Supplemental Appendix — Campbell v. Department of Transportation

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Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

84:75 FILED

JUL 26 1984

ALEXANDER . STEVAS.

CrERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

fy.

Vv

ROBERT L. CAMPBELL, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vs.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

fy

Vv

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

r -

Vv

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

io)

Kernwetu H. Stern

1763 Franklin Street

Denver, CO 80218

Telephone: (303) 861-8580

Attorney for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion and Order 1

| RRR ERROR ALT SONY a ON 1

II. Prima Facie Case of Strike Participation ............... 4

‘A tees eee 5

B. Continuation of the Strike ...... ‘ 6

III. Unauthorized Absence .................... me ve 13

IV. Readmission teu Ageney’s Facility 2... 14

V. Procedural Error Comtemtiors 2.2... 18

TI I gs hiceeccrancanhionsienancndbaecccnmintpcib 18

I I iar cetacean 20

VI. Suspension 21

i a nT PEE on on Nee rt tee 22

A. Consolidation 22

B. Ex Parte Communications ... 22

C. Adverse Inference P 23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROBERT L. CAMBPELL, ET AL.!

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DOCKET NUMBER:

DE075281F 0674

OPINION AND ORDER

I. Background

Appellants were removed from their positions as Air

Traftie Control Specialists, Denver Air Route Traffic

Control Center, Longmont, Colorado. Their removals

were based on charges of: (1) striking against the United

States Government in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18

U.S.C. $1918; and (2) unauthorized absence (absence

without leave or AWOL). Appellants, 54 in all, petitioned

for appeal of their removals to the Denver Regionai Of-

fice of the Board. The appeals were consolidated by the

presiding official pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b).

With respect to each appellant, the presiding official

found in a consolidated initial decision rendered on Octo-

ber 7, 1982, that the agency charges were supported by a

preponderance of the evidence and that the penalty of re-

moval was appropriate. She therefore sustained the agen-

ey actions. However, as to appellant Russell S. Root, the

presiding official found that because he had notified the

agency that he was ready, willing, and able to return to

work prior to receiving his removal proposal, his place-

1All 54 appellants and their individual docket numbers

are listed on the attached appendix.

1

2

ment by the agency in a non-duty, non-pay status during

the removal notice period constituted an improper suspen-

sion. She ordered the agency to amend its records and to

place appellant Root in a duty and pay status from August

8, 1981, the date he requested to be returned to work, until

September 2, 1981, the effective date of his removal.

Appellants’ petition for review of the initial decision

is based on numerous contentions of harmful error by the

agency and reversible error by the presiding official in

sustaining their removals.? Also, the agency cross-petit-

2Additionally, appellants filed a motion to strike the agen-

cy’s submissions on review on the basis that the agency failed

to file a notice of a change of its designated representative as,

they assert, is required by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a). They further

assert that a February 2, 1982 Prehearing Order by the pre-

siding official stated that the Board would not accept submis-

sions from any person other than the designated representative

or a pro se appellant.

While the Prehearing Order applied only to proceedings

before the presiding official, the Board has held that the pro-

cedures for the designation of representatives as provided in

5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a) are applicable in petitions for review be-

fore the Board. See Riddick v. Office of Personnel Manage-

ment, 5 MSPB 263 (1981). We consider appellants’ motion to

strike as the equivalent of a request for a sanction against the

agency for failing to comply with section 1201.31(a). Before

imposing a sanction, however, the Board’s practice is to pro-

vide the affected party an opportunity to comply with the reg-

ulation in question. Since, in this case, the agency was not

afforded such an opportunity, the Board finds that the impo-

sition of a sanction would be inappropriate. Moreover, in re-

sponse to appellants’ motion, the agency cured its defective

filing by submitting a proper notice of change of represen-

tative. Also, we note that appellants have not shown any re-

sulting prejudice to their rights. Therefore, appellants’ motion

to strike is denied.

Appellants also filed a motion to dismiss the agency

charges on the basis that the notice of proposed removal was

(Continued on next page)

ions for review from the presiding official’s finding that

it improperly suspended appellant Root. We _ hereby

GRANT review under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e) (1)3

(Continued from last page)

issued contrary to law. Appellants have cited no authority to

support the granting of that motion on the basis alleged. We

find that the appropriate procedure for challenging any error

in the notice of proposed removal is by petition for review,

as has been filed by appellants. Therefore, appellants’ motion

to dismiss is also hereby denied.

3By notice published in the Federal Register, 48 Fed. Reg.

