Jurisdictional Statement — Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

Supreme Court brief1983

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Office - Supreme ©" |

FIL"

JUL 1% 1983

83-43

Caer.

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.

CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING

COMPANY,

Appellant,

vs.

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO,

Appellee.

On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME CouRT OF OHIO

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

ALAN P. BUCHMANN

Of Counsel: Counsel of Record

RICHARD W. McLareN, JR.

ALAN D. Wricut Squire, Sanders & Dempsey

Vice President-Public 1800 Huntington Building

Affairs and Legal Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Craic I. SMITH (216) 687-8500

The Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Company Attorneys for Appellant,

55 Public Square The Cleveland Electric

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Illuminating Company

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

May the State of Ohio, by statute, constitutionally

require a public utility to invest its capital for the con-

venience of the public to ensure reliable service in the

future and simultaneously prohibit, by statute, that utility

from recovering through rates such capital when prudently

invested?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EE Te

ee

Reports of Opinions Below — Eehai 1

Grounds for Jurisdiction cs See aah 1

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and

Regulations Involved —. penta el 2

Statement of the Case:

A. The facts material to the question presented 3

B. The stage at which the question sought to be re-

viewed was raised below ....................-------------------- 8

C. The consequences of non-recovery sd

Reasons Requiring Plenary Consideration:

I. OHIO REVISED CODE $4905.22 AND §4909.15,

AS CONSTRUED BY THE OHIO COURT,

DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH THE PROVI-

SIONS OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION, PROHIBITING THE CON-

FISCATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH-

OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ............................ 14

a 29

Appendix:

PAGE

Appellant’s Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court of

The United States (filed July 7, 1983) 0. 3

Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio

Be. 3a OL 467 TLR. Sa Foe 1108s) oe 5

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.,

4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447 N.E. 2d 746 (1983) 33

Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 4 Ohio

St. 3d 111, 447 N.E. 2d 749 (1983) _.. ed cea 39

Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission

of Ohio in Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR (filed ican 5,

Rs ee ee re: 51

Rehearing Entry of The Public Utilities Commission of

Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR (filed May 12, 1982) 160

Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission of

Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR (filed March 12,1982) 168

Journal Entry of Ohio Supreme Court Denying Rehear-

ing in Case No. 82-165 (filed July 29, 1982) . 2s

Journal Entry and Mandate of Ohio Supreme Court

Dismissing Appeal in Case No. 82-165 (filed mm 3

1982) - : 2 259

Entry on Rehearing of the Public Utilities Commission

of Ohio in Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI (filed December

9, 1981) _ 261

Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission

of Ohio in Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI (filed October 21,

1981 ) 264

Journal Entry of Ohio aes Court Denying Motion

for Stay in Case No. 80-1480 (filed September 11, 1981) 272

iv

Journal Entries of Ohio Supreme Court Denying Re-

hearing in Case Nos. 80-1547, 80-1528, and 80-1480

Se oy | SR eee een eenenees Wr eee a

Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. adie 67 Ohio

St.2d 153, 423 N.E. 2d 820 (1981) _ ee

Rehearing Entry of the Public Utilities Commission in

Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR (filed September 3, 1980) ___

Opinion and Order in Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR of the

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (filed July 10, 1980)

Order On Motions For Summary Disposition, in Docket

No. ER 81-612-000 of the Federal Energy and

Commission (filed April 14, 1982) .

Letter of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Staff

directing immediate write-off (dated July 7, 1982)

Ohio Statutes: Ohio Revised Code $§ 4905.13, 4905.18,

4905.20, 4905.22, 4909.15; Ohio Administrative Code

Ee EE ORE a

PAGE

419

422

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Bluefield Water Works v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 US.

679, 690 (1923) . ERE i Eee Oe . 16, 18, 23

The Cleveland Electric iene Company, PUCO

Case No, 79-537-EL-AIR, — and Order sata

10, 1980) _ ec Abae es . 6, 8, 9, 10

The Cleveland Electric ices anal PUCO

Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR, RES and Order ( May 4,

1981) __.. 9, 10, 11

The Cleveland Electric haces Company, PUCO

Case No. §1-146-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order ( March

17, 1982); 46 PUR 4th 63 (1982) 1

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, PUCO

Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI, Opinion and Order ( Octo-

ber 21, 1981) _. . 9, 10

The Cleveland Electric icine Company, PUCO

Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR, ee and Order ( —

Se 12

Cleveland Electric ; iain Company v. Pub, Util.

Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746 (1983). 1, 10,11

Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 67 Ohio

St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981) 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14,

16, 17, 22

Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (Toledo Edi-

son), 1 Ohio St.3rd 22, at 24, 437 N.E.2d 586 (1982) 7,13

Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d

111, 447 N.E.2d 749 (1983) ..... 12, 22, 28

Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio

St.3d 91, at 99, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983) aaa, FS

PAGE

Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,

ae we, oon (24) eee eS

Fed. Power Comm. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water

Division, 411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973) 00000 28, 27

Kaiser Aetna v, United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)... 24

Keco Industries, Inc. v. The Cincinnati & Suburban Bell

Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254, 141 N.E.2d 465 (1957) 9

Mississippi River Fuel gai v. Fed. Pwr. Comm., 163

F.2d 433, at 437 (1947) . Pe:

Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.

Comm., 262 U.S. 276, at 292 (1923) 00. 20, 23

NEPCO Mun. Rate Committee v. Fed. Energy sas

Comm., 688 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1981) re 21

“5° — Tel. & Tel. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d

9 (1949) - ee aE 24

Ohio Edison Company, PUCO Case No, 80-141-EL-

AIR, Opinion and Order (February 11, 1981) 1]

Ohio Edison Company, PUCO Case No. 81-1171-EL-

AIR, Opinion and Order (November 3, 1982)... 12

Ohio Utilities Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d

153, at 161, 389 N.E.2d 483 (1979) 21

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City and County of San

Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (1924) 19, 20

Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 3, 23, 24, 27

Petition of New England Tel. & Tel., 115 Vt. 494, 66

A.2d 135 (1949) 24

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672

a aeaee ae 25

vii

PAGE

Senior Citizens Coalition v. Pub, Util. Comm., 69 Ohio

St.2d 625, 433 N.E.2d 583 (1982) 00 9

Toledo Edison Company, PUCO Case No. 81-1097-EL-

COI, Opinion and Order (October 28, 1981)... ~—s:13

Toledo Edison Company, Case No. 81-620-EL-AIR,

Opinion and Order (June 9, 1982) . i

Virginia Electric & Power Co,, 29 PUR 4th 65 (1979) .. 8

Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C.

