Opposition — Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Secretary of the Interior

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| L i

| OCT 5 1983

No. 83-180 i BLEXAS; iL. STEvas

IN THE Je oe ue

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1983

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JAMES G. WATT, et al., and the WALKER

RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE OF NEVADA,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To

The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE WALKER RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE

IN OPPOSITION

Yvonne T. Knight

Counsel of Record

Jeanne S. Whiteing

Native American Rights Fund

1506 Broadway

Boulder, Colorado 80302

(303) 447-8760

Attorneys for Respondent

The Walker River Paiute Tribe

October, 1983

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether pursuant to the Act of March 2,

1899, 30 Stat. 990, 25 U.S.C. §§$312-318,

the Secretary of the Interior can require

tribal consent as a precondition to the

filing and processing of an application for

a railroad right-of-way across tribal trust

lands of the Walker River Paiute Tribe of

Nevada.

whe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . «= - i

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . - « ~~ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . ~ iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . « «= + 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . + «+ + 4

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Gives Effect

To Longstanding, Congressionally

Approved Regulations Governing

Rights of Way Across Tribal

Land tl kt Ge i ee, ee 6

II. The Decision is Consistent With

Decisions of This Court and the

Courts of Appeal... « - 16

III. Review is Otherwise

Inappropriate . . +6 + « -« 20

A. Authority of the

Secretary . + + « « e 21

B. Delegation Sl ide a ee ae 26

IV. The Court's Judgment Can Also

Be Sustained on Other Grounds. 32

CONCLUSION ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° 36

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Pag

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) . «+ « + 16

Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d

800 (10th Cir. 1930) . -« «© » «© « 20

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.,

698 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982) .. .» 18,29

Helvering v. Reynolds Co.,

306 U.S. 110 (1939) . . - . . . . 12,18

Helvering v. Winmill,

305 U.S. 79 (1938) x. Gress eee 12

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache

Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) or car ye 13

Montana v. United States,

450 U.S. 544 (1981) a? a aan 17

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.

199 (1974) eee ‘ 12

Nance v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.

3447 (Dec. 7, 1981) .. - Kk whee eee

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache

Tribe, U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W.

4741 (June 14, 1983) ..+-+-+es-s 13,17

New York Indians (Fellows v.

Denniston), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)

761 (1867) + ee elrete 16

iii

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Cases:

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,

aoa Us8. 366 (1935) .. -« «© «© « «© 26,27

Plains Electric Generation and

Transmission Cooperative, Inc.

v. Pueblo of Laguna, 542 F.2d

Beem eemem Gar. L976) « « « © «© 10

Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau

of Revenue, U.S. _,

Daememmeee an7e (1982) ....-- 13

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,

436 U.S. 49 (1978) ia a 6 «© 17

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S.,

316 U.S. 317 (1942) Pits - «@ 12

Southern Pacific Transportation

Co. v. Watt (Southern Pacific II),

700 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1983) .. 4,18,29

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. l

6s. | roe. . 6 © « e 22

United States v. Ft. Smith &

W.R. Co., 195 F. 211 (8th Cir.

1912) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,20

United States v. 43 Gallons of

Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876) ... 16

United States v. Mazurie,

OPPs . « 4 6 « «© « 26,88

United States v. Midwest Oil

Ge., 2206 U.8. 639 (1915) . . +. - 12

iv

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Cases:

United States v. Santa Fe Pacific

Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941) . 17

United States v. Sheffield Board

of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110

(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

United States v. Shoshone Tribe,

206 .0.,8. 122 (2330) «+ 6 #& 6 ee % 8 17

United States v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co. (Southern

Pacific I), 543 F.2d 676 (9th

Cis. I9T6) « «se 6 ws be 6Bphe yee

Vigil v. Andrus, 667 F.2a 931

oh Gis. BOURY bc se 6 12

White Mountain Apache Tribe v.

Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) ... 13

Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,

442 0.8. 653 (1979) . 2 «

Statutes and Other Laws:

25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 ....-. i,2,4,20

25 U.S.C. § 322 “AE Oo. At et ee ot 10,25

25 U.S.C. §§ 323 et seg. ... 2,33,34

25 U.S.C. § 326 ASP Gk ee ee On Oe te 35

25 U.S.C. § 407 Mee he eee? Ene Se 29

25 U.S.C. § 476 e220 + 6 Rgbaeae

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Statutes and Other Laws:

ae eee oes ie ga ae eur a ae

Aa 0.8.0. § 2401-76462 SS a

43 U.S.C. §§ 934 et seg. . ~~ + - - 25

59-000. 8 24 eo a oe eee

Fees SO cn es sie Sterne

54 Gtk. 2005 6 6 Sees ee

SG WAGES AAO 2s uv: 6 ela BRS

ay) Ae |; Sem narra teres Ga tA c

ae Stato MR ec ee ee

46 bunt. 1560- sss os we ee

oe Beek. 2788 Gree ee wee ee

aS C.7.R Peet Ih oe es

<6 CR. 6263.0) DN ee ee

i G,9.8. § 80959956 56 ks ee .

25 C.F.R. § 256.63 . . . . « + « «© 78,33

40 C.F «Rs

§

§

25 C.F.R. $ 211626 « we we wo ee ss 30

§

OS SRcSR 4 6s 6 8 4 oe 30

§

43 C.F.R. C208 a 6 8 se eee

1976 Pueblo Lands Act ...+ 2+ « « 34

vi

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Other Authorities:

S. Rep. No. 823, 80th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in

1948 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News 1033 ke ee eee eT 8 we 34

H.R. Rep. No. 78, 9lst Cong.,

ist Sess. (1969) ..«e«eeerese 34

H.R. Rep. No. 1896, 55th Cong.,

34 Sess. 2 (1899) . « « «© « «© «© « «© 15,282

H. Rep. No. 91-78, 91st Cong.,

aae Bese: 2° (2067). 2 es ew ee te 6S

H.R. Rep. No. 94-800, 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 34 (1976), reprinted

in 1976 U.S. Code & Adm. News

2370 a a rr ee se ae ee 31

Hearings Before the Subcommittee

on Indian Affairs on S.217, 94th

Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1975) .... -~ 26

Conf. Rep. No. 94-1439, 94th

Cong., 24 Sess. 3 (1976) ...e«-« « 10,32

3 Federal Register 984 ...... 7

32 Federal Register 5512 ..... 9

1A Sutherland, Statutory

Construction Section 22.13 .... 35

Cohen, Original Indian Title,

32 Minn. L. R. 28 (1947/7) . . « « « 17

vil

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Other Authorities:

Prucha, American Indian Policy

in the Formative Years (Harvard

Univ. Press, 1962) ‘ . . . . . . . 16

R. Collins, Implied Limitations

on the Jurisdiction of Indian

Tribes, 54 Wash. L. R. (1979) .. .« 28

1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation

Law § 5.28 at 81-82 (1982) ... . 29

viii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issue in this case grows out of a

decision by the Secretary of the Interior

to reject an application by Southern Paci-

fic Transportation Company for a right-

of-way across lands held in trust for the

Walker River Paiute Tribe of Nevada.l/ The

application was rejected because it lacked

tribal consent.

Southern Pacific filed the application

on April 28, 1977 because a 1976 decision

of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that Southern Pacific had never complied

with applicable federal laws governing the

acquisition of railroad rights-of-way

1/ The Walker River Paiute Tribe of

Nevada is the governing body of the Walker

River Indian Reservation and is organized

pursuant to § 16 of the Indian Reorgani-

zation Act, 25 U.S.C. §476.

ale

across Indian lands and therefore the rail-

road was a trespasser on tribal and

allotted lands 2/ of the Walker River

Indian Reservation. United States v.

Southern Pacific Transportation Company,

543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976) (nereinafter

Southern Pacific I). Pet. App. B iil.

The Superintendent for the Western

Nevada Agency of the Bureau of Indian

Affairs initially rejected the application

because it lacked any evidence of tribal

3/

consent. = The Superintendant's

2/ The right-of-way application at

issue, however, involves only tribal trust

lands and not allotted lands.

3/ Southern Pacific cited the Act of

March 2, 1899, 30 Stat. 990, 25 U.S.C. §§

312-318 (the 1899 Act), as the sole

authority for the application. A

supplemental response from the Super-

intendent informed Southern Pacific that

the application should have been filed

under the 1948 Indian Rights of Way Act, 62

Stat. 17, 25 U.S.C. § 323 et seq. (the 1948

Act), which expressly requires tribal con-

sent for right-of-way grants.

ota

decision was subsequently affirmed by the

Assistant Area Director for the Phoenix

Area Office of the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, and by the Assistant Secretary of

the Interior for Indian Affairs. Pet. App.

