Opposition Brief — Scott v. City of Hammond
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wees oupreme Court, US.
EI LE bh
Nos. 84-21
em : AUC 7 1984
ae
CLERK ii
Iu the
Supreme Court of the United States
OctroBer TERM 1984
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, et al.,
Respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and the
METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF
GREATER CHICAGO,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF HAMMOND, et al.,
Respondents.
WILLIAM J. SCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, et al.
Respondents.
HAMMOND RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
JEREMIAH MarsH*
Joun L. Conton
MicHArL ScHNEIDERMAN
Davip O. TooLan
Hopkins & SuttTer
Three First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Maa, (312) 558-6600
Attorneys for the
Hammond Respondents
* Counsel of Record
aaa
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply the limita-
tions on state power recognized by this Court in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (“Milwaukee I’),
in its decision that Illinois law and courts could not
govern discharges to Lake Michigan by a municipality
located in Indiana?
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that
interstate water pollution disputes involve the same con-
siderations of federalism as disputes over the allocation
of water in interstate rivers and lakes?
p 3. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that
the limitations on state power recognized in Milwaukee I
remain unaffected by the passage of the 1972 amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”),
33 U.S.C. $1251 et seq., and this Court’s decision in City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (“Milwaukee
IT’)?
4. Did the Court of Appeals’ decision that Illinois
could not govern discharges made in Indiana constitute
the application of principles of federalism derived from
the Constitution rather than, as petitioners claim, the crea-
tion of a separate body of federal choice-of-law rules?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
OPINIONS BELOW _ ...cccscsscossescrsssssvccsscscsevcssccrcsssssosessomess 2
THE NATURE OF THE CASES ..........ccccccosesseessomees 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WPITS ...........4. 6
INTRODUCTION ocssrnssisnsvcessssnsnvionseinsicnngsecnunimntinses 6
Il
UNDER OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM STATES
AND THEIR COURTS CANNOT HAVE EX-
TRATERRITORIAL POWER OVER THE USE
OF INTERSTATE WATERS. .........ccceseesseceeeneees 9
lil
THE FWPCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE
USE OF STATE LAW TO GOVERN OUT-OF-
STATE, DESO ARGS ccccenscnsesisisemsesssvsseneticsteetnts 13
IV
ERIE 18 NOT APPLIC BRIG | cise wesiiccnssianimnbshesss 15
CONC TOBIN, cvecescusssssevn'siisnneiinson teketphnateitiditshistneintacadashan as 16
ill
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
CasEs
PAGE
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 324
a EE WW
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 186-187, 192 (1947)... 11
Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) 11
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (“Milwaukee II”), 451
aan ac cdamprmeandnsnaabaeahapls passtm
Erie R. Co. v. Tompktns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ........... 7,15
Georaia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
os oniehngnsicdhiiansinnsnil 9,10
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ...........0 12
Hinderlider vy. LaPlata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
a os cisetrana i vesamapanselaseaneinniceneneninie 7, 9,15
Illinois vy. City of Milwaukee (“Milwaukee I’), 406
USS. 91 (LIFE ans sssesssscsssensssensennesessnssscsesnessssnssonee passim
Illinois v. ‘Sanitary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp.
oul dha ver csiedininaiibialencnsbens 13
Kansas vy. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) ...... 10
Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) 7
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ou. 13
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) ...........ccssesscessseseseees 11
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-360 (1943) wu... 10
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ............cece0 12
Solliday v. The District Court in and for the City
and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 489, 497-98, 313
P.2d 1000, 1004 (1957) . ialaaisaemitipeanicilcinmuseed ae
iv
PAGE
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) .. 12
Suffolk v. Chapman, 31 Ill. 2d 551, 555, 202 N.B.2d
i EEE ALLO ORE A 12
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
Wm. De, GRRE me. 1D CEDBE) cnccscncvcccnvcescccconsesendtbics 9
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
GREE ei cleashenelatiapeais sn tadecsidascsadheesicbiensmnkainltencie cic 13
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537-538
Nn: ieidebeailehdiaahciaiabicinbisiees:itndesiasnlasuecitdiaisanadadeencuniiicicnus 11