Cir., 1950) cert. den., 340 U.S. 952 (1951) 16, 21, 22, 23

West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n. (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63, 72

(1935) 17

Wisc. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 252

Wis. 481, 32 N.W.2d 247 (1948) 24

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation v. Public Service

Commission, 109 Wis.2d 256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982) 17

PAGE

STATUTES

SS URS: SRG) ect hee e

Ohio Revised Code § 4905.13 eee eens 7

Ohio Revised Code § 4905.18 0 |

Ohio Revised Code § 4905.20 sak Geasciaasee aaleeena ieee 4

Ohio Revised Code § 4905.22 ae ; 1, 2,4, 14, 16

Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15 . 2,14

Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15( A) (3) a

Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15( A) (4) eee ee

Ohio Administrative Code § 4901; 1-9-05 . 2,7, 15

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

18 C.F.R. 101 Pa AR I a: BEEN we AL. 7,15

AMENDMENTS

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States 1, 2, 14, 17

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States 1, 2. 14, 17, 18

1

REPORTS OF OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court appealed

here is reported at 4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746

(1983). The underlying Opinion and Order of the Public

Utilities Commission of Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR

is reported at 46 PUR 4th 63 (1982).

The related decision of the Ohio Supreme Court dated

July 15, 1981 in Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm.

(CEI), is reported at 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820

(1981).’ These decisions, along with other related deci-

sions, are printed in the separate Appendix.’

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

This appeal is brought to review a decision of the

Ohio Supreme Court denying Appellant’s appeal and

affirming an Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio which denied recovery of Appellant’s

investment in four cancelled electric generating units as

an operating expense in setting Appellant’s rates for elec-

tric utility service to retail customers in Ohio.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1257(2) to review the final judgment rendered on

April 13, 1983 by the Ohio Supreme Court, the highest

court of the State of Ohio. Appellant filed its Notice of

Appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court on July 7, 1983.

The validity of Ohio Revised Code Sections 4905.22

and 4909.15(A)(4) was drawn into question before the

Ohio Supreme Court on the grounds that, as construed

and applied, they are repugnant to the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United

States, and the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court was

in favor of the validity of those statutes.

1Hereinafter cited as Consumers’ Counsel. Other decisions with

the same title will be cited in full.

*Hereinafter cited as CEI Appx.

2

In the event that an appeal is not considered the

proper mode of review, Appellant requests that the papers

upon which this appeal is taken be regarded and acted

upon as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2103.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states,

in pertinent part, as follows:

“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-

vate property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.”

2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-

ess of law... .

3. Ohio Revised Code §4905.22, states, in pertinent

part, as follows:

“Every public utility shall furnish necessary and

adequate service aid facilities, and every public

utility shall furnish and provide with respect to its

business such instrumentalities and facilities as are

adequate and in all respects just and reasonable.”

4. Ohio Revised Code $4909.15, states, in pertinent

part, as follows:

“(A) The public utilities commission, when fixing

and determining just and reasonable rates, fares, tolls,

and charges shall determine:

(4) The cost to the utility of ‘eet the public

utility service for the test period .

3

5. Ohio Administrative Code §4901: 1-9-05, Uniform

Classification of Accounts for Electric Utilities — FPC,

1961 states, in pertinent part:

“The system of accounts and records, identified and

designated as “Uniform System of Accounts Pre-

scrited for Public Utilities and Licenses, effective

January 1, 1961,” as adopted by the Federal Power

Commission, is adopted by this Commission effec-

tive as of January 1, 1961, for electric light com-

panies operating within the state of Ohio which are

subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Com-

mission. . .. Each such public utility shall carry on its

books, in addition to such additional accounts as may

hereafter be prescribed by this Commission, the

accounts and records prescribed in said Uniform Sys-

tem of Accounts effective January 1, 1961, for a public

utility of its class, and shall accordingly keep such

accounts in accordance with the requirements, defini-

tions and instructions contained and set forth in said

uniform system of accounts... .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The facts material to the question presented.

The issue on this appeal is whether the Supreme Court

of Ohio correctly held that this Court, in Permian Basin

Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), deferred completely

to the local legislative will and that:

“The [Federal] Constitution no longer provides any

special protections for the utility investor.”®

The facts which have given rise to this extraordinary hold-

ing can be briefly summarized.

Appellant, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com-

pany (CEI), is an electric utility rendering service to some

700,000 customers in northeastern Ohio. Appellant is reg-

*Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d

91, at 99, 447 N.E.2d 733, CEI Appx., p. 19 (1983).

4

ulated under a comprehensive regulatory scheme by The

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) in virtually

all aspects of its operations, including rates, financing, ac-

counting, and service. Appellant is also regulated by the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, formerly

the Federal Power Commission (FPC) ).

In 1967, CEI embarked with four other regulated

utilities‘ on a program for the joint construction of electric

generating units — both coal-fired and nuclear — some of

which have been completed and are now in operation,

some of which are now under construction, and some of

which have been cancelled. It is the cancellation of four

of those planned units, after a substantial investment had

been made in them, that gives rise to the current contro-

versy.

Any business enterprise, in order to remain viable,

should plan for the future. Appellant, however, as a reg-

ulated electric utility, is required by statute’ to provide

service when it is demanded. This means that appellant

not only should plan for the future but is legally obligated

to do so. Moreover, appellant is unable to withdraw from

the business without the permission of the State." Thus

appellant, by statute, . . . “must anticipate load growth

years in advance to maintain adequate capacity to ensure

reliable service .. .” and, of course, expenditures must be

made in the process in order to fulfill the statutory obliga-

tion.’ If, as time goes on, the anticipated demand dimin-

‘Ohio Edison Company, Toledo Edison Company, Duquesne

Power & Light Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company, to-

gether with CEI serving some 2,500,000 customers in northern and

central Ohio and Western Pennsylvania. The five are known as the

Central Area Power Coordination Group (CAPCO).

®Ohio Revised Code Section 4905.22.

*Ohio Revised Code Section 4905.20.

*Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 67 Ohio

St.2d 153, at 158, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981); CEI Appx., p. 283.

5

ishes, plans and construction may be prudently postponed.

