*P.L. 91-230, the original Education of the Handicapped Act of 1971,

authorized funding to “initiate, expand, or improve programs and projects

... which are designed to meet the special educational and related neecs

of handicapped children . . ." 20 U.S.C. former § 1413 (emphasis added).

28

This educational fact that handicapped children should

be excluded from the regular classroom situation only

as a last resort is recognized in federal law. The federal

statute providing moneys to states for special educa-

tion programs mandates that every state have proce-

dures to assure handicapped children are educated with

children who are not handicapped and that ‘‘removal

of handicapped children from the regular education envi-

ronment occurs only when the nature or severity of the

handicap is such that education in regular classes with

the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be

achieved satisfactorily."’ 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13)B).

Hairston v. Drosick, supra, at 183-184. Petitioner and the

school board amici stress that Amber is able to ‘benefit

educationally"’ from the individualized program offered by

Petitioner. Pet. Brief at 31-32; NSBA Brief at 7-8; TASB

Brief at 11-12. It is precisely because Amber can “benefit

educationaily"’ from instruction in the regular public school

that she should be provided the service which will permit

her access to that program in the regular school environment.

Amber is entitled to be educated in the least restrictive place-

ment appropriate to her individual educational needs and

abilities.

Not only have we guaranteed [handicapped children] a

right to education, but I think we have written adequate

provisions which will protect those rights and guarantee

that a child will not be improperly labeled or placed in

an educational setting which will not suit his or her edu-

cational needs.

121 Cong. Rec. 37026 (November 18, 1975, remarks of Rep.

Quie) (emphasis added). Petitioner has acknowledged, as it

must, that ‘where a child has average or above-average in-

telligence, the goal of the school system may be to enable

the child to go from one grade to another and graduate with

an average level of success,”’ citing , Supra, at 3049.

Pet. Brief at 30. The NSBA Amicus stresses the im-

portance Congress assigned to enabling handicapped children

to participate in physical education classes and extra

29

curricular activities, id. at 12-14, options that will be fore-

closed to Amber if she must remain at home because CIC

is not available at school.

If Amber were not educationally capable of benefitting

from any program that could be offered in a public school

setting, even with supplementary aids and services, then it

would be permissible to educate Amber in a non-public seg-

regated (by handicap) setting, such as a residential place-

ment. Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983)

at 226-230, relying upon Board of Education v. Rowley,

supra. Amber's neurogenic bladder does not render her educa-

tionally incapable of benefitting from instruction in a regular

public school setting. In fact, it is agreed that Amber is intel-

lectually and emotionally normal. (Even most mentally and

emotionally disabled children are educated in or near the

‘“‘mainstream.'’) Rather, Amber's neurogenic bladder renders

her physically incapable of being educated alongside children

who are not handicapped, without the supplementary aid or

service of CIC. The distinction is significant. To justify place-

ment of Amber outside the regular educational environment,

Petitioner must be able to show that Amber needs a type

of instruction which can only be offered in a separate facil-

ity. Some handicapped children require such separation on

account of their unique educational needs. But once it is

established that the type of instruction Amber needs is the

kind which can be presented in an integrated regular public

school environment, Petitioner must make available the ancil-

lary services necessary to enable Amber to receive such

instruction in that setting.

IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF CLEAN INTERMITTENT

CATHETERIZATION AS A RELATED OR SUPPLE-

MENTARY SERVICE FOR A HANDICAPPED CHILD

SUCH AS AMBER TATRO IS A REASONABLE CON-

because Amber

30

public school, the EHA gives her a right to that service.

Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that:

Any rights created by § 1415, enforceable against the

Petitioner, are limited to a showing Petitioner has

violated the ‘State Plan.’’ This [Respondents] did not

attempt to do. Without a finding that the local educa-

tional agency has violated the provisions of the ‘‘State

Plan” as required by § 1413, any ‘relief may well be

limited to enjoining the federal government from pro-

viding funds to the [State].”

Pet. Brief at 18, relying on Pennhurst State School &

Hospital. v. Halderman, supra. However, this Court has

already disposed of the foregoing contention in Board of

Education v. Rowley, supra, which prescribes a two-fold in-

quiry for judicial review in EHA cases:

First, has the State complied with the procedures set

forth in the Act?*’ And second, is the individualized

educational program developed through the Act's pro-

cedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to

receive educational benefits?

"This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that

the State has adopted the State plan, policies and assurances re-

quired by the Act, but also to determine that the State has created

an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the require

ments of § 1401 (19).

Board of Education v. Rowley, supra, at 3051 (emphasis

Whatever might be contained in the Texas State Plan and

whatever might be the political decision of the Department

ameemunniy pea cemtiaetiodiat

school district was not to provide them. oko

31

of Education as to whether to approve the State Plan, a Court

still must determine whether the individual program offered

Amber is reasonably calculated to enable her to benefit edu-

‘ cationally. For the reasons discussed in Parts I-III, supra,

that program, taken as a whole, does not, due to its crucial

omission of CIC.

Petitioner next argues that if the EHA mandates CIC for

Amber, then Congress exceeded its authority under this

Court's reasoning in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, supra. In that decision, this Court held that:

[Ljegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power

is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal

funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed

conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legis-

late under the spending power thus rests on whether

the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms

of the ‘‘contract."’ There can, of course, be no knowing

acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is

unable to ascertain what is expected of it. According-

ly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the

grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.

By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we

enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly,

cognizant of the consequences of their participation.

Id. at 17 (emphasis added, citations omitted). A comparison

of the EHA with the statute examined in PennAurst, the

Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (the “DD Act”), will show

that the State of Texas, and, through it, its political sub-

divisions such as Petitioner, voluntarily and knowingly ac-

cepted the terms of the EHA, which unambigously imposed

conditions from which the State could ascertain

an obligation such as CIC for a child as Amber.