B iii.

Southern Pacific sought review of the

Secretary's decision in the district court

for the District of Nevada claiming that

tribal consent was not necessary for rail-

road right-of-way grants under the 1899

Act. The Walker River Paiute Tribe inter-

vened as a party defendant, and argued,

along with the United States, that tribal

consent was required. Judgment was entered

by the district court in favor of Southern

Pacific on August 14, 1980, and amended on

August 28, 1980. Pet. App. B iv. and v.

The district court held that tribal consent

could not be a condition precedent to 4

railroad right-of-way grant pursuant to the

1899 Act.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed

and held that "(tjJhe Secretary acted within

his power in requiring by regulation that

tribal consent be obtained for the acquisi-

tion of rights-of-way pursuant to the 1899

Act, 25 U.S.C. § 312 (1976)." Southern

Pacific ‘ransportation Co. v. Watt, 700

F.2a 550, 556 (9th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter

Southern Pacific II). Southern Pacific

seeks review of this decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The tribal consent precondition

required by the Secretary for the right-

of-way at issue is a longstanding, congres~

sionally approved requirement which is

rooted in and consistent with principles

whoa

governing tribal sovereignty and with

federal Indian policy. Both preserve and

protect the right of Indian tribes to

consent to and control the use of their

lands.

The decision below gives full effect to

these principles and policies and is con-

sistent with decisions of this Court and

the Courts of Appeals. There are no con-

flicts with decisions of any court.

The consent precondition is also in

accord with the Secretary's broad authority

under the 1899 Act, and is supported by

provisions in the 1934 Indian Reor-

ganization Act and the 1948 Indian Rights

of Way Act which require tribal consent for

all right-of-way grants and other disposi-

tions of tribal land.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Gives Effect to

Longstanding, Congressionally

Approved Regulations Governing

Rights of Way Across Tribal Land.

Tribal consent has been a part of the

Secretary of the Interior's right of way

regulations since at least 1928 - a period

of 55 years. The 1928 regulations

specifically require tribal consent for

railroad rights-of-way. Section 79 of the

regulations states:

Where tribal lands are involved, all

railroad and other right-of-way

applications of more than ordinary

importance should be presented to the

tribe in general council assembled. A

record of the proceedings shall be kept

and a duly authenticated copy of such

minutes should be attached. Except in

the case of railroads the approval of

the Secretary of the Interior may be

given in his discretion, even though no

amicable settlement has been reached

with the Indians. However, it is

required that every effort be made to

bring about an amicable agreement

whenever reasonably possible.

(Emphasis added).

aGn

Regulations of the U.S. Department of

Interior Concerning Rights of Way Over

Indian Lands, U.S. Govt. Printing Office,

1929. Subsequently, regulations in 1938

provided:

256.83 Consent of allottees or

TEibS.cee Where tribal lands are

involved, belonging to a tribe which is

Organized under the Act of June 18,

1934 ..., all right-of-way applications

must be presented to the tribal council

or other authorized representative

body; and, in the case of unorganized

tribes, all railroad rights-of-way and

others of more than ordinary import-

ance, should likewise be thus submitted

to the council or representative body

of the tribe. A record of the pro-

ceedings should be kept and a duly

authenticated copy attached to the

schedule.

25 C.F.R. §256.83 (1939-40), 3 Fed. Reg.

984, 985 (May 24, 1938) .4/ The consent

4/ Southern Pacific's assertion that

the consent requirement was first

promulgated in 1951 (Petition at 33, n.1l)

is incorrect. The 1951 regulations amended

the 1938 regulations and were intended to

implement the 1948 Act. Ignoring the

earlier regulations, Gouthern Pacific

provision has appeared in all subsequent

regulations governing rights-of-way. See

25 C.F.R. §256.3(a) (1951) (the 1951

regulations); and 25 C.F.R. §161.3(a),

redesignated 25 C.F.R. §169.3(a) (1982).

(footnote 4 contined) contends that the

tribal consent requirement applies only to

grants under the 1948 Act. It points to

the reference in section 256.3(c) of the

1951 regulations that the 1948 Act is the

authority for the consent provision. But

section 256.3(c) applies only to allotted

lands, not tribal lands. Moreover, the

1951 regulations recite the 1948 Act as

authority for all sections, including

section 256.23 which implements the

specific provisions of the 1899 Act.