On the other hand, if the future requirements exceed those

forecasted, there is no practical and economic way to sig-

nificautly speed up the process,” thus increasing the risk

of a shortfall in available electric energy.

Initially, based on forecasts made in late 1972, the

four units here involved (known as Davis-Besse Nos, 2

and 3 and Erie Nos. 1 and 2) were intended to be placed

in service in 1983. Importantly, they were intended to be

replicas of a now-licensed and operating CAPCO gen-

erating unit, Davis-Besse No. 1. As time passed, it became

apparent that the rate of growth in the demand for electric

service was lower than anticipated, in large part because

of the effects of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the re-

sultant increased sensitivity to energy conservation.” This

caused appellant to postpone construction of the four

units, as well as others. In addition, the Three Mile Island

incident in early 1979 gave rise to a variety of substantial

changes in construction requirements imposed by the Nu-

clear Energy Regulatory Commission and it became ap-

parent that the original concept of duplicating Davis-Besse

No. 1 would not work.'’ Those regulatory changes, still

not today totally ascertainable, would have added sig-

nificantly to the costs of the proposed units, ax they have

to many others throughout the country.

‘Certain types of generating capacity require much less time to

construct, but they are usually oil-fired units which are extremely

expensive to operate and which, because of international implica-

tions, have been discouraged by the Federal government.

*It should be emphasized, because it is frequently overlooked,

that there continues to be growth. It is the growth rate that has

decreased.

“The four units involved were intended to be a Babcock &

Wilcox design. TMI and Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 are also Babcock

& Wilcox plants.

6

Given these and other factors, the constructing com-

panies (including CEI) decided in January 1980 to cancel

these four units.’ At that time the five participating com-

panies had already expended approximately $250,000,000

on them, of which some $56,000,000 had been spent by

CEI. The issue on this appeal arises from the denial of

the recovery through rates as an expense of that portion

of CEI’s investment attributable to Ohio jurisdictional elec-

tric service.””

In the original proceeding before the PUCO, Case

No. 79-537-EL-AIR, the Commission expressly held that

(1) the initial decision to embark on the construction of

these units was prudent, (2) all expenditures made had

been prudent, and (3) the decision to cancel was pru-

dent."* The Commission also concluded that, in view of

all the available case law — uniformly authorizing recovery

of such investments in similar circumstances — the invest-

ing public had not taken into account the risk of total non-

recovery and hence the utility had not been compensated

for such a risk through the return allowed in previous rate

cases.'' In holding that these costs could not be recovered

through rates as an expense, the Supreme Court of Ohio

did not disturb these findings of prudence at every step of

"While not directly relevant, it is worthwhile to note that

construction proceeded on several others, including three additional

nuclear units.

"*FERC has provided for recovery from CEI’s interstate custo-

mers. CEI Appx., pp. 400-415. Pennsylvania has provided for re-

covery by the Pennsylvania members of CAPCO from Pennsylvania

customers.

“The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, PUCO Case

No. 79-537-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at pp. 25-29 (July 10.

1980); CEI Appx., pp. 360-362.

“This was amply confirmed by the evidence, discussed infra,

in the later CEI rate case which is the subject of this appeal.

7

the process.’* This appeal, therefore, presents a straight-

forward legal issue.

The issue is the result of the interplay of the relevant

Ohio statutes which, as now construed by the Supreme

Court of Ohio, both impose upon appellant a mandatory

duty not only to render utility service, but also to make in-

vestments to ensure reliable service in the future, and then

deprive it of any opportunity to recover the investment

made in fulfilling the latter obligation. This situation is

brought about to large degree by the Uniform System of

Accounts imposed upon appellant, and all other electric

utilities, by FERC and, in this case, by the PUCO." Ap-

pellant was required by Ohio law to capitalize these ex-

penditures and was barred from their current recovery,

with the expectation of future recovery,’ whether or not

the investment produced a commercial product, in this case

operating electric plants. Appellant was then denied any

recovery by the Ohio Supreme Court's announcement of

“new” Ohio law. **

Consumers’ Counsel, supra, at 163, CEI Appx., p. 289.

See 18 C.F.R. 101 (1937): Ohio Revised Code §4905.13- Ohio

Administrative Code §4901:1-9-05; CEI Appx., pp. 422-430.

‘There are, of course, variations in state regulatory treatment.

In some jurisdictions, including Ohio, it is possible for the utility to

earn a return on such investments, as Construction Work In Prog-

ress, before the plant goes into commercial service. This was not

the case here, because of constraints in Ohio law not relevant to

this discussion.

"The word “new” is not appellant's. The Ohio Supreme Court

has expressly characterized its ruling in Consumers Counsel, supra,

as “new law”: “That statute may be used to investigate the reason-

ableness of rate schedules in the light of new law. such as our deci.

sion in Consumers Counsel, supra” Consumers Counsel vo Pub

Util. Comm. (Toledo Edison), 1 Ohio St 3d 22. at 24. 497 N_EQd

586, at SSS (1982)

8

B. The stage at which the question sought to be reviewed

was raised below.

The affected utilities cancelled the four plants in

January, 1980. CEI then had pending before the PUCO

an application for general rate relief, PUCO Case No.

79-537-EL-AIR on the docket of the Commission. CEI

asked the Ohio Commission to permit it to amortize its

investment in the four cancelled plants over a ten year

period and to include the annual amortization amount in

allowable expenses for ratemaking purposes. The Commis-

sion unanimously agreed.’ On appeals to the Ohio Su-

preme Court by three intervening parties, the Court

reversed, holding that such recovery is not permitted under

Ohio law. Consumers’ Counsel, supra. As intervening ap-

pellee,” appellant suggested in its first brief to the Ohio

Court that even the recovery allowed by the PUCO raised

constitutional issues, with the plain implication that no

recovery at all obviously would raise even more serious

problems. The Ohio Supreme Court did not address the

“CEI Appx., pp. 360-362. Note that this had the effect of pro-

viding for the return of the invested capital over a ten-year span.

This, of course, is not the same as a full return of that capital (be-

cause of the delayed recovery) and no provision was sought, or

made, for any earnings on the investment. Such additional recovery

has been permitted in a number of jurisdictions and it has been

suggested that it is constitutionally required. Virginia Electric &

Power Co., 29 PUR 4th 65, at 96 (1979).