32

stitutions for the mentally retarded and substituting one

mode of treatment (small community-based group homes)

for that state's present method of services through large

isolated institutions. First, this Court found that section 6010

did not by its terms impose conditions for the receipt of

federal funds under the DD Act. The Court stressed that

whereas §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, 6012, 6063 and 6067 of the DD

Act clearly state ‘‘conditions’’ which a state must meet in

order to receive funding under the Act, § 6010 is expressed

in terms 6f Congressional ‘‘findings.’’ Pennhurst, supra, at

13-14, 22-23. By contrast, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1415 clearly

_ state conditions for the receipt of federal funds under the

EHA as amended. A state could not ascertain from the

language of § 6010 that the rights enumerated therein were

enforceable conditions for that state’s receipt of DD Act

funding. However, a state could have no doubt that the

requirements of EHA §§ 612-615, 20 U.S.C. § 1412-1415,

were conditions of EHA Part B funding. Thus’ Congress

spoke with a clear voice, unambiguously imposing conditions

for the grant of EHA moneys.

Second, this Court judged the Act’s requirements, and the

specificity thereof, in relation to the amount of money ap-

propriated by Congress to implement the legislation and the

burden and expense of the requirements to be imposed. The

Court noted that under the DD Act, Pennsylvania received

only $1.6 million in 1976. ‘When Congress does impose af-

firmative obligations, it usually makes a far more substan-

tial contribution to defray costs."’ Pennhurst, supra, at 24.

By contrast, the federal government spends over a billion

dollars per year under the EHA as amended. Texas’ share

alone of the Fiscal Year 1984 EHA Part B appropriation

($67.6 million) exceeds DD Act funding for the entire nation

($62.1 million). P.L. 98-139. In comparing the EHA to the

DD Act in light of the Pennhurst decision, it must be

remembered that while the Pennhurst plaintiffs sought a

massive, costly systemic overhaul, Respondents herein seek

only a service of minimal cost and burden, if any.

Finally, the State could ascertain from the Act as a whole,

in context, what might be expected of it. By listing such ser-

‘ pit © a! ea

an 8 Le ./ ear tek cuk ve eT) ie ee

33

vices as physical therapy, audiology, psychological services,

etc. in § 1401(17), Congress gave fair notice to the states that

the EHA would require school districts to provide types of

services not traditionally offered in the public schools. By

emphasizing ‘‘individualized"’ services to meet each handi-

capped child's “unique needs,” § 1401(16)-(19), Congress indi-

cated that the list of services in subsection (17) was not—

indeed, could not be—exhaustive. Any doubt as to that point

should have vanished when the implementing federal regula-

tions expanded the illustrative list and expressly declared

that even the expanded list was not exhaustive. 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.13 and Comment. From all the foregoing, it is clearly

ascertainable from the EHA, and thus Texas voluntarily and

knowingly accepted as terms of its ‘‘contract,”’ that a child

such as Amber Tatro would be entitled to a physician-

prescribed supportive service which, though not specified by

name in the Act, is needed to enable her to attend public

school and participate without undue risk to her health in

the regular educational environment.

V. CLEAN INTERMITTENT CATHETERIZATION IS A

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT.

A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is applicable to the in-

stant case

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

requires in relevant part that:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the

United States, as defined in (29 U.S.C. § 706(7)], shall,

solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-

jected Batson rwor > gud: gee chal

receiving Federal financial assistance .

29 U.S.C. § 794. The question of whether handicapped plain-

tiffs have a private right of action to enforce Section 504 (Pet.

Brief at 38) was disposed of by this Court in Consolidated

Rail Corp. v. LaStrange, supra. Cf. Cannon v. University of

Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) trecognising a private right of

« fa

oe. =

34

action under the analogous Title IX of the 1972 Education

Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.); Guardians Ass'n v.

Civil Service Comm'n, supra, at 3227-3228 (private right of

action under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d).

As to the assertion that the EHA ‘‘preempts"’ Section 504

in this case (Pet. Brief at 37-38), this Court has granted cer-

tivrari on the principal decision relied upon by Petitioner for

that proposition. Smith v. Cumberland School Committee,

703 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v.

Robinson, __. U.S. —___, 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (No. 82-2120,

October 31, 1983). Thus, the Court probably will resolve the

pre-emption question prior to deciding the instant case. «.

Respondents will not presume to add here to the arguments

already presented to the Court in Smith, supra, as to why

the EHA does not preempt Section 504—especially since

the analysis in other sections of this Brief is necessarily

lengthy. Instead, Respondents respectfully commend to the

Court the arguments and authorities presented in the Smith

uv. Robinson Brief of Petitioners and Brief of Amici Curiae

Association for Retarded Citizens, Advocacy. Inc., et al Cf.

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454

(1975) at 459-460, and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415

U.S. 36 (1974) at 47-49 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e does not pre-empt

42 U.S.C. § 1981 with respect to employment discrimination);

Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42 U.S.C.

§ 3601 et seq. does not pre-empt 42 U.S.C. § 1982 with regard

to housing discrimination).

It is the position of Respondents that Section 504 is ap-

plicable to the present case and that Petitioner has violated

that statute. Respondents have established a violation of

Amber's rights under the foregoing statute by showing that

(1) Amber is an “otherwise qualified handicapped individual”

with respect to Petitioner's public school program; (2) the

public school program to which Amber seeks continued ac-

cess is a program receiving federal financial assistance; and

(3) Amber has been excluded from participation in, denied

the benefits of, and subjected to discrimination by Peti-

tioner’s public school program (and would be again if Peti-

Pay om oe il

35

tioner prevails) solely on the basis of her handicap.* The Dis-

trict Court below found as a fact, which the Court of Appeals

affirmed, that the public educational program in question

receives federal financial assistance. 516 F.Supp. 977 n. 17;

Pet. App. 60a-61a: 703 F.2d 832. The District Court cannot

be said to have so clearly abused its discretion as to be held

clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. Pro.; United States

vu. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) at 395. Consequently,

the inquiry next turns to the remaining elements of a Sec-

tion 504 violation.

B. Amber Tatro is otherwise qualified to receive a free appro-

priate public education in the least restrictive environment.

