Opposition Brief — Scott v. City of Hammond

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wees oupreme Court, US.

EI LE bh

Nos. 84-21

em : AUC 7 1984

ae

CLERK ii

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

OctroBer TERM 1984

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, et al.,

Respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and the

METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF

GREATER CHICAGO,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF HAMMOND, et al.,

Respondents.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, et al.

Respondents.

HAMMOND RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

JEREMIAH MarsH*

Joun L. Conton

MicHArL ScHNEIDERMAN

Davip O. TooLan

Hopkins & SuttTer

Three First National Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Maa, (312) 558-6600

Attorneys for the

Hammond Respondents

* Counsel of Record

aaa

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply the limita-

tions on state power recognized by this Court in Illinois v.

City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (“Milwaukee I’),

in its decision that Illinois law and courts could not

govern discharges to Lake Michigan by a municipality

located in Indiana?

2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that

interstate water pollution disputes involve the same con-

siderations of federalism as disputes over the allocation

of water in interstate rivers and lakes?

p 3. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that

the limitations on state power recognized in Milwaukee I

remain unaffected by the passage of the 1972 amendments

to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”),

33 U.S.C. $1251 et seq., and this Court’s decision in City

of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (“Milwaukee

IT’)?

4. Did the Court of Appeals’ decision that Illinois

could not govern discharges made in Indiana constitute

the application of principles of federalism derived from

the Constitution rather than, as petitioners claim, the crea-

tion of a separate body of federal choice-of-law rules?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

OPINIONS BELOW _ ...cccscsscossescrsssssvccsscscsevcssccrcsssssosessomess 2

THE NATURE OF THE CASES ..........ccccccosesseessomees 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WPITS ...........4. 6

INTRODUCTION ocssrnssisnsvcessssnsnvionseinsicnngsecnunimntinses 6

Il

UNDER OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM STATES

AND THEIR COURTS CANNOT HAVE EX-

TRATERRITORIAL POWER OVER THE USE

OF INTERSTATE WATERS. .........ccceseesseceeeneees 9

lil

THE FWPCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE

USE OF STATE LAW TO GOVERN OUT-OF-

STATE, DESO ARGS ccccenscnsesisisemsesssvsseneticsteetnts 13

IV

ERIE 18 NOT APPLIC BRIG | cise wesiiccnssianimnbshesss 15

CONC TOBIN, cvecescusssssevn'siisnneiinson teketphnateitiditshistneintacadashan as 16

ill

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

CasEs

PAGE

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 324

a EE WW

Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 186-187, 192 (1947)... 11

Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) 11

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (“Milwaukee II”), 451

aan ac cdamprmeandnsnaabaeahapls passtm

Erie R. Co. v. Tompktns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ........... 7,15

Georaia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237

os oniehngnsicdhiiansinnsnil 9,10

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ...........0 12

Hinderlider vy. LaPlata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304

a os cisetrana i vesamapanselaseaneinniceneneninie 7, 9,15

Illinois vy. City of Milwaukee (“Milwaukee I’), 406

USS. 91 (LIFE ans sssesssscsssensssensennesessnssscsesnessssnssonee passim

Illinois v. ‘Sanitary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp.

oul dha ver csiedininaiibialencnsbens 13

Kansas vy. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) ...... 10

Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) 7

McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ou. 13

Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) ...........ccssesscessseseseees 11

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-360 (1943) wu... 10

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ............cece0 12

Solliday v. The District Court in and for the City

and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 489, 497-98, 313

P.2d 1000, 1004 (1957) . ialaaisaemitipeanicilcinmuseed ae

iv

PAGE

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) .. 12

Suffolk v. Chapman, 31 Ill. 2d 551, 555, 202 N.B.2d

i EEE ALLO ORE A 12

Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451

Wm. De, GRRE me. 1D CEDBE) cnccscncvcccnvcescccconsesendtbics 9

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

GREE ei cleashenelatiapeais sn tadecsidascsadheesicbiensmnkainltencie cic 13

Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537-538

Nn: ieidebeailehdiaahciaiabicinbisiees:itndesiasnlasuecitdiaisanadadeencuniiicicnus 11