Southern Pacific also relies on the

statement in the current regulations, 25

C.F.R. § 169.23, that railroad rights-

of-way granted under the 1899 Act are sub-

ject to "pertinent sections of this Part

169," and argues that tribal consent is not

one of the pertinent sections. But the

present regulations contain provisions

dealing with other existing special

right-of-way statutes, and these provisions

would not be pertinent to railroad

rights-of-way. See, e.g., §169.25 (oil and

gas pipeline); sTES. 30 Uhelechous and

telegraph lines) and §169.28 (public

highways).

i

Congress has twice expressly approved

the tribal consent provision in the regu-

lations. In 1967, a House Committee recom-

mended against proposed regulations, 32

Fed. Reg. 5512 (1967), which would have

eliminated the consent requirement for

rights-of-way across tribal lands of

non-IRA tribes. The House Committee in-

vestigated the matter and concluded that:

e+. the Secretary's proposal for grant-

ing rights-of-way over tribal land

without the consent of the tribe which

owns it violates property rights, demo-

cratic principles, and the pattern of

modern Indian legislation.

The committee believes that the

Secretary's assertion of power to act

in disregard of his own regulation and

issue rights-of-way over lands of

tribes that have withheld their consent

to such grants is contrary to law, as

well as to good government, and should

not be entertained.

H. Rep. No 91-78, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 3

(1967). The Committee cited "one of the

oldest principles of jurisprudence in

=9=

America - that Indian tribes should not be

deprived of rights in their land without

their consent." Id. at 17.

In 1976, Congress repealed a 1926 act

which authorized condemnation of Pueblo

tribal lands and made applicable to the

Pueblos the 1899 Act, the 1948 Act and

other special rights of way acts. Act of

Sept. 17, 1976, 90 Stat. 1275, 25 U.S.C.

§322. See Plains Electric Generation and

Transmission Cooperative, Inc., V-. Pueblo

of Laguna, 542 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).

In so doing, Congress authorized the Pueblo

tribes to consent to right-of-way grants

across their lands, thereby placing them

“in the same position ... as other

federally recognized Indian tribes." Conf.

Rep. No. 94-1439, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3

(1976). The necessity for this was that:

-10-

.e. the 1926 Act denies the Pueblos the

right of consent in considering

applications for rights-of-way across

their lands for whatever purpose. On

the other hand, those tribes that

organized constitutional governments

pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934

(48 Stat. 987), clearly, were provided

the right of consent in considering

rights-of-way applications. Moreover,

the balance of federally recognized

tribes have been granted the privilege

of consent through Secretarial

regulations.

Id. Obviously, Congress would not have

repealed the 1926 condemnation statute on

the one hand, and made the 1899 Act appli-

cable on the other hand, unless it believed

that Pueblo consent was necessary for

grants under the 1899 Act.

In reenacting the right-of-way statutes

in 1976, the above legislative history

shows that Congress explicitly approved the

Secretary's regulations which contained a

tribal consent requirement for right-of-way

grants including those made pursuant to the

alle

1899 Act. See, United States v. Sheffield

Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110,

134-35 (1978); Helvering v. Reynolds Co.,

306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939); Helvering v.

Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938). Such

approval also confirms the Secretary's

authority to require tribal consent for all

types of right-of-way grants for all tribes

whether IRA or non-IRA. See e.g., Morton

v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 214, 229-30 (1974);

Vigil v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 931, 934-35 (10th

Cir. 1982). 2/

5/ Congress' longstanding acquiescence

in the Secretary's regulatory scheme also

evinces an implied delegation by Congress

to the Secretary of the authority to

establish tribal consent as a pre-

condition. See, United States v. Midwest

Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-75 (1915); Sioux

Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 316 U.S. 317, 327

(1942); Southern Pacific I, supra at 686,

689.

ale

The Secretary's regulatory scheme is

fully consistent with current federal

Indian policy of encouraging tribal self-

sufficiency and economic development. See,

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W. 4741, 4744 (June 24,

1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982); White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.

136, 143 n.10 (1980). It is also

consistent with the rule that federal

Indian statutes and regulations must be

“construed generously in order to comport

with ... traditional notions of sovereignty

and with the federal policy of encouraging

tribal independence." Ramah Navajo Sch.

