Jurisdictional Statement — Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
Supreme Court brief1983
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Office - Supreme ©" |
FIL"
JUL 1% 1983
83-43
Caer.
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.
CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1982
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO,
Appellee.
On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME CouRT OF OHIO
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
ALAN P. BUCHMANN
Of Counsel: Counsel of Record
RICHARD W. McLareN, JR.
ALAN D. Wricut Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
Vice President-Public 1800 Huntington Building
Affairs and Legal Cleveland, Ohio 44115
Craic I. SMITH (216) 687-8500
The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company Attorneys for Appellant,
55 Public Square The Cleveland Electric
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Illuminating Company
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
May the State of Ohio, by statute, constitutionally
require a public utility to invest its capital for the con-
venience of the public to ensure reliable service in the
future and simultaneously prohibit, by statute, that utility
from recovering through rates such capital when prudently
invested?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EE Te
ee
Reports of Opinions Below — Eehai 1
Grounds for Jurisdiction cs See aah 1
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and
Regulations Involved —. penta el 2
Statement of the Case:
A. The facts material to the question presented 3
B. The stage at which the question sought to be re-
viewed was raised below ....................-------------------- 8
C. The consequences of non-recovery sd
Reasons Requiring Plenary Consideration:
I. OHIO REVISED CODE $4905.22 AND §4909.15,
AS CONSTRUED BY THE OHIO COURT,
DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, PROHIBITING THE CON-
FISCATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ............................ 14
a 29
Appendix:
PAGE
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court of
The United States (filed July 7, 1983) 0. 3
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio
Be. 3a OL 467 TLR. Sa Foe 1108s) oe 5
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447 N.E. 2d 746 (1983) 33
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 4 Ohio
St. 3d 111, 447 N.E. 2d 749 (1983) _.. ed cea 39
Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio in Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR (filed ican 5,
Rs ee ee re: 51
Rehearing Entry of The Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR (filed May 12, 1982) 160
Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR (filed March 12,1982) 168
Journal Entry of Ohio Supreme Court Denying Rehear-
ing in Case No. 82-165 (filed July 29, 1982) . 2s
Journal Entry and Mandate of Ohio Supreme Court
Dismissing Appeal in Case No. 82-165 (filed mm 3
1982) - : 2 259
Entry on Rehearing of the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio in Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI (filed December
9, 1981) _ 261
Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio in Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI (filed October 21,
1981 ) 264
Journal Entry of Ohio aes Court Denying Motion
for Stay in Case No. 80-1480 (filed September 11, 1981) 272
iv
Journal Entries of Ohio Supreme Court Denying Re-
hearing in Case Nos. 80-1547, 80-1528, and 80-1480
Se oy | SR eee een eenenees Wr eee a
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. adie 67 Ohio
St.2d 153, 423 N.E. 2d 820 (1981) _ ee
Rehearing Entry of the Public Utilities Commission in
Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR (filed September 3, 1980) ___
Opinion and Order in Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR of the
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (filed July 10, 1980)
Order On Motions For Summary Disposition, in Docket
No. ER 81-612-000 of the Federal Energy and
Commission (filed April 14, 1982) .
Letter of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Staff
directing immediate write-off (dated July 7, 1982)
Ohio Statutes: Ohio Revised Code $§ 4905.13, 4905.18,
4905.20, 4905.22, 4909.15; Ohio Administrative Code
Ee EE ORE a
PAGE
419
422
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
PAGE
Bluefield Water Works v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 US.
679, 690 (1923) . ERE i Eee Oe . 16, 18, 23
The Cleveland Electric iene Company, PUCO
Case No, 79-537-EL-AIR, — and Order sata
10, 1980) _ ec Abae es . 6, 8, 9, 10
The Cleveland Electric ices anal PUCO
Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR, RES and Order ( May 4,
1981) __.. 9, 10, 11
The Cleveland Electric haces Company, PUCO
Case No. §1-146-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order ( March
17, 1982); 46 PUR 4th 63 (1982) 1
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, PUCO
Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI, Opinion and Order ( Octo-
ber 21, 1981) _. . 9, 10
The Cleveland Electric icine Company, PUCO
Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR, ee and Order ( —
Se 12
Cleveland Electric ; iain Company v. Pub, Util.
Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746 (1983). 1, 10,11
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 67 Ohio
St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981) 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14,
16, 17, 22
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (Toledo Edi-
son), 1 Ohio St.3rd 22, at 24, 437 N.E.2d 586 (1982) 7,13
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d
111, 447 N.E.2d 749 (1983) ..... 12, 22, 28
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio
St.3d 91, at 99, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983) aaa, FS
PAGE
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
ae we, oon (24) eee eS
Fed. Power Comm. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division, 411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973) 00000 28, 27
Kaiser Aetna v, United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)... 24
Keco Industries, Inc. v. The Cincinnati & Suburban Bell
Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254, 141 N.E.2d 465 (1957) 9
Mississippi River Fuel gai v. Fed. Pwr. Comm., 163
F.2d 433, at 437 (1947) . Pe:
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 262 U.S. 276, at 292 (1923) 00. 20, 23
NEPCO Mun. Rate Committee v. Fed. Energy sas
Comm., 688 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1981) re 21
“5° — Tel. & Tel. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d
9 (1949) - ee aE 24
Ohio Edison Company, PUCO Case No, 80-141-EL-
AIR, Opinion and Order (February 11, 1981) 1]
Ohio Edison Company, PUCO Case No. 81-1171-EL-
AIR, Opinion and Order (November 3, 1982)... 12
Ohio Utilities Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d
153, at 161, 389 N.E.2d 483 (1979) 21
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (1924) 19, 20
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 3, 23, 24, 27
Petition of New England Tel. & Tel., 115 Vt. 494, 66
A.2d 135 (1949) 24
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
a aeaee ae 25
vii
PAGE
Senior Citizens Coalition v. Pub, Util. Comm., 69 Ohio
St.2d 625, 433 N.E.2d 583 (1982) 00 9
Toledo Edison Company, PUCO Case No. 81-1097-EL-
COI, Opinion and Order (October 28, 1981)... ~—s:13
Toledo Edison Company, Case No. 81-620-EL-AIR,
Opinion and Order (June 9, 1982) . i
Virginia Electric & Power Co,, 29 PUR 4th 65 (1979) .. 8
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C.
