Appendix — Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission

Supreme Court brief1984

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Office - Supreme Court, U.S

FILED

83-2059 JUN 6 1908

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

CASE NO. __ CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

PETITIONER,

V.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WYOMING,

RESPONDENT.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE WYOMING

SUPREME COURT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

= _— — ——a —_—— —_- -—

George D. Rives,

Counsel of Record

Leonard A. Girard

Stephen S. Walters

Nancy M. Ganong

Stoel, Rives, Boley,

Fraser & Wyse

900 SW Fifth Avenue

Portland, OR 97204

Telephone: (503) 224-3380

June 6, 1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF APPENDIX

Pacific Power & Light Co.

v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,

677 P2d 799 (Wyo 1983)

Order Denying Rehearing,

No. 83-75, (Wyo March 8, 1984)

Memorandum Opinion and Final

Order, Dkt No. 9454 Sub 17

(Wyo PSC Dec. 2, 1982)

Missouri v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,

Case No. CV 183-1064cc

(Mo Cir Ct April 16, 1984)

Ohio Edison Co., Case No.

81-898-EL-AEM (Ohio PUC

July 31, 1981)

Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No.

79-1929 (Wis Ct App

Dec. 22, 1981)

73

75

126

135

170

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT

COMPANY, a corporation,

Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WYOMING, Appellee

(Respondent).

LOWER VALLEY POWER & LIGHT

INC., Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WYOMING, Appellee

(Respondent).

CHEMICAL BANK, a New York corpo-

ration, Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve.

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WYOMING, Appellee

(Respondent).

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUP-

PLY SYSTEM, Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WYOMING, Appellee

(Respondent).

Nos. 83-75 to 83-78

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 7, 1984

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1984

in No. 83-75

Before ROONEY, C. J., and

THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a dis-

trict court ruling affirming an order of

the Wyoming Public Service Commission

(PSC) which denied appellants the right

to recover in rates any and all invest-

ments, expenses or obligations related to

three abandoned nuclear power construc-

tion projects.

We hold the matter to be moot

as to all appellants except Pacific

Power & Light Company (PP&L), and we

affirm the decision of appellee insofar

as it pertains to PP&L.

There are four appellants.

Appellant Lower Valley Power and Light,

Inc. (LV) is a distribution level elec-

tric cooperative. Appellant PP&L is a

publicly held corporation providing elec-

tric service as a regulated public util-

ity. Both LV and PP&L are electric pub-

lic utilities within the regulatory

jurisdiction of the Wyoming PSC. Appel-

lant Washington Public Power Supply Sys-

tem (WPPSS) is a joint operating agency

which builds, owns and operates electric

generation and transmission facilities

and sells electric power to its members

and others. Appellant Chemical Bank (CB)

is a New York corporation which is a

bond-fund trustee.

LV and Fall River (FR), another

distribution level electric cooperative

which is not a party to this appeal,

along with 86 other electric utility

cooperatives, municipalities, and public

utility districts, each signed, on

July 14, 1976, identical Participants'

Agreements (Agreements) which entitled

them to a percentage share of power from

two nuclear power projects (WNP-4 and

WNP-5) which WPPSS was constructing in

the state of Washington and which obli-

gated them each to pay a proportion of

the costs of said projects "whether or

not" the projects were ever completed.

PP&L was a 10% owner of WNP-5, and also

was participating in another nuclear

power project known as Pebble Springs.

WPPSS financed its ownership shares of

WNP-4 and WNP-5 through the sale of

municipal tax exempt bonds. CB is the

bond-fund trustee for said bonds.

The Agreements executed by LV

and FR were not submitted to the PSC for

review or approval prior to their execu-

tion, %r at any time subsequent.

Construction of WNP-4 and WNP-5

was begun in 1976 and abandoned in 1981,

when WNP-4 was 16% complete and WNP-5 was

20% complete. The Pebble Springs project

was terminated in 1982, with no construc-

tion ever being done, but with over $200

million invested in site preparation. No

electric power will ever be generated by

any of these three power plant projects.

The controversy was initiated

by the PSC under its investigative powers

pursuant to § 37-2-117, W.S. 1977}?

through a "Notice and Order Setting Hear-

ing" made and entered on April 22, 1982

and directed to LV, PP&L and FR. The

Commission Staff had previously

petitioned the Commission to investigate

the matter as to LV. Of course, the

+ Section 37-2-117 provides:

"Whenever the commission

shall believe that an investi-

gation of any act or omission

to act, accomplished or pro-

posed, or an investigation of

any rate, service, facility or

service regulation of any pub-

lic utility should be made in

order to secure compliance with

the provisions of this act and

orders of the commission, it

may of its own motion summarily

investigate the same."

Commission could institute the investiga-

tion without such petition "summarily"

and "of its own motion." It did so with

its "Notice and Order Setting Hearing."

The record amply reflects the waiver of

any defect or objection in and to the

investigation by PP&L. The scope of the

investigation was also explored and

understood by the parties, and the hear-

ing proceeded on the issue of whether or

not the investment, expenses and obliga-

tions incurred by PP&L and LV in the

projects could be properly considered in

fixing the rate base for their operation,

and it did not proceed on the issue of

what the rates should be, i.e., a rate

case.

The transcript reflects that

all parties recognized the correct issue

and that it would be pertinent to rates

and the procedure and evidence would be

Similar to that of a rate case. The

following occurred prior to the testimony

of the first PP&L witness:

"MR. ROGERS [Representing

PSC Staff]: *** I do have one

additional matter.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: Yes.

"MR. ROGERS: And that is

concerning the filing by the

company made on July 2, 1982,

pursuant to the commission's

order. The commission will

recall that these matters were

Originally set for hearing on

July 16th of 1982, pursuant to

the commission order of

April 22, 1982.

"Upon the motion of the

staff the hearings were contin-

ued until this week, and that

was made pursuant to the

commission's order of May 28,

1982. And contained within

that order was a provision that

all testimony by all parties

was to be filed on or before

July 2, 1982.

"Now, I don't know if the

commission is aware, but as

part of the company's filing on

July 2, on or about July 2,

they filed tariffs, and those

tariffs contain a request for a

change of rates in amounts

variously set at $5,743,000, or

$10,967,000. It was the

staff's understanding at the

beginning that this was to be a

generic matter, that it was not

to be a rate matter. The fil-

ing made by the company has

changed that to a contested

case.

"And the staff has con-

cerns regarding the notice

requirement of the Admin-

istrative Procedures Act, with

regard to this matter. I am

sure that the commission will

recall its own rulings, that a

rate making matter is a con-

tested matter under the act,

and the commission, or the act

is very specific with regard to

the notice required.

"And I think that this

matter should be resolved by

the commission in some way. I

have broached the matter with

Mr. Girard, and we are attempt-

ing to come up with some type

of a solution to the problem,

but I think that the commission

should be made aware of it

prior to the beginning of this

testimony.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH:

Mr. Girard, do you wish to

respond to that?

"MR. GIRARD: Very

briefly. Mr. Rogers is cor-

rect, he made me aware of this

matter, I think it was five or

six minutes before the hearing

commenced this afternoon, so he

and I didn't really have time

to have a calm lawyer-like dis-

cussion of the problem. He

agreed to raise it to bring it

to your attention. The only

thing I will say is this: The

purpose of the generic proceed-

ing, I believe, was to deter-

mine how to deal with the costs

of the nuclear plants at issue.

"And the question the com-

pany had was: The generic

proceeding presumably will con-

sider how much was spent, why

was it spent, was it reason-

able, who bears the risk of

that and so forth. And let us

assume just for discussion,

that the commission considered

all that, and after deliberat-

ing said, ‘We think the total

10

costs that should be borne by

ratepayers are, say, $10 mil-

lion a year for five years.'

"Then the question would

get to be, ‘What would then

happen?’ Presumably, if the

company hadn't filed rates it

could then file rates designed

to achieve the level of reve-

nues found appropriate by the

commission. And we would then

wonder, would we have a rate

case in which every issue would

be open again, and we would

then retry the question of who

should pay for the nuclear

plants.

"We figured that the

commission likely didn't want

to do that, that this is the

hearing to find out how that

expenditure is going to be

dealt with. There may be a

question as to exactly how the-

-which particular ratepayer

should pay for it, but we would

think that there should be one

time and one time only to

decide, is that a stockholder

responsibility, a ratepayer

responsibility, or anywhere in

between.

"That's all I have to say.

11

Se 28

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: We will

come back to order.

"The commission feels very

strongly, not just a little

bit, that this was wrong, that

we cannot have a rate case

without giving notice to the

public, and that any issues as

to asking ratepayers to pay for

amounts in the future, will be

taken care of in future rate

cases and will not be taken

care of in this generic hearing

which is to determine whether

Or not any amount should be

involved.

"And therefore, there

being no notice to the public,

and certainly in these cases

significant intervention has

been made by the public in the

past, we will restrict the

hearing to those matters that

have previously been noticed

and that as to what rates you

are required in the future to

pay for any amounts that might

be found will be a matter to be

determined in the future rate

case.

"And perhaps, since you

already have one filed before

12

us, that it might be a more

proper time to discuss those

kinds of issues.

"So, if you will proceed

on that basis, Mr. Girard.

"MR. GIRARD: Fine, thank

you.

"I should have mentioned

that when the revised rate

schedules were filed, notice

was posted, there was not a

mailing made or I don't think a

newspaper publication made. I

wantd [sic] the record to show

that, and I am not arguing it

was adequate or what is not.

"We will present the case

and the only question is,

whether we should try and

strike from it, if you will,

before we ask our questions

that material that might be

offensive.

"One thing I think, Your

Honor, Mr. Chairman, is that

the testimony of witness Sloan,

who is our rate witness, may be

appropriate, and we will have

to allow you of course to make

the ruling when the time comes,

to at least show for illus-

trative purposes the type of

13

impact there would be on the

ratepayers.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: I might

express to you that we will be

restrictive and we are talking

what is required rates of

return at this time. That's

matter for rate cases, and I am

sure by the time we get down to

that testimony, we will have

had lots of testimony before

this commission. I do not want

to in any way impair your

presentation of this case.

"However, the ground rules

are those matters that are ger-

mane will be heard, those mat-

ters that are not presumably

staff will object to them and

they will not be heard, and if

staff doesn't object to them,

if I find they are not material

I will certainly advise you,

and as you well know I am not

bashful in this manner.

"MR. GIRARD: I would

stipulate that.

"(Laughter.)

"MR. ROGERS: So will

staff."

14

Again, before presenting the

testimony of PP&L's witness Watson:

"MR. GIRARD: ***

"This case, of course,

based on the ruling of the

Commission will not involve a

contested rate case ***,

zxkker tk

"I discussed this part

with Staff Counsel because the

concern, I'm sure, that Staff

has and the Commission has is

this isn't a general rate case.

kk

a2 2 & &

"eee Tt is the Staff's

position and has been from the

beginning that the issue in

this case is whether or not the

ratepayer should pay. ***"

The Commission's investigation

had for its purpose the determination of

whether or not the investment, expenses

and obligations incurred by PP&L and LV

15

in the projects could be considered in

connection with rates later to be set for

PP&L and LV in Wyoming.

"(a) The term ‘rate,'

when used in this act, shall

mean and include *** every ***

charge or other compensation

for service rendered or to be

rendered *** and every ***

practice, act, requirement or

privilege in any way relating

to such *** charge or other

compensation ***," Section 37-

1-102(a), W.S. 1977.

Section 37-2-117, W.S. 1977, supra,

fn. 1, authorizes investigation of "any

act *** accomplished or proposed, or an

investigation of any rate” which the

Commission believes should be made "to

secure compliance with the provisions of

this act and orders of the commission."

The association of PP&L and of

LV with the projects are certainly acts

and practices "in any way related” to the

16

charges and compensation for services to

be rendered by them. And the Commission

could well believe that an investigation

was proper to determine if the projects

were or could be part of that sub-

sequently to be considered in fixing

rates pursuant to § 37-2-122(a), W.S.

1977, infra, fn. 5.

The PSC concludec that the

Agreements executed by LV and FR con-

stituted a guarantee of securities as

contemplated by § 37-6-101 et seq., W.S.

1977, and that their failure to obtain

PSC authorization rendered the Agreements

void for rate making and other purposes

within the regulatory jurisdiction of the

PSC. Further, that the costs incurred by

LV, FR and PP&L could not be lawfully

passed on to their rate payers, as the

17

projects were not and would not be “used

and useful” for the convenience of the

public.

Appellants LV, PP&L, WPPSS and

CB all filed petitions for review of the

Commission Order, which were ultimately

consolidated. The district court

affirmed the Commission Order without

independent review, whereupon appellants

appealed to this court.

Lower Valley, Washington Public

Power Supply Service,

and Chemical Bank

While all of the litigation

below was going on, litigation was also

progressing in other states. The deci-

sions reached in the state of Washington

are particularly significant to the case

before us presently.

18

The Washington Supreme Court

had before it the case of Chemical Bank,

a New York corporation v. Washington Pub-

lic Power Supply System, 99 Wash.2d 772,

666 P.2d 329 (1983). It involved WNP-4

and WNP-5, wherein CB brought a declara-

tory judgment action against WPPSS and

the pafticipants (those who had signed

Participants' Agreements, including LV

and FR) seeking a determination that the

participants owe to WPPSS sufficient

funds to pay the bonds, of which CB is

trustee, with interest. The Washington

Supreme Court held that the defendants

who were Washington public utility

districts or Washington municipalities

lacked authority to enter into said

agreement and as to them the agreement

19

was ultra vires, void ab initio, invalid,

ineffective and unenforceable.

Subsequently, and pursuant to

mandate from the Washington Supreme

Court, the Superior Court of Washington

for King County, in its Order and Judg-

ment, held that:

"2. Inasmuch as the

Participants’ Agreement is

ultra vires, void ab initio,

invalid, ineffective and unen-

forceable as to the defendants

which are Washington public

utility districts or Washington

municipalities, and by reason

thereof, the Participants'

Agreement is also ineffective

and unenforceable as to all

other moving defendants and all

participant defendants, on the

grounds of (a) contract in-

divisibility and failure of the

condition of substantially 100%

participation, (b) mutual mis-

take as to the authority of

Washington public utility dis-

tricts and municipalities to

enter into the Agreement, and

20

(c) frustration of purpose and

impracticability."*

Further, the Superior Court held that:

"3. For the aforesaid

reasons, none of the moving

defendants or any other

participant defendant is obli-

gated, under or by virtue of

the Participants’ Agreement or

WPPSS Board of Directors

Resolution No. 890, as amended

(the 'Bond Resolution'), to

make any payment to WPPSS, or

to any other defendant, or to

Chemical or any purchaser or

holder of bonds issued by WPPSS

in connection with the

Projects."

We agree with the Washington

Superior Court that because the

Participants’ Agreement is void ab initio

2 Chemical Bank v. Washington Public

Power Supply System, Case No. 82-2-06840-

3, August ll, 1983.

21

as to 68.275% of the participants,’ it is

also ineffective and unenforceable as to

the other participants on the grounds

quoted above. Therefore, we hold that

the case at bar is moot as regards appel-

lant LV. LV has no debt because of the

projects’ failure and the issue is not

pertinent to any rate case now or here-

after filed by LV.

"a*e*k [Wlhen no judgment

rendered can be carried into

effect the cause is moot ***,"

Belondon v. State, Wyo., 379

P.2d 828, 829 (1963).

This being so, we also hold

that this case is moot as to WPPSS and

CB, as their interests were piedicated on

* Namely, the Washington public utility

districts and Washington municipalities.

22

the validity of the Participants’

Agreement.