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

IN hit ah dins sonia Shctsainioicintrsaccieneciann 10

ConSTITUTION, STATUTES

SR In I TN icin i 10

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”),

33 U.S.C. §1251, et seq.

Section 505(e), 33 U.S.C. §1865(e) ..ccccceseceseees 13-15

Section 510, 33 U.S.C. $1370 .....ccc.cccscccccesceescssss. 7, 13-15

Indiana Statutes

Ind. Code §$36-9-25-1, €€ 8€q. ....ccccccssssssscscesscacssesesses: 10

LEGISLATIVE History

Congressional Research Service, A Legislative Histo-

ny of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972,

93rd Cong., Ist Sess. vol. 1, 823, vol. 2, 1503

SU UII Sdalichpidbesccss ect dkcatnteiataanatalsiens ianeeidbecagitie cons anced 15

Booxs

1 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 13-14 (1935) 16

3A Moore, Federal Practice 118.07 [1.—3], 18-59 (2nd

ERRNO DEMON RANE HN MERE 13

OcrosBer TERM 1984

Nos. 84-21

84-38

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and

In THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, et al.

Respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and the

METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF

GREATER CHICAGO,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF HAMMOND, et al.,

Respondents.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, et al.,

Respondents.

HAMMOND RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

——

a

OPINIONS BELOW

This brief is filed in opposition to the petitions for

writs of certiorari filed by the State of Illinois and the

Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago in

No. 84-38 and William J. Seott in No. 84-21. The opinion

of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the

District Court is reported in the advance sheets at 731

F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), and is set forth in the sepa-

rately bound Appendices filed with the petitions at A-1.

The Court’s subsequent order of May 29, 1984, which

denied the petitions for rehearing and modified the

March 27, 1984 opinion, is unreported and is set forth

in the Appendices at B-1. The District Court’s opinion

is reported at 519 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1981), and is

set forth in the Appendices at F-1.

THE NATURE OF THE CASES

In September, 1980 Illinois and the Metropolitan Sani-

tary District of Greater Chicago filed a five count com-

plaint in the Cireuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

against Hammond, Indiana, the Hammond Sanitary

District and the District’s trustees and manager

(“Hammond”) in which they alleged that discharges

by Hammond of inadequately treated sewage and

grease to Lake Michigan which floated to the part of

Lake Michigan adjoining Illinois were in violation of

the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Counts I

and II), the federal common law of nuisance (Count ITT),

Illinois common law and statutory law of nuisance

(Count IV) and the Illinois common law of trespass

(Count V). The complaint requested that the court order

Hammond: (1) to stop making the discharges, (2) to

prevent any illegal or unauthorized interconnections with

its sewer systems, (3) to deny any new or additional

hook-ups to its system, (4) to remove and dispose of

—

all complained of materials in Lake Michigan and on

the beaches of Lake Michigan in a manner approved in

advance by the Illinois Attorney General, the Illinois

Environmental Protection Agency, and the United States

Environmental Protection Agency within the shortest

possible time, (5) to construct and install permanent

facilities that would prevent further discharges to Lake

Michigan of the type complained of, (6) to pay damages

to be placed in a trust fund to reimburse any entity

which had or would incur costs to clean the waters of

Lake Michigan, (7) to pay a civil penalty of $10,000 for

each violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act and an additional penalty of $1,000 per day for each

day that the violations continued, and (8) to provide

such other relief as shall be just.

The Illinois case was removed to the District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois by Hammond

on the ground that the federal common law of nui-

sance claim created federal question jurisdiction. The

District Court thereafter denied the motion of IIli-

nois to remand the case to state court. Illinois v. Sani-

tary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. II.

1980).

William J. Seott filed a class action in the District

Court on behalf of citizens of Dllinois who used Lake

Michigan. He alleged that Hammond’s discharges con-

stituted “both a public and private nuisance under IIli-

nois law and independently both a publie and private

“ nuisance under federal common law.” Scott invoked

federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizen-

ship and the existence of a federal question under the

federal common law of nuisance claim. Scott requested

on pees

money damages of $1,000,000 “for benefit of the plain-

tiff class” and an injunction requiring Hammond to

cease the challenged discharges.