In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra, this

Court illuminated the parameters of the term ‘otherwise

qualified"’ as used in Section 504. In that decision, the Court

held that Francis Davis, a deaf applicant, was not ‘‘other-

wise qualified” for admission to a college's professional nurse

training program. Jd. at 414. Two critical distinctions

between that case and the instant one must be examined in

order to determine the application of Davis to Amber Tatro.

“The U. S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR), the

executive agency charged with administrative enforcement of Section 504,

found in September of 1979 that Petitioner had violated Amber's rights

under Section 504 by withholding CIC. Pl. Exh. 3 (Tr. 42). That ruling

was in line with the consistent position of OCR. North Kansas City (Mo.)

School District, 3 E.H.L.R. 257:04 (November 29, 1978). Cf, Consolidated

Rail Corp. v. LaStrange, supra, at 4304 (the Department of HEW § 504

regulations “particularly merit deference’) & n. 15 (In adopting §

505(aX2) in the amendments of 1978, Congress incorporated the substance

of the Department's regulations into the statute'’). Those

regulations require Petitioner to provide ‘related aids and services that

(i) are designed to meet individual educational needs ofhandicapped per-

sons as adequately as the needs of persons are met;"’ to

‘provide for the education of each qualified person... with

... that the education of the person in the regular environment

use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactor-

ily.” 34 C.F.R. $§ 104.33(bM1), 104.34.

36

To be a ‘qualified handicapped person” under U.S. Depart-

ment of Education regulations governing post-secondary

educational and vocational programs, the applicant must

‘‘meet{ ] the academic and technical standards requisite to

admission or participation in the recipient's education pro-

gram...” 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)\(3), cited with approval in

Davis, supra, at 406 (previously codified as 45 C.F.R. §

84.3(k)(3)). By contrast, to be ‘otherwise qualified’’ for pur-

poses of a public pre-school, elementary, or secondary pro-

gram, the handicapped child need only be within the proper

age range.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2).

In the Davis case, this Court found as a fact that, due to

her deafness, Francis Davis could not be trained to perform

some of the essential elements of nursing. Southeastern Com-

munity College v. Davis, supra, at 401-404, 409-410, 413.

Thus, she could not meet the academic/technical require

ments for participation in the professional nurse training pro-

gram (which ultimately amount to the ability to be trained

to serve as a professional nurse). Amber Tatro, by contrast,

is not required to meet any academic or technical standards

in order to be otherwise qualified for a free appropriate public

education. It is sufficient that she is a handicapped child

between the ages of 3 and 21 inclusive and a legal resident

of the Irving Independent School District. Southeastern

Community College was not required to undertake “‘affirma-

tive action’’ in order to prevent the exclusion of a handi-

capped applicant not otherwise qualified; nor was it com-

pelled to fundamentally alter its program in order to render

it one for which the not otherwise qualified handicapped per-

son could qualify. Since Amber meets the essential elements

Amber has the right to ask for more in the way of accom-

modation, to insure that she is not denied benefits and

excluded from participation, than did Francis Davis at the

post-secondary level.

“Further, the child must reside “in the recipient’s jurisdiction.” 34

C.F.R. § 104.33(a) and Appendix A Comment 23.

37

A second distinction, found persuasive by the Fifth, Tenth,

and Eleventh Circuits, leads to the same result. As previously

noted, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra,

this Court accepted the lower court's factual finding that Ms.

Davis’ deafness would prevent her from ever being able to

perform certain essential tasks of nursing. Thus, even with

reasonable accommodations, Ms. Davis still could not realize

the principal benefit of the program to which she sought

access—i.e., to be trained to fulfill the role of professional

nurse. Jd. at 401-402, 409-410. By contrast, in the instant

case, the simple modification necessary to enable Amber's

safe participation (CIC) would not prevent her from realiz-

ing the benefits of specialized instruction in public school.

Tatro I, supra, at 564; Tatro II, supra, at 832. Accord New

Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d

847 (10th Cir. 1982) at 853-854; Georgia Ass'n for Retarded

Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983) at 1580.

Cf. Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1982) at

1201-1202 n. 36. Petitioner has acknowledged that Amber

is educationally capable of benefitting from the instruction

offered in its public school program. Assuming that the pro-

gram offered Amber is otherwise appropriate by this

analysis, but for the contested omission of CIC, the ques-

tion of whether Amber could benefit from that program if

given access to it is foreclosed. Amber thus is presumptive-

ly an otherwise qualified handicapped individual.

C. Petitioner's refusal of clean intermittent catheterization to

Amber Tatro would have the effect of excluding her from

participation in, denying her the benefits of, and subjecting

her to discrimination by, Petitioner's program solely on the

basis of her handicap.

To be permitted access to Petitioner's program, Amber re-

quires a small accommodation of her bodily elimination

needs. A more reasonable accommodation for a handi-

capped person hardly could be imagined than CIC. It takes

only a few minutes twice a day, can be provided safely and

easily, does not entail costly or elaborate equipment, and re-

quires neither highly specialized credentials nor extraor-

dinary training for the person providing the service. This

.

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38

Court held in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,

supra:

We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal

to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination

against handicapped persons always will be clear. It is

possible to envision situations where an insistence on

continuing past requirements and practices might ar-

bitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped per-

sons of the opportunity to participate in a covered pro-

gram. Technological advances can be expected to

enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped

or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employ-

ment. Such advances also may enable attainment of

these goals without imposing undue financial and ad-

ministrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situations may

arise where a refusal to modify an existing program

might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Jden-

tification of those instances where a refusal to accom-

modate the needs of a disabled person amounts to dis-

crimination against the handicapped continues to be an

important responsibility of HEW.

Id. at 412-413 (emphasis added). As discussed in the State-

ment of the Case, supra, CIC represents a technological ad-

vance which replaced the expensive and burdensome sterile

catheteriation and which allows the needs of handicapped

children such as Amber to be accommodated without undue

financial and administrative burdens on either the State of

Texas or Petitioner. In the exercise of its continuing impor-

tant responsibility. the Office for Civil Rights of the Depart-

ment of HEW and of its successor Department of Educa-

tion has consistently identified the refusal to provide CIC

as an instance of discrimination under Section 504. See foot-

notes 26, supra and 28, infra.