Cir., 1950) cert. den., 340 U.S. 952 (1951) 16, 21, 22, 23
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n. (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63, 72
(1935) 17
Wisc. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 252
Wis. 481, 32 N.W.2d 247 (1948) 24
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation v. Public Service
Commission, 109 Wis.2d 256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982) 17
PAGE
STATUTES
SS URS: SRG) ect hee e
Ohio Revised Code § 4905.13 eee eens 7
Ohio Revised Code § 4905.18 0 |
Ohio Revised Code § 4905.20 sak Geasciaasee aaleeena ieee 4
Ohio Revised Code § 4905.22 ae ; 1, 2,4, 14, 16
Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15 . 2,14
Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15( A) (3) a
Ohio Revised Code § 4909.15( A) (4) eee ee
Ohio Administrative Code § 4901; 1-9-05 . 2,7, 15
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
18 C.F.R. 101 Pa AR I a: BEEN we AL. 7,15
AMENDMENTS
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States 1, 2, 14, 17
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States 1, 2. 14, 17, 18
1
REPORTS OF OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court appealed
here is reported at 4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746
(1983). The underlying Opinion and Order of the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio in Case No. 81-146-EL-AIR
is reported at 46 PUR 4th 63 (1982).
The related decision of the Ohio Supreme Court dated
July 15, 1981 in Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm.
(CEI), is reported at 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820
(1981).’ These decisions, along with other related deci-
sions, are printed in the separate Appendix.’
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought to review a decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court denying Appellant’s appeal and
affirming an Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio which denied recovery of Appellant’s
investment in four cancelled electric generating units as
an operating expense in setting Appellant’s rates for elec-
tric utility service to retail customers in Ohio.
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257(2) to review the final judgment rendered on
April 13, 1983 by the Ohio Supreme Court, the highest
court of the State of Ohio. Appellant filed its Notice of
Appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court on July 7, 1983.
The validity of Ohio Revised Code Sections 4905.22
and 4909.15(A)(4) was drawn into question before the
Ohio Supreme Court on the grounds that, as construed
and applied, they are repugnant to the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States, and the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court was
in favor of the validity of those statutes.
1Hereinafter cited as Consumers’ Counsel. Other decisions with
the same title will be cited in full.
*Hereinafter cited as CEI Appx.
2
In the event that an appeal is not considered the
proper mode of review, Appellant requests that the papers
upon which this appeal is taken be regarded and acted
upon as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2103.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
1. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states,
in pertinent part, as follows:
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”
2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law... .
3. Ohio Revised Code §4905.22, states, in pertinent
part, as follows:
“Every public utility shall furnish necessary and
adequate service aid facilities, and every public
utility shall furnish and provide with respect to its
business such instrumentalities and facilities as are
adequate and in all respects just and reasonable.”
4. Ohio Revised Code $4909.15, states, in pertinent
part, as follows:
“(A) The public utilities commission, when fixing
and determining just and reasonable rates, fares, tolls,
and charges shall determine:
(4) The cost to the utility of ‘eet the public
utility service for the test period .
3
5. Ohio Administrative Code §4901: 1-9-05, Uniform
Classification of Accounts for Electric Utilities — FPC,
1961 states, in pertinent part:
“The system of accounts and records, identified and
designated as “Uniform System of Accounts Pre-
scrited for Public Utilities and Licenses, effective
January 1, 1961,” as adopted by the Federal Power
Commission, is adopted by this Commission effec-
tive as of January 1, 1961, for electric light com-
panies operating within the state of Ohio which are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Com-
mission. . .. Each such public utility shall carry on its
books, in addition to such additional accounts as may
hereafter be prescribed by this Commission, the
accounts and records prescribed in said Uniform Sys-
tem of Accounts effective January 1, 1961, for a public
utility of its class, and shall accordingly keep such
accounts in accordance with the requirements, defini-
tions and instructions contained and set forth in said
uniform system of accounts... .”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The facts material to the question presented.
The issue on this appeal is whether the Supreme Court
of Ohio correctly held that this Court, in Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), deferred completely
to the local legislative will and that:
“The [Federal] Constitution no longer provides any
special protections for the utility investor.”®
The facts which have given rise to this extraordinary hold-
ing can be briefly summarized.
Appellant, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com-
pany (CEI), is an electric utility rendering service to some
700,000 customers in northeastern Ohio. Appellant is reg-
*Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d
91, at 99, 447 N.E.2d 733, CEI Appx., p. 19 (1983).
4
ulated under a comprehensive regulatory scheme by The
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) in virtually
all aspects of its operations, including rates, financing, ac-
counting, and service. Appellant is also regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, formerly
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) ).
In 1967, CEI embarked with four other regulated
utilities‘ on a program for the joint construction of electric
generating units — both coal-fired and nuclear — some of
which have been completed and are now in operation,
some of which are now under construction, and some of
which have been cancelled. It is the cancellation of four
of those planned units, after a substantial investment had
been made in them, that gives rise to the current contro-
versy.
Any business enterprise, in order to remain viable,
should plan for the future. Appellant, however, as a reg-
ulated electric utility, is required by statute’ to provide
service when it is demanded. This means that appellant
not only should plan for the future but is legally obligated
to do so. Moreover, appellant is unable to withdraw from
the business without the permission of the State." Thus
appellant, by statute, . . . “must anticipate load growth
years in advance to maintain adequate capacity to ensure
reliable service .. .” and, of course, expenditures must be
made in the process in order to fulfill the statutory obliga-
tion.’ If, as time goes on, the anticipated demand dimin-
‘Ohio Edison Company, Toledo Edison Company, Duquesne
Power & Light Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company, to-
gether with CEI serving some 2,500,000 customers in northern and
central Ohio and Western Pennsylvania. The five are known as the
Central Area Power Coordination Group (CAPCO).
®Ohio Revised Code Section 4905.22.
*Ohio Revised Code Section 4905.20.
*Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 67 Ohio
St.2d 153, at 158, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981); CEI Appx., p. 283.
5
ishes, plans and construction may be prudently postponed.
On the other hand, if the future requirements exceed those
forecasted, there is no practical and economic way to sig-
nificautly speed up the process,” thus increasing the risk
of a shortfall in available electric energy.