2235-36 (1983), the Board solicited amicus briefs on issues of

law common to numerous appeals of former air traffic control-

lers. In response to that notice, a total of some 11 amicus briefs

were filed, and all have been duly considered by the Board

in its decision-making process.

In a letter to the Board dated March 7, 1983, Rex B. Camp-

bell, the designated representative for appellant Robert L.

Campbell, et al., alleged that Special Presiding Official Kenneth

Goshorn and agency representative Diane R. Liff engaged in an

ex parte communication regarding the agency’s motion to file

a response to the amicus briefs. Because the charge involved

a Board employee, it has been carefully investigated by the

Board’s Designated Agency Ethics Officer, Evangeline W. Swift.

See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.103(b) (2).

Having examined Mr. Campbell’s correspondence, Special!

Presiding Official Goshorn’s Summary of Telephone Calls of

February 23-24, 1983, and the Board order of March 17, 1983,

granting the agency motion, the Ethics Officer has determined

that the subject of the telephone communication in question

was procedural in nature, and did not relate to the merits of a

Board appeal or otherwise violate Board rules. She therefore

concluded that it did not constitute a prohibited ex parte com-

munication under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.102. This conclusion was

conveyed to Mr. Campbell by letter dated April 14, 1983. We

concur in that determination. Thus, no sanctions under 5

C.F.R. § 1201.103(b) are warranted under these circumstances.

All of the documentation relating to this charge of ex parte

communication is included in the official administrative record

of this case.

II. Prima Facie Case of Strike Participation

In Schapansky v. Department of Transportation,

MSPB Docket No. DA075281F1130 at 6 n.2 (October 28,

1982), the Board stated that ‘‘[i]n a ease, such as this one,

in which the existence of a strike is a matter of general

knowledge, the agency may establish a prima facie case of

an employee’s voluntary participation therein by present-

ing evidence of his unauthorized absence from duty during

the strike.”* The Board further stated that the burden of

going forward would then shift to the appellant to present

evidence showing that he was without knowledge of the

strike or that his absence from duty was due to some other

factor. However, the agency bears the burden of ultimate-

ly proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the

appellant had participated in the strike. Jd.

In the instant case, appellants contend in their peti.

tion that the agency lailed to establish a prima facie case

of their participation in a strike against the United States

Government. The presiding official found that the agen-

cy presented both documentary and testimonial evidence

that appellants were AWOL during the strike and failed

to report for their first regularly scheduled shifts subse-

quent to a 48-hour grace period granted by President Rea-

gan on August 3, 1981.5 She found that, except for appel-

4This Board has previously taken official notice that a strike

by air traffic controllers commenced on August 3, 1981, and

continued through August 6, 1981. Ketchem v. Department of

Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DA075281F0713 at 9 (May 28,

1982). Also, the Board found that the strike was unlawful un-

der 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918. Id. at 5.

S5On August 3, 1981, at approximately 11:00 a.m., E.D.T.,

President Reagan announced that striking air traffic controllers

(Continued on next page)

5

lant Root, appellants made no request to be returned to

work. Further, the presiding official found that appel-

lants failed to even allege a legitimate nonstrike-related

reason for their absence. Therefore, she eoncluded that

the agency had sustained its burden of proving strike par-

ticipation and absence without leave.

A. Hearsay Evidence

In arriving at that determination, the presiding ofti-

cial noted that the testimonial evidence on appellants’

strike participation was presented by the Chief of the

Denver Air Traffie Control Center, Ralph Kiss, who was

without ‘‘iirsthand knowledge’’ of the facts to which he

testified, and that other agency officials with personal

knowledge of the facts were present at the hearing. Nev-

ertheless, relying on a line of Board cases holding that

hearsay evidence may be admitted in proceedings before

the Board,° the presiding official determined that the tes-

(Continued from last page)

who failed to return to work within 48 hours would be termi-

nated. The agency interpreted the announcement to allow a

“grace period” during which those who reported for work at

their first scheduled shifts after August 5, 1981, were not re-

moved. See Schapansky, supra, at 11 n.9, citing Air Traffic

Controllers Strike, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 845 (August 3,

1981); and PATCO v. United States Department of Transporta-

tion, 529 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1982). In a series of General

Notices (GENOTS), the agency alsc allowed for regular days off

and absence for other legitimate reasons which could have af-

fected the deadline for returning. GENOT 128 (August 5,

1981); and GENOT 141 (August 10, 1981).

