Petition — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro
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— OCT % 1983
oO. Pissemadaenin * |
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
v.
HENRI AND MARY TATRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NEXT FRIEND OF AMBER TATRO, A MINOR,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JAMES W. DEATHERAGE
O. GLENN WEAVER
DEATHERAGE & WEAVER, INC.
200-201 InterFirst Building
Irving, Texas 75061
(214) 254-3188
Attorneys for Petitioner
Cee ee ee ee mienneetieeimmiomenmnann
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203
i
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether “medical treatment” such as clean in-
termittent catheterization is a “related service” re-
quired under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act and, therefore, required to be provided
to the minor Respondent.
Is a public school required to provide and perform the
medical treatment prescribed by the physician of a
handicapped child by the Education of All Handi-
~—ate Children Act or the Rehabilitation Act of.
1973
Whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals miscon-
strued the opinions of this Court in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, and State Board of
Education v. Rowley.
ii
TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW
This Petition is submitted on behalf of the Irving Inde-
pendent School District and its Board of Trustees. The
parties below are as follows: -
HENRI AND MARY TATRO, Individually and as
Next Friend of Amber Tatro, a Minor, (
: Plaintiffs-Appellees
Cross-Appellants
THE STATE OF TEXAS, TEXAS EDUCATION
AGENCY,
Defendants
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS
MEMBERS: Elizabeth Armstrong, James M. Bin-
ion, Joe Kelly Butler, W. W. Carter, Don H. Cook,
Brian Crouch, Jimmy L. Elrod, W. H. Fetter,
Wayne Frederick, Joseph C. Gathe, E. R. Gregg,
Jr., Rubin E. may pay im Hollingsworth, William
N. Kem Leveridge, Paul Matthews,
Rex dell, William P. , Richard Ten-
cinte, Laura es, sone ickery, James H.
Whiteside; ALTON BO COMMISSIONER
OF EDUCATION, :
Defendants-Appellants
THE IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES: Roger Hill,
Vickie Tatum, Troy Kelley, Pat N John
i atum elley, Pat Norman, Jo
Stipes; James W. Fillbeck has now replaced Robert
Pierce on the Board,
Defendants-Appellants
ow
- Cross-Appellees
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ i
TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW ........... hits Sak sdbbases ii
I. OpInIONS OF THE CouRT BELOW ................ 1
TL, JURIGDICTION ......csccccccccccccccecccccccess 2
III. Statutory AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2
TV, Sravenmar OP THE CASE oo. ccc cccccccccescess 3
V. REASONS For GRANTING THE WRIT ............ ai 2
A. This Case Presents Questions Of Great Publi
Importance Concerning The Scope Or “Non-
educational” Services Required To Be Provided
By State And Local Education Agencies Under
Education For All Handicapped Children
BP. yo hud ahaa cocks = apdeces erases 5
B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Applicable
Decisions Of This Court. ...........seeeee: 10
IN 6 oop X acvokwadsnows evanscdebvandee Vaweks 13
APPENDIX:
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed May
26, 1981) Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981) . la
COR i. oa 604 eck Te ude vil tena bon’ wee wha 53a
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed
September 8, 1981-Unpublished) ................ 55a
AURORE FOI os 00 cana 6is 6.0 05.0 vik'ns ec cys vhs Gus 62a
Order (J. Gee) Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc
(Filed July.6, 1965) .......ceccccccscscccssvecs 84a
Memorandum Opinion of J Rigesboien, i Tatro I
(Filed December 21, 1979) Tatro v. Texas, 481
F.Supp. 1224 (1970) «.....0c..cecsccoceseccsess 86a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) (J. Goldberg)
Tatro (led September 2 1980) Tato Texas,
GES FBS GOT CBU) a vive cc nc cccccccvccsccteiese 94a
iv
Table of Contents Continued
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: .
y ie toe! re FPR, Ean CL ie 4
Ps Cadabetgtcss poaaceieausanecates
es Os IE vad enccnrentanedanustonaed
Page
110a
110a
¥
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES: Page
sori Sesion Ron, — US, ROY,
Pennhurst State School & H. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1581 (1981) ........... 4, 11, 12, 13
Scanlon v. Tokarcik, 665 F.2d 443 (8rd Cir. 1981) cert.
denied 2 yoni yt. aap 5, 6
Southeastern Cos Comtnuniiy Ce College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
| SS IIE. 6. 6 baleen c oct cen ceccdss 9, i2, 13
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) TatroI .. 2,4
MISCELLANEOUS:
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Sana MEE. dec ccccciecccececsvvsvcuec 9
a iceiw bones banhevas sone 2, 3, 4, 12
ee os os. vee cenecadeeeeesea 2
20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.:
Ee Sat be cia cliscecdpewece 2, 5, 6, 7, 11
SECS Salih 3 SE Pe ee 2, 5, 10
Article 4495(b) § 3.06(d)(1), Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann.
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83) .............ceeeeceenes 2,6
at <
at aa? Boe hat es
e ae 4. Rs ee st
_ Po Se ee eS ee a
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
No. 83-__
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
Vv.
HENRI AND MARY TATRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NEXT FRIEND OF AMBER TATRO, A MINOR,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
' The Irving Independent School District and its Board
of Trustees, John Stipes, Roger Hill, Pat Norman, Vickie
Tatum, Troy W. Kelley, Anne Pfaff, and James W. Fil-
beck, hereby petition that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this case on April
25, 1983.
I. OPINIONS OF THE COURT BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 703
F.2d 823 and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages
64a to 88a. The Opinion of the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Texas is reported at 516 F.Supp.
968 and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages la to
2
36a. The Opinion below is the second Opinion is this case.
The first Opinion of the Court of Appeals (hereafter Tatro
I) is reported at 625 F.2d 557 (1980) and is printed in the
Appendix hereto at 94a to 109a. The Opinion of the Dis-
trict Court in Tatro J is reported at 481 F.Supp. 1224
(1973) and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages 86a
to 93a.
II. JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
April 25, 1983. A timely Motion for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was denied on July 5,
1983; and this Petition for Certiorari was filed within
ninety days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS IN-
VOLVED
The following statutory provisions relevant to this peti-
tion are set forth verbatim in the Appendix hereto:
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976):
Section 1401-Definitions
Section 1415-Procedural Safeguards
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et
seq.:
Section 794, 794a
State Statutes:
Article 4495(b) § 3.06(d)(1),
Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann.
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83)
3
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In early 1979, when the minor Respondent was 3%
years old, her mother asked the Irving Independent
School District to provide special education for her. The
District agreed, and in a series of meetings developed an
Individual Education Program (“IEP”) for the child. The
IEP did not provide for clean intermittent catheterization
(“C.1.C.”), which procedure was stipulated by the parties
and subsequently found by the District Court to be medi-
cal treatment requiring a valid prescription of a physician
and other physician’ s services. The School District main-
tained that since C.I.C. was medical treatment, it had no
legal obligation fo provide for nor administer C.I.C..
The parents pursued an administrative appeal through
the Texas State Board of Education, which agreed with
the School District’s decision, holding that the child’s IEP
met with the standards of the State Education Agency
and complied with applicable statutes and regulations.
The parents then brought an action in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas basing
their claims upon the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, requesting both monetary and injunctive
relief.
The District Court denied the application for prelimi-
nary injunction to require the School District to provide
C.I.C., holding that C.I.C. was not a related service
within the meaning of the EAHCA because the need for it
did not arise from the effort to educate and that the
Plaintiffs could not convert a statute prohibiting dis-
crimination in certain governmental programs [Section
504] to a statute requiring, in essence, the setting up of
governmental health care for people seeking to partici-
4
pate in such programs. App. p. 92a. On original sub-
mission, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on
assumed facts, remanded for trial determining that, on
the assumed facts, failure to provide C.I.C. violated both
the EAHCA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) App. p. 92a.
On remand, the District Court, feeling constrained by
Tatro I App. p. 94a, ordered Petitioner to modify the
child’s IEP to include provisions for C.I.C. in accordance
with and as prescribed by a valid medical prescription
provided by the child. Although the Court believed that
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, ‘451 U.S. 1, 101
S.Ct. 1531 (1981), reinforced its doubts that § 504 re-
quired C.I.C., it felt sufficiently constrained by Tatro J
App. p. 3la, and without finding a specific violation of
§ 504, awarded attorneys fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(b).
All parties appealed; and the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying heavily on “law of the case doctrine,”
affirmed. The panel decision reflects that were the panel
“writing on a clean slate, we would share the district
court’s reluctance to read a statute designed to aid educa-
tion to require provision of medical necessities of life
which are required by a child whether or not she partici-
pates in the state’s education program.” App. p. 67a. The
panel further found that although Pennhurst reinforced
the District Court’s doubts that Section 504 required
C.1.C., it concluded that the Supreme Court had not
spoken with sufficient clarity in Pennhurst to allow the
single panel to overrule the previous panel’s decision in
Tatro I.
Petitioners filed a timely Motion for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, which motions were
5
denied by order dated July, 1983. App. p. 84a. Petitioners
now present this Application for Writ of Certiorari.
V. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. This Case Presents Questions Of Great Public Import-
ance Concerning The Scope Of “Noneducational” Serv-
ices Required To Be Provided By State And Local Edu-
cation Agencies Under The Education For All Handi-
capped Children Act Of 1975.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (hereinafter called “the
Act”), is a fanding statute intended to.assist the states in
providing an education for handicapped children. The Act
has been the subject of much litigation and has been
described as “Delphic” by both lower courts. This Court,
in Board of Education v. Rowley, _—. U.S. ——, 102
S.Ct. 3034 (1982), removed much of the ambiguity from
the Act for the benefit of state and local education agen-
cies, emphasizing that the Act was designed to assist
handicapped children to benefit educationally. This
Court further held that the requirement of a free appro-
priate public education (FAPE) is satisfied when the
state provides personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the handicapped child to bene-
fit educationally from that instruction. Rowley, supra, at
3048 (emphasis added). The critical question remaining
which is of major public interest is the extent to which
states are obligated to provide “support services” and
whether such “support services” must relate to the effort
to educate, the paramount issue being whether the Act
requires state and local education agencies to provide
“medical treatment” prescribed by the handicapped
child’s attending physician.
Petitioner recognizes that this Court denied certiorari
in Pennsylvania Department of Education v. Tokarcik,
oe
ae
a ee
6
665 F.2d 443 (8rd Cir. 1981) cert. denied, ___ U.S. __.,
‘102 S.Ct. 3508, a case involving C.I.C.. However, the
critical distinction between Tokarcik and this case is that
in this case, the procedure C.I.C. was stipulated by the
parties to be “medical treatment”; that it was the treat-
ment of choice of most medical centers; that prescribing
C.I.C. or other treatment of a neurogenic bladder is the
sole responsibility of the treating physician; and that it is
a medical function. The District Court further found that
C.I.C. required more services from the physician than
diagnostic and evaluation services in determining a
handicapping condition and that absent a valid physician’s
prescription, providing C.I.C. would be unlawful in viola-
tion of the Texas Medical Practices Act. Tex. Rev.Civ-
.Stat.Ann., Art. 4495b § 3.06(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
83) App. p. 118a. The Court of Appeals failed to address
the “medical treatment” question squarely and deter-
mined that since the procedure could be performed by
persons other than licensed physicians without violating
prohibitions against practicing medicine without a
license, the procedure was a “related service” under the
Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) App. p. 110a. Unfortun-
ately, major questions of significant importance to the
general public are left unariswered and elucidate the need
for a definitive answer from this Court.
Does the opinion below ire that any medical treat-
ment prescribed by an attending physician be performed
and paid for by the education agency if a general health
hazard might result otherwise? Are schools required to
secure the services of persons sufficiently trained to allow
a treating physician to prescribe with a view toward
prescription implementation by the school? Does the Act
create “national health care” through the public school”
system and obligate the local systems to provide same at
no cost to the parent? Concommitent to these questions of
7
national importance if the answer is affirmative is the
significance of additional planning necessary to the imple-
mentation of such requirements. If states and local educa-
tion agencies are required to provide medical treatment,
budgeting on the local level is of nation-wide importance.
The additional revenue necessary to provide for the treat-
ment, the personnel necessary for implementation of
same, and insurance necessary to guard against liability
for potentially catastrophic losses must be considered.
These additional funds can come only from the individual
taxpayer. Certainly the states, the local education agen-
cies, and the individual taxpayers are entitled to a defini-
tive answer regarding whether or not this funding statute
has created an affirmative obligation to provide “medical
treatment” to handicapped students.
Under the Act, “related services” are defined as fol-
lows:
“The term ‘related services’ means transportation,
and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech pathology and
audiology, oa services, physical-and occu-
pational t erapy, recreation, and medical and
counseling services, except that such medical serv-
ices shall be for diagnostic and evaluation p
_e — required to assist a handica child
to benefit from special education, and includes the
early identification and assessment of handicapping
conditions in children.”
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) App. p. 110a. In the first appeal of
this case, the Court of Appeals, in what Petitioner be-
lieves is an advisory opinion, held that C.I.C. was a
related service because it could be performed by persons
other than licensed physicians. App.p, 105a. It is impor-
tant to remember that at the time of the first opinion, the
parties had not stipulated that the procedure was medical
8
treatment. The opinion of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reviewed herein overlooks this stipulation and fol-
lowed the first opinion under the “law of the case” doc-
trine. App. p. 67a. The decision in question states that the
School District argued that C.I.C. could not be performed
unless a physician is physically present to supervise and
control the procedure. App. p. 69a. Such has never been
the position of Petitioner. However, Petitioner does sub-
mit that C.I.C. is “medical treatment” as stipulated by
the parties and that in order to be performed, more is
required from the physician than diagnosis and evalua-
tion. The District Court on remand of the first appeal
found that when delegating prescribed medical treat-
ment, the physician must:
(1) — the needs and capabilities of the pa-
ien
(2) determine the training, experience, and compe-
tence of the person who will be performing the
prescribed treatment;
(3) assume the responsibility for supervision, train-
ing, and control of the salioonasa person
performing the procedure;
(4) determine if the treament is being properly
formed and is progressing without comp ea
tion;
(5) monitor the patient’s progress and perform the
numerous physician duties discussed in Amicus
Brief of Texas Medical Association reprinted as
an appendix to the District Court’s o — on
ct 5 5 516. F.Supp. at 987 App. p,
Thus it is clear that extensive services of a cath
physician are required to administer the prescribed medi-
cal treatment and such treatment is not a related service
as defined by the Act, nor is it a medical service as defined
at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4). Since the public school em-
9
ployee cannot administer the prescribed treatment with-
out a valid physician’s prescription and other services of a
licensed physician, the public school employee is not a
“qualified person” as contemplated in the definition of
“school health services” at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)10. The
Court of Appeals held that a valid prescription and physi-
cian supervision were necessary, but still determined
that the procedure was a related service. App. p. 72a. The
issue is not whether certain medical treatment such as
C.I.C. can be performed by persons other than physi-
cians. The issue is whether the Act requires that medical
treatment other than for diagnostic and evaluation pur-
poses be provided by the funding recipient. The statutory
definition certainly does not contemplate the provision of
medical treatment; and Petitioner submits that if the
implementing regulations require same, they run afoul of
this Court’s opinion in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442°U.S. 397, 60 L.Ed.2d 980, 99 S.Ct. 2361
(1971).
