Petition — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro

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— OCT % 1983

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

v.

HENRI AND MARY TATRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

NEXT FRIEND OF AMBER TATRO, A MINOR,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JAMES W. DEATHERAGE

O. GLENN WEAVER

DEATHERAGE & WEAVER, INC.

200-201 InterFirst Building

Irving, Texas 75061

(214) 254-3188

Attorneys for Petitioner

Cee ee ee ee mienneetieeimmiomenmnann

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

i

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether “medical treatment” such as clean in-

termittent catheterization is a “related service” re-

quired under the Education for All Handicapped

Children Act and, therefore, required to be provided

to the minor Respondent.

Is a public school required to provide and perform the

medical treatment prescribed by the physician of a

handicapped child by the Education of All Handi-

~—ate Children Act or the Rehabilitation Act of.

1973

Whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals miscon-

strued the opinions of this Court in Southeastern

Community College v. Davis, Pennhurst State

School & Hospital v. Halderman, and State Board of

Education v. Rowley.

ii

TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW

This Petition is submitted on behalf of the Irving Inde-

pendent School District and its Board of Trustees. The

parties below are as follows: -

HENRI AND MARY TATRO, Individually and as

Next Friend of Amber Tatro, a Minor, (

: Plaintiffs-Appellees

Cross-Appellants

THE STATE OF TEXAS, TEXAS EDUCATION

AGENCY,

Defendants

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS

MEMBERS: Elizabeth Armstrong, James M. Bin-

ion, Joe Kelly Butler, W. W. Carter, Don H. Cook,

Brian Crouch, Jimmy L. Elrod, W. H. Fetter,

Wayne Frederick, Joseph C. Gathe, E. R. Gregg,

Jr., Rubin E. may pay im Hollingsworth, William

N. Kem Leveridge, Paul Matthews,

Rex dell, William P. , Richard Ten-

cinte, Laura es, sone ickery, James H.

Whiteside; ALTON BO COMMISSIONER

OF EDUCATION, :

Defendants-Appellants

THE IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIS-

TRICT, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES: Roger Hill,

Vickie Tatum, Troy Kelley, Pat N John

i atum elley, Pat Norman, Jo

Stipes; James W. Fillbeck has now replaced Robert

Pierce on the Board,

Defendants-Appellants

ow

- Cross-Appellees

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ i

TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW ........... hits Sak sdbbases ii

I. OpInIONS OF THE CouRT BELOW ................ 1

TL, JURIGDICTION ......csccccccccccccccecccccccess 2

III. Statutory AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2

TV, Sravenmar OP THE CASE oo. ccc cccccccccescess 3

V. REASONS For GRANTING THE WRIT ............ ai 2

A. This Case Presents Questions Of Great Publi

Importance Concerning The Scope Or “Non-

educational” Services Required To Be Provided

By State And Local Education Agencies Under

Education For All Handicapped Children

BP. yo hud ahaa cocks = apdeces erases 5

B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Applicable

Decisions Of This Court. ...........seeeee: 10

IN 6 oop X acvokwadsnows evanscdebvandee Vaweks 13

APPENDIX:

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed May

26, 1981) Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981) . la

COR i. oa 604 eck Te ude vil tena bon’ wee wha 53a

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed

September 8, 1981-Unpublished) ................ 55a

AURORE FOI os 00 cana 6is 6.0 05.0 vik'ns ec cys vhs Gus 62a

Order (J. Gee) Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc

(Filed July.6, 1965) .......ceccccccscscccssvecs 84a

Memorandum Opinion of J Rigesboien, i Tatro I

(Filed December 21, 1979) Tatro v. Texas, 481

F.Supp. 1224 (1970) «.....0c..cecsccoceseccsess 86a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) (J. Goldberg)

Tatro (led September 2 1980) Tato Texas,

GES FBS GOT CBU) a vive cc nc cccccccvccsccteiese 94a

iv

Table of Contents Continued

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: .

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Ps Cadabetgtcss poaaceieausanecates

es Os IE vad enccnrentanedanustonaed

Page

110a

110a

¥

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES: Page

sori Sesion Ron, — US, ROY,

Pennhurst State School & H. v. Halderman, 451

U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1581 (1981) ........... 4, 11, 12, 13

Scanlon v. Tokarcik, 665 F.2d 443 (8rd Cir. 1981) cert.

denied 2 yoni yt. aap 5, 6

Southeastern Cos Comtnuniiy Ce College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,

| SS IIE. 6. 6 baleen c oct cen ceccdss 9, i2, 13

Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) TatroI .. 2,4

MISCELLANEOUS:

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Sana MEE. dec ccccciecccececsvvsvcuec 9

a iceiw bones banhevas sone 2, 3, 4, 12

ee os os. vee cenecadeeeeesea 2

20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.:

Ee Sat be cia cliscecdpewece 2, 5, 6, 7, 11

SECS Salih 3 SE Pe ee 2, 5, 10

Article 4495(b) § 3.06(d)(1), Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann.

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83) .............ceeeeceenes 2,6

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at aa? Boe hat es

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_ Po Se ee eS ee a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-__

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

Vv.

HENRI AND MARY TATRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

NEXT FRIEND OF AMBER TATRO, A MINOR,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

' The Irving Independent School District and its Board

of Trustees, John Stipes, Roger Hill, Pat Norman, Vickie

Tatum, Troy W. Kelley, Anne Pfaff, and James W. Fil-

beck, hereby petition that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this case on April

25, 1983.

I. OPINIONS OF THE COURT BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 703

F.2d 823 and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages

64a to 88a. The Opinion of the Federal District Court for

the Northern District of Texas is reported at 516 F.Supp.

968 and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages la to

2

36a. The Opinion below is the second Opinion is this case.

The first Opinion of the Court of Appeals (hereafter Tatro

I) is reported at 625 F.2d 557 (1980) and is printed in the

Appendix hereto at 94a to 109a. The Opinion of the Dis-

trict Court in Tatro J is reported at 481 F.Supp. 1224

(1973) and is printed in the Appendix hereto at pages 86a

to 93a.

II. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

April 25, 1983. A timely Motion for Rehearing and

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was denied on July 5,

1983; and this Petition for Certiorari was filed within

ninety days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS IN-

VOLVED

The following statutory provisions relevant to this peti-

tion are set forth verbatim in the Appendix hereto:

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20

U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976):

Section 1401-Definitions

Section 1415-Procedural Safeguards

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq.:

Section 794, 794a

State Statutes:

Article 4495(b) § 3.06(d)(1),

Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann.

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83)

3

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In early 1979, when the minor Respondent was 3%

years old, her mother asked the Irving Independent

School District to provide special education for her. The

District agreed, and in a series of meetings developed an

Individual Education Program (“IEP”) for the child. The

IEP did not provide for clean intermittent catheterization

(“C.1.C.”), which procedure was stipulated by the parties

and subsequently found by the District Court to be medi-

cal treatment requiring a valid prescription of a physician

and other physician’ s services. The School District main-

tained that since C.I.C. was medical treatment, it had no

legal obligation fo provide for nor administer C.I.C..

The parents pursued an administrative appeal through

the Texas State Board of Education, which agreed with

the School District’s decision, holding that the child’s IEP

met with the standards of the State Education Agency

and complied with applicable statutes and regulations.

The parents then brought an action in the Federal

District Court for the Northern District of Texas basing

their claims upon the Education for All Handicapped

Children Act (EAHCA); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1983, requesting both monetary and injunctive

relief.

The District Court denied the application for prelimi-

nary injunction to require the School District to provide

C.I.C., holding that C.I.C. was not a related service

within the meaning of the EAHCA because the need for it

did not arise from the effort to educate and that the

Plaintiffs could not convert a statute prohibiting dis-

crimination in certain governmental programs [Section

504] to a statute requiring, in essence, the setting up of

governmental health care for people seeking to partici-

4

pate in such programs. App. p. 92a. On original sub-

mission, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on

assumed facts, remanded for trial determining that, on

the assumed facts, failure to provide C.I.C. violated both

the EAHCA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) App. p. 92a.

On remand, the District Court, feeling constrained by

Tatro I App. p. 94a, ordered Petitioner to modify the

child’s IEP to include provisions for C.I.C. in accordance

with and as prescribed by a valid medical prescription

provided by the child. Although the Court believed that

Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, ‘451 U.S. 1, 101

S.Ct. 1531 (1981), reinforced its doubts that § 504 re-

quired C.I.C., it felt sufficiently constrained by Tatro J

App. p. 3la, and without finding a specific violation of

§ 504, awarded attorneys fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 794a(b).

All parties appealed; and the 5th Circuit Court of

Appeals, relying heavily on “law of the case doctrine,”

affirmed. The panel decision reflects that were the panel

“writing on a clean slate, we would share the district

court’s reluctance to read a statute designed to aid educa-

tion to require provision of medical necessities of life

which are required by a child whether or not she partici-

pates in the state’s education program.” App. p. 67a. The

panel further found that although Pennhurst reinforced

the District Court’s doubts that Section 504 required

C.1.C., it concluded that the Supreme Court had not

spoken with sufficient clarity in Pennhurst to allow the

single panel to overrule the previous panel’s decision in

Tatro I.

Petitioners filed a timely Motion for Rehearing and

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, which motions were

5

denied by order dated July, 1983. App. p. 84a. Petitioners

now present this Application for Writ of Certiorari.

V. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. This Case Presents Questions Of Great Public Import-

ance Concerning The Scope Of “Noneducational” Serv-

ices Required To Be Provided By State And Local Edu-

cation Agencies Under The Education For All Handi-

capped Children Act Of 1975.

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of

1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (hereinafter called “the

Act”), is a fanding statute intended to.assist the states in

providing an education for handicapped children. The Act

has been the subject of much litigation and has been

described as “Delphic” by both lower courts. This Court,

in Board of Education v. Rowley, _—. U.S. ——, 102

S.Ct. 3034 (1982), removed much of the ambiguity from

the Act for the benefit of state and local education agen-

cies, emphasizing that the Act was designed to assist

handicapped children to benefit educationally. This

Court further held that the requirement of a free appro-

priate public education (FAPE) is satisfied when the

state provides personalized instruction with sufficient

support services to permit the handicapped child to bene-

fit educationally from that instruction. Rowley, supra, at

3048 (emphasis added). The critical question remaining

which is of major public interest is the extent to which

states are obligated to provide “support services” and

whether such “support services” must relate to the effort

to educate, the paramount issue being whether the Act

requires state and local education agencies to provide

“medical treatment” prescribed by the handicapped

child’s attending physician.

Petitioner recognizes that this Court denied certiorari

in Pennsylvania Department of Education v. Tokarcik,

oe

ae

a ee

6

665 F.2d 443 (8rd Cir. 1981) cert. denied, ___ U.S. __.,

‘102 S.Ct. 3508, a case involving C.I.C.. However, the

critical distinction between Tokarcik and this case is that

in this case, the procedure C.I.C. was stipulated by the

parties to be “medical treatment”; that it was the treat-

ment of choice of most medical centers; that prescribing

C.I.C. or other treatment of a neurogenic bladder is the

sole responsibility of the treating physician; and that it is

a medical function. The District Court further found that

C.I.C. required more services from the physician than

diagnostic and evaluation services in determining a

handicapping condition and that absent a valid physician’s

prescription, providing C.I.C. would be unlawful in viola-

tion of the Texas Medical Practices Act. Tex. Rev.Civ-

.Stat.Ann., Art. 4495b § 3.06(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-

83) App. p. 118a. The Court of Appeals failed to address

the “medical treatment” question squarely and deter-

mined that since the procedure could be performed by

persons other than licensed physicians without violating

prohibitions against practicing medicine without a

license, the procedure was a “related service” under the

Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) App. p. 110a. Unfortun-

ately, major questions of significant importance to the

general public are left unariswered and elucidate the need

for a definitive answer from this Court.

Does the opinion below ire that any medical treat-

ment prescribed by an attending physician be performed

and paid for by the education agency if a general health

hazard might result otherwise? Are schools required to

secure the services of persons sufficiently trained to allow

a treating physician to prescribe with a view toward

prescription implementation by the school? Does the Act

create “national health care” through the public school”

system and obligate the local systems to provide same at

no cost to the parent? Concommitent to these questions of

7

national importance if the answer is affirmative is the

significance of additional planning necessary to the imple-

mentation of such requirements. If states and local educa-

tion agencies are required to provide medical treatment,

budgeting on the local level is of nation-wide importance.

The additional revenue necessary to provide for the treat-

ment, the personnel necessary for implementation of

same, and insurance necessary to guard against liability

for potentially catastrophic losses must be considered.

These additional funds can come only from the individual

taxpayer. Certainly the states, the local education agen-

cies, and the individual taxpayers are entitled to a defini-

tive answer regarding whether or not this funding statute

has created an affirmative obligation to provide “medical

treatment” to handicapped students.

Under the Act, “related services” are defined as fol-

lows:

“The term ‘related services’ means transportation,

and such developmental, corrective, and other

supportive services (including speech pathology and

audiology, oa services, physical-and occu-

pational t erapy, recreation, and medical and

counseling services, except that such medical serv-

ices shall be for diagnostic and evaluation p

_e — required to assist a handica child

to benefit from special education, and includes the

early identification and assessment of handicapping

conditions in children.”

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) App. p. 110a. In the first appeal of

this case, the Court of Appeals, in what Petitioner be-

lieves is an advisory opinion, held that C.I.C. was a

related service because it could be performed by persons

other than licensed physicians. App.p, 105a. It is impor-

tant to remember that at the time of the first opinion, the

parties had not stipulated that the procedure was medical

8

treatment. The opinion of the Court of Appeals sought to

be reviewed herein overlooks this stipulation and fol-

lowed the first opinion under the “law of the case” doc-

trine. App. p. 67a. The decision in question states that the

School District argued that C.I.C. could not be performed

unless a physician is physically present to supervise and

control the procedure. App. p. 69a. Such has never been

the position of Petitioner. However, Petitioner does sub-

mit that C.I.C. is “medical treatment” as stipulated by

the parties and that in order to be performed, more is

required from the physician than diagnosis and evalua-

tion. The District Court on remand of the first appeal

found that when delegating prescribed medical treat-

ment, the physician must:

(1) — the needs and capabilities of the pa-

ien

(2) determine the training, experience, and compe-

tence of the person who will be performing the

prescribed treatment;

(3) assume the responsibility for supervision, train-

ing, and control of the salioonasa person

performing the procedure;

(4) determine if the treament is being properly

formed and is progressing without comp ea

tion;

(5) monitor the patient’s progress and perform the

numerous physician duties discussed in Amicus

Brief of Texas Medical Association reprinted as

an appendix to the District Court’s o — on

ct 5 5 516. F.Supp. at 987 App. p,

Thus it is clear that extensive services of a cath

physician are required to administer the prescribed medi-

cal treatment and such treatment is not a related service

as defined by the Act, nor is it a medical service as defined

at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4). Since the public school em-

9

ployee cannot administer the prescribed treatment with-

out a valid physician’s prescription and other services of a

licensed physician, the public school employee is not a

“qualified person” as contemplated in the definition of

“school health services” at 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)10. The

Court of Appeals held that a valid prescription and physi-

cian supervision were necessary, but still determined

that the procedure was a related service. App. p. 72a. The

issue is not whether certain medical treatment such as

C.I.C. can be performed by persons other than physi-

cians. The issue is whether the Act requires that medical

treatment other than for diagnostic and evaluation pur-

poses be provided by the funding recipient. The statutory

definition certainly does not contemplate the provision of

medical treatment; and Petitioner submits that if the

implementing regulations require same, they run afoul of

this Court’s opinion in Southeastern Community College

v. Davis, 442°U.S. 397, 60 L.Ed.2d 980, 99 S.Ct. 2361

(1971).