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
IN hit ah dins sonia Shctsainioicintrsaccieneciann 10
ConSTITUTION, STATUTES
SR In I TN icin i 10
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”),
33 U.S.C. §1251, et seq.
Section 505(e), 33 U.S.C. §1865(e) ..ccccceseceseees 13-15
Section 510, 33 U.S.C. $1370 .....ccc.cccscccccesceescssss. 7, 13-15
Indiana Statutes
Ind. Code §$36-9-25-1, €€ 8€q. ....ccccccssssssscscesscacssesesses: 10
LEGISLATIVE History
Congressional Research Service, A Legislative Histo-
ny of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972,
93rd Cong., Ist Sess. vol. 1, 823, vol. 2, 1503
SU UII Sdalichpidbesccss ect dkcatnteiataanatalsiens ianeeidbecagitie cons anced 15
Booxs
1 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 13-14 (1935) 16
3A Moore, Federal Practice 118.07 [1.—3], 18-59 (2nd
ERRNO DEMON RANE HN MERE 13
OcrosBer TERM 1984
Nos. 84-21
84-38
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and
In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, et al.
Respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and the
METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF
GREATER CHICAGO,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF HAMMOND, et al.,
Respondents.
WILLIAM J. SCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, et al.,
Respondents.
HAMMOND RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
——
a
OPINIONS BELOW
This brief is filed in opposition to the petitions for
writs of certiorari filed by the State of Illinois and the
Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago in
No. 84-38 and William J. Seott in No. 84-21. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
District Court is reported in the advance sheets at 731
F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), and is set forth in the sepa-
rately bound Appendices filed with the petitions at A-1.
The Court’s subsequent order of May 29, 1984, which
denied the petitions for rehearing and modified the
March 27, 1984 opinion, is unreported and is set forth
in the Appendices at B-1. The District Court’s opinion
is reported at 519 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1981), and is
set forth in the Appendices at F-1.
THE NATURE OF THE CASES
In September, 1980 Illinois and the Metropolitan Sani-
tary District of Greater Chicago filed a five count com-
plaint in the Cireuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
against Hammond, Indiana, the Hammond Sanitary
District and the District’s trustees and manager
(“Hammond”) in which they alleged that discharges
by Hammond of inadequately treated sewage and
grease to Lake Michigan which floated to the part of
Lake Michigan adjoining Illinois were in violation of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Counts I
and II), the federal common law of nuisance (Count ITT),
Illinois common law and statutory law of nuisance
(Count IV) and the Illinois common law of trespass
(Count V). The complaint requested that the court order
Hammond: (1) to stop making the discharges, (2) to
prevent any illegal or unauthorized interconnections with
its sewer systems, (3) to deny any new or additional
hook-ups to its system, (4) to remove and dispose of
—
all complained of materials in Lake Michigan and on
the beaches of Lake Michigan in a manner approved in
advance by the Illinois Attorney General, the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency within the shortest
possible time, (5) to construct and install permanent
facilities that would prevent further discharges to Lake
Michigan of the type complained of, (6) to pay damages
to be placed in a trust fund to reimburse any entity
which had or would incur costs to clean the waters of
Lake Michigan, (7) to pay a civil penalty of $10,000 for
each violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act and an additional penalty of $1,000 per day for each
day that the violations continued, and (8) to provide
such other relief as shall be just.
The Illinois case was removed to the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois by Hammond
on the ground that the federal common law of nui-
sance claim created federal question jurisdiction. The
District Court thereafter denied the motion of IIli-
nois to remand the case to state court. Illinois v. Sani-
tary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. II.
1980).
William J. Seott filed a class action in the District
Court on behalf of citizens of Dllinois who used Lake
Michigan. He alleged that Hammond’s discharges con-
stituted “both a public and private nuisance under IIli-
nois law and independently both a publie and private
“ nuisance under federal common law.” Scott invoked
federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship and the existence of a federal question under the
federal common law of nuisance claim. Scott requested
on pees
money damages of $1,000,000 “for benefit of the plain-
tiff class” and an injunction requiring Hammond to
cease the challenged discharges.