“Under Ohio Practice, on an appeal from the PUCO to the

Ohio Supreme Court (which appeal is as of right) against the

interests of the affected utility, the utility is not a party as of right;

the PUCO is the statutory appellee. While intervention is normally

allowed the utility, as it was in these cases. that does not auto-

matically entitle the utility to participate in the argument, which

is permitted only if the court consents and the Commission leaves

time available

9

constitutional question in Consumers’ Counsel. When the

Constitutional issue was fully briefed on CEI’s Application

For Rehearing, the Ohio Court denied the Application

without opinion. Appellant's appeal to this Court was dis-

missed “for want of a properly presented federal

question, *'

The remand to the PUCO raised distinct procedural

problems. The rates set in PUCO Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR

had already been superceded by those set in CEI’s next

subsequent rate case, PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR.”

In 80-376-EL-AIR, decided prior to the Ohio Supreme

Court's decision, the Commission had again allowed the

annual amortization of the investment in the four can-

celled units as an expense. No party had pressed an ap-

peal from that decision.” Accordingly, any adjustment of

the superceded rates from the remanded case (79-537-

EL-AIR) would have been meaningless,** and any adjust-

ment in the most recent case (80-376-EL-AIR) was pro-

cedurally impossible. The Commission, therefore, insti-

tuted an investigation on its own motion, PUCO Case No.

81-1096-EL-COI, and, over appellant's objection, reduced

appellant’s then-current rates pro tanto by the amount of

the amortization which had been included in the last pre-

“United States Supreme Court Cases A-250 (Application For

Stay) and 81-1002; 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982).

*2See Consumers’ Counsel, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d 153, at 154 n.3;

CEI Appx., p. 278.

*An appeal from PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR was prose-

cuted, but on completely different issues. See Senior Citizens Coali-

tion v. Pub. Util. Comm., 69 Ohio St.2d 625, 433 N_E.2d 583 ( 1982)

“Ohio law makes no provision for refunds in such cireum-

stances. Keco Industries, Inc. ve. The Cincinnati ¢> Suburban Bell

Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254. 141 N.E.2d 465 ( 1957)

10

ceding rate case (PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR).*

Appellant appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme

Court, expressly raising the Constitutional issue presented

here, but the appeal was dismissed and rehearing denied,

both without opinion, with the grounds for dismissal un-

stated and unclear.”* Appellant noticed an appeal to this

Court, but that appeal was dismissed “for want of a prop-

erly presented federal question.”*’

In appellant's next Ohio jurisdictional electric rate

case, No. 81-146-EL-AIR, the one here under appeal, the

PUCO said that it would approve the amortization again,

but denied it solely on the ground that it was beund by

the decision** of the Ohio Supreme Court in Consumers’

Counsel, supra:

“Applicant has requested an allowance for rate-

making purposes for the amortization of the costs

incurred with respect to four cancelled nuclear units.

This subject was fully discussed in Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Company, Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR,

Opinion and Order, July 10, 1980, in which the Com-

mission approved such an amortization. The Commis-

sion approved the same amortization in applicant's

subsequent rate case, Cleveland Electric Illuminating

2°The Commission took no evidence and refused to consider

other intervening changes in expenses, justifying its peremptory

action by the imminence of appellant's next general rate case, the

one here under appeal. The Opinion and Order of the PUCO in

Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI is printed at CEI Appendix, pp. 264-271.

The Ohio Court's Journal Entries dismissing and denying re-

hearing are printed at CEI Appendix, pp. 255-260.

27United States Supreme Court Case No. 82-704; 51 U.S.L.W.

3507 (1983).

*“Chere was no exercise of the Commission's expertise on this

issue when the Commission denied recovery of this cost as an

operating expense.

11

Company, Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR, supra, and ap-

proved a similar amortization in Ohio Edison, Case

No, 80-141-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, [February

11, 1981]. The Commission would approve the amor-

tization again if it were not constrained by the deci-

sion of the Supreme Court of Ohio in OCC v. Public

Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio St.2d 153 (1981). This

case clearly holds that this expense is, as a matter of

law in Ohio, not includable as an operating expense

for ratemaking purposes. The Commission must, there-

fore, deny applicant's request.” (Case No. 81-146-

EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at pages 27-28; CEI

Appx., pp. 220-221).

On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, both

adhering to its prior construction of Ohio law first made

in Consumers’ Counsel, supra and, at last, addressing the

constitutional issue.*” The Ohio Court held that the Ohio

statutes, as construed in Consumers’ Counsel, supra, do

not contravene the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. This appeal followed.

In this case, the Ohio Commission recognized that

the Ohio Court's declaration of “new law” in Consumers’

Counsel, supra, had increased the perceived risk of invest-

ment in Ohio utilities, and specifically in CEI, a result

anticipated by the Ohio Court in Consumers’ Counsel,

supra.’ The Ohio Commission accordingly determined

that the cost of equity capital to CEI had been increased

and authorized an allowed cost of equity (and hence an

allowed cost of capital) higher than it might otherwise

**Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Pub. Util. Comm.,

4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746 (1983); CEI Appx., pp. 33-50. In

deciding the constitutional issue, the Ohio court relied entirely

upon its decision, on the same day, in Dayton Power & Light Co.

v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 91, 147 N.E.2d 733 (1983),

CEI Appx., pp. 5-32. That case involved the disallowance of a

similar, but much smaller, expense item for The Dayton Power and

Light Company, another Ohio utility, relative to a cancelled coal-

fired generating unit.

®°See 67 Ohio St.2d at 167; CEI Appx., p. 294.

12

have done.*' The Commission also authorized CEI to con-

tinue to amortize the remaining book balance of its in-

vestment for book purposes although not for ratemaking

purposes. In a parallel appeal in this case, Consumers’

Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 111, 447 N.E.2d

749 (1983),"* the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed both

these decisions.

Appellant has had a subsequent Ohio rate case,

PUCO Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order

(January 5, 1983)" The Commission, again constrained by

Consumers’ Counsel, supra, declined to include the amor-

tization of the cancelled plants as an expense. It also

found it unnecessary, in the circumstances, to authorize

a specific increment in rate of return to account for this

item. Appellant has filed an appeal to the Ohio Supreme

Court in order to preserve the record."

C. The consequences of non-recovery.

It is important to recognize the impact of non-recov-

ery. If CEI is unable to recover its prudent investment in

"Opinion and Order, at pp. 39-40, CEI Appx., pp. 244-246.