Petitioner understands that medical treatment such as

kidney dialysis is delegated to and performed by techni-

cians and nurses. A literal interpretation of the opinion of

the Court of Appeals would transform this obvious medi-

cal treatment into a related service because it can be

prescribed and delegated by a physician. Certainly, the

Act neither contemplates nor requires recipients of funds

to assume such obligations and responsibilities. The next

obvious question is whether the recipients (state and local

education agencies) are required to provide the personnel

and equipment necessary to implement the medical treat-

ment prescribed. Since special education and related

services must be provided at public expense and at no cost

to the parent, the answer must be in the affirmative.

10

It is undisputed that the child involved in this case is

physically able to attend school. The courts below found,

however, that to attend school without C.I.C., the child

would suffer a potential risk and danger to her general

health, as would a child in need of kidney dialysis.

Whether or not states and local schools are required by

the Act to provide the medical treatment necessary to

avoid the potential general health risk is of monumental

importance and should be definitively answered by this

Court. |

B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Applicable Deci-

sions Of This Court.

In Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3041, this Court set

forth the role of the courts in suits brought under the

Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).

“A court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is

twofold. First, has the state complied with the proce-

dures set forth in the Act? Second, is the individualized

educational program developed through the Act’s proce-

dures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

educational benefits. (Emphasis added.) Respondents

have never asserted that the State or Local District failed

to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act.

Moreover, they have never asserted that the State’s plan

violates the Act. They have only asserted that the child’s

IEP should include the medical treatment desired, which

medical treatment is not related to the educational effort,

but to general health considerations. Thus, the Court of

Appeals and the District Court have overlooked the edu-

cational nexus described by this Court in Rowley. The

Court of Appeals determined that the thorny issue of

what circumstances might call for judicial modification of

an IEP was unnecessary since the District did not present

evidence that the educational setting established by the

1]

IEP was not appropriate. App. p. 76a. However, al-

though the State Board of Education found that the IEP

met with the standards of the State Education Agency

and complied with applicable statutes and regulations, an

assertion was never made that the State plan violated

EAHCA requirements, the Courts below ordered the

State and Petitioner to modify the child’s IEP to include

C.1I.C.. Therefore, the District Court and the Court of

Appeals have judicially modified the child’s IEP to in-

clude an alleged “related service” which was stipulated to

be “medical treatment” and which is totally unrelated to

the effort to educate. In.Rowley, supra, 1025 S.Ct. at

3049, n.26, this Court quoted its opinion in Pennhurst

State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101

S.Ct. 1531 (1981), in construing the EAHCA as being also

enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power as follows:

“he already demonstrated, the Act and its history

im no requirements on the states like those

im by the District Court and the Court of

Appeals. A fortiori, Congress has not done so

unambiguously, as required in the valid exercise of

its spending power.” :

Although § 1401(17) App. p. 110a specifically limits

medical services to those having to do with diagnosis and

evaluation, the District Court and the Court of Appeals

have judicially modified the child’s IEP to include “medi-

cal treatment” not unambiguously required by Congress.

Therefore, the decisions of the District Court and the

Court of Appeals are in conflict with this Court’s prior

opinion in both Rowley and Pennhurst; and this Writ

should be granted.

In Rowley, this Court determined that, if the require-

ments of its twofold inquiry under the EAHCA were met,

the state has complied with the obligations imposed by

Congress; and the courts can require no more. Rowley,

12

102 S.Ct. at 3051. In Pennhurst, 101 S.Ct. at 1545, this

Court referred to its decision in Southeastern Communi-

ty College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99S.Ct. 2361, stressing

that Congress understood that accommodation of the

needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative

action and knew how to provide for it in those instances

where it wished to do so. The Court of Appeals miscon-

strued this Court’s decisions in Rowley, Pennhurst, and

Davis by imposing an affirmative obligation to provide.

medical treatment pursuant to the EAHCA, which is a

funding statute. Certainly, the State of Texas, through

the State’s local school districts, has not voluntarily and

knowingly accepted the potentially massive financial

obligations of providing medical treatment by contracting

to receive federal assistance for education for the handi-

capped.

Although the Court of Appeals recognized the issues

presented by this Court’s decisions, the panel felt con-

strained to follow the decision in Tatro J. App. p. 79a.

The Court of Appeals also discussed this Court’s deci-

sions in Pennhurst and Davis when determining that the

District Court properly awarded attorneys’ fees under

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794,

again relying on the decision in Tatro J App. p. 79a. The

District Court and the Court of Appeals determined that

this Court had not spoken with sufficient clarity in Pen-

nhurst to allow departure from the decision of the Court

of Appeals in Tatro J holding that refusal to provide

C.I.C. violated § 504. In view of Pennhurst, Rowley, and

Davis, C.1.C., which is stipulated to be medical treat-

ment, is not required by the EAHCA or the Rehabilita-

tion Act;’ and as this Court stated in Davis, if the regula-

tions implementing the Act can be read to have imposed

such an affirmative obligation, then such regulations con-

13

stitute an unauthorized extension of the obligation im-

posed by the statute. Davis, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. Since both

the EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act are funding stat-

utes, the above language applies. The courts below,

determining that medical treatment is a related service

and that failure to provide same violates both the

EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act and awarding attor-

neys’ fees under § 504, have misapplied this Court’s deci-

sions in Rowley, Pennhurst, and Davis. Therefore, im-

portant federal questions have been decided in conflict

with applicable decisions of this Court, and this Court

should grant review herein. |

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully re-

quest that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this

case.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES W. DEATHERAGE

O. GLENN WEAVER

DEATHERAGE & WEAVER, INC.

200-201 InterFirst Building

Irving, Texas 75061

(214) 254-3188

Attorneys for Petitioners,

Irving Independent School District

and its Board of Trustees

la

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TaTRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. ;

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK

By 2277997?

Deputy

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amber Tatro is a five year old female suffering from myelo-

menengocele, commonly known as spinal bifida.' As a result of

‘In accordance with the Court of Appeals’ Order of Remand in

Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), this court has tried this

case. This opinion sets forth the court’s findings of fact and con-

clusions of law. The general nature of this suit has been described

both at 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D.Tex. 1979) and 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.

1980).

The parties stipulated in the Pre-Trial Order that the preparation,

materials and procedure for performing CIC on females is generally

as follows:

(1) Equipment and Materials:

(a) Clean catheter in size prescribed by treating physician;

2a

this birth defect, Amber suffers from orthopedic and speech

impediments and a neurogenic bladder. Because of her bladder

condition, Amber is unable to void voluntarily, and must be

catheterized several times each day. The method of choice is

' Clean Intermittent Catheterization (“CIC”).

(2)

(b) Catheter carrying containers;

(c) Catheter extension when patient is in a wheelchair;

(d) Clear plastic liquid detergent container with a hanger when

patient is in a wheelchair:

(e) Soap and water;

(f) Container for catching the urine;

(g) Table or desk on which to place the child;

(h) Large underpad to prevent soaking of liners or other table

covering;

(i) Water soluable lubricant.

Preparation and Procedure:

(a) Get all the equipment and materials ready.

(b) Wash hands with soap and water.

(c) Get the child ready and place her on her back on the table or

desk (CIC is easier to perform at table or desk height).

(d) Spread labia apart with one hand and wash genitalia with

soap and water with the other hand, always moving in a down-

ward direction (never working in an upward direction since

doing so will move germs from around the rectum up into the

area of the bladder opening). ;

(e) Hold the catheter one inch from the tip and insert it into the

urethra until the urine flows.

(f) Hold the catheter in place until the urine s draining,

then pash the entheter in smother inch or as to be mre ths

bladder is completely emptied.

(g) Remove the catheter slowly, ing any time urine flows

so as to empty the bladder com the catheter is

y.

ready to come out, hold the catheter tip up so that the urine will

drain down from the tip of the catheter and not on you.

(h) After noting and recording the amount of urine obtained,

its appearance for any abnormality, discard the urine.

(i) Clean the catheter with soap and water, allow it to dry and

lage ie 8 Sea, Op cane Ay ene aon after the

catheter has been with soap and water, place it in a pot of

3a

In early 1979 Mary Tatro, Amber’s mother, asked the Irving

Independent School District (“school district”) to provide Am-

ber with special education. After testing Amber, the school

district developed an Individual Education Program (“IEP”)

which it believed would provide Amber with the necessary

educational and therapeutic services. Amber then was recom-

mended for placement in the school district’s Early Childhood

Development Classes beginning September, 1979. The school

district, however, maintained that it had no obligation to pro-

vide CIC.

In June of 1979, Amber’s parents nero to an Impartial

Due Process Hearing Officer the school district’s decision not

- to provide CIC. They did not otherwise question the appropri-

ateness of the IEP. The Hearing Officer found the school

district to be obligated to furnish CIC, and recommended that

Amber’s IEP be modified accordingly. This decision was

appealed to and affirmed by the State Commissioner of Educa-

tion. The school district then appealed to the State Board of

Education, which reversed the Commissioner.

On October 12, 1979, the Tatros brought this action seeking

an injunction ordering defendants* to provide Amber with CIC

and to recover compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.

water and boil for 20 minutes. Allow it to air dry and place it ina

clean dry envelope.

(j) Catheterize at prescribed intervals so that there is never

more than 5 ounces (150cc) of urine in the bladder at any one time

for a female child of one to five years of age.

(k) Keep a daily record of the time of catheterization, the

amount of urine obtained, and if the child is wet, damp or dry.

(1) Do not crede the bladder as it may push urine back into the

kidneys.

? As of the Amended Complaint of November 8, 1979, the defend-

ants are the State of Texas, The Texas Education Agency, Alton

Bowen (the Commissioner of Education), the State Board of Educa-

tion, the individual members of the Board of Education, the school

district, the Board of Trustees for the school district, the individual

members of the Board of Trustees, and J. F. Townley, individually,

da

In its Memorandum Opinion filed December 21, 1979, 481

F.Supp. 1224, this court, relying upon a written stipulation of

facts believed to have been agreed to by the Tatros and the

District, held that neither the Education of All Handicapped

Children Act (“EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seg., nor the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., requires the

school district to provide Amber with CIC. After the Decem-

ber 21, 1979 Order, the school district advised the Court of

Appeals, but not this court, that it had not actually signed the

filed written stipulation. On September 2, 1980, the Court of

Appeals vacated that ruling, and held that the school district

was obligated under both the EAHCA and § 504 of the Reha-

bilitation Act to furnish CIC. 625 F.2d 557. In remanding for

further proceedings, the Court of Appeals recognized that

there was no factual record upon which to base an opinion, but

nonetheless proceeded to address the merits of the case. The

court then directed this court to make appropriate findings to

determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to relief under either

statute as construed by it. 625 F.2d at 558 n.1.

Applying the Act as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, on

January 16, 1981, this court issued an Interim Order directing

the school district to provide Amber with such CIC as neces-

sary to her IEP. Amber was enrolled with the school district on

January 19th, and until January 23rd, the school district pro-

vided CIC. During that week a dispute between the school

district and Mary Tatro developed concerning the adequacy of

a parental consent form with attached physician’s prescription

submitted by Mary Tatro to the school district. Believing the

consent inadequate and that it was not required under the

Interim Order to furnish CIC without a valid consent form, the

school district discontinued CIC on January 26th. Amber,

however, continued to attend her classes, with CIC provided

as superintendent of the school district. Although it is unclear from

the pleading, plaintiffs indicated at the hearing that the named in-

dividuals are sued in their individual capacity. Townley was dis-

missed from this action by Order of December 21, 1979.

=

~”

5a

by her babysitter as necessary. On March 13, 1981, the Tatros

questioned the school district decision by filing a motion for

sanctions. At the hearing on the motion, a consent form and

physician’s prescription acceptable to both the Tatros and the

school district was agreed upon. With this collateral dispute

resolved, the school district resumed CIC on April 1, 1981

(after spring vacation). A final hearing was held on April 23,

1981, to allow the Tatros to offer additional evidence as to

damages and to supplement their request for attorneys’ fees.

At this hearing, the court denied the motion for sanctions

because it found that the school district had acted properly,

and within the spirit of the Interim Order.

At the outset, it is important to place the school district’s

refusal in perspective. At no time has the school district re-

fused to place Amber in its Early Childhood Development

Classes. Instead, the school district urged Amber’s parents to

enroll her in the program and make private arrangements for

CIC pending the final disposition of the legal dispute.’ Despite

the benefits of placing Amber in the program, her parents

chose to forego such an arrangement, and instead kept Amber

at the Helping Hand Development Center‘ for an additional

* Although Amber’s parents apparently expressed an initial pre-

ference for a full day rather than the half day program in which

Amber would have been enrolled, the only aspect of the IEP raised at

the administrative proceedings or before this court was the school

district’s unwillingness to furnish CIC.

‘The Center provides theraputic services for the mentally and

physically handicapped. It does not offer educational services. From

September through December, 1980, Amber was enrolled at the

Special World Day Care Center, where she received kindergarten

classes. While there, she was transported to the Helping Hand

Development Center several times each week for physical therapy.

6a

year. Amber’s parents did not attempt to enroll Amber with

the school district for the 1980/81 school year.°

The State Defendants

Inits Memorandum Opinion of December 31, 1980, this court

dismissed any claims for retrospective relief against the State

defendants (the State of Texas, the Texas Education Agency

and the State Board of Education) on the basis of their 11th

Amendment immunity.’ See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332

. (1979). Because the State Board of Education has supervisory

responsibility for assuring that Amber is educated in accord-

ance with the EAHCA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6); S-1 v. Turling-

ton, 635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle

County School Dist., Nos. 80-1875, 80-1876, 80-2063, 80-2064

(8rd Cir., April 1, 1981), the members of the State Board of

Education will be retained in their official capacities for the

purpose of injunctive relief. Plaintiffs joined the State Com-

missioner of Education in his capacity as “director” of the

Texas Education Agency. Because the members of the Board

of Education are the proper parties for injunctive relief, the

Commissioner is DISMISSED in his official capacity. The

State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency are DIS-

MISSED. See Alabama v. Pugh, 488 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).

5 By letter of September 9, 1980, and again, by letter of October 21,

1980, the school district requested permission to reevaluate Amber

80 as to update her IEP. Mary Tatro, in a letter dated November 20,

1980, informed the school district that she believed a new assessment

to be inappropriate, but agreed to allow Scottish Rite Hospital to

provide the school district with some information.

*Such an immunity also applies to Commissioner Bowen and the

members of the State Board of Education to the extent they are sued

in their official capacity.

Ta

Commissioner Bowen And The Members Of The State Board

Of Education

There is no prospective relief to which plaintiffs are entitled

against Commissioner Bowen or the members of the State

Board of Education in their individual capacities.

State officials sued in their individual capacities do not, of

course, share their State’s 11th Amendment immunity. They,

however, are entitled to a qualified good-faith immunity, pro-

vided such defense is properly pled. See Wood v. Strickland,

420 U.S. 308 (1975);’ Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S.Ct. 1970 (1980).

The record is bereft of any evidence that Commissioner

Bowen or any member of-the State Board of Education acted

with anything but good-faith. There is no evidence that they

intentionally attempted to violate plaintiffs’ rights or acted

with malice toward plaintiffs. In that the Board’s decision that

CIC is not a “related service” was affirmed by a federal district

court, it cannot be found that its members knew or reasonably

should have known that such is not the case.