Petitioner understands that medical treatment such as
kidney dialysis is delegated to and performed by techni-
cians and nurses. A literal interpretation of the opinion of
the Court of Appeals would transform this obvious medi-
cal treatment into a related service because it can be
prescribed and delegated by a physician. Certainly, the
Act neither contemplates nor requires recipients of funds
to assume such obligations and responsibilities. The next
obvious question is whether the recipients (state and local
education agencies) are required to provide the personnel
and equipment necessary to implement the medical treat-
ment prescribed. Since special education and related
services must be provided at public expense and at no cost
to the parent, the answer must be in the affirmative.
10
It is undisputed that the child involved in this case is
physically able to attend school. The courts below found,
however, that to attend school without C.I.C., the child
would suffer a potential risk and danger to her general
health, as would a child in need of kidney dialysis.
Whether or not states and local schools are required by
the Act to provide the medical treatment necessary to
avoid the potential general health risk is of monumental
importance and should be definitively answered by this
Court. |
B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Applicable Deci-
sions Of This Court.
In Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3041, this Court set
forth the role of the courts in suits brought under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).
“A court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is
twofold. First, has the state complied with the proce-
dures set forth in the Act? Second, is the individualized
educational program developed through the Act’s proce-
dures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits. (Emphasis added.) Respondents
have never asserted that the State or Local District failed
to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act.
Moreover, they have never asserted that the State’s plan
violates the Act. They have only asserted that the child’s
IEP should include the medical treatment desired, which
medical treatment is not related to the educational effort,
but to general health considerations. Thus, the Court of
Appeals and the District Court have overlooked the edu-
cational nexus described by this Court in Rowley. The
Court of Appeals determined that the thorny issue of
what circumstances might call for judicial modification of
an IEP was unnecessary since the District did not present
evidence that the educational setting established by the
1]
IEP was not appropriate. App. p. 76a. However, al-
though the State Board of Education found that the IEP
met with the standards of the State Education Agency
and complied with applicable statutes and regulations, an
assertion was never made that the State plan violated
EAHCA requirements, the Courts below ordered the
State and Petitioner to modify the child’s IEP to include
C.1I.C.. Therefore, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals have judicially modified the child’s IEP to in-
clude an alleged “related service” which was stipulated to
be “medical treatment” and which is totally unrelated to
the effort to educate. In.Rowley, supra, 1025 S.Ct. at
3049, n.26, this Court quoted its opinion in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101
S.Ct. 1531 (1981), in construing the EAHCA as being also
enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power as follows:
“he already demonstrated, the Act and its history
im no requirements on the states like those
im by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. A fortiori, Congress has not done so
unambiguously, as required in the valid exercise of
its spending power.” :
Although § 1401(17) App. p. 110a specifically limits
medical services to those having to do with diagnosis and
evaluation, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
have judicially modified the child’s IEP to include “medi-
cal treatment” not unambiguously required by Congress.
Therefore, the decisions of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals are in conflict with this Court’s prior
opinion in both Rowley and Pennhurst; and this Writ
should be granted.
In Rowley, this Court determined that, if the require-
ments of its twofold inquiry under the EAHCA were met,
the state has complied with the obligations imposed by
Congress; and the courts can require no more. Rowley,
12
102 S.Ct. at 3051. In Pennhurst, 101 S.Ct. at 1545, this
Court referred to its decision in Southeastern Communi-
ty College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99S.Ct. 2361, stressing
that Congress understood that accommodation of the
needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative
action and knew how to provide for it in those instances
where it wished to do so. The Court of Appeals miscon-
strued this Court’s decisions in Rowley, Pennhurst, and
Davis by imposing an affirmative obligation to provide.
medical treatment pursuant to the EAHCA, which is a
funding statute. Certainly, the State of Texas, through
the State’s local school districts, has not voluntarily and
knowingly accepted the potentially massive financial
obligations of providing medical treatment by contracting
to receive federal assistance for education for the handi-
capped.
Although the Court of Appeals recognized the issues
presented by this Court’s decisions, the panel felt con-
strained to follow the decision in Tatro J. App. p. 79a.
The Court of Appeals also discussed this Court’s deci-
sions in Pennhurst and Davis when determining that the
District Court properly awarded attorneys’ fees under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
again relying on the decision in Tatro J App. p. 79a. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals determined that
this Court had not spoken with sufficient clarity in Pen-
nhurst to allow departure from the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Tatro J holding that refusal to provide
C.I.C. violated § 504. In view of Pennhurst, Rowley, and
Davis, C.1.C., which is stipulated to be medical treat-
ment, is not required by the EAHCA or the Rehabilita-
tion Act;’ and as this Court stated in Davis, if the regula-
tions implementing the Act can be read to have imposed
such an affirmative obligation, then such regulations con-
13
stitute an unauthorized extension of the obligation im-
posed by the statute. Davis, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. Since both
the EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act are funding stat-
utes, the above language applies. The courts below,
determining that medical treatment is a related service
and that failure to provide same violates both the
EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act and awarding attor-
neys’ fees under § 504, have misapplied this Court’s deci-
sions in Rowley, Pennhurst, and Davis. Therefore, im-
portant federal questions have been decided in conflict
with applicable decisions of this Court, and this Court
should grant review herein. |
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully re-
quest that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this
case.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES W. DEATHERAGE
O. GLENN WEAVER
DEATHERAGE & WEAVER, INC.
200-201 InterFirst Building
Irving, Texas 75061
(214) 254-3188
Attorneys for Petitioners,
Irving Independent School District
and its Board of Trustees
la
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G
HENRI and Mary TaTRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv. ;
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED
MAY 26 1981
JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK
By 2277997?
Deputy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Amber Tatro is a five year old female suffering from myelo-
menengocele, commonly known as spinal bifida.' As a result of
‘In accordance with the Court of Appeals’ Order of Remand in
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), this court has tried this
case. This opinion sets forth the court’s findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. The general nature of this suit has been described
both at 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D.Tex. 1979) and 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1980).
The parties stipulated in the Pre-Trial Order that the preparation,
materials and procedure for performing CIC on females is generally
as follows:
(1) Equipment and Materials:
(a) Clean catheter in size prescribed by treating physician;
2a
this birth defect, Amber suffers from orthopedic and speech
impediments and a neurogenic bladder. Because of her bladder
condition, Amber is unable to void voluntarily, and must be
catheterized several times each day. The method of choice is
' Clean Intermittent Catheterization (“CIC”).
(2)
(b) Catheter carrying containers;
(c) Catheter extension when patient is in a wheelchair;
(d) Clear plastic liquid detergent container with a hanger when
patient is in a wheelchair:
(e) Soap and water;
(f) Container for catching the urine;
(g) Table or desk on which to place the child;
(h) Large underpad to prevent soaking of liners or other table
covering;
(i) Water soluable lubricant.
Preparation and Procedure:
(a) Get all the equipment and materials ready.
(b) Wash hands with soap and water.
(c) Get the child ready and place her on her back on the table or
desk (CIC is easier to perform at table or desk height).
(d) Spread labia apart with one hand and wash genitalia with
soap and water with the other hand, always moving in a down-
ward direction (never working in an upward direction since
doing so will move germs from around the rectum up into the
area of the bladder opening). ;
(e) Hold the catheter one inch from the tip and insert it into the
urethra until the urine flows.
(f) Hold the catheter in place until the urine s draining,
then pash the entheter in smother inch or as to be mre ths
bladder is completely emptied.
(g) Remove the catheter slowly, ing any time urine flows
so as to empty the bladder com the catheter is
y.
ready to come out, hold the catheter tip up so that the urine will
drain down from the tip of the catheter and not on you.
(h) After noting and recording the amount of urine obtained,
its appearance for any abnormality, discard the urine.
(i) Clean the catheter with soap and water, allow it to dry and
lage ie 8 Sea, Op cane Ay ene aon after the
catheter has been with soap and water, place it in a pot of
3a
In early 1979 Mary Tatro, Amber’s mother, asked the Irving
Independent School District (“school district”) to provide Am-
ber with special education. After testing Amber, the school
district developed an Individual Education Program (“IEP”)
which it believed would provide Amber with the necessary
educational and therapeutic services. Amber then was recom-
mended for placement in the school district’s Early Childhood
Development Classes beginning September, 1979. The school
district, however, maintained that it had no obligation to pro-
vide CIC.
In June of 1979, Amber’s parents nero to an Impartial
Due Process Hearing Officer the school district’s decision not
- to provide CIC. They did not otherwise question the appropri-
ateness of the IEP. The Hearing Officer found the school
district to be obligated to furnish CIC, and recommended that
Amber’s IEP be modified accordingly. This decision was
appealed to and affirmed by the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion. The school district then appealed to the State Board of
Education, which reversed the Commissioner.
On October 12, 1979, the Tatros brought this action seeking
an injunction ordering defendants* to provide Amber with CIC
and to recover compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.
water and boil for 20 minutes. Allow it to air dry and place it ina
clean dry envelope.
(j) Catheterize at prescribed intervals so that there is never
more than 5 ounces (150cc) of urine in the bladder at any one time
for a female child of one to five years of age.
(k) Keep a daily record of the time of catheterization, the
amount of urine obtained, and if the child is wet, damp or dry.
(1) Do not crede the bladder as it may push urine back into the
kidneys.
? As of the Amended Complaint of November 8, 1979, the defend-
ants are the State of Texas, The Texas Education Agency, Alton
Bowen (the Commissioner of Education), the State Board of Educa-
tion, the individual members of the Board of Education, the school
district, the Board of Trustees for the school district, the individual
members of the Board of Trustees, and J. F. Townley, individually,
da
In its Memorandum Opinion filed December 21, 1979, 481
F.Supp. 1224, this court, relying upon a written stipulation of
facts believed to have been agreed to by the Tatros and the
District, held that neither the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act (“EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seg., nor the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., requires the
school district to provide Amber with CIC. After the Decem-
ber 21, 1979 Order, the school district advised the Court of
Appeals, but not this court, that it had not actually signed the
filed written stipulation. On September 2, 1980, the Court of
Appeals vacated that ruling, and held that the school district
was obligated under both the EAHCA and § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act to furnish CIC. 625 F.2d 557. In remanding for
further proceedings, the Court of Appeals recognized that
there was no factual record upon which to base an opinion, but
nonetheless proceeded to address the merits of the case. The
court then directed this court to make appropriate findings to
determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to relief under either
statute as construed by it. 625 F.2d at 558 n.1.
Applying the Act as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, on
January 16, 1981, this court issued an Interim Order directing
the school district to provide Amber with such CIC as neces-
sary to her IEP. Amber was enrolled with the school district on
January 19th, and until January 23rd, the school district pro-
vided CIC. During that week a dispute between the school
district and Mary Tatro developed concerning the adequacy of
a parental consent form with attached physician’s prescription
submitted by Mary Tatro to the school district. Believing the
consent inadequate and that it was not required under the
Interim Order to furnish CIC without a valid consent form, the
school district discontinued CIC on January 26th. Amber,
however, continued to attend her classes, with CIC provided
as superintendent of the school district. Although it is unclear from
the pleading, plaintiffs indicated at the hearing that the named in-
dividuals are sued in their individual capacity. Townley was dis-
missed from this action by Order of December 21, 1979.
=
~”
5a
by her babysitter as necessary. On March 13, 1981, the Tatros
questioned the school district decision by filing a motion for
sanctions. At the hearing on the motion, a consent form and
physician’s prescription acceptable to both the Tatros and the
school district was agreed upon. With this collateral dispute
resolved, the school district resumed CIC on April 1, 1981
(after spring vacation). A final hearing was held on April 23,
1981, to allow the Tatros to offer additional evidence as to
damages and to supplement their request for attorneys’ fees.
At this hearing, the court denied the motion for sanctions
because it found that the school district had acted properly,
and within the spirit of the Interim Order.
At the outset, it is important to place the school district’s
refusal in perspective. At no time has the school district re-
fused to place Amber in its Early Childhood Development
Classes. Instead, the school district urged Amber’s parents to
enroll her in the program and make private arrangements for
CIC pending the final disposition of the legal dispute.’ Despite
the benefits of placing Amber in the program, her parents
chose to forego such an arrangement, and instead kept Amber
at the Helping Hand Development Center‘ for an additional
* Although Amber’s parents apparently expressed an initial pre-
ference for a full day rather than the half day program in which
Amber would have been enrolled, the only aspect of the IEP raised at
the administrative proceedings or before this court was the school
district’s unwillingness to furnish CIC.
‘The Center provides theraputic services for the mentally and
physically handicapped. It does not offer educational services. From
September through December, 1980, Amber was enrolled at the
Special World Day Care Center, where she received kindergarten
classes. While there, she was transported to the Helping Hand
Development Center several times each week for physical therapy.
6a
year. Amber’s parents did not attempt to enroll Amber with
the school district for the 1980/81 school year.°
The State Defendants
Inits Memorandum Opinion of December 31, 1980, this court
dismissed any claims for retrospective relief against the State
defendants (the State of Texas, the Texas Education Agency
and the State Board of Education) on the basis of their 11th
Amendment immunity.’ See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
. (1979). Because the State Board of Education has supervisory
responsibility for assuring that Amber is educated in accord-
ance with the EAHCA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6); S-1 v. Turling-
ton, 635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle
County School Dist., Nos. 80-1875, 80-1876, 80-2063, 80-2064
(8rd Cir., April 1, 1981), the members of the State Board of
Education will be retained in their official capacities for the
purpose of injunctive relief. Plaintiffs joined the State Com-
missioner of Education in his capacity as “director” of the
Texas Education Agency. Because the members of the Board
of Education are the proper parties for injunctive relief, the
Commissioner is DISMISSED in his official capacity. The
State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency are DIS-
MISSED. See Alabama v. Pugh, 488 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).
5 By letter of September 9, 1980, and again, by letter of October 21,
1980, the school district requested permission to reevaluate Amber
80 as to update her IEP. Mary Tatro, in a letter dated November 20,
1980, informed the school district that she believed a new assessment
to be inappropriate, but agreed to allow Scottish Rite Hospital to
provide the school district with some information.
*Such an immunity also applies to Commissioner Bowen and the
members of the State Board of Education to the extent they are sued
in their official capacity.
Ta
Commissioner Bowen And The Members Of The State Board
Of Education
There is no prospective relief to which plaintiffs are entitled
against Commissioner Bowen or the members of the State
Board of Education in their individual capacities.
State officials sued in their individual capacities do not, of
course, share their State’s 11th Amendment immunity. They,
however, are entitled to a qualified good-faith immunity, pro-
vided such defense is properly pled. See Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975);’ Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S.Ct. 1970 (1980).
The record is bereft of any evidence that Commissioner
Bowen or any member of-the State Board of Education acted
with anything but good-faith. There is no evidence that they
intentionally attempted to violate plaintiffs’ rights or acted
with malice toward plaintiffs. In that the Board’s decision that
CIC is not a “related service” was affirmed by a federal district
court, it cannot be found that its members knew or reasonably
should have known that such is not the case.