Hammond moved for dismissal of the petitioners’ com-
plaints for failure to state claims. The District Court
granted the motion on the federal common law of nui-
sance claims, but denied it on the state law claims. Scott
v. City of Hammond, 519 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Til. 1981),
App. at F-1. The District Court certified its ruling for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292 (b). Ham-
mond was granted permission to appeal by the Court of
Appeals and its appeal was consolidated with the consid-
eration of the remand in Milwaukee IJ. App. at E-2.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s
decision on the applicability of Illinois law and directed
that the cases be dismissed. It observed:
“In the present cases the political subdivisions of
one state claim a right to an extent of use of in-
terstate water in the exercise of their public health
functions. A different state complains that a use
to that extent causes contamination of its waters
and is inimical to public health because those waters
are used for water supplies and recreation. This is
a controversy of federal dimensions, implicating the
conflicting rights of states and inappropriate for
state law resolution. The latter state does not seek
mere enforcement of effluent limitations established
under federal law, but imposition of more stringent
limitations.
“The very reasons the Court gave for resorting
to federal common law in Milwaukee / are the same
reasons why the state claiming injury cannot apply
its own state law to out-of-siate discharges now.”
(731 F.2d at 410, App. at A-16)
ay ts
The Court of Appeals also concluded that in addition
to the remedies available to petitioners under the
FWPCA, the petitioners could bring an action under
Indiana law in a federal or state court in Indiana be-
cause the FWPCA preserved state jurisdiction over dis-
charges made within them. 731 F.2d at 410 n. 2, 414;
App. at A-16 n. 2, A-23.
Petitioners filed a request for rehearing in which they
requested the Court of Appeals to modify its decision
to allow them to amend their complaints in the District
Court to assert their claims under Indiana law. The
Court of Appeals denied this request. App. at B-3.
pam, We
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRITS
I
INTRODUCTION
Twelve years ago petitioners Illinois and Scott, its
then Attorney General, argued persuasively that the law
of one State could not control interstate water pollution
disputes. See Plainuff’s Brief Regarding the Applicable
Law filed by Illinois in Milwaukee I. This Court in Mil-
waukee I unanimously held that the nature of such dis-
putes required the recognition of a federal common law
of nuisance. Milwaukee I recognized that interstate water
pollution disputes involve the same considerations of
federalism and the sovereign rights of States as inter-
state water allocation disputes. A State has the power
to choose what uses it will permit of the waters within
it, but it does not have the power to impose its choices
on another State. Although the members of this Court
disagreed in Milwaukee II over the effect of the 1972
FWPCA amendments, there was no disagreement that
under our federal system the law of one State could not
govern the discharges to an interstate lake or river made
in another State. Compare Milwaukee IT, 451 U.S. at
314 n. 7, App. at G-7 n. 7; 451 U.S. at 315 n. 8, App. at
G-9 n. 8; with 451 U.S. at 335, App. at G-28 - G-29
(Blackmun, dissenting).
The Court of Appeals correctly applied these principles
in these cases. It recognized that no State or the courts
created by it had the power to impose policy decisions
over the use of resources in another State. To permit
this to be done would infringe upon the equal power of
the other State to make its own policy decisions. Any
ee oom
disputes arising from conflicting resource uses permitted
by different States can only be resolved through federa!
law. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 105 & n. 6, App. at S-13
& n. 6; Hinderlider vy. LaPlata River & Cherry Cr. D. Co.,
304 - 92, 110 (1938). Since 1972 that federal law has
been th» FWPCA.
The Court of Appeals also correctly recognized that
nothing in Milwaukee I or the FWPCA prevented some-
one from asking the courts of a State in which discharges
were being made to apply its law to those discharges. This
state remedy was ‘specifically preserved in FWPCA sece-
tion 510 (33 U.S.C. $1370).