Having pled the good-faith defense, there being no evidence

that they acted in any other manner, and the uncertainty of the

law providing affirmative evidence of good-faith, Commission-

er Bowen and the individual members of the State Board of

Education are DISMISSED.

™In Wood the Court recognized a qualified good-faith immunity

from liability for damages under § 1983. The Court found that there

was no basis for believing that Congress intended to eliminate the

traditional common law good-faith immunity available to school offi-

cials. 420 U.S. at 318-22. Even assuming that damages are available

under the EAHCA or § 504, there is no basis for believing that

Congress intended to abrogate that good-faith immunity through

either statute.

* Commissioner Bowen affirmed the Hearing Officer’s finding that

CIC is a “related service.” Plaintiffs have never clarified why this

decision should subject the Commissioner to personal liability for

compensatory damages.

8a

The Members Of The Board Of Trustees

Plaintiffs also have joined the individual members of the

Board of Trustees of the school district. In that there is no

equitable relief to which plaintiffs are entitled against the

individual Trustees, plaintiffs’ sole basis for the Trustees’ pre-

sence in their individual capacities is that they may be liable for

compensatory damages.

Plaintiffs have advanced one argument for why the Trustees

_ are not entitled to the Woods v. Strickland qualified good-faith

immunity. Plairitiffs contend that as a result of a Department

of Health, Education and Welfare letter of September 27,

1979, the Trustees knew or should have known that they were

violating plaintiffs’ rights. That letter informed the super-

intendent of the school district that the Office for Civil Rights

had concluded from its investigation that the school district

was violating § 504 by not providing CIC. It should be noted,

however, that the letter was sent almost three weeks after the

school district’s decision had been affirmed by the State Board

of Education.’

There is no evidence that the Trustees acted with malice or

intentionally attempted to deprive plaintiffs of their rights.

The President of the Board of Trustees testified that it was the

belief of the Board that the school district was not legally

obligated to provide CIC. He further testified that the Board

was concerned that CIC is a medical practice, and, therefore,

cannot be performed lawfully by employees of the school dis-

trict. See pages 11-13, infra.

If for no other reason, because the Board of Trustee’s con-

struction of applicable federal law was upheld by the State

Board of Education, and, later, by this court, the members of

the Board of Trustees are not deprived of their qualified good-

® HEW’s conclusion that the school district was violating § 504 was

based, in part, on the finding that CIC is a “related service,” as

defined by 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13. The Board of Education previously

had ruled that CIC is not a “related service.”

9a

faith immunity by the HEW letter. Although the Board’s belief

as to its duty to furnish CIC has to date proved to be an

incorrect assessment of the law, it was not an unreasonable

conclusion. See Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 321-22."° The

members of the Board of Trustees are DISMISSED in their

individual capacities.

The EAHCA

In its 1979 Memorandum Opinion, this court held that CIC is

not a “related service” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C.

§ 1401(17) and that the EAHCA, therefore, does not require

the school district to furnish CIC. Defendants argued that CIC

is a medical service, and thus not covered by the Act. Under

this court’s view it was unnecessary to reach this definitional

issue. This court found that Congress had not intended “re-

lated services” to sweep so broadly as to include services which

do not “arise from the effort to educate.” The Court of Appeals

disagreed with that construction. The school district now re-

turns to its earlier argument that CIC is an exempt medical

service. This court will first describe CIC and then turn to its

proper classification under the EAHCA.

Despite its present widespread use, CIC has becomie an

accepted procedure only in recent years. Before CIC became

an accepted practice, a substantial number of physicians. be-

lieved that penetration of the urethra ought to be done only ina

sterile environment with sterile instruments. The only alter-

native entailed exerting manual pressure upon the bladder.

This pressure technique, however, presented a risk of reflux of

fluid and injury to the kidneys. CIC is a far more simple

© The Court in Wood was concerned that ignorance not be used as a

basis for immunizing violations of “clearly established constitutional

rights.” The obligation of a school district to furnish CIC hardly can

be considered a settled question of law. As noted in Wood, school

board members cannot be “charged with predicting the future course

of (the) law.” 420 U.S. at 322.

4 Pie,

ue go)

10a

procedure. The catheter need not be sterile nor must its use be

confined to a sterile environment. Obviously, CIC requires

relatively less direct medical superintendence than this earlier

used method.

There is dispute about when Amber must be catheterized

each day. The parties stipulated that Amber must be cathete-

rized approximately four times a day, but the stipulation does

not further address when it is needed despite the fact that her

need for catheterization on any given day largely is a function

of her fluid intake. Because Amber has no sensation of bladder

fullness, she is dependent upon a routinized schedule of

catheterization to insure proper voiding." The evidence in-

dicates that CIC performed approximately every three to four

hours is sufficient to prevent injury to Amber’s health. The

appropriate schedule may vary, however, as Amber continues

to mature.

In sum, CIC has become a relatively simple procedure that

can be taught in less than an hour. Amber has been cathete-

rized by her parents, her babysitter, her teachers and teach-

ers’ aides at the Helping Hand Development Center, and her

teenage brother. In a few years, Amber should be able to

catheterize herself.

EAHCA

The EAHCA does not define medical services, except to

provide that only medical services for diagnostic and evalua-

tion purposes are related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). The

implementing regulations shed a little more light. They define

medical services as “services provided by a licensed physician

to determine a child’s medically related handicapping condition

which results in the child’s need for special education and

related services.” 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(4). The regulations

further provide that “school health services” are related serv-

'' Improper voiding may result in influx, a condition in which urine

backs up in the kidneys.

™~

lla

ices, and, by implication, not exempt medical services. Jd.

§ 121a.13(a). “School health services” are defined as “services

provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person.”

Id. § 121a.13(b)(10). The statute and its implementing regula-

tions suggest that medical services are services that can be

provided lawfully only by a licensed physician. But they give

no direct guidance as to precisely what “provided by a licensed

physician” means.

The school district argues that all services that must be

performed under the control and supervision of a licensed

physician are “provided by a licensed physician.” Plaintiffs’

response seems to be that the appropriate test is not one of

control and supervision, but whether CIC must be performed

only in the presence of a physician.

Texas Law

This court is here construing an act of Congress of nation-

wide application. And it ought to be given a uniform construc-

tion. Yet Congress, by defining the Act’s reach by definitions

locatable only in the law of the respective States, perforce

intended, at least to this extent, that its construction be paroc-

hial. A contrary view would require a finding that Congress

intended to alter oe relations in the several States.

Stating the proposition answers it. The types of medical treat-

ment that can be performed by nonphysicians, and the extent

to which any treatment must be under the control and supervi-

sion of a licensed physician, are regulated by State law. And

the courts must look to State law to determine whether a

service is a medical service. To the extent of the accommoda-

tion of varying practices, the Act tolerates non-uniform appli-

cation. A given service, therefore, may be a related service in

one State and an exempt medical service in another.” This

court turns now to the law of Texas.

That State law must determine who can provide a service is

recognized by the commentary following § 121a.13, which states:

There are certain services be provided

2 en ee caudate

12a

The school district contends that under the Texas Medical

Practice Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4495, et seq.

(Vernon 1976), its employees can provide CIC only if they are

under the control and supervision of a licensed physician. To

furnish CIC without such direction, it argues, would be to

engage in the unlawful practice of medicine. Jd., art. 4510,

4510a & 4510b. Yet, to require it to retain a physician to control

and supervise the provision of CIC would convert CIC into a

medical service it is not required to furnish.

This court has been forced to inquire into the legal responsi-

bility of Texas physicians to control and supervise prescribed

treatment, a subject that has received little judicial attention.

The task includes fitting together a three party relationship:

the school district, the child and the child’s doctor. The interest

and concern of the medical profession is plain. At a practical

level it makes little sense to require school districts to providea

service that cannot be provided without a prescription if physi-

cians will not write them for fear of running afoul of their own

Practice Act and the demands of their malpractice insurance

carriers. For these reasons, this court invited the Texas Medi-

cal Association and the Dallas County Medical Society to par-

ticipate as amicus curiae. The medical societies submitted a

joint brief stating their view of the Texas Medical Practice

Act.™

The parties agree that the school district cannot provide CIC

without a valid medical prescription. To do so would constitute

the practice of medicine in violation of Article 4510b. A physi-

cian, however, may prescribe treatment to be performed by

‘24 For the aid of treating physicians, their brief is attached as an

appendix to this Opinion.

13a

another individual or an institution if he believes that individ-

ual or institution capable of providing the prescribed service in

a competent manner. Such treatment by the delegate does not

constitute the unlawful practice of medicine. See Thompson v.

Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d 123,

129-30 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Nor is

the physician obligated to supervise directly the treatment he

has prescribed; his duty is to ascertain that the person or

institution providing the treatment in conformity with his

prescription is adequately qualified.

This construction is consistent with the Texas Nursing Prac-

tice Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4513 et seq. (Vernon

1976). Article 4518(5) of that Act defines professional nursing

“as the performance for compensation of any nursing act. . . in

the administration of medications or treatments as prescribed

by a licensed physician.” Jd. (Vernon Supp. 1980-81). Provid-

ing such treatment is a nursing act, and, therefore, not unlaw-

ful practice of medicine whether or not the nurse is under the

direct supervision and control of the prescribing physician. See

Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978) (“Professional

nurses may also administer medications and treatments on a

physician’s prescription . . . without any statutory require-

ment of direct supervision by the physician.”)

A physician thus may prescribe CIC to be furnished by a

school district if he believes that the district has personnel

qualified to perform CIC." The school district retains profes-

sional nurses. CIC has been prescribed for Amber by a licensed

physician, and a proper prescription for such treatment now

has been submitted to the school district. Moreover, the par-

ties concede that with only minimal additional training a pro-

fessional nurse should be more than capable of performing

CIC. In sum, the court is persuaded that furnishing CIC does

'8 It follows that a school district must secure the services of per-

sons sufficiently trained to allow a treating physician to prescribe

with a view toward prescription implementation by the school.

l4a

not constitute the unlawful practice of medicine when per-

formed by professional nurses in accordance with a valid medi-

eal prescription. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4510b

(Vernon 1976)."* Because services that can be provided by

qualified school nurses are “school health services,” and, there-

fore, “related services,” see page 10, supra, CIC is net an

exempt “medical service” within the meaning of the EAHCA."*

The school district contends that even if CIC is not a medical

service, it is not a related service in her case because it is not

“ This court does not hold that CIC can only be performed lawfully

by professional nurses. Lay persons, with proper medical training,

may, in accordance with a valid prescription, provide treatment that

without such training and prescription would be considered unlawful

practice of medicine. Plaintiffs have presented testimony that Scot-

tish Rite Hospital will provide to school district employees free

instruction in CIC. Provided the physician has ascertained that such

training is sufficient to qualify a person to perform CIC, he can

prescribe CIC to be furnished by a school district through its profes-

sional nurses or those non-nursing employees who have received

such training.

6 It is unclear whether a physician is liable for independent acts of

negligence of school district employees performing services in con-

formity with his prescription. In Sparger v. Worley Hospital, Inc.,

547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977), the Texas Supreme Court rejected the

“captain of the ship” doctrine in favor of the “borrowed servant”

doctrine. Arguably, under Sparger, the prescribing physician would

not be liable for independent acts of negligence by school district

employees as long as he exercised ordinary care in prescribing that

the treatment be performed by school district personnel. But, to the

extent that a physician controls, supervises, or instructs unlicensed

persons providing nursing care, he may be liable for their acts. See

Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. MW-318, at 1016-17 (April 1, 1981). Al-

though the Attorney General takes a somewhat narrower view, see

id., on the facts of Sparger, it does not appear that a prescribing

physician exercising ordinary care would be liable for the school

district’s negligence simply because he prescribed the treatment.

But the question has not been dispositively resolved by the Texas

courts.

15a

“required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special

education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). Specifically, they argue that

Amber can attend the school district’s Early Childhood Devel-

opment Classes without CIC during her hours of attendance.

The majority of five-year olds in the school district attend a

half-day program, and only ??? attend more than haif-day.

Upon recommendations of the district’s Coordinator for Early

Childhood Training, Amber has been placed in the half-day

program which lasts two hours and forty-five minutes. While

there was no evidence as to the exact time needed to bus

Amber to school, its range is approximately fifteen to thirty

minutes each way. Assuming the maximum thirty minutes,

Amber will be under the school district’s supervision for almost

four hours each school day.

This court finds that Amber will require catheterization

during her school hours if she is to attend the school district’s

half-day program. The medical evidence presented at trial

establishes that while it cannot be determined definitively

whether a daily interval of four hours between catheterizations

will injure Amber, it does present a risk of serious injury.

Amber is not required to accept such a risk in order to attend

school. Under the EAHCA, Amber is entitled to have her IEP

modified to have the school district furnish CIC. Without such

a modification, Amber’s IEP fails to provide a “related service”

that is “required to assist [Amber] to benefit from special

education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17).

For the stated reasons, the school district is ordered to

modify Amber’s IEP to provide for CIC as prescribed by her

personal physician."* In this regard, this court finds that plain-

6 Although this court uses the term “personal physician” in its

Order, any physician treating Amber regularly may prescribe CIC.

It also is not necessary that the prescribed treatment be identical to

the procedures set out in the pre-trial order, see note 1 supra, so long

as they are prescribed by a licensed physician. Throughout this

dispute, one of the school district’s stated concerns has been that it

16a

tiffs will suffer irreparable harm if such prospective relief is

withheld, that the cost to defendants from such an order is

minimal, and that the public interest is served by ensuring that

Amber receives a free appropriate public education."

§ 504

Because plaintiff's recovery of counsel fees may ultimately

turn on whether a violation of § 504 has been proved, that

statute is discussed in that context. See pages 30-31, infra.

Damages .

The Tatros seek damages for expenses incurred in sending

Amber to the Helping Hand Development Center and the

Special World Day Care Center, and an additional award of

$50,000 for the violation of Amber’s rights.

The federal district courts have split on whether the

EAHCA provides a private right of action for damages. Com-

pare Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.Supp. 1075, 1094 (D. Neb.

1980), aff'd in part vacated in part (8th Cir., April 1, 1981) and

Bochall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F.Supp.

1104, 1112 (N.D.Cal. 1979) with Miener v. Missouri, 498

F.Supp. 944, 949 (E.D.Mo. 1980) and Anderson v. Thompson,

495 F.Supp. 1256, 1269 (E.D.Wis. 1980) and Loughran v. .

Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 113-15 (D.Conn. 1979). The Act

provides that the reviewing court may grant such relief as it

not be required to exercise medical discretion in furnishing CIC. The

latest consent form submitted by Amber’s parents includes, at this

court’s request, her physician’s statement on how Amber is to be

catheterized and the precise times during the day she should be

catheterized. The school district thus is relieved from having to

exercise medical discretion.

" As for the school district’s earlier suggestion that there has been

no showing that the school district receives federal funds, the super-

intendent of the school district conceded that the school district

receives federal funds allocated for special education.

17a

determines to be appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Reim-

bursement for substitute educational services is consistent

with the congressional purpose that handicapped children be

furnished free appropriate education. See Monahan v. Nebras-

ka, supra, at 1094. But the cost of recognizing a general right of

recovery is that educational institutions may be inhibited from

implementing new curricula and techniques for fear of ex-

posure to liability. See Loughran v. Flanders, supra, at 115.