‘See Borninkoff v. Department of Justice, 5 MSPB 150

(1981), and federal court cases cited therein. See also Kunick

v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. SE07528110102

(January 19, 1982); Lee v. Department of the Interior, 6 MSPB

561 (1981); Davies v. Department of Agriculture, 5 MSPB 291

(1981); Green v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 MSPB 403 (1980).

timony provided by Mr. Kiss was worthy of evidentiary

weight since it ‘‘was generally consistent, was corrobo-

rated by documents within the appeal record, was subject

to cross-examination, and was uncontradicted by appel-

lants.’’ Initial Decision at 14-15. Further, the presiding

official noted that appellants failed to object to the hear-

say testimony proffered at the hearing.

In their petition for review, appellants now challenge

the presiding official’s admission of the hearsay testi-

mony. Appellants assert that they requested the agency

to produce a witness, John Schinidt, who allegedly had

first-hand knowledge of the leave cancellation procedures

utilized by the agency, but that the agency failed to do so.

Appellants also allege that the presiding official failed to

order the agency to produce the witness. The record

shows, however, that Mr. Schmidt did testify at the ap-

pellants’ request. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 805-813.

On consideration of the record, we find no error in the

presiding official’s decision to assign probative value to

the hearsay testimony.

B. Continuation of the Strike

Two appellants, David Gold and Thaddeus W. Wal-

lace, were charged with strike partici ation commencing

subsequent to August 6, 1981. The agency had initially

charged appellant Gold with striking from August 13 to

August 18, 1981, the date of the notice of his proposed re-

moval, but thereafter conceded that appellant Gold was on

a combination of approved annual leave, regular days off,

and spot leave through August 16, 1981. Therefore, the

agency amended the commencement date of appellant

Gold’s alleged strike participation to August 17, 1981. Ap-

a

‘

pellant did not dispute the corrected ayency deadline. He

failed to report for his August 17, 1981 deadline.

Appellant Wallace was on approved annual leave and

regular days off through August 12, 1981. His stated

agency deadline was August 13, 1981. Appellant Wallace

also failed to report for his ageney deadline and was

charged with strike participation from August 13, 1981, to

August 19, 1981, the date of the notice of his proposed

removal.

Both appellants chalienge the presiding official’s

finding that the strike continued beyond August 6, 1981.

The presiding official based her finding upon the follow-

ing unrebutted evidence presented by the agency: media

excerpts showing that leaders of the Professional Air

Traffie Controllers Organization (PATCO) regarded the

strike as continuing until as late as October 31, 1981; an

October 28, 1981 submission made by PATCO before the

Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) concerning

discontinuation of the strike;’ and testimony by Mr. Kiss

that picketing at the Denver facility continued until Sep-

tember 24, 1981, subsequent to the removal dates of all the

appellants to this action. Tr. at 37.

In Ketchem, supra, at 9, the Board held that when an

employee is charged with participation in the strike on

dates subsequent to August 6, 1981, the agency bears the

burden of proving by direct evidence that the strike was in

fact in progress on the date charged and that the employee

could have returned to work on that date. We also held in

?See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and

Federal Aviation Administration, 7 F.L.R.A. No. 10 at 2, footnote

(November 3, 1981) (Supplemental Opinion of Ronald H.

Haughton, Chairman).

Noa v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No.

NY075281F0697 at 14-16 (April 25, 1983), that in order to

show continuation of the strike, the agency need not neces-

sarily present evidence proving that on the charged date

or dates there was a certain number of co-workers mutual-

ly withholding their services.

In consideration of the record, and in light of our dis-

cussion in Noa, supra, at 14-16, we find that it is more

likely true than not true that the strike continued at least

until August 17, 1981, when the last of three appellants

(Wallace) could have returned to work. Ketchem, supra,

at 9.

Further, the agency showed by testimonial evidence,

as well as documentary evidence consisting of leave and

attendance records, that both of these appellants were

absent without authorization from the dates of their

agency deadlines and had neither contacted the agency

nor attempted to report for duty. Tr. at 373-80, 766-78.

Therefore, we find that the agency established a prima

facie case of strike participation by appellants Goid and

Wallace on August 17 and 13, respectively. See Schapan-

sky, supra, at 6 n.2. These appellants have failed to offer

any evidence to rebut the ageucy’s prima facie case by

showing that they were without knowledge of the strike

or that there was some other legitimate nonstrike-related

reason for their absence. Jd. Therefore, we find that the

agency sustained its brvden of proving by prepunderant

evidence strike participation by appellants Gold and Wal-

lace.

It has been held that participation in a strike against

the United States Government, however, “short-lived,”

justifies removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7311. See American

Postal Workers Union v. United States Pestal Service,

682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 51 U.S.