Initially, based on forecasts made in late 1972, the
four units here involved (known as Davis-Besse Nos, 2
and 3 and Erie Nos. 1 and 2) were intended to be placed
in service in 1983. Importantly, they were intended to be
replicas of a now-licensed and operating CAPCO gen-
erating unit, Davis-Besse No. 1. As time passed, it became
apparent that the rate of growth in the demand for electric
service was lower than anticipated, in large part because
of the effects of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the re-
sultant increased sensitivity to energy conservation.” This
caused appellant to postpone construction of the four
units, as well as others. In addition, the Three Mile Island
incident in early 1979 gave rise to a variety of substantial
changes in construction requirements imposed by the Nu-
clear Energy Regulatory Commission and it became ap-
parent that the original concept of duplicating Davis-Besse
No. 1 would not work.'’ Those regulatory changes, still
not today totally ascertainable, would have added sig-
nificantly to the costs of the proposed units, ax they have
to many others throughout the country.
‘Certain types of generating capacity require much less time to
construct, but they are usually oil-fired units which are extremely
expensive to operate and which, because of international implica-
tions, have been discouraged by the Federal government.
*It should be emphasized, because it is frequently overlooked,
that there continues to be growth. It is the growth rate that has
decreased.
“The four units involved were intended to be a Babcock &
Wilcox design. TMI and Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 are also Babcock
& Wilcox plants.
6
Given these and other factors, the constructing com-
panies (including CEI) decided in January 1980 to cancel
these four units.’ At that time the five participating com-
panies had already expended approximately $250,000,000
on them, of which some $56,000,000 had been spent by
CEI. The issue on this appeal arises from the denial of
the recovery through rates as an expense of that portion
of CEI’s investment attributable to Ohio jurisdictional elec-
tric service.””
In the original proceeding before the PUCO, Case
No. 79-537-EL-AIR, the Commission expressly held that
(1) the initial decision to embark on the construction of
these units was prudent, (2) all expenditures made had
been prudent, and (3) the decision to cancel was pru-
dent."* The Commission also concluded that, in view of
all the available case law — uniformly authorizing recovery
of such investments in similar circumstances — the invest-
ing public had not taken into account the risk of total non-
recovery and hence the utility had not been compensated
for such a risk through the return allowed in previous rate
cases.'' In holding that these costs could not be recovered
through rates as an expense, the Supreme Court of Ohio
did not disturb these findings of prudence at every step of
"While not directly relevant, it is worthwhile to note that
construction proceeded on several others, including three additional
nuclear units.
"*FERC has provided for recovery from CEI’s interstate custo-
mers. CEI Appx., pp. 400-415. Pennsylvania has provided for re-
covery by the Pennsylvania members of CAPCO from Pennsylvania
customers.
“The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, PUCO Case
No. 79-537-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at pp. 25-29 (July 10.
1980); CEI Appx., pp. 360-362.
“This was amply confirmed by the evidence, discussed infra,
in the later CEI rate case which is the subject of this appeal.
7
the process.’* This appeal, therefore, presents a straight-
forward legal issue.
The issue is the result of the interplay of the relevant
Ohio statutes which, as now construed by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, both impose upon appellant a mandatory
duty not only to render utility service, but also to make in-
vestments to ensure reliable service in the future, and then
deprive it of any opportunity to recover the investment
made in fulfilling the latter obligation. This situation is
brought about to large degree by the Uniform System of
Accounts imposed upon appellant, and all other electric
utilities, by FERC and, in this case, by the PUCO." Ap-
pellant was required by Ohio law to capitalize these ex-
penditures and was barred from their current recovery,
with the expectation of future recovery,’ whether or not
the investment produced a commercial product, in this case
operating electric plants. Appellant was then denied any
recovery by the Ohio Supreme Court's announcement of
“new” Ohio law. **
Consumers’ Counsel, supra, at 163, CEI Appx., p. 289.
See 18 C.F.R. 101 (1937): Ohio Revised Code §4905.13- Ohio
Administrative Code §4901:1-9-05; CEI Appx., pp. 422-430.
‘There are, of course, variations in state regulatory treatment.
In some jurisdictions, including Ohio, it is possible for the utility to
earn a return on such investments, as Construction Work In Prog-
ress, before the plant goes into commercial service. This was not
the case here, because of constraints in Ohio law not relevant to
this discussion.
"The word “new” is not appellant's. The Ohio Supreme Court
has expressly characterized its ruling in Consumers Counsel, supra,
as “new law”: “That statute may be used to investigate the reason-
ableness of rate schedules in the light of new law. such as our deci.
sion in Consumers Counsel, supra” Consumers Counsel vo Pub
Util. Comm. (Toledo Edison), 1 Ohio St 3d 22. at 24. 497 N_EQd
586, at SSS (1982)
8
B. The stage at which the question sought to be reviewed
was raised below.
The affected utilities cancelled the four plants in
January, 1980. CEI then had pending before the PUCO
an application for general rate relief, PUCO Case No.
79-537-EL-AIR on the docket of the Commission. CEI
asked the Ohio Commission to permit it to amortize its
investment in the four cancelled plants over a ten year
period and to include the annual amortization amount in
allowable expenses for ratemaking purposes. The Commis-
sion unanimously agreed.’ On appeals to the Ohio Su-
preme Court by three intervening parties, the Court
reversed, holding that such recovery is not permitted under
Ohio law. Consumers’ Counsel, supra. As intervening ap-
pellee,” appellant suggested in its first brief to the Ohio
Court that even the recovery allowed by the PUCO raised
constitutional issues, with the plain implication that no
recovery at all obviously would raise even more serious
problems. The Ohio Supreme Court did not address the
“CEI Appx., pp. 360-362. Note that this had the effect of pro-
viding for the return of the invested capital over a ten-year span.
This, of course, is not the same as a full return of that capital (be-
cause of the delayed recovery) and no provision was sought, or
made, for any earnings on the investment. Such additional recovery
has been permitted in a number of jurisdictions and it has been
suggested that it is constitutionally required. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 29 PUR 4th 65, at 96 (1979).