Prior to the passage of Section 504 and the 1975 EHA

amendments, many school systems across the nation, on the

basis of state law or local practice, excluded non-toilet-trained

handicapped children from their free public schools. A.

Abeson, et al, Access to Opportunity, in 2 HOBBS (ed.),

39

ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 270

(1975) at 272. Since the enactment of Section 504 and the

EHA, that exclusion has been discontinued. Obviously,

states have been willing to assume that a handicapped child

must not be excluded from participation in or denied the

benefits of the public schools solely on the basis of her

handicap-related inability to toilet appropriately. Conse-

quently, it should come as no surprise now to find public

school personnel assisting handicapped children with their

toileting needs, including physically placing a child on and

removing her from the commode.” A child reasonably can-

not be expected to remain in school through a six-to-eight

hour school day without relieving her bladder or bowels. If,

due to physical or mental disability, the child is unable to

perform this natural function independently, a reasonable

accommodation, in order that her education might proceed,

is for school personnel to assist the child. Due to her or-

thopedic/other-health-impairment, Amber Tatro is unable to

empty her bladder independently. A reasonable accommoda-

tion, so that Amber tnay remain in the most integrated set-

ting in which she is educationally capable of benefitting, is

for school personnel to assist twice a day through CIC to

drain her bladder. If the Court of Appeals decision in this

case is reversed, the clock may be turned back to the time

when public school systems could exclude children who, sole-

ly on account of their handicaps, lacked independent toileting

skills.

Similarly, a child cannot be expected to attend school all

day without eating. Some handicapped children, although

able to benefit educationally from instruction (standardized

or personalized) in public school, are unable, due to a physical

or mental handicap, to eat independently. Such children re-

*In a recent decision, the U. S. Department of Education's Office of

Civil Rights found a school district in non-compliance with Section 504

for “‘[flailing to provide related aids and services ... necessary for (the

child] to receive an appropriate education," because the district failed to

implement a two-hour restroom schedule to accommodate the child's

handicap-related bladder problems. Kansas City U.S.D. # 50, OCR Ref.

No. 07831094, reprinted at E.H.L.R. Curr. Dec. 257:455 (May 2, 1983).

40

quire the reasonable accommodation of being spoon fed by

school personnel. Some handicapped children, although able

to benefit educationally from instruction in public school,

are unable, for example due to paralysis of the hands and

arms, to dress and undress. Such a child could not be

expected to remain in school throughout the school day

without removing and putting back on items of clothing, such

as coat and hat, and may need reasonable accommodation

in the form of assistance from school personnel in taking off

and putting on their coats, hats, etc.

All of the foregoing examples have legally relevant aspects

in common with CIC for Amber. CIC is comparable to the

accommodations discussed above in terms of cost, risk, and

physical involvement. In each case, including CIC, a child

educationally capable of benefitting from instruction in

public school would be excluded from participation in and

denied the benefits of the public school program without the

service as a reasonable accommodation.

A key benefit of the educational program offered to non-

handicapped eight-year-olds is second-grade-level academic

and other instruction” in a regular second grade class in a

regular public elementary school. However, without the ac-

commodation of CIC, Amber's educational program would

have to be offered to her in a setting outside the public school

system. (See discussion in Part I above.) This significant

41

public school. The basis for the deviation is not educational.

Amber's age and residence qualify her for a free appropriate

public education in the least restrictive environment ap-

propriate to her educational needs and abilities. In the

absence of CIC, Amber's ‘‘need” for separation from the

public school mainstream arises not from her educational

needs and abilities (as, for example, in the case of Abraham-

son uv. Hershman, supra) but solely from Petitioner's refusal

to accommodate her handicap. ‘“The exclusion of a minimally

handicapped child from a regular public classroom situation

without a bona fide educational reason is in violation of . . .

29 U.S.C. § 794." Hairston v. Drosick, supra, at 184.

Clearly then, Petitioner has discriminated against an other-

wise qualified handicapped individual solely on the basis of

her handicap—by withholding from Amber the reasonable

accommodation she needs, solely on account of her handicap,

in order to participate in and benefit from the educational

program for which she is otherwise qualified. In yet one other

respect, Petitioner has discriminated against Amber under

classical discrimination analysis. Petitioner makes available

to non-handicapped regular students the services of its school

nurses, to administer physician-prescribed medications, oral-

ly or in emergencies by injection. Pl. Exh. 2, supra. Through-

out the public school systems, school nurses routinely

dispense medications prescribed by medical doctors. Brief

for Amicus TASB at 6. School nurses also provide first aid.

Id. Thus, Petitioner makes available to students who do not

have Amber's unique handicap those physician-prescribed

services which are within the competence of 2 school nurse

and which are needed by the children in order to attend school

safely throughout the school day. However, Petitioner seeks

to withhold from Amber the simple physician-prescribed ser-

vice of CIC, which is well within the competence of a school

nurse and which is needed by Amber, solely on the basis of

ee ee ee

D. Clean intermittent catherization for Amber Tatro does not

impose an undve burden on Petitioner.

42

In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra, this

Court identified two forms of ‘‘undue burden” which would

relieve a recipient of responsibility for accommodating a

handicapped person: ‘fundamental alteration in the nature

of a program” and undue financial and administrative costs.

Id. at 410, 412. To accommodate Francis Davis, the college

nursing training program would have had to eliminate prac-

tical training in those essential tasks of nursing which Ms.

Davis could never perform (and thus never demonstrate com-

petency in) due to her handicap. Consequently, the recipient

could not accommodate the handicapped plaintiff without

rendering its program in essence something other than a pro-

fessional nursing training program. ‘It is undisputed that

respondent could not participate in Southeastern’s nursing

program unless the standards were substantially lowered."’