Pacific Power & Light

The above considerations do not

control the disposition of appellant

PP&L, as PP&L was not a participant under

the Participants’ Agreement, but rather a

10% owner of WNP-5, and 29.4% owner of

Pebble Springs.

PSC founded its decision, rela-

tive to PP&L, on an application of the

provisions of § 37-2-119, W.S. 1977,

which provides in part:

"In conducting any inves-

tigation pursuant to the pro-

visions of this act the commis-

sion may investigate, consider

and determine such matters as

the cost or value, or both, of

the property and business of

any public utility, used and

useful for the convenience of

the public, and all matters

23

affecting or influencing such

cost or value ***,”

Emphasizing the "used and useful” lan-

guage of this section, PSC found the

investment, expenses and obligations

incurred by PP&L could not properly be

considered in fixing the rate base for

PP&L's operation.

If the projects had been

successful and had gone on line for

production of electricity for public

convenience, the cost or value would have

been properly considered in establishing

a rate base. Since they were not

successful and were only partially con-

structed, they could never become

"property" of a "used and useful” nature.

Although the project undertakings might

conceivably be part of the “business” of

24

PP&L,* we need not determine such

inasmuch as the business activity relat-

ing to the projects was not current so as

to meet the “used and useful" require-

ment, as the "used and useful" status

must be as of the time of rate considera-

tion. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement

Co. v. Public Service Commission of West

Virginia, 262 U.S. 679, 43 S.Ct. 675, 67

L.Ed. 1176 (1923); Boston Gas Company v.

Department of Public Utilities, 367 Mass.

92, 324 N.E.2d 372 (1975); South Dakota

* Business is "‘the habitual or regular

occupation that the party was engaged in

with a view to winning a livelihood or

some gain,'" In re Lamont, 48 Wyo. 56, 41

P.2d 497, 502 (1935). Business is

"'{alny occupation connected with the

operations and details of trade or indus-

try,'" Zurich Insurance Company v.

Friedlander, 261 Md. 612, 276 A.2d 658,

660 (1971).

25

Public Utilities Commission v. Otter Tail

Power Company, S.D., 291 N.W.2d 291

(1980).

Although the investment,

expenses and obligations resulting from

the projects do not conform to the “used

and useful” concept, PP&L contends that

they could still qualify for considera-

tion in establishing a rate base if they

are a prudent, reasonable and proper

expense of operation.*® Other jurisdic-

tions have dealt with the obligations

herein considered as operating expenses

> Section 37-2-122(a), W.S. 1977,

provides:

"In determining what are just

and reasonable rates the com-

mission may take into consid-

eration depreciation of plant,

obsolescence of equipment,

(Footnote continued)

26

and not as property under the "used and

useful" principle.‘

(Footnote 5 continued from previous page)

expense of operation, physical

and other values of the plant,

system, business and properties

of the public utility whose

rates are under consideration."

* See Office of Consumers' Counsel v.

Public Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio

St.2d 153, 21 Ohio Op.3d 96, 423 N.E.2d

820 (1981), dismissed Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Company v. Office of Con-

sumer's Counsel, 455 U.S. 914, 102 S.Ct.

1267, 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982), where the

court guoted the commission order as

stating, "'*** [t]hus, we now see the

wisdom of the standard emerging from the

cases from other juzisdictions; if the

expenditures are prudent, amortization

should be permitted.'" Id. 67 Ohio St.2d

153, 423 N.E.2d at 825. The court also

said: "(tlhe core issue *** is whether

the commission lawfully and reasonably

permitted CEI to treat its investment in

the four cancelled nuclear generting sta-

tions as amortizable costs.” Id. at 825.

"There is no question but that the over-

whelming weight of authority from other

jurisdictions supports the position of

the commission." Id. at 826. However,

(Footnote continued)

27

We cannot accept the invest-

ment, expenses, and obligations incurred

in construction, or intended construction

of property which would normally qualify

as “used and useful" for inclusion in a

rate base as an operating expense. An

Operating expense includes:

"In general, various

particular expenses of a public

utility are properly chargeable

to expense of operation,

including any legitimate

expense contributing to the

better management or greater

efficiency of the utility, a

reduction of its investment, or

an increase in its operating

return. ***" 73B C.J.S. Public

Utilities, § 36, p. 234.

Unified systems of accounts prescribed by

most regulatory agencies usually specify

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page)

that court disallowed amortization, based

on its interpretation of the Ohio statute

relating to service-related costs that a

utility may recover from its rate payers.

28

that considered as operating expenses,

i.e. taxes, advertising, salaries,

commodity purchases and similar items.

The PSC recognizes that it cannot ignore

the necessary, fair and reasonable

expenses of operation incurred by a util-

ity in the rendition of service, and also

that there are certain expenses which

should be disallowed, such as the

following:

"1. If the questioned

outlays represent

‘inefficiency' or

‘improvidence,' or

"2. Managerial discretion

has been abused, or

"3. The action taken has

been ‘arbitrary’ or ‘inimical'

to the public interest, or

"4. There has been

‘economic waste,' or

"5. Such outlays were not

legitimate operating expenses

29

because they were ‘in excess of

just and reasonable charges.'"’

In contending that the charges

were "operating expenses," PP&L argues

that a reasonable and prudent test should

be allowed. We need not consider this

test insofar as it applies to "operating

expenses” since these charges were not

"operating expenses" as that term is gen-

erally considered.

It is probable that PP&L would

not contend these expenses to be "operat-

ing" ones if the projects were completed.

7 Brief of the Staff of the Wyoming

Public Service Commission, before the

Public Service Commission of the State of

Wyoming, quoting from 1 A. Priest,

Principles of Public Utility Regulation,

p. 51 (1969).

30

PP&L would then own a percentage of prop-

erty; and it would expect to have the

cost of the project included in the

amount attributed to its "used and use-

ful" property in establishing a rate

base.

The argument in this case

results from the situation in which PP&L

suffers financial loss due to failure of

a project intended to become "used and

useful" in the service of the public.

PP&lL wants to include the loss in its

financial picture whereby an increase in

rates will eventually pay for the loss,

i.e., the loss will be borne by the con-

sumers. P&L believes this proper inas-

much as service rendered by an electric

power utility is limited by the

availability of the supply of the product

31

it furnishes. The same can be said of

some other utilities. A prudent and

reasonable attempt to secure or preserve

such supply could well be considered a

service rendered on behalf of the

consumers.*® When the life of a utility

is limited by such supply, amortization

of an entire plant investment has been

allowed. Pennsylvania Power & Light Com-

pany v. Pennsylvania Public Utility

Commission, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 328, 311 A.2d

151 (1973); Clarksburg Light & Heat Co.

v. Public Service Commission, 84 W.Va.

638, 100 S.E. 551 (1919); East Ohio Gas

* It should also be noted that utilities

are under a statutory duty to provide

service that is adequate and safe. Sec-

tion 37-3-112, W.S. 1977. This may carry

with it the obligation to take some

action to insure future supplies.

Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 137

Ohio St. 225, 28 N.E.2d 599 (1940). PP&L

contends that successful effort in this

endeavor would redound to the benefit of

the consumers by furnishing a more

abundant and cheaper supply of the prod-

uct and, thus, the failure of the effort

should be at the expense of the

consumers.

On the other hand, PSC consid-

ers the failure of the projects as one of

the risks incurred by PP&L when it

entered into them. PSC would have the

stockholders of PP&L bear the loss since

the decision to embark upon the project

was made by their representatives who had

an opportunity to calculate the risk and

to be governed by such calculation. If

PP&L gauged the risk with the intention

33

that the loss would be borne by the con-

sumers, there would be no risk at all for

PP&L (the stockholders). This fact might

encourage PP&L to venture into activities

having a very small chance of economic

success with the knowledge of no loss to

it should the activity fail and of great

gain should the small chides of success

occur.

If the consumers are to take

the risk, it would seem that they should

have some say as to whether or not the

projects are to be undertaken. Only PSC

is properly in a position to be concerned

with the consumer interest in considera-

tion of the propriety of the risk activ-

ity and to balance the interests of the

consumer and the utility.

34

In McCulloch Gas Transmission

Company v. Public Service Commission of

Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173, 179 (1981),

we said:

"As pointed out in Public

Service Commission for the

State of New York v. Federal

Power Commission, D.C. Cir.

1972, 467 F.2d 361, the primary

mission of a regulatory body is

to protect the consumer, it

must ‘strive to reach a balance

between consumer, producer, and

those whose interests fall in

between.' The fixing of just

and reasonable rates by the PSC

involves a balancing of inves-

tor and consumer interests, but

a fair return to investors is

not necessarily fair to con-

sumers. Petition of New

England Tel. & Tel. Co., Supra

(115 vt. 494] 66 A.2d [135] at

147."

PSC is not in a position to

take on any aspect of utility management.

It must restrict its position to "regula-

tion" with management decisions being

a3

entirely that of the utility. The

difficulty surfaces when it is necessary

to distinguish between "regulation" and

"management."

Regulation by means of setting

rates and determining the factors

controlling such by necessity prescribes

the "management" domain. Section 37-2-

121, W.S. 1977, empowers the commission

to act when it determines a rate to be

"inadequate or unremunerative, or to be

unjust, or unreasonable, or unjustly

discriminatory, or unduly preferential”

and it may "fix *** such rate as it shall

determine to be just and reasonable and

in compliance with the provisions of this

act." PSC has authority to "prescribe

and order" changed "any service or serv-

ice regulation" as it shall determine "to

36

be unjustly discriminatory or unduly

preferential," or "any service or facil-

ity" found "to be inadequate or unsafe,"

or “any facility or service regulation"

found "to be unjust or unreasonable."

Section 37-2-122(b), W.S. 1977.

"Regulation" also can be said

to limit "management" aspects in connec-

tion with certain debt acquisitions by

utilities.

"The right of every gas

corporation and of every elec-

trical corporation operating as

a public utility in the state

of Wyoming to issue, assume or

guarantee securities and to

create liens on its property

situated within the state of

Wyoming is a special privilege,

hereby subjected to the super-

vision and control of the pub-

lic service commission of the

state of Wyoming, as herein-

after in this act [§§ 37-6-101

to 37-6-107] set forth. Such

public utility when authorized

by order of the commission and

37

not otherwise, may issue stocks

and stock certificates and may

issue, assume or guarantee

other securities payable at

periods of more than eighteen

(18) months after the date

thereof, for the following pur-

poses: for the acquisition of

property; for the construction,

completion, extension or

improvement of its facilities;

for the improvement or mainte-

nance of its service; for the

discharge or lawful refunding

of its obligations; for the

reimbursement of monies actu-

ally expended for said purposes

from income or from other mon-

ies in the treasury not secured

by or obtained from the issue,

assumption or guarantee of

securities, within five (5)

years next prior to the filing

of an application witn the

commission for the required

authorization; or for any other

purpose approved by the commis-

sion." Section 37-6-101, W.S.

1977.

Section 37-6-102, W.S. 1977,

provides that such securities may be

issued only after application therefor

filed with the PSC and after a hearing

38

is

from which the Commission does not find

that such

"transactions are incon-

sistent with the public

interest; or that the purpose

Or purposes thereof are not

permitted by this act [§§ 37-6-

101 to 37-6-107]; or that the

aggregate amount of the securi-

ties outstanding and proposed

to be outstanding would exceed

the fair value of the prop-

erties and business of the pub-

lic utility."

And § 37-6-106, W.S. 1977, provides that

such securities shall be void if "issued,

assumed or guaranteed without application

to or approval of the commission."

provides in part that:

"Every public utility

shall file with the commission

copies of contracts, agreements

Or arrangements to which it may

be a party, as the commission

may designate. ***"

39

Section 218 of PSC Rules (1979)

requires the filing with it of a copy of

all "special contracts which govern the

sale by the utility of public utility

service or the purchase by the utility of

a utility commodity for resale.”

It is recognized that the fore-

going statutes and rule do not require

PSC approval for PP&L's part ownership of

the terminated projects. The reference

to the statutes and rule is only to exem-

plify the "management" control by PSC in

utility operation. It is a necessary

adjunct to "regulation."

Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.

1979) defines "regulate" as:

"To fix, establish, or

control; to adjust by rule,

method or established mode; to

direct by rule or restriction;

40

to subject to governing prin-

ciples or laws."

"e*e* Regulation is an

exercise of control while

management is an exercise of

conduct, in carrying on busi-

ness. ***" Cloutier v. State

Milk Control Board, 92 N.H.

199, 28 A.2d 554, 558 (1942).

"xk* 'The word "regulate"

is one of broad import. ***'"

Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne,

64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556, 566

(1947), quoting from City of

Owensboro v. Cumberland Tele-

Phone & Telegraph Co., 230 U.S.

58, 33 S.Ct. 988, 992, 57 L.Ed.

1388 (1913).

seee "The power *** to

"regulate" *** implies the

right to prescribe and enforce

all such proper *** rules and

regulations as may be deemed

necessary and wholesome in

conducting such business in a

proper and orderly manner. Og-

den City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,

182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960.'"

Jensen v. Town of Afton, 59

Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 201

(1943).

"*** prohibitling] an

incident to or a particular

41

method in connection with busi-

ness. *** is merely regula-

tion. *** [Rlegulation nec-

essarily implies restriction in

some respects and that that

means nothing more or less than

a partial prohibition. ***"

Steffey v. City of Casper,

Wyo., 357 P.2d 456, 461 (1960).

The PSC is vitally concerned

with fixing of rates. If an effort to

obtain a new source of energy supply will

affect rates--potentially lowering them

if successful and potentially raising

them if not successful, PSC has the power

to contrel the effect such project will

have on rates. This does not mean that

it has the power to dictate whether or

not the project should be undertaken or

to concern itself with other aspects of

the conduct relative to the project. The

utility need not consult PSC before

embanking on the project. However, if

42

the utility wishes to involve the con-

sumer in a loss or cost resulting from

failure of the project, i.e., if it

wishes to have such cost or loss con-

sidered in subsequent rates, PSC's prior

approval is necessary.

In briefs and arguments, the

parties make reference to other instances

in which PSC has authorized inclusion in

the rate base of costs of wells for gas

which could turn into dry holes, costs

for early retirement of obsolete (for

environmental reasons) mechanical flue

gas stacks, costs for an abandoned hydro

project as a result of federal legisla-

tion, etc. Usually the activity which

subsequently failed was approved as an

activity prior to its inception by the

43

PSC or it consisted of property with a

used and useful history.

Although we cannot attribute a

consideration by PSC in determining just

and reasonable rates of an investment of

questionable return in a potential prod-

uct producing project to (1) the used and

useful property or business of the util-

ity, or (2) to an operating expense of

it, we do recognize the authority of the

PSC to consider such as a part of the

"other values of the *** system, business

*** of the public utility," § 37-2-

122(a), W.S. 1977 (see fn. 5), if the

consideration, and only if the considera-

tion is given before the investment is

44

made or agreed to be made.*® The require-

ment for prior approval of the PSC is

necessary so that the risk attributable

to the consumers can be evaluated and be

either rejected or accepted--or, perhaps,

the proportion of the risk to be borne by

the consumers, if unsuccessful, can be

set. The conversion computations to a

used and useful property, if successful,

and the period of amortization, if

unsuccessful and such becomes necessary,

can be predetermined. The percentage of

the investment attributable to the

Wyoming operation can be ascertained.

All to be done before the fact of success

* PP&L's project had a book value as

part of its system or business when the

investment was made. After it failed, it

had no value at all.

45

or failure is known. As noted, this con-

sideration and resulting decision will

affect a "management" aspect within

"regulation," but it is a type of regula-

tion necessary and proper for the exer-

cise of the power and duties of the PSC.