“Under Ohio Practice, on an appeal from the PUCO to the
Ohio Supreme Court (which appeal is as of right) against the
interests of the affected utility, the utility is not a party as of right;
the PUCO is the statutory appellee. While intervention is normally
allowed the utility, as it was in these cases. that does not auto-
matically entitle the utility to participate in the argument, which
is permitted only if the court consents and the Commission leaves
time available
9
constitutional question in Consumers’ Counsel. When the
Constitutional issue was fully briefed on CEI’s Application
For Rehearing, the Ohio Court denied the Application
without opinion. Appellant's appeal to this Court was dis-
missed “for want of a properly presented federal
question, *'
The remand to the PUCO raised distinct procedural
problems. The rates set in PUCO Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR
had already been superceded by those set in CEI’s next
subsequent rate case, PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR.”
In 80-376-EL-AIR, decided prior to the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision, the Commission had again allowed the
annual amortization of the investment in the four can-
celled units as an expense. No party had pressed an ap-
peal from that decision.” Accordingly, any adjustment of
the superceded rates from the remanded case (79-537-
EL-AIR) would have been meaningless,** and any adjust-
ment in the most recent case (80-376-EL-AIR) was pro-
cedurally impossible. The Commission, therefore, insti-
tuted an investigation on its own motion, PUCO Case No.
81-1096-EL-COI, and, over appellant's objection, reduced
appellant’s then-current rates pro tanto by the amount of
the amortization which had been included in the last pre-
“United States Supreme Court Cases A-250 (Application For
Stay) and 81-1002; 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982).
*2See Consumers’ Counsel, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d 153, at 154 n.3;
CEI Appx., p. 278.
*An appeal from PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR was prose-
cuted, but on completely different issues. See Senior Citizens Coali-
tion v. Pub. Util. Comm., 69 Ohio St.2d 625, 433 N_E.2d 583 ( 1982)
“Ohio law makes no provision for refunds in such cireum-
stances. Keco Industries, Inc. ve. The Cincinnati ¢> Suburban Bell
Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254. 141 N.E.2d 465 ( 1957)
10
ceding rate case (PUCO Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR).*
Appellant appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme
Court, expressly raising the Constitutional issue presented
here, but the appeal was dismissed and rehearing denied,
both without opinion, with the grounds for dismissal un-
stated and unclear.”* Appellant noticed an appeal to this
Court, but that appeal was dismissed “for want of a prop-
erly presented federal question.”*’
In appellant's next Ohio jurisdictional electric rate
case, No. 81-146-EL-AIR, the one here under appeal, the
PUCO said that it would approve the amortization again,
but denied it solely on the ground that it was beund by
the decision** of the Ohio Supreme Court in Consumers’
Counsel, supra:
“Applicant has requested an allowance for rate-
making purposes for the amortization of the costs
incurred with respect to four cancelled nuclear units.
This subject was fully discussed in Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company, Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR,
Opinion and Order, July 10, 1980, in which the Com-
mission approved such an amortization. The Commis-
sion approved the same amortization in applicant's
subsequent rate case, Cleveland Electric Illuminating
2°The Commission took no evidence and refused to consider
other intervening changes in expenses, justifying its peremptory
action by the imminence of appellant's next general rate case, the
one here under appeal. The Opinion and Order of the PUCO in
Case No. 81-1096-EL-COI is printed at CEI Appendix, pp. 264-271.
The Ohio Court's Journal Entries dismissing and denying re-
hearing are printed at CEI Appendix, pp. 255-260.
27United States Supreme Court Case No. 82-704; 51 U.S.L.W.
3507 (1983).
*“Chere was no exercise of the Commission's expertise on this
issue when the Commission denied recovery of this cost as an
operating expense.
11
Company, Case No. 80-376-EL-AIR, supra, and ap-
proved a similar amortization in Ohio Edison, Case
No, 80-141-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, [February
11, 1981]. The Commission would approve the amor-
tization again if it were not constrained by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Ohio in OCC v. Public
Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio St.2d 153 (1981). This
case clearly holds that this expense is, as a matter of
law in Ohio, not includable as an operating expense
for ratemaking purposes. The Commission must, there-
fore, deny applicant's request.” (Case No. 81-146-
EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at pages 27-28; CEI
Appx., pp. 220-221).
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, both
adhering to its prior construction of Ohio law first made
in Consumers’ Counsel, supra and, at last, addressing the
constitutional issue.*” The Ohio Court held that the Ohio
statutes, as construed in Consumers’ Counsel, supra, do
not contravene the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. This appeal followed.
In this case, the Ohio Commission recognized that
the Ohio Court's declaration of “new law” in Consumers’
Counsel, supra, had increased the perceived risk of invest-
ment in Ohio utilities, and specifically in CEI, a result
anticipated by the Ohio Court in Consumers’ Counsel,
supra.’ The Ohio Commission accordingly determined
that the cost of equity capital to CEI had been increased
and authorized an allowed cost of equity (and hence an
allowed cost of capital) higher than it might otherwise
**Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746 (1983); CEI Appx., pp. 33-50. In
deciding the constitutional issue, the Ohio court relied entirely
upon its decision, on the same day, in Dayton Power & Light Co.
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 91, 147 N.E.2d 733 (1983),
CEI Appx., pp. 5-32. That case involved the disallowance of a
similar, but much smaller, expense item for The Dayton Power and
Light Company, another Ohio utility, relative to a cancelled coal-
fired generating unit.
®°See 67 Ohio St.2d at 167; CEI Appx., p. 294.
12
have done.*' The Commission also authorized CEI to con-
tinue to amortize the remaining book balance of its in-
vestment for book purposes although not for ratemaking
purposes. In a parallel appeal in this case, Consumers’
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 111, 447 N.E.2d
749 (1983),"* the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed both
these decisions.
Appellant has had a subsequent Ohio rate case,
PUCO Case No. 81-1378-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order
(January 5, 1983)" The Commission, again constrained by
Consumers’ Counsel, supra, declined to include the amor-
tization of the cancelled plants as an expense. It also
found it unnecessary, in the circumstances, to authorize
a specific increment in rate of return to account for this
item. Appellant has filed an appeal to the Ohio Supreme
Court in order to preserve the record."
C. The consequences of non-recovery.
It is important to recognize the impact of non-recov-
ery. If CEI is unable to recover its prudent investment in
"Opinion and Order, at pp. 39-40, CEI Appx., pp. 244-246.