Having pled the good-faith defense, there being no evidence
that they acted in any other manner, and the uncertainty of the
law providing affirmative evidence of good-faith, Commission-
er Bowen and the individual members of the State Board of
Education are DISMISSED.
™In Wood the Court recognized a qualified good-faith immunity
from liability for damages under § 1983. The Court found that there
was no basis for believing that Congress intended to eliminate the
traditional common law good-faith immunity available to school offi-
cials. 420 U.S. at 318-22. Even assuming that damages are available
under the EAHCA or § 504, there is no basis for believing that
Congress intended to abrogate that good-faith immunity through
either statute.
* Commissioner Bowen affirmed the Hearing Officer’s finding that
CIC is a “related service.” Plaintiffs have never clarified why this
decision should subject the Commissioner to personal liability for
compensatory damages.
8a
The Members Of The Board Of Trustees
Plaintiffs also have joined the individual members of the
Board of Trustees of the school district. In that there is no
equitable relief to which plaintiffs are entitled against the
individual Trustees, plaintiffs’ sole basis for the Trustees’ pre-
sence in their individual capacities is that they may be liable for
compensatory damages.
Plaintiffs have advanced one argument for why the Trustees
_ are not entitled to the Woods v. Strickland qualified good-faith
immunity. Plairitiffs contend that as a result of a Department
of Health, Education and Welfare letter of September 27,
1979, the Trustees knew or should have known that they were
violating plaintiffs’ rights. That letter informed the super-
intendent of the school district that the Office for Civil Rights
had concluded from its investigation that the school district
was violating § 504 by not providing CIC. It should be noted,
however, that the letter was sent almost three weeks after the
school district’s decision had been affirmed by the State Board
of Education.’
There is no evidence that the Trustees acted with malice or
intentionally attempted to deprive plaintiffs of their rights.
The President of the Board of Trustees testified that it was the
belief of the Board that the school district was not legally
obligated to provide CIC. He further testified that the Board
was concerned that CIC is a medical practice, and, therefore,
cannot be performed lawfully by employees of the school dis-
trict. See pages 11-13, infra.
If for no other reason, because the Board of Trustee’s con-
struction of applicable federal law was upheld by the State
Board of Education, and, later, by this court, the members of
the Board of Trustees are not deprived of their qualified good-
® HEW’s conclusion that the school district was violating § 504 was
based, in part, on the finding that CIC is a “related service,” as
defined by 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13. The Board of Education previously
had ruled that CIC is not a “related service.”
9a
faith immunity by the HEW letter. Although the Board’s belief
as to its duty to furnish CIC has to date proved to be an
incorrect assessment of the law, it was not an unreasonable
conclusion. See Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 321-22."° The
members of the Board of Trustees are DISMISSED in their
individual capacities.
The EAHCA
In its 1979 Memorandum Opinion, this court held that CIC is
not a “related service” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(17) and that the EAHCA, therefore, does not require
the school district to furnish CIC. Defendants argued that CIC
is a medical service, and thus not covered by the Act. Under
this court’s view it was unnecessary to reach this definitional
issue. This court found that Congress had not intended “re-
lated services” to sweep so broadly as to include services which
do not “arise from the effort to educate.” The Court of Appeals
disagreed with that construction. The school district now re-
turns to its earlier argument that CIC is an exempt medical
service. This court will first describe CIC and then turn to its
proper classification under the EAHCA.
Despite its present widespread use, CIC has becomie an
accepted procedure only in recent years. Before CIC became
an accepted practice, a substantial number of physicians. be-
lieved that penetration of the urethra ought to be done only ina
sterile environment with sterile instruments. The only alter-
native entailed exerting manual pressure upon the bladder.
This pressure technique, however, presented a risk of reflux of
fluid and injury to the kidneys. CIC is a far more simple
© The Court in Wood was concerned that ignorance not be used as a
basis for immunizing violations of “clearly established constitutional
rights.” The obligation of a school district to furnish CIC hardly can
be considered a settled question of law. As noted in Wood, school
board members cannot be “charged with predicting the future course
of (the) law.” 420 U.S. at 322.
4 Pie,
ue go)
10a
procedure. The catheter need not be sterile nor must its use be
confined to a sterile environment. Obviously, CIC requires
relatively less direct medical superintendence than this earlier
used method.
There is dispute about when Amber must be catheterized
each day. The parties stipulated that Amber must be cathete-
rized approximately four times a day, but the stipulation does
not further address when it is needed despite the fact that her
need for catheterization on any given day largely is a function
of her fluid intake. Because Amber has no sensation of bladder
fullness, she is dependent upon a routinized schedule of
catheterization to insure proper voiding." The evidence in-
dicates that CIC performed approximately every three to four
hours is sufficient to prevent injury to Amber’s health. The
appropriate schedule may vary, however, as Amber continues
to mature.
In sum, CIC has become a relatively simple procedure that
can be taught in less than an hour. Amber has been cathete-
rized by her parents, her babysitter, her teachers and teach-
ers’ aides at the Helping Hand Development Center, and her
teenage brother. In a few years, Amber should be able to
catheterize herself.
EAHCA
The EAHCA does not define medical services, except to
provide that only medical services for diagnostic and evalua-
tion purposes are related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). The
implementing regulations shed a little more light. They define
medical services as “services provided by a licensed physician
to determine a child’s medically related handicapping condition
which results in the child’s need for special education and
related services.” 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(4). The regulations
further provide that “school health services” are related serv-
'' Improper voiding may result in influx, a condition in which urine
backs up in the kidneys.
™~
lla
ices, and, by implication, not exempt medical services. Jd.
§ 121a.13(a). “School health services” are defined as “services
provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person.”
Id. § 121a.13(b)(10). The statute and its implementing regula-
tions suggest that medical services are services that can be
provided lawfully only by a licensed physician. But they give
no direct guidance as to precisely what “provided by a licensed
physician” means.
The school district argues that all services that must be
performed under the control and supervision of a licensed
physician are “provided by a licensed physician.” Plaintiffs’
response seems to be that the appropriate test is not one of
control and supervision, but whether CIC must be performed
only in the presence of a physician.
Texas Law
This court is here construing an act of Congress of nation-
wide application. And it ought to be given a uniform construc-
tion. Yet Congress, by defining the Act’s reach by definitions
locatable only in the law of the respective States, perforce
intended, at least to this extent, that its construction be paroc-
hial. A contrary view would require a finding that Congress
intended to alter oe relations in the several States.
Stating the proposition answers it. The types of medical treat-
ment that can be performed by nonphysicians, and the extent
to which any treatment must be under the control and supervi-
sion of a licensed physician, are regulated by State law. And
the courts must look to State law to determine whether a
service is a medical service. To the extent of the accommoda-
tion of varying practices, the Act tolerates non-uniform appli-
cation. A given service, therefore, may be a related service in
one State and an exempt medical service in another.” This
court turns now to the law of Texas.
That State law must determine who can provide a service is
recognized by the commentary following § 121a.13, which states:
There are certain services be provided
2 en ee caudate
12a
The school district contends that under the Texas Medical
Practice Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4495, et seq.
(Vernon 1976), its employees can provide CIC only if they are
under the control and supervision of a licensed physician. To
furnish CIC without such direction, it argues, would be to
engage in the unlawful practice of medicine. Jd., art. 4510,
4510a & 4510b. Yet, to require it to retain a physician to control
and supervise the provision of CIC would convert CIC into a
medical service it is not required to furnish.
This court has been forced to inquire into the legal responsi-
bility of Texas physicians to control and supervise prescribed
treatment, a subject that has received little judicial attention.
The task includes fitting together a three party relationship:
the school district, the child and the child’s doctor. The interest
and concern of the medical profession is plain. At a practical
level it makes little sense to require school districts to providea
service that cannot be provided without a prescription if physi-
cians will not write them for fear of running afoul of their own
Practice Act and the demands of their malpractice insurance
carriers. For these reasons, this court invited the Texas Medi-
cal Association and the Dallas County Medical Society to par-
ticipate as amicus curiae. The medical societies submitted a
joint brief stating their view of the Texas Medical Practice
Act.™
The parties agree that the school district cannot provide CIC
without a valid medical prescription. To do so would constitute
the practice of medicine in violation of Article 4510b. A physi-
cian, however, may prescribe treatment to be performed by
‘24 For the aid of treating physicians, their brief is attached as an
appendix to this Opinion.
13a
another individual or an institution if he believes that individ-
ual or institution capable of providing the prescribed service in
a competent manner. Such treatment by the delegate does not
constitute the unlawful practice of medicine. See Thompson v.
Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d 123,
129-30 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Nor is
the physician obligated to supervise directly the treatment he
has prescribed; his duty is to ascertain that the person or
institution providing the treatment in conformity with his
prescription is adequately qualified.
This construction is consistent with the Texas Nursing Prac-
tice Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4513 et seq. (Vernon
1976). Article 4518(5) of that Act defines professional nursing
“as the performance for compensation of any nursing act. . . in
the administration of medications or treatments as prescribed
by a licensed physician.” Jd. (Vernon Supp. 1980-81). Provid-
ing such treatment is a nursing act, and, therefore, not unlaw-
ful practice of medicine whether or not the nurse is under the
direct supervision and control of the prescribing physician. See
Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978) (“Professional
nurses may also administer medications and treatments on a
physician’s prescription . . . without any statutory require-
ment of direct supervision by the physician.”)
A physician thus may prescribe CIC to be furnished by a
school district if he believes that the district has personnel
qualified to perform CIC." The school district retains profes-
sional nurses. CIC has been prescribed for Amber by a licensed
physician, and a proper prescription for such treatment now
has been submitted to the school district. Moreover, the par-
ties concede that with only minimal additional training a pro-
fessional nurse should be more than capable of performing
CIC. In sum, the court is persuaded that furnishing CIC does
'8 It follows that a school district must secure the services of per-
sons sufficiently trained to allow a treating physician to prescribe
with a view toward prescription implementation by the school.
l4a
not constitute the unlawful practice of medicine when per-
formed by professional nurses in accordance with a valid medi-
eal prescription. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4510b
(Vernon 1976)."* Because services that can be provided by
qualified school nurses are “school health services,” and, there-
fore, “related services,” see page 10, supra, CIC is net an
exempt “medical service” within the meaning of the EAHCA."*
The school district contends that even if CIC is not a medical
service, it is not a related service in her case because it is not
“ This court does not hold that CIC can only be performed lawfully
by professional nurses. Lay persons, with proper medical training,
may, in accordance with a valid prescription, provide treatment that
without such training and prescription would be considered unlawful
practice of medicine. Plaintiffs have presented testimony that Scot-
tish Rite Hospital will provide to school district employees free
instruction in CIC. Provided the physician has ascertained that such
training is sufficient to qualify a person to perform CIC, he can
prescribe CIC to be furnished by a school district through its profes-
sional nurses or those non-nursing employees who have received
such training.
6 It is unclear whether a physician is liable for independent acts of
negligence of school district employees performing services in con-
formity with his prescription. In Sparger v. Worley Hospital, Inc.,
547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977), the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
“captain of the ship” doctrine in favor of the “borrowed servant”
doctrine. Arguably, under Sparger, the prescribing physician would
not be liable for independent acts of negligence by school district
employees as long as he exercised ordinary care in prescribing that
the treatment be performed by school district personnel. But, to the
extent that a physician controls, supervises, or instructs unlicensed
persons providing nursing care, he may be liable for their acts. See
Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. MW-318, at 1016-17 (April 1, 1981). Al-
though the Attorney General takes a somewhat narrower view, see
id., on the facts of Sparger, it does not appear that a prescribing
physician exercising ordinary care would be liable for the school
district’s negligence simply because he prescribed the treatment.
But the question has not been dispositively resolved by the Texas
courts.
15a
“required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). Specifically, they argue that
Amber can attend the school district’s Early Childhood Devel-
opment Classes without CIC during her hours of attendance.
The majority of five-year olds in the school district attend a
half-day program, and only ??? attend more than haif-day.
Upon recommendations of the district’s Coordinator for Early
Childhood Training, Amber has been placed in the half-day
program which lasts two hours and forty-five minutes. While
there was no evidence as to the exact time needed to bus
Amber to school, its range is approximately fifteen to thirty
minutes each way. Assuming the maximum thirty minutes,
Amber will be under the school district’s supervision for almost
four hours each school day.
This court finds that Amber will require catheterization
during her school hours if she is to attend the school district’s
half-day program. The medical evidence presented at trial
establishes that while it cannot be determined definitively
whether a daily interval of four hours between catheterizations
will injure Amber, it does present a risk of serious injury.
Amber is not required to accept such a risk in order to attend
school. Under the EAHCA, Amber is entitled to have her IEP
modified to have the school district furnish CIC. Without such
a modification, Amber’s IEP fails to provide a “related service”
that is “required to assist [Amber] to benefit from special
education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17).
For the stated reasons, the school district is ordered to
modify Amber’s IEP to provide for CIC as prescribed by her
personal physician."* In this regard, this court finds that plain-
6 Although this court uses the term “personal physician” in its
Order, any physician treating Amber regularly may prescribe CIC.
It also is not necessary that the prescribed treatment be identical to
the procedures set out in the pre-trial order, see note 1 supra, so long
as they are prescribed by a licensed physician. Throughout this
dispute, one of the school district’s stated concerns has been that it
16a
tiffs will suffer irreparable harm if such prospective relief is
withheld, that the cost to defendants from such an order is
minimal, and that the public interest is served by ensuring that
Amber receives a free appropriate public education."
§ 504
Because plaintiff's recovery of counsel fees may ultimately
turn on whether a violation of § 504 has been proved, that
statute is discussed in that context. See pages 30-31, infra.
Damages .
The Tatros seek damages for expenses incurred in sending
Amber to the Helping Hand Development Center and the
Special World Day Care Center, and an additional award of
$50,000 for the violation of Amber’s rights.
The federal district courts have split on whether the
EAHCA provides a private right of action for damages. Com-
pare Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.Supp. 1075, 1094 (D. Neb.
1980), aff'd in part vacated in part (8th Cir., April 1, 1981) and
Bochall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F.Supp.
1104, 1112 (N.D.Cal. 1979) with Miener v. Missouri, 498
F.Supp. 944, 949 (E.D.Mo. 1980) and Anderson v. Thompson,
495 F.Supp. 1256, 1269 (E.D.Wis. 1980) and Loughran v. .
Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 113-15 (D.Conn. 1979). The Act
provides that the reviewing court may grant such relief as it
not be required to exercise medical discretion in furnishing CIC. The
latest consent form submitted by Amber’s parents includes, at this
court’s request, her physician’s statement on how Amber is to be
catheterized and the precise times during the day she should be
catheterized. The school district thus is relieved from having to
exercise medical discretion.
" As for the school district’s earlier suggestion that there has been
no showing that the school district receives federal funds, the super-
intendent of the school district conceded that the school district
receives federal funds allocated for special education.
17a
determines to be appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Reim-
bursement for substitute educational services is consistent
with the congressional purpose that handicapped children be
furnished free appropriate education. See Monahan v. Nebras-
ka, supra, at 1094. But the cost of recognizing a general right of
recovery is that educational institutions may be inhibited from
implementing new curricula and techniques for fear of ex-
posure to liability. See Loughran v. Flanders, supra, at 115.