In this instance, the PSC was

not consulted prior to the investment

about it. It was not necessary to do so.

But when the investment failed, the onus

of the failure must rest on PP&L, the

only one which considered the risk and,

therefore, the only one accepting it.

Affirmed as to PP&L and dis-

missed as moot as to the other appel-

lants. LV's rate applications are to be

processed without consideration of its

involvement in the projects.

ROSE, Justice, specially

concurring.

I concur with the result

reached by the majority but do not join

in that portion of the opinion which

would allow the consumers to bear all

costs associated with canceled construc-

tion projects so long as the Public Serv-

ice Commission (PSC) had approved the

projects prior to investment by the util-

ity. As I interpret Wyoming's statutory

scheme pertaining to the regulation of

public utilities, the PSC is without

authority to accept or veto proposed con-

struction projects for the purpose of

shifting their cost to ratepayers.

Furthermore, even if the PSC possessed

such authority, the ratemaking principles

embodied in our statutes do not permit

47

the recovery of costs associated with

construction projects which are ter-

mMinated before ever providing service to

utility customers.

I

This court has consistently

held that the PSC possesses only that

power and authority granted to it by the

Wyoming Constitution and statutes. The

enabling statutes must be strictly con-

strued and any reasonable doubt as to the

existence of any power must be resolved

against its exercise. Public Service

Commission v. Formal Complaint of WWZ

Company, Wyo., 641 P.2d 183 (1982); Phil-

lips Petroleum Company v. Public Service

Commission, Wyo., 545 P.2d 1167 (1976);

Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v.

48

City of Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3

(1974).

The general powers of the PSC

are set out in § 37-2-112, W.S. 1977:

"The commission shall have

general and exclusive power tc

regulate and supervise every

public utility within the state

in accordance with the pro-

visions of this act.”

This statute, as the majority recognize,

empowers the PSC to regulate and super-

vise utilities, not to manage’ them.

Regulation and supervision, however,

necessarily entail control over the

effects of decisions made by those who

manage public utilities.

1 The American Heritage Dictionary

defines "manage" to mean: "To direct or

administer (the affairs of an organiza-

tion, estate, household, or business‘."

49

The position advocated by the

majority would extend the PSC's sphere of

control to cover not only the effects of

managerial decisions but the decision-

making process itself. In support of

their position, the majority cite and

discuss a number of provisions in our

regulatory scheme as illustrative of the

degree of control that the PSC exerts

over management as a necessary adjunct to

regulation. These statutes, in my judg-

ment, emphasize the supervisory or watch-

dog function of the PSC in protecting the

public interest. Section 37-2-122, W.S.

1977, authorizes the PSC to eliminate

existing services, facilities, and

regulations which are inadequate, unsafe,

unjust, or unreasonable. Section 37-6-

101, W.S. 1977, empowers the PSC to

50

Supervise the issuance of securities and

the creation of liens, activities which

are regulated in competitive as well as

monopolistic enterprises in order to pro-

tect the public investor. Section 37-6-

102, W.S. 1977, mandates PSC approval of

proposed securities transactions unless

such transactions are inconsistent with

the public interest, unlawful, or exceed

the assets of the utility. Finally,

§ 37-3-111, W.S. 1977 and PSC Rule 218

require public utilities to file des-

ignated contracts in order to keep the

PSC informed.

Clearly, these statutes autho-

rize the PSC, in obeying its charge to

guard the public interest, to monitor the

business decisions previously made by

utility executives. Using these statutes

|

as a foothold, however, the majority make

what I consider to be a monumentally

faulty and frighteningly unjustified

logic-leap to the conclusion that the PSC

has the authority to rule on the viabil-

ity of proposed utility projects with

respect to whether consumers will bear

the risk of failure. To deny that such

authority would encompass the power to

dictate whether a particular project

should be undertaken is to deny reality.

Utility executives would be compelled to

consult the PSC and obtain approval

before embarking on any project, or face

possible stockholder suits for mismanage-

ment in the event the project fails. The

PSC would, in effect, be making crucial

decisions concerning utility proposals--

all in the name of regulation and, with

52

all due respect to our Public Service

Commission and its able membership, the

PSC is not required to be qualified and

probably is not qualified to make such

delicate and technical public utility

management decisions.

The function of the PSC is to

protect the consumer through the regula-

tion of public utilities, while taking

into consideration tne legitimate inter-

ests of the utilities. McCulloch Gas

Transmission Company v. Public Service

Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173

(1981). In carrying out this function,

the PSC is empowered to control the

effect that new energy projects will have

on rates--but only after the utility

management has assessed the merits and

drawbacks of the proposal and reached a

53

final decision based on sound business

judgment, and only after the project has

become used and useful in providing

energy. It is not the function of the

PSC to provide an insurance policy under

which the ratepayers will protect the

investments of utility stockholders

against all risks. This court recognized

as much in McCulloch Gas Transmission

Company v. Public Service Commission of

Wyoming, supra, 627 P.2d at 179, where we

described the regulatory function of the

PSC and said:

"xk* The public interest

is to be given paramount con-

sideration; desires of a util-

ity are secondary. Big Horn

Rural Electric Co. v. Pacific

Power & Light Co., Wyo. 1964,

397 P.2d 455. The purpose of

the PSC's authority is to pro-

tect the public from utilities

54

affected with a public

interest."

Not only is the participation

by a state agency in a utility's business

decisions unnecessary to regulation, it

is impermissible. The United States

_—_—_—_o oo ee ee 8

rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

Vv. Public Service Commission of Missouri,

262 U.S. 276, 289, 43 S.Ct. 544, 547, 67

L.Ed. 981, 985 (1923), said:

"**k* Tt must never be

forgotten that while the State

may regulate, with a view to

enforcing reasonable rates and

charges, it is not the owner of

the property of public utility

companies, and is not clothed

with the general power of

management incident to owner-

Ship. The applicable general

rule is well expressed in State

Public Utilities Commission ex

rel. Springfield v. Springfield

Gas_and Electric Company, 291

Ill. 209, 234 [125 N.E. 891].

55

"'The commission is not

the financial manager of the

corporation, and it is not

empowered to substitute its

judgment for that of the direc-

tors of the corporation ***,'"

(Emphasis added.)

The proper relationship between regu-

lators and regulated enterprises was

described by 1 Priest, Principles of Pub-

lic Utility Regulation, p. 23:

"Where inefficiency or

improvide..ce or economic waste

or abuse of discretion or

action inimical to the public

interest have been dem-

onstrated, the agency having

jurisdiction may intervene.

Business decisions are, how-

ever, the prerogative of

management. Regulators are not

the masters of public utility

enterprises. They may, and

often should, breathe down the

executive's neck, but the basic

responsibility is his, not

theirs."

The majority opinion would per-

mit utility companies to recover their

56

investments in terminated construction

projects, ineligible for inclusion in

rate base: or operation expenses, if the

proposal is first submitted to the PSC

for approval. I conclude that the exer-

cise of such power by the PSC would

exceed the scope of the enabling statutes

and implicate constitutional proscrip-

tions concerning private property.

II

The majority conclude, and I

agree, that Pacific Power & Light

Company's capital investment in the now

terminated nuclear plants cannot properly

be included in the rate base as used and

useful property or be amortized as an

Operating expense. However, the majority

would permit the PSC, in determining just

and reasonable rates, to consider the

57

costs associated with such investments

under the "other values" language of

§ 37-2-122(a), W.S. 1977. That statute

provides:

"In determining what are

just and reasonable rates the

commission may take into con-

sideration depreciation of

plant, obsolescence of equip-

ment, expense of operation,

physical and other values of

the plant, system, business and

properties of the public util-

ity whose rates are under con-

sideration."

Under this statute, the decisive question

is whether "an investment of questionable

return in a potential product producing

project" (majority opinion 677 P.2d at

808) is one of the "other values of the

plant, system, business and properties of

the public utility," which may properly

be considered for ratemaking purposes. I

conclude that it is not, because to allow

58

the PSC to consider the value of a con-

struction project which ultimately fails

is to circumvent the used and useful

principle of § 37-2-119, W.S. 1977.2? I

would interpret the physical and other--

presumably nonphysical--values specified

* Section 37-2-119, W.S. 1977, provides

as follows:

"In conducting any investiga-

tion pursuant to the provisions

of this act the commission may

investigate, consider and

determine such matters as the

cost or value, or both, of the

property and business of any

public utility, used and useful

for the convenience of the pub-

lic, and all matters affecting

Or influencing such cost or

value, the operating statistics

for any public utility both as

to revenues and expenses and as

to the physical features of

operation in such detail as the

commission may deem advisable;

the earnings, investment and

expenditures of any such corpo-

(Footnote continued)

59

Sioa

in § 37-2-122(a), supra, as encompassing

Only the values of those items properly

includable in the rate base. That is,

§ 37-2-122(a) empowers the PSC to con-

Sider for ratemaking purposes only the

property and business of the public util-

ity which is used and useful in producing

the product. I cannot attribute to the

legislature the intent to embody in the

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)

ration as a whole within this

state, and as to rates in local

exchanges or plants of any

telephone, telegraph, water,

electrical or gas corporations,

the geographical location

thereof shall be considered as

well as the population of the

municipality in which such

plant or exchange is located."

60

ratemaking formula both the used and use-

ful principle and the means to annihilate

that principle.’

* See Office of Consumers' Counsel v.

Public Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio

St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), where

the Ohio Supreme Court refused to inter-

pret a catch-all statute so as to permit

the commission to consider the utility's

investment in four terminated nuclear

power plants as amortizable costs. The

court said:

"*** The commission views [the

pertinent statute] as a virtual

wild card to be played whenever

the commission in its discre-

tion sees fit. We interpret

the statute less sweepingly,

first because the provisions

are linked inextricably with

the ratemaking factors con-

tained in [the statute specify-

ing permissible considerations

in ratesetting proceedings],

and secondly because the

General Assembly undoubtedly

did not intend to build into

its recently revised (1976)

ratemaking formula a means by

which the commission may

effortlessly abrogate that very

formula." 423 N.E.2d at 828.

61

The majority cite several

instances in which the PSC has considered

for ratemaking purposes the costs of

projects not currently useful in supply-

ing the product. Such consideration was

permissible, according to the majority,

since the terminated activity had

received the prior approval of the PSC or

had a used and useful history. I wouid

have held that our statutory scheme,

including the used and useful principle,

contemplates the consideration of the

costs attributable to the cited projects,

without expanding the meaning of the

"other values" language of § 37-2-122(a)

and notwithstanding a lack of prior

approval by the PSC.

Pursuant to § 37-2-122(a),

supra, obsolescence of previously useful

62

equipment is a proper factor to be

considered in setting just and reasonable

rates. The cost of drilling a dry gas

well is properly categorized as an

operating expense, since gas, unlike

electricity, is a commodity for which the

utility must search in order to provide

service. The search for gas necessarily

includes the drilling of a certain

percentage of dry holes, whereas the

production of electricity does not nec-

essarily include the building of a cer-

tain percentage of defunct plants. I

agree with the pronouncement of the Ohio

Supreme Court in East Ohio Gas Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 137 Ohio St.

225, 28 N.E.2d 599, 609 (1940), concern-

ing the propriety of considering the cost

of gas leaseholds which turn out to be

unproductive:

"It must be apparent that

the cost of acquiring, holding

for a time during which delay

rentals must be paid, testing

and finally canceling unproduc-

tive acres is the only method

by which productive gas acres

can be found and developed, and

it is equally apparent that

this expense must ce borne by

the consumer who ultimately

uses the gas from the produc-

tive acres."

It is not necessary to expand our exist-

ing statutory scheme in order to justify

the recovery of these types of costs

through rates.

I conclude that the statutory

formula for setting just and reasonable

rates does not permit the consideration

of utility investments which are not

attributable to the rate base and which

are not properly designated as costs of

64

operation. I would adopt the position

reiterated by the Ohio Supreme Court when

faced with a question of statutory

interpretation under circumstances simi-

lar to the instant case:

saee 'ee*e Tt is only

proper that their [the inves-

tors] venture be found oper-

ational before they commence to

recoup their capital outlays

from the consumers.' ***"

Office of Consumers’ Counsel v.

Public Utilities Commission, 67

Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820,

829 (1981), quoting from Office

of Consumers’ Counsel v. Public

Utilities Commission, 58 Ohio

St.2d 449, 456-457, 391 N.E.2d

311 (1979).

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting.

I must dissent in part from the

decision reached by the majority of the

court in this case. I am in accord that

the case must be dismissed as to Lower

Valley Power & Light, Inc., Chemical Bank

65

and Washington Public Power Supply System

because it is moot. With respect to

Pacific Power & Light Company, however, I

would hold that the Public Service

Commission had no authority to enter the

order which it entered, and I would

remand the case with directions that it

be dismissed.

The remarkable thing in connec-

tion with the disposition of this case by

this court is that the majority opinion

and the concurring opinion refer to and

discuss the correct legal propositions,

but they apply them in an erroneous man-

ner. In Justice Rose's special concur-

ring opinion he very ably articulates the

proposition that the Public Service

Commission has only that power and

authority granted to it by the Wyoming

66

Constitution and statutes, and that the

statutory powers must be strictly con-

strued. There is no need to again cite

the authorities which encompass those

holdings. At page 808 of the majority

Slip opinion the court aptly says:

"It is recognized that the

foregoing statutes and rule do

not require PSC approval for

PP&L's part ownership of the

terminated projects."

The document which initiated

Pacific Power & Light Company's involve-

ment in this proceeding was a notice and

order setting hearing which was entered

on April 22, 1982, and that document did

not reflect the justification for the

investigation by the Public Service

Commission. It is clear, however, that

67

the commission did proceed pursuant to

§ 37-2-117, W.S. 1977, which provides:

"Whenever the commission

shall believe that an investi-

gation of any act or omission

to act, accomplished or pro-

posed, or an investigation of

any rate, service, facility or

service regulation of any pub-

lic utility should be made in

order to secure compliance with

the provisions of this act and

orders of the commission, it

may of its own motion summarily

investigate the same." (Empha-

sis added.)

While I might rely simply upon

the concession in the majority opinion to

the effect that no investigation was

needed to secure compliance with the pro-

visions of the act or the orders of the

commission, I will point out that this

record and the arguments of counsel for

the commission are devoid of any ref-

erence to any statute or order of the

68

commission with which compliance by

Pacific Power & Light Company needed to

be secured. I am prepared to concede

that the commission might investigate in

Order to determine if such a situation

existed, but once it determined that

there was no justification for the inves-

tigation I cannot perceive any authority

which would permit the Public Service

Commission to enter the order that it did

in this instance.

I recognize that it is popular

to ride on the judicial steam roller

which has flattened Washington Public

Power Supply System. While I might be in

sympathy with the result which the Public

Service Commission and this court

reaches, I find I have no empathy for

what I believe to be an abuse of the

69

commission's authority which this court

has sustained.

I understand that the Public

Service Commission has told Pacific

Power & Light Company that if Pacific

Power & Light Company should wish to

include its investment costs in these

abandoned nuclear power plants in any

future rate to be applied to Wyoming con-

sumers that the Public Service Commission

of Wyoming will not permit that. Purely

and simply that is an advisory order from

the Public Service Commission, and our

statutory scneme does not justify such an

approach. This court has said that it

does not render advisory opinions, and we

dismiss cases in which an advisory opin-

ion is sought. Aetna Casualty and Surety

Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 624 P.2d 240

70

(1981); Kwallek v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d

tion of Casper v. City of Casper, Wyo.,

575 P.2d 1146 (1978); State v. Rosachi,

Wyo., 549 P.2d 318 (1976); Knudson v.