The PUCO reached the same conclusion in rate cases involving the

other affected Ohio utilities. Ohio Edison Co., Case No, 81-1171-

EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at p. 37 (November 3, 1982); and

Toledo Edison Co., Case No, 81-620-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order,

at p. 27 (June 9, 1982),

*The Opinion is printed at CEI Appx., pp. 39-50.

“The Commission's Opinion and Order is printed at CEI

Appx., pp. 51-159. Recovery of the cancelled plants investment is

denied at CEI Appx., p. 108,

“Cleveland Electric Iluminating Company v. The Public Utili-

ties Commission of Ohio, Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 83-677.

13

the four cancelled plants through rates, it will be required

to write-off that balance sheet asset in a single accounting

period. In other words, the investment will be lost forever.

The write-off will be a charge to earnings in that year and

hence earnings and retained earnings will be decreased

to that degree. The State of Ohio will have confiscated

this investment, which the State required CEI to make,

as surely as if it had ordered it paid over to the State.

The Ohio Commission, which has elsewhere recog-

nized the severe financial impact of such a write-off,”’ has

authorized appellant to continue to amortize the invest-

ment on its books over a period of years. The Chief Ac-

countant of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

however, directed appellant to immediately write-off its

entire investment, having concluded that appellant is spe-

cifically denied by law from recovery of these costs as an

operating expense. FERC has been requested not to en-

force the directive during this appeal.”

“Toledo Edison Co,, PUCO Case No, 81-1097-EL-COI, Opin-

ion and Order (October 28, 1981), affirmed, Consumers’ Counsel v.

Pub. Util. Comm. (Toledo Edison), 1 Ohio St.3d 22, N.E.2d 586

(1982). That impact will also adversely affect the consuming pub-

lic, through increased future capital costs, as the Ohio Supreme

Court expressly recognized and the PUCO held in the case at bar.

“It might be argued that appellant has suffered no injury until

there has been a write-off. That, however, would give rise to a loss

which could not be remedied. If the write-off had occurred in 1982

(the latest calendar year for which figures are available) appellant's

reported earnings per share of $3.01 would have been reduced by

$0.51. The fact that the regulatory agency having final jurisdiction

has to date been willing to preserve the status quo pending appeal

should not be a ground for denying review.

14

REASONS REQUIRING PLENARY CONSIDERATION

I. OHIO REVISED CODE $4905.22 AND $4909.15,

AS CONSTRUED BY THE OHIO COURT, DIRECT-

LY CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE

FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, PRO-

HIBITING THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE

PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW,

The legal issue presented can be succinctly stated.

Can Ohio law constitutionally require a public utility to

make an investment to ensure reliable service and, simul-

taneously, prohibit recovery of such investment? The

answer seems self-evident; the parameters of the issue

are also extremely clear.

Ohio Revised Code §4905.22, states, in pertinent part,

as follows:

“Every public utility shall furnish necessary and

ade aan service and facilities, and every public util-

ity shall furnish and provide with respect to its busi-

ness such instrumentalities and facilities as are ade-

quate and in all respects just and reasonable.” (em-

phasis added ),

There is no question that this statute requires appel-

lant, as a public utility, to invest its capital in the present

for planning and engineering for the convenience of the

public to furnish adequate facilities in the future. The

plain words of the statute say so, and the Ohio Court so

held in Consumers’ Counsel. The Ohio Court reiterated

its stated view that “utilities must anticipate load growth

years in advance to maintain adequate capacity to ensure

reliable service...” (67 Ohio St.2d at 155, CEI Appx. p.

283, emphasis added). An electric utility serving 700,000

customers obviously cannot “maintain adequate capacity”

without planning and engineering for the future. Large

base load generating units, which have the advantage of

15

being energy efficient, simply cannot be built without a

lead-time exceeding ten (10) years. The Commission found

that the expenses at issue were proper business expenses

which were prudently incurred.

Likewise, there is no question in this case that the

capital invested by CEI for planning and engineering

these generating units was dedicated to the convenience

of the public as required by this Ohio statute. No party has

ever argued otherwise. The Commission noted that “What

the company seeks is the recovery of costs incurred on

behalf of its rate payers to assure that adequate service

could be maintained.” (Quoted by the Ohio Court, 67

Ohio St.2d at 161).

Under Ohio and Federal law, such investments are not

currently recoverable through rates as an operating ex-

pense. This results from the Uniform System of Accounts,

prescribed by Ohio law, and there is no dispute about

that fact. The accounting treatment for the capital invested

in such required construction is tightly circumscribed by

satute. See 18 C.F.R. 101 (1937); Ohio Administrative

Code §4901;1-9-05.

Under the Uniform System of Accounts, planning and

engineering expenditures of this kind are not shown on a

utility’s books as operating expenses when made, but are

capitalized. CEI had no choice but to capitalize its invest-

ments in these plants from 1973 until 1980 and to postpone

any recovery of or on these expenditures. Thus, the expend-

itures increased the eventual book cost of the property

to which they relate.

If the project is completed and goes into service, the

investment (including the kinds of planning and engi-

neering expenses here under discussion ) is recovered, over

the property's life, through depreciation accruals, for which

explicit provision is made in the Ohio statutes. Ohio Re-

vised Code §4905.18. The investor would also have an

opportunity to earn a return on this capital investment

16

since it would become part of the utility's rate base when

completed. See Ohio Revised Code §4909.15( A) (3). See

also Bluefield Water Works v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U.S.

679, 690 (1923), Federal Power Commission v. Hope Nat-

ural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Stated another way,

the investor is entitled not only to get his original money

back, but also to have an opportunity to earn a profit on

his investment in a public utility.

Since these projects were not completed, the invest-

ment was never recognized in rate base as plant in service.

No return was ever earned on the investment. Since the

units were never in service, no depreciation accruals were

ever recovered through rates. See Washington Gaslight

Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir., 1950) cert. den., 340

U.S. 952 (1951).

When the four planned generating units were can-

celled, the invested dollars were, pursuant to the FERC

Uniform System of Accounts, with the approval of FERC,

transferred to Account 182 (extraordinary property loss),

They were then, as the Ohio Commission initially held,

to be amortized over a period of years and the annual

amortization was recognized as an expense for rate making

purposes as part of the “cost” of “service” under Ohio

Revised Code § 4909.15(.A)(4). This, the Ohio Court

held in Consumers’ Counsel was an incorrect interpretation

of the statute. The Ohio Court has expressly characterized

Consumers’ Counsel as announcing “new law’. It is this

combination of statutory requirements and interpretations

which results in the unconstitutional taking here.