Bad. v. Bureau of Revenue, U.S. a Fe

L.Ed.2d 1174, 1175 (1982).

Southern Pacific argues that the

federal policy of encouraging railroad

=] 3<

expansion in the late 1800's controls and

divested tribes of the power to consent.

The history of railroad expansion vis a vis

Indian reservations does not bear this out,

however, and in any case, the national in-

terest in protecting tribal lands is para-

nount .£/

Until 1899, railroad right-of-way

grants across tribal lands were authorized

only by special acts of Congress. When

self-executing railroad right-of-way grants

across public lands were authorized in

1875, Indian reservations were expressly

excepted. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat.

6/ In right-of-way statutes prior to

and after 1899, Congress apparently did not

find tribal consent to be inconsistent with

the promotion, growth and expansion of an

interstate railroad system. See Act of

August 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 299; Act of May

30, 1888, 25 Stat. 160; Act of May 8, 1890,

26 Stat. 102, Act of Feb. 18, 1895, 28

Stat. 665, all cited in Pet. at 56 n.36.

@l4-

482, 43 U.S.C. § 938. See Southern Pacific

I, supra at 687-89. 2/ Later, the 1899

Act authorized administrative grants of

railroad rights-of-way across tribal lands

to eliminate the need for special acts and

to achieve uniformity, but in a manner

which would “fully pres?2rve and protect the

rights and interests of Indians." H.R.

Rep. No. 1896, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. 2

(1899). If railroad expansion had been

paramount, Congress could have simply

amended the 1875 Act to include Indian

reservations rather than enacting a special

statute protective of Indian lands.

77 The 1875 Act was repealed in 1976,

90 Stat. 2793. Presently rights-of-way for

public utility purposes including railroads

can be acquired over public lands through a

rant from the Secretary. See 43 U.S.C.

1761.

<{ =

II. The Decision is Consistent With

Decisions of this Court and the

Courts of Appeal

Congress has always respected, and this

Court has upheld, the right of Indians to

consent to and control the use of their

lands.2/ Thus this Court has required

8/ This policy was articulated early in

history in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,

ratified by the First Congress, 1 Stat. 50,

52:

The utmost good faith shall always be

observed toward the Indians. Their

lands and property shall never be taken

from them without their consent; and in

their property, rights and liberty they

shall never be invaded or disturbed

unless in just and lawful wars

authorized by Congress ..-«-.

The policy is relied on in numerous Supreme

Court decisions, e.g., Cherokee Nation v.

Georgia, 30 U.S. Pet.) 1, 17 (1831);

United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93

U.S. 188, 197 (1876); New York Indians

(Fellows v. Deniston), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)

761, 768 (1867); Wilson v. Omaha Indian

Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 665 (1979). See also,

Prucha, American Indian Policy in the

Formative Years (Harvard University Press,

1962),p. 40.

-16-

that any congressional intent to deprive a

Tribe of its rights or interests in or over

its land without its consent be clear and

unequivocal. United States v. Santa Fe

Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353

(1941); United States v. Shoshone Tribe,

304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938); cf. Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60

(1978). See also, Cohen, "Original Indian

Title," 32 Minn. L.R. 28, 36-37 (1947).

Most recently this Court has stated

that "(a] tribe's power to exclude non-

members entirely or to condition their

presence on the reservation is ... well

established." New Mexico v. Mescalero

Apache Tribe, supra 51 U.S.L.W. at 4743.

See also Mcntana v. United States, 450 U.S.

544, 557 (1981). The power derives from

the dual role of a tribe as a landowner and

ol 7-

a local government, see e.g., Merrion v.

Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra, 455 U.S. at

145 n.12, and includes the "sovereign power

of determining the conditions upon which

persons shall be permitted to enter its

domain, to reside therein, and to do

business...." Id. The right to condition

a right-of-way grant on the consent of a

tribe is certainly in accordance with these

principles. See Escondido Mutual Water Co.

v. F.E.R.C., 692 F.2d 1223, 1231-1233 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Southern Pacific suggests that there is

a conflict in the circuits as to whether

the 1899 Act is an eminent domain statute.

See discussion infra at 24-26. However, as

recognized by the court below, the

purported conflict involves only dicta.

Southern Pacific II, supra at 555 n.2.

-198-

In United States v. Ft. Smith & W.R.