Petitioners now contend, contrary to the belief of the
entire Court in Milwaukee IT, that state law can operate
far more broadly. They argue that when the federal
common law of nuisance was replaced by the FWPCA,
an extraterritorial state police power that could
not coexist with the federal common law of nuisance was
revived as an alternative to federal statutory law. They
do not explain how’ this extraterritorial — state
power that was suppressed by the federal common law
of nuisance ean flourish under the FWPCA; it is simply
presented as a fact. Rather than aecept the Court of Ap-
peals’ statement that the “very reasons” that were given
for this Court’s resort to federal common law in Milwau-
kee I required the decision it reached, petitioners charac-
terize the Court of Appeals’ decision as the creation of a
federal common law choice-of-law rule for interstate tort
disputes. They argue that its implementation would have
a profound effect on the remedies available for all torts
with interstate aspects and that it conflicts with Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klagxon v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
co eis
These cases are not, as petitioners portray them, com-
parable to simple transboundary tort cases. The conclu-
sions of the Court of Appeals were based on the subject
matter of the dispute, the use of water resources within
a State, and the significant State interest in that subject
matter, especially with respect to its own political subdi-
visions. Thus, the issue decided by the Court of Appeals
was not one of choice-of-law, but the fundamental ques-
tion of whether a State has the power to impose through
its law or courts regulations and financial burdens on the
taxpayers of a sister State that infringe upon the sister
State’s sovereignty. The Court of Appeals recognized
the real nature of these cases and correctly followed this
Court’s decisions on the nature of the relationship of the
States.
The Court of Appeals did not hold that there are
no remedies for interstate pollution of Lake Michigan.
There are the remedies provided by the FWPCA, which
were invoked by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency and the State of Indiana. Also, more
stringent relief can be sought under Indiana law in
Indiana courts. Petitioners are not seeking a remedy
but the assertion of extraterritorial power either through
Illinois statutes or “vague and indeterminate nuisance
concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence.” The basis
on which review is actually being sought is petitioners’
adamant refusal to accept the inherent limitation on state
power under our federal system which has been repeat-
edly confirmed by this Court. Review of the Court of
Appeals’ decision, therefore, is not warranted.
UNDER OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM
STATES AND THEIR COURTS
CANNOT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL POWER
OVER THE USE OF INTERSTATE WATERS
The use made of the air, a river or a lake in one State
cannot be controlled by any other State. Milwaukee I,
406 U.S. at 105 n. 6 (1972), App. at 8-13 n. 6; Hinder-
lider v. LaPlata & Cherry Cr. D. Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907. This Court in Wilwaukee |] created a federal
common law of nuisance to govern interstate water pol-
lution disputes heeause state law could not be applied.
Texas Industries, Inc. y. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640-641 n. 18 (1981). As the Court sueeinetly ob-
served in Milwaukee IT: “If state law can be applied,
there is no need for federal common law; if federal com-
mon law exists, if is because state law eannot be used.”
451 U.S. at 314 n. 7, App. at G-7 n. 7. There was no
dispute on this point in Wlwaukee IT, 451 U.S. at 335,
App. at G-28 - G-29 (Blackmun, dissenting). Extrater-
ritorial state power over the use of the environment can-
not exist beeause of the coequal sovereign status of the
States.
Just as it is accepted that Canada’s Parliament and
Canadian courts do net have the power to regulate the
emmissions of industries in the United States because of
their effect on Canada’s environment, it must also be ac-
cepted that Tllinois law and Illinois courts cannot have
the power that petitioners claim for them. The relation-
ship between States in environmental matters is compar-
able to that between countries, except that the Constitution
authorizes a federal resolution of interstate disputes.
— e
Each State is sovereign within its territory, except to
the extent provided by the Constitution and laws enacted
in accordance with it. U.S. Const. amend. X; Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-360 (1943); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907). The sovereignty of each State
necessarily implies a barrier against intrusion by the laws
and courts of sister States into matters that involve the
attributes of sovereignty. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-294 (1979). Each State has
the sovereign power to regulate the use of the resources
located within it, but no State has the power to interfere
with a sister State’s equal power. Georgia v. Tennessee
Cupper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-238 (1907).