Such a development could frustrate Congress’ intent to expand

and improve the education and related services available to

handicapped children. Jd. at 114. These concerns seem rele-

vant to whether the relief would be appropriate. We do not

here reach this question because the actual proved damages

are of a different sort.

While plaintiffs occasionally have suggested that they are

entitled to a wide range of compensatory damages, the only

damages they were able to prove was the cost of sending

Amber to the Helping Hand Development Center and the

Special World Day Care Center. See page 4, supra. The issue

here thus is not whether the EAHCA exposes school districts

to open-ended tort liability, but whether school districts must

reimburse parents of handicapped children for the cost of

providing services the district was obligated to furnish but did

not. In this regard, it is important to note that damages for

such substitute services are only available where the child is

applying for initial admission. Once the child is enrolled in a

public school, the EAHCA requires the child to remain in its

current educational placement pending EAHCA proceedings.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3); see Stemple v. Board of Education, 623

F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.

3606 (1981). Thus, if the parents remove the child from school

while proceedings are pending, they will not be reimbursed for

the cost of providing appropriate private education. See id.

Where, however, as here, the parents cannot enroll the child

without a risk of injury to the child because a school will not

provide a required related service, appropriate relief ought to

include the cost of alternative sources of education and ther-

18a

apy. Such discretion on the part of the parents is implicit in the

requirement of § 1415(e)(3) that the school district enroll the

applicant in its school program with the consent of the child’s

parents or guardians. The school district, by reimbursing the

parents, indirectly bears the cost it would have borne directly

had it furnished the services it was obligated to provide. That

is, the money “damages” reflect no more than a judicially

compelled provision of the statutorily ordered free appropriate

education. This relief seems to fall within the congressionally

mandated duty to “grant such relief as the court determines is

appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). This court here ex-

presses no opinion on whether a similar analysis is appropriate

where parents can enroll. their child in the school district’s

program without risk to the child’s health."*

This court thus concludes that for the limited type of dam-

ages plaintiffs have proved, they are entitled to recover under

the EAHCA. Their right to recover, of course, is qualified by

their duty to mitigate.

Plaintiffs claim that they suffered damages of $444 per

month while Amber was enrolled at the Development Center

(September, 1979 through August, 1980),"* and $45 per week

plus $100 per month during the sixteen weeks Amber was at

® Where the parents can enroll the child in the public school, and

make private arrangements to remove the source of danger, under

§ 1415(e)(3) the school district may not be obligated to reimburse any

more than the marginal cost of making its program acceptable. This,

of course, simply restates plaintiffs’ general duty to mitigate, dis-

cussed infra.

® Plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket expenses were $191 per month. Under

the collateral source rule, plaintiffs are entitled to the reasonable

value of the services rendered by the Helping Hand Development

Center even though most of the Center’s expenses were paid by

private charities. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 921, comment

c(3); see generally “Collateral Source Rule: Receipt of Public Relief

or Gratuity As Affecting Recovery In Personal Injury Action,” 77

A.L.R.3d 366 (1977).

19a

the Day Care Center (September 1 through December 22,

1980). Plaintiffs’ total claim up until this court’s Interim Order

thus is $6,419 plus attorneys’ fees (see pages 31-35, infra).

The school district argues that even if plaintiffs are entitled

to damages, they breached their duty to mitigate by not plac-

ing Amber in the chool district’s Early Childhood Development

Classes and privately arranging for CIC. The district also

notes that plaintiffs’ expenses were for full-day supervision,

some of which would have been incurred even if Amber had

attended the school district’s half-day program.

Plaintiffs’ burden includes proof that the asserted damages

were proximately caused by the alleged injury. See Prosser on

Torts 236-44 (4th ed. 1971). In this, plaintiffs’ proof is less than

adequate.

Plaintiffs imply that none of the costs of placing Amber inthe

Helping Hand Development Center and the Special World Day

Care Center would have been incurred had Amber been

attending school. The evidence does not support their conten-

tion. As previously noted, Amber was scheduled to attend the

school district’s half-day program. Because both of Amber’s

parents are employed full time, it would have been necessary

’ to arrange for supervision during the remainder of the day.

Amber’s parents thus would have had to arrange, at their own

expense, for a day care center or a private babysitter for the

period that Amber was not in school.” Indeed, a school district

employee testified that many of the district’s half-day pupils

are bussed directly from school to their day care center or

babysitter.

The school district notes that at least some of plaintiffs’

expenses for outside supervision would have been incurred

whether or not Amber had been placed with the school district.

® Although the programs of the Development Center and Day

Care Center are almost full-day, Amber apparently had a private

babysitter for part of the late afternoon.

20a

Plaintiffs offered no evidence from which this court can deter-

mine which of their expenses were incurred because of the

school district’s failure to provide CIC, and which would have

been incurred under any circumstances.” It is plaintiffs’ bur-

den to show that their expenses are sufficiently related to the

alleged injury that compensation is warranted. Here, on the

basis of the record, any such determination is purely specula-

tive, and cannot be made. Although plaintiffs presumably

could have submitted evidence from which this court cduld

calculate the damages proximately caused by the school dis-

trict, they have not done so.

There is one exception to this analysis. Amber received

physical therapy at the Helping Hand Development Center

from September, 1979, through May, 1980, and September

through December 22, 1980,” that would have been provided

by the school district had Amber been able to attend the school

district’s half-day program. A reasonable value of $100 per

month was placed on that service. Plaintiffs, therefore, are

entitled to damages, not including attorneys’ fees, of $1,271.

There is substantial merit to defendants’ contention that

plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages. A school district employ-

ee testified that she had recommended to Amber’s parents that —

Amber be enrolled with the school district and that CIC

privately be arranged pending the dispute’s resolution. If the

district lost, it would reimburse plaintiffs’ expenses. Plaintiffs

*! Mary Tatro testified that she paid Amber’s babysitter $15 to $25

per week. But the hours that Amber was placed with her babysitter

appear to be far less than what would have been necessary had

Amber been attending the school district’s half-day program. More-

over, there was no evidence that such services would have been

available, or that Amber would have been placed with a babysitter

rather than in a day care center for that period.

2% Amber also received such therapy from Jane through August,

1980. Amber’s IEP did not, however, indicate that she would be

receiving any therapy during the summer months, and there is no

evidence that such would have been provided by the school district.

2la

never satisfactorily explained why they chose to forego this

option. Their failure to make such an arrangement is particu-

larly disturbing in that plaintiffs arranged for Amber to be

catheterized at school by her babysitter for over two months

after this court had entered its Interim Order. See pages 4-5,

supra. Plaintiffs introduced much evidence to show how simple

a procedure CIC really is, and how quickly and safely it can be

performed by a lay person with only an hour’s training. Amber

would have needed to be catheterized only once during her

school day at some pre-arranged time. This court agrees with

defendants that it would have been a reasonable and relatively

simple solution for plaintiffs privately to have arranged for

such a service.”

The burden of showing failure to minimize damages rests

with the wrongdoer. See Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co.

v. M/V Delta, 598 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1979). The defendant

must show that the failure was unreasonable and had the

consequence of aggravating the harm. Jd. Defendants have

demonstrated the first element, but not the latter. The only

evidence on what the cost of privately arranged CIC might

have been is the value placed by Amber’s babysitter on her own

services. Amber’s babysitter testified that although she did .-

not charge plaintiffs for her trips to the school to catheterize

Amber and did not expect any remuneration, she valued her

services at ten dollars per trip. No foundation, however, was

laid by plaintiffs to show that Amber’s babysitter had sufficient

personal knowledge to testify as to the reasonable value of

catheterization services. But even accepting ten dollars per

trip as the reasonable value of privately arranged catheteriza-

tion, it is obvious that over the relevant period (September,

1979 through December, 1980), plaintiffs would have expended

more than $1,271 in such services. Thus, plaintiffs’ conduct

® The victim of plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate is Amber. A school

district employee and Amber’s physician testified that Amber would

have benefited from attending the school district’s Early Childhood

Development Classes.

22a

may have been unreasonable but it did not aggravate the harm

(that is, at least not when measured in dollars and cents, see

note 23, supra).™

Plaintiffs also request damages (the cost of providing CIC)”

and attorneys’ fees incurred after this court entered its In-

terim Order. As earlier discussed, after providing CIC for

approximately a week, the school district discontinued

catheterization because of plaintiffs’ failure to submit a paren-

tal consent form and physician’s prescription meeting the

school district’s requirements. The school district contends

that plaintiffs were uncooperative and unreasonable,” while

’ plaintiffs maintain that the school district was not entitled to

the type of consent form and physician’s prescription it had

requested. From the evidence adduced at the March 13th and

April 23rd hearings, this court finds that the school district’s

requested parental consent form and physician’s prescription

were reasonable. Although the final agreed to consent form

and prescription are not identical to those originally requested

by the school district, they meet many of the school district’s

requirements. In particular, this court believes that the school

district’s insistence that the prescription be written in a man-

ner not requiring medical discretion on its part was a legiti-

mate request and one plaintiffs should have complied with.

* Alternatively, if the testimony of Amber’s babysitter is con-

sidered nonprobative, defendants failed to meet their burden by not

offering any evidence on the cost of catheterization services.

*% Presumably, plaintiffs contend that under the collateral source

rule they are entitled to the value of the services rendered by Am-

ber’s babysitter, even though they suffered no out-of-pocket ex-

penses. See note 19, supra.

* The school district offered evidence showing that at the time it

and plaintiffs were discussing the consent form and prescription,

Mary Tatro was threatening officials of the district with additional

lawsuits as well as requesting the Texas Medical Association to

investigate the school district’s medical consultant.

23a

This court also notes that the school district never disavowed

its duty to provide CIC under this court’s Interim Order, and

went to some length to accommodate plaintiffs. Because the

school district violated no duty, plaintiffs are not for this

reason entitled to damages and attorneys’ fees incurred after

this court’s Interim Order. We turn to the more difficult ques-

tion of whether attorney fees are recoverable at all.”

Attorneys’ Fees

The EAHCA does not provide for an award of attorneys’

fees, see Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F.Supp. 1256, 1268-70

(E.D. Wis. 1980); see also Hines v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ.,

497 F.Supp. 403, 409 (E.D.N.C. 1980), and they are not re-

coverable unless they may be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1988; see Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980);

Maher v. Gagne, 100 S.Ct. 2570 (1980), or 29 U.S.C. §§ 794,

794a(b).

Since passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in 1976, courts may intheir

discretion allow a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee

as part of the costs in actions or proceedings to enforce certain

statutory provisions. One of the listed provisions is 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and the Tatros throughout this suit have argued that

they were seeking relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

and § 1983 as well as the EAHCA. ;

The Tatros can recover counsel fees only under three possi-

ble theories. First, it can be contended that an award of counsel

fees is “appropriate relief’ under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).

Second, it can be argued that this is an action to enforce rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that § 1988, therefore, authorizes

an award of fees. Third, the Tatros may be entitled to attor-

neys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. § 749a(b) (§ 505) from a State denial

of rights under § 504.

*" No evidence was offered to sustain the prayed for $50,000. Plain-

tiffs have not shown any bad faith or malicious conduct on the part of

any defendant.

24a

Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980) seemed to provide

strong support for the attorney fee application under the

second theory. In Thiboutot the Court held that the “and laws”

language of § 1983 allowed a suit for a denial by Maine of

benefits to which plaintiffs claimed entitlement under the

federal Social Security Act. The Court also held that the “any

action” language of § 1988 authorized an award of counsel fees

for the suit. Three justices dissented, expressing concern over

the apparent open-ended reasoning of the majority. The dis-

sent, authored by Justice Powell, pointed out that the major- ~

ity’s construction creates rights of action under § 1983 for

which there is no grant of federal jurisdiction. It reasoned that,

contrary to the effect of the majority’s holding, § 1983 has

always been read to be coextensive with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)

which supplies jurisdiction for claims involving rights secured

by the Constitution or by any act of Congress providing for

equal rights of citizens. In listing by illustration the possible

rights of action created by the majority, the dissenting justices

observed that the “only exception will be in cases where the

governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations

of its terms. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-151,

n.5 (1970); ef., Great American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny,

442 U.S. 366 (1979).” Jd. at 2513, n.11 (parallel citations

omitted).

Assuming for now the EAHCA to be an act of Congress

providing for equal rights of citizens within the meaning of

§ 1343(3), this court has jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim. Cf.,

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600

(1979). It appeared that Thiboutot answered the question be-

fore this court, despite the caveat implicit in the expressed

unease of three justices. Recently, however, the three were

joined by Stewart and Stevens in Pennhurst State School,and

Hospital v. Halderman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (April 20, 1981) in

casting doubt on such a sweeping construction of Thiboutot. In

Pennhurst, the Court suggested two qualifications to a possi-

ble § 1983 application. First, the right claimed to be denied by

the State must be a “right secured” by the laws of the United

25a

States. Second, Justice Powell’s footnote in the Thiboutot dis-

sent regarding exclusivity of remedy, 100 S.Ct. 2513 n.11,

gained majority support. Even Justice White’s dissent in

Pennhurst acknowledged that “Congress may explicitly direct

otherwise such as if the ‘governing statute provides an ex-

clusive remedy for violation of its terms.’” Jd. at 4376. This

court will address these two inquiries first in determining the

applicability of § 1983 to the EAHCA, and then will turn to

§ 504.

The right to a free appropriate education is plainly secured

by the Act. The more difficult question is whether Congress

intended the remedies it created to ensure such an education to

be exclusive; that is, whether the EAHCA falls under the

“Powell exception.” Undoubtedly, Congress can, by express

language, provide either that a created remedial scheme is or is

not the only enforcement mechanism for a congressional enact-

ment.

In addressing the applicability of § 1983 tothe EAHCA, this

court will first assume that compliance with the Act’s remedial

scheme is not held to be a prerequisite to federal suit. See Patsy

v. Florida Intern University, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (en

banc), and will then make the contrary assumption. This court

proceeds in both directions because there is substantial dis-

agreement among the Circuits as to the exhaustion require-

ment, and the Supreme Court has not yet decided the question. —

This court usually would stop with an en banc decision of the

Fifth Circuit because it binds this court. Here, however, there

is a Janus faced quality to the reliance in this case upon § 1983

to enforce rights secured by the EAHCA. Plaintiffs face a

virtual conceptual “catch-22.” A contention that the EAHCA

may be enforced by § 1983 without exhausting the EAHCA

remedies breathes life into the argument that its remedial

scheme is exclusive. But, a concession that such exhaustion is a

prerequisite breathes life into the argument that no action

under § 1983 has been prosecuted; that its citation alone is

insufficient to trigger § 1988.

26a

Exclusivity Without Exhaustion

The difficult task is the inferring of intended exclusivity of

remedy from the detail of the particular remedial scheme.

Here, applying the standards set forth in the Court’s recent

opinions, such an inference is both plain and compelling.