Simply put, Ohio Revised Code § 4905.22 requires

CEI to spend money, the Uniform System of Accounts

prohibits current recovery of that money, and Ohio Re-

vised Code § 4909.15) 4)(4), as now applied to CEL by

the Commission, prevents CEL from recovering even the

return of that money, much less earning a return on that

17

money. That is an unconstitutional confiscation of prop-

erty in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

of the Constitution.

The precise question was confronted by the Su-

preme Court of Wisconsin in Wisconsin Public Service

Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 109 Wis.2d

256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982). In that case, the Wisconsin

Commission had held that the utility's prudent investment

in a cancelled generating unit could not be recovered

through rates. The Wisconsin Court reversed:

“In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n, (No, 1), 294 U.S.

63, 72 (1935), the United States Supreme Court

stated that, “development expenses to re normal

growth are legitimate charges upon income for rate

purposes as for others.” In this case, there is no dis-

pute that the precertification expenditures were pru-

dent. Utilities have a statutory duty to engage in

such expenditures. Sec. 196.03(1), Stats., states:

“Every public utility is required to furnish reasonably

adequate service and facilities.” It is arbitrary and

capricious to authorize a utility to expand its facilities,

spend large amounts of money prudently to accom-

plish that goal, and then tt the utility to bear the

entire risk of such expenditures.”

At the time when the Ohio Court announced its

Consumers’ Counsel decision, the question of the recovery

of an investment in cancelled projects had been raised in

a number of jurisdictions and it is fair to say that, in simi-

lar circumstances, recovery in some form had been uni-

formly permitted.’ The Ohio Court recognized in Consum-

ers’ Counsel that “the overwhelming weight of authority

from other jurisdictions supports the position of the com-

mission [allowing amortization].” (67 Ohio St.2d at 162;

“"We say “in some form” because, in a number of instances, the

utility in question had been authorized not only to recover its in-

vestment but also to earn a return upon it during the recovery

period.

18

CEI Appx., pp. 287-288 ). Since that decision, while the vast

majority of jurisdictions has authorized recovery through

rates, there have been some additional cases in which

recovery has been denied, sometimes on technical grounds

not here relevant and, generally, without any discussion

of the constitutional question.** The issue presented, there-

fore, potentially involves much more than an Ohio ques-

tion,

In Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Com-

mission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), this Court

declared the requirements of the United States Constitu-

tion regarding state regulation of utility rates:

“A public utility is entitled to such rates as will per-

mit it to earn a return on the value of the property

which it employs for the convenience of the public

equal to that generally being made at the same time,

and in the same general part of the country on invest-

ments in other business undertakings which are at-

tended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but

it has no constitutional right to profits such as are

realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises

or speculative ventures. The return should be reason-

ably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial

soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under

efficient and economical management, to maintain its

credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for

the proper discharge of its public duties.” (262 U.S.

at 692-93, emphasis added).

"The cases are too numerous to permit citation within the con-

fines of this Statement. Recovery through rates has been authorized

in some 31 jurisdictions, some of which have allowed a return on

the unamortized investment. Where recovery has been denied, it is

usually due to circumstances peculiar to the specific case which do

not seem to raise a Constitutional issue, e.g. a failure of proof,

cancellation caused by the act of a different regulatory jurisdiction,

or illegality in the making of the commitment. No such questions

are presented here.

19

This Court further stated that rates which fail to satisfy

this standard

“|... are confiscatory and therefore beyond legislative

power. Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reason-

able return on the value of the property used at the

time it is being used to render the service are unjust,

unreasonable and confiscatory, and their enforcement

deprives the public utility company of its property in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (262 U.S.

at 690, emphasis added).

While this Court has not had occasion to address the

constitutional implications of the cancellations of electric

generating plants which have occurred in the last decade

(largely because recovery of some sort was almost univer-

sally permitted until the decision of the Ohio Supreme

Court), a comparable situation arose years ago because

of rapid changes in the gas industry and, eventually, the

conversion to natural gas and the unexpected abandon-

ment of manufactured gas facilities. In Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. vy. City and County of San Francisco, 265 U.S.

403, 44 S. Ct. 537, 68 L. Ed. 1075 (1924), this Court held

that it was error for the District Court to employ in deter-

mining the cost of service for ratemaking purposes the

reduced costs of manufacturing gas made possible by new

inventions but to exclude from the valuation of the rate

base both 1) the proper valuation of the patented inven-

tions and 2) “recompense for the obsolescence” of the

utility property which had to be abandoned.

The importance of Pacific Gas is that this Court placed

particular emphasis on the facts that 1) the patents which

rendered the old gas plant obsolete “were of recent con-

ception,” 2) that the utility could not have provided for

the obsolescence of the old plant through depreciation

charges in previous rates, and 3) that the obsolescence

“could not have been long anticipated.”

20

The analogy is apparent. The reasons for the termina-

tion of appellant's units were of “recent conception” and

“could not have been long anticipated.” No one could have

forecasted the reduction in the rate of growth in demand

for power in the CAPCO area after the Arab Oil Embargo

or the incident involving the Babcock and Wilcox unit at

Three Mile Island. The planning costs were incurred

prudently, and the denial of at least recovery of those

costs by Ohio Revised Code §4909.15( A) (4) as construed

and applied to CEI here amounts to the same kind of con-

fiscation as was found unconstitutional in Pacific Gas,

supra. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was,

itself, an unanticipated event, expressly characterized by

that Court as a declaration of “new law.”

Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pacific Gas, found only

issues of fact, and not law, in the case, and proposed that

justice would be better served by adopting the “prudent

investment” theory of rate base:

“If a new device is adopted which involves additional

investment (to buy a new plant or a patent right),

the company’s investment, on which the return must

be paid, is increased by that amount. If the new

device does not involve new investment, but the in-

novation involves increased current payments (like

royalties for use of a process ), the additional disburse-

ment is borne by the community as an operating

expense. The cost of a scrapped plant is carried as

part of the investment on which a return must be paid

unless and until it has been retired, — that is, fully

paid for, out of the depreciation reserve. Thus, justice

both to the owners of the utility and to the public is

assured.” (265 U.S. at 425, emphasis added),

Under his “prudent investment” theory of rate base, Justice

Brandeis expressly noted that the investor is entitled to a

return of his investment in utility plant, whether or not

the plant is “scrapped.” The classic statement of this theory

appears in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.