What a State permits to be put into the air and waters
in its territory involves policy decisions that arise from
the exercise of its fundamental powers as a State and
frequently, as in this case, a State’s ability to manage
traditional governmental operations. The best proof of
this is the nature of relief sought in this litigation by
Illinois; relief that Illinois and its courts might appropri-
ately impose on an Illinois municipality but cannot impose
on an Indiana municipality. For instance, Illinois sought
an order that would have blocked economic development
in a part of Indiana by barring any new factory, business
or home from having access to the only sanitary and
stormwater sewer systems in an area of Hammond. IIli-
nois also requested relief that would have involved an
Illinois court in directing and controlling the construction
of an Indiana municipal sewer facility, who would do it,
on what schedule and how it would be paid for by Indiana
taxpayers. Such matters are usually the subject of a
State’s own laws. See, e.g., Ind. Code §36-9-25-1, et seq.
ay A
Petitioners have cited decisions of this Court such as
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Haque, 449 U.S. 302 (1981),
Nevada vy. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), and Bradford Elec-
tric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), for their argu-
ment that the interstate aspects of petitioners’ claims
raise no barrier to the application of Illinois law. None
of those decisions involved an effort by one State to in-
trude on the sovereignty of sister States by governing
what could be done within their borders. Thus, in Nevada
v. Hall it was noted that a decision involving a traffic
accident that occurred outside of Nevada “could hardly
interfere with Nevada’s capacity to fulfill its own sove-
reign responsibilities.” 440 U.S. at 424 n. 24. See also All-
state Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 324 (1981)
(Stevens, concurring).
Petitioners argue that even if Indiana law is the only
state law that can govern discharges to Lake Michigan
made in Indiana, the Court of Appeals should have re-
manded these eases to the District Court in Illinois so
that petitioners could seek their relief under Indiana law.
The Court of Appeals’ remand for dismissal was correct,
however, because the District Court could not have had
jurisdiction under the proposed amended claims.
The dismissal of the federal common law of nuisance
claim in the Seott case left diversity as the only basis
for federal jurisdiction. Since the District Court under
diversity jurisdiction is, in effect, another court of the
State of Illinois, it could have retained the case with the
proposed amendment only if Illinois courts have the power
to grant the relief sought by Scott under the guise of ap-
plying Indiana law. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535, 537-538 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
183, 186-187, 192 (1947). It is inconceivable that Illinois
sites! UE ions
courts by merely saying that they are applying Indiana
law could require parties in Indiana to adhere to stricter
standards than those established by Indiana pursuant to
the FWPCA and to pay for costly facilities not required |
by Indiana under the FWPCA. The creation of such obli-
gations by Illinois courts through what this Court de-
seribed in Milwaukee IT as “often vague and indetermi-
nate nuisgnee concepts and maxims of equity jurispru-
dence” would be an intolerable invasion of Indiana’s sow
ereignty.
The jurisdiction of state courts is restricted by the ter-
ritorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 251 (1958); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877): Suffolk v. Chapman, 31
Tl. 2d 551, 555, 202 N.B.2d 535, 537 (1964): Solliday v.
The District Court in and for the City and County of
Denver, 185 Colo. 489, 497-98, 318 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1957).
Since an Tllinois court purperting to apply Indiana law to
Hammond would still be only a creation of Illinois, there
is no basis on which it can exceed the power possessed by
Illinois and infringe upon the sovereignty of Indiana. The
Court recognized this principle in the foreign relations
eontext in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285
(1952), in whieh it was held that a federal court could
govern the conduct of United States eitizens in foreign
eountries “when the rights of other nations or their na-
tionals are not infringed” because of the duty owed by
citizens to their own government.
To transform an Illinois court claiming to adopt Indi-
ana law ixto an Indiana court would create a fiction in a
field in which Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned: “And in
States bound together by a Constitution and subject to
em, em
the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used
not to let fiction deny the fair play that ean be secured
only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.” McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
The District Court should not have exercised jurisdiction
over any claims asserted under Indiana law by Illinois
upon remand. The 'linois easé was initiated in an Ilh-
nois court and renivved solely on the ground that it as-
serted a claim under the federal common law of nuisance.
Illinois vy. Sanitary District of Hammond, 498 F. Supp. 166
(N.D. Tl. 1980).2. The Tilinois state law elaims fell under
the pendent jurisdiction of the District Court. Discovery
in the Tllinois and Seott cases has been insignificant. If
the Illinois case were remanded and Tllinois filed a claim
under Indiana law, the District Court would be presented
with claims based solely upon state law in a ease that was
procedurally in its infaney. Federal jurisdiction should
not be exercised under such cireumstances. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); 3A Moore,
Federal Practice {18.07 [1.-3], 18-59 (2nd ed. 1984).