L.W. 3606 (February 22, 1983) (No. 82-575). Thus, hav-

ing found that the agency showed by preponderant evi-

dence strike participation by these appellants on August

13 and 17, we need not address allegations of their strike

participation on subsequent dates.

The remaining appellants were charged with strike

participation for all or a portion of the August 3-6, 1981

official notice period’ until the issuance of their notices

of proposed removal.’ The agency presented testimonial

and documentary evidence showing that each of these ap-

pellants was absent without authorization during the of-

ficial notice period. See Tr. at 187-801. (These pages in-

clude the extensive testimony presented by the agency

to show unauthorized absence by these appellants). Thus,

under Schapansky, supra, at 6 n.2, the agency established

a prima facie case of strike participation by these appel-

lants.

Several appellants sought to rebut the agency’s prima

facie case of strike participation by contending that they

were on approved annual leave for at least a portion of

the period for which they were charged with striking and

AWOL. With respect to those appellants, the agency pre-

sented documentary and testimonial evidence of their

8See Ketchem, supra, at 9.

%In light of the court’s holding in American Postal Workers

Union v. U.S. Postal Service, supra, at 1284, we also find it un-

necessary to address roy ps“ of these appellants’ strike par-

ticipation subsequent to the official notice period.

10

annual leave cancellation prior to the commencement of

the August 3, 1981 strike as follows:

Michael A. Nord

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”

indicating that on August 2, 1981, appellant’s supervisor

left a message with appellant’s wife that appellant’s an-

nual leave was cancelled. This evidence was buttressed

by Mr. Kiss’ testimony to that effect. Tr. at 629-633. Ap-

pellant has not denied he received notice of the leave

cancellation. Appellant failed to report for his August

6, 1981 deadline.

Shannon K. Redding

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”

by appellant’s supervisor, indicating that appellant was

personally notified on July 31, 1981, of her annual leave

cancellation. See Tr. at 680. Appellant failed to report

for her August 6, 1981 deadline.

Russell S. Root

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”

signed by appellant’s supervisor. The document stated

that a telephonic notification of appellant’s leave can-

cellation was communicated to appellant’s wife on August

2, 1981, and that she agreed to forward the message to

appellant. At no time has appellant denied receiving the

message from his wife. Appellant simply alleges that the

agency failed to prove that his wife had relayed the mes-

sage of cancellation to him.

We note, though, that Mr. Kiss telephoned appellant

on August 4, 1981, and requested that he return to work

11

but that appellant refused. It is undisputed that annual

leave cancellation was not discussed on that occasion. We

find that Mr. Kiss’ explanation that he did not mention

leave cancellation because he was aware appellant had

already been notified of the cancellation and that he was

merely encouraging appellant to return to work was

plausible. See Tr. at 688, 692-93. Appellant failed to re-

port for his August 5, 1981 deadline. He called the agency

on August 8, 1981, requesting to be returned to work. He

was informed that he had missed his deadline and would

not be allowed to return.

Darrell L. Taylor

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”

showing appellant’s wife was informed telephonically on

August 2, 1981, of appellant’s leave cancellation and that

she agreed to notify him.'’® Appellant has not alleged that

his wife failed to notify him that his annual leave was

cancelled. Appellant failed to report for his August 6,

1981 deadline.

Thomas G. Weimer

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”

indicating that on August 1, 1981, appellant was notified

in person by his supervisor that his annual leave was

cancelled. See Tr. at 790-91. Appellant does not deny

that his leave was cancelled. Appellant failed to report

for his August 5, 1981 deadline.

\0Appellant challenges an agency statement in his file con-

cerning cancellation of annual leave and regularly scheduled

days off in the event of a strike as unsigned and undated. Ap-

pellant has not further identified that statement, and it is not

evident from review of appellant’s file.

12

Further, the record shows that all of those appellants,

as well as the other appellants in this consolidation, had

been informed by the agency that all annual leave would

be cancelled in the event of a strike, and each appellant’s

file contains a July 31, 1981 memorandum of annual leave

cancellation. Appellants have not denied receiving those

general notices of leave cancellation. Thus, we find that

the agency showed by preponderant evidence that appel-

lants’ leave was effectively cancelled. See McPartland

v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DA-

075281F1018 at 2-4 (February 8, 1983).

Except for appellant Russell S. Root, none of the

appellants, including those who alleged that they were

on scheduled annual leave for a portion of the period

during which they were charged with striking, even

claimed that they attempted to contact the agency re-

garding their job status or to return to work pursuant to

the Presidential amnesty offer. Further, none of the

appellants charged with striking during the August 3 to

August 6, 1981 period has alleged lack of knowledge of

the strike or absence from duty due to some other factor.