Co., 195 F. 211 (8th Cir. 1912), the

statute involved was an eminent domain

statute, 30 Stat. 1368, passed one day

after the 1899 Act. At issue, was a

rignt-of-way across individual allotted

lands. In dictum, the Eighth Circuit

compared the speciai act with certain

provisions of the 1899 Act and stated that

the 1899 Act also granted eminent domain

power over tribal and allotted lands. But

the Eighth Circuit obviously was not

required to make, nor did it make, a

careful analysis of the 1899 Act. If it

had, it would have found that Congress

passed the special act granting the

Railroad condemnation power precisely

because it believed that the 1899 Act did

not grant such power. Furthermore, the

=) Go

court would have discovered that the

condemnation provisions of the 1899 Act it

cites apply only to allotted lands. See

section 3 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. $314.

The decision of the Tenth Circuit in

Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d 800 (lOth Cir.

1930) likewise did not turn on whether the

1899 Act is an eminent domain statute. The

Tenth Circuit did not independently analyze

the 1899 Act, but simply cited and relied

upon the erroneous findings of the Eighth

Circuit in United States v. Ft. Smith &

W.R. Co., supra.

III. Review is Otherwise Inappropriate

Southern Pacific raises additional

questions regarding the authority of the

Secretary to require tribal consent as a

precondition for a railroad right-of-way.

None of these issues warrant review.

-20-

A. Authority of the Secretary.

The tribal consent precondition is

within the Secretary's authority. The 1899

Act on its face authorizes the Secretary to

establish grant preconditions by

regulation. Section 1 provides that a

right-of-way:

is hereby granted to any railroad

company ... which shall comply with the

provisions of this Act and such rules

and regulations as may be prescribed

thereunder. (Emphasis added).

This provision requires compliance with the

act and administrative rules and

regulations, and constitutes a grant of

broad authority to the Secretary which by

its terms contemplates regulations which go

beyond the specific conditions enumerated

in the Act. Thus tribal consent, although

not specifically provided for in the 1899

aia

Act, is authorized by the Act and has been

required by the Secretary for grants under

the Act since at least 1928.

It is by now a fundamental rule that

substantial deference shall be given to the

construction of a statute by the agency

charged with its administration. Udall v.

Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The stan-

dard for reviewing the agency's con-

struction is whether it is reasonable. Id.

The Secretary's regulation requiring

tribal consent as a grant precondition is

entirely consistent with the purpose of the

1899 Act to allow administrative grants of

railroad rights-of-way in a manner which

would "fully preserve and protect the

rights and interests of the Indians." H.R.

Rep. No. 1896, supra at 2. The tribal con-

sent regulation is a reasonable means of

achieving this purpose. Indeed, as

@22=

Southern Pacific points out in its

Petition at 31-33, the protective effect of

a tribal consent requirement to

administrative conveyances of tribal land

prompted Congress to require consent for

all such conveyances as part of section 16

of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §476.

The consent provision is based on a

long history of federal policies and legal

principles which respect the right of

Indians to control the use of their land,

see discussion supra at 16-18. These basic

principles and policies, along with the

purpose of the 1899 Act as set out in its

terms and legislative history, provide the

standards by which the Secretary exercises

his authority. These standards govern many

aspects of Indian affairs, see note /|

supra, and guard against any arbitrary

action by the Secretary.

@23@

Southern Pacific argues that tribal

consent is inconsistent with the 1899 Act

because the 1899 Act is "in the nature of

an eminent domain statute." Pet. at 40.

But the specific language of the statute

Supports a different conclusion. On its

face, the statute requires that the

railroad comply with conditions in the Act,

as well as the Secretary's rules and

regulations in order for a right-of-way to

issue. This is in contrast to the

right-of-way granted to the Fort Smith and

Western Railroad Company the day after the

1899 Act, where the Railroad was:

invested and empowered with the right

of locating, constructing, owning,

equipping, operating, using, and

maintaining a railway and telegraph and

telephone line through the Choctaw and

Creek nations....

Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1899, 30

Stat. 1368. It is also in contrast with

-24-

the earlier 1875 statute granting

rights-of-way across public domain land.

Section 1 of this Act provides that:

eee @ right of way through the public

lands ... is hereby granted to any

railroad company ... which shall have

filed with the Secretary of the

Interior a copy of its articles of

incorporation, and due proofs of its

Organization ... to the extent of one

hundred feet on each side of the

control line of said road. ...

Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875, 18

Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. §934 et seq. This

language has been interpreted as a grant in

praesenti, Southern Pacific I, supra at 691.

Congress obviously has not interpreted

the 1899 Act as an eminent domain statute.

In 1976, when it repealed the 1926 Pueblo

lands railroad condemnation statute, and

made the 1899 Act applicable, the purpose

was to abolish condemnation of Pueblo

lands. Act of Sept. 17, 1976, 90 Stat.

1275. See Hearings Before the

=25<

Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on S. 217,

94th Cong. lst Sess. 4 (1975). It would

have made no sense for Congress to repeal

one railroad condemnation statute and in

the same breath make another condemnation

Statute applicable. Thus Congress’ inter-

pretation of the 1899 Act rejects its

characterization as an eminent domain

statute, and supports the authority of the

Secretary to require tribal consent.

B. Delegation

Southern Pacific also argues that

requirement of tribal consent is an

unconstitutional delegation of authority to

Indian tribes. However, such delegation is

fully consistent with this Court's decision

in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544

(1975). In Mazurie, the limitations on the

power to delegate recognized in Panama

Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935),

=26<

were found to be "less stringent in cases

where the entity exercising the delegated

authority itself possesses independent

authority over the subject matter." Id. at

556-57. The underlying rationale was that

the delegatee tribe is required to afford

due process to non-members under the Indian

Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 1302,

and that the Fifth Amendment may also be

available to protect against arbitrary

tribal action. Id. at 558 n.12. 2/

These are the standards by which the Tribe

must exercise its authority. See Nance v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d

701, 714-16 (9th Cir. 1981)(upholding the

9/ Of course, any issue of whether the

Tribe's exercise of its delegated authority

denied Southern Pacific any rights of due

process is not properly before this Court.

The only issue squarely presented by this

case is whether the delegation itself is

valid.

a2F=

constitutionality of the delegation to

tribes of the power to redesignate air

quality even where it affects areas off the

reservation). See R. Collins, "Implied

limitations On The Jurisdiction of Indian

Thus to the extent that the Secretary's

tribal consent regulation constitutes a

delegation of his power to regulate rail-

road right-of-way grants, the delegation is

10/

valid under Mazurie. In fact, if

10/ In any case, it is arguable that

the tribal consent regulation is a

delegation of the Secretary's regulatory

power under the 1899 Act. Rather, the

regulations merely confirm that the

Secretary in exercising his power under the

1899 Act will defer action until the Tribe

exercises its inherent power as landowner

and consents to a conveyance of its

property. Statutes requiring consent of

persons as a precondition to government

action have generally been upheld against

claims of unconstitutional delegation of

power. The reasoning is that the power to

-28-

the delegation of power to regulate liquor

is valid then the delegation of power to

regulate the use of tribal lands is a

fortiori valid because it is an even more

basic attribute of tribal sovereignty. See

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. F.E.R.C,

11/

Supra, 698 F.2d at 1233 n.6.

(footnote 10 continued)consent to the

exercise of regulatory authority is not

power to regulate where the ultimate power

to take action remains in the government.

See generally, 1 Antieau, Municipal

Corporation Law, Section 5.28 at 81-82

(1982). Here, the ultimate power to

approve a railroad right of way remains in

the Secretary. Southern Pacific II, supra,

700 F.2d at 556.

11/ The Secretary has delegated power

to tribes in many other instances, even

where no express legislative authorization

exists. See e.g., 25 C.F.R. Part ll

establishing Courts of Indian Offenses and

authorizing tribes in Section 1l.l(e) to

preempt certain regulations through the

passage of inconsistent tribal ordinances;

25 C.F.R. §163.7 promulgated under 25

U.S.C. § 407, authorizing tribal consent to

sale of timber on tribal lands; 43 C.F.R.

-29-

Southern Pacific and amici raise the

spectre that tribes will unreasonably with-

hold their consent. However Congress has

considered this argument on several occa-

sions and has expressly rejected it as a

reason for divesting tribes of the right to

consent. In 1976 when Congress applied the

1899 Act and other right-of-way acts to the

Pueblo tribes, see discussion Supra at 10-ll

(footnote 11 continued) §4.200 promulgated

under various statutory authority

authorizing tribal preemption of the

Secretary's regulations establishing rules

governing the settlement of trust estates

of deceased Indians; and 25 C.F.R. § 211.28

promulgated under various Indian mineral

leasing statutes authorizing tribes to

supersede the Secretary's regulations

governing leasing of tribal lands for

mining purposes See also 40 C.F.R.