In Pennhurst, the majority did not reach the question of

§ 1983 applicability, having concluded that § 6010 of the

Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

conferred no substantive rights. Justice White, joined by

Brennan and Marshall, reached a contrary conclusion and then

‘faced the exclusivity issue. At the outset, the dissenting jus-

‘ tices pointed to Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,

supra, for the proposition that “§ 1983 protections apply to all

rights secured by federal statutes ‘unless there is a clear in-

dication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are

exclusive or that for various other reasons a § 1983 action is

inconsistent with congressional intention.’” 49 U.S.L.W. at

4376 (emphasis added). The dissent reasoned that the creation

of a federal agency to oversee a cooperative state-federal ven-

ture was not alone sufficient to infer that Congress intended

the oversight to be exclusive. It then found language in

§ 6010's legislative history that Congress contemplated that

the “rights” under § 6010 “should be protected and assured by

the Congress and the courts.” Jd. at 4375-77. In sum, the

dissenting justices found that Thiboutot “creates a presump-

tion that a federal statute creating federal rights may be en-

forced in a § 1983 action.” Jd. at 4376.

The dissent’s conclusion plowed no new ground. Where Con-

gress has spoken explicitly, the Court has had little difficulty

finding remedial exclusivity. See Adickes v.S. H. Kress &Co.,

supra, (§ 1983 cannot supplement Title II, the Public Accom-

modation Provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000a). Where recognition of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), as

supplementary to a detailed remedial scheme, would frustrate

the scheme, the Court has found exclusivity. Thus, in Great

American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny, supra, the Court

refused to allow prosecution under § 1985(c) of rights secured

27a

by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court observed

that § 1985(c) confers no substantive rights itself; that “[uJnder

Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are sub-

ject to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed

to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary

resolution of claims.” Jd. at 372-73. The Court pointed to the

requirement that a complainant must first go to a State em-

ployment commission, to the conciliation processes, and to the

time limits for the filing of claims. It also noted that the Act

withholds resort to the courts until these processes are ex-

hausted. Finally, it observed that Title VII has been judicially

construed as not allowing general or punitive damages or jury

trials. Permitting the case to proceed under § 1985 would allow

a complaint to by-pass the administrative process. After

gathering analogical support from Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S..820

(1976) (holding § 717 of Title VII to be the exclusive federal

remedy for employment discrimination claims of federal em-

ployees) the Court concluded that “{uJnimpaired effectiveness

can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII

only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII

cannot be the basis for a course of action under § 1985(c).” Jd. at

378.

The EAHCA is not silent about either the judiciary’s or the

administering agency’s roles in resolving disputes arising

under its provisions. Section 1415 details procedures granting

parents access to records, written notice to parents of pro-

posed changes or refusals to change the placement of a child,

opportunity to present complaints regarding the education,

and an impartial due process hearing by the State educational

agency. The statute provides that the hearings will allow par-

ticipation of counsel, cross-examination, a right to a verbatim

record and written findings. Only after administrative reme-

dies have been exhausted may de novo review by State or

federal court be sought. Although the reviewing court may

take additional evidence, the statute provides that the court

shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Finally, the statute mandates the

28a

preservation of the status quo during the pendency of any

proceeding under the Act. Jd. § 1415(e)(3).

Given this carefully constructed scheme, the teachings of

Novotny and Brown compel the conclusion that it need not be

eviscerated by tolerance of § 1983 suits. Section 1983 creates

no substantive rights but is solely a procedural statute. See

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra. It is illogic-

al to conclude that Congress created an elaborate administra-

tive review mechanism at local and State levels, yet,

simultaneously, envisioned that anyone wishing to do so, could

proceed directly to federal court. While the federal courts are

given an important role by the EAHCA, it is not an open-ended

responsibility. Their role is limited in two material ways.

First, the federal judicial review is not available until after at

least two levels of State administrative review have failed to

adjust the dispute. Second, under this scheme, even if the

dispute is not resolved at the administrative level, the review-

ing court will have before it a fully developed administrative

record, presumably reflecting the nuances of the decisions of

the school and the parents. Section 1983, however, has no such

constraints. Moreover, like Title VII, judicial decisions have

limited the type of damages recoverable under the EAHCA.

For example, there is no recovery of private tuition expenses

for children withdrawn from school before completion of the

review procedure. See Stemple v. Board of Education, supra.

Recognizing a right of action under § 1983 for rights “secured”

by the EAHCA would open the door to a range of damages

unavailable under the EAHCA, and thereby undermine the

entire analytical focus of granting relief as appropriate under

the EAHCA. Finally, the status quo requirement of

§ 1415(e)(3) could be cast aside if relief became available under

§ 1983. In the words of the Novotny majority:

together by Conereen tin the EALCA} only by boldieg

r in 0

that deprivation of a right created by [the EAHCA] can-

= e basis for a course of action under [§ 1983]. Jd. at

Se

2s

ed ae

29a

Yet, the compelling force of Novotny and Brown is met

head-on by Thiboutot. Plainly, the Social Security Act contains

an elaborate internal remedial scheme. But the potential for its

destruction by § 1983 enforcement was not discussed in Thi-

boutot, even by the dissent. It is difficult, if not impossible, to

reconcile this aspect of Thiboutot with the Court’s pronounce-

ment in Novotny and Brown.

Exclusivity With Exhaustion

The disruptive consequences of recognizing a § 1983 suit are

substantially reduced, if not eliminated, if exhaustion of

EAHCA administrative remedies is a prerequisite to a § 1983

suit. In Patsy v. Florida Intern University, supra, the Court

of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies

would be required in appropriate cases. Because none of the

four traditional exceptions to required exhaustion, as stated in

Patsy, are present here, there appears to be no reason not to

require exhaustion of remedies in compliance with EAHCA.

Id. at 903-04. The EAHCA thus does not foreclose a § 1983 suit

provided Patsy exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit.

But if exhaustion of administrative remedies is required

under both the EAHCA and § 1983, and, all the proved dam-

ages are available under the EAHCA, there is the additional

consideration that § 1983 serves no purpose other than that ofa

conduit for attorneys’ fees. It appears that the Tatros, at least

until this suit was filed, in no way relied upon a § 1983 claim,

unless it is assumed that all of the activity before ARD Com-

mittee, the Impartial Due Process Hearing Officer and the

administrative appeals were all § 1983 prosecutions because

they were required exhaustion steps.

Whatever may be the role of § 1983 where the attack is upon

the adequacy of procedures themselves, this court sees no role

for § 1983 here. Where § 1983 has no greater role than the

statute it purportedly “enforces,” its citation will not trigger

the § 1988 attorney fee provisions. Specifically, this was not

“an action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§ 1983].”

30a

As Justice Powell noted in his Thiboutot dissent, “(t]he uses

of this technique have not been explored fully.” 100 S.Ct. at

2514. But this court has had experience in other contexts with

multi-claim litigation where there is a statutory basis for coun-

sel fees only for part of a claim. Whether the descriptive phase

be “gravamen” or some other expression of predominance, this

court sees no basis for awarding fees when the fee triggering

statute plays no role but that of allowing attorney fees.

This court turns now to the question of whether § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 700, et seq., secures a

right enforceable either under § 1983 so as to allow recovery of

§ 1988 attorney fees or by an implied right of action under § 504

so as to allow recovery of fees under 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).

With the EAHCA, our primary focus was upon remedial

exclusivity, the second Pennhurst inquiry. That focus shifts

here to the first inquiry, whether the general proscription of

§ 504 imposes an obligation upon Texas, enforceable by a

Texas citizen—a question logically antecedent to whether

there is an implied right of action or whether its “obligation” is

enforceable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

This question is controlled by Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman, supra, where the court construed the

Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. § 6010. The Court held that Congress must express

clearly its intent to impose obligations upon the states when it

acts under its spending power—“if Congress intends to impose

a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so

unambiguously.” Jd. at 4367. Because the lower courts had

almost uniformly held that § 504 is enforceable by an implied

right of action, and the Congress, by passage of

§ 794a(b), authorized attorney fees, there has been little need

% Therefore, this court will not dwell upon the relationship be-

tween § 1983 and § 504 in the context of attorney fees. If there is a

right secured after Pennhurst, § 794a(b) explicitly authorizes attor-

ney fees.

3la

to press § 1983 as the procedural expression for § 504 viola-

tions. And in Tatro v. Texas, supra, the Court of Appeals

found that the Tatros have rights secured under § 504 and an

implied right to enforce them.

The Court in Pennhurst referred to § 504 in illustrating the

failure of the lower court “to recognize the well-settled distinc-

tion between Congressional ‘encouragement’ of state pro-

grams and the imposition of binding obligations on the States.”

49 U.S.L.W. at 4370. The Court continued:

Relying on that distinction, this Court in Southeastern

Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), re-

jected a claim that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

which bars discrimination against coca — in

federally funded pro , obligates schools to take

affirmative steps to eliminate problems raised by appli-

cant’s hearing disability. Finding that “state agencies

such as Southeastern are only ‘encouraged’. . . to —

such policies and procedures,’” Jd. at 410 (quoting the

Act), we stressed that “Congress understood that accom-

modation of the needs of handicap individuals may

require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it

in those instances where it wished to do so.” Jd. at 411. -

Likewise in this case, Congress was aware of the need of

developmentally disabled persons and plainly understood

the difference, financial and otherwise, between

encouraging a specified type of treatment and mandating

it.

Id.

This court makes no pretense that it comprehends the in-

tended reach of the quoted language. In Southeastern, the

Court expressly reserved the question of enforcement by an

implied right or action under § 1983. 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5.

The Circuit’s holding in Tatro v. Texas, supra, is binding

upon this court unless plainly undermined by the later decided

Pennhurst. This court and the Court of Appeals obviously

differ on the reach of Southeastern. Moreover, another panel of

the Court of Appeals reached a result contrary to the view of

this court in Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127

32a

(5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 49 U.S.L.W. 4468 (1981). The Su-

preme Court’s remand of Camenisch left the question unre-

solved because it did not address the merits of the § 504 issues.

This court remains unconvinced as to the applicability of

§ 504; its views reinforced by Pennhurst. Yet, there is no

intervening decision speaking with sufficient clarity to allow

this court to take a course different from that of the Court of

Appeals. This court’s conscience is to follow the law; and

Camenisch and Tatro are the law of this Circuit until they are

overturned by the Supreme Court. For these reasons of in-

stitutional order, this court finds that 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b)

authorize an award of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs. It

turmis now to their amount.

Awarded Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees of $30,000 and expenses of

$2,314. Craig Enoch, attorney for plaintiffs, testified that ap-

proximately 334 hours of attorney time were devoted to this

case up to the January trial. This court estimates that the trial

necessitated an additional twelve hours.” Enoch also testified

that 145 hours of law clerk time were used in preparation.

Plaintiffs contend that the attorney time should be billed at $90

an hour, and the law clerk time at $45 an hour.

In determining a reasonable fee, this court looks to the

twelve factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-

press, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), as further explicated

in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575

(1980). Those factors are:

(1) The time and labor required;

(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions;

® Enoch also testified that 64.4 hours were devoted to this case

after this court entered its Interim Order. For the reasons stated

above, no attorneys’ fees will be awarded for those hours.

33a

(3) = skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-

erly;

(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney

due to acceptance of the case;

(5) The customary fee;

(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the cir-

cumstances;

(8) The amount involved and the results obtained; .

(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys;

(10) The “undesirability” of the case;

(11) The nature and length of the professional rela-

tionship with the client; and

(12) Awards in similar cases.

Johnson, at 717-19.

As noted in Copper Liquor, at 583, “recent decisions . . .

suggest that district courts, in computing attorneys’ fees,

should pay special heed to Johnson criteria numbers (1) the

time and labor involved, (5) the customary fee, (8).the amount

involved and the results obtained, and (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of counsel.”

At the outset, it must be noted that Enoch is relatively

inexperienced. At the time of the initiation of this dispute,

Enoch had been practicing for approximately three and a half

years, and had been a member of the federal bar for only two

and a half of those years. During that time he had accumulated

virtually no experience as a civil rights counsel, and had only

limited experience in federal litigation. Although it is improper

to penalize an attorney for his recent admission to the bar, see

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra, at 719, the

Johnson factors nevertheless require this court to consider the

experience, reputation, and ability of counsel.

34a

Enoch testified that he believes $90 an hour to be a reason-

able and customary fee. This court concurs that such an hourly

rate is appropriate and reasonable for an attorney experienced

in civil rights actions of this general nature. This court has

reservations, however, at reimbursing a relatively in-

experienced lawyer at such a rate.

Enoch submitted time records indicating the hours spent on

briefing, trial preparation and other services. Upon reviewing

those records, this court concludes that the time devoted by

Enoch to this case was greater than that which would have

ordinarily been required by an attorney with experience in

civil rights and federal litigation.” As such, this court believes

*® The following items are illustrative of why this court believes the

amount of billed time to be excessive: (1) From October 4 to October

12, 1980, plaintiffs’ attorneys spent over seventeen hours preparing

and filing the original complaint and request for injunctive relief..

That document consists of little more than lengthy citations from the

relevant statutes and a recitation of the essential facts. Plaintiffs at

that time already had completed three levels of administrative re-

view, and were intimately familiar with the facts and applicable law.

(2) From October 24 to November 8, 1979, plaintiffs’ attorneys

needed approximately fourteen hours to prepare both a motion to

amend the complaint and the amended complaint. The motion to

amend, which cited virtually no law, and was two and a half pages

long, requested this court to permit plaintiffs to join the Texas

Education Agency, Commissioner Bowen, and the individual mem-

bers of the involved Boards. The amended complaint was a duplicate

of the original complaint, with the new parties “pasted in.” (3) From

December 3 to December 11, 1980, plaintiffs’ attorneys required

approximately six hours to prepare a six and half page

in opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss. In that memoran-

dum, almost half of which is quotations, plaintiffs cite a total of three

federal district court decisions. Most of defendants’ contentions

already had been raised and briefed earlier in the litigation, and

plaintiffs’ response essentially was to reassert its previous argu-

ments. In that regard, it is worthwhile noting that defendants did

raise some issues—particularly the applicability of Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332 (1979)—to which plaintiffs simply did not respond. See

Memorandum Opinion of December 31, 1980, pages 2-4.

©

-

VE

35a

that Enoch’s request must be discounted by some factor that

reflects his inexperience. Such a determination necessarily is

somewhat arbitrary. But on the basis of Enoch’s written sub-

missions to and personal appearances before this court, it is

this court’s conclusion that an appropriate and reasonable

hourly rate is in the area of $60 an hour. A contingency factor of

20% is reasonable, bringing the rate to $72 an hour. Multiply-

ing that rate by the hours testified to, plaintiffs are entitled to

reasonable attorneys’ fees of $24,192."

Plaintiffs’ attorneys acknowledged at the trial that their

time may appear excessive at first blush. They assert, how-

ever, that the complexity of the case required such an invest-

ment of time and effort. This court is acquainted with the legal

and factual issues raised by this case. Factually, this case is not

sufficiently complex to warrant the requested award. The

record in this case is relatively straight-forward, and was

developed early in the course of the administrative proceed-

ings. With the exception of the permissible time interval be-

tween catheterizations, most of the facts necessary for grant-

ing injunctive relief were undisputed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are

correct in noting that the legal issues here are both complex

and novel. But this complexity was not reflected in plaintiffs’

attorneys’ work. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ memoranda and oral

arguments were of little assistance to this court in resolving

the legal issues raised by this case. The number of hours

devoted by plaintiffs’ attorneys to this case thus appears to be

less the product of any factual or legal complexity than the

result of their relative inexperience. I intend no criticism of

counsel for lack of experience; the question is compensation

and experience is relevant.