See Schapansky, supra, at 6 n.2. Therefore, we find that

the agency met its burden of proving by preponderant evi-

dence strike participation by these appellants. Jd. See

also Ketchem, supra, at 9.

With respect to the propriety of the penalty, appel-

lants have not appealed from the presiding official’s find-

ing that removal was appropriate for their strike partici-

pation. In any event, in Schapansky, supra, at 10-11, the

Board found that under Douglas v. Veterans Administra-

tion, 5 MSPB 313 (1981), the agency’s imposition of a re-

moval penalty on an air traffic controller cannot be deem-

13

ed clearly excessive or disproportionate to a sustained

charge of striking against the Federal government.

III. Unauthorized Absence

Appellants contend that the agency charge of unau-

thorized absence lacks specificity. They contend that the

language, which they allege is identical in all cases except

for the dates and times concerned, fails to clearly specify

the period of AWOL.

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (1), an employee against

whom an adverse action is proposed is entitled to be in-

formed of the specific reasons for the agency’s proposed

action. The information provided by the agency must

be sufficiently specific to permit the appellant an oppor-

tunity to properly respond to the agency charge. See

Young v. Department of the Navy, 7 MSPB 7, 10-11 (1981).

In this case, the AWOL charge as to each appellant

alleges that, commencing on a specific date, the appellant

failed to report tor his scheduled tour of duty and has

since remained absent without authorization. We find that

the charge as alleged was sufficiently specific to apprise

appellants of the reason for the charge and to provide

them an opportunity to properly respond thereto. Fur-

ther, as the presiding official noted, and the record clear-

ly indicates, appellants’ presentation at the hearing dem-

onstrated that they understood the charges against them.

See Pinto v. Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No.

DE07528010140 (May 11, 1982); Bize v. Department of

the Treasury, 3 MSPB 261 (1980). In view of the court’s

holding in American Postal Workers Umon v. United

States, swpra, at 1284, that striking for any period of time

14

is cause for removal under 5 U.S.C. 47311, we deem it

unnecessary to address the agency’s allegations of AWOL

subsequent to the period for which we have found appel-

lant’s strike participation based on AWOL during the

strike. We find that the evidence of unauthorized ab-

sence presented by the agency to establish appellants’

strike participation likewise supports by preponderant

evidence the charges of unauthorized absence for the

same period.

IV. Readmission to Agency’s Facility

Appellants allege that the agency’s failure to inform

them of their individual deadlines and ambiguities gen-

erated by the President’s announcement and statements

by the Secretary of Transportation’! misled them into be-

lieving that they had already been discharged after the

expiration of the Presidential grace period. They con-

tend that under NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meat, Inc.,

323 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1963), they were therefore not re-

quired to make a futile request to return to work. Appel-

lants also rely on Pennypower Shopping News, Inc., 253

N.L.R.B. 11, 105 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1980), and Winn-Dixie

Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1974), in

support of their contention. These cases address the le-

gality of an employer’s actions in “locking out” or dis-

charging private sector employees engaged in protected

11Indeed in Ketchem, supra, at 7-8, the Board quoted from

Judge Green’s holding in United States v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp.

160, 164 n.6 (D.D.C. 1981), noting the conflicting information

resulting from “the multiplicity of the statements issuing from

government officials and the contradictions and ambiguities

that they involved.”

15

strike activities under section 7 of the National Labor

Relations Act.!?

In the private sector, a “lockout,” generally defined

as “an employer’s withholding of work from his employees

in order to gain a concession from them,’ is unlawful

when it “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] em-

ployees in the exercise of some right protected by section

7 of the [National Labor Relations] <Act.”!* American

Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965). One

of the rights conferred by section 7 of the Act upon pri-

vate employees is the right to strike.'’ In circumstances

where unlawful lockouts or discharges of private em-

ployees exercising the right to strike occur, the employers

concerned have consistently been ordered to reinstate the

affected employees with back pay. See Pennypower Shop-

ping News, Inc., supra, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1433-34; Abilities

& Goodwill, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 5, 100 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472

(1979); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 1151-

52; NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., supra, at

959; NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., 303 F.2d 64, 66-67

(6th Cir. 1962); and National Labor Relations Board v.

Sunrise Lumber & Trim Corp., 241 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir.

1957).

12See 29 U.S.C. § 158.

13Brandenburg v. Capital Distributors Corp., 353 F. Supp.

115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), quoting from Restatement of Torts

§ 787 comment a. See also Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d

610, 615 n.9 (8th Cir. 1970).