§52.21(g)(1) promulgated under the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642, authorizing

tribes to redesignate the air quality on

their reservations from that already

established by the Environmental Protection

Agency. This authority was upheld in Nance

v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra.

-30-

it responded to the argument by stating:

"Should public necessity require rights-

of-way across the lands of the Pueblo not-

withstanding the lack of consent of the

Pueblos, the Congress retains its authority

to grant such rights-of-way." H.R. Rep.

No. 94-800, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976)

reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 2370.

Again, in 1969, when Congress rejected

proposed regulations which would have di-

vested non-IRA tribes of the right to con-

sent to rights-of-way, the argument was

also rejected. The House Committee which

reviewed the regulations recognized that

"CtJhere may be cases where overwhelming

public necessity will justify the con-

demnation of rights-of-way over tribal

Indian land despite the opposition of the

Indian landowners.” It nevertheless

=Zle-

believed that “involuntary disposal of the

Indians' property rights ought not to be

done by administrative action of the

Interior Department." Instead, the

Committee stated that such cases ought to

be left to resolution by Congress. H.R.

Rep. No. 91-78, supra at 9. Clearly

Congress has never believed that the issue

raised by Southern Pacific and amici war-

rants divesting tribes of the power to con-

sent (or withhold consent) for rights-

of-way across their lands.

IV. The Court's Judgment Can Also Be

Sustained On Other Grounds

The Ninth Circuit's decision rests

solely on construction of the 1899 Act, but

it also may be sustained on other grounds.

Both section 16 of the Indian Reorgani-

zation Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 476, and

section 2 of the 1948 Indian Rights of Way

=32<

Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 324, require tribal

consent for rights-of-way across Indian

lands and would apply to the railroad

right-of-way at issue.

Section 16 of the IRA empowers tribes

Organized under the Act "to prevent the

sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of

tribal lands ...." The right-of-way regu- :

lations issued by the Secretary in 1938

implement the tribal consent condition re-

quired by the IRA, 25 C.F.R. §256.83 (lst

ed. 1939-40), and apply to railroad

right-of-way grants across tribal lands as

well as other dispositions of tribal

lands.

<

When Congress enacted the 1948 Indian

Rights of Way Act, it believed that IRA ,

tribes already possessed the power to con-

sent to dispositions of their land for oad

rights-of-way under the various existing

o33e

special acts. See S. Rep. No. 823, 80th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in 1948

U.S. Code.Cong. & Adm. News 1033, 1036.

Thus Congress sought to "preserve the

powers" of IRA tribes to consent to right-

of-way grants by expressly providing for

such consent in the 1948 Act. See section

2 of the 1948 Act, 25 U.s.c. §324, 12/

Alternatively, the 1899 Act and all

other special right-of-way statutes auth-

orizing secretarial grants were implicitly

amended in 1948 to require tribal consent

when they were incorporated into the com-

prehensive and uniform scheme for granting

rights-of-way contemplated by the 1948

Act. See, S. Rep. No. 823, supra.

Congress specifically considered the

12/ See also discussion of the 1976

Pueblo Lands Act supra at 10-1ll, and H.R.

Rep. No. 78, 9lst Cong. lst Sess. (1969)

discussed supra.at 9-10.

o3f<

treatment of special right- of-way statutes

in the 1948 Act's comprehensive scheme and

decided to preserve them as parts of the

scheme. 25 U.S.C. §326. It is reasonable

‘to infer that the same Congress which so

carefully preserved the power of IRA tribes

to consent to rights-of-way, intended that

this power apply to those special

right-of-way acts preserved under the same

act. In instances where Congress knowingly

includes pre-existing statues as parts of

an overall legislative scheme, implied

amendment of such statutes is 4m keeping

with Congress' intent in enacting the

comprehensive scheme. iA Sutherland,

Statutory Sesnt cambios Weation y > i

ft

o3$~

CONCLUSION

The writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Yvonne T. Knight

Counsel of Record

Jeanne S. Whiteing

Native American Rights Fund

1506 Broadway

Boulder, Colorado 80302

(303) 447-8760

Attorneys for the Walker River

Paiute Tribe of Nevada

October 1983

-36-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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