III
THE FWPCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
THE USE OF STATE LAW TO GOVERN
OUT-OF-STATE DISCHARGES
The Court of Appeals followed the language and legisla-
tive history of sections 505(e) and 510 of the FWPCA
(33 U.S.C. §$§1865(e), 1370) in rejecting petitioners’ argu-
ment that the sections authorized the extraterritorial ap-
plication of state law. It found that both sections were
Saving provisions that preserved the traditional power
‘Diversity jurisdiction did not exist over the Illinois
ease. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 97 n. 1, App. at S-6 n. 1.
as i
of the States over the use of water resources within them
but did not create any new state power.
Section 505(e)* states only that nothing in the provi-
sions of $505 affects any other remedies which persons
may have under other laws. It is a standard saving pro-
vision and means only that the provisions for citizen suits
in $505 do not preclude the use of other existing reme-
dies. It does not create remedies itself. Milwaukee IT, 451
U.S. at 328-329, App. at G-22. Section 510° is similar in
*Section 505 provides for citizen suits under certain
conditions. Section 505(e) provides:
“Nothing im this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement
of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administra-
tor or a State agency).” (Emphasis. added. )
* Section 510 provides:
“Except as expressly provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall (1) preelude or deny the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any stan-
dard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants,
or (B) any requirement respecting control or abate-
ment of pollution; except that if an effluent limita-
tion, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibi-
tion, pretreatment standard, or standard of perform-
ance is in effect under this chapter, such State or po-
litical subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt
or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard,
or standard of performance which is less stringent
than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, ef-
fluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard,
or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2)
be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting
any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to
the waters (including boundary waters) of such
States.” (Emphasis added.)
— |. oo
that it provides that nothing in chapter 26 of the FWPCA
is to preclude or deny the right of any State to adopt re-
quirements more stringent than those created under the
FWPCA. It does not purport to create any new State
powers, especially extraterritorial powers. The only pur-
pose of $O10 was to preserve whatever rights, if any, the
States had prior to the 1972 FWPCA amendments. Noth-
ing in the legislative history of §510 indicates any in-
tent other than to prevent the FWPCA being interpreted
as a preemption of the existing rights of the States, ex-
cept as expressly provided. Congressional Research Ser-
vee, A Legislative Ilistory of the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., vol.
1, 823, vol. 2, 1503 (1973). |
r
IV
| Bye is NOT APPLICABLE
The Court of Appeals’ decision does not contravene
Erie IR Co. vy. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1958). Sinee the
nature of our federal system requires that the only sub-
stantive state law that can be applied to discharges in In-
diana is Indiana law, Hrie is not applicable. If Erie were
applicable, then Hinderlider vy. LaPlata River & Cherry
Cr. D. Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided the same day as
Erie, was wrongly decided. Erie did not upset the over-
riding federal interest in precluding the extraterritorial
imposition of the law of one State upon the sovereign
rights and interests of another. Milwaukee I, 451 U.S.
at 334-535; App. at G-28-G-29 (Blackmun, dissenting).
The application of limitations on state power required by
our federal system does not constitute the creation of a
federal choice-of-law rule any more than the application
of constitutional provisions to state actions or laws is a
choice-of-law decision.
nk Nios
The fact that Indiana follows the lex loci delicto rule
in orainary tort cases that do not involve its sovereign
rights cannot be translated into a determination that
it would surrender its sovereignty to Illinois. The choice
of law involved in ordinary tort cases is a determina-
tion of which law of two or more possible laws governs
a certain situation. 1 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws 13-14 (1935). In interstate water pollution dis-
putes the law of another State is not an alternative
possible law.
V
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the petitions for writs of
certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JEREMIAH MarsH*
Joun L. ConLon
MicHAEL SCHNEIDERMAN
Davin O. Too_an
Hopkins & Sutter
Three First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 558-6600
Attorneys for the
Hammond Respondents
* Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.