Id. at 413. By contrast, Amber does not seek the removal

of any requirement which is relevant to her eligibility to

receive a free appropriate public education. The de facto “'re-

quirement” that she be able to remain in class all day without

catheterization has nothing to do with her age, legal

residence, or educational needs and abilities. Independent

toileting skill is not a criterion for public school eligibility

and the lack of it does not ‘otherwise disqualify’’ Amber.

whereas the requirements imposed on Francis Davis had very

much to do with her academic/technical qualifications for ad-

mission to a post-secondary educational program.

Further, and more important, the addition of CIC to the

total array of services offered by Irving I.S.D. to meet the

unique needs of its handicapped students will not transform

that school district into something it is not already. Peti-

tioner already is, as it is required by the EHA to be, an

health services. It is already a system which includes the ee

medically-related (though not strictly “medical” within the ‘

meaning of the EHA) services of ; 7

i > ‘ ' P a

ok je? Re =. a ee eee a Be ees

43

system.” Requiring Petitioner to provide the simple, inex-

pensive, and safe accommodation of CIC does not legally or

logically obligate Petitioner in the future to offer such

elaborate medical treatment as kidney dialysis to some other

child as a ‘reasonable accommodation." The same factors

discussed in section II-B above, which propel kidney dialysis

and other falsely analogized treatments outside the scope

of ‘‘related services,’ would also serve to preclude such treat-

ment as a “reasonable accommodation."

By use of the qualifier ‘‘undue,”’ this Court signalled in

Davis that not every financial and/or administrative burden

is impermissible in order to accommodate a handicapped per-

son. Consequently, the question of ‘‘undue burden” is a fac-

tual determination, which the trial court obviously resolved

in Respondents’ favor in the instant case. In Davis, the

burden was found to be ‘‘undue"’ because even after exten-

sive modifications in order to render the program one for

which Ms. Davis could qualify despite her handicap, Ms.

Davis still could not realize the intended benefit of the pro-

gram. By contrast, Amber, who is already otherwise qual-

ified, could realize the intended benefit of a public school

education if provided reasonable accommodation to permit

her access to it. The intended benefit of a handicapped

elementary school student's special education program dif-

fers significantly from the intended benefit of a post-

secondary professional training program. The intended

benefit of the latter is to achieve a particular result—i.e., to

be trained to perform the essential tasks of the p..>fession

in question. Southeastern Community College v. Davis,

supra, at 413. However, as this Court has observed, the in-

tended benefit of a free appropriate public education at the

*For handicapped and non-handicapped children alike, tho public schools

perform the incidental role of ‘public babysitter” or “day care” program,

enabling both parents to be employed full time. The fact that the public

school system happens to perform this secondary function does not con-

vert it from a primarily educational to primarily custodial system. Com-

parably, the fact that a reasonable accommodation such as CIC, to enable

a handicapped child such as Amber to be educated in public school, also

serves a health-related purpose, does not transform the school district

into a health care institution.

44

pre-school/elementary/secondary level is not necessarily to

produce a particular outcome, but simply to enable the child

to receive educationa! benefits. Board of Education v.

Rowley, supra, at 3043. With the accommodation of CIC to

permit Amber to remain safely in the public school class-

room, she can benefit educationally from the instruction

offered there.

The financial and administrative ‘‘costs’’ of CIC cannot

be considered undue. None of the courts examining CIC has

been persuaded as a fact that this simple service entails much

cost at all. Since the level of training required to administer

the service is minimal, a school district need not hire new

staff to provide the CIC, unless it chooses to for reasons of

its own. The cost in terms of staff time (perhaps ten minutes

per school day) is negligible. The amount of time that would

have to be spent in consultation with the prescribing physi-

cian is well within tolerable limits—no more so than respon-

sible school personnel would spend for children with other

medically-related handicap needs, e.g., for physical therapy,

audiology, etc. Finally, to the extent that the prescribing/

delegating physician provides diagnostic or evaluation ser-

vices in connection with the child's CIC, the school district

would be financially responsible.”' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17); 34

C.F.R. § 300.13(bN4).

Petitioner virtually concedes that CIC itself is not burden-

some, by placing such heavy reliance on arguments as to the

dire impositions to which upholding CIC might lead. By this

reasoning, Amber must be denied the service she needs in

order to be able to remain in class through the day, not

because serving Amber would burden the district but because

someday some other child might ask for something that real-

ly is burdensome. However, the legal standards for related

(as opposed to purely medical) services and for reasonable

accommodation, as thoroughly examined above, provide

“Note than four of the seven physician functions in CIC that are listed

in Pet. Brief at 25-26 are diagnostic and evaluative in nature: (1), (4), (5),

(7). Respondents have not asked that Petitioner either pay for or hire the

_ physician to perform any of the physician functions.

45

more than adequate safeguards for the public school system

against the future horrors feared by Petitioner.

_ To create the illusion of cost, Petitioner and the school

board emici argue that provision of CIC will increase the risk

of injury and thus necessitate higher liability insurance

premiums for the school district. Two points render this argu-

ment invalid. In the first instance, as previously discussed,

the record shows that CIC is a very safe procedure, with

minimum risk. More importantly, Congress has removed in-

creased risk as a basis for excluding handicapped children

from public school. Opening the public schoolhouse doors to

previously barred children in wheelchairs, with diminished

intelligence, wiih impaired judgment, with deficient motor

coordination, with fragile bodies, with damaged senses, etc.,

cannot help but increase the overall risk of accident or in-

jury. Nevertheless, the EHA’s and Section 504's command

is unmistakable: to include all handicapped children, in the

regular public school environment to the maximum extent

such children can benefit educationally therefrom. The focus

is on the needs and abilities of the children rather than on

school officials’ fears of liability. Congress has made the judg-

ment that the benefit to society of appropriately educating

handicapped children for independence and productivity

outweighs any increased burden on local school systems of

serving previously excluded handicapped children.

Conclusion

In consideration of all the foregoing, Respondents respect-

fully pray that this Court affirm the decision of the U. S.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

James C. Todd

ADVOCACY, INCORPORATED

1006 East 50th Street

Austin, Texas 78751

(512) 475-5543

Attorney for Respondents

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ADMISSION, REVIDY, AND DISMISSAL COMMITTEE SUMMARY

spert_As bec Tatre DATE + “2 =

b.0.8. Lol 2/75 - SCHOOL a Ha aoa PROGRAM

>. The committee reviewed the following data:

A. Assessment reports (specify reports and dates)

Bo additional information provided

a Aseesement information presented as documented:

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III. The committee decided that this student:

needs special education services because of the handicapping conditicn(s)

cited above.