Looking to the other Johnson criteria, this court finds that

plaintiffs’ attorneys were not prejudiced by having been pre-

%! Plaintiffs’ attorneys have billed approximately ten hours spent

deliberating with the press. As noted by plaintiffs’ own expert wit-

ness, plaintiffs request to be reimbursed for this is inappropriate.

36a

cluded from accepting more lucrative employment; that there

were time limitations imposed by the circumstances, but that

such limitations were not inordinately severe or unusual for

federal litigation; that plaintiffs’ attorneys do not have a

reputation as experienced civil rights and federal litigator,”

and that the case was not “undesirable.” This court also deter-

mines that while the money involved here is not substantial,

the awarded prospective relief is necessary for Amber’s con-

tinued well-being. Taking all these factors into consideration,

this court finds reasonable attorneys’ fees to be $24,192." In

addition, plaintiffs will be awarded reasonable attorneys’ ex-

penses of $3,039."

Judgment is by separate instrument filed herewith.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM

United States District Judge

® Plaintiffs’ attorneys initially were retained with regard to the

administrative proceedings before the involved Texas agencies.

* This court awards an additional $7,200 (100 hours at $72 an hour)

if this case is appealed to the Fifth Circuit by defendants.

™ Considering that a not insubstantial portion of the clerk time was

devoted to secretarial type duties rather than legal research, such

time is reimbursed as an expense item at the rate at which the clerk

was paid, five dollars an hour. See generally Jones v. Armstrong

Cork Co., 680 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1980) (may not bill paralegal time

where most of time was in performance of clerical duties).

37a

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TATRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

STATE OF TEXAS, et al., ;

Defendants.

AMICUS CURIAE ADDRESSING

QUESTIONS RAISED IN ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT:

As invited in this Court’s Order of February 6, 1981, the

Texas Medical Association and the Dallas County Medical Soci-

ety respectfully submit this Amicus Curiae brief and request

that it be considered by this Honorable Court.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The Texas Medical Association is a non-profit corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Texas. Its mem-

bership consists of approximately 18,500 physicians. The Dal-

las County Medical Society is composed of physicians practic-

ing in Dallas County, Texas. Its membership consists of ap-

proximately 3,000 members. Questions concerning the provi-

sion of medical care for patients in Texas by licensed physicians

utilizing the skills of qualified nonphysicians are of major in-

terest to these organizations and their members.

. rel

> ‘>

weet a —S ss Te eS

38a

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The questions raised in the Court’s Order of February 6,

1981, are addressed in the sequence of their presentation in

that Order.

Question (1)(a). Whether under the Texas Medical Practice

Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4495, et seg. (Vernon

1978) employees of the school district can only provide CIC

(the provision of CIC is described in the attached stipula-

tion from the pretrial order in this case) if they are under

the control and supervision of a licensed physician and what

the training of such persons must be. These questions. in-

clude the question of whether to furnish CIC without such _ .

supervision would be to engage in the unlawful practice of

medicine. /d., art. 4510, 4510a and 4510b. See also, art. 4518

V.A.T.S. and Op. Tex. Att. Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978),

H-395 (Sept. 9, 1974).

Under Texas law, a person is regarded as practicing medi-

cine if he (she) professes to be a physician or surgeon and

diagnoses, treats, or offers to treat any disease or disorder,

mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury, by any

system or method, or seeks to effect cures thereof; or does the

above acts and charges therefor, directly or indirectly, money

or other compensation. (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., arts. 4510 and

4510a (Vernon 1976)).

Thus, a person professing to be a physician who treats

another for a disease or disorder, such as neurogenic bladder

dysfunction using clear intermittent catheterization (CIC), is

practicing medicine and must have a license to do so under

Texas law. Similarly, a person who treats another for a disease

or disorder and charges for that treatment is also practicing

medicine and must have a license to do so lawfully.

Both the Dallas County Medical Society and the Texas Medi-

cal Association respectfully submit that CIC should not be

administered to a patient except when ordered by a physician.

It is a treatment used for selected patients with

sia and neurogenic bladders. (Enrile and Crooks,

39a

mittent Catheterization for Home Management in Children

with Myclomeningocele,” 19 Clinical Pediatrics, 743 (Nov.

1980)). Even though patients, parents, and others can be

trained to perform the technical aspects of this treatment, this

does not affect the judgment that CIC should be performed

only under a physicians order. However, classification of CIC

as the practice of medicine would not prevent the delegation of

such a procedure by a physician to a nonphysician. The delega-

tion of medical tasks by physicians to nonphysicians has been

an accepted part of the practice of medicine for years. Thomp-

son v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d

123 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).

The parties in this case appear to agree that CIC is a proce-

dure which, if provided by school system personnel, would only

be provided when prescribed or ordered by a physician. The

debate appears to be centered on the fact that physicians can

and do delegate this task to others. However, administering

the treatment itself by a nonphysician under a physician’s

order is not the unlawful practice of medicine even if a charge is

made for the treatment provided. If providing CIC is not

considered to be the unlawful practice of medicine because it is

a treatment which the physician can delegate to others, this

does not mean that it is a treatment which need not be ordered

by a physician. In Texas, a nurse or an unlicensed lay person

may not lawfully decide that a treatment such as CIC is needed

for a particular condition (diagnose), administer treatment,

and “charge therefor, directly or indirectly, money or other

compensation” without a physician’s direction. (Tex. Rev. Civ.

Stat., arts. 4510, 4510a, 4510b (Vernon 1976)).

The definitions of the practice of medicine, nursing, and the

other licensed health professions overlap to some extent. This

creates the result that the same act when per-

formed by a nurse under the direction of a physician is con-

sidered to be part of the practice of nursing and when per-

formed by a physician is considered to be the practice of medi-

cine.

40a

The Texas Attorney General recognized this result in 1962

when he defined the practice of nursing prior to the inclusion of

the definition of professional nursing in what is now commonly

referred to as the “Nursing Practice Act,” (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.

Ann., art. 4513 et seq. (Vernon 1976 and Vernon Supp. 1980-

1981)). This definition formulated by the Attorney General

included the following statement recognizing the delegation of

medical tasks:

“Generally speaking, the duty of the nurse is to out

.the medical Seestennet ceeneribed by a doctor tor his pa-

tient.” (Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. -1403 (1962))

The practice of nursing is more precisely defined today.

(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4518, sec. 5, (Vernon Supp.

1980-1981)). The statutory definition includes:

“.. . The administration of . . . treatments as prescribed

by a licensed physician. . .”

Thus, nurses can lawfully perform medical functions dele-

gated to them by physicians. When nurses do perform dele-

gated medical tasks, they do so with the knowledge that

administering these delegated treatments is part of the prac-

tice of nursing and recognized as such in the state statutes

defining nursing practice. When performing CIC as ordered by

a physician for a particular patient, the nurse is practicing

nursing as it is contemplated in the statutes.

Question (1)(b). The nature and extent of such supervision.

Once a physician has determined that CIC or any other

treatment modality is appropriate for his or her patient, the

physician may delegate performance of part or all of the treat-

ment to another. The physician continues to monitor the prog-

ress of the patient, making sure that the treatment is being

a parent, or the patient, is a treatment ordered and monitored

by the physician.

4la

The extent of the supervision or control which is proper in

cases where CIC is ordered must be determined by each physi-

cian in each case, taking into consideration (1) the needs and

capabilities of the patient and (2) the training, experience and

competence of the individual (parent, teacher, patient, or

nurse) who will be monitoring or performing the procedure

ordered by the physician. One thing is certain: a patient being

provided CIC by nurses, school teachers, or others under a

physician’s orders will expect that the treatment provided will

conform to the same standard of care as would apply if a

physician were providing the treatment.

Concerning the physical location of the physician, the follow-

ing statement made to the Attorney General by the Texas

State Board of Medical Examiners in a 1973 Attorney General

Opinion Request was referenced with approval in an Attorney

General Opinion involving ambulance attendants not in the

physical presence of a licensed physician.

“Unlicensed persons could legally perform acts which

would constitute the practice of medicine if such persons

were under the reasonable control and supervision of a

licensed physician,” Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-27 (April

12, 1973)

Several Attorney General Opinions have dealt with the

meaning of such terms as “direct” and “on-site” supervision as

those terms are used in describing the supervision required of

the delegating physicians. Tex. Att. Gen. Op. Nos. C-795 (Dec.

30, 1966) and H-368 (Aug. 12, 1974). The degree of instruction

or supervision by the physician was also discussed in a 1978

Attorney General Opinion addressing the scope of lawful prac-

- tice by nurse midwives:

“Thus, even if ‘orming an episiotomy or making su-

tures were held to constitute medical treatment, a reg-

istered nurse could provide these services at the doctor's

direction ... The a te degree of instruction or

supervision by the ician will vary with the nurse’s

rience and q tions . . . These qualifications are

relevant to a determination of the appropriate degree of

42a

instruction and supervision to be provided by a physician.

Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-1293 (1978).

In the case of CIC, the technical aspects of the procedure are

not complicated and can be performed successfully by children

on themselves after appropriate training (boys by age 8 and

girls by age 10). Wyndacle, Oosterlinck and De Sy, “Clean

Intermittent Self-Catheterization in the Chronical Manage-

ment of the Neurogenic Bladder,” 6 European Neurology 107-

110 (1980). Hannigan, in “Teaching Intermittent Self-Cathe-

terization to Young Children with Myelodysplasia,” 21 De-

velopmental Medicine and Child Neurology 365-368 (1979),

describes the successful training by nurses of several five year

old children (one boy, three girls) to perform CIC on them- .

selves. Of course, physician supervision and continuous

monitoring by parents or nurses is vital to minimize the likeli-

hood and severity of complications and to assure proper main-

tenance and sterilization of the equipment used.

CIC appears to be a procedure which can be safely per-

formed while neither a physician or nurse is present. CIC can

be done safely when a patient or other person is trained to

perform it properly and is taught to recognize conditions which

should be brought to the physician’s attention.

Nonphysicians often care for patients under such circum-

stances. Even when relatively sophisticated treatment is

being provided, nonphysicians are commonly placed in a role of

deciding when a physician should be notified or when to in-

stitute treatment prescribed by a physician under standing

medical orders written after the patient has been examined

and diagnosed. The physician need not be present for every

treatment ordered. The activities which commonly take place

in a cardiac intensive care unit provide an illustrative example

of such a situation. In an article by the present Assistant

General Counsel of the American Medicial Association, the

following is recorded:

“When the nurse serves in the cardiac intensive care unit,

she has the advantage of sophisticated equipment that

extends her ability to make evaluations pieuane the

43a

reliability of such evaluations. Her training may be more

highly specialized for the tasks she performs in the unit

than that of the average physician. When the nurse in the

unit institutes treatment measures in emergency situa-

tions, she is instituting treatment prescribed by a physi-

cian in anticipation that such a contingency might arise.”

Anderson, “Orderly Transfer of Procedural Responsibili-

ties from Medical to Nursing Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics

of North America 311-319 at 318-319 (Jun. 1970).

The nurse is not unlawfully practicing medicine in the situation

described above. He or she is instituting treatment prescribed

under a contingency order and, no doubt, has been placed in

that position of responsibility because of demonstrated train-.

ing, experience, and competence. The same should be true for

any nurse, parent, or teacher who performs the CIC for the

child. Each should have the necessary training to perform the

treatment safely, and to know when the physician should be

called.

Question 2. The conditions under which CIC ought to be

provided consistently with conservative and sound medical

judgment including both technique and with training level

of the person administering it.

CIC should only be provided under the orders of directions

of a licensed physician. Just as in any other treatment,

“. . . a nurse should comprehend the cause and effect of

any order a physician instructs to her execution. As nurs-

ing education and pak have become more sophisti-

cated, and as more medical acts have become technical in

nature in that they are repetitive and are performed under

controlled circumstances re mrey have delegated to

med ae marine haha pew pono mye aye

n ce encom 8 as -

miinisteation of injections wdc at and intramuscu-

of dlagnost procedures Se! the utilization of comple

c n of complex

mechanical devices in the Saad

therapeutic ” Anderson, “Orders Transfer of

Procedural Responsibilities from Medical to Nursin,

Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics of North America 311-319

314 (June 1970).

x.

doa

The performance of procedures by nurses under a physi-

cian’s order has been called “. . . dependent nursing functions

(which) are those performed under the legal orders and direc-

tion or supervision of licensed physicians.” (See Anderson

supra, at 314). These functions can be distinguished from

recognized independent nursing functions, that is, those per-

formed by virtue of the nurse’s education, training, and experi-

ence, and which properly reflect the nurse’s independent judg-

ment. Such functions might include:

“(T)he evaluation of a patient’s condition for the 1 mal ears of

determining his ability to care for himself or his require-

4and reporting of sym toms and reactions; and the applica-

tion and execution of nursing techniques and p ures.

(See Anderson, supra, at 314).

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals offers a

voluntary accreditation mechanism for hospitals which is rec-

ognized by the Medicare program for purposes of determining

a hospital’s eligibility for participation. (See Commerce Clear-

ing House Medicare and Medicaid Guide, “Conditions of Par-

ticipation for Hospitals,” para 12,340 (Mar. 1979)). Thus, in the

case of nurses performing dependent functioris outside the

’ hospital or nursing home setting, it may be helpful to review

provisions of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-

tals (JCAH) Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1981 Edi-

tion) relating to home health services.

The section on “Home Care Services,” pp. 57-62 of the JCAH

Manual, provides in part:

“Each patient receiving home care services shall be under

identity of the physician pri primary aprnshinietiaciee

identity o res e for prstes

U yo rral 5 ean each patien

pon to the home core: eres

shall receive an initial evaluation by a physician or can Fe

istered nurse acceptable to the home care

determine the appropriateness of the patients health cae

ments for nursing or medical attendance; the observation |

45a

registered nurse employed by the home care program.

This individual or a similarly qualif ualified designee shall be

available during the operating hours of the program, and

shall participate in activities relevant to the professional

services oe to the oo including the level of

personne! required.” (p.

The JCAH Manual further provides that when services are

to be provided by individuals or by a participating community

agency on an hourly or per-visit basis, a written agreement

must be prepared and must specify:

“e The services to be provided . .

«The manner in which services shall be coordinated,

supervised, and evaluated by the hospital-administered

home care program and its staff;

* The role of the hospital, the participating community

agency, and the responsible physician in the establish-

ment of a patient care plan;

* A statement to the effect that the patient care plan will

not be altered unilaterally;

* The submission, within one week after each service/

visit, of appropriate documentation (such as progress

notes) of services provided;

* The participation in case conferences .

¢ The term of the agreement or contract, in the basis for

its termination or renewal.” (pp. 58-59)

The JCAH Manual also provides that a director of the home

health care program shall be designated. The director’s re-

sponsibilities include written descriptions of the responsibility

of physicians and other professionals in the delivery of health

services. The JCAH Manual also states that:

“Home care services wood nee ype bag ms hone shall

be ee i perrensiss and

thon of paronnel providing come

46a

are to be employed in the provision of — care serv-

ices, such personnel shall be adequately trained and su-

pervised, and their duties shall be specified in writing.

“The medical staff shall assure that the quality of care

provided to home care patients is comparable to that pro-

vided to inpatients, ambulatory care patients, and

emergency care patients. The medical staff may, con-

sistent with hospital policy, ee one or more a ef

cians to carry out this responsib ity, or such responsibil-

ity may be a function of one of the committees of the

me bo a the activites of a — director

emplo’ y the home care program on a full-time or

ne basis include clinical responsibilities, he must

ve achieved and maintained medical staff membershi

through the same procedures provided for all medical s

members. Physician advice and/or consultation must be

Hye to the home care program staff at all times. (pp.