Hilzer, Wyo., 551 P.2d 680 (1976); and

Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo., 539 P.2d 361

(1975). In part the fact that this court

does eschew advisory opinions is premised

upon the proposition that there is no way

in which the judgment which is rendered

may be carried into effect. Perhaps the

result is to make the case moot as dis-

cussed on page 802 of the majority slip

Opinion. The point, however, is that the

Public Service Commission, without statu-

tory authority, does not have any busi-

ness entering an order such as this; and

yet, by affirming what the Public Service

71

Commission has done, this court has, in

effect, and contrary to a longstanding

jurisprudential discipline, joined in an

advisory opinion. No matter how much the

parties want an answer to this question

we should not so casually abandon that

rule of jurisprudence.

As indicated, I would reverse

the order of the Public Service Commis-

sion because this court has the duty to

hold unlawful and set aside agency action

which is in excess of statutory author-

ity. Section 16-3-114(c) (ii), W.S. 1977

(Oct. 1982 Rev.).

72

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 1983

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT )

COMPANY, a corporation, )

)

Appellant )

(Petitioner), )

)

)

THE PUBLIC SERVICE )

COMMISSION OF WYOMING, )

)

Appellee )

(Respondent). )

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Pacific Power & Light Company

having made application for rehearing in

this matter, and the court being fully

advised, it is

ORDERED that Pacific Power &

Light Company's Application for

73

Rehearing be, and the same hereby is,

denied.

Dated March 8, 1984.

By the Court

ss/John J. Rooney

John J. Rooney

Chief Justice

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WYOMING

IN THE MATTER OF THE ) DOCKET NO. 9617

INVESTIGATION OF LOWER ) SUB 1l

VALLEY POWER AND LIGHT,)

INC.

DOCKET NO. 9628

SUB 6

IN THE MATTER OF THE

INVESTIGATION OF FALL

RIVER RURAL ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 9454

SUB 17

IN THE MATTER OF THE

INVESTIGATION OF

PACIFIC POWER &

LIGHT COMPANY

ee eee eee oe eee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

The Commission initiated this

investigation of the participation by

Wyoming jurisdictional public utilities

in the Washington Public Power Supply

System (WPPSS) nuclear generation plant

construction projects known as WNP 4 and

-

75

The Commission having consid-

ered the evidence adduced at public hear-

ings and being advised in the premises,

FINDS and CONCLUDES that:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE FINDINGS

OF FACT

l. Lower Valley Power and Light,

Inc. (Lower Valley) is a distribution

level electric cooperative providing

service in Afton, Jackson and the

surrounding communities and areas in

Lincoln and Teton counties in Wyoming.

Fall River Rural Electric Cooperative,

Inc. (Fall River) is also a distribution

level electric cooperative serving

approximately 114 Wyoming consumers and

approximately 6600 consumers in Idaho and

Montana. Pacific Power & Light Company

(Pacific Power) is a publicly held corpo-

ration providing electric service as a

regulated public utility in Wyoming,

Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington and

California. Communities served by

Pacific Power in Wyoming include Casper,

Laramie, Lander, Rawlins, Riverton,

Worland, and Rock Springs. Pacific Power

also wholesales electric power to Wyoming

utilities (e.g., Cheyenne Light, Fuel &

Power Co.) and municipalities which have

their own distribution systems (e.g.

Basin and Powell).

The Independent Staff of the

Commission acted separate and apart from

the Commission in investigating and

examining these matters from a consumer

interest viewpoint. The Independent

Staff was permitted to intervene and

77

participate as a party pursuant to W.S.

9-4-111 and 9-4-112(c) of the Wyoming

Administrative Procedure Act and Commis-

sion Rule Section 103(c). The assigned

Independent Staff had no contact with the

Commission except in the public proceed-

ings in this matter.

2. On November 4, 1981, the Inde-

pendent Staff of the Public Service

Commission brought a Petition in Docket

No. 9617 Sub 11 for authority to conduct

an investigation concerning the

participation by Lower Valley Power and

Light Company in the Washington Public

Power Supply System's construction of

Units 1 through 5. On November 13, i981,

an Order was entered granting the Peti-

tion. On November 19, 1981, Lower Valley

filed its Petition which also requested

78

that the Commission Staff investigate

Lower Valley's involvement with the WPPSS

projects. On the 10th day of December,

1981, the Commission again reaffirmed its

prior Order requiring an investigation of

the matter. Subsequently, on April 19,

1982, the Commission entered its Notice

and Order Setting Hearing in this docket.

Hearing was set for June 16, 1982 in

Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Three days after the Commission

set the matter for hearing concerning

Lower Valley's participation in these

projects, the Commission entered another

Notice and Order Setting Hearing which

required a consolidated hearing for Lower

Valley in Docket No. 9617 Sub 1l, Fall

River Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. in

Docket No. 9628 Sub 6, and Pacific Power

79

and Light Company in Docket No. 9454 Sub

17. The consolidated investigation was

for the purpose of considering the par-

ticipation by these three electric util-

ities in the WPPSS nuclear power

projects. The consolideted hearings were

to commence on June 16, 1982 in Cheyenne,

Wyoming.

3. On May 26, 1982, the Indepen-

dent Staff filed its Motion for Continu-

ance which was unopposed, and on May 28,

1982 the Commission granted that Motion.

Those persons seeking to intervene were

required by the Commission's Order to

present their petitions to intervene

before July 2, 1982, and hearings were

scheduled to commence on July 12, 1982 in

Cheyenne, Wyoming.

80

4. Publication of the change of

hearing date and the Commission's Order

was accomplished by publishing the Order

in the newspapers of general circulation

in the communities of Casper, Laramie,

Lander, Rawlins, Riverton, Worland, Rock

Springs, Jackson and Afton. No party

intervened within the time period

required by the Commission's Order. How-

ever, on September 1, 1982 the Commission

received a Petition to Intervene by FMC

Corporation which was denied by the

Commission since hearings had already

been had.

5. Hearings were conducted from

July 12th through the 16th, 1982 in

Cheyenne, Wyoming. Protest statements

were received in conjunction with another

hearing held in Afton on July 20, 1982

81

and in Jackson on July 22, 1982 in Docket

9617 Sub 12. Briefs were filed by the

Companies and the Independent Staff on

September 3, 1982.

6. During the hearings Pacific

Power presented evidence without

objection concerning its participation in

another nuclear power project known as

Pebble Springs. Pebble Springs is not in

any way connected with the WPPSS

projects. Neither the Commission nor any

participant made note of the fact that

the investigation of Pebble Springs was

not noticed to the public or required to

be investigated by the Commission's

Notice and Order Setting Hearing. While

the Commission realizes that such a

procedural defect should cause us to

reset the inquiry into Pebble Springs for

82

hearing after public notice, we believe

that the public interest will not be

served by withholding a decision relating

to Pebble Springs and that no harm will

be done. We come to this conclusion

after considering the following: a) the

facts upon which we rely in making our

decision are straight forward and there

can be no dispute over these facts; b)

the principles upon which we base our

decision are as applicable to Pebble

Springs as they are to the WPPSS

projects; c) the parties in their

presentation, briefs, and arguments,

carefully and fully developed the law,

and competing theories and arguments for

Our considerations; and d) our decision

will not cause rates to increase. The

83

Commission therefore finds that the pub-

lic interest will not be served by

withholding a decision in this matter.

7 Lower Valley Power and Light

Company, Fall River Rural Electric Coop-

erative, Inc., and Pacific Power and

Light Company are public utilities within

the jurisdiction of the Commission.

8. The Commission has the power to

investigate and determine whether costs

associated with capital expenditures in

abandoned or cancelled power projects

shall be passed on to ratepayers in the

form of increased rates. See W. S. 37-2-

112, 37-2-116, 37-2-119, 37-2-127.

FINDINGS ON WPPSS POWER PROJECTS

9. The Washington Public Power

Supply System is a Joint Operating Agency

organized in 1957 under Washington law

84

for the purpose of building, owning and

Operating electric generation and trans-

mission facilities and for the purpose of

selling electric power to its members and

others from those facilities. Tr. Vol.

IV p. 904. WPPSS is composed of 23 menm-

bers consisting of four Washington cities

and 19 Washington public utility

districts. Tr. Vol. III p. 676. Between

1970 and 1975 WPPSS decided to undertake

the construction of five nuclear power

piants known as WNP 1 through 5. Tr.

Vol. III pgs. 676-679.

WNP 1, 2, and 3 were financed

by WPPSS through an arrangement with the

Bonneville Power Administration known as—

the "net billing agreement." Under this

agreement WPPSS would construct plants

and would provide to BPA the output of

85

the plants at cost in return for an equal

credit on power bills they received from

BPA. This resulted in BPA averaging the

higher cost nuclear power with the lower

priced hydro power, and with the BPA

indirectly backing the plant construc-

tion, the result was the highest possible

ratings for the project's bond issues.

Tr. Vol. IV p. 906-7.

WNP 4 and 5 were financed dif-

ferently because BPA could not provide

the backing for these additional units

through the net billing agreement. WPPSS

enlisted 88 electric utility cooperatives

and public utility districts in its

efforts to gather the financial backing

needed for these additional projects.

Among the 88 participants were Lower Val-

ley with a 0/837% participant's share in

86

ee

WNP 4 and 5, and Fall River with a 0.648%

participant's share in these two units.

In addition, Pacific Power was a 10%

owner Of WNP 5. Tr. Vol. IV p. 907, 956;

Vol. IV p. 451. While Pacific Power

financed its 10% ownership share of WNP

5, WPPSS financed its ownership of WNP 4

and its 90% ownership of WNP 5 through

the sale of municipal tax-exempt bonds.

In turn the 88 participants each signed a

Participant's Agreement which entitled

them to a percentage share of WPPSS power

from units 4 and 5 at cost, and obligated

each utility to pay this same proportion

of total WPPSS costs "whether or not" the

projects were completed. Tr. Vol. IV p.

956; Fall River Exhibit 10 Tr. Vol. I p.

98; Lower Valley Exhibit 15. These

Participants’ Agreements were executed on

87

July 14, 1976 by Lower Valley and Fall

River. Pacific Power also entered into

its ownership agreement with WPPSS on WNP

5 on July 14, 1976. LV Exhibit 15; FR

Exhibit 10; Tr. Vol. IV p. 678.

FINDINGS CONCERNING GUARANTEE

OF WPPSS BONDS

10. The provisions of the Partici-

pant's Agreements that both Lower Valley

and Fall River executed are identical (FR

Exhibit No. 10 and LV Exhibit No. 15).

Section 4 of the Participant's Agreement

requires WPPSS to issue and sell bonds to

finance the cost of construction of the

projects, and to pay or provide for the

payment of the principal, interest, and

premium on the outstanding bonds. In

Section 5 of the Participant's Agreement,

88

Lower Valley and Fall River agree to pur-

chase a share of the project's capabil-

ity. The purchase price to be paid by

Lower Valley and Fall River each year for

its Participant's share is the amount

specified in the billing statement pro-

vides by WPPSS.

ll. Section 6(d) of the Partici-

pant's Agreement provides:

"The participant shall make

the payments to be made to supply

system under this agreement

whether or not any of the

projects are completed, operable

Or operating and notwithstanding

the suspension, interruption,

interference, reduction or

curtailment of the output of

either project for any reason

whatsoever in whole or in part.

Such payments shall not be sub-

ject to any reduction, whether by

offset or otherwise, and shall be

conditioned upon the performance

Or nonperformance by supply sys-

tem or any other participant or

entity under this or any other

agreement or instrument, the

89

remedy for any performance being

limited to mandamus, specific

performance or other legal or

equitable remedy."

Because participants agreed to

make payments to WPPSS regardless of

whether the projects were ever completed;

and because the payments that Lower Val-

ley and Fall River must make to WPPSS for

WNP 4/5, aside from termination costs,

are directly tied to the principal and

interest payments on WPPSS bonds, the

Participant's Agreement Section 6(d) is

for all intents and purposes a guarantee

of the WPPSS bonds which financed the

projects.

12. The Participant's Agreements

executed by Lower Valley and Fall River

were not submitted to the Public Service

Commission for its review or approval at

90

the time of their execution or at any

subsequent time prior to these proceed-

ings. Tr. Vol. I p. 107, 203; Vol. IV p.

908.

13. Wyoming Statute 37-6-101 pro-

vides in pertinent part that

"a public utility when

authorized by order of the

Commission and not otherwise, may

issue stocks and stock certifi-

cates and may issue, assume or

guarantee other securities pay-

able at periods of more than 18

months after the date thereof for

the purposes of acquisition of

property, or the construction of

facilities..."

The WPPSS bonds that were issued are pay-

able at periods more than 18 months after

issuance and were for the purpose of

acquisition of property and the construc-

tion of facilities.

91

Wyoming Statute 37-6-106 pro-

vides that "all zecurities issued,

assumed or guaranteed without application

to or approval of the Commission...shall

be void.”

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW ON

GUARANTEE OF WPPSS BONDS

14. The Participant's Agreements

entered into by Fall River and Lower Val-

ley with the Washington Public Power Sup-

ply System constitute a guarantee of

securities as contemplated by Wyoming

Statute 37-6-101 and Wyoming Statute

37-6-106.

15. Fall River and Lower Valley did

not comply with Wyoming Statute 37-6-101

and 37-6-106 by failing to apply for or

obtain the Commission's authorization to

92

vee

i ee ee

issue the guarantee contained in the

Participant's Agreements.

16. The failure of Fall River and

Lower Valley to obtain the Commission's

authorization to guarantee the WPPSS

securities renders the Participant's

Agreement void for rate making and other

purposes within the regulatory jurisdic-

tion of the Commission. W.S. 37-6-106.

17. Because the Participant's

Agreement is void for ratemaking and

other purposes within the regulatory

jurisdiction of the Commission, the costs

incurred by these public utilities

because of the guarantee in the Partici-

pants’ Agreements cannot and should not

be lawfully passed on to Fall River or

Lower Valley ratepayers.

93

FINDINGS CONCERNING WPPSS TERMINATION

18. Construction of WNP 4 and 5 was

terminated by WPPSS in January 1982. WNP

4 was approximately 20% complete and WNP

5 was approximately 16% complete when

terminated. Tr. Vol. III p. 709; Tr.

Vol. IV p. 914. These projects are being

terminated through contractor settlements

and negotiations to avoid lawsuits and

ensure that the termination of these

projects proceeds with some degree of

efficiency. This has been termed

‘controlled termination.’ Tr. Vol. IV p.

913. Termination costs estimated for WNP

4 and 5 during 1982 are $94,639,000. For

1983-84 final termination and settlement

costs are estimated to be an additional

$120,360,000. Tr. Vol. IV p. 955; Staff

Exhibit 3. Lower Valley and Fall River

94

voluntarily advanced 'loans' to WPPSS to

assist in WPPSS cash flow for this con-

trolled termination. Lower Valley

‘loaned' WPPSS $305,618, and Fall River

‘loaned' WPPSS $236,710; amounts which

the utilities claim wili be credited back

at a later date against monies owed to

WPPSS. Tr. Vol. I pgs. 425-428; Vol. IV

p. 957.