Goes not need special education services at this time.

The data ou which this decision was based include asses t as documented:

Peeswus medical re Vo tries Brey Or nope. ¢ ‘

Waretic ay , ite Mecn ASSsSer eed ad. ee bh. = ne fds

tA Gane @ c Wyss.

IV. The committee encures that this student is not assigned to special education

on the basic of criteria which vere Jeveloped solely on the command o! the

English languace. —Yes

The committee ensures that this student was not placed in special education

if the oly deficiencies identified are directly attributable to:

A. w G@ifferent cultural lifestyle xtes No

B. lack of educational opportunities —Yes

Cc. lack of achievement irom previous education experiences

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A. Long-range goals and short-term objectives ingicated by the sorwme:ntei

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appropriate ___ inappropriate

C. The relates services, if any, are _i/ appropriate ____ inappropriate i

D. Referral e4ditional asvessment is consideres necessary ""

unnecessary :

E. A there in the etusent's prorres placenent is ___reeded w_not newse:

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Ce. serrice, Ting turt bad : ficatiuns

Rervuler bducwtion

. ‘

ies bducution

Vecuticna! Etucetion

mA Lua

helatey Services

of enmetienal Therapy = 61> Frew

Ben Si?

hysice. Th erepy wr ¥

— yes Me4d Pee oe

2 Ribs fey ai’

rE ="

=z twech/ acuage Therapy Euatoch cn

se. nny ow

>

—“T trensyortation 4

mA ejh> biey

Special Ed. bus

bir. Sus

burent Keisbursed

Viner

For visually handicapped, autistic, of contract students, the committe. hus

completed and attachec additional LEP requirements. ayes te

Fur the steht in 8th grade or age 14 as of September |, on SOMMATKOe fue

con -tvtes une attached @ graduation plan. Ajh ves

Seed j=l eat

vi

Gif ol

Dr. Jonn Townley

Irving Independent School District

901 O'Connor Road

Irving, Texas

Re: C.1.C. Instructions for Amber Leigh Tatro

PRESCRIPTION

Deer Sir:

Amber Tatro nas been placed on a schedule of Clean Intermittent

Catheterization every three to four hours during the waking day.

Amber is to be catheterized at the times listed:

€:30 A.M.

9:30 A.M.

12:30 P.M.

33:30 O.%.

6:30 P.M.

9:30 P.M.

If Amber's diaper ts wet at the time for the scheduled

catheterization, this should be reported to me. Or. Frosts. or

Or. Goldstein at the Spina Bifida Clinic at the Scnottisn Rite

Hospital as the above schedule may need to be modified.

A qualified school nurse or other qualified person can perforr

C.1.C. and attached to these instructions are tne Scottisn Rite

Hospital instructions for catheterization of a female which are

to be tollowed.

A © 10 or # 12 catheter should be used to start out.

The above schedule for catheterization and size of catheter may

be altered upon the direction of myself, Or. Frosts, or

Or. Goldstein from time to time according to Amber's needs.

If there are any questions, I, Nr. Frostg, or Or. Goldstein

may be reached through the Spina Bifias Clinic at Scottish

Rite Hospital).

vii

a. < aba

©62 3) P

703 OF tbe Ge’ “jute

id

Tshw ceue dunt +e tO dleils in ACC. hance wri bt

“Clreet ussctulu av

taphninc

rey face 6 em Ute nO At mrove sheta seoks+ Leaees

- wS re owcle’ — - owtulhun 5 ren

2. (6 teow will pur eu shots vocks + Lvameer. +c’

aol Avsewr wlhin (0 new,

ot /Pare at 5 (mere url at met and Fama Cw SHG wT

a

erleTipanwd

fon bh “ue 16 i |

Q fetes rll wounte Leelee beGuer— Gehl tan “J

OT ne) me QS

a

c Sahat heanadie egies Lerek B or > aes Lape pany 1

© 0 /iaren re / *) fe ow eee. weelk aot 3 pe — ges Ow peveksa ud

Touft .

cup, ees 1 Cher An ae awd am pecaaat a mae

‘

.% aut mt oe

eT ‘ Cur ds nate “Cathie vation pes wen wn bh Pearse

-\ Cyvsepuate, Sota fe ieee be formants hk és

~

viii

Tef a!

TEXAS SCOTTISH RITE HOSP: TAL FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN

In. IONS PA THETERI ZATION OF

Myst, a

« mpletely emoty the bladder at scheduled intervals in ord“: to decrease the

ateecidence cf urinary tract infection.

Usine that 474-8 stagnant in the bladder 18 more likel, to becore anfected. A

Diedder tha: s-ays full becomes enlarged ad chickered.

Scheduleé err: /.7g of the Fliécer alievs the patient to become familiar wits the

@ilference ir the sensation Of « full Eladdér and an empty bladder.

:

Equapment Zeezed:

Clean catheter. metal or robber. (Metal is best since it can be boiled repeatedly

without detericration.)

Soap and warer.

Dash to catch the urine, fcr example, a re-usable jar.

Large underpad. <o preven: soaking bed linens.

i} S228 Fy

i. “eeh hearts with soap ant water.

2. Get all of the equiraert ready.

3. Get ch:id ready. (If possible, jut et table height since it is easier to do this

procedure at th:s height.) Place child or her back

4. Spread labia apart with one hand end wash genitalia with soap and water with the

ether hard. aiveve sovirg in a downward direction. (Never wash in an cpward

@arection 8.57¢ to18 ¥i11 move geres from around the rectum up into the ares

et the blasser o¢ening.)

&. Insert catueter in urpthra and let 91) urine drain out of the bladder. Th.s nay

teke lerger <"e5 you thane. se Go not scemove catheter until che urine has 12. ;res

©. tf yew are wnatle to caetheterise, contact your :ocal Public Nealth Nurse cc cal)

Tenes Secttisnh Rite Mospite. .