Such a development could frustrate Congress’ intent to expand
and improve the education and related services available to
handicapped children. Jd. at 114. These concerns seem rele-
vant to whether the relief would be appropriate. We do not
here reach this question because the actual proved damages
are of a different sort.
While plaintiffs occasionally have suggested that they are
entitled to a wide range of compensatory damages, the only
damages they were able to prove was the cost of sending
Amber to the Helping Hand Development Center and the
Special World Day Care Center. See page 4, supra. The issue
here thus is not whether the EAHCA exposes school districts
to open-ended tort liability, but whether school districts must
reimburse parents of handicapped children for the cost of
providing services the district was obligated to furnish but did
not. In this regard, it is important to note that damages for
such substitute services are only available where the child is
applying for initial admission. Once the child is enrolled in a
public school, the EAHCA requires the child to remain in its
current educational placement pending EAHCA proceedings.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3); see Stemple v. Board of Education, 623
F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3606 (1981). Thus, if the parents remove the child from school
while proceedings are pending, they will not be reimbursed for
the cost of providing appropriate private education. See id.
Where, however, as here, the parents cannot enroll the child
without a risk of injury to the child because a school will not
provide a required related service, appropriate relief ought to
include the cost of alternative sources of education and ther-
18a
apy. Such discretion on the part of the parents is implicit in the
requirement of § 1415(e)(3) that the school district enroll the
applicant in its school program with the consent of the child’s
parents or guardians. The school district, by reimbursing the
parents, indirectly bears the cost it would have borne directly
had it furnished the services it was obligated to provide. That
is, the money “damages” reflect no more than a judicially
compelled provision of the statutorily ordered free appropriate
education. This relief seems to fall within the congressionally
mandated duty to “grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). This court here ex-
presses no opinion on whether a similar analysis is appropriate
where parents can enroll. their child in the school district’s
program without risk to the child’s health."*
This court thus concludes that for the limited type of dam-
ages plaintiffs have proved, they are entitled to recover under
the EAHCA. Their right to recover, of course, is qualified by
their duty to mitigate.
Plaintiffs claim that they suffered damages of $444 per
month while Amber was enrolled at the Development Center
(September, 1979 through August, 1980),"* and $45 per week
plus $100 per month during the sixteen weeks Amber was at
® Where the parents can enroll the child in the public school, and
make private arrangements to remove the source of danger, under
§ 1415(e)(3) the school district may not be obligated to reimburse any
more than the marginal cost of making its program acceptable. This,
of course, simply restates plaintiffs’ general duty to mitigate, dis-
cussed infra.
® Plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket expenses were $191 per month. Under
the collateral source rule, plaintiffs are entitled to the reasonable
value of the services rendered by the Helping Hand Development
Center even though most of the Center’s expenses were paid by
private charities. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 921, comment
c(3); see generally “Collateral Source Rule: Receipt of Public Relief
or Gratuity As Affecting Recovery In Personal Injury Action,” 77
A.L.R.3d 366 (1977).
19a
the Day Care Center (September 1 through December 22,
1980). Plaintiffs’ total claim up until this court’s Interim Order
thus is $6,419 plus attorneys’ fees (see pages 31-35, infra).
The school district argues that even if plaintiffs are entitled
to damages, they breached their duty to mitigate by not plac-
ing Amber in the chool district’s Early Childhood Development
Classes and privately arranging for CIC. The district also
notes that plaintiffs’ expenses were for full-day supervision,
some of which would have been incurred even if Amber had
attended the school district’s half-day program.
Plaintiffs’ burden includes proof that the asserted damages
were proximately caused by the alleged injury. See Prosser on
Torts 236-44 (4th ed. 1971). In this, plaintiffs’ proof is less than
adequate.
Plaintiffs imply that none of the costs of placing Amber inthe
Helping Hand Development Center and the Special World Day
Care Center would have been incurred had Amber been
attending school. The evidence does not support their conten-
tion. As previously noted, Amber was scheduled to attend the
school district’s half-day program. Because both of Amber’s
parents are employed full time, it would have been necessary
’ to arrange for supervision during the remainder of the day.
Amber’s parents thus would have had to arrange, at their own
expense, for a day care center or a private babysitter for the
period that Amber was not in school.” Indeed, a school district
employee testified that many of the district’s half-day pupils
are bussed directly from school to their day care center or
babysitter.
The school district notes that at least some of plaintiffs’
expenses for outside supervision would have been incurred
whether or not Amber had been placed with the school district.
® Although the programs of the Development Center and Day
Care Center are almost full-day, Amber apparently had a private
babysitter for part of the late afternoon.
20a
Plaintiffs offered no evidence from which this court can deter-
mine which of their expenses were incurred because of the
school district’s failure to provide CIC, and which would have
been incurred under any circumstances.” It is plaintiffs’ bur-
den to show that their expenses are sufficiently related to the
alleged injury that compensation is warranted. Here, on the
basis of the record, any such determination is purely specula-
tive, and cannot be made. Although plaintiffs presumably
could have submitted evidence from which this court cduld
calculate the damages proximately caused by the school dis-
trict, they have not done so.
There is one exception to this analysis. Amber received
physical therapy at the Helping Hand Development Center
from September, 1979, through May, 1980, and September
through December 22, 1980,” that would have been provided
by the school district had Amber been able to attend the school
district’s half-day program. A reasonable value of $100 per
month was placed on that service. Plaintiffs, therefore, are
entitled to damages, not including attorneys’ fees, of $1,271.
There is substantial merit to defendants’ contention that
plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages. A school district employ-
ee testified that she had recommended to Amber’s parents that —
Amber be enrolled with the school district and that CIC
privately be arranged pending the dispute’s resolution. If the
district lost, it would reimburse plaintiffs’ expenses. Plaintiffs
*! Mary Tatro testified that she paid Amber’s babysitter $15 to $25
per week. But the hours that Amber was placed with her babysitter
appear to be far less than what would have been necessary had
Amber been attending the school district’s half-day program. More-
over, there was no evidence that such services would have been
available, or that Amber would have been placed with a babysitter
rather than in a day care center for that period.
2% Amber also received such therapy from Jane through August,
1980. Amber’s IEP did not, however, indicate that she would be
receiving any therapy during the summer months, and there is no
evidence that such would have been provided by the school district.
2la
never satisfactorily explained why they chose to forego this
option. Their failure to make such an arrangement is particu-
larly disturbing in that plaintiffs arranged for Amber to be
catheterized at school by her babysitter for over two months
after this court had entered its Interim Order. See pages 4-5,
supra. Plaintiffs introduced much evidence to show how simple
a procedure CIC really is, and how quickly and safely it can be
performed by a lay person with only an hour’s training. Amber
would have needed to be catheterized only once during her
school day at some pre-arranged time. This court agrees with
defendants that it would have been a reasonable and relatively
simple solution for plaintiffs privately to have arranged for
such a service.”
The burden of showing failure to minimize damages rests
with the wrongdoer. See Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co.
v. M/V Delta, 598 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1979). The defendant
must show that the failure was unreasonable and had the
consequence of aggravating the harm. Jd. Defendants have
demonstrated the first element, but not the latter. The only
evidence on what the cost of privately arranged CIC might
have been is the value placed by Amber’s babysitter on her own
services. Amber’s babysitter testified that although she did .-
not charge plaintiffs for her trips to the school to catheterize
Amber and did not expect any remuneration, she valued her
services at ten dollars per trip. No foundation, however, was
laid by plaintiffs to show that Amber’s babysitter had sufficient
personal knowledge to testify as to the reasonable value of
catheterization services. But even accepting ten dollars per
trip as the reasonable value of privately arranged catheteriza-
tion, it is obvious that over the relevant period (September,
1979 through December, 1980), plaintiffs would have expended
more than $1,271 in such services. Thus, plaintiffs’ conduct
® The victim of plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate is Amber. A school
district employee and Amber’s physician testified that Amber would
have benefited from attending the school district’s Early Childhood
Development Classes.
22a
may have been unreasonable but it did not aggravate the harm
(that is, at least not when measured in dollars and cents, see
note 23, supra).™
Plaintiffs also request damages (the cost of providing CIC)”
and attorneys’ fees incurred after this court entered its In-
terim Order. As earlier discussed, after providing CIC for
approximately a week, the school district discontinued
catheterization because of plaintiffs’ failure to submit a paren-
tal consent form and physician’s prescription meeting the
school district’s requirements. The school district contends
that plaintiffs were uncooperative and unreasonable,” while
’ plaintiffs maintain that the school district was not entitled to
the type of consent form and physician’s prescription it had
requested. From the evidence adduced at the March 13th and
April 23rd hearings, this court finds that the school district’s
requested parental consent form and physician’s prescription
were reasonable. Although the final agreed to consent form
and prescription are not identical to those originally requested
by the school district, they meet many of the school district’s
requirements. In particular, this court believes that the school
district’s insistence that the prescription be written in a man-
ner not requiring medical discretion on its part was a legiti-
mate request and one plaintiffs should have complied with.
* Alternatively, if the testimony of Amber’s babysitter is con-
sidered nonprobative, defendants failed to meet their burden by not
offering any evidence on the cost of catheterization services.
*% Presumably, plaintiffs contend that under the collateral source
rule they are entitled to the value of the services rendered by Am-
ber’s babysitter, even though they suffered no out-of-pocket ex-
penses. See note 19, supra.
* The school district offered evidence showing that at the time it
and plaintiffs were discussing the consent form and prescription,
Mary Tatro was threatening officials of the district with additional
lawsuits as well as requesting the Texas Medical Association to
investigate the school district’s medical consultant.
23a
This court also notes that the school district never disavowed
its duty to provide CIC under this court’s Interim Order, and
went to some length to accommodate plaintiffs. Because the
school district violated no duty, plaintiffs are not for this
reason entitled to damages and attorneys’ fees incurred after
this court’s Interim Order. We turn to the more difficult ques-
tion of whether attorney fees are recoverable at all.”
Attorneys’ Fees
The EAHCA does not provide for an award of attorneys’
fees, see Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F.Supp. 1256, 1268-70
(E.D. Wis. 1980); see also Hines v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ.,
497 F.Supp. 403, 409 (E.D.N.C. 1980), and they are not re-
coverable unless they may be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1988; see Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980);
Maher v. Gagne, 100 S.Ct. 2570 (1980), or 29 U.S.C. §§ 794,
794a(b).
Since passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in 1976, courts may intheir
discretion allow a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs in actions or proceedings to enforce certain
statutory provisions. One of the listed provisions is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the Tatros throughout this suit have argued that
they were seeking relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and § 1983 as well as the EAHCA. ;
The Tatros can recover counsel fees only under three possi-
ble theories. First, it can be contended that an award of counsel
fees is “appropriate relief’ under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
Second, it can be argued that this is an action to enforce rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that § 1988, therefore, authorizes
an award of fees. Third, the Tatros may be entitled to attor-
neys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. § 749a(b) (§ 505) from a State denial
of rights under § 504.
*" No evidence was offered to sustain the prayed for $50,000. Plain-
tiffs have not shown any bad faith or malicious conduct on the part of
any defendant.
24a
Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980) seemed to provide
strong support for the attorney fee application under the
second theory. In Thiboutot the Court held that the “and laws”
language of § 1983 allowed a suit for a denial by Maine of
benefits to which plaintiffs claimed entitlement under the
federal Social Security Act. The Court also held that the “any
action” language of § 1988 authorized an award of counsel fees
for the suit. Three justices dissented, expressing concern over
the apparent open-ended reasoning of the majority. The dis-
sent, authored by Justice Powell, pointed out that the major- ~
ity’s construction creates rights of action under § 1983 for
which there is no grant of federal jurisdiction. It reasoned that,
contrary to the effect of the majority’s holding, § 1983 has
always been read to be coextensive with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
which supplies jurisdiction for claims involving rights secured
by the Constitution or by any act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens. In listing by illustration the possible
rights of action created by the majority, the dissenting justices
observed that the “only exception will be in cases where the
governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations
of its terms. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-151,
n.5 (1970); ef., Great American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366 (1979).” Jd. at 2513, n.11 (parallel citations
omitted).
Assuming for now the EAHCA to be an act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens within the meaning of
§ 1343(3), this court has jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim. Cf.,
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979). It appeared that Thiboutot answered the question be-
fore this court, despite the caveat implicit in the expressed
unease of three justices. Recently, however, the three were
joined by Stewart and Stevens in Pennhurst State School,and
Hospital v. Halderman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (April 20, 1981) in
casting doubt on such a sweeping construction of Thiboutot. In
Pennhurst, the Court suggested two qualifications to a possi-
ble § 1983 application. First, the right claimed to be denied by
the State must be a “right secured” by the laws of the United
25a
States. Second, Justice Powell’s footnote in the Thiboutot dis-
sent regarding exclusivity of remedy, 100 S.Ct. 2513 n.11,
gained majority support. Even Justice White’s dissent in
Pennhurst acknowledged that “Congress may explicitly direct
otherwise such as if the ‘governing statute provides an ex-
clusive remedy for violation of its terms.’” Jd. at 4376. This
court will address these two inquiries first in determining the
applicability of § 1983 to the EAHCA, and then will turn to
§ 504.
The right to a free appropriate education is plainly secured
by the Act. The more difficult question is whether Congress
intended the remedies it created to ensure such an education to
be exclusive; that is, whether the EAHCA falls under the
“Powell exception.” Undoubtedly, Congress can, by express
language, provide either that a created remedial scheme is or is
not the only enforcement mechanism for a congressional enact-
ment.
In addressing the applicability of § 1983 tothe EAHCA, this
court will first assume that compliance with the Act’s remedial
scheme is not held to be a prerequisite to federal suit. See Patsy
v. Florida Intern University, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), and will then make the contrary assumption. This court
proceeds in both directions because there is substantial dis-
agreement among the Circuits as to the exhaustion require-
ment, and the Supreme Court has not yet decided the question. —
This court usually would stop with an en banc decision of the
Fifth Circuit because it binds this court. Here, however, there
is a Janus faced quality to the reliance in this case upon § 1983
to enforce rights secured by the EAHCA. Plaintiffs face a
virtual conceptual “catch-22.” A contention that the EAHCA
may be enforced by § 1983 without exhausting the EAHCA
remedies breathes life into the argument that its remedial
scheme is exclusive. But, a concession that such exhaustion is a
prerequisite breathes life into the argument that no action
under § 1983 has been prosecuted; that its citation alone is
insufficient to trigger § 1988.
26a
Exclusivity Without Exhaustion
The difficult task is the inferring of intended exclusivity of
remedy from the detail of the particular remedial scheme.
Here, applying the standards set forth in the Court’s recent
opinions, such an inference is both plain and compelling.
In Pennhurst, the majority did not reach the question of
§ 1983 applicability, having concluded that § 6010 of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
conferred no substantive rights. Justice White, joined by
Brennan and Marshall, reached a contrary conclusion and then
‘faced the exclusivity issue. At the outset, the dissenting jus-
‘ tices pointed to Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,
supra, for the proposition that “§ 1983 protections apply to all
rights secured by federal statutes ‘unless there is a clear in-
dication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are
exclusive or that for various other reasons a § 1983 action is
inconsistent with congressional intention.’” 49 U.S.L.W. at
4376 (emphasis added). The dissent reasoned that the creation
of a federal agency to oversee a cooperative state-federal ven-
ture was not alone sufficient to infer that Congress intended
the oversight to be exclusive. It then found language in
§ 6010's legislative history that Congress contemplated that
the “rights” under § 6010 “should be protected and assured by
the Congress and the courts.” Jd. at 4375-77. In sum, the
dissenting justices found that Thiboutot “creates a presump-
tion that a federal statute creating federal rights may be en-
forced in a § 1983 action.” Jd. at 4376.