14See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3).

1SSee 29 U.S.C. § 157.

16

Further, in the private sector, where ambiguities in

the employment status of legally striking employees have

been generated by illegal acts of the employers, the un-

certainties have been resolved in favor of the striking

employees. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra, at 1151-

52; NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., supra, at

957-59; and NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., supra, at 66-

67. These cases stand for the proposition that, where the

private sector employees reasonably believed they had

been unlawfully discharged, they were not required to

engage in the futile act of notifying their employers of

their intent to abandon the strike and their desire to re-

turn to work. However, where no illegal acts had heen

committed by the private sector employers, such notifi-

eation was required by the striking employees. Abilities

& Goodwill, Inc., supra, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1471.

In contrast, Federal employees have no similar stat-

utorily conferred right to strike, but rather are express-

ly prohibited from striking by 5 U.S.C. $7311 and 18

U.S.C. § 1918. See Ketchem, supra, at 5. Similarly, in

United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.

879, 882 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971), the Court

noted the difference in treatment accorded public and

private employers by Congress. The Blount court stressed

that in the National Labor Relations Act of 1937, as well

as the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-

Hartley), the term “employer” was defined “as not in-

cluding any governmental or political subdivisions, and

therefore, indirectly withheld the protections of section

7 from governmental employees.” Indeed, the Board is

unaware of any instances in which the lockout principle,

as applied in private sector cases, has been similarly ap-

17

plied in eases of prohibited striking under 5 U.S.C. § 7311

and 18 U.S.C. § 1918.

We find the private sector cases, upon which appel-

lants rely to support their contentions of confusion and

futility of notification, inapplicable to Federal employees

engaged in an illegal strike under 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18

U.S.C. ¢ 1918.'!° Any right by appellants, as illegally strik-

ing employces, to be readmitted to the agency’s facility

was specifically limited by the terms and conditions of the

Presidential amnesty offer and subsequent interpretive

directives issued by the agency. Thus, in order to be re-

adinitted to duty, the appellants in this case were required

to timely notify the agency of their availability and their

desire to return to work on or before their next regularly

scheduled tour of duty. Appellants could not properly

have unilaterally expanded that limited right to include

the right accorded legally striking employees to reason-

ably rely on confusion and the futility rule to relieve

themselves of their responsibility of timely notification.

In any event, the futility rule employed in the private

sector would nevertheless not apply in the instant case

since the alleged confusion generated by the agency was

not caused by any illegal acts on the part of the agency.

Abilities & Goodwill, Inc., supra, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1471-72.

Thus, we hold that despite any ambiguities and uncertain-

16See Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.

1974), which holds that irrespective of ‘‘however valid the

charge [by the strikers] may be, it does not excuse illegal and

disruptive behavior.” See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.

Supp. 203 (D. Md.), aff’d, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.

dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972), disapproved on other grounds,

Sethy v. Alameda Co. Water District, 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.

1976).

18

ties caused by the President’s announcement or statements

by agency officials regarding appellants’ employment

status, it was incumbent upon appellants to timely notify

the agency of their readiness and desire to return to work

and to inquire as to their individual deadlines in order

to qualify for returning to work during the President’s

grace period. Since appellants failed to so notify the

agency, they were properly subject to removal.

V. Procedural Error Contentions

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(¢) (2) (A), the agency charges,

although found supported by preponderant evidence, can-

not be sustained where the appellant shows harmful pro-

cedural error by the agency in arriving at its decision.

See Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489,

492-99 (1980). Appellants contend that the agency com-

mitted harmful procedural error in failing to provide

them with 7 days for presenting an oral response to the

agency charges as is required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2).

Appellants also contend that the oral reply process was

rendered meaningless because the decision by the agency

deciding official to remove them was based, not on his

own independent judgment, but on the “command influ-

ence” of President Reagan and other high-level agency

officials.

A. Oral Reply

Appellants contend that because the agency in its

notice of proposed removal required them to respond to

the charges “within 7 calendar days,” they were afforded

less than 7 days to respond in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513

(b) (2), which requires “not less than 7 days” to respond

19

orally and in writing.’’” Appellants also contend that they

were given less than 7 days for oral response because of

the agency’s denial of their request for an extension of

time. However, apyellants failed to raise these conten-

tions before the presiding official. Therefore, they can-

not be considered on review. See 5 C.F.R. $115; Banks

v. Department of the Air Force, 4 MSPB 342, 343 (1980).