Hammond moved for dismissal of the petitioners’ com-

plaints for failure to state claims. The District Court

granted the motion on the federal common law of nui-

sance claims, but denied it on the state law claims. Scott

v. City of Hammond, 519 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Til. 1981),

App. at F-1. The District Court certified its ruling for

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292 (b). Ham-

mond was granted permission to appeal by the Court of

Appeals and its appeal was consolidated with the consid-

eration of the remand in Milwaukee IJ. App. at E-2.

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s

decision on the applicability of Illinois law and directed

that the cases be dismissed. It observed:

“In the present cases the political subdivisions of

one state claim a right to an extent of use of in-

terstate water in the exercise of their public health

functions. A different state complains that a use

to that extent causes contamination of its waters

and is inimical to public health because those waters

are used for water supplies and recreation. This is

a controversy of federal dimensions, implicating the

conflicting rights of states and inappropriate for

state law resolution. The latter state does not seek

mere enforcement of effluent limitations established

under federal law, but imposition of more stringent

limitations.

“The very reasons the Court gave for resorting

to federal common law in Milwaukee / are the same

reasons why the state claiming injury cannot apply

its own state law to out-of-siate discharges now.”

(731 F.2d at 410, App. at A-16)

ay ts

The Court of Appeals also concluded that in addition

to the remedies available to petitioners under the

FWPCA, the petitioners could bring an action under

Indiana law in a federal or state court in Indiana be-

cause the FWPCA preserved state jurisdiction over dis-

charges made within them. 731 F.2d at 410 n. 2, 414;

App. at A-16 n. 2, A-23.

Petitioners filed a request for rehearing in which they

requested the Court of Appeals to modify its decision

to allow them to amend their complaints in the District

Court to assert their claims under Indiana law. The

Court of Appeals denied this request. App. at B-3.

pam, We

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRITS

I

INTRODUCTION

Twelve years ago petitioners Illinois and Scott, its

then Attorney General, argued persuasively that the law

of one State could not control interstate water pollution

disputes. See Plainuff’s Brief Regarding the Applicable

Law filed by Illinois in Milwaukee I. This Court in Mil-

waukee I unanimously held that the nature of such dis-

putes required the recognition of a federal common law

of nuisance. Milwaukee I recognized that interstate water

pollution disputes involve the same considerations of

federalism and the sovereign rights of States as inter-

state water allocation disputes. A State has the power

to choose what uses it will permit of the waters within

it, but it does not have the power to impose its choices

on another State. Although the members of this Court

disagreed in Milwaukee II over the effect of the 1972

FWPCA amendments, there was no disagreement that

under our federal system the law of one State could not

govern the discharges to an interstate lake or river made

in another State. Compare Milwaukee IT, 451 U.S. at

314 n. 7, App. at G-7 n. 7; 451 U.S. at 315 n. 8, App. at

G-9 n. 8; with 451 U.S. at 335, App. at G-28 - G-29

(Blackmun, dissenting).

The Court of Appeals correctly applied these principles

in these cases. It recognized that no State or the courts

created by it had the power to impose policy decisions

over the use of resources in another State. To permit

this to be done would infringe upon the equal power of

the other State to make its own policy decisions. Any

ee oom

disputes arising from conflicting resource uses permitted

by different States can only be resolved through federa!

law. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 105 & n. 6, App. at S-13

& n. 6; Hinderlider vy. LaPlata River & Cherry Cr. D. Co.,

304 - 92, 110 (1938). Since 1972 that federal law has

been th» FWPCA.

The Court of Appeals also correctly recognized that

nothing in Milwaukee I or the FWPCA prevented some-

one from asking the courts of a State in which discharges

were being made to apply its law to those discharges. This

state remedy was ‘specifically preserved in FWPCA sece-

tion 510 (33 U.S.C. $1370).

Petitioners now contend, contrary to the belief of the

entire Court in Milwaukee IT, that state law can operate

far more broadly. They argue that when the federal

common law of nuisance was replaced by the FWPCA,

an extraterritorial state police power that could

not coexist with the federal common law of nuisance was

revived as an alternative to federal statutory law. They

do not explain how’ this extraterritorial — state

power that was suppressed by the federal common law

of nuisance ean flourish under the FWPCA; it is simply

presented as a fact. Rather than aecept the Court of Ap-

peals’ statement that the “very reasons” that were given

for this Court’s resort to federal common law in Milwau-

kee I required the decision it reached, petitioners charac-

terize the Court of Appeals’ decision as the creation of a

federal common law choice-of-law rule for interstate tort

disputes. They argue that its implementation would have

a profound effect on the remedies available for all torts

with interstate aspects and that it conflicts with Erie R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klagxon v.

Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

co eis

These cases are not, as petitioners portray them, com-

parable to simple transboundary tort cases. The conclu-

sions of the Court of Appeals were based on the subject

matter of the dispute, the use of water resources within

a State, and the significant State interest in that subject

matter, especially with respect to its own political subdi-

visions. Thus, the issue decided by the Court of Appeals

was not one of choice-of-law, but the fundamental ques-

tion of whether a State has the power to impose through

its law or courts regulations and financial burdens on the

taxpayers of a sister State that infringe upon the sister

State’s sovereignty. The Court of Appeals recognized

the real nature of these cases and correctly followed this

Court’s decisions on the nature of the relationship of the

States.

The Court of Appeals did not hold that there are

no remedies for interstate pollution of Lake Michigan.

There are the remedies provided by the FWPCA, which

were invoked by the United States Environmental

Protection Agency and the State of Indiana. Also, more

stringent relief can be sought under Indiana law in

Indiana courts. Petitioners are not seeking a remedy

but the assertion of extraterritorial power either through

Illinois statutes or “vague and indeterminate nuisance

concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence.” The basis

on which review is actually being sought is petitioners’

adamant refusal to accept the inherent limitation on state

power under our federal system which has been repeat-

edly confirmed by this Court. Review of the Court of

Appeals’ decision, therefore, is not warranted.

UNDER OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM

STATES AND THEIR COURTS

CANNOT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL POWER

OVER THE USE OF INTERSTATE WATERS

The use made of the air, a river or a lake in one State

cannot be controlled by any other State. Milwaukee I,

406 U.S. at 105 n. 6 (1972), App. at 8-13 n. 6; Hinder-

lider v. LaPlata & Cherry Cr. D. Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110

(1938); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,

237 (1907. This Court in Wilwaukee |] created a federal

common law of nuisance to govern interstate water pol-

lution disputes heeause state law could not be applied.

Texas Industries, Inc. y. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.

630, 640-641 n. 18 (1981). As the Court sueeinetly ob-

served in Milwaukee IT: “If state law can be applied,

there is no need for federal common law; if federal com-

mon law exists, if is because state law eannot be used.”

451 U.S. at 314 n. 7, App. at G-7 n. 7. There was no

dispute on this point in Wlwaukee IT, 451 U.S. at 335,

App. at G-28 - G-29 (Blackmun, dissenting). Extrater-

ritorial state power over the use of the environment can-

not exist beeause of the coequal sovereign status of the

States.

Just as it is accepted that Canada’s Parliament and

Canadian courts do net have the power to regulate the

emmissions of industries in the United States because of

their effect on Canada’s environment, it must also be ac-

cepted that Tllinois law and Illinois courts cannot have

the power that petitioners claim for them. The relation-

ship between States in environmental matters is compar-

able to that between countries, except that the Constitution

authorizes a federal resolution of interstate disputes.

— e

Each State is sovereign within its territory, except to

the extent provided by the Constitution and laws enacted

in accordance with it. U.S. Const. amend. X; Parker v.

Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-360 (1943); Kansas v. Colorado,

206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907). The sovereignty of each State

necessarily implies a barrier against intrusion by the laws

and courts of sister States into matters that involve the

attributes of sovereignty. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-294 (1979). Each State has

the sovereign power to regulate the use of the resources

located within it, but no State has the power to interfere

with a sister State’s equal power. Georgia v. Tennessee

Cupper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-238 (1907).