The dissent’s conclusion plowed no new ground. Where Con-
gress has spoken explicitly, the Court has had little difficulty
finding remedial exclusivity. See Adickes v.S. H. Kress &Co.,
supra, (§ 1983 cannot supplement Title II, the Public Accom-
modation Provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a). Where recognition of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), as
supplementary to a detailed remedial scheme, would frustrate
the scheme, the Court has found exclusivity. Thus, in Great
American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny, supra, the Court
refused to allow prosecution under § 1985(c) of rights secured
27a
by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court observed
that § 1985(c) confers no substantive rights itself; that “[uJnder
Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are sub-
ject to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed
to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary
resolution of claims.” Jd. at 372-73. The Court pointed to the
requirement that a complainant must first go to a State em-
ployment commission, to the conciliation processes, and to the
time limits for the filing of claims. It also noted that the Act
withholds resort to the courts until these processes are ex-
hausted. Finally, it observed that Title VII has been judicially
construed as not allowing general or punitive damages or jury
trials. Permitting the case to proceed under § 1985 would allow
a complaint to by-pass the administrative process. After
gathering analogical support from Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S..820
(1976) (holding § 717 of Title VII to be the exclusive federal
remedy for employment discrimination claims of federal em-
ployees) the Court concluded that “{uJnimpaired effectiveness
can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII
only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII
cannot be the basis for a course of action under § 1985(c).” Jd. at
378.
The EAHCA is not silent about either the judiciary’s or the
administering agency’s roles in resolving disputes arising
under its provisions. Section 1415 details procedures granting
parents access to records, written notice to parents of pro-
posed changes or refusals to change the placement of a child,
opportunity to present complaints regarding the education,
and an impartial due process hearing by the State educational
agency. The statute provides that the hearings will allow par-
ticipation of counsel, cross-examination, a right to a verbatim
record and written findings. Only after administrative reme-
dies have been exhausted may de novo review by State or
federal court be sought. Although the reviewing court may
take additional evidence, the statute provides that the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Finally, the statute mandates the
28a
preservation of the status quo during the pendency of any
proceeding under the Act. Jd. § 1415(e)(3).
Given this carefully constructed scheme, the teachings of
Novotny and Brown compel the conclusion that it need not be
eviscerated by tolerance of § 1983 suits. Section 1983 creates
no substantive rights but is solely a procedural statute. See
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra. It is illogic-
al to conclude that Congress created an elaborate administra-
tive review mechanism at local and State levels, yet,
simultaneously, envisioned that anyone wishing to do so, could
proceed directly to federal court. While the federal courts are
given an important role by the EAHCA, it is not an open-ended
responsibility. Their role is limited in two material ways.
First, the federal judicial review is not available until after at
least two levels of State administrative review have failed to
adjust the dispute. Second, under this scheme, even if the
dispute is not resolved at the administrative level, the review-
ing court will have before it a fully developed administrative
record, presumably reflecting the nuances of the decisions of
the school and the parents. Section 1983, however, has no such
constraints. Moreover, like Title VII, judicial decisions have
limited the type of damages recoverable under the EAHCA.
For example, there is no recovery of private tuition expenses
for children withdrawn from school before completion of the
review procedure. See Stemple v. Board of Education, supra.
Recognizing a right of action under § 1983 for rights “secured”
by the EAHCA would open the door to a range of damages
unavailable under the EAHCA, and thereby undermine the
entire analytical focus of granting relief as appropriate under
the EAHCA. Finally, the status quo requirement of
§ 1415(e)(3) could be cast aside if relief became available under
§ 1983. In the words of the Novotny majority:
together by Conereen tin the EALCA} only by boldieg
r in 0
that deprivation of a right created by [the EAHCA] can-
= e basis for a course of action under [§ 1983]. Jd. at
Se
2s
ed ae
29a
Yet, the compelling force of Novotny and Brown is met
head-on by Thiboutot. Plainly, the Social Security Act contains
an elaborate internal remedial scheme. But the potential for its
destruction by § 1983 enforcement was not discussed in Thi-
boutot, even by the dissent. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile this aspect of Thiboutot with the Court’s pronounce-
ment in Novotny and Brown.
Exclusivity With Exhaustion
The disruptive consequences of recognizing a § 1983 suit are
substantially reduced, if not eliminated, if exhaustion of
EAHCA administrative remedies is a prerequisite to a § 1983
suit. In Patsy v. Florida Intern University, supra, the Court
of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be required in appropriate cases. Because none of the
four traditional exceptions to required exhaustion, as stated in
Patsy, are present here, there appears to be no reason not to
require exhaustion of remedies in compliance with EAHCA.
Id. at 903-04. The EAHCA thus does not foreclose a § 1983 suit
provided Patsy exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit.
But if exhaustion of administrative remedies is required
under both the EAHCA and § 1983, and, all the proved dam-
ages are available under the EAHCA, there is the additional
consideration that § 1983 serves no purpose other than that ofa
conduit for attorneys’ fees. It appears that the Tatros, at least
until this suit was filed, in no way relied upon a § 1983 claim,
unless it is assumed that all of the activity before ARD Com-
mittee, the Impartial Due Process Hearing Officer and the
administrative appeals were all § 1983 prosecutions because
they were required exhaustion steps.
Whatever may be the role of § 1983 where the attack is upon
the adequacy of procedures themselves, this court sees no role
for § 1983 here. Where § 1983 has no greater role than the
statute it purportedly “enforces,” its citation will not trigger
the § 1988 attorney fee provisions. Specifically, this was not
“an action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§ 1983].”
30a
As Justice Powell noted in his Thiboutot dissent, “(t]he uses
of this technique have not been explored fully.” 100 S.Ct. at
2514. But this court has had experience in other contexts with
multi-claim litigation where there is a statutory basis for coun-
sel fees only for part of a claim. Whether the descriptive phase
be “gravamen” or some other expression of predominance, this
court sees no basis for awarding fees when the fee triggering
statute plays no role but that of allowing attorney fees.
This court turns now to the question of whether § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 700, et seq., secures a
right enforceable either under § 1983 so as to allow recovery of
§ 1988 attorney fees or by an implied right of action under § 504
so as to allow recovery of fees under 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).
With the EAHCA, our primary focus was upon remedial
exclusivity, the second Pennhurst inquiry. That focus shifts
here to the first inquiry, whether the general proscription of
§ 504 imposes an obligation upon Texas, enforceable by a
Texas citizen—a question logically antecedent to whether
there is an implied right of action or whether its “obligation” is
enforceable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
This question is controlled by Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, supra, where the court construed the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6010. The Court held that Congress must express
clearly its intent to impose obligations upon the states when it
acts under its spending power—“if Congress intends to impose
a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously.” Jd. at 4367. Because the lower courts had
almost uniformly held that § 504 is enforceable by an implied
right of action, and the Congress, by passage of
§ 794a(b), authorized attorney fees, there has been little need
% Therefore, this court will not dwell upon the relationship be-
tween § 1983 and § 504 in the context of attorney fees. If there is a
right secured after Pennhurst, § 794a(b) explicitly authorizes attor-
ney fees.
3la
to press § 1983 as the procedural expression for § 504 viola-
tions. And in Tatro v. Texas, supra, the Court of Appeals
found that the Tatros have rights secured under § 504 and an
implied right to enforce them.
The Court in Pennhurst referred to § 504 in illustrating the
failure of the lower court “to recognize the well-settled distinc-
tion between Congressional ‘encouragement’ of state pro-
grams and the imposition of binding obligations on the States.”
49 U.S.L.W. at 4370. The Court continued:
Relying on that distinction, this Court in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), re-
jected a claim that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which bars discrimination against coca — in
federally funded pro , obligates schools to take
affirmative steps to eliminate problems raised by appli-
cant’s hearing disability. Finding that “state agencies
such as Southeastern are only ‘encouraged’. . . to —
such policies and procedures,’” Jd. at 410 (quoting the
Act), we stressed that “Congress understood that accom-
modation of the needs of handicap individuals may
require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it
in those instances where it wished to do so.” Jd. at 411. -
Likewise in this case, Congress was aware of the need of
developmentally disabled persons and plainly understood
the difference, financial and otherwise, between
encouraging a specified type of treatment and mandating
it.
Id.
This court makes no pretense that it comprehends the in-
tended reach of the quoted language. In Southeastern, the
Court expressly reserved the question of enforcement by an
implied right or action under § 1983. 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5.
The Circuit’s holding in Tatro v. Texas, supra, is binding
upon this court unless plainly undermined by the later decided
Pennhurst. This court and the Court of Appeals obviously
differ on the reach of Southeastern. Moreover, another panel of
the Court of Appeals reached a result contrary to the view of
this court in Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127
32a
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 49 U.S.L.W. 4468 (1981). The Su-
preme Court’s remand of Camenisch left the question unre-
solved because it did not address the merits of the § 504 issues.
This court remains unconvinced as to the applicability of
§ 504; its views reinforced by Pennhurst. Yet, there is no
intervening decision speaking with sufficient clarity to allow
this court to take a course different from that of the Court of
Appeals. This court’s conscience is to follow the law; and
Camenisch and Tatro are the law of this Circuit until they are
overturned by the Supreme Court. For these reasons of in-
stitutional order, this court finds that 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b)
authorize an award of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs. It
turmis now to their amount.
Awarded Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees of $30,000 and expenses of
$2,314. Craig Enoch, attorney for plaintiffs, testified that ap-
proximately 334 hours of attorney time were devoted to this
case up to the January trial. This court estimates that the trial
necessitated an additional twelve hours.” Enoch also testified
that 145 hours of law clerk time were used in preparation.
Plaintiffs contend that the attorney time should be billed at $90
an hour, and the law clerk time at $45 an hour.
In determining a reasonable fee, this court looks to the
twelve factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), as further explicated
in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575
(1980). Those factors are:
(1) The time and labor required;
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions;
® Enoch also testified that 64.4 hours were devoted to this case
after this court entered its Interim Order. For the reasons stated
above, no attorneys’ fees will be awarded for those hours.
33a
(3) = skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly;
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case;
(5) The customary fee;
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the cir-
cumstances;
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained; .
(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys;
(10) The “undesirability” of the case;
(11) The nature and length of the professional rela-
tionship with the client; and
(12) Awards in similar cases.
Johnson, at 717-19.
As noted in Copper Liquor, at 583, “recent decisions . . .
suggest that district courts, in computing attorneys’ fees,
should pay special heed to Johnson criteria numbers (1) the
time and labor involved, (5) the customary fee, (8).the amount
involved and the results obtained, and (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of counsel.”
At the outset, it must be noted that Enoch is relatively
inexperienced. At the time of the initiation of this dispute,
Enoch had been practicing for approximately three and a half
years, and had been a member of the federal bar for only two
and a half of those years. During that time he had accumulated
virtually no experience as a civil rights counsel, and had only
limited experience in federal litigation. Although it is improper
to penalize an attorney for his recent admission to the bar, see
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra, at 719, the
Johnson factors nevertheless require this court to consider the
experience, reputation, and ability of counsel.
34a
Enoch testified that he believes $90 an hour to be a reason-
able and customary fee. This court concurs that such an hourly
rate is appropriate and reasonable for an attorney experienced
in civil rights actions of this general nature. This court has
reservations, however, at reimbursing a relatively in-
experienced lawyer at such a rate.
Enoch submitted time records indicating the hours spent on
briefing, trial preparation and other services. Upon reviewing
those records, this court concludes that the time devoted by
Enoch to this case was greater than that which would have
ordinarily been required by an attorney with experience in
civil rights and federal litigation.” As such, this court believes
*® The following items are illustrative of why this court believes the
amount of billed time to be excessive: (1) From October 4 to October
12, 1980, plaintiffs’ attorneys spent over seventeen hours preparing
and filing the original complaint and request for injunctive relief..
That document consists of little more than lengthy citations from the
relevant statutes and a recitation of the essential facts. Plaintiffs at
that time already had completed three levels of administrative re-
view, and were intimately familiar with the facts and applicable law.
(2) From October 24 to November 8, 1979, plaintiffs’ attorneys
needed approximately fourteen hours to prepare both a motion to
amend the complaint and the amended complaint. The motion to
amend, which cited virtually no law, and was two and a half pages
long, requested this court to permit plaintiffs to join the Texas
Education Agency, Commissioner Bowen, and the individual mem-
bers of the involved Boards. The amended complaint was a duplicate
of the original complaint, with the new parties “pasted in.” (3) From
December 3 to December 11, 1980, plaintiffs’ attorneys required
approximately six hours to prepare a six and half page
in opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss. In that memoran-
dum, almost half of which is quotations, plaintiffs cite a total of three
federal district court decisions. Most of defendants’ contentions
already had been raised and briefed earlier in the litigation, and
plaintiffs’ response essentially was to reassert its previous argu-
ments. In that regard, it is worthwhile noting that defendants did
raise some issues—particularly the applicability of Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979)—to which plaintiffs simply did not respond. See
Memorandum Opinion of December 31, 1980, pages 2-4.
©
-
VE
35a
that Enoch’s request must be discounted by some factor that
reflects his inexperience. Such a determination necessarily is
somewhat arbitrary. But on the basis of Enoch’s written sub-
missions to and personal appearances before this court, it is
this court’s conclusion that an appropriate and reasonable
hourly rate is in the area of $60 an hour. A contingency factor of
20% is reasonable, bringing the rate to $72 an hour. Multiply-
ing that rate by the hours testified to, plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees of $24,192."
Plaintiffs’ attorneys acknowledged at the trial that their
time may appear excessive at first blush. They assert, how-
ever, that the complexity of the case required such an invest-
ment of time and effort. This court is acquainted with the legal
and factual issues raised by this case. Factually, this case is not
sufficiently complex to warrant the requested award. The
record in this case is relatively straight-forward, and was
developed early in the course of the administrative proceed-
ings. With the exception of the permissible time interval be-
tween catheterizations, most of the facts necessary for grant-
ing injunctive relief were undisputed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are
correct in noting that the legal issues here are both complex
and novel. But this complexity was not reflected in plaintiffs’
attorneys’ work. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ memoranda and oral
arguments were of little assistance to this court in resolving
the legal issues raised by this case. The number of hours
devoted by plaintiffs’ attorneys to this case thus appears to be
less the product of any factual or legal complexity than the
result of their relative inexperience. I intend no criticism of
counsel for lack of experience; the question is compensation
and experience is relevant.
Looking to the other Johnson criteria, this court finds that
plaintiffs’ attorneys were not prejudiced by having been pre-
%! Plaintiffs’ attorneys have billed approximately ten hours spent
deliberating with the press. As noted by plaintiffs’ own expert wit-
ness, plaintiffs request to be reimbursed for this is inappropriate.