19. The payments that Lower Valley

and Fall River must make to WPPSS for WNP

4/5, aside from termination costs, are

directly tied to the principal and

interest payments on WPPSS bonds which

financed the projects. The principal and

interest payments, together with the

prorata share of antic. sated termination

costs for Lower Valley and Fall River,

will continue under the Participant's

95

Agreement through the year 2018 A.D. In

total Lower Valley would ultimately pay

approximately $62,250,000 and Fall River

would ultimately pay WPPSS approximately

$48,193,000. Tr. Vol. IV p. 956; Staff

Exhibit 4. Placed in the perspective of

all WPPSS costs for WNP 4/5, even these

large amounts of money seem small. As

previously noted WPPSS termination costs

through 1984 are anticipated to be

$214,999,000. Bond principal payments

from 1989 to 2018 will amount to

$2,250,000,000. Interest payments from

1982 to 2018 will amount to

$4,972,282,000. Incredibly enough, the

total bill for WNP 4/5 comes to

$7,437,281,000. Tr. Vol. IV pgs. 955-

960; Staff Exhibits 3 and 4. These are

not estimates of what it would cost to

96

complete the projects, but actual costs

associated with these two WPPSS projects

which were only 16 to 20 percent complete

when terminated. The estimated cost of

completing WNP 5 alone was over $6 bil-

lion in December 1981. Tr. Vol. III p.

718.

20. Pacific Power financed its own

participation in WNP 5. Through December

31, 1981, Pacific Power had an actual

before tax investment of $99,092,000 in

WNP 5. Tr. Vol. III p. 719; Pacific

Exhibit 7, Table 7-1.

21. It is clear that no electric

power has been generated or can be

expected to be generated by these can-

celled power plant projects. We cannot

find any present or future benefit that

will flow from the massive investment in

97

these projects to the consumers of

Pacific Power, Lower Valley or Fall

River.

THE USED AND USEFUL PRINCIPLE

The used and useful principle

provides that only that utility plant

which is currently used and useful in

rendering utility service to the public

shall be included in computing rate base

and expenses recoverable in rates from

the public.

W.S. 37-2-119 requires that the

Commission consider “the property and

business of any public utility, used and

useful for the convenience of the

public..." We understand this to mean

that by law the Commission must focus on

the assets used and useful in rendering

service to the public, rather than the

98

capital invested in utility assets. We

have concluded that in any case the prin-

ciple ought to be applied by focusing on

the assets involved in rendering service

to the public. Otherwise utility con-

sumers might find themselves supporting

non-utility investments as well as util-

ity investments - clearly a result which

the law was enacted to avoid.

We reject the notion thet the

thing which is truly used and useful to

consumers is the capital investment in

the form of funds which require a return

and not the capital assets which are used

to provide the utility service. Union

Electric Co., Docket No. U-558 (Iowa Com-

merce Commission (1975)). While it is

true that a utility plant does cost money

and that money is provided by investors,

99

it is the utility plant and not the money

which generates electricity. By focusing

on the capital rather than the asset side

of the balance sheet, we would make an

unfounded assumption that the assets pur-

chased by the capital are used and use-

ful, or we would be compelled to assume

that investor owned public utilities are

not subject to the same risks of loss

that exist in the competitive arena. We

will not make either of these assump-

tions.

Since no Commission should

assume that all capital invested was for

plant used and useful in rendering serv-

ice to the public, testing such an

assumption would always lead back to the

asset or left-hand side of the balance

sheet anyway. We prefer not to make such

100

an assumption and we find that the sim-

plest, most direct way to apply the used

and useful concept is to focus on the

asset side of the balance sheet in the

first instance. Policy and the law

require focusing on utility facilities.

It appears, however, that a

more fundamental reason we are asked to

focus on the right-hand side of the bal-

ance sheet (a method known as the

invested-capital or prudent-investment

rate base) may be to allow a means of

accommodating the assumption that inves-

tor owned public utilities should only

bear the risk of loss from imprudent or

fraudulent capital investments. For rea-

sons which will be set out below we

reject this assumption also. Our focus

101

then is upon the asset side of the bal-

ance sheet because this is the simplest,

most direct and logical method for

identifying those assets which are used

and useful in rendering service to the

public. If logic did not dictate that we

focus on the assets in applying the prin-

ciple then we believe W.S. 37-2-119 would

require such a focus in the public

interest.

The second element of the con-

cept revolves around the requirement that

the plant or property be ‘used and useful

for the convenience of the public.' We

understand these words to refer to those

capital assets which directly or indi-

rectly are actually and currently used in

providing utility service to the public.

102

ee veatinsial a

a ee

In summary, the concept is best

expressed by the question: “Are particu-

lar items of property used and useful in

rendering service to the public?" The

emphasis in the application of the con-

cept is upon the identification and valu-

ation of property and assets, and upon

the determination whether those assets

are currently used and useful in render-

ing service to the public. We believe

our understanding of this basic public

utility principle is one to which the

parties to these proceedings subscribe.

Tr. Vol. III p. 572-573.

CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE

USED AND USEFUL PRINCIPLE

22. If utility plant is used and

useful in rendering service to the public

then that plant will be included in rate

103

base and the utility will be allowed to

earn a rate of return on that investment.

Plant included in rate base is allowed to

be depreciated or expensed over a period

of years. Maintenance and other expenses

related to capital plant are expensed as

they occur. Conversely, if utility plant

is not used and useful in rendering serv-

ice to the public then application of

the used and useful principle has the

following consequences for rate making

purposes:

l. Exclusion of the investment

from rate base upon which rate of return

is computed;

2 Denial of an amortized recovery

of the investment; and

104

36 Denial of recovery of termina-

tion, maintenance, and other expenses

related to the property in question.

Investors do not only risk an

Opportunity to earn a return on invest-

ment, but also any return of the

investment itself and of those expenses

related to the capital investment.

REASONS FOR APPLYING THE USED AND

USEFUL PRINCIPLE

23. There are a number of reasons

for applying this principle. First we

believe the legislature has required its

application. W.S. 37--2-119 provides that

in conducting any investigation the

Commission “may investigate, consider and

determine such matters as the cost or

105

value, or both, of the property and busi-

ness of any public utility, used and use-

ful for the convenience of the public

***," The issue is raised whether the

application of the "used and useful”

principle is mandated by this statute or

whether the use of the word "may" indi-

cates that application of the principle

is a matter of discretion with the

Commission. We believe that the dis-

cretion given to the Commission by the

Legislature is with respect to whether

the Commission will use a cost or a fair

value method or both for the valuation of

rate base, and not whether the Commission

will apply the used and useful principle.

While the Commission believes

that the Legislature has mandated

106

application of the used and useful prin-

ciple, we do not apply that principle

here solely because of this reading and

understanding of W.S. 37-2-119. We also

apply this principle to the abandoned

construction projects in question because

we believe it is appropriate in the pub-

lic interest. If we have discretion to

apply the used and useful principle we

exercise that discretion by applying the

principle because the consuming public

has not and will not receive any elec-

trical service from these cancelled power

projects. Regulation in the public

interest requires that rates reflect only

those costs and expenses related to

facilities which serve the public. Tr.

Vol. IV p. 962-966. The risk of loss

from a failed investment falls upon the

107

investor, not the consumers of these

utilities, and the risk taking by inves-

tor utilities does not shift because of a

showing of management prudence. Losses

may occur when management is prudent as

well as when management is imprudent. We

do not accept the proposition that

because a public utility has a service

Obligation and its rates are regulated,

it takes on a quasi-governmental role and

immunizes itself from a risk of loss

which investors in non-regulated compa-

nies incur.

The risk of loss to public

utility investors is not lessened by the

fact that a public utility incurs a serv-

ice obligation. The service obligation

merely recognizes the fact that an elec-

tric public utility, for all intents and

108

purposes, has a monopoly within a service

area and it provides an essential modern

service. The grant of a certificate of

public convenience for a service area

carries with it the obligation that serv-

ice will be provided to those in the area

which require it. The service obligation

flows from the monopoly position the

utility enjoys in providing an essential

service to the public.

Regulation of rates also flows

from the fact that public utilities oper-

ate more efficiently as monopolies, and

the public interest thus requires both

the most efficient method of providing

essential services and protection from

monopoly abuse. It does not follow that

because utilities have a public service

obligation and their rates are regulated,

109

public utility investors only incur the

risk of capital investment loss when

management is imprudent or engages in

fraudulent activities.

24. We conclude that under the

circumstances the application of the used

and useful principle will result in the

setting of just and reasonable rates

because ratepayers should not be required

to pay for facilities and related

expenses which will not directly or indi-

rectly provide electric service.

25. Pacific Power & Light is a pub-

licly held corporation which is traded on

the New York Stock Exchange. Lower Val-

ley and Fall River are distribution level

electric cooperatives whose membership is

composed of its ratepayers. Despite the

110

differences between a publicly held cor-

poration and a cooperative, the burden of

risk bearing in these enterprises remains

upon the investor, whether that investor

is a stockholder or a cooperative

member/ratepayer. Given the fact that

electricity is an essential modern serv-

ice it should also be observed that coop-

erative membership in Lower Valley or

Fall River is not a purely voluntary mat-

ter as it is with Pacific Power & Light's

stock and bond holders. Nevertheless a

cooperative member's capital credits are

at risk here.

26. In examining the reasons why we

should exercise any discretion we may

have in applying this principle, we have

not relied solely upon the record.

Whether or not as a matter of fact a

lll

capital investment is used and useful is

a matter which must be supported by the

record. However, our understanding of

the meaning and reasons why certain

established utility principles exist,

such as the used and useful principle, is

not wholly dependent for its application

upon an explanatory recitation in the

record by one or more of the parties.

The Commission believes it can, should,

and sometimes must be able to draw upon

its more than 22 years of collective

experience, expertise, and regulatory

judgment in defining and applying certain

general and long established utility

principles.

112

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON WPPSS PROJECTS

27. It is clear that no electric

power has been generated or can presently

be expected to be generated by WNP 4 and

5. The investment by WPPSS and Pacific

in these projects is not and cannot be

expected tc be used and useful for the

convenience of the public. We believe

that each of these three public utilities

must agree that this is the case. Tr.

Vol. I p. 1323 Tr. Vol. I p.j 193, lines

2-5; Tr. Vol. III p.j 572-579. We there-

fore conclude that Pacific's investment

in WNP 5 should not be included in rate

base for rate of return purposes, should

not be recovered in rates through any

period of investment amortization; and no

termination costs or other costs asso-

Ciated with the WNP 5 should be included

113

in utility expenses recoverable from its

Wyoming ratepayers.

28. We also conclude that Lower

Valley and Fall River should not be

permitted to recover in rates any pay-

ments due to WPPSS under the

Participant's Agreement because any such

payments would be for facilities which

are not and will not be used and useful

for the convenience of the public. The

application of the used and useful prin-

Ciple of public utility ratemaking is not

dependent upon the particular form of

financial agreement to which the utility

has committed itself. If this were the

case the legislature's intent to have the

used and useful principle applied would

be easily circumvented. For ratemaking

114

be edi she

F

3

3

4

purposes we are concerned with one essen-

tial question in this case. Is the

facility for which the utility has guar-

anteed payment of a pro rata share of

costs used and useful for the convenience

of the public? The answer in this case

is no. Therefore, application of the

principle properly precludes the recovery

from ratepayers of expenditures related

to these cancelled power projects.

We recognize that there is a

difference between Pacific Power which

entered into an Ownership Agreement with

WPPSS, and Lower Valley and Fall River

which entered into a Participant's Agree-

ment with WPPSS. Had WNP 5 become oper-

ational we would have allowed Pacific

Power's ten percent ownership interest to

115

be included in rate base, and deprecia-

tion and other expenses would have been

allowed. Under the Participant's Agree-

ment WPPSS remained the owner and the

participants would have expensed the cost

of electricity purchased from WPPSS.

This cost, however, would have included

an amortization of the investment,

interest payments on WPPSS bonds, and all

operations and maintenance expenses.

Since WNP 4/5 were not completed, how-

ever, Lower Valley and Fall River are

obligated to WPPSS under the

Participant's Agreement to make payments

for termination expenses, and bond prin-

cipal and interest payments. Their

financial obligation is no different

under the Participant's Agreement than it

116

would have been under an ownership agree-

ment. While we recognize that there is a

distinction between the financial

arrangement entered into by Lower Valley

and Fall River and that entered into by

Pacific Power, we believe that for pur-

poses of applying the used and useful

principle it is a distinction without a

difference. The intent of the legisla-

ture to have the principle applied, and

our belief that it should be applied,

ought not be affected by the form of the

financing agreement when the ultimate

financial obligation is the same. Rural

Electric Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-

tion, 120 P.2d 741, reh. den. 122 P.2d

189 (Wyo. 1942); Tri-County Electric

Association v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d

995 (Wyo. 1978).

117

29. Pebble Springs was to be a two-

unit nuclear generating station with a

net electrical rating for each unit of

1260 megawatts. It was to be located in

Gilliam County, Oregon, approximately

four miles southeast of Arlington.

Ownership was divided among Portland Gen-

eral Electric Company (PGE), Puget Sound

Power and Light Company, and Pacific, in

47.1 percent, 23.5 percent and 29.4 per-

cent shares respectively. Tr. Vol. II

p. 450. In October 1974 Pacific agreed

to participate in the Pebble Springs

project. Seven and one-half years later

in April 1982, PGE announced the termina-

tion of the project by withdrawing its

site certificate application. Tr. Vol.

III p. 673. The estimated cost of

118

completion of Pebble Springs had risen

from $650 million in May 1973 to more

than $5 billion at the time of hearing in

July 1982. Tr. Vol. III p. 673-675.

Although more than $200 million was

invested in this project no actual con-

struction other than site preparation

ever commenced. Tr. Vol. III p. 531. No

electric power has been generated or can

presently be expected to be generated by

this cancelled power plant project. The

investment by Pacific and its partners in

the Pebble Springs project is not used

and useful for the convenience of the

public. We believe that Pacific must

agree that this is the case. Tr. Vol.

III p. 572-579. Our prior discussion of

the reasons for applying the used and

119

useful principle is incorporated by ref-

erence here. In summary, the legislative

mandate of W.S. 37-2-119 requires, and

the unanimous judgment of the Commission

compels the application of the used and

useful principle in establishing just and

reasonable rates under these circum-

stances. We therefore conclude that

Pacific's investment in this cancelled

power project should not be included in

rate base for rate of return purposes,

and should not be recovered in rates

through any period of investment

amortization. Neither should any ter-

mination costs or other costs associated

with the project be included in utility

expenses recoverable from Pacific's

Wyoming ratepayers.

120

OTHER FINDINGS

30. The utilities contend that if

they were prudent they should be permit-

ted to recover from ratepayers their

investment and related financial obliga-

tions. We have indicated why we believe

that application of the used and useful

principle is required and appropriate.

Application of this principle makes it

unnecessary to decide whether or not

these utilities were prudent in their

decision making, participation, and

management of these cancelled power plant

projects.

31. To the extent any that prior

decisions of the Commission are in con-

flict with this decision, this decision

should be considered controlling and

definitive. Never before have we been

121

asked to thoroughly explore the meaning

and application of the used and useful

principle in such depth. In this case we

have not been asked to consider the

application of the principle to power

plants or capital facilities which have

been operational but are abandoned or

superceded before being fully depre-

ciated. That is a different factual

situation which might require a different

result, as was the case in Docket 9454

Sub 11 when we allowed Pacific Power to

recover the unamortized balance of its

extraordinary property losses from the

early retirement of the Dave Johnson

Plant mechanical flue gas stacks. The

premature retirement in that case was

required by changes in Wyoming's

122

environmental air quality standards which

forced replacement of the stacks.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

THAT:

1. Pacific Power & Light Company

is hereby denied, now and in the future,

the opportunity to recover in rates from

its Wyoming jurisdictional consumers its

investment and expenses related to the

cancelled and abandoned power plant

projects known as WNP 5 and Pebble

Springs. These investments shall be

excluded from the computation of rate

base in any future rate proceeding before

this Commission.