The PUCO reached the same conclusion in rate cases involving the
other affected Ohio utilities. Ohio Edison Co., Case No, 81-1171-
EL-AIR, Opinion and Order, at p. 37 (November 3, 1982); and
Toledo Edison Co., Case No, 81-620-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order,
at p. 27 (June 9, 1982),
*The Opinion is printed at CEI Appx., pp. 39-50.
“The Commission's Opinion and Order is printed at CEI
Appx., pp. 51-159. Recovery of the cancelled plants investment is
denied at CEI Appx., p. 108,
“Cleveland Electric Iluminating Company v. The Public Utili-
ties Commission of Ohio, Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 83-677.
13
the four cancelled plants through rates, it will be required
to write-off that balance sheet asset in a single accounting
period. In other words, the investment will be lost forever.
The write-off will be a charge to earnings in that year and
hence earnings and retained earnings will be decreased
to that degree. The State of Ohio will have confiscated
this investment, which the State required CEI to make,
as surely as if it had ordered it paid over to the State.
The Ohio Commission, which has elsewhere recog-
nized the severe financial impact of such a write-off,”’ has
authorized appellant to continue to amortize the invest-
ment on its books over a period of years. The Chief Ac-
countant of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
however, directed appellant to immediately write-off its
entire investment, having concluded that appellant is spe-
cifically denied by law from recovery of these costs as an
operating expense. FERC has been requested not to en-
force the directive during this appeal.”
“Toledo Edison Co,, PUCO Case No, 81-1097-EL-COI, Opin-
ion and Order (October 28, 1981), affirmed, Consumers’ Counsel v.
Pub. Util. Comm. (Toledo Edison), 1 Ohio St.3d 22, N.E.2d 586
(1982). That impact will also adversely affect the consuming pub-
lic, through increased future capital costs, as the Ohio Supreme
Court expressly recognized and the PUCO held in the case at bar.
“It might be argued that appellant has suffered no injury until
there has been a write-off. That, however, would give rise to a loss
which could not be remedied. If the write-off had occurred in 1982
(the latest calendar year for which figures are available) appellant's
reported earnings per share of $3.01 would have been reduced by
$0.51. The fact that the regulatory agency having final jurisdiction
has to date been willing to preserve the status quo pending appeal
should not be a ground for denying review.
14
REASONS REQUIRING PLENARY CONSIDERATION
I. OHIO REVISED CODE $4905.22 AND $4909.15,
AS CONSTRUED BY THE OHIO COURT, DIRECT-
LY CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, PRO-
HIBITING THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
The legal issue presented can be succinctly stated.
Can Ohio law constitutionally require a public utility to
make an investment to ensure reliable service and, simul-
taneously, prohibit recovery of such investment? The
answer seems self-evident; the parameters of the issue
are also extremely clear.
Ohio Revised Code §4905.22, states, in pertinent part,
as follows:
“Every public utility shall furnish necessary and
ade aan service and facilities, and every public util-
ity shall furnish and provide with respect to its busi-
ness such instrumentalities and facilities as are ade-
quate and in all respects just and reasonable.” (em-
phasis added ),
There is no question that this statute requires appel-
lant, as a public utility, to invest its capital in the present
for planning and engineering for the convenience of the
public to furnish adequate facilities in the future. The
plain words of the statute say so, and the Ohio Court so
held in Consumers’ Counsel. The Ohio Court reiterated
its stated view that “utilities must anticipate load growth
years in advance to maintain adequate capacity to ensure
reliable service...” (67 Ohio St.2d at 155, CEI Appx. p.
283, emphasis added). An electric utility serving 700,000
customers obviously cannot “maintain adequate capacity”
without planning and engineering for the future. Large
base load generating units, which have the advantage of
15
being energy efficient, simply cannot be built without a
lead-time exceeding ten (10) years. The Commission found
that the expenses at issue were proper business expenses
which were prudently incurred.
Likewise, there is no question in this case that the
capital invested by CEI for planning and engineering
these generating units was dedicated to the convenience
of the public as required by this Ohio statute. No party has
ever argued otherwise. The Commission noted that “What
the company seeks is the recovery of costs incurred on
behalf of its rate payers to assure that adequate service
could be maintained.” (Quoted by the Ohio Court, 67
Ohio St.2d at 161).
Under Ohio and Federal law, such investments are not
currently recoverable through rates as an operating ex-
pense. This results from the Uniform System of Accounts,
prescribed by Ohio law, and there is no dispute about
that fact. The accounting treatment for the capital invested
in such required construction is tightly circumscribed by
satute. See 18 C.F.R. 101 (1937); Ohio Administrative
Code §4901;1-9-05.
Under the Uniform System of Accounts, planning and
engineering expenditures of this kind are not shown on a
utility’s books as operating expenses when made, but are
capitalized. CEI had no choice but to capitalize its invest-
ments in these plants from 1973 until 1980 and to postpone
any recovery of or on these expenditures. Thus, the expend-
itures increased the eventual book cost of the property
to which they relate.
If the project is completed and goes into service, the
investment (including the kinds of planning and engi-
neering expenses here under discussion ) is recovered, over
the property's life, through depreciation accruals, for which
explicit provision is made in the Ohio statutes. Ohio Re-
vised Code §4905.18. The investor would also have an
opportunity to earn a return on this capital investment
16
since it would become part of the utility's rate base when
completed. See Ohio Revised Code §4909.15( A) (3). See
also Bluefield Water Works v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923), Federal Power Commission v. Hope Nat-
ural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Stated another way,
the investor is entitled not only to get his original money
back, but also to have an opportunity to earn a profit on
his investment in a public utility.
Since these projects were not completed, the invest-
ment was never recognized in rate base as plant in service.
No return was ever earned on the investment. Since the
units were never in service, no depreciation accruals were
ever recovered through rates. See Washington Gaslight
Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir., 1950) cert. den., 340
U.S. 952 (1951).
When the four planned generating units were can-
celled, the invested dollars were, pursuant to the FERC
Uniform System of Accounts, with the approval of FERC,
transferred to Account 182 (extraordinary property loss),
They were then, as the Ohio Commission initially held,
to be amortized over a period of years and the annual
amortization was recognized as an expense for rate making
purposes as part of the “cost” of “service” under Ohio
Revised Code § 4909.15(.A)(4). This, the Ohio Court
held in Consumers’ Counsel was an incorrect interpretation
of the statute. The Ohio Court has expressly characterized
Consumers’ Counsel as announcing “new law’. It is this
combination of statutory requirements and interpretations
which results in the unconstitutional taking here.