36a
cluded from accepting more lucrative employment; that there
were time limitations imposed by the circumstances, but that
such limitations were not inordinately severe or unusual for
federal litigation; that plaintiffs’ attorneys do not have a
reputation as experienced civil rights and federal litigator,”
and that the case was not “undesirable.” This court also deter-
mines that while the money involved here is not substantial,
the awarded prospective relief is necessary for Amber’s con-
tinued well-being. Taking all these factors into consideration,
this court finds reasonable attorneys’ fees to be $24,192." In
addition, plaintiffs will be awarded reasonable attorneys’ ex-
penses of $3,039."
Judgment is by separate instrument filed herewith.
/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
United States District Judge
® Plaintiffs’ attorneys initially were retained with regard to the
administrative proceedings before the involved Texas agencies.
* This court awards an additional $7,200 (100 hours at $72 an hour)
if this case is appealed to the Fifth Circuit by defendants.
™ Considering that a not insubstantial portion of the clerk time was
devoted to secretarial type duties rather than legal research, such
time is reimbursed as an expense item at the rate at which the clerk
was paid, five dollars an hour. See generally Jones v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 680 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1980) (may not bill paralegal time
where most of time was in performance of clerical duties).
37a
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G
HENRI and Mary TATRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
STATE OF TEXAS, et al., ;
Defendants.
AMICUS CURIAE ADDRESSING
QUESTIONS RAISED IN ORDER
TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT:
As invited in this Court’s Order of February 6, 1981, the
Texas Medical Association and the Dallas County Medical Soci-
ety respectfully submit this Amicus Curiae brief and request
that it be considered by this Honorable Court.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Texas Medical Association is a non-profit corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Texas. Its mem-
bership consists of approximately 18,500 physicians. The Dal-
las County Medical Society is composed of physicians practic-
ing in Dallas County, Texas. Its membership consists of ap-
proximately 3,000 members. Questions concerning the provi-
sion of medical care for patients in Texas by licensed physicians
utilizing the skills of qualified nonphysicians are of major in-
terest to these organizations and their members.
. rel
> ‘>
weet a —S ss Te eS
38a
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
The questions raised in the Court’s Order of February 6,
1981, are addressed in the sequence of their presentation in
that Order.
Question (1)(a). Whether under the Texas Medical Practice
Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4495, et seg. (Vernon
1978) employees of the school district can only provide CIC
(the provision of CIC is described in the attached stipula-
tion from the pretrial order in this case) if they are under
the control and supervision of a licensed physician and what
the training of such persons must be. These questions. in-
clude the question of whether to furnish CIC without such _ .
supervision would be to engage in the unlawful practice of
medicine. /d., art. 4510, 4510a and 4510b. See also, art. 4518
V.A.T.S. and Op. Tex. Att. Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978),
H-395 (Sept. 9, 1974).
Under Texas law, a person is regarded as practicing medi-
cine if he (she) professes to be a physician or surgeon and
diagnoses, treats, or offers to treat any disease or disorder,
mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury, by any
system or method, or seeks to effect cures thereof; or does the
above acts and charges therefor, directly or indirectly, money
or other compensation. (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., arts. 4510 and
4510a (Vernon 1976)).
Thus, a person professing to be a physician who treats
another for a disease or disorder, such as neurogenic bladder
dysfunction using clear intermittent catheterization (CIC), is
practicing medicine and must have a license to do so under
Texas law. Similarly, a person who treats another for a disease
or disorder and charges for that treatment is also practicing
medicine and must have a license to do so lawfully.
Both the Dallas County Medical Society and the Texas Medi-
cal Association respectfully submit that CIC should not be
administered to a patient except when ordered by a physician.
It is a treatment used for selected patients with
sia and neurogenic bladders. (Enrile and Crooks,
39a
mittent Catheterization for Home Management in Children
with Myclomeningocele,” 19 Clinical Pediatrics, 743 (Nov.
1980)). Even though patients, parents, and others can be
trained to perform the technical aspects of this treatment, this
does not affect the judgment that CIC should be performed
only under a physicians order. However, classification of CIC
as the practice of medicine would not prevent the delegation of
such a procedure by a physician to a nonphysician. The delega-
tion of medical tasks by physicians to nonphysicians has been
an accepted part of the practice of medicine for years. Thomp-
son v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d
123 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
The parties in this case appear to agree that CIC is a proce-
dure which, if provided by school system personnel, would only
be provided when prescribed or ordered by a physician. The
debate appears to be centered on the fact that physicians can
and do delegate this task to others. However, administering
the treatment itself by a nonphysician under a physician’s
order is not the unlawful practice of medicine even if a charge is
made for the treatment provided. If providing CIC is not
considered to be the unlawful practice of medicine because it is
a treatment which the physician can delegate to others, this
does not mean that it is a treatment which need not be ordered
by a physician. In Texas, a nurse or an unlicensed lay person
may not lawfully decide that a treatment such as CIC is needed
for a particular condition (diagnose), administer treatment,
and “charge therefor, directly or indirectly, money or other
compensation” without a physician’s direction. (Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat., arts. 4510, 4510a, 4510b (Vernon 1976)).
The definitions of the practice of medicine, nursing, and the
other licensed health professions overlap to some extent. This
creates the result that the same act when per-
formed by a nurse under the direction of a physician is con-
sidered to be part of the practice of nursing and when per-
formed by a physician is considered to be the practice of medi-
cine.
40a
The Texas Attorney General recognized this result in 1962
when he defined the practice of nursing prior to the inclusion of
the definition of professional nursing in what is now commonly
referred to as the “Nursing Practice Act,” (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., art. 4513 et seq. (Vernon 1976 and Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981)). This definition formulated by the Attorney General
included the following statement recognizing the delegation of
medical tasks:
“Generally speaking, the duty of the nurse is to out
.the medical Seestennet ceeneribed by a doctor tor his pa-
tient.” (Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. -1403 (1962))
The practice of nursing is more precisely defined today.
(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4518, sec. 5, (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981)). The statutory definition includes:
“.. . The administration of . . . treatments as prescribed
by a licensed physician. . .”
Thus, nurses can lawfully perform medical functions dele-
gated to them by physicians. When nurses do perform dele-
gated medical tasks, they do so with the knowledge that
administering these delegated treatments is part of the prac-
tice of nursing and recognized as such in the state statutes
defining nursing practice. When performing CIC as ordered by
a physician for a particular patient, the nurse is practicing
nursing as it is contemplated in the statutes.
Question (1)(b). The nature and extent of such supervision.
Once a physician has determined that CIC or any other
treatment modality is appropriate for his or her patient, the
physician may delegate performance of part or all of the treat-
ment to another. The physician continues to monitor the prog-
ress of the patient, making sure that the treatment is being
a parent, or the patient, is a treatment ordered and monitored
by the physician.
4la
The extent of the supervision or control which is proper in
cases where CIC is ordered must be determined by each physi-
cian in each case, taking into consideration (1) the needs and
capabilities of the patient and (2) the training, experience and
competence of the individual (parent, teacher, patient, or
nurse) who will be monitoring or performing the procedure
ordered by the physician. One thing is certain: a patient being
provided CIC by nurses, school teachers, or others under a
physician’s orders will expect that the treatment provided will
conform to the same standard of care as would apply if a
physician were providing the treatment.
Concerning the physical location of the physician, the follow-
ing statement made to the Attorney General by the Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners in a 1973 Attorney General
Opinion Request was referenced with approval in an Attorney
General Opinion involving ambulance attendants not in the
physical presence of a licensed physician.
“Unlicensed persons could legally perform acts which
would constitute the practice of medicine if such persons
were under the reasonable control and supervision of a
licensed physician,” Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-27 (April
12, 1973)
Several Attorney General Opinions have dealt with the
meaning of such terms as “direct” and “on-site” supervision as
those terms are used in describing the supervision required of
the delegating physicians. Tex. Att. Gen. Op. Nos. C-795 (Dec.
30, 1966) and H-368 (Aug. 12, 1974). The degree of instruction
or supervision by the physician was also discussed in a 1978
Attorney General Opinion addressing the scope of lawful prac-
- tice by nurse midwives:
“Thus, even if ‘orming an episiotomy or making su-
tures were held to constitute medical treatment, a reg-
istered nurse could provide these services at the doctor's
direction ... The a te degree of instruction or
supervision by the ician will vary with the nurse’s
rience and q tions . . . These qualifications are
relevant to a determination of the appropriate degree of
42a
instruction and supervision to be provided by a physician.
Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-1293 (1978).
In the case of CIC, the technical aspects of the procedure are
not complicated and can be performed successfully by children
on themselves after appropriate training (boys by age 8 and
girls by age 10). Wyndacle, Oosterlinck and De Sy, “Clean
Intermittent Self-Catheterization in the Chronical Manage-
ment of the Neurogenic Bladder,” 6 European Neurology 107-
110 (1980). Hannigan, in “Teaching Intermittent Self-Cathe-
terization to Young Children with Myelodysplasia,” 21 De-
velopmental Medicine and Child Neurology 365-368 (1979),
describes the successful training by nurses of several five year
old children (one boy, three girls) to perform CIC on them- .
selves. Of course, physician supervision and continuous
monitoring by parents or nurses is vital to minimize the likeli-
hood and severity of complications and to assure proper main-
tenance and sterilization of the equipment used.
CIC appears to be a procedure which can be safely per-
formed while neither a physician or nurse is present. CIC can
be done safely when a patient or other person is trained to
perform it properly and is taught to recognize conditions which
should be brought to the physician’s attention.
Nonphysicians often care for patients under such circum-
stances. Even when relatively sophisticated treatment is
being provided, nonphysicians are commonly placed in a role of
deciding when a physician should be notified or when to in-
stitute treatment prescribed by a physician under standing
medical orders written after the patient has been examined
and diagnosed. The physician need not be present for every
treatment ordered. The activities which commonly take place
in a cardiac intensive care unit provide an illustrative example
of such a situation. In an article by the present Assistant
General Counsel of the American Medicial Association, the
following is recorded:
“When the nurse serves in the cardiac intensive care unit,
she has the advantage of sophisticated equipment that
extends her ability to make evaluations pieuane the
43a
reliability of such evaluations. Her training may be more
highly specialized for the tasks she performs in the unit
than that of the average physician. When the nurse in the
unit institutes treatment measures in emergency situa-
tions, she is instituting treatment prescribed by a physi-
cian in anticipation that such a contingency might arise.”
Anderson, “Orderly Transfer of Procedural Responsibili-
ties from Medical to Nursing Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics
of North America 311-319 at 318-319 (Jun. 1970).
The nurse is not unlawfully practicing medicine in the situation
described above. He or she is instituting treatment prescribed
under a contingency order and, no doubt, has been placed in
that position of responsibility because of demonstrated train-.
ing, experience, and competence. The same should be true for
any nurse, parent, or teacher who performs the CIC for the
child. Each should have the necessary training to perform the
treatment safely, and to know when the physician should be
called.
Question 2. The conditions under which CIC ought to be
provided consistently with conservative and sound medical
judgment including both technique and with training level
of the person administering it.
CIC should only be provided under the orders of directions
of a licensed physician. Just as in any other treatment,
“. . . a nurse should comprehend the cause and effect of
any order a physician instructs to her execution. As nurs-
ing education and pak have become more sophisti-
cated, and as more medical acts have become technical in
nature in that they are repetitive and are performed under
controlled circumstances re mrey have delegated to
med ae marine haha pew pono mye aye
n ce encom 8 as -
miinisteation of injections wdc at and intramuscu-
of dlagnost procedures Se! the utilization of comple
c n of complex
mechanical devices in the Saad
therapeutic ” Anderson, “Orders Transfer of
Procedural Responsibilities from Medical to Nursin,
Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics of North America 311-319
314 (June 1970).
x.
doa
The performance of procedures by nurses under a physi-
cian’s order has been called “. . . dependent nursing functions
(which) are those performed under the legal orders and direc-
tion or supervision of licensed physicians.” (See Anderson
supra, at 314). These functions can be distinguished from
recognized independent nursing functions, that is, those per-
formed by virtue of the nurse’s education, training, and experi-
ence, and which properly reflect the nurse’s independent judg-
ment. Such functions might include:
“(T)he evaluation of a patient’s condition for the 1 mal ears of
determining his ability to care for himself or his require-
4and reporting of sym toms and reactions; and the applica-
tion and execution of nursing techniques and p ures.
(See Anderson, supra, at 314).
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals offers a
voluntary accreditation mechanism for hospitals which is rec-
ognized by the Medicare program for purposes of determining
a hospital’s eligibility for participation. (See Commerce Clear-
ing House Medicare and Medicaid Guide, “Conditions of Par-
ticipation for Hospitals,” para 12,340 (Mar. 1979)). Thus, in the
case of nurses performing dependent functioris outside the
’ hospital or nursing home setting, it may be helpful to review
provisions of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals (JCAH) Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1981 Edi-
tion) relating to home health services.
The section on “Home Care Services,” pp. 57-62 of the JCAH
Manual, provides in part:
“Each patient receiving home care services shall be under
identity of the physician pri primary aprnshinietiaciee
identity o res e for prstes
U yo rral 5 ean each patien
pon to the home core: eres
shall receive an initial evaluation by a physician or can Fe
istered nurse acceptable to the home care
determine the appropriateness of the patients health cae
ments for nursing or medical attendance; the observation |
45a
registered nurse employed by the home care program.
This individual or a similarly qualif ualified designee shall be
available during the operating hours of the program, and
shall participate in activities relevant to the professional
services oe to the oo including the level of
personne! required.” (p.
The JCAH Manual further provides that when services are
to be provided by individuals or by a participating community
agency on an hourly or per-visit basis, a written agreement
must be prepared and must specify:
“e The services to be provided . .
«The manner in which services shall be coordinated,
supervised, and evaluated by the hospital-administered
home care program and its staff;
* The role of the hospital, the participating community
agency, and the responsible physician in the establish-
ment of a patient care plan;
* A statement to the effect that the patient care plan will
not be altered unilaterally;
* The submission, within one week after each service/
visit, of appropriate documentation (such as progress
notes) of services provided;
* The participation in case conferences .
¢ The term of the agreement or contract, in the basis for
its termination or renewal.” (pp. 58-59)
The JCAH Manual also provides that a director of the home
health care program shall be designated. The director’s re-
sponsibilities include written descriptions of the responsibility
of physicians and other professionals in the delivery of health
services. The JCAH Manual also states that:
“Home care services wood nee ype bag ms hone shall
be ee i perrensiss and
thon of paronnel providing come
46a
are to be employed in the provision of — care serv-
ices, such personnel shall be adequately trained and su-
pervised, and their duties shall be specified in writing.
“The medical staff shall assure that the quality of care
provided to home care patients is comparable to that pro-
vided to inpatients, ambulatory care patients, and
emergency care patients. The medical staff may, con-
sistent with hospital policy, ee one or more a ef
cians to carry out this responsib ity, or such responsibil-
ity may be a function of one of the committees of the
me bo a the activites of a — director
emplo’ y the home care program on a full-time or
ne basis include clinical responsibilities, he must
ve achieved and maintained medical staff membershi
through the same procedures provided for all medical s
members. Physician advice and/or consultation must be
Hye to the home care program staff at all times. (pp.