Appellants further contend that the oral response

process was reduced to a mockery since, they assert, the

agency was aware that it would have been logistically im-

possible for it to accommodate the numerous oral replies

contemplated. In this regard, appellants have not shown

that the oral reply process was defective because of the

agency’s inability to fully consider or hear the large num-

ber of oral responses presented. Appellants merely assert

that the agency committed procedural error in failing io

schedule the response of each appellant, requesting in-

stead that appellants’ representative undertake that task.

Neither 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2), which confers upon

appellants the right to an oral reply to the agency charges,

nor its implementing regulation, 5 C.F.R. ¢ 752.404(c) (2),

requires the agency to schedule oral responses. Appel-

lants’ representative failed to schedule the responses as

requested. Agency official Kiss, designated to hear the

17In Schapansky, supra, at 7-8, the Board held that, in light

of the felony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1918, the agency could

invoke the crime exception of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2) to waive

the 30-day notice period otherwise required by 5 U.S.C.

§ 7513(b) (1) where the agency had reasonable cause to believe

that the employee had engaged in strike participation prohib-

ited under 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918. Appellants

have not appealed from the pending official’s finding that the

crime exception was properly invoked in the present case.

20

oral replies, testified that the agency would have extend-

ed the oral reply period to hear appellants’ responses.

Since appellants failed to exercise their statutory right

to an oral response by refusing to schedule the response

time, appellants have failed to show procedural error by

the agency in its handling of the oral response process.

See Parker, swpra, at 492-99.

B. Command Influence

Appellants also contend that the “command influ-

ence” of President Reagan’s announcement regarding the

dismissal of air traffic controllers, who failed to report

for duty during the grace period, precluded a meaningful

consideration by the agency of appellants’ responses to

the agency charges. Appellants also allege “command

influence” from the Secretary of Transportation and the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

Appellants assert that the statements by those officials

resulted in harmful procedural error since they precluded

Mr. Ralph Kiss, the agency’s deciding official, from acting

independently in removing appellants.

In Anderson v. Department of Transportation, MSPB

Docke; No. SL075281F0347 at 8-13 (Apri! 25, 1983), the

Board held that neither the public statements of President

Reagan and high level agency officials regarding the

strike, nor the written communications from agency head-

quarters to the various facilities, impinged on the ability

of deciding officials to exercise independent judgment re-

garding whether the charges in individual cases should

be sustained, or in any manner deprived the appellants

of a meaningful opportunity to reply to the charges on

which their removals were based. Thus, appellants have

not shown procedural error by the agency in this respect.

21

VI. Suspension

Appellants have not appealed from the presiding of-

ficial’s finding that, except as to appellant Root, appel-

lants were not suspended during the notice period. There-

fore, that contention will not be addressed on review.

The agency, however, cross-petitions for review of

the presiding official’s determination that appellant Root

was improperly suspended because, prior to receiving the

notice of proposed removal, he notified the agency that

he was ready, willing, and able to report for duty but was

not allowed to return.

The Board held in Martel v. Department of Trans-

portation, MSPB Docket No. BN075281F0558 at 11 (April

25, 1983), that in order to meet his burden of establishing

jurisdiction over an alleged constructive suspension dur-

ing the notice period under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a) (2), an

appellant must show by preponderant evidence that he

contacted an agency official with decision-making author-

ity and unequivocally communicated his availability and

desire to return to work. The Board held that such a

showing would establish that the appellant was ready,

willing, and able to return to work. 7d. The Board further

held that the agency’s admission that it nevertheless re-

fused to readmit the appellant would be sufficient to show

that the appellant’s absence after his attempted return

was involuntary and disciplinary in nature. Jd.

It is uncontested that appellant Root telephoned his

supervisor on August 8, 1981, prior to the issuance of the

notice of his proposed removal and clearly requested to

be returned to work. Tr. at 689, 691-92. It is also undis-

puted that appellant was informed by his supervisor that

22

appellant had missed his deadline and would not be al-

lowed to return. Jd. Thus, under Martel, supra, we find

that appellant Root was erroneously suspended by the

agency from August 8, 1981, until September 2, 1981, the

effective date of his removal.

VII. Other Contentions

A. Consolidation

Appellants contend that the presiding official im-

properly consolidated these appeals despite their objec-

tions thereto. Under 5 U.S.C. §7701(f) and 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.36(b), the presiding official is authorized to con-

solidate cases on his or her own motion where to do so

would result in more expeditious processing of the cases

and would not adversely affect the rights of the parties.