Ze Lower Valley Power & Light Com-

pany and Fall River Rural Electric Com-

pany are hereby denied, now and in the

future, the opportunity to recover in

123

rates from their Wyoming jurisdictional

consumers any expenses related to their

obligations under the Participant's

Agreement with the Washington Public

Power Supply System for the cancelled and

abandcned power plant projects known as

WNP 4 and WNP 5.

36 This order is effective

immediately.

MADE and ENTERED at Cheyenne,

Wyoming this 2nd day of December, 1982.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF

WYOMING

JOHN KR. SMYTH

John R. Smyth, Chairman

G. KEITH OSBORN

G. Keith Osborn, Commissioner

124

C. E. JOHNSON

—_—- - - eSe eer er re eK FO Or

C. E. Johnson, Commissioner

(SEAL)

ATTEST:

ALEX J. ELIOPULOS

ALEX J. ELIOPULOS, Secretary

125

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY

MISSOURI

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel.

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY,

A Missouri corporation,

Relator,

Vs.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

and 183-1064cc

Division No.

PUBLIC COUNSEL FOR THE II

STATE OF MISSOURI

and

MISSOURI PUBLIC INTEREST

RESEARCH GROUP,

Intervenor-Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) Case No. CV

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

This case has been submitted to

the Court on transcript and exhibits

before the Missouri Public Service

Commission ("Commission"), in Commission

Case No. ER-83-163.

126

The parties hereto have filed

with the Court briefs and suggested find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law, and

the arguments of counsel having been

heard, now therefore, on the 16th day of

April 1984, the Court having considered

this matter and being fully advised in

the premises, finds and determines as

follows:

TINDINGS OF FACT

On December 3, 1982, Union

Electric Company ("Company") filed

revised tariffs with the Commission for

an annual increase in electric rates of

approximately $122,000,000. Before the

effective date of the new rates, the

Commission duly suspended the proposed

tariffs and set the matter for formal

hearings. Various groups were parties to

127

the proceedings before the Commission

including the Missouri Public Interest

Research Group ("MoPirg") and the Office

of the Public Counsel ("Public Counsel").

A Stipulation and Agreement was

approved by the Commission on July 6,

1983, providing for an increase in gross

annual revenues of $30,500,000. The

Stipulation and Agreement provided in

part that it was intentionally silent as

to rate of return and that the issue of

the recovery of the costs associated with

the cancelled Callaway II nuclear facil-

ity was not resolved but was left to be

resolved after hearing by the Commission.

Hearings on the issue of the

recovery of the costs associated with the

cancelled Callaway II nuclear facility

were held in Jefferson City beginning

128

August 24 and concluding on August 29,

1983. The Company and the Commission

Staff submitted testimony and exhibits

and were subject to cross examination by

all parties.

Union Electric is an electrical

corporation doing business as a public

utility within the State of Missouri.

Union Electric cancelled the Callaway II

nuclear plant in October of 1981. There

is no dispute among the parties to this

review that the Callaway II nuclear

facility has not provided, is not now

providing, and will never provide elec-

trical service to Union Electric's

Missouri customers.

In its Report and Order dated

October 21, 1983, the Commission ruled

129

that Section 393.135, RSMo 1978 (Propo-

sition 1) barred the recovery through the

rates to be charged by Union Electric of

the costs associated with the construc-

tion of the Callaway II nuclear facility.

The Commission did not reach the issues

of whether under the facts of the case,

recovery of the Callaway II costs was

desirable and reasonable under general

ratemaking principles, the amount of

cancellation costs attributable to

Callaway II, the amortization period, if

any, Or proposed adjustments with respect

to APUDC settlements and deferred taxes.

Thereafter, Relator timely filed an

Application for Rehearing with the

Commission, alleging that the Commission

130

erred in denying the costs. The Applica-

tion for Rehearing was denied by the

Commission.

The only issues presented to

this Court are whether Union Electric is

prohibited from recovering the costs

associated with the construction of the

Callaway II nuclear facility by Section

393.135, RSMo 1978, and, if so, whether

the operation of that statute denying

recovery is permitted under the United

States and the Missouri constitutions and

whether the Commission properly excluded

Exhibit 42 offered by Union Electric.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction in

this case pursuant to Section 386.510

RSMo 1978.

131

2. The Court concludes that Section

393.135 RSMo 1978, prohibits Union Elec-

tric from recovering the costs associated

with the construction of the cancelled

Callaway II nuclear facility through its

rates charged to Missouri customers.

That section of the Revised Statutes of

Missouri clearly and unambiguously

prohibits any charge based on the costs

of construction in progress and, dispos-

itive of this issue, any charge based on

"... any other cost associated with own-

ing, Operating, maintaining, or financing

any property before it is fully oper-

ational and used for service."

3. The Court concludes that the

operation of Section 393.135 in prohibit-

ing the recovery by Union Eiectric of the

costs associated with the construction of

132

the cancelled Callaway II nuclear facil-

ity does not violate the due process

clauses of the United States and Missouri

constitutions. Cleveland Electric Illu-

Minating Company v. Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, 104 S Ct 47 (1983).

4. The Court concludes that the

Order of the Public Service Commission

does not violate the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 2 of the Constitution of

Missouri. Williamson v. Lee Optical Com-

pany, 348 US 483 (1955); City of St.

Louis v. Liberman, 547 SW2d 452 (Mo banc

1977); McClellan v. Kansas City, 379 SW2d

500 (Mo banc 1964).

5. The Court concludes that the

Order of the Public Service Commission

£33

properly excluded from evidence Exhibit

42, proffered by Union Electric.

6. The Court concludes that the

Order of the Public Service Commission is

supported by competent and substantial

evidence and is reasonable and lawful in

all respects.

WHEREFORE, it is Ordered, Ad-

judged, and Decreed, that the October 21,

1983, Order of the Commission is affirmed

in all respects.

ss/Bryron L. Kinder

Byron L. Kinder

Circuit Judge, Division II

Dated: April 16, 1984

134

BEFORE

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the

Application of Ohio

Edison Company for an

Emergency Increase in

Rates and Charges for

Electric Service

Case No. 81-898-

EL-~ AEM

~— "i Oe

OPINION AND ORDER

The Commission, coming now to

consider the application for emergency

rate relief filed by Ohio Edison Company

on July 30, 1981, pursuant to Section

4909.16, Revised Code, the exhibits filed

therewith, and the Stipulation and Recom-

mendation signed by its Staff and by

other parties as described below; and

being otherwise fully advised in the

premises, hereby issues its Opinion and

Order.

135

APPEARANCES

Under the provisions of the

Stipulation and Recommendation discussed

below, the parties to the Company's

permanent rate application (Case No. 80-

1139-EL-AIR) and the applicant for inter-

vention, E. Ray Davis et al., wish to be

treated as intervenors in this emergency

case. Those parties, as well as the

Staff of this Commission, make the

following appearances:

Mr. Russell J. Spetrino,

Miss Frances McGovern and Mr. Anthony J.

Alexander, 76 South Main Street, Akron,

Ohio 44308, on behalf of Ohio Edison

Company.

Mr. William J. Brown, Attorney

General, by Mr. Marvin I. Rosnik and

Mr. James R. Bacha, Assistant Attorneys

136

General, 180 East Broad Street, Columbus,

Ohio 43215, on behalf of the Staff of the

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

Mr. Richard M. Fanelly, Special

Legal Counsel, for the City of Akron. 521

Centran Building, Akron, Ohio 44308, on

behalf of the City of Akron.

Mr. Edward M. Zaleski, Lorain

Law Director, by Mr. Stephen B. Angel,

Special Utilities Counsel, 200 West Erie

Avenue, Lorain, Ohio 44052, on behalf of

the City of Lorain.

Mr. William A. Spratley, Con-

sumers' Counsel, by Mr. Richard P.

Rosenberry, Associate Consumers' Counsel,

137 East State Street, Columbus, Ohio

43215, on behalf of the Residential Con-

sumers of Ohio Edison Company.

137

Messrs. Steer, Strauss, White &

Tobias, by Mr. Theodore K. High, 2208

Central Trust Tower, Cincinnati, Ohio

45202 and Mr. John A. DiNardo, Assistant

Counsel, P.O. Box 600, Middietown, Ohio

45042, on behalf of Armco Inc.

Mr. Wayne L. Emery and

Mr. Kenneth R. Pepperney, 600 Grant

Street - Room 1569, Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania 15230, on behalf of United

States Steel Corporation.

Bell & Clevenger Co., L.P.A.,

by Mr. Langdon D. Bell, 21 East State

Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, on behalf

of General Motors Corporation and PPG

Industries, Inc.

Messrs. Muldoon, Pemberton &

Ferris, by Mr. Boyd B. Morris, 50 West

138

Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, on

behalf of Ray Davis et al.

Introduction:

Ohio Edison Company (herein-

after referred to as the applicant, the

company, or Ohio Edison) is an Ohio cor-

poration engaged in the generation,

transmission and distribution of electric

energy and is a public utility and an

electric light company within the defi-

nitions of Sections 4905.02 and

4905.03(A) (4), Revised Code. On July 30,

1981, the company filed the instant

application pursuant to Section 4909.16,

Revised Code, praying that the Commission

find an emergency exists as to the com-

pany, and, to prevent injury to the busi-

ness or interests of the public or of the

company, that the company be authorized

139

to place into effect on bills rendered on

and after August 1, 1981, an increase of

$90,000,000 on an annualized basis over

the revenue at current rates, including

the provision for recovery of fuel costs,

based on the six months actual-six months

estimated billing determinants as set out

in the company's E-4 schedules in its

application for a permanent rate increase

in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR. The tem-

porary rate would apply to all current

customer classes.

On December 1, 1980, the com-

pany began the statutory process of seek-

ing permanent rate increases by giving

notice of its intention to file an

application for an increase in rates

pursuant to Section 4909.43(B), Revised

Code. The notices were docketed under

140

Case No. 80-113S9-EL-AIR. The increase

sought in the permanent rate case amounts

to approximately $138,000,000 over

currently authorized revenues based on a

test year ending August 31, 1981, or

approximately $139,000,000 based on a

fully forecasted test year ending

June 30, 1982. Ohio Edison proposed that

the temporary increase remain in effect

until a permanent increase is authorized

by the Commission. An Opinion and Order

in the permanent case is expected to he

issued on or about December 1, 1981.

Ohio Edison alleges that its

poor financial condition was unexpectedly

and extensively exacerbated by the

prospective need to write off $52,495,829

as of September 30, 1981, as a result of

the decision on July 15, 1981, of the

141

Ohio Supreme Court in Consumers’ Counsel

v. Pub. Util. Comm., 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,

that, while the Court did not disturb the

finding of the Commission that the deci-

sion of the CAPCD companies to embark on

the construction of the nuclear units and

the decision to terminate construction

were reasonable, given the uncertainties

that now attend the construction of

nuclear units and the intervening decline

in growth expectations, the costs

incurred by The Cleveland Electric Illu-

minating Company in conjunction with the

termination of construction of the four

units were not properly includable for

rate purposes as ordinary operating

expenses under Section 4909.15(A) (4),

Revised Code. Pursuant to this Commis-

sion's Opinion and Order in Case No.

142

80-141-EL-AIR, Ohio Edison is currently

recovering an amount required to permit

amortization of 1/10 of the estimated

jurisdictional cost, net of tax, incurred

by Ohio Edison in conjunction with ter-

mination of the same four units. The

circumstances in the Consumers' Counsel

decision, supra, are so similar as to

suggest that allowance to Ohio Edison,

the principal owner of the four units, of

its share of the costs of the units will

also be disallowed. Its independent

auditors, which have already qualified

their opinion with respect to the Com-

pany's earnings as of June 30, 1981, have

advised that, in accordance with gen-

erally accepted accounting principles,

the entire unamortized loss to Ohio Edi-

son must be written off if the decision

143

stands. As far as the investment commu-

nity is concerned, this imminent loss has

already taken place.

The company also alleges that

following the decision in Consumers'

Counsel, supra, it was obliged to with-

draw its offering of $75,000,000 in first

mortgage bonds which had already been

priced at a 16-7/8% coupon rate to aid it

in paying off $150,000,000 in 10% bonds

due August 1, 1981. The company was also

forced to cancel a scheduled August sale

of 7,000,000 shares of common stock

intended to produce approximately

$84,000,000. The write-off of the loss

will immediately reduce, dollar for dol-

lar, the unrestricted retained earnings

of the company available to pay common

stock dividends and further reduce the

144

company's already low common equity

component of permanent capitalization

which is already increasing the risk to

common stock investors and the cost of

common capital to the company. In its

present circumstances the company is

virtually precluded from gaining any

access to the market for the permanent

capital financings and is forced to rely

on costly short-term bank borrowings.

The amount of such borrowings is limited

by the company's charter and will be at

the limit by the end of 1981 if emergency

relief is not granted. Access to perma-

nent capital is critical to the ability

of the company to provide adequate and

reliable service to customers and

something approaching $235,000,000 in

proceeds from external financing with

145

permanent capital is needed still in |

1981. Given the company's ongoing need

for access to the public markets for

capital and the practical inability to

"catch-up" with deferred financings added

to what will be required to be scheduled

in 1982, the company must receive

substantial emergency relief if it is to

be able to attempt to issue new permanent

capital in 1981 before short-term unse-

cured capital limitations are reached.

While it is not so much indenture and

charter limitations limiting access to

the capital market as the perception of

the market of the unsettling effect on

Ohio Edison of having to write off an

immense loss immediately instead of

amortization of the amount over ten

years, the company also states that it

146

has no interest and dividend coverage

leeway uncer its charter that will permit

issuance of preferred stock and that its

interest coverage required under its

indenture to be at least 2X including

coverage of interest on any new issue, is

currently 2.07. Perceiving the potential

impact on the company of its inability to

gain access to the market for permanent

capital, the intervenors in the company's

pending permanent rate case, Case No. 80-

1139-EL-AIR, recognized that accelerated

recovery of an agreed sum of $90,000,009

to settle issues as to revenue in the

pending permanent rate case, might serve

to alleviate the company's financial

circumstances.

Attached to the company's

application for temporary emergency rate

147

relief, as Exhibit A, is a Stipulation

and Recommendation signed by all parties 4

who are intervenors in the company's

permanent rate case, as well as by a

party applying to intervene. The

Stipulation and Recommendation is also

Signed on behalf of the Staff of this

Commission respecting certain matters

stipulated and recommended therein.

The Stipulation recommends,

inter alia, that Ohio Edison be permitted

to recover on bills rendered on and after

August 1, 1981, the sum of $90,000,000,

which does not include any continued

amortization of costs associated with the

censtruction and subsequent termination

of the four generating units, in full

settlement of issues as to revenue

requirements in the company’s pending

148

permanent rate case. Since, however, it

was judged that the permanent rate case

cannot be finally adjudged until after

issuance in that case of a Staff Report

of Investigation, service of the report,

a thirty day period to receive objections

and a hearing, the parties also agreed

that the company should file an applica-

tion for emergency relief to effectuate

the Stipulation and Recommendation, that

the emergency increase should be effec-

tive on bills rendered on and after

August 1, 1981, that, as evidenced by

information and data provided in the com-

pany's emergency application (previewed

by parties), the compary is in a finan-

cial emergency as that term has been used

by the Commission in prior decisions,

that the magnitude of relief agreed to is

149

not unreasonable as emergency relief,

given the company's present situation and

further financing requirements and is

less than the company states it otherwise

would have requested in the absence of

agreement of the parties, and that the

emergency rates should be the rates set

out in Exhibit No. 1 to the Stipulation

and Recommendation.