If a physician is not a member of the hospital’s medical staff
and requests the services provided by the home care program,
a special procedure to credential that physician is provided,
including a provision for evaluating the care provided to that
physician’s patients. (p: 60)
Written policies and procedures are required on the delega-
tion of responsibility, as well as the “scope of services to be
offered and the manner in which they are to be provided.” (p.
60) These must be approved by the hospital’s. medical staff,
administration, and governing body. (p. 60) A written patient
care plan that conforms with the physician’s orders must be
developed for each patient, (p. 61) An “accurate medical rec-
ord” shall be maintained which shall include progress notes
including:
“a description of signs, ; treatment, service, or
medication rendered; reaction; in the
patient’s condition; and any wstlontioonig’ inttoustion
given.” (p. 61)
47a
Coordination and evaluation of patient services on a continu-
ing basis are encouraged in this section. The “patient care
plan” must be
“reviewed and evaluated as often as the — condi-
tion required, but not less than once every 60 days.” (p. 62)
Some of the extensive requirements which now exist for
those hospitals seeking accreditation by the JCAH when they
provide home care programs have been described. Should
schools begin providing similar services under a physician’s
order, a similar mechanism will likely evolve. To assure that
the treatment provided by the school will be provided safely,
proper coordination of activities and delineation of responsibi-
lities will be necessary. If history is any guide, should schools
be required to provide treatment as ordered by a pupil’s physi-
cian, the JCAH or some other accrediting body will be called
upon to develop standards for administration of such treat-
ment. These standards will then be recognized by Congress in
legislation and will serve as a reference point for evaluating
eligibility for federal funding.
Question 3. Any additional questions believed to be pre-
sented by this case that impact the practice of medicine or
the medical community’s role in providing chi!dren neces-
sary maintenance while participating in their individual
‘education program.
One question presented by this case concerns the direction
by a physician of an act to be performed by a nurse or another
trained person. Ifthe physician is providing instruction not toa
particular individual, but to an unidentified person selected in
an organized system such as exists in a hospital, nursing home,
rely on an existing system to assure that only those who are
capable of carrying out his instructions do so. In such a situa-
tion, the physician is not necessarily liable for the acts of those
carrying out his directions if the person to whom responsibility
is delegated is selected by another upon whose judgment the
physician can reasonably rely.
48a
In an Amarillo case, a sponge had been left in the abdominal
cavity of a patient during surgery. The patient sued the
surgeon and the hospital which employed the nurses involved
in the procedure.
The jury’s verdict absolved the operating surgeon of any
negligence of his own. The jury did find negligence on the part
of the operating room nurses who were hospital employees,
but declined to find that these employees were “borrowed
servants” of the surgeon. On this verdict the trial court ren- -
dered judgment against the hospital only, not against the
surgeon. —
The Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, in reviewing the trial -
court decision, reversed the judgment of the trial couy* and
held the surgeon liable for the nurses’ negligence under the
“captain of the ship” doctrine. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell,
529 S.W.2d 639 (Amarillo Civ. App. 1975)). On appeal the
Texas Supreme Court set aside the Ararillo appeals court’s
judgment and remanded the case back to that court. (Sparger
v. Worley Hospital, 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977)).
The Texas Supreme Court noted that an employee of one
employer may be the borrowed servant of another under Texas
law. (See Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at 583). The
right to control is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to
decide. In this case the Supreme Court concluded that physi-
cians should be subject to the usual rules applicable to bor-
rowed servants. It held that the heavy burden of vicarious
liability imposed by the “captain of the ship” doctrine as it has
come to be applied in professional liability actions should no
longer be applied in Texas. (Sparger v. Worley Hospital, su-
pra, at 585).
The Supreme Court mentioned that in this case the nurses
were assigned to the operating room by the hospital, their
employer. The duties of the nurses were detailed in the hospi-
Pee
s PA art
Spee Sey Aw
49a
tal’s Policy and Procedures Manual. Specific duties were
assigned by the hospital to each nurse:
“The procedures for the sponge count were intended for
use re less of the surgeon who was to perform the
ty) “Suing ...” Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at
The physician was “in charge, medically speaking, of the
nurses” (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, 552 S.W.2d 534 at 535
(Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1977)). Testimony at trial demon-
strated that the physician had the right to control the nurses
assigned to the operating room and in fact did direct them to
take a second sponge count as the wound was being closed. (See
Justice Johnson’s opinion, dissenting from the opinion of the
Supreme Court, 547 S. W. at 586-589). However, this degree of
control did not persuade the appeals court on remand that the
jury’s refusal to find that the nurses were the borrowed em-
ployees of the doctor was against the great and overwhelming
weight of the evidence. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, supra,
552 S.W.2d at 536).
The Texas Supreme Court in this case found that this physi-
cian was not necessarily liable for the acts of those who are
selected by another person when those acts are performed _-
under his direction for his patient. The right of the hospital to
assign their employed nurses and determine their qualifica-
tions was not questioned.
Thus, a home health care agency, nursing home, or hospital
with an estabished system to assign qualified persons to carry
out a physician’s instructions can properly select the agent to
carry out the orders of a physician. However, when no such
system exists, the physician may be held to have improperly
delegated a treatment unless he selects specific individuals to
carry out his treatment orders.
On November 21, 1980, an Attorney General Opinion was
issued addressing the delegation of functions by a physician to
an optician outside the physician’s office. (Tex. Att. Gen. Op.
No. MW-275 (Nov. 21, 1980)). The Attorney General opined
50a
that a physician’s orders in such a situation must be directed to
a particular optician or opticians and cannot lawfully be dele-
gated to an unnamed optician of the patient’s choice. The
Attorney General reasoned:
“Where a physician delegates a medical task to another
person, he must provide adequate instruction consistent
with that person’s skill and knowledge. . . Since opticians
are not licensed in Texas, he (the physician) cannot rely on
a particular level of ability in the profession.” (p. 2)
The Opinion also states that the delegation by a physician
must be to a natural person, not to a corporation or other group
since: :
“. . . only natural persons can be subject to the control or
supervision of the physician.” (p. 3)
The Opinion concludes that the physician is legally liable for
the negligence of the optician in performing services under his
direction.
However, in this case the Attorney General was faced with a
fact situation of unlicensed opticians in Texas. Since no particu-
lar minimum level of ability of these unlicensed persons exists,
the Attorney General could only conclude that the physician
must delegate to a particular optician or opticians, and provide
instructions appropriate to the ability of particular persons.
Therefore, although this Attorney General Opinion concluded
that physicians can only delegate properly to designated natu-
ral persons in the fact situation before him, there is no reason to
believe that the Attorney General intended to suggest a
change in the common practice of delegation to undesignated
nurses and others in hospitals, skilled nursing homes, and
home health care agencies. These individuals typically are
- assigned duties by the organizations which employ them under
systems designed to assure that only competent persons carry
out any physician’s order.
If an institution such as a school has no system to assure that
only qualified individuals will carry out a physician’s order, we
respectfully submit that the physician would be required to
5la
tailor his instructions to the individual who would carry them
out just as the Attorney General concluded in MW-275, supra.
The physician would need to satisfy himself that the individual
who is to perform the task would be qualified to do so and that
his instructions were sufficient to match the individual’s train-
ing. On the other hand, if the school has in place of a mechanism
to assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed and proper
coordination of activities and responsibilities such as is de-
scribed in the JCAH Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
(1981) for home health services, the physician would be able to
reasonably rely on the mechanism available and could tailor his
instructions to a pre-established level of training for a person
to be designated by the school system.
CONCLUSION
All parties in this litigation appear to support the view that
diagnosing a patient’s condition and concluding that CIC treat-
ment is appropriate are functions which only licensed physi-
cians should perform. The Texas statutes support this view.
However, consistent with this view is the accepted practice in
Texas of nonphysicians performing acts which, if performed
independent of a physician, would constitute the unlawful.
practice of medicine, but when performed under a physician’s
direction, are considered to be lawful and proper.
The extent to which a physician may properly delegate medi-
cal treatment to a nonphysician is conditioned in each case by
the needs of the patient and by the experience and training of
the nonphysician to perform the functions delegated. The
Nursing Practice Act contemplates such a delegation of depen-
dent nursing functions. The physician need not be physically
present during administration of all treatments. The physician
should, however, monitor the treatment rendered even though
some of the treatment might be simple enough that children
can perform certain technical aspects on themselves. The
potential for harm, should all the steps in treatment not be
adhered to or should an adverse reaction occur, warrants over-
all physician supervision of the treatment provided.
52a
If a school system undertakes to provide CIC to its pupils
under a physician’s supervision, the responsibility for daily
administration of CIC treatment will be delegated by the
physician either (1) to persons the physician reasonably be-
lieves are capable of discharging them in a competent manner,
or (2) to an organization which has in place a mechanism to
assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed. In either
case, the physician would tailor his instructions to the individ-
ual providing the care or would write orders for those selected
by the school system to provide the treatment based on a
pre-established level of training for those individuals.
DALLAS COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY AND
TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
/s/ By Durwood E. Neal, M.D.
Durwoop E. NEAL M.D., President
Texas Medical Association
/s/ By Joseph C. Ogle, M.D.
JOSEPH C. OGLE, M.D., President
Dallas County Medical Society
/s/ By Richard Gray, Jr.
RICHARD GRAY, JR.
THOMPSON AND KNIGHT
/s/ By Donald P. Wilcox
DONALD P. WILcox, General Counsel
Texas Medical Association
/s/ By Michael G. Young
MICHAEL G. YounG, Staff Attorney
Texas Medical Association
53a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G
HENRI and Mary TATRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Ve
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants. |
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED
MAY 26 1981
JOSEPH V'CEROY, JR, CLERK
By 777?
Deputy
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opin-
ion, itis ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
State Board of Education and the Irving Independent School
District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber
Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid
medical prescription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs
recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-
ages and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses in the sum of
54a
$28,502, plus interest on such sum from the date of judgment
until finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are
taxed against defendants.
/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PaTRIcK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
United States District Judge
55a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G
HENRI and Mary TAtTRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
; P Defendants.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED
MAY 26 1981
JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK
By 2777777?
Deputy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Irving Independent School District (“school dis-
trict”) has moved to amend the Memorandum Opinion and
Judgment entered May 26, 1981. Upon reviewing the motion,
this court makes the following amendments. The motion is
DENIED in all other respects.
This court finds that of the 336 billable hours devoted to this
case by plaintiff's counsel, 62 hours were devoted tc the admin-
istrative proceedings provided by defendants pursuant to 20
56a
U.S.C. § 1415, and 33.6 hours were devoted to the issue of
compensatory damages.’
Il.
The school district asks this court to hold the State Board of
Education liable for plaintiffs’ damages and attorneys’ fees. As
explained in the Memorandum Opinions of December 31, 1980,
and May 26, 1981, the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
State Board of Education precludes any award of compensato-
ry damages. The immunity is not applicable, of course, to
reasonable attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C..
§ 1988: See Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 406 (5th
Cir. 1980). This court did not, however, award attorneys’ fees
under § 1988, to which it held plaintiffs to be unentitled, but
awarded the fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794a.*
This court held in its Memorandum Opinion of December 31,
1980, that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. See Jones v.
Illinois Dep’t of Rehabilitation Services, 504 F.Supp. 1244,
1257-58 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F.Supp. 110,
115-16 (W.D. Pa. 1976); cf., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979). The question to be answered here is whether § 505
abrogates that immunity as to attorneys’ fees.
| Plaintiffs’ counsel testified that 20 more than 10% of his time was
devoted to compensatory damages. This court construes his testi-
mony as stating that approximately 10% of his total billable hours
(336 hours) was devoted to compensatory damages. If this court’s
construction is incorrect, plaintiffs’ counsel is to file an appropriate
affidavit within ten (10) days of this Opinion.
* The section provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a
provision of this subchapter, the court, in its oe, may
—aeminbsdicak ,
57a
The starting point of any analysis of the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity to attorneys’ fees provisions
is Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 677 (1978). In Hutto, the Supreme
Court held that States cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment
to defeat the attorneys’ fees provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
Court’s reasoning rested on two pillars.’ First, the Court noted
that § 1988 imposes attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs.” Jd. at
695. Costs can be taxed against a State regardless of its immun-
ity. Id. at 696-97. The Court concluded that by authorizing
attorneys’ fees as an item of cost, Congress brought attorneys’.
fees under the judicially created “litigation costs” exemption to
the Eleventh Amendment. /d. at 697-98.‘
The second pillar was Congress’ intent that the States be
subject to the attorneys’ fees provision. Jd. at 694, 698 n.31. As
noted by the Court, “Congress considered and firmly rejected
the suggestion that States should be immune from fee
awards.” Id. at 698 n.31.
Over time, it is the second pillar—the existence of con-
gressional inter. .o subject the States to § 1988 attorneys’ fees
awards—that appears to have become the primary analytical
foundation laid by Hutto. Thus, in Supreme Court of Virginia
v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
737-39 (1980), the Court held that although Congress intended
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, there was no
similar indication that Congress intended § 1988 to overcome
* The State defendants did not act in bad faith or violate a judicial
decree. The portion of Hutto upholding an award of attorneys’ fees as
“ancillary” remedial relief, therefore, is inapplicable to this case. See
437 U.S. at 698-93.
‘ As this court reads Hutto, the authority to tax costs against State
litigants derives from some sort of inherent constitutional power of
the federal judiciary that may be redefined or even eliminated by
Congress. 437 U.S. 695-98. The Court was somewhat equivocal,
however, on precisely where it found this power. Jd. at 696 n.25
(citing § 254 of the Judicial Code); see also 28 U.S.C. $§ 1911, 1913,
1920.
58a
legislative immunity. The Court made no mention of the alter-
native holding in Hutto that attorneys’ fees are part of recover-
able costs. See also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447
U.S. 54, 67 (1980). In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the
Court was faced with the issue of whether attorneys’ fees may
be awarded pursuant § 1988 for a purely statutory, non-civil-
rights violation. Jd. at 130-33. The Court did not, however,
reach the question. It held that although no constitutional
violation had been found, because the plaintiffs’ allegation of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation had been sufficiently color-
able to maintain federal jurisdiction, the awarded fees fell
within Congress’ § 5 power to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. Only in footnote did the Court -
mention that Congress may define “costs” to include reason-
able attorneys’ fees. Jd. at 131 n.14; see also Maine v. Thi-
boutot, 488 U.S. 1, 9n.7 (1980). Similarly, in Familias Unidas
v. Briscoe, supra, at 406, the Fifth Circuit, in explaining why
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of § 1988
attorneys’ fees against the Texas State Board of Education,
cited Hutto for the proposition that Congress abrogated the
immunity pursuant to its plenary powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As in Supreme Court of Virginia, no
mention was made of Congress’ redfinition of recoverable
costs. In Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979), in
holding that the Eleventh Amendment waiver applies to cases
pending at the time § 1988 was enacted, the Circuit prop-
ounded at some length on Congress intent to abrogate the
immunity, with virtually no discussion of Congress’ power to
define taxable costs.