If a physician is not a member of the hospital’s medical staff

and requests the services provided by the home care program,

a special procedure to credential that physician is provided,

including a provision for evaluating the care provided to that

physician’s patients. (p: 60)

Written policies and procedures are required on the delega-

tion of responsibility, as well as the “scope of services to be

offered and the manner in which they are to be provided.” (p.

60) These must be approved by the hospital’s. medical staff,

administration, and governing body. (p. 60) A written patient

care plan that conforms with the physician’s orders must be

developed for each patient, (p. 61) An “accurate medical rec-

ord” shall be maintained which shall include progress notes

including:

“a description of signs, ; treatment, service, or

medication rendered; reaction; in the

patient’s condition; and any wstlontioonig’ inttoustion

given.” (p. 61)

47a

Coordination and evaluation of patient services on a continu-

ing basis are encouraged in this section. The “patient care

plan” must be

“reviewed and evaluated as often as the — condi-

tion required, but not less than once every 60 days.” (p. 62)

Some of the extensive requirements which now exist for

those hospitals seeking accreditation by the JCAH when they

provide home care programs have been described. Should

schools begin providing similar services under a physician’s

order, a similar mechanism will likely evolve. To assure that

the treatment provided by the school will be provided safely,

proper coordination of activities and delineation of responsibi-

lities will be necessary. If history is any guide, should schools

be required to provide treatment as ordered by a pupil’s physi-

cian, the JCAH or some other accrediting body will be called

upon to develop standards for administration of such treat-

ment. These standards will then be recognized by Congress in

legislation and will serve as a reference point for evaluating

eligibility for federal funding.

Question 3. Any additional questions believed to be pre-

sented by this case that impact the practice of medicine or

the medical community’s role in providing chi!dren neces-

sary maintenance while participating in their individual

‘education program.

One question presented by this case concerns the direction

by a physician of an act to be performed by a nurse or another

trained person. Ifthe physician is providing instruction not toa

particular individual, but to an unidentified person selected in

an organized system such as exists in a hospital, nursing home,

rely on an existing system to assure that only those who are

capable of carrying out his instructions do so. In such a situa-

tion, the physician is not necessarily liable for the acts of those

carrying out his directions if the person to whom responsibility

is delegated is selected by another upon whose judgment the

physician can reasonably rely.

48a

In an Amarillo case, a sponge had been left in the abdominal

cavity of a patient during surgery. The patient sued the

surgeon and the hospital which employed the nurses involved

in the procedure.

The jury’s verdict absolved the operating surgeon of any

negligence of his own. The jury did find negligence on the part

of the operating room nurses who were hospital employees,

but declined to find that these employees were “borrowed

servants” of the surgeon. On this verdict the trial court ren- -

dered judgment against the hospital only, not against the

surgeon. —

The Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, in reviewing the trial -

court decision, reversed the judgment of the trial couy* and

held the surgeon liable for the nurses’ negligence under the

“captain of the ship” doctrine. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell,

529 S.W.2d 639 (Amarillo Civ. App. 1975)). On appeal the

Texas Supreme Court set aside the Ararillo appeals court’s

judgment and remanded the case back to that court. (Sparger

v. Worley Hospital, 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977)).

The Texas Supreme Court noted that an employee of one

employer may be the borrowed servant of another under Texas

law. (See Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at 583). The

right to control is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to

decide. In this case the Supreme Court concluded that physi-

cians should be subject to the usual rules applicable to bor-

rowed servants. It held that the heavy burden of vicarious

liability imposed by the “captain of the ship” doctrine as it has

come to be applied in professional liability actions should no

longer be applied in Texas. (Sparger v. Worley Hospital, su-

pra, at 585).

The Supreme Court mentioned that in this case the nurses

were assigned to the operating room by the hospital, their

employer. The duties of the nurses were detailed in the hospi-

Pee

s PA art

Spee Sey Aw

49a

tal’s Policy and Procedures Manual. Specific duties were

assigned by the hospital to each nurse:

“The procedures for the sponge count were intended for

use re less of the surgeon who was to perform the

ty) “Suing ...” Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at

The physician was “in charge, medically speaking, of the

nurses” (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, 552 S.W.2d 534 at 535

(Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1977)). Testimony at trial demon-

strated that the physician had the right to control the nurses

assigned to the operating room and in fact did direct them to

take a second sponge count as the wound was being closed. (See

Justice Johnson’s opinion, dissenting from the opinion of the

Supreme Court, 547 S. W. at 586-589). However, this degree of

control did not persuade the appeals court on remand that the

jury’s refusal to find that the nurses were the borrowed em-

ployees of the doctor was against the great and overwhelming

weight of the evidence. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, supra,

552 S.W.2d at 536).

The Texas Supreme Court in this case found that this physi-

cian was not necessarily liable for the acts of those who are

selected by another person when those acts are performed _-

under his direction for his patient. The right of the hospital to

assign their employed nurses and determine their qualifica-

tions was not questioned.

Thus, a home health care agency, nursing home, or hospital

with an estabished system to assign qualified persons to carry

out a physician’s instructions can properly select the agent to

carry out the orders of a physician. However, when no such

system exists, the physician may be held to have improperly

delegated a treatment unless he selects specific individuals to

carry out his treatment orders.

On November 21, 1980, an Attorney General Opinion was

issued addressing the delegation of functions by a physician to

an optician outside the physician’s office. (Tex. Att. Gen. Op.

No. MW-275 (Nov. 21, 1980)). The Attorney General opined

50a

that a physician’s orders in such a situation must be directed to

a particular optician or opticians and cannot lawfully be dele-

gated to an unnamed optician of the patient’s choice. The

Attorney General reasoned:

“Where a physician delegates a medical task to another

person, he must provide adequate instruction consistent

with that person’s skill and knowledge. . . Since opticians

are not licensed in Texas, he (the physician) cannot rely on

a particular level of ability in the profession.” (p. 2)

The Opinion also states that the delegation by a physician

must be to a natural person, not to a corporation or other group

since: :

“. . . only natural persons can be subject to the control or

supervision of the physician.” (p. 3)

The Opinion concludes that the physician is legally liable for

the negligence of the optician in performing services under his

direction.

However, in this case the Attorney General was faced with a

fact situation of unlicensed opticians in Texas. Since no particu-

lar minimum level of ability of these unlicensed persons exists,

the Attorney General could only conclude that the physician

must delegate to a particular optician or opticians, and provide

instructions appropriate to the ability of particular persons.

Therefore, although this Attorney General Opinion concluded

that physicians can only delegate properly to designated natu-

ral persons in the fact situation before him, there is no reason to

believe that the Attorney General intended to suggest a

change in the common practice of delegation to undesignated

nurses and others in hospitals, skilled nursing homes, and

home health care agencies. These individuals typically are

- assigned duties by the organizations which employ them under

systems designed to assure that only competent persons carry

out any physician’s order.

If an institution such as a school has no system to assure that

only qualified individuals will carry out a physician’s order, we

respectfully submit that the physician would be required to

5la

tailor his instructions to the individual who would carry them

out just as the Attorney General concluded in MW-275, supra.

The physician would need to satisfy himself that the individual

who is to perform the task would be qualified to do so and that

his instructions were sufficient to match the individual’s train-

ing. On the other hand, if the school has in place of a mechanism

to assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed and proper

coordination of activities and responsibilities such as is de-

scribed in the JCAH Accreditation Manual for Hospitals

(1981) for home health services, the physician would be able to

reasonably rely on the mechanism available and could tailor his

instructions to a pre-established level of training for a person

to be designated by the school system.

CONCLUSION

All parties in this litigation appear to support the view that

diagnosing a patient’s condition and concluding that CIC treat-

ment is appropriate are functions which only licensed physi-

cians should perform. The Texas statutes support this view.

However, consistent with this view is the accepted practice in

Texas of nonphysicians performing acts which, if performed

independent of a physician, would constitute the unlawful.

practice of medicine, but when performed under a physician’s

direction, are considered to be lawful and proper.

The extent to which a physician may properly delegate medi-

cal treatment to a nonphysician is conditioned in each case by

the needs of the patient and by the experience and training of

the nonphysician to perform the functions delegated. The

Nursing Practice Act contemplates such a delegation of depen-

dent nursing functions. The physician need not be physically

present during administration of all treatments. The physician

should, however, monitor the treatment rendered even though

some of the treatment might be simple enough that children

can perform certain technical aspects on themselves. The

potential for harm, should all the steps in treatment not be

adhered to or should an adverse reaction occur, warrants over-

all physician supervision of the treatment provided.

52a

If a school system undertakes to provide CIC to its pupils

under a physician’s supervision, the responsibility for daily

administration of CIC treatment will be delegated by the

physician either (1) to persons the physician reasonably be-

lieves are capable of discharging them in a competent manner,

or (2) to an organization which has in place a mechanism to

assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed. In either

case, the physician would tailor his instructions to the individ-

ual providing the care or would write orders for those selected

by the school system to provide the treatment based on a

pre-established level of training for those individuals.

DALLAS COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY AND

TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

/s/ By Durwood E. Neal, M.D.

Durwoop E. NEAL M.D., President

Texas Medical Association

/s/ By Joseph C. Ogle, M.D.

JOSEPH C. OGLE, M.D., President

Dallas County Medical Society

/s/ By Richard Gray, Jr.

RICHARD GRAY, JR.

THOMPSON AND KNIGHT

/s/ By Donald P. Wilcox

DONALD P. WILcox, General Counsel

Texas Medical Association

/s/ By Michael G. Young

MICHAEL G. YounG, Staff Attorney

Texas Medical Association

53a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TATRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Ve

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

Defendants. |

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH V'CEROY, JR, CLERK

By 777?

Deputy

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opin-

ion, itis ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

State Board of Education and the Irving Independent School

District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber

Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent

Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid

medical prescription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-

ages and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses in the sum of

54a

$28,502, plus interest on such sum from the date of judgment

until finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are

taxed against defendants.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham

PaTRIcK E. HIGGINBOTHAM

United States District Judge

55a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TAtTRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

; P Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK

By 2777777?

Deputy

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Irving Independent School District (“school dis-

trict”) has moved to amend the Memorandum Opinion and

Judgment entered May 26, 1981. Upon reviewing the motion,

this court makes the following amendments. The motion is

DENIED in all other respects.

This court finds that of the 336 billable hours devoted to this

case by plaintiff's counsel, 62 hours were devoted tc the admin-

istrative proceedings provided by defendants pursuant to 20

56a

U.S.C. § 1415, and 33.6 hours were devoted to the issue of

compensatory damages.’

Il.

The school district asks this court to hold the State Board of

Education liable for plaintiffs’ damages and attorneys’ fees. As

explained in the Memorandum Opinions of December 31, 1980,

and May 26, 1981, the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the

State Board of Education precludes any award of compensato-

ry damages. The immunity is not applicable, of course, to

reasonable attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C..

§ 1988: See Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 406 (5th

Cir. 1980). This court did not, however, award attorneys’ fees

under § 1988, to which it held plaintiffs to be unentitled, but

awarded the fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. § 794a.*

This court held in its Memorandum Opinion of December 31,

1980, that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. See Jones v.

Illinois Dep’t of Rehabilitation Services, 504 F.Supp. 1244,

1257-58 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F.Supp. 110,

115-16 (W.D. Pa. 1976); cf., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332

(1979). The question to be answered here is whether § 505

abrogates that immunity as to attorneys’ fees.

| Plaintiffs’ counsel testified that 20 more than 10% of his time was

devoted to compensatory damages. This court construes his testi-

mony as stating that approximately 10% of his total billable hours

(336 hours) was devoted to compensatory damages. If this court’s

construction is incorrect, plaintiffs’ counsel is to file an appropriate

affidavit within ten (10) days of this Opinion.

* The section provides in pertinent part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a

provision of this subchapter, the court, in its oe, may

—aeminbsdicak ,

57a

The starting point of any analysis of the applicability of the

Eleventh Amendment immunity to attorneys’ fees provisions

is Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 677 (1978). In Hutto, the Supreme

Court held that States cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment

to defeat the attorneys’ fees provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The

Court’s reasoning rested on two pillars.’ First, the Court noted

that § 1988 imposes attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs.” Jd. at

695. Costs can be taxed against a State regardless of its immun-

ity. Id. at 696-97. The Court concluded that by authorizing

attorneys’ fees as an item of cost, Congress brought attorneys’.

fees under the judicially created “litigation costs” exemption to

the Eleventh Amendment. /d. at 697-98.‘

The second pillar was Congress’ intent that the States be

subject to the attorneys’ fees provision. Jd. at 694, 698 n.31. As

noted by the Court, “Congress considered and firmly rejected

the suggestion that States should be immune from fee

awards.” Id. at 698 n.31.

Over time, it is the second pillar—the existence of con-

gressional inter. .o subject the States to § 1988 attorneys’ fees

awards—that appears to have become the primary analytical

foundation laid by Hutto. Thus, in Supreme Court of Virginia

v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,

737-39 (1980), the Court held that although Congress intended

to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, there was no

similar indication that Congress intended § 1988 to overcome

* The State defendants did not act in bad faith or violate a judicial

decree. The portion of Hutto upholding an award of attorneys’ fees as

“ancillary” remedial relief, therefore, is inapplicable to this case. See

437 U.S. at 698-93.

‘ As this court reads Hutto, the authority to tax costs against State

litigants derives from some sort of inherent constitutional power of

the federal judiciary that may be redefined or even eliminated by

Congress. 437 U.S. 695-98. The Court was somewhat equivocal,

however, on precisely where it found this power. Jd. at 696 n.25

(citing § 254 of the Judicial Code); see also 28 U.S.C. $§ 1911, 1913,

1920.

58a

legislative immunity. The Court made no mention of the alter-

native holding in Hutto that attorneys’ fees are part of recover-

able costs. See also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447

U.S. 54, 67 (1980). In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the

Court was faced with the issue of whether attorneys’ fees may

be awarded pursuant § 1988 for a purely statutory, non-civil-

rights violation. Jd. at 130-33. The Court did not, however,

reach the question. It held that although no constitutional

violation had been found, because the plaintiffs’ allegation of a

Fourteenth Amendment violation had been sufficiently color-

able to maintain federal jurisdiction, the awarded fees fell

within Congress’ § 5 power to enforce the guarantees of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. Only in footnote did the Court -

mention that Congress may define “costs” to include reason-

able attorneys’ fees. Jd. at 131 n.14; see also Maine v. Thi-

boutot, 488 U.S. 1, 9n.7 (1980). Similarly, in Familias Unidas

v. Briscoe, supra, at 406, the Fifth Circuit, in explaining why

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of § 1988

attorneys’ fees against the Texas State Board of Education,

cited Hutto for the proposition that Congress abrogated the

immunity pursuant to its plenary powers under § 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment. As in Supreme Court of Virginia, no

mention was made of Congress’ redfinition of recoverable

costs. In Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979), in

holding that the Eleventh Amendment waiver applies to cases

pending at the time § 1988 was enacted, the Circuit prop-

ounded at some length on Congress intent to abrogate the

immunity, with virtually no discussion of Congress’ power to

define taxable costs.