21

Pub. Serv. Comm. 262 U.S. 276, at 292 (1923), and that

statement has been cited with approval by this Court in

Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,

320 U.S. 591, at 603 (1944) and by the Ohio Supreme

Court in Ohio Utilities Co. vy. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio

St.2d 153, at 161, 389 N.E.2d 483, at 488 (1979). Recovery

of its prudent investment in the four cancelled plants is

all that appellant is requesting here. Contrast NEPCO

Mun. Rate Committee v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., 668

F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir., 1981), cert. den., 102 $.Ct. 2928

(1982) (FERC allowance of amortization of cancelled

plants expense and denial of a return on the investment

affirmed ).

More recently the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia had occasion to address a similar question. In

Washington Gas Light Co., ei al. vy. Baker, 188 F.2d 11

(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. den., 304 U.S. 952 (1951), that

Court affirmed the District Court's reversal of a Utilities

Commission rate order which included the depreciated

original cost of the utility’s abandoned West Plant in rate

base in determining the rates. By including the abandoned

gas plant in rate base, the Commission in Washington Gas

Light had awarded a return on the investment in the aban-

doned plant. (The propriety of the recovery of the invest-

ment in the abandoned gas plant, the issue on this appeal,

was apparently not even challenged.) The Court of Ap-

peals found that the record before the Commission was

inadequate for it to determine whether the investor had

already received a return for the risk of obsolescence

through either 1) depreciation expense in cost of service

or 2) “as a risk considered in fixing the permissible rate

of return.” (188 F.2d at 20). Accordingly, the decision of

the Commission was vacated and remanded because it

potentially had allowed the investor a return on his invest-

ment twice. The Court commented that it seemed “likely

... in view of the prevalence in the past of the doctrine

22

that abandoned property would not be included in the

rate base . . . that investors have been compensated for

the risk of obsolescence.” (188 F.2d at 20).

Here the facts are precisely the converse of those

mentioned in Washington Gas Light. In the present sit-

uation the Ohio Court noted that “the overwhelming

weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports the

position of the [Ohio] commission” allowing recovery of

such planning costs. (67 Ohio St.2d at 162). Since “the

overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions”

allowed recovery of similar expenses, the investor had not

anticipated the risk of exclusion from cost of service in

Ohio and therefore had not received compensation either

through rate of return or through depreciation expense

for such an unforeseeable and unprecedented disallow-

ance.

This is amply confirmed by the evidence in this case.

An abrupt break in the stock prices of appellant, Toledo

Edison, and Ohio Edison occurred immediately after the

Consumers’ Counsel decision on July 15, 1981. This abrupt

break in stock prices was demonstrated in graphical form

and admitted into evidence in the present case."” The Ohio

Commission found that there was an increase in the in-

vestors’ perceived risk as a result of the Ohio Court's

Consumers Counsel decision, announcing the “new law”

that prudent expenditures in cancelled electric plants could

not be recovered through rates."” The Ohio Court affirmed,

Consumers’ Counsel vy. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 4 Ohio

St.3d 111, 447 N.E.2d 749 (1983), CEI Appx. pp. 39-50.

The investors’ perceived risk increased, and the break

in the stock prices occurred, because the market had never

“These six graphs, CEI Exhibit 4A, pages 29-34, are printed

following the final page of text in CEI’s Appendix, filed with this

Jurisdictional Statement.

“Opinion and Order, at page 40; CEI Appx., pp. 244-245.

23

anticipated the complete confiscation of prudent expendi-

tures on cancelled generating plants. The investors had not

been compensated for the risk of confiscation “as a risk con-

sidered in fixing the permissible rate of return.” Washing-

ton Gas Light, supra, 188 F.2d at 20. See also, Missouri

ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra, 262 U.S. at 288-

312; Bluefield, supra, 262 U.S. 692-693; Hope, supra, 320

U.S. at 603; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, sttpra, 390

U.S. at 770; Fed. Power Comm. v. Memphis Light, Gas &

Water Division, 411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973).

The constitutional analysis presented by the Ohio

Supreme Court in Dayton Power and Light v. Pub. Util.

Comm., supra, decided on the same day and relied upon

in the decision here under appeal, is critically lacking.

While the Ohio Court reviews a long series of decisions

of this Court in the field of utility regulation, it is apparent

that the discussion was taken in large part from a single

law review article, Bernstein, “Utility Rate Regulation:

The Little Locomotive That Couldn't,” 1970 Wash. U.L.Q.

223, the thesis of which is that, in Permian Basin Area

Rate Cases, supra, this Court reversed Hope and com-

pletely deferred to the legislative will on the question of

the Constitutional rights of a regulated public utility in

the ratemaking area.*' The Ohio Court expressly adopted

the proposition that:

“The Constitution no longer provides any special pro-

tection for the utility investor.”

‘The author rather clearly indicates what he believes is, and

apparently recommends as, the solution: “This country is accus-

tomed to using government subsidies and even nationalization when

necessary for the fulfillment of important social goals.” Bernstein,

“Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't,”

1970 Wash. Univ. Law Q. 223, 264.

“Dayton Power & Light Co. vy. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio

St.3d 91, at 99, CEI Appx., p. 19.

24

We do not know what “special protection” means in

this context. All that is sought by appellant here is the

same kind of constitutional protection afforded anyone,

whether individual or corporate, against the uncompen-

sated expropriation of property.’ It is plain that the de-

cisions of this Court do not support the Ohio Court's

proposition. It is true that this Court held in Federal

Power Commission vy. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 US.

591 (1944), that the Natural Gas Act and the Federal

Constitution did not require any particular mode of rate-

making. No issue is taken with that proposition here and,

despite that holding as to techniques, it is plain that Hope

announced — and did not abandon — constitutional stan-

dards.**

The Supreme Court of Ohio drew its principal sup-

port for its sweeping proposition from this Court’s decision

in Permian Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). In that

case, this Court affirmed the then Federal Power Com-

mission’s handling of the enormous practical problem oi

*8Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979; This Court

“has examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad

hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors — such as

the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reason-

able investment backed expectations, and the character of the gov-

ernment action — that have particular significance.” at 175, emphasis

added ).