What a State permits to be put into the air and waters

in its territory involves policy decisions that arise from

the exercise of its fundamental powers as a State and

frequently, as in this case, a State’s ability to manage

traditional governmental operations. The best proof of

this is the nature of relief sought in this litigation by

Illinois; relief that Illinois and its courts might appropri-

ately impose on an Illinois municipality but cannot impose

on an Indiana municipality. For instance, Illinois sought

an order that would have blocked economic development

in a part of Indiana by barring any new factory, business

or home from having access to the only sanitary and

stormwater sewer systems in an area of Hammond. IIli-

nois also requested relief that would have involved an

Illinois court in directing and controlling the construction

of an Indiana municipal sewer facility, who would do it,

on what schedule and how it would be paid for by Indiana

taxpayers. Such matters are usually the subject of a

State’s own laws. See, e.g., Ind. Code §36-9-25-1, et seq.

ay A

Petitioners have cited decisions of this Court such as

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Haque, 449 U.S. 302 (1981),

Nevada vy. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), and Bradford Elec-

tric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), for their argu-

ment that the interstate aspects of petitioners’ claims

raise no barrier to the application of Illinois law. None

of those decisions involved an effort by one State to in-

trude on the sovereignty of sister States by governing

what could be done within their borders. Thus, in Nevada

v. Hall it was noted that a decision involving a traffic

accident that occurred outside of Nevada “could hardly

interfere with Nevada’s capacity to fulfill its own sove-

reign responsibilities.” 440 U.S. at 424 n. 24. See also All-

state Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 324 (1981)

(Stevens, concurring).

Petitioners argue that even if Indiana law is the only

state law that can govern discharges to Lake Michigan

made in Indiana, the Court of Appeals should have re-

manded these eases to the District Court in Illinois so

that petitioners could seek their relief under Indiana law.

The Court of Appeals’ remand for dismissal was correct,

however, because the District Court could not have had

jurisdiction under the proposed amended claims.

The dismissal of the federal common law of nuisance

claim in the Seott case left diversity as the only basis

for federal jurisdiction. Since the District Court under

diversity jurisdiction is, in effect, another court of the

State of Illinois, it could have retained the case with the

proposed amendment only if Illinois courts have the power

to grant the relief sought by Scott under the guise of ap-

plying Indiana law. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337

U.S. 535, 537-538 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.

183, 186-187, 192 (1947). It is inconceivable that Illinois

sites! UE ions

courts by merely saying that they are applying Indiana

law could require parties in Indiana to adhere to stricter

standards than those established by Indiana pursuant to

the FWPCA and to pay for costly facilities not required |

by Indiana under the FWPCA. The creation of such obli-

gations by Illinois courts through what this Court de-

seribed in Milwaukee IT as “often vague and indetermi-

nate nuisgnee concepts and maxims of equity jurispru-

dence” would be an intolerable invasion of Indiana’s sow

ereignty.

The jurisdiction of state courts is restricted by the ter-

ritorial limitations on the power of the respective States.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 251 (1958); Pennoyer v.

Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877): Suffolk v. Chapman, 31

Tl. 2d 551, 555, 202 N.B.2d 535, 537 (1964): Solliday v.

The District Court in and for the City and County of

Denver, 185 Colo. 489, 497-98, 318 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1957).

Since an Tllinois court purperting to apply Indiana law to

Hammond would still be only a creation of Illinois, there

is no basis on which it can exceed the power possessed by

Illinois and infringe upon the sovereignty of Indiana. The

Court recognized this principle in the foreign relations

eontext in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285

(1952), in whieh it was held that a federal court could

govern the conduct of United States eitizens in foreign

eountries “when the rights of other nations or their na-

tionals are not infringed” because of the duty owed by

citizens to their own government.

To transform an Illinois court claiming to adopt Indi-

ana law ixto an Indiana court would create a fiction in a

field in which Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned: “And in

States bound together by a Constitution and subject to

em, em

the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used

not to let fiction deny the fair play that ean be secured

only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.” McDonald v.

Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).

The District Court should not have exercised jurisdiction

over any claims asserted under Indiana law by Illinois

upon remand. The 'linois easé was initiated in an Ilh-

nois court and renivved solely on the ground that it as-

serted a claim under the federal common law of nuisance.

Illinois vy. Sanitary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp. 166

(N.D. Tl. 1980).2. The Tilinois state law elaims fell under

the pendent jurisdiction of the District Court. Discovery

in the Tllinois and Seott cases has been insignificant. If

the Illinois case were remanded and Tllinois filed a claim

under Indiana law, the District Court would be presented

with claims based solely upon state law in a ease that was

procedurally in its infaney. Federal jurisdiction should

not be exercised under such cireumstances. United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); 3A Moore,

Federal Practice {18.07 [1.-3], 18-59 (2nd ed. 1984).