Unlike § 1988, it is not at all clear that Congress focused

directly on the question of State liability when it enacted § 505

of the Rehabilitation Act, or that it firmly rejected a sugges-

tion that States should be immune from fee awards. None of

the three Committee Reports make any direct reference to

State immunity. See S. Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

18-20 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21

(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1780 (Conferences Report), 95th

59a

Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1978) (latter two Reports reprinted in

[1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7312). That is not to say,

however, that there is no indication of congressional intent. In

giving his understanding of the attorneys’ fees provision in the

Senate bill, Senator Cranston made the following remark:

(With respect to State and local bodies, or State and local

officials, attorney’s fees, similar to other items of cost,

would be collected from the official, in his official capacit

from funds of his or her agency or under his or her control;

or from the State or local government—regardless of

whether the such agency or Government is a named party.

The authorization of attorney’s fees under A en sec-

tion 505(b) in cases brought to enforce title V is within the

power of Congress under among other things, section 5 of

the 14th amendment. Thus, in accordance with the Su-

reme Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney, No. 77-1660,

une 23, 1978, the 11th amendment is no bar to the recov-

ery of attorney’s fees under proposed section 505(b) from

State government as a result of an action or | em to

enforce or change a violation under title V of the Rehabili-

tation Act of 1973.

124 Cong. Rec. $15,591 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978). These senti-

ments were echoed by Senator Stafford, ranking member of

the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped and chief co-

sponsor of the Senate bill, in his discussion of the Conference

bill. 124 Cong. Rec. $19,000 (daily ed. October 14, 1978).

A court may not conclude that Congress intended to abro-

gate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it finds

a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect. See Quern

v. Jordan, supra, at 340-45. These remarks by two Senators,

isolated from any real debate on the issue, do not, by them-

selves, meet that test. But in the context of Hutto v. Finney,

supra, and with the presumption that Congress understood

the significance of its languge when it made the award of

reasonable attorneys’ fees a part of recoverable costs, this

’ ’ “Qe ai *

' , : " ys ih a mo <n’ ;

7F P Or ee Oe ee! Pee ee - re A > Meee e

60a

court concludes that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a

§ 505 award of attorneys’ fees against State defendants.’

In that plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief against the State

Board of Education, the Judginent will be amended to make

the Board jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs’ reasonable

attorneys’ fees.

Ill.

The school district suggests in its motion that plaintiffs did

not establish a § 504 violation because they failed to show that

Amber Tatro was excluded from a school district program or

activity receiving federal financial assistance. See Brown v.

Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766-71 (5th Cir. 1981).

As this court noted in its earlier Memorandum Opinion:

As for the school district’s earlier su tion that there

has been no showing that the school district receives

federal funds, the superintendent of the school district

5 From time to time, the State Board of Education has contended

that it enjoys an absolute judicial or legislative immunity. Arguably,

if such immunity exists, the Board may be immune from attorneys’

fees awards. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of

the United States, Inc., supra, at 737-39. But as this court noted in its

Se eee the State Board of Education is under

a statutory obligation to supervise Amber’s Individual Education

Program. 516 F.Supp. at 972; See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342,

350 (5th Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642

F.2d 687, 696-98 (3d Cir. 1981). In this regard, the Board’s role is akin

to that of an administrative agency charged with enforcing a statute.

As the Supreme Court noted in Supreme Court of Virginia, “{flee

awards against enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill occurr-

ences.” 446 U.S. at 739. This court does not, however, hold that the

immunity. It only holds that the awarded injunctive relief goes to the

Board's “direct enforcement role,” see id., and that the Board thus is

unentitled to any judicial or legislative immunity as to the duty it 4

6la

conceded that the school district receives federal funds

allocated for special education. 516 F.Supp. at 977, n.17.

This court has reviewed the transcript, and is persuaded

that superintendent Townley conceded that the school district

receives federal financial assistance for special education.* As

the record stands, plaintiffs have met their burden of proof.

But because Townley’s concession arguably is somewhat ambi-

guous, in the interests of justice this court will consider

reopening the record as to the issue if within ten (10) days of

this Opinion the school district files an affidavit setting forth

the federal funds received and the programs and activities on

which such funds are spent. The affidavit is to be accompanied

by a legal memorandum dealing with what constitutes a “pro-

gram or activity” within the meaning of § 504. See generally

Brown v. Sibley, supra."

IV.

An Amended Judgment reflecting this court’s amended find-

ings and conclusions is filed herewith by separate instrument.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* The school district appears to assume that plaintiffs must show

that federal funds are allocated specifically for the school district’s

Early Childhood Development Program. All plaintiffs must show is

that Amber was excluded from any program or activity receiving

federal financial assistance. In this regard, had Amber been enrolled

by the school district she would have been entitled to participate in

the school district’s physical therapy program. See 516 F.Supp. at

979. Physical therapy is a type of “special education.”

"Specifically, the school district is to address the issue of the

administrative level at which such funds must be allocated before a

person is excluded from a “program or activity.” That is, if the school

district receives federal financial assistance, is every program or

activity provided by the school district a § 504 “program or activity,”

or must the funds be targeted to the precise types of education

Amber would have received by attending the school district?

; ie , . cA 2 mp Ege! AS Oe

\ ee Stee (OE e y sy .* ae ‘ae YO See : eS ce prs a A

62a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TaTRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

STATE OF TEXasS, et al.,

Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK

AMENDED JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

State Board of Education and the Irvirig Independent School

District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber

Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent

Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid

medical precription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is

ORDERED, ANJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-

ages in the sum of $1,271, and of the Irving Independent School

District and the State Board of Education, jointly and several-

ly, their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the sum of

68a

$27,231, plus interest on such sums from May 26, 1981, until

finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are taxed

against defendants.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham

PaTRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM

United States District Judge

64a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT.

April 25, 1983.

NO. 81-1454.

Henri and Mary TatTro, Individually,

and as Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,

v.

The STaTE OF TEXas, et al.,

Defendants,

State Board of Education,

Defendant-Appellant,

The Irving Independent School District,

~ Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Parents of handicapped child brought action seeking injunc-

tion requiring school district to provide child with special serv-

ices and to recover compensatory damages and attorney fees.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of

Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 481 F.Supp. 1224, denied

preliminary injunction and appeal was taken. The Court of

Appeals, 625 F.2d 557, vacated and remanded. On remand,

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 516 F.Supp. 968, entered

injunction requiring school district to provide child with re-

quested special services and authorized award of reasonable

attorney fees to parents, and school board appealed. The Court

of Gee, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) clean in-

catheterization required for handicapped child was

“related service” within meaning of Education of All Handi-

Children Act; (2) school district was required to pro-

with clean intermittent catheterization;

65a

(3) injunction requiring state board to act in supervisory capac-

ity to assure that handicapped child’s individual education

program conformed to Act was proper; and (4) state board’s

violation of Rehabilitation Act supported award of attorney

fees.

Affirmed.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas.

Before BROWN, GEE and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

This is Amber Tatro’s second appearance before this court.

The facts and procedural history of her case are reported in

detail in our prior opinion, 625 F.2d 557 (1980) (Tatro J), and in

those of the district court. 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981); 481 F.Supp.

1224 (1979). To aid the reader, we will briefly summarize them

here. Amber is a seven year old gir] afflicted with myelomenin-

gocele, a birth defect commonly known as spina bifida. As a

result of this handicap, she suffers from speech and orthopedic

impediments and a neurogenic bladder. Because this last con-

dition prevents voluntary emptying of the bladder, Amber

must be catheterized several times daily to prevent injury to

her health. The method chosen by Amber’s doctors, the most

widely accepted procedure, is Clean rr Catheteri-

zation (“CIC”).

In early 1979, when Amber was three and one-half years old,

her mother asked the Irving Independent School District

(“school district”) to provide special education for Amber. The

school district agreed, and in a series of meetings with the

Tatros, developed an Individual Education Program (“IEP”)

for Amber as required by the Education of All ped

Children Act (“EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(aX5)

(1976). The IEP provided for Amber’s placement in the school

district’s Early Childhood Development (“ECD”) classes and

for the provision of various other services to Amber, including

physical and occupational therapy. The IEP did not provide for

66a

CIC and the school district maintained that it had no legal

obligation to administer it.

Amber’s parents next pursued an administrative appeal

from the school district’s decision not to provide CIC. See 20

U.S.C. § 1415 (1976) (setting out procedures). Pursuant to 20

U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), an impartial hearing officer conducted a

hearing and determined that the EAHCA required the school

district to provide CIC. The Texas Commissioner of Education

adopted the hearing officer’s decision. Amber T., bnf Mary T.

v. Irving Independent School District, TEA Docket No. 115-

SE-579 (August 6, 1979). The Texas State Board of Education

' (“State Board”) reversed the decision of the Commissioner and

hearing officer and reinstated the school board’s decision not to

provide CIC. After thus exhausting state remedies as required

by the EAHCA, the Tatros brought the present action in

federal district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(2) (1976),

naming the school board, the State Board, and others as

defendants.’

The Tatros contended that the school district violated the

EAHCA by failing to provide Amber with a “free appropriate

public education,” id. § 1412(1), which is defined in part as

“special education and related services.” Jd. § 1401(18). Specif-

ically, they argued that CIC is a “related service” the state

must provide to fulfill its duty to Amber under the EAHCA.

The Tatros also argued that the school district’s refusal to

provide CIC violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in

federally funded programs. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).

The district court denied the Tatros’ motion for a prelimi-

nary injunction to require the school board to provide CIC. 481

F.Supp. at 1229. That court concluded that CIC is not a “re-

'. All defendants save the school board and the State Board were

dismissed by the district court, 516 F.Supp. at 972-73; the Tatros do

not contest these dismissa!s. The propriety of the State Board’s

action is discussed in Part III, infra.

CE ea ee Tk nde AC ce 8k OSE Dh Re a tee ee

67a

lated service” within the meaning of the EAHCA because the

need for it does not arise from the effort to educate Jd. at 1227.

The district court further concluded that section 504’s prohibi-

tion of discrimination does not impose a duty upon the school

board to take affirmative action such as the provision of CIC.

Id. at 1228-29.

The Tatros appealed from the district court’s order, and

based upon facts that were assumed for purposes of the appeal,

this court reversed. Tatro /, 624 F.2d at 558 n. 1, 562. This

’ court held that CIC falls within the literal terms of the statuto-

ry definition of “related services,” which includes “supportive

services. . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to

benefit from special education.” Jd. at 564 (citing 20 U.S.C.

§ 1401(17) (1976)). Because, under the assumed facts, Amber

would be unable to attend ECD classes without provision of

CIC during the school day, this court concluded that CIC was

essential if she was to benefit from special education, and that

CIC was therefore a “related service” in her case. The district

court had thought it necessary to limit the statutory language

to services arising from the effort to educate in the absence of

any evidence of Congressional intent to require provision of life

support services through and education statute. 481 F.Supp.

at 1227. This court concluded that the district court’s limiting

construction of the EAHCA’s literal language was erroneous

because the EAHCA contained its own limitations on the types

of life support services falling within the ambit of “related

services.” 625 F.2d at 562. This court further held that the

school district’s refusal to provide CIC violated section 504.

I. THE EAHCA CLAIM

Were we writing on a clean slate, we would share the district

court’s reluctance to read a statute designed to aid education to

require provision of medical necessities of life which are re-

quired by a child whether or not she participates in the state’s

educational program. Nevertheless, Tatro J is the authorita-

tive interpretation of the EAHCA in this circuit, and under

“law of the case” principles, must be followed by us in this

68a

subsequent appeal “unless (1) the evidence on a subsequent

trial was substantially different, (2) controlling authority has

since made a contrary decision of the icable to such

issues, or (3) the decision was clearly erro would

work a manifest injustice,” White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 432

(5th Cir.1967) (footnote omitted; enumeration added); see

Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 688 F.2d 1008, 1005-06 (5th

Cir. 1982); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 593 F.2d 658,

664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 234, 62

L.Ed.2d 173 (1979). None of these considerations justifies

departure from Tatro I by this panel.

Although we perhaps would have taken a different view of

the EAHCA upon de novo consideration, we cannot say that

the well-documented Tatro I decision was not also a principled

interpretation of that undeniably Delphic statute. It is not

clearly erroneous and certainly does not work manifest in-

justice. Further, neither the parties’ briefs nor our own re-

search has revealed any supervening authority.? Thus, the

only remaining issue under the EAHCA in this case is whether

the evidence adduced on remand from Tatro I is so different

from the assumed factual basis for that decision that its legal

conclusions no longer apply. The school district argues that

such is the case.

Tatro I did not hold that all life support services are “related

services” under the EAHCA, nor that school districts must

* The school district argues t!:at after Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694

(1981), federal statutes that grant funds to state programs cannot be

read to confer judicially enforceable substantive rights on the pro-

grams’ beneficiaries. This argument misreads Pennhurst, which only

requires that funding statutes must by their terms create such

rights. That the EAHCA creates enforceable rights to “special edu- #

cation and related services” was clearly established in Board of A

Education v. Rowley, U.S. —_, 102 S.Ct. 3084, 3048-49, 78

L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The issue in the present case is the scope of those *

69a

always provide CIC to children who need it. Derived from the

statute and its regulations were three conditions that must

obtain before a school board must provide services such as

CIC:

+s in vty uh nae fee to any related epihen a all, a

ild must ica so as to require speci uca-

tion. 45 C.F.R. § ita 14 (1979) (comment one); see 20

U.S.C.A. § 1401(1). . . . Second, the life support service

must be geome ot to aid a handicapped child to benefit

from the special education to be provided. See id.

§ 1401(17). Thus, a life support service would not be a

related service if it did not have to be provided during

school hours, but instead could be performed at some

other time. Taird, in order to be a related service, the life

ro jl service must be one which a nurse or other qual-

ified person can perform. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(10)

(1979). Excluded from the term “related services” are

those health-related activities which must be performed

by a licensed physician that are not provided “to deter-

mine a child’s medically related icapping condition

which results in the child’s need for ial education and

related services.” Jd. § 121a.13(4). Thus, even under a

literal interpretation of the statutory definition, the types

of life support services needed by a child which can be

related services are limited.

625 F.2d at 562-68 (footnotes omitted).

All parties agree that Amber is handicapped and in need of

special education. The school district argues that the district

court erred in finding the other two Tatro J conditions met in

this case. It is argued first that under Texas law, CIC may not

be performed by a nurse or other qualified person unless a

physician is physically present to control and supervise the

procedure. The argument concludes that such participation by

a physician transforms CIC into “medical treatment” which

the school district need not provide under Tatro I. Id. at 563; 20

U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) (medical treatment is a related serv-

ice only if provided for diagnostic and evaluation purposes).

The district court, guided by its extensive experience in upply-

70a

ing Texas law, and with the aid of able amicus curiae,’ rejected

the school district’s view of state law. 516 F.Supp. at 975-76.

We cannot say that the district court was wrong.

As the district court found, it has been long settled that

physicians in Texas may prescribe treatment and delegate its

administration to others. Thompson v. Texas State Board of

Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d 123, 129-30 (Tex.Civ.App.—

Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKinney v. Tromly, 386

S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see

‘ also Op.Tex.Atty.Gen. No. WW-1403 (1962). Subsequent to

the district court’s decision on remand, this principle was codi-

fied in Texas’ new Medical Practice Act:

a person licensed to practice medicine shall have the au-

thority to delegate to Mh wae and properly trained

person or persons acting under the physician’s supervision

any medical act which a reasonable and prudent pe eam

eer

to de if, in the opinion o i ysician,

the act can be riyand safely performed by the person

to whom the ical act is delegated and the act is per-

formed in its customary manner,

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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