Simply put, Ohio Revised Code § 4905.22 requires
CEI to spend money, the Uniform System of Accounts
prohibits current recovery of that money, and Ohio Re-
vised Code § 4909.15) 4)(4), as now applied to CEL by
the Commission, prevents CEL from recovering even the
return of that money, much less earning a return on that
17
money. That is an unconstitutional confiscation of prop-
erty in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution.
The precise question was confronted by the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin in Wisconsin Public Service
Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 109 Wis.2d
256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982). In that case, the Wisconsin
Commission had held that the utility's prudent investment
in a cancelled generating unit could not be recovered
through rates. The Wisconsin Court reversed:
“In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n, (No, 1), 294 U.S.
63, 72 (1935), the United States Supreme Court
stated that, “development expenses to re normal
growth are legitimate charges upon income for rate
purposes as for others.” In this case, there is no dis-
pute that the precertification expenditures were pru-
dent. Utilities have a statutory duty to engage in
such expenditures. Sec. 196.03(1), Stats., states:
“Every public utility is required to furnish reasonably
adequate service and facilities.” It is arbitrary and
capricious to authorize a utility to expand its facilities,
spend large amounts of money prudently to accom-
plish that goal, and then tt the utility to bear the
entire risk of such expenditures.”
At the time when the Ohio Court announced its
Consumers’ Counsel decision, the question of the recovery
of an investment in cancelled projects had been raised in
a number of jurisdictions and it is fair to say that, in simi-
lar circumstances, recovery in some form had been uni-
formly permitted.’ The Ohio Court recognized in Consum-
ers’ Counsel that “the overwhelming weight of authority
from other jurisdictions supports the position of the com-
mission [allowing amortization].” (67 Ohio St.2d at 162;
“"We say “in some form” because, in a number of instances, the
utility in question had been authorized not only to recover its in-
vestment but also to earn a return upon it during the recovery
period.
18
CEI Appx., pp. 287-288 ). Since that decision, while the vast
majority of jurisdictions has authorized recovery through
rates, there have been some additional cases in which
recovery has been denied, sometimes on technical grounds
not here relevant and, generally, without any discussion
of the constitutional question.** The issue presented, there-
fore, potentially involves much more than an Ohio ques-
tion,
In Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), this Court
declared the requirements of the United States Constitu-
tion regarding state regulation of utility rates:
“A public utility is entitled to such rates as will per-
mit it to earn a return on the value of the property
which it employs for the convenience of the public
equal to that generally being made at the same time,
and in the same general part of the country on invest-
ments in other business undertakings which are at-
tended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but
it has no constitutional right to profits such as are
realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises
or speculative ventures. The return should be reason-
ably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under
efficient and economical management, to maintain its
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for
the proper discharge of its public duties.” (262 U.S.
at 692-93, emphasis added).
"The cases are too numerous to permit citation within the con-
fines of this Statement. Recovery through rates has been authorized
in some 31 jurisdictions, some of which have allowed a return on
the unamortized investment. Where recovery has been denied, it is
usually due to circumstances peculiar to the specific case which do
not seem to raise a Constitutional issue, e.g. a failure of proof,
cancellation caused by the act of a different regulatory jurisdiction,
or illegality in the making of the commitment. No such questions
are presented here.
19
This Court further stated that rates which fail to satisfy
this standard
“|... are confiscatory and therefore beyond legislative
power. Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reason-
able return on the value of the property used at the
time it is being used to render the service are unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, and their enforcement
deprives the public utility company of its property in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (262 U.S.
at 690, emphasis added).
While this Court has not had occasion to address the
constitutional implications of the cancellations of electric
generating plants which have occurred in the last decade
(largely because recovery of some sort was almost univer-
sally permitted until the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court), a comparable situation arose years ago because
of rapid changes in the gas industry and, eventually, the
conversion to natural gas and the unexpected abandon-
ment of manufactured gas facilities. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. vy. City and County of San Francisco, 265 U.S.
403, 44 S. Ct. 537, 68 L. Ed. 1075 (1924), this Court held
that it was error for the District Court to employ in deter-
mining the cost of service for ratemaking purposes the
reduced costs of manufacturing gas made possible by new
inventions but to exclude from the valuation of the rate
base both 1) the proper valuation of the patented inven-
tions and 2) “recompense for the obsolescence” of the
utility property which had to be abandoned.
The importance of Pacific Gas is that this Court placed
particular emphasis on the facts that 1) the patents which
rendered the old gas plant obsolete “were of recent con-
ception,” 2) that the utility could not have provided for
the obsolescence of the old plant through depreciation
charges in previous rates, and 3) that the obsolescence
“could not have been long anticipated.”
20
The analogy is apparent. The reasons for the termina-
tion of appellant's units were of “recent conception” and
“could not have been long anticipated.” No one could have
forecasted the reduction in the rate of growth in demand
for power in the CAPCO area after the Arab Oil Embargo
or the incident involving the Babcock and Wilcox unit at
Three Mile Island. The planning costs were incurred
prudently, and the denial of at least recovery of those
costs by Ohio Revised Code §4909.15( A) (4) as construed
and applied to CEI here amounts to the same kind of con-
fiscation as was found unconstitutional in Pacific Gas,
supra. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was,
itself, an unanticipated event, expressly characterized by
that Court as a declaration of “new law.”
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pacific Gas, found only
issues of fact, and not law, in the case, and proposed that
justice would be better served by adopting the “prudent
investment” theory of rate base:
“If a new device is adopted which involves additional
investment (to buy a new plant or a patent right),
the company’s investment, on which the return must
be paid, is increased by that amount. If the new
device does not involve new investment, but the in-
novation involves increased current payments (like
royalties for use of a process ), the additional disburse-
ment is borne by the community as an operating
expense. The cost of a scrapped plant is carried as
part of the investment on which a return must be paid
unless and until it has been retired, — that is, fully
paid for, out of the depreciation reserve. Thus, justice
both to the owners of the utility and to the public is
assured.” (265 U.S. at 425, emphasis added),
Under his “prudent investment” theory of rate base, Justice
Brandeis expressly noted that the investor is entitled to a
return of his investment in utility plant, whether or not
the plant is “scrapped.” The classic statement of this theory
appears in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
21
Pub. Serv. Comm. 262 U.S. 276, at 292 (1923), and that
statement has been cited with approval by this Court in
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, at 603 (1944) and by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Ohio Utilities Co. vy. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio
St.2d 153, at 161, 389 N.E.2d 483, at 488 (1979). Recovery
of its prudent investment in the four cancelled plants is
all that appellant is requesting here. Contrast NEPCO
Mun. Rate Committee v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., 668
F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir., 1981), cert. den., 102 $.Ct. 2928
(1982) (FERC allowance of amortization of cancelled
plants expense and denial of a return on the investment
affirmed ).