The Stipulation also recommends

the severing and separate determination

of issues of revenue distribution and

rate design in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR

ému, as between the Office of Consumers’

Counsel and Ohio Edison, calls for sever-

ing and separately determining, after a

special hearing, whether the Commission

should order a management audit pursuant

to Section 4909.154, Revised Code, as

150

requested by the Consumers' Counsel in a

pending motion in Case No. 80-1139-EL-

AIR.

The Stipulation further pro-

vides that it is not to be binding upon

the parties in any other proceedings than

those which are required to effectuate

the Stipulation.

Finally, it was agreed that

should the Commission reject all or any

part of the agreement and recommendations

offered therein, the Stipulation and

Recommendation shall be of no force and

effect.

Commission Review and Discussion:

The Commission's authority to

order modifications of existing rates on

a temporary basis arises under Section

151

4909.16, Revised Code, which provides as

follows:

When the public utilities

commission deems it necessary

to prevent injury to the busi-

ness or interests of the public

or of any public utility of

this state in case of any

emergency to be judged by che

commission, it may temporarily

alter, amend, or, with the con-

sent of the public utility con-

cerned, suspend any existing

rates, schedules, or order

relating to or affecting any

public utility or part of any

public utility in this state.

Rates so made by the commission

shall apply to one or more of

the public utilities in this

state, or to any portion

thereof, as is directed by the

commission, and shall take

effect at such time as the

commission prescribes.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has

consistently construed this statute as

vesting the Commission with broad dis-

cretionary power in determining when an

emergency exists and in tailoring a

152

remedy which will enable the public

utility concerned to meet that emergency.

Cambridge v. PUCO (1953), 159 Ohio St.

88; Manufacturer's Light & Heat Co. v.

PuCO (1955), 163 Ohio St. 78.

The Commission is guided by the

following considerations when confronted

with a request for emergency rate relief:

(a) emergency rate relief is "extraor-

dinary" in nature; (b) the existence of

an "emergency" is a condition precedent

to temporary rate relief; (c) temporary

rate relief will be granted only at the

"minimum level" necessary to avert or

relieve the emergency; (d) the

applicant's evidence will be reviewed

with the "strictest scrutiny" and that

evidence must "clearly and convincingly”

153

demonstrate the presence of "extraor-

dinary circumstances" which constitute a

genuine emergency situation; and

(e) emergency rate relief will not be

granted under Sectiun 4909.16, Revised

Code, if the emergency request was filed

merely to circumvent and as a substitute

for permanent rate relief under Section

4909.18, Revised Code.

The primary question is simply

whether, absent temporary rate relief,

the utility's ability to render service

will be impaired or the utility will be

financially imperiled. If the utility

fails to sustain its burden of proof on

this issue, the Commission's inquiry is

at an end. See Toledo Edison, Case No.

76-439-EL-AEM (Opinion and Order,

September 8, 1976).

154

The Commission is persuaded and

finds that the requisite considerations

have been met in this case. Moreover, it

has never had before it a case in which

the timing of relief was of such grave

importance and in which parties

representing a diversity of interests

and viewpoints and the Staff of the

Commission have all agreed not merely to

the level of temporary emergency relief

needed but also as to the need to grant

emergency relief forthwith and to make it

immediately effective.

Notwithstanding the swiftness

of the Commission's action, it is not

ill-considered in the circumstances.

The company has supplied as

Exhibit B a projected income statement

for 1981, a projected cash flow statement

155

for 1981, and a measurement of unsecured

indebtedness as against charter limita-

tions on that indebtedness for the same

period. The data, as to which no ques-

tion of reliability has been raised and

which is based in substantial part on

actual data recorded on the books ot the

company and on the known obligation of

the company to write off $52,495,829 as

of September 30, 1981, on the advice of

the company's independent auditors,

reveals that a $150,000,000 10% bond

issue must be refunded August l, 1981,

and must be replaced in the company's

existing circumstances with high cost,

short term debt approximating a cost rate

of 20%, that the estimated direct short

term indebtedness will range from

$289,000,000 to $382,000,000 between

156

August and December, 1981, and that by

year end 1981, the company will have

effectively reached the limitation under

its charter relating to unsecured

indebtedness absent permanent financing

to partially relieve this burden. More-

over, the information indicates that the

write-off of almost $52.5 million may

jeopardize the continued stock dividend

payment of the company and thus indi-

rectly serve as a practical impediment to

the company in raising permanent debt or

equity capital for its on-going

construction program, which includes

funding for the environmental contro:

program underway.

The Commission is, of course,

not bound by the Stipulation and Recom-

mendation presented to it by its Staff

157

and the parties. However, a joint recom-

mendation made by the Staff and the par-

ties in circumstances such as these is

entitled to careful consideration and

should not be lightly regarded. It is

impressive that there is unanimous

concurrence in the conclusion that

$90,000,000 in emergency relief is imme-

diately needed. While ordinarily in

emergency cases the Staff is not able to

conduct as detailed an investigation as

it does in permanent cases, in this case,

the Staff has been investigating the Com-

pany's financial condition in connection

with the permanent application for nearly

five months. Under these circumstances,

the Staff's stipulation and recom-

mendation regarding the need for emer-

gency relief is even more persuasive.

158

It is not the custom of the

Commission to act without prior hearing

and the taking of testimony in emergency

cases nor would it ever do so except in

extraordinary circumstances. In the

opinion of the Commission, however,

extraordinary circumstances exist in this

case to justify such a course of action,

including not merely the urgency of the

need for emergency action but also the

effective participation of all parties

normally taking part in Ohio Edison rate

cases. Moreover, the Commission believes

Summary action is lawful. Section

4909.16, Revised Code, not only does not

require a hearing, but the fact that no

provision was made by the iegislature for

a hearing may well be an acknowledgment

that the ability of the Commission to act

159

promptly in emergency circumstances is an

essential feature of its authority under

Section 4909.16, Revised Code, for it

cannot be doubted that in some circum-

stances the best means of containing an

emergency at overall lowest cost to cus-

tomers is to grant relief as swiftly as

possible. Accordingly, the Commission

concludes that a temporary emergency

increase should be granted forthwith.

Moreover, the existence of an emergency

cannot be in doubt. It is clear that the

funds needed by Ohio Edison to finance

the enterprise must come from external

sources under present rates. It is

equally clear that undue reliance by the

company on short-term unsecured borrow-

ing, particularly at the high cost

prevailing today, cannot only create a

160

crisis of investor confidence but, in so

doing, reduce the future ability of the

company to finance essential requirements

at reasonable cost to ratepayers.

When, moreover, there is the

sudden occurrence of an unexpected event

that has forced the withdrawal of pro-

posed issues of bonds and common stock

and has destroyed, for all practical pur-

poses, the ability of the company to

resort to the market for permanent

financing, the Commission is bound to

recognize in the interests of ratepayers

that untoward measures to cope with the

emergency are in order. It can but hope

that prompt relief, which will maximize

receipts in 1981, the year of extraor-

dinary loss, and that the level of relief

granted, as requested by the company and

161

concurred in by the Staff and all par-

ties, will prove to be adequate.

Upon review of the evidence

supplied by the company and the Stipula-

tion and Recommendation of the Staff and

the parties, the Commission finds that an

emergency exists which, without rate

relief, will imperil the company's abil-

ity to provide adequate and reliable

electric service consistent with its duty

as a public utility. We accept the

recommendations to the Commission in the

Stipulation and Recommendation in so far

as they relate to the granting of emer-

gency relief. While the Stipulation and

Recommendation also encompasses stipula-

tions and recommendations relating to the

permanent rate case, which was used as a

vehicle to establish a proper level of

162

interim emergency relief, those matters

must be finally reviewed and determined

in the permanent rate case, Case No. 80-

1139-EL-AIR. Only the recommendation in

the Stipulation and Recommendation that a

hearing should be held on whether the

Commission should order a management

audit as requested in Case No. 80-1139-

EL-AIR can be addressed at this time. In

light of the allegations contained in the

company's emergency application and based

on the motion for a management audit

filed by the Office of Consumer's Counsel

in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR, the Commis-

sion believes that a management audit

should be conducted and will so order.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1) Ohio Edison Company is an Ohio

corporation and a public utility engaged

163

in the construction of generating, trans-

mission, distribution and other facili-

ties required to furnish adequate and

reliable supplies of energy to its cus-

tomers now and in the future.

2) The company is a public utility

as defined in Sections 4905.02 and

4905.03, Revised Code, and is subject to

the jurisdiction of the Commission pursu-

ant to Sections 4905.04, 4905.05 and

4905.06, Revised Code.

3) The applicant filed the instant

application for emergency rate relief

pursuant to the provisions of Section

4909.16, Revised Code, on July 30, 1981.

4) The inability of the company to

obtain permanent capital and to rely

entirely on short-term unsecured borrow-

ings at high cost and in amounts

164

approaching the company's charter limita-

tions on its ability to raise such

capital, will injure the business or

interests of the public and the company

and constitutes an emergency within the

meaning of Section 4909.16, Revised Code.

5) The immediate suspension of

existing rates and authorization to the

company to file new rates producing a

$90,000,000 increase effective immedi-

ately on bills rendered on and after

August 1, 1981, will ameliorate the

emergency.

6) Absent such a level of emergency

rate relief effective immediately, the

ability of the company to render adequate

service at reasonable cost to its cus-

tomers will be impaired. The company's

165

financial integrity will be jeopardized

and the public interest will be injured.

7) An increase in Ohio Edison's cur-

rent rates by $90,000,000 on an

annualized basis effective on bills ren-

dered on and after August 1, 1981, is the

minimum amount necessary to enable the

company to meet the emergency condition.

8) The Commission, pursuant to Sec-

tion 4909.16, Revised Code, has the

authority under the circumstances herein

to grant emergency rate relief as to all

rates established by this Commission.

9) Evidence of sufficient reliabil-

ity was presented to allow the Commission

to determine whether the company's

circumstances constitute an emergency.

166

ORDER:

It is, therefore,

ORDERED, That the company be

authorized to place in effect the rate

schedule attached to the Stipulation and

Recommendation as Exhibit No. 1. Such

rates shall remain in effect until the

Commission orders otherwise or new rates

go into effect by operation of law. it

is, further,

ORDERED, That the company shall

file as soon as possible three (3) origi-

nal revised rate schedules reflecting tne

rates authorized herein. It is, further,

ORDERED, That these revised

sheets be clearly designated as “emer--

gency and temporary." It is, further,

ORDERED, That the effective

date of such schedules shall be August 1,

167

1981, and will be applicable to bills

rendered on and after that date. It is,

further,

ORDERED, That there shall be

conducted a management audit of the

company. The Commission will issue an

appropriate order in the near future

instituting such a procedure. It is,

further,

ORDERED, That a copy of this

Opinion and Order be served on all those

having entered appearances in this mat-

ter, as listed above.

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

OF OHIO

3s/

(Chairman)

ss/

ss/

(Commissioners)

168

Entered in the Journal

July 31, 1981

A True Copy

ss/

David N. Polk

Secretary

169

-No.- -79-1929

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE

CORPORATION,

Petitioner-Respondent,

Ve

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF WISCONSIN,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order! of the

circuit court for Brown County:

ROBERT J. PARINS, Judge. Reversed.

Before Foley, P.J., Dean and

Cane, JJ.

DEAN, J. The Public Service

Commission of Wisconsin appeals from an

order that remands a March 2, 1979, PSC

order (hereinafter the Order) that

directs WPS to place on its books certain

170

expenditures incurred in seeking author-

ity to construct a two-unit nuclear power

generating facility in the Town of

Koshkonong in Jefferson County. The

Order was separate and distinct from any

rate proceeding. The circuit court

determined that the PSC's method of

accounting, which precluded the expenses

from appearing as operating expenses on

the books of the utilities in any rate

case test year, was inconsistent with the

PSC's finding that the expenses were pru-

dently made and not chargeable to the

stockholders. We conclude that the PSC

did not abuse its discretionary authority

to direct the manner and form in which

the utilities keep their books and that

the Order does not confiscate utility

property. We therefore reverse the order

171

of the trial court and reinstate the PSC

Order directing the utilities to write

off $7.5 million in nuclear power plant

development costs.

On July 10, 1974, Wisconsin

Public Service Corporation and three

other utilities submitted to the PSC a

joint application for authority to con-

struct and put into operation power gen-

erating facilities at Koshkonong,

Wisconsin. In 1977, the applicants with-

drew their application with the consent

of the PSC. Prior to withdrawal, the

utilities spent $34,898.362.29 developing

their application, an amount which they

expected to capitalize when the project

was completed. The costs were accrued, )

and the expenditures did not appear on

172

the utilities' books as operating

expenses during the years 1974 to 1977.

The PSC held hearings relating

to the accounting treatment of the costs

while the Koshkonong application was

pending and after the application's with-

drawal. The proceedings culminated in

the PSC's Order of March 2, 1979, which

directed the accounting of the

$33,881.244.86 in expenditures.* WPS con-

tested the accounting treatment with

respect to its share of $7,526,324.66 in

expenditures, and the other three appli-

cants?

join WPS on appeal as intervenors.

We consider first whether the

case is moot because WPS has submitted

and received consideration on a rate

increase application subsequent to the

March 2, 1979, Order.? A case is moot

173

when "a determination is sought which,

when made, cannot have any practical

effect upon an existing controversy.">

In Wisconsin Association of Manufacturers

& Commerce, Inc. v. PSC, 100 Wis2d 300,

301 NW2d 247 (1981), a controversy

involving a rate order was found moot

because a subsequent rate order had been

entered. This case, however, involves an

accounting order. If we were to affirm ,

the case would be remanded to the PSC to

make its order consistent with its

findings as directed by the trial court.

WPS contends that the PSC can, and does,

order utilities to retroactively adjust

their books to conform to an accounting

order.® ‘The PSC also could order the

$7.5 million in expenditures amortized

over a period of years to commence at the

174

en} ele Bae ee,

Qa en OS te eT Oe ee ee ee

beginning of the next rate case test

year./ If upon remand the PSC ordered

the expenditures removed from the account

to which they were charged and charged to

that account to commence with the begin-

ning of the next rate case test year,

then the expenses would appear as reason-

able and prudent expenses in addition to

all other reasonable and prudent expenses

in the rate case test year. At that

time, WPS could request higher rates than

would otherwise be approved to cover its

costs relating to the $7.5 million in

expenditures. We conclude that the case

is not moot.

We turn to the merits of the

case. The legislature has delegated to

the PSC the power to prescribe the manner

and form in which utilities keep their

175

books and records.® The legislature has

provided for review in the circuit court

of such an administrative decision.?

Section 227.20(8), Stats., required the

circuit court to:

reverse or remand the case to

the agency if it finds that the

agency's exercise of discretion

is outside the range of dis-

cretion delegated to the agency

by law; is inconsistent with an

agency rule, an officially

stated agency policy or a prior

agency practice, if deviation

therefrom is not explained to

the satisfaction of the court

by the agency; or is otherwise

in violation of a constitu-

tional or statutory provision;

but the court shall not sub-

stitute its judgement for that

of the agency on an issued of

discretion.

The legislature provided for further

review of the final judgment of the

circuit court by appeal to the court of

appeals.11 On appeal, this court is only

176

to determine whether the circuit court

erred in its determination.+2

When the circuit court con-

cluded that the Order was inconsistent

with its findings, it concluded that the

PSC's action was not explained to the

satisfaction of the court. WPS also

argues that the Order is inconsistent

with prior agency practice and is other-

wise is violation of constitutional pro-

vision. We first consider whether the

circuit court correctly concluded that

the Order inadequately justifies its

action and then consider WPS's arguments.