Appellants have contended neither that the consolidation

failed to expedite processing nor that their rights were

harmed thereby. Therefore, appellants have not shown

error by the presiding official in this respect. See Noa,

supra, at 3-5,

B. Ex Parte Communications

Appellants also contend that the presiding official

erred in refusing to find prohibited ex parte communica-

tions in public statements made by President Reagan and

FAA Administrator Helms to agency officials with deci-

sion-making authority in these adverse actions. Appel-

lants rely on 5 U.S.C. §554(d) and Camero v. United

States, 375 F.2d 177 (Ct. Cl. 1967), in support of this con-

tention. Those authorities prohibit ex parte communica-

tions on facts in issue between decision-making officials

and a party to the action.

23

The Board finds that the public statements made by

President Reagan and FAA Administrator Helms cannot

be deemed ex parte communications. Our regulations at

5 C.F.R. § 1201.101(a) explain that an ex parte communi-

cation is one made “between decision-making personnel

. and an interested party to... [an adverse action]

without providing the other parties a chance to partici-

pate.” Since the statements in this case were public state-

ments, appellants were not thereby excluded from par-

ticipating fully in defending against their removal actions

before the agency.'®

C. Adverse Inference

Appellants further contend that the presiding official

erred in drawing an adverse inference from their failure

to testify at the hearing. ..ppellanis assert that the pre-

siding official’s reliance on Book v. U.S. Postal Service,

6 MSPB 322 (1981), aff’d, 675 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1982),

was misplaced. Appellants argue that under Book, supra,

the presiding official is required to request that the ap-

pellant testify; then, if the appellant declines, caution

him that his silence could affect the credibility of his ar-

guments even though he is not obligated to testify. Ap-

pellants allege that since they were not so warned, the

presiding official erred in drawing an adverse inference

from their failure to testify. There is no requirement in

Book that the presiding official first warn an appellant

18To the extent that appellants’ argument in this record

may relate to the issue of the effect of these public statements

on adverse action procedures pefore the agency, the Board

notes that Anderson v. Department of Transportation, MSPB

Docket No. $L075281F0347 at 8-13 (April 25, 1983), resolves

that issue adverse to appellants’ position.

24

regarding the consequences of his failure to testify, and

we find no error by the presiding official under Book,

supra. See Adams v. Department of Transportation,

MSPB Docket No. NY0O75281F0424 at 14-15 (April 25,

1983) .!°

Accordingly, the initial decision of the presiding of-

ficial is hereby AFFIRMED.

The agency is hereby ORDERED to amend its rec-

ords so as to place appellant Root in a pay status from

August 8, 1981, to September 2, 1981, the effective date

of his removal. Proof of compliance with this Order shall

be submitted by the agency to the Office of the Secretary

of the Board within 20 days of the date of issuance of this

Opinion. Any petition for enforcement of this Order

191n their petition for review, and in a subsequent submis-

sion dated March 15, 1983, appellants allude to an April 21,

1982 research assistance memorandum from the Board’s Office

of General Counsel to the Board’s then Acting Assistant Man-

aging Director for Regional Operations. Appellants suggest

that Board proceedings relating to the air traffic controller strike

which commenced on August 3, 1982, were merely pro forma.

The record in this case simply does not support this allegation.

The memorandum in question sep ore stated that it was

not intended to influence presiding officials’ decisions. Pre-

siding officials were not obligated to adopt the mode of analy-

sis or the conclusions in the memorandum. In fact, presiding

officials were cautioned to conduct their own legal research

and to exercise independent fact-finding responsibility and

judgment. The different findings on similar issues in the air

traffic controller appeals evidence that presiding officials did

undertake their own legal research and made independent fact

findings. Nor can the memorandum be properly deemed to

have been an ‘advisory opinion” issued by the Board in viola-

tion of 5 U.S.C. § 1205(g). The Board members did not con-

sider or vote on the memorandum, and it can not in any way

be construed as an expression of their views, collectively or in-

dividually. Nothing in 5 U.S.C. § 1205(g), or elsewhere, bars

the Office of General Counsel from preparing research assis-

tance memoranda.

25

shall be made to the Denver Regional Office in accordance

with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(a).

This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protec-

tion Board in these appeals. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(c).

Appellants are hereby notified of the right to seek

judicial review of the Board’s action by filing a petition

for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20439. The petition for judicial review must be filed

no later than thirty (30) days after the appellants’ re-

ceipt of this order.

FOR THE BOARD:

April 25, 1983 /8/ Herpert EK. Evitrncwoop

(Date) Chairman

April 25, 1983 /s/ Ersa H. Poston

(Date) Vice Chair

April 25, 1983 /s/ Dennis M. Devaney

(Date) Member

Washington, D. C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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