III

THE FWPCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE

THE USE OF STATE LAW TO GOVERN

OUT-OF-STATE DISCHARGES

The Court of Appeals followed the language and legisla-

tive history of sections 505(e) and 510 of the FWPCA

(33 U.S.C. §$§1865(e), 1370) in rejecting petitioners’ argu-

ment that the sections authorized the extraterritorial ap-

plication of state law. It found that both sections were

Saving provisions that preserved the traditional power

‘Diversity jurisdiction did not exist over the Illinois

ease. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 97 n. 1, App. at S-6 n. 1.

as i

of the States over the use of water resources within them

but did not create any new state power.

Section 505(e)* states only that nothing in the provi-

sions of $505 affects any other remedies which persons

may have under other laws. It is a standard saving pro-

vision and means only that the provisions for citizen suits

in $505 do not preclude the use of other existing reme-

dies. It does not create remedies itself. Milwaukee IT, 451

U.S. at 328-329, App. at G-22. Section 510° is similar in

*Section 505 provides for citizen suits under certain

conditions. Section 505(e) provides:

“Nothing im this section shall restrict any right

which any person (or class of persons) may have

under any statute or common law to seek enforcement

of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any

other relief (including relief against the Administra-

tor or a State agency).” (Emphasis. added. )

* Section 510 provides:

“Except as expressly provided in this chapter,

nothing in this chapter shall (1) preelude or deny the

right of any State or political subdivision thereof or

interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any stan-

dard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants,

or (B) any requirement respecting control or abate-

ment of pollution; except that if an effluent limita-

tion, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibi-

tion, pretreatment standard, or standard of perform-

ance is in effect under this chapter, such State or po-

litical subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt

or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation,

effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard,

or standard of performance which is less stringent

than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, ef-

fluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard,

or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2)

be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting

any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to

the waters (including boundary waters) of such

States.” (Emphasis added.)

— |. oo

that it provides that nothing in chapter 26 of the FWPCA

is to preclude or deny the right of any State to adopt re-

quirements more stringent than those created under the

FWPCA. It does not purport to create any new State

powers, especially extraterritorial powers. The only pur-

pose of $O10 was to preserve whatever rights, if any, the

States had prior to the 1972 FWPCA amendments. Noth-

ing in the legislative history of §510 indicates any in-

tent other than to prevent the FWPCA being interpreted

as a preemption of the existing rights of the States, ex-

cept as expressly provided. Congressional Research Ser-

vee, A Legislative Ilistory of the Water Pollution Con-

trol Act Amendments of 1972, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., vol.

1, 823, vol. 2, 1503 (1973). |

r

IV

| Bye is NOT APPLICABLE

The Court of Appeals’ decision does not contravene

Erie IR Co. vy. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1958). Sinee the

nature of our federal system requires that the only sub-

stantive state law that can be applied to discharges in In-

diana is Indiana law, Hrie is not applicable. If Erie were

applicable, then Hinderlider vy. LaPlata River & Cherry

Cr. D. Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided the same day as

Erie, was wrongly decided. Erie did not upset the over-

riding federal interest in precluding the extraterritorial

imposition of the law of one State upon the sovereign

rights and interests of another. Milwaukee I, 451 U.S.

at 334-535; App. at G-28-G-29 (Blackmun, dissenting).

The application of limitations on state power required by

our federal system does not constitute the creation of a

federal choice-of-law rule any more than the application

of constitutional provisions to state actions or laws is a

choice-of-law decision.

nk Nios

The fact that Indiana follows the lex loci delicto rule

in orainary tort cases that do not involve its sovereign

rights cannot be translated into a determination that

it would surrender its sovereignty to Illinois. The choice

of law involved in ordinary tort cases is a determina-

tion of which law of two or more possible laws governs

a certain situation. 1 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of

Laws 13-14 (1935). In interstate water pollution dis-

putes the law of another State is not an alternative

possible law.

V

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petitions for writs of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JEREMIAH MarsH*

Joun L. ConLon

MicHAEL SCHNEIDERMAN

Davin O. Too_an

Hopkins & Sutter

Three First National Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 558-6600

Attorneys for the

Hammond Respondents

* Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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