More recently the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had occasion to address a similar question. In
Washington Gas Light Co., ei al. vy. Baker, 188 F.2d 11
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. den., 304 U.S. 952 (1951), that
Court affirmed the District Court's reversal of a Utilities
Commission rate order which included the depreciated
original cost of the utility’s abandoned West Plant in rate
base in determining the rates. By including the abandoned
gas plant in rate base, the Commission in Washington Gas
Light had awarded a return on the investment in the aban-
doned plant. (The propriety of the recovery of the invest-
ment in the abandoned gas plant, the issue on this appeal,
was apparently not even challenged.) The Court of Ap-
peals found that the record before the Commission was
inadequate for it to determine whether the investor had
already received a return for the risk of obsolescence
through either 1) depreciation expense in cost of service
or 2) “as a risk considered in fixing the permissible rate
of return.” (188 F.2d at 20). Accordingly, the decision of
the Commission was vacated and remanded because it
potentially had allowed the investor a return on his invest-
ment twice. The Court commented that it seemed “likely
... in view of the prevalence in the past of the doctrine
22
that abandoned property would not be included in the
rate base . . . that investors have been compensated for
the risk of obsolescence.” (188 F.2d at 20).
Here the facts are precisely the converse of those
mentioned in Washington Gas Light. In the present sit-
uation the Ohio Court noted that “the overwhelming
weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports the
position of the [Ohio] commission” allowing recovery of
such planning costs. (67 Ohio St.2d at 162). Since “the
overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions”
allowed recovery of similar expenses, the investor had not
anticipated the risk of exclusion from cost of service in
Ohio and therefore had not received compensation either
through rate of return or through depreciation expense
for such an unforeseeable and unprecedented disallow-
ance.
This is amply confirmed by the evidence in this case.
An abrupt break in the stock prices of appellant, Toledo
Edison, and Ohio Edison occurred immediately after the
Consumers’ Counsel decision on July 15, 1981. This abrupt
break in stock prices was demonstrated in graphical form
and admitted into evidence in the present case."” The Ohio
Commission found that there was an increase in the in-
vestors’ perceived risk as a result of the Ohio Court's
Consumers Counsel decision, announcing the “new law”
that prudent expenditures in cancelled electric plants could
not be recovered through rates."” The Ohio Court affirmed,
Consumers’ Counsel vy. Pub. Util. Comm. (CEI), 4 Ohio
St.3d 111, 447 N.E.2d 749 (1983), CEI Appx. pp. 39-50.
The investors’ perceived risk increased, and the break
in the stock prices occurred, because the market had never
“These six graphs, CEI Exhibit 4A, pages 29-34, are printed
following the final page of text in CEI’s Appendix, filed with this
Jurisdictional Statement.
“Opinion and Order, at page 40; CEI Appx., pp. 244-245.
23
anticipated the complete confiscation of prudent expendi-
tures on cancelled generating plants. The investors had not
been compensated for the risk of confiscation “as a risk con-
sidered in fixing the permissible rate of return.” Washing-
ton Gas Light, supra, 188 F.2d at 20. See also, Missouri
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra, 262 U.S. at 288-
312; Bluefield, supra, 262 U.S. 692-693; Hope, supra, 320
U.S. at 603; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, sttpra, 390
U.S. at 770; Fed. Power Comm. v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Division, 411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973).
The constitutional analysis presented by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Dayton Power and Light v. Pub. Util.
Comm., supra, decided on the same day and relied upon
in the decision here under appeal, is critically lacking.
While the Ohio Court reviews a long series of decisions
of this Court in the field of utility regulation, it is apparent
that the discussion was taken in large part from a single
law review article, Bernstein, “Utility Rate Regulation:
The Little Locomotive That Couldn't,” 1970 Wash. U.L.Q.
223, the thesis of which is that, in Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, supra, this Court reversed Hope and com-
pletely deferred to the legislative will on the question of
the Constitutional rights of a regulated public utility in
the ratemaking area.*' The Ohio Court expressly adopted
the proposition that:
“The Constitution no longer provides any special pro-
tection for the utility investor.”
‘The author rather clearly indicates what he believes is, and
apparently recommends as, the solution: “This country is accus-
tomed to using government subsidies and even nationalization when
necessary for the fulfillment of important social goals.” Bernstein,
“Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't,”
1970 Wash. Univ. Law Q. 223, 264.
“Dayton Power & Light Co. vy. Pub. Util. Comm., 4 Ohio
St.3d 91, at 99, CEI Appx., p. 19.
24
We do not know what “special protection” means in
this context. All that is sought by appellant here is the
same kind of constitutional protection afforded anyone,
whether individual or corporate, against the uncompen-
sated expropriation of property.’ It is plain that the de-
cisions of this Court do not support the Ohio Court's
proposition. It is true that this Court held in Federal
Power Commission vy. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 US.
591 (1944), that the Natural Gas Act and the Federal
Constitution did not require any particular mode of rate-
making. No issue is taken with that proposition here and,
despite that holding as to techniques, it is plain that Hope
announced — and did not abandon — constitutional stan-
dards.**
The Supreme Court of Ohio drew its principal sup-
port for its sweeping proposition from this Court’s decision
in Permian Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). In that
case, this Court affirmed the then Federal Power Com-
mission’s handling of the enormous practical problem oi
*8Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979; This Court
“has examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors — such as
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reason-
able investment backed expectations, and the character of the gov-
ernment action — that have particular significance.” at 175, emphasis
added ).