We conclude that the Order was not incon-

Sistent with its findings, that the Order

adquately justified its exercise of dis-

cretion, and that the Order did not con-

fiscate utility property.

177

To determine whether the cir-

cuit court erred, we consider the basis

for the circuit court's decision. The

circuit court reviewed the record and

determined that substantial evidence

supported findings made by the PSC in the

Order. The circuit court accepted as

fact that the monies were spent and that

the expenditures had no value to the

utilities or ratepayers. More impor-

tantly, it accepted that the expenditures

were reasonably and prudently made in the

planning for customer service and that,

consequently, they were not "to be

charged against the stockholders on the

books of the company." The court also

accepted that the write-off would reduce

WPS earnings per share by $.06, in

178

rw. sS — « _-_—

comparison to 1978 annual earnings per

share of $2.54.

The circuit court determined

that the Order amortized the expense in

twelve months and that, as a practical

matter, the write-off would not permit

expenses to appear on the utilities'

books in a rate case test year. The

court also determined that the expendi-

tures were not of the type routinely

written off and that these types of

expenditures usually were amortized over

periods of time longer than one year. In

addition, the court determined that the

PSC had policy reasons for choosing a

one-year period, including (1) that

sound, conservative accounting practice

requires prompt early removal of items

without value from the utilities' books;

179

(2) that the impact on stockholders was

not significant; (3) that tax benefits

reduced the impact of losses on stock-

holders; (4) that the PSC anticipated

introducing a policy of treating

precertification planning expenditures as

operating expenses; and (5) that a change

of policy concurrent with longer term

amortizastion of past expenditures would

cumulatively burden current ratepayers.

In spite of these policy reasons for one-

year amortization, the circuit court con-

cluded that the Order was inconsistent

with its findings because, although the

expenditures were "not to be charged to

stockholders," the practical effect of

the write-off, which precluded recovery

in rates, was to place the entire burden

of the expenditures on stockholders.?3 |

180

We agree with the circuit court

that the PSC chose one-year amortization

periods for sound policy reasons, but we

conclude that the circuit court erred

when it concluded that the one-year

amortization period was inconsistent with

the Order's findings. In the Order, the

PSC stated: "The fact that ... [the $7.5

million in expenditures] were not found

imprudent means that they will not be

charged against the stockholders on the

books of the company." [Emphasis sup-

plied.] The circuit court reduced this

statement to a finding that the expendi-

tures were not be "charged against the

stockholders."

The circuit court created the

inconsistency that it found troublesome

by reducing "charged against stockholders

181

on the books of the company” to "charged

against stockholders." The expenditures

were not "charged against stockholders on

the books of the company"; a comparison

of the treatment of $45,228.82 in impru-

dent advertising expenditures that were

"charged against stockholders on the

books of the company” and the treatment

of the $7.5 million in expenditures sup-

ports this conclusion.

Prior to the Order, both the

$45,000 in advertising expenditures and

the $7.50 million in other expenditures

were accrued in account 186, miscella-

neous deferred debits.14 When amortized,

the $7.5 million in expenditures were

transferred to account 407, classifying

them as operating expenses. In contrast,

the order transferred the $45,000 worth

182

ee ee eee ee eee a See

of advertising expenses, which were

imprudent and chargeable to stockholders,

to account 426, classifying them as "mis-

cellaneous income deduction." There is

an ultimate difference in treatment. On

the one hand, if any month in which the

$7.5 million in expenditures appeared on

the books had been part of a rate case

test year, these expenses would have been

included in those expenses used to esti-

mate the cost of operation for the pur-

pose of establishing rates. On the other

hand, if the $45,000 had been on the

books in a rate case test year, the

expenses would not be included in operat-

ing costs upon which rates would be

based. We conclude that the $7.5 million

in expenditures were not charged against

183

the stockholders on the books of the com-

pany because of this difference.

WPS argues that the Order is

arbitrary and capricious for reasons

other than the reason upon which the cir-

cuit court based its order.1> wes con-

tends that the PSC practice was tc am-

Ortize losses over periods longer than

one year. If amortized over three, five

Or ten years, then the losses would

appear in a rate case test year, and the

utilities would subsequently have the

opportunity to recover losses in rates.

WPS concludes that the Order is inconsis-

tent with prior agency practice because

it precluded recovery in rates.

WPS cites numerous other cases

and orders to establish that PSC practice

is to amortize losses over periods longer

184

than one year. The examples include PSC

orders involving other types of losses,1+®

17 and

other orders in the same docket,

orders made by other public service

commissions relating to precertification

expenditures from abandoned projects.28

We do not agree that such examples estab-

lish PSC practice in this type of case.

At the same time, the one-year

write-off is an express deviation from

the past practice, which capitalized such

expenses in the cost of completed

projects, and is different from the

expressly anticipated policy of treating

precertification expenditures as operat-

ing expenses.

The PSC has authority to direct

the manner and form in which the util-

ities maintain their books. Section

185

196.06, Stats. The circuit court is

authorized to reverse or remand an order

exercising that authority if an order is

inconsistent with agency practice, but

only if the deviation is not explained to

the satisfaction of the court. Moreover,

the statute directs the court not to sub-

stitute its judgment for that of the

agency. Section 227.20(8), Stats. The

circuit court recognized that the PSC

justified its choice of a one-year

amortization period with policy reasons.

We concur with the circuit court that the

policy reasons stated in the Order are

sound. In light of the policy reasons

supporting the PSC's exercise of dis-

cretion, the Order should not be reversed

or remanded because it is inconsistent

with prior agency practice.

186

WPS also contends that the

Order violates fourteenth amendment due

process. WPS phrases its argument in

plain language: "The flaw in the order

is that it requires the joint applicants

to write off prudent expenditures in such

a way that the utilities will never have

the opportunity to recover these expendi-

tures from rate payer. "19 WPS's due

process contention is not a procedural

due process objection, 2° but it contends

that the Order deprives the utilities of

property without compensation. In an

explanation of ratemaking, WPS states:

"Rather than guaranteeing a rate of

return for utilities, rates set the maxi-

mum price which can be charged. If

everything goes as projected in the test

year, then the utility will have just an

187

opportunity to earn the rate of return

authorized. "21 [Emphasis in the origi-

nal.] From this statement, we understand

that when WPS contends that it must have

an opportunity to recover losses, it

argues that the losses must be included

in the expenses of a rate case test year

used to establish rates.

WPS cites numerous cases“? for

the principle that a public service

commission cannot exclude from the rate

base regular, reasonable and prudent

expenses incurred in the test year. Each

of the cases cited is a rate case. The

issue of whether an expense must be

included in a rate base is distinguish-

able from the issue of whether the PSC

properly exercised its discretion in

188

ordering expenses amortized over a one-

year period rather than over a three- or

five-year period. WPS, thus, misplaces

its reliance on the authority it cites.

Both WPS and PSC cite Trans-

continental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. FPC,

518 F2d 459 (DC Cir 1975), in support of

their position. In Transcontinental, the

court approved a Federal Power Commission

accounting order. The order permitted

the recovery in rates of advance payments

made by gas pipeline companies to gas

producers to finance gas exploration and

development. WPS argues that because the

FPC permitted recovery of costs to the

pipeline companies, the PSC must permit

recovery of costs to the utilities in

this case.

189

In Transcontinental, the court

did not affirm the order because the

order permitted recovery of costs. The

recovery of pipeline costs was not at

issue. Instead, the issue in Trans-

continental was whether the pipeline

should earn a profit on the value of the

advance payments. This issue is not

relevant to our case.

We agree with the PSC that the

Transcontinental opinion describes the

role of a reviewing court when a utility

claims that a public service commission

accounting order constitutes an unconsti-

tutional confiscation of property:

In judging in a rate

proceeding whether an unconsti-

tutional confiscation of prop-

erty has occurred, the Commis-

sion and the reviewing court

must compare the total rate of

190

return to the value of dedi-

cated property as a whole. ...

Such a test in a rate

proceeding leads to the conclu-

sion that in an attack on indi-

vidual accounting rules, the

reviewing court must defer to

agency expertise. ...

We think the petitioner

bears a heavy burden when it

challenges FPC accounting

regulations on the grounds that

they result in an unconstitu-

tional confiscation of prop-

erty. The effect of the

accounting rules should not be

viewed and analyzed piecemeal,

as Transco would have us do in

this case. Rather, the Commis-

sion should be free to fashion

individual accounting rules

unless a rule ... would clearly

and necessarily have the effect

of rendering any rate, which is

based upon the rule's use,

confiscatory 40 the constitu-

tional sense.

Transcontinental applied the standard of

orders.

review for rate orders to accounting

an unconstitutional confiscation of

191

An accounting order constitutes

property if, when applied, it reduces the

total rate of return to the value of the

dedicated property as a whole to an

unreasonable level.

WPS does not argue that its

1979 cate of return was reduced to an

unreasonable level by the accounting

order. Among the findings of the PSC in

the Order, the PSC determined that the

annual earnings per share for WPS could

be reduced $.06. The PSC compared this

amount to WPS's 1978 annual earnings per

share of $2.54, and it concluded that the

amount was insignificant. This conclu-

sion is within the PSC's sphere of exper-

tise, and we defer to the expertise of

the Ppsc.*4 we conclude that the order

does not constitute an unconstitutional

confiscation of property.

192

By the Court.--Order reversed.

Not recommended for publication

in the official reports.

APPENDIX

1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court

determined on a prior appeal that this

order was a final order from which an

appeal could be taken. Bearns v. DILHR

08 vs PSC), 102 Wis 2d 70, 306 NW2d 22

1981).

2 Ina prior order, the difference

between $34,898,362.29 and

$33,881,244.86, representing cost of

land, was reclassified to an account

entitled "non-utility property.”

3 The other joint applicants are

Wisconsin Electric Power Company,

Wisconsin Power & Light Company, and

Madison Gas and Electric Company.

4 At oral argument, this court

presented to the parties the question of

mootness. The parties were subsequently

permitted to file supplemental briefs on

this question.

5 City of Racine v. J-T Enter-

prises of America, Inc., 64 Wis 2d 691,

700, 221 NW2d 869, 874 (1974)

193

6 WPS cites to the court an exam-

ple of such an order and includes a copy

of it in its appendix. Letter from PSC

to WEPCO (March 30, 1977) in which the

PSC directs WEPCO to modify its accounts

of January 1977.

7 Subsequent to the March 2, 1979

Order, the PSC has ordered expenses

relating to the Haven power facility am-

ortized "starting with the completion of

the next rate case by each applicant."

Public Service Comm'n order of February

14, 1980 in Docket No. 05-CE-3 (Haven

order).

8 Section 196.06, Stats.

9 Section 227.20, Stats.

10 Other subsections of § 227.20

provide grounds for reversal or remand of

administrative decisions, but the other

grounds are not relevant to this appeal.

11 Section 227.21, Stats.

12 Seebach v. PSC, 97 Wis 2d 712,

717, 295 NW2d 753, 757 (Ct App 1980).

13 In reaching its conclusion that

the expenditures were charged to share-

holders, the circuit court adopted the

reasoning of WPS. WPS described its

financing as having only two sources:

stockholders and ratepayers. Since the

194

amortization in one year had the prac-

tical effect of precluding the expendi-

tures from appearing on the utilities’

books in a rate case year, the expendi-

tures were not charged to ratepayers.

The circuit court, then, was forced to

accept the conclusion that the expendi-

tures were charged to stockholders.

The same reasoning can be used to

conclude that the expenditures were

charged to ratepayers. For example, when

the expenditures were charged to

accounts, they were charged to operating

accounts. Since stockholder equity is

not used to pay operating expenses, the

expenditures were not charged to stock-

holders. Therefore, the expenditures

were charged to ratepayers. Since the

same reasoning can produce either conclu-

sion, the reasoning is defective.

Moreover, the reasoning creates

conceptual difficulty because it appears

to set rates retrospectively. Rates are

only set prospectively. The PSC found

that these monies were spent and were of

no value to ratepayers. Yet, WPS con-

tends that in order not to charge share-

holders, future rates must permit the

Opportunity to recover the costs from

ratepayers. If such recovery is permit-

ted, future ratepayers pay for previously

incurred costs. The ratemaking, then, is

made retrospectively for those costs.

195

14 the account numbers refer to

accounts in the Uniform System of

Accounts. The Uniform System of Accounts

is an accounting system developed by the

National Association of Regulatory Util-

ity Commissioners and used by the PSC to

provide a format for utility bookkeeping.

Section 227.01(11) (s), Stats., exempts

the PSC from promulgating the system as

an administrative rule.

15 In WPS's brief-in-chief and at

oral argument, WPS stressed that the

March 2, 1979 Order directed the util-

ities to amortize expenditures retro-

actively to January 1979. Counsel's

stress on retroactivity implied that it

is objectionable. Since WPS argues for

purposes of the mootness issue that

retroactive accounting orders are

accepted practice, we do not consider any

question relating to retroactivity.

16 For example, WPS cites: In Re

Northern States Power Co., 83 PUR3d 176,

2-U-744 (1970); In Re Bonduel Tele. Co.,

87 PUR2d 107, 2-U-6986 (1970); Applica-

tion of the City of Two Rivers, 42 PSCW

Rep 420, 2-U-4790 (July 29, 1957). Brief

for respondent, at 10-ll.

17 Por example, WPS cites: PSC

order, Koshkonong Docket, October 18,

1974; PSC order, Docket 05-CE-3,

February 14, 1980.

196

18 Por example, WPS cites: Peti-

tion of Consolidated Edison of New York,

Inc., Case No. 9187; Petition of New York

State Elec. & Gas Co., Rate Case No.

26763; Application of Virginia Elec. &

Power Co., Case No. 19960 (March 19,

1979); Application of Consumers Power

Co., Case No. F-700; Application of Con-

sumers Power Co., Case No. U-4840; 14 PUR

4th 370, 391; Application of the Detroit

Edison Co., Case No. F-762; Application

of San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Decision

No. 90405 (June 5, 1979). Brief for

respondent, at 20-22.

19 Brief for respondent, at 3.

20 The requirements of procedural

due process are notice and hearing. Mid-

Plains Tel., Inc. v. PSC, 56 Wis 2d 780,

785-86, 202 NW2d 907, 909-10 (1973). The

record shows that both requirements are

well satisfied.

21 Brief for respondent, at 6.

22 For example, WPS cites:

New England Telephone and

Telegraph Company v. Department

of Public Utilities, 121 NE2d

896 (Mass 1954); New England

Telephone and Telegraph Company

v. Department of Public Util-

ities, 275 NE2d 493 (Mass

1971); Central Maine Power Com-

pany v. Public Utilities

197

Commission, 136 A2d 726 (Maine

1957); New England Telephone

and Telegraph Company v. Public

Utilities Commission, 390 A2d 8

(Maine 1978); Boise Water Cor-

poration v. Idaho Public Util-

ities Commission, 555 Pld 163

(Idaho 1976); Application of

Wilmington Suburban Water Cor-

poration, 211 A2d 602 (Del

1965); New England Telephone

and Telegraph v. State, 64 A2d

9 (NH 1949); Petition of New

England Telephone and Telegraph

Company, 66 A2d 135 (Vt 1949);

Application of Diamond State

Telephone Company, 149 A2d 324

(Del 1959); Public Service

Commission v. Ely Light and

Power Company, 393 P2d 305 (Nev

1964). Brief for respondent,

at 16.

23 Transcontinental, 518 F2d at

465.

24 Robertson Trans. Co. v. PSC, 39

Wis 2d 653, 657, 159 NW2d 636, 638

(1968).

198

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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