**Certainly Hope has been so understood. See New England Tel.

& Tel. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d 9 (1949); Petition of New

England Tel. & Tel., 115 Vt. 494, 66 A.2d 135 (1949); Wise. Com-

monwealth Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 252 Wis. 481, 32 N.W.2d

247 (1948). As one commentator correctly notes, “Hope did not

specifically end the duty to the investor, but rather redefined the

standards for evaluating performance of that duty.” Liberman,

“Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits Where None

Are Due.” 30 South Carolina Law. Rev. 703, 765 (1979).

25

fixing natural gas producer rates** on an area basis. That

case, however, does not support the view that the United

States Constitution “no longer” has any relevance in

utility ratemaking or, as stated in the article followed by

the Ohio Court, that there is “no longer a federal consti-

tutional imperative”. Bernstein, op. cit. p. 260, On the con-

trary, this Court pointedly, and quite correctly, at the

outset noted that:

“Producers of natural gas cannot usefully be classified

as public utilities.” (390 U.S. at 756).

— an observation which would seem to make the decision,

important as it may be, of limited value where, in our

context, appellant is undoubtedly a public utility. More

important, this Court went on to say that, even in dealing

with independent producers of natural gas

“|. maximum rates must be calculated for a reg-

ulated class in conformity with the pertinent constitu-

tional limitations.” (390 U.S. at 769).

This Court then examined the FPC’s actions in precisely

that constitutional context.** In doing so, far from revers-

ing Hope (as the Ohio Court has held), this Court

reiterated the constitutional standards set in Hope. How

**Engendered by this Court's holding, in Phillips Petroleum Co.

v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), that independent producers of

natural gas were, contrary to prior perception, “natural gas com-

panies” within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act.

‘Thus Permian specifically repeats the Hope requirements . . .

Although the quibbling about the rate base definition may be over,

the regulation of returns still entails due process considerations.”

Liberman, at 766.

26

this can be construed by the Ohio Supreme Court*’ as an

abandonment of all constitutional standards is beyond us.

If the constitutional standards which have been enunciated

hy this Court in connection with utility ratemaking for

a century or more have been abandoned, such a striking

change in established American law should be made here,

and not in Columbus, Ohio.

Two other points remain for discussion. The Ohio

Court, in concluding that utilities no longer have any con-

stitutional rights in the ratemaking process, relies, rather

heavily, on the refusal of this Court to allow review in

several recent cases, including this appellant's previous

appeals which were dismissed “for want of a properly

presented federal question.” The Ohio Court's reliance on

such dismissals to show that this Court has deferred com-

pletely to the legislative will in ratemaking matters is con-

trary to this Court's established practice that such dis-

missals are not resolutions of the merits underlying those

appeals. R. Stern AND E. GressMAN, SupREME CouRT

Practice, 380-381 (5th Ed, 1978).

The other point is that, as long as rates are set

in a “zone of reasonableness”, there can be no constitu-

tional issue. This argument, which is obviously inconsistent

with the Court's statement that there is no longer any

‘7Or, more correctly, by the author of the article on which the

Court has based its decision. For what it is worth, the article has

been cited but seldom and never with approval. Indeed, if any-

thing, other commentators directly contradict it. Liberman, “Nor-

malized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits Where None Are

Due”, 30 South Carolina L. Rev. 703, 763 (1979) (“there are well-

established . . . constitutional duties”), Newburger, “Reforming

Electric Utility Rate Regulation Reform”, 25 Case Western Res.

Law Rev. 556, 579 (1975).

27

constitutional issue in utility ratemaking, completely misses

the mark. No one can quarrel with the idea that the fair

rate of return, a concept established in Bluefield and Hope,

is a judgmental one, nor with the proposition that, gen-

erally speaking, no constitutional issue can be distilled

from a finding that the fair rate of return is 12.59%

rather than 12.60%, particularly when either is supported

on the record.

The question here, however, is the inclusion vel non

of an expense for ratemaking purposes. It is in or it is out.

Either these costs are recoverable or they are not.

This proposition must be obvious, As the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia said in reviewing a

Federal Power Commission rate order on the issue of the

allocation of expenses between jurisdictions:

“Expenses (using that term in its broad sense to in-

iu not only operating expenses but depreciation

and taxes) are facts. They are to be ascertained, not

created, by the regulatory authorities. If properly in-

curred, they must be allowed as part of the composi-

tion of the rates. Otherwise, the so-called allowance

of a return upon the investment, being an amount

over and above expenses, would be a farce.”

Mississippi River Fuel Corp, vy. Fed. Pwr. Comm., 163

F.2d 433, at 437 (1947) (emphasis added). See also Fed.

Power Comm, v, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division,

411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973; “One of [the Commission's]

statutory duties is to determine just and reasonable rates

which will be sufficient to permit the company to recover

its costs of service and a reasonable return on its invest-

ment. Cost of service is therefore a major focus of in-

quiry.”) There is no “zone’ here. If the Ohio Supreme

Court decision stands, the stockholders of this utility alone

28

will lose $56,000,000.** The “zone” has stark boundaries; in

this case, given the position of the FERC accounting staff,

the boundaries are all or nothing. If the utilities in this

nation have no constitutional protection from such a result,

this Court should say so. If they do have protection against

uncompensated expropriation — which, under the cases de-

cided to date, they surely have — this Court should make

that clear by reversing the Ohio Court’s decision below.

‘**The rate payer may lose a lot more, although that may not be

directly relevant. The attorney who argued Consumers’ Counsel on

behalf of the Ohio Office of Consumers’ Counsel, was quoted in

the July 16, 1981 Wall Street Journal as follows:

““The court's ruling probably will lead to higher utility

rates eventually, said Gary Petroff, a senior trial attorney in

Ohio's Office of Consumer's Counsel, the state agency that

challenged the public utilities commission ruling.” (Emphasis

added )

This has already happened. Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util.

Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 111 (1983), CEI Appx., p. 39 et seq, and

graphs following p. 430.

29

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse

the decisions of the Ohio Court and allow amortization of

Appellant’s prudent planning and engineering expenses

in its cost of service.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

ALAN D. Wricut ALAN P, BUCHMANN

Vice President-Public Counsel of Record

Affairs and Legal Ricuarp W. McLaren, Jr.

Craic I, Smiru Squire, Sanders & Dempsey

Senior Counsel 1800 Huntington Building

The Cleveland Electric Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Illuminating Company (216) 687-8500

55 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.