**Certainly Hope has been so understood. See New England Tel.
& Tel. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d 9 (1949); Petition of New
England Tel. & Tel., 115 Vt. 494, 66 A.2d 135 (1949); Wise. Com-
monwealth Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 252 Wis. 481, 32 N.W.2d
247 (1948). As one commentator correctly notes, “Hope did not
specifically end the duty to the investor, but rather redefined the
standards for evaluating performance of that duty.” Liberman,
“Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits Where None
Are Due.” 30 South Carolina Law. Rev. 703, 765 (1979).
25
fixing natural gas producer rates** on an area basis. That
case, however, does not support the view that the United
States Constitution “no longer” has any relevance in
utility ratemaking or, as stated in the article followed by
the Ohio Court, that there is “no longer a federal consti-
tutional imperative”. Bernstein, op. cit. p. 260, On the con-
trary, this Court pointedly, and quite correctly, at the
outset noted that:
“Producers of natural gas cannot usefully be classified
as public utilities.” (390 U.S. at 756).
— an observation which would seem to make the decision,
important as it may be, of limited value where, in our
context, appellant is undoubtedly a public utility. More
important, this Court went on to say that, even in dealing
with independent producers of natural gas
“|. maximum rates must be calculated for a reg-
ulated class in conformity with the pertinent constitu-
tional limitations.” (390 U.S. at 769).
This Court then examined the FPC’s actions in precisely
that constitutional context.** In doing so, far from revers-
ing Hope (as the Ohio Court has held), this Court
reiterated the constitutional standards set in Hope. How
**Engendered by this Court's holding, in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), that independent producers of
natural gas were, contrary to prior perception, “natural gas com-
panies” within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act.
‘Thus Permian specifically repeats the Hope requirements . . .
Although the quibbling about the rate base definition may be over,
the regulation of returns still entails due process considerations.”
Liberman, at 766.
26
this can be construed by the Ohio Supreme Court*’ as an
abandonment of all constitutional standards is beyond us.
If the constitutional standards which have been enunciated
hy this Court in connection with utility ratemaking for
a century or more have been abandoned, such a striking
change in established American law should be made here,
and not in Columbus, Ohio.
Two other points remain for discussion. The Ohio
Court, in concluding that utilities no longer have any con-
stitutional rights in the ratemaking process, relies, rather
heavily, on the refusal of this Court to allow review in
several recent cases, including this appellant's previous
appeals which were dismissed “for want of a properly
presented federal question.” The Ohio Court's reliance on
such dismissals to show that this Court has deferred com-
pletely to the legislative will in ratemaking matters is con-
trary to this Court's established practice that such dis-
missals are not resolutions of the merits underlying those
appeals. R. Stern AND E. GressMAN, SupREME CouRT
Practice, 380-381 (5th Ed, 1978).
The other point is that, as long as rates are set
in a “zone of reasonableness”, there can be no constitu-
tional issue. This argument, which is obviously inconsistent
with the Court's statement that there is no longer any
‘7Or, more correctly, by the author of the article on which the
Court has based its decision. For what it is worth, the article has
been cited but seldom and never with approval. Indeed, if any-
thing, other commentators directly contradict it. Liberman, “Nor-
malized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits Where None Are
Due”, 30 South Carolina L. Rev. 703, 763 (1979) (“there are well-
established . . . constitutional duties”), Newburger, “Reforming
Electric Utility Rate Regulation Reform”, 25 Case Western Res.
Law Rev. 556, 579 (1975).
27
constitutional issue in utility ratemaking, completely misses
the mark. No one can quarrel with the idea that the fair
rate of return, a concept established in Bluefield and Hope,
is a judgmental one, nor with the proposition that, gen-
erally speaking, no constitutional issue can be distilled
from a finding that the fair rate of return is 12.59%
rather than 12.60%, particularly when either is supported
on the record.
The question here, however, is the inclusion vel non
of an expense for ratemaking purposes. It is in or it is out.
Either these costs are recoverable or they are not.
This proposition must be obvious, As the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia said in reviewing a
Federal Power Commission rate order on the issue of the
allocation of expenses between jurisdictions:
“Expenses (using that term in its broad sense to in-
iu not only operating expenses but depreciation
and taxes) are facts. They are to be ascertained, not
created, by the regulatory authorities. If properly in-
curred, they must be allowed as part of the composi-
tion of the rates. Otherwise, the so-called allowance
of a return upon the investment, being an amount
over and above expenses, would be a farce.”
Mississippi River Fuel Corp, vy. Fed. Pwr. Comm., 163
F.2d 433, at 437 (1947) (emphasis added). See also Fed.
Power Comm, v, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division,
411 U.S. 458, at 466 (1973; “One of [the Commission's]
statutory duties is to determine just and reasonable rates
which will be sufficient to permit the company to recover
its costs of service and a reasonable return on its invest-
ment. Cost of service is therefore a major focus of in-
quiry.”) There is no “zone’ here. If the Ohio Supreme
Court decision stands, the stockholders of this utility alone
28
will lose $56,000,000.** The “zone” has stark boundaries; in
this case, given the position of the FERC accounting staff,
the boundaries are all or nothing. If the utilities in this
nation have no constitutional protection from such a result,
this Court should say so. If they do have protection against
uncompensated expropriation — which, under the cases de-
cided to date, they surely have — this Court should make
that clear by reversing the Ohio Court’s decision below.
‘**The rate payer may lose a lot more, although that may not be
directly relevant. The attorney who argued Consumers’ Counsel on
behalf of the Ohio Office of Consumers’ Counsel, was quoted in
the July 16, 1981 Wall Street Journal as follows:
““The court's ruling probably will lead to higher utility
rates eventually, said Gary Petroff, a senior trial attorney in
Ohio's Office of Consumer's Counsel, the state agency that
challenged the public utilities commission ruling.” (Emphasis
added )
This has already happened. Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util.
Comm., 4 Ohio St.3d 111 (1983), CEI Appx., p. 39 et seq, and
graphs following p. 430.
29
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse
the decisions of the Ohio Court and allow amortization of
Appellant’s prudent planning and engineering expenses
in its cost of service.
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel:
ALAN D. Wricut ALAN P, BUCHMANN
Vice President-Public Counsel of Record
Affairs and Legal Ricuarp W. McLaren, Jr.
Craic I, Smiru Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
Senior Counsel 1800 Huntington Building
The Cleveland Electric Cleveland, Ohio 44115
Illuminating Company (216) 687-8500
55 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.