Unlike § 1988, it is not at all clear that Congress focused
directly on the question of State liability when it enacted § 505
of the Rehabilitation Act, or that it firmly rejected a sugges-
tion that States should be immune from fee awards. None of
the three Committee Reports make any direct reference to
State immunity. See S. Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
18-20 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1780 (Conferences Report), 95th
59a
Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1978) (latter two Reports reprinted in
[1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7312). That is not to say,
however, that there is no indication of congressional intent. In
giving his understanding of the attorneys’ fees provision in the
Senate bill, Senator Cranston made the following remark:
(With respect to State and local bodies, or State and local
officials, attorney’s fees, similar to other items of cost,
would be collected from the official, in his official capacit
from funds of his or her agency or under his or her control;
or from the State or local government—regardless of
whether the such agency or Government is a named party.
The authorization of attorney’s fees under A en sec-
tion 505(b) in cases brought to enforce title V is within the
power of Congress under among other things, section 5 of
the 14th amendment. Thus, in accordance with the Su-
reme Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney, No. 77-1660,
une 23, 1978, the 11th amendment is no bar to the recov-
ery of attorney’s fees under proposed section 505(b) from
State government as a result of an action or | em to
enforce or change a violation under title V of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.
124 Cong. Rec. $15,591 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978). These senti-
ments were echoed by Senator Stafford, ranking member of
the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped and chief co-
sponsor of the Senate bill, in his discussion of the Conference
bill. 124 Cong. Rec. $19,000 (daily ed. October 14, 1978).
A court may not conclude that Congress intended to abro-
gate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it finds
a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect. See Quern
v. Jordan, supra, at 340-45. These remarks by two Senators,
isolated from any real debate on the issue, do not, by them-
selves, meet that test. But in the context of Hutto v. Finney,
supra, and with the presumption that Congress understood
the significance of its languge when it made the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees a part of recoverable costs, this
’ ’ “Qe ai *
' , : " ys ih a mo <n’ ;
7F P Or ee Oe ee! Pee ee - re A > Meee e
60a
court concludes that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
§ 505 award of attorneys’ fees against State defendants.’
In that plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief against the State
Board of Education, the Judginent will be amended to make
the Board jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs’ reasonable
attorneys’ fees.
Ill.
The school district suggests in its motion that plaintiffs did
not establish a § 504 violation because they failed to show that
Amber Tatro was excluded from a school district program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. See Brown v.
Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766-71 (5th Cir. 1981).
As this court noted in its earlier Memorandum Opinion:
As for the school district’s earlier su tion that there
has been no showing that the school district receives
federal funds, the superintendent of the school district
5 From time to time, the State Board of Education has contended
that it enjoys an absolute judicial or legislative immunity. Arguably,
if such immunity exists, the Board may be immune from attorneys’
fees awards. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., supra, at 737-39. But as this court noted in its
Se eee the State Board of Education is under
a statutory obligation to supervise Amber’s Individual Education
Program. 516 F.Supp. at 972; See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342,
350 (5th Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642
F.2d 687, 696-98 (3d Cir. 1981). In this regard, the Board’s role is akin
to that of an administrative agency charged with enforcing a statute.
As the Supreme Court noted in Supreme Court of Virginia, “{flee
awards against enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill occurr-
ences.” 446 U.S. at 739. This court does not, however, hold that the
immunity. It only holds that the awarded injunctive relief goes to the
Board's “direct enforcement role,” see id., and that the Board thus is
unentitled to any judicial or legislative immunity as to the duty it 4
6la
conceded that the school district receives federal funds
allocated for special education. 516 F.Supp. at 977, n.17.
This court has reviewed the transcript, and is persuaded
that superintendent Townley conceded that the school district
receives federal financial assistance for special education.* As
the record stands, plaintiffs have met their burden of proof.
But because Townley’s concession arguably is somewhat ambi-
guous, in the interests of justice this court will consider
reopening the record as to the issue if within ten (10) days of
this Opinion the school district files an affidavit setting forth
the federal funds received and the programs and activities on
which such funds are spent. The affidavit is to be accompanied
by a legal memorandum dealing with what constitutes a “pro-
gram or activity” within the meaning of § 504. See generally
Brown v. Sibley, supra."
IV.
An Amended Judgment reflecting this court’s amended find-
ings and conclusions is filed herewith by separate instrument.
/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
* The school district appears to assume that plaintiffs must show
that federal funds are allocated specifically for the school district’s
Early Childhood Development Program. All plaintiffs must show is
that Amber was excluded from any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. In this regard, had Amber been enrolled
by the school district she would have been entitled to participate in
the school district’s physical therapy program. See 516 F.Supp. at
979. Physical therapy is a type of “special education.”
"Specifically, the school district is to address the issue of the
administrative level at which such funds must be allocated before a
person is excluded from a “program or activity.” That is, if the school
district receives federal financial assistance, is every program or
activity provided by the school district a § 504 “program or activity,”
or must the funds be targeted to the precise types of education
Amber would have received by attending the school district?
; ie , . cA 2 mp Ege! AS Oe
\ ee Stee (OE e y sy .* ae ‘ae YO See : eS ce prs a A
62a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G
HENRI and Mary TaTRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
STATE OF TEXasS, et al.,
Defendants.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.
FILED
MAY 26 1981
JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK
AMENDED JUDGMENT
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
State Board of Education and the Irvirig Independent School
District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber
Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid
medical precription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is
ORDERED, ANJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs
recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-
ages in the sum of $1,271, and of the Irving Independent School
District and the State Board of Education, jointly and several-
ly, their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the sum of
68a
$27,231, plus interest on such sums from May 26, 1981, until
finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are taxed
against defendants.
/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PaTRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
United States District Judge
64a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
April 25, 1983.
NO. 81-1454.
Henri and Mary TatTro, Individually,
and as Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
v.
The STaTE OF TEXas, et al.,
Defendants,
State Board of Education,
Defendant-Appellant,
The Irving Independent School District,
~ Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
Parents of handicapped child brought action seeking injunc-
tion requiring school district to provide child with special serv-
ices and to recover compensatory damages and attorney fees.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 481 F.Supp. 1224, denied
preliminary injunction and appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, 625 F.2d 557, vacated and remanded. On remand,
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 516 F.Supp. 968, entered
injunction requiring school district to provide child with re-
quested special services and authorized award of reasonable
attorney fees to parents, and school board appealed. The Court
of Gee, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) clean in-
catheterization required for handicapped child was
“related service” within meaning of Education of All Handi-
Children Act; (2) school district was required to pro-
with clean intermittent catheterization;
65a
(3) injunction requiring state board to act in supervisory capac-
ity to assure that handicapped child’s individual education
program conformed to Act was proper; and (4) state board’s
violation of Rehabilitation Act supported award of attorney
fees.
Affirmed.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
Before BROWN, GEE and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
GEE, Circuit Judge:
This is Amber Tatro’s second appearance before this court.
The facts and procedural history of her case are reported in
detail in our prior opinion, 625 F.2d 557 (1980) (Tatro J), and in
those of the district court. 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981); 481 F.Supp.
1224 (1979). To aid the reader, we will briefly summarize them
here. Amber is a seven year old gir] afflicted with myelomenin-
gocele, a birth defect commonly known as spina bifida. As a
result of this handicap, she suffers from speech and orthopedic
impediments and a neurogenic bladder. Because this last con-
dition prevents voluntary emptying of the bladder, Amber
must be catheterized several times daily to prevent injury to
her health. The method chosen by Amber’s doctors, the most
widely accepted procedure, is Clean rr Catheteri-
zation (“CIC”).
In early 1979, when Amber was three and one-half years old,
her mother asked the Irving Independent School District
(“school district”) to provide special education for Amber. The
school district agreed, and in a series of meetings with the
Tatros, developed an Individual Education Program (“IEP”)
for Amber as required by the Education of All ped
Children Act (“EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(aX5)
(1976). The IEP provided for Amber’s placement in the school
district’s Early Childhood Development (“ECD”) classes and
for the provision of various other services to Amber, including
physical and occupational therapy. The IEP did not provide for
66a
CIC and the school district maintained that it had no legal
obligation to administer it.
Amber’s parents next pursued an administrative appeal
from the school district’s decision not to provide CIC. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (1976) (setting out procedures). Pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), an impartial hearing officer conducted a
hearing and determined that the EAHCA required the school
district to provide CIC. The Texas Commissioner of Education
adopted the hearing officer’s decision. Amber T., bnf Mary T.
v. Irving Independent School District, TEA Docket No. 115-
SE-579 (August 6, 1979). The Texas State Board of Education
' (“State Board”) reversed the decision of the Commissioner and
hearing officer and reinstated the school board’s decision not to
provide CIC. After thus exhausting state remedies as required
by the EAHCA, the Tatros brought the present action in
federal district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(2) (1976),
naming the school board, the State Board, and others as
defendants.’
The Tatros contended that the school district violated the
EAHCA by failing to provide Amber with a “free appropriate
public education,” id. § 1412(1), which is defined in part as
“special education and related services.” Jd. § 1401(18). Specif-
ically, they argued that CIC is a “related service” the state
must provide to fulfill its duty to Amber under the EAHCA.
The Tatros also argued that the school district’s refusal to
provide CIC violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in
federally funded programs. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
The district court denied the Tatros’ motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction to require the school board to provide CIC. 481
F.Supp. at 1229. That court concluded that CIC is not a “re-
'. All defendants save the school board and the State Board were
dismissed by the district court, 516 F.Supp. at 972-73; the Tatros do
not contest these dismissa!s. The propriety of the State Board’s
action is discussed in Part III, infra.
CE ea ee Tk nde AC ce 8k OSE Dh Re a tee ee
67a
lated service” within the meaning of the EAHCA because the
need for it does not arise from the effort to educate Jd. at 1227.
The district court further concluded that section 504’s prohibi-
tion of discrimination does not impose a duty upon the school
board to take affirmative action such as the provision of CIC.
Id. at 1228-29.
The Tatros appealed from the district court’s order, and
based upon facts that were assumed for purposes of the appeal,
this court reversed. Tatro /, 624 F.2d at 558 n. 1, 562. This
’ court held that CIC falls within the literal terms of the statuto-
ry definition of “related services,” which includes “supportive
services. . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to
benefit from special education.” Jd. at 564 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(17) (1976)). Because, under the assumed facts, Amber
would be unable to attend ECD classes without provision of
CIC during the school day, this court concluded that CIC was
essential if she was to benefit from special education, and that
CIC was therefore a “related service” in her case. The district
court had thought it necessary to limit the statutory language
to services arising from the effort to educate in the absence of
any evidence of Congressional intent to require provision of life
support services through and education statute. 481 F.Supp.
at 1227. This court concluded that the district court’s limiting
construction of the EAHCA’s literal language was erroneous
because the EAHCA contained its own limitations on the types
of life support services falling within the ambit of “related
services.” 625 F.2d at 562. This court further held that the
school district’s refusal to provide CIC violated section 504.
I. THE EAHCA CLAIM
Were we writing on a clean slate, we would share the district
court’s reluctance to read a statute designed to aid education to
require provision of medical necessities of life which are re-
quired by a child whether or not she participates in the state’s
educational program. Nevertheless, Tatro J is the authorita-
tive interpretation of the EAHCA in this circuit, and under
“law of the case” principles, must be followed by us in this
68a
subsequent appeal “unless (1) the evidence on a subsequent
trial was substantially different, (2) controlling authority has
since made a contrary decision of the icable to such
issues, or (3) the decision was clearly erro would
work a manifest injustice,” White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 432
(5th Cir.1967) (footnote omitted; enumeration added); see
Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 688 F.2d 1008, 1005-06 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 593 F.2d 658,
664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 234, 62
L.Ed.2d 173 (1979). None of these considerations justifies
departure from Tatro I by this panel.
Although we perhaps would have taken a different view of
the EAHCA upon de novo consideration, we cannot say that
the well-documented Tatro I decision was not also a principled
interpretation of that undeniably Delphic statute. It is not
clearly erroneous and certainly does not work manifest in-
justice. Further, neither the parties’ briefs nor our own re-
search has revealed any supervening authority.? Thus, the
only remaining issue under the EAHCA in this case is whether
the evidence adduced on remand from Tatro I is so different
from the assumed factual basis for that decision that its legal
conclusions no longer apply. The school district argues that
such is the case.
Tatro I did not hold that all life support services are “related
services” under the EAHCA, nor that school districts must
* The school district argues t!:at after Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694
(1981), federal statutes that grant funds to state programs cannot be
read to confer judicially enforceable substantive rights on the pro-
grams’ beneficiaries. This argument misreads Pennhurst, which only
requires that funding statutes must by their terms create such
rights. That the EAHCA creates enforceable rights to “special edu- #
cation and related services” was clearly established in Board of A
Education v. Rowley, U.S. —_, 102 S.Ct. 3084, 3048-49, 78
L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The issue in the present case is the scope of those *
69a
always provide CIC to children who need it. Derived from the
statute and its regulations were three conditions that must
obtain before a school board must provide services such as
CIC:
+s in vty uh nae fee to any related epihen a all, a
ild must ica so as to require speci uca-
tion. 45 C.F.R. § ita 14 (1979) (comment one); see 20
U.S.C.A. § 1401(1). . . . Second, the life support service
must be geome ot to aid a handicapped child to benefit
from the special education to be provided. See id.
§ 1401(17). Thus, a life support service would not be a
related service if it did not have to be provided during
school hours, but instead could be performed at some
other time. Taird, in order to be a related service, the life
ro jl service must be one which a nurse or other qual-
ified person can perform. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(10)
(1979). Excluded from the term “related services” are
those health-related activities which must be performed
by a licensed physician that are not provided “to deter-
mine a child’s medically related icapping condition
which results in the child’s need for ial education and
related services.” Jd. § 121a.13(4). Thus, even under a
literal interpretation of the statutory definition, the types
of life support services needed by a child which can be
related services are limited.
625 F.2d at 562-68 (footnotes omitted).
All parties agree that Amber is handicapped and in need of
special education. The school district argues that the district
court erred in finding the other two Tatro J conditions met in
this case. It is argued first that under Texas law, CIC may not
be performed by a nurse or other qualified person unless a
physician is physically present to control and supervise the
procedure. The argument concludes that such participation by
a physician transforms CIC into “medical treatment” which
the school district need not provide under Tatro I. Id. at 563; 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) (medical treatment is a related serv-
ice only if provided for diagnostic and evaluation purposes).
The district court, guided by its extensive experience in upply-
70a
ing Texas law, and with the aid of able amicus curiae,’ rejected
the school district’s view of state law. 516 F.Supp. at 975-76.
We cannot say that the district court was wrong.
As the district court found, it has been long settled that
physicians in Texas may prescribe treatment and delegate its
administration to others. Thompson v. Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d 123, 129-30 (Tex.Civ.App.—
Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKinney v. Tromly, 386
S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see
‘ also Op.Tex.Atty.Gen. No. WW-1403 (1962). Subsequent to
the district court’s decision on remand, this principle was codi-
fied in Texas’ new Medical Practice Act:
a person licensed to practice medicine shall have the au-
thority to delegate to Mh wae and properly trained
person or persons acting under the physician’s supervision
any medical act which a reasonable and prudent pe eam
eer
to de if, in the opinion o i ysician,
the act can be riyand safely performed by the person
to whom the ical act is delegated and the act is per-
formed in its customary manner,
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