®t least once «@ Gay after the catheter hes Been washed with soap ord water piece

it am & pot Gf water en@ bes! fer 20 aenutes. Allow the cetheter to air é:) ori

- Zell

i 6 wag

OPHTHALMOLOGY CONSULTANTS PF A see eees se 8 meee

tveect A Mocoy ™ DO or we Eve

PED ATES CPM THALMOLOGY ome STRAGIGNUS

- 18 & Sermiyr MO

( “ERet OPHTHAL MOLOn.)

EXAMINATION REPORT

A —_

Patient's Lame: Atm ber AALS EG:

Date of Examination: ail Fre ae

1. Usaunosis: Asi Z. sect cienhleg Pare

+ afatony

Il. Treatment:

L“_ Glasses

B. Patching

c. Medications

Ae Exercises

g. Surgery

F. None

Tll. kecommendations for school:

ite Front of class placement

b. Needs visual aids

Sf Needs special materials

li. Visual restrictions

&. : i 7~ WNone of the above

i. Other

f]

Iv. Pataent ais to return: ng aha :

, . : _—

id

Me/..7 Loaf WA Pea Fue tea f Lice: 2

S a2. .

wv Crnetthaliena “Cre att 7 ,

EVERETT A. MOODY, i1.D. 4

se) ecstrensh Gant eee feaa 1000 gees somenen

Dallas, Texas

214:521-3168

Report of Clinic Visit/Return

In response to your request, the following information is provided to you as a

summary of the patient's last visit.

Prtient's Neve Ce et ios) +... °F

’ Sa EO nanPags Ss ak

Clinic “> . IS rela) eS eee re a + Date edlied ov &

Cuief Compluint/Diagnosis tot. TA ok ee. Pe oe ee Oe |

peer remus ’ ay

Interval History We ors Vwi ee faa few t Bes

necomendatioss {\\i, bh: ys 2! bp at et py aes

7, ry

act U > ee eeri rae Tare waar

t

nee ” ara 4 +

‘ &

xi

3 —

Hedy } |

wo beasy .

(itt

PLETED E 4

tubing lef

ad 24

|

post-

has

see her

knee

xii

~N

leased,

today

th how

mother

Time

‘

a

2

xiii

a, 3gate ipa

a, 4 ay : : 2 i

‘ah TF | é tile

Eine ir 308285.

STILLS ELT mete ttt

xiv

— a

[.¢ ef ~

I4VINC INDPYCNDENTUSCIOOL DIsTeicr te “4,

OCCIPATIONAC/OMYSICAL TI SRAPY SCT “.

NAME: oF & 9.0.8, sa/j lym

OATE : o a oc? WA y

Ae Fe ‘ roa Lee) that tt bb. gh. 4 EA TE RES Te eT ae a

ese ‘ PS. te, he o4 off sh fs 4, Pe Fas at | > . suse eh ss ,

4 .

NOE COALS Ce Stee

” : ; oe ,

oi. Le a! Oe Pa?) Mei sd: pil opel as yy eathicss 4s raf a Ay tt, >

sfondi. «5 4s 41, fees i eiiny eh sv lash gel, raver

1 v4

PROGRE>S:

aes ae A ha i OO ta et wD fe ot i gts wry

‘ < se Poe Jv z ; ./

ry “tt Bunt ~ .

wan wet ° asse!

U Ts, Are ahs

la

27 Te ; hid Me ete ( ste the A a. «2

‘ Fis te

gh Aue’ ard. ma OR hey me sbornid aleiw cris

v , .

«3 mses ccs gh 4 ween fur Qu Bue 16 Sua dues. Ja ths wee mites clin ks.

overs tei te ts pital “pneu “ay owt. Ett the ¢ MMe Mh AT Oe

ela) SP a ee ee eee AKtilin-

slit tt ttl LIEN YT ae Re TCE cE Fae | #

. 4 :

es 6 oes: = ideas

! teal

Serretimeattanan” — Shain fl dale a/'F

300: Jacanem Street

Teving, Tenas 75001

&,; Fi as ! “oak 7 P

OD ue “NOH ps eye wat w Clad ae. GF Hl -

‘ , gy on 42 4 — at tu yd fd ’

ARC) UCT? Brice wens t Rees

urhuch Arik a * “ , a op ay

por heapat. a Sly A% ¢

aefianka.

of * wb comd Se uh

Q, ‘. era eet? a? Dhan, «« 2, pee Mf Pec a.

arcs sete ates, KU S ts ness

oe ee ey buh wot Ohm, MAD, Gon ¢

kD eae nt axl ee es See ee oe, See

eer Cee eal uzlt Fly Qe A. wee a® opt.’

ot) ee ery ps wh el dy 60% tial vA, “e?

Ley the atehcot ay = a. Co Ste

soathie wrcwudid Nakl demu

keh ts agent Ofna 06 tA meen,

ee eI -

Sb heen ath srasrtaiad fvkh oitngh of ws’

ty her J muochine

¢ tmbn well vaonTauvn, gor ia berly ¢* nyt )

in ug ae nied arent pega Kot ;

a lod on an ae bras. e

xvi

IS ef 21

VIMC_INDERENOR:T SCHOOL DISTR:

LOCCUPATIONA./PMYSICAL THERAPY REPORT

wage: ' 6 oo. wig 5.0.8. ie 1-1

aes . eat <a eer’ ta +> ars | = ad »

hone RVGE DIA :

ag as » Mae Oe. ahe-ites gos EUr ae. 6: » bh. », he

bad . a! bd

4, - a at vcd wee Pfu: * bon seed (a a Be + 00 en be & fs

> To Tet oe , ay <r ew. ee Oe as

i eo fre Leer aay TS In lt, Buns’. Se oi le Fount. ©

a ai? se aieth /> seleck G fewt a Aer Pires, s- t, ee Lee ee

lett ae a. Seen ae eee cee a ee ar a ow areaayn tit, = =eog

1d rig ot tag tnt Crate hes ae Chm nye Lie weet

ve re oe Ties ft mis- gobi! ee Bk BE EN

" ee «we haha “bite ms oe Stiesegelitn -bew . Cait ne”

apees Spar} one:

; SMart 2 its Sy ae iwet am, * = hws, an) a { oes' of. s

— zs

-

Focematiora’ Me ca Teter —~ oT he ol /

vt. of Of wae ~ecatim v Fe : n

wl. Swat Seem

teow ‘aan

xvii

oft ft * salu

4& ext fe a\e

“ -—+

oh rere. “wort tee Oy

THINKS

7 Wa et *

vlathy ‘%

* wee oo 6. Oe

es wa

. e f .

tr oe end 62 oe-eee Shatin we tire

BR We wrth ree” vag oS. ee

“s wr we. Ck mur fe wher, +6 t baw

tm figdses™ awrlhin Gann

we

“?

;

“a

os

. .

~ .

e<

»

doe on

cet a

~

- Pace

4

ce OC arte Lathes brkieees

es toe OrMe ‘ghmae Lavel ee ied

‘

—asT Cot hae sateen pee sien

- "Bw

e

fe. -

° fee *4.

© bowler

t* osote tal po Ca Ut?

in eet.

we Oe PO aE ADM 4 Ot meet a:

;

ee

vine Seale ‘ve. Bnei

Io h al

xviii

17 of A

August 22, 1983

Adapted Phreical Education Ruport

Amber Teatro received adapted physical education instruction

one day « week during the 1962-83 school year. During this time

improvement was seen in eye-hand coordination. Amber meet the first

and second short range goals which dealt with catching a bounced bell.

The third short range of bouncing and catching was not reached.

During the 1983-84 school year I am recommending that Amber be

mainstreamed into the regular second grade physical education class at

least one day during the week. I will go with her to clases to assist

im any wey possible. Aleo, I wili be available to give suggestions

to the physical education teacher in ways to adapt games and activities

so that Amber may be involwed as auch as possibile.

Sincerely,

Kathie Shaffer

Adapted Physical Education, IISD

ARD Minn. . Auber Tatro Miavds oat ae inas

Present

WaAm¢s Posi aon

nfm y rhe aped

Sih Ape ee ade fubi Jyad -degnedicvin

ry F< em

< eae Abamnes-

nt, Dae - gr Meloy Athan)

- ath Lome

oy Mig ~ Pumas’, Boome

a be

Lunn t 6 Atpeiad wtrt vr & r septate ye 4

ail. Att Ue ken Angheris, « 3 aetlettcanse

sealraliOry and Salhi, Lit shat

apo ‘ [re OTIPT tne ne FE, whine

: ( Gackl A sempsee mene’ smdvoaticn (das sorte)

lat nade tracks wrtecatie

ee: talay wre one way C7259 gan od

¢ wae nlacaal Lt Mrrtith gt Mhle when, “Miles

, beni on nee Ahatli W414 2m OS:

wu mia, areal Aled ade Blin

3 Nitieg 2 Mth an Malle AO thisegy

ike as. Abed. N- at 0 Ing

Me mill Sirniee teen tysinneas —

Se ainan ac ented i uA And Pax lcel,

ee 4 Hhet hel ondduia Tih drier Has

Lasitbn sank, an » wahaate’ eater ae

acd COxte O710T Onde Adapts

Aewawed nn go eect ww ynanng sales

dnd. Ci, Mticees Ecupdes)

wd , O12 hhtectae et

40 Af, and (2:30 PM,

Cimber) ee ~~ On 3.

y Ai WI; Le Fad gadke ees

Praripntatan ua hemimacd/

Wamilio wtr pag tad aa pene

xxi

Page pre) of Zl

VI. SUMMARY OF DELIBFRATIONS

A. Assessment data vas considered LZ Yes Wo

B. Alternative placements revieved: seco nth

ee Me

C. Aé@ditional ye related es discussed:

See TE tr AtwWNies

D. “Recommendations: S44 desman (&.) alr .

xxii

Page 2) of 2!

I have participated in all of the decisions listed on the preceding pages:

VOTING MEMBERS

a «

istration Yes = No * Voc. Admin. Yes No *

Voc. Teacher Yes No *

v.E. Yes No *

A.H. Yes wo *

LPAC Representative Yes No «

* Voting members casting dissenting votes may express objections on bottom of

this fora.

1 give my permission for y to receive the special

: — °

education services described in this p . I wnderstand that ay permission may

be revoked at any tine.

CES Sears race Hnt A

Sk ue BM Vxbeed Hera

‘ yaueke

° . "“@er 4 :

a anne! noccrrer Bache)

Ae

4 3 : - mee

{ (dsenpel®? vis 'S ee Re

08d ~ cistern, Sco

xxiii

so OF. Roe.

068s. <

TEP suPPLiMaD, coals “*SDS-K4 Scheak. - page of

Goal # \

se sepa sats Clitdiinnignitins das,

eet, GOS =

Objective fl:

Ae Hoe. Derma, smn on Rem Berernn orton ond,

Criteria for evaluation: nai,-CcCem’.. 0 148.25.6..

Schedule for evaluation: | - 3“

Implementor: DD.eee “oe

Objective #2: : :

Re +3... Sonme, om err OS,

a OH One Onm~=e.

Criteria for evaluation: maai- <u, tros—c2.,

Schedule for evaluation: A- ¥“4

Implementor: Od-e.22, —~~-2-

Objective #3:

Criteria for evaluation:

Schedule for evaluation:

Laplementor:

2 se A:

Geet @ ’ 3° qs Ay a ate, ro,

Objective fl:

Re Cohen e Sey, ote Ono

Criteria for evaluation: mami. <. «38. ee ee ee

Schedule for evaluation: 4“- 84

criteria for evaluation: ReDs -cems\. @ edad,

Schedule for evaluation: S- 44

laplementor: JacheeQ ~un ro,

Objective #3:

Criteria for evaluation:

Sehedule for evaluation:

Implement or:

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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