Opposition Brief — Ohio Power Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief1984

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. AS

On the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcToBER TERM, 1984

Oxn10 Power COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut, II

Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL

JANET L. STECKEL

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals, in reviewing the promulga-

tion by the Environmental Protection Agency of air pollu-

tion emission limitations pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. 7401 et seq., properly remanded for further consid-

eration one of the agency’s factual determinations which the

court found unsupported by the administrative record,

without ordering repromulgation of the agency’s emission

limitation in its entirety.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

7 Page

Co ciS se Le cicisihesdevccasbectsecces |

EEE Tc. pobechesnh pacesugsesoipeceveess |

EE Eas Dhlica nn'n oo ak bbb Gelne ob MED abeedpecne 2

PE ilies bani eds dis oo kdo hac ehae ss oe 6 o'ssece 7

SE Cees en dedes sss ae pene see es Vee dovecces 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Importers Assn v. CAB

Ge MEU EG Se wSs bles iics bec ccvccee li

American Meat Institute v. EPA,

ED os Ws bie s BWW ein ci ccveves 11

Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1 ......... 11, 12

ASH VeCAB, TIS 2B TOS: vieceviviovccccccvtee 12

Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 ............ 7

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United

CPT PEE cccccceovssdvosccccccce 10

California Cartage Co. v. United States,

DTM Cetcacccedneaeecebeccatccese 12

SE a PUREE Gilets EOD ccc ccccccccccccace 9

Central Power & Light Co. v. United :

IIIT a vaccccenepecscccece 11, 12

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.

We VOIR Wels TES pacccncccccccccscccccs 9

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.

EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, cert. denied,

NINE Fa SUS 500 b0 Fad cc cee sccccccces 2

IV

Page

Cases—Continued:

Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co. v.

Castle; GIB FAO SIO: .cccccicevcvvcccveveass 8

CPC International, Inc. vy. Train,

ee aes as os os os Sma batan 11

Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,

Be EE has Ve ddWeen ide ves ceseweee 11, 12

EDF, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 ........ee8: 12

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,

Dee Che i na ch ee ek eave cehees tes g

FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 ........cceeees 4

FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 .......+6-- 11

FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

COPD .; Ge SAS Heber nrenccresccecs 7, 10

FTC v. Colgate- Palmolive Co.,

PE rl Oda ae oes kn onc. tae tee 7

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305

SE a isle nik sow ede tikind dee oe eres 10, 11

Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d

SEE acbick cthud ovuhhedl kekeeed sees are 11

International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,

478 F.2d 615 ........ OP EEE AP LOO 11

Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General

SE Os ee SE con Cha bccbdvercdves 7

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d

RY RRINR ERIE Oa Say 2 eA ATS GE 11

Page

Cases—Continued:

League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v.

Troundary, 598 F.2d 1164, cert. denied,

Ge Adnan AentrenAvibanAchesceccecce 9

Montana- Dakota Utilities Co. vy. FERC,

EE nec kath tens veanbardeneeess 12

NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519 ..... cc cceeceees 11

New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution

VFR PEt PM NEED cocccevicdecccivvcce 11

Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC,

a neice es hanes cane me 12

Rodway v. Department of Agriculture,

EE ic ceed k dake on onpe 4s es 11

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.

eh hi cee eke a wa eye ene ss be bes 9

Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 ...... 1

Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 ........+650% 9

Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v.

pi My we ey Pe eee 9

South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d

GR i dee etwas Chas de was eenkne epee 11, 12

State of New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d

BRE Te a a oe C8 Ce a eee 11

Tabor v. Joint Board for Enrollment of

ACME, FO Tn TOP. cha cpeccencccccecoss 12

Train. v. NRDC, 421 U.S. Qiviccsic deine ccccccces 2

United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d |

1152, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 ............. 7

VI

Page

Cases—Continued:

United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,

GAD AIR i ink wei CARA 4 Ge eRNARES eo ce 11

United Steelworkers v. Marshall,

GOT Fi OO ik. i sits ee Dake 6 le wn deuesee 11

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

NRDC, Brac, 435 UiS. SUD kc cviccccvivveaee 10

Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA,

GS DOR: 6s os FER RH Gh io i854 eae 11, 12

Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 ........eeeeee 7

Statutes:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

551 et seq. :

FRR obs oka bs aes wed pviee 14

as oe a's aks veh wees Mebane ee 8

SU es EE oo oe nied nc cc bwenavecens 11, 12

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et. seq. .......... 1

§ 110(a), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a) ............20-- 2

§ 110(c), 42 U.S.C. 7410(c) ...........50es 2

§ 306(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7606(b)(1) ........... 2

§ 306(d), 42 U.S.C. 7606(d) ............ 5, 15

§ 307(d), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d) ...........06-- 6

§ 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1) ........... 4

§ 307(d)(8), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(8) .......... 15

§ 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9) ........ 9, 15

§ 307(d)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C.

TEOHGNOMA) 2. cccccccccccccccccccces 6

Vil

Page

Statutes—Continued:

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.

No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 et seg. ........eceeeee 2

MFP a 6ccin'e sé 0 vie dé oes esos y

oe ee ede cbeebvisececese y

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C.

CT chi werccdcncccccces 2

en cose etaneserere 8-9

Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a),

Oe chsh ba cbkbicdescicevevecess Q

Miscellaneous:

H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-564, 95th Cong.,

Se Eo U st kok iro ses ccvcedovcsncece 4

41 Fed. Reg. 36324 (1976) ......... esha ew een 2

OF es I Fie RIFT 6 ooo. 0.00.0 5000 ob o00 0 4, 13

In the Supreme Court of the Huited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-195

OHIO POWER COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

_ ETAL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-8a) is

reported at 729 F.2d 1096. A previous opinion of the court

of appeals (Pet. App. 9a-22a) is reported at 578 F.2d 660.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 96a-97a)

was entered on March 22, 1984. A petition for rehearing

was denied on May 8, 1984 (Pet. App. 98a). The netition for

a writ of certiorari was filed on August 3, 1984. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,

84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1857 et seq.,' directed the

United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to

ensure that a plan for the control of air pollution is estab-

lished in each state. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60

(1975). The State of Ohio failed to develop a plan for the

control of sulfur dioxide pollution that satisfied the

requirements of Section 1 10(a), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a). Accord-

ingly, as required by Section 1 10(c), 42 U.S.C. 7410(c), EPA

promulgated its own control plan for sulfur dioxide emis-

sions in Ohio, including limitations on power plants oper-

ated in Ohio by petitioner. 41 Fed. Reg. 36324 (1976).

Shortly thereafter, petitioner and others sought judicial

review of the plan in the court of appeals pursuant to

Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The court of

appeals issued two decisions. Its first decision, issued Feb-

ruary 13, 1978, concerned questions applicable to all utility

companies involved in the appeal. It held that the EPA

hearings on the control plan were procedurally adequate

and approved the computer model used by EPA to set

emission standards for pollution sources in urban areas.

Cleveland Electric Iluminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).

In its second decision, the procedural aspects of which are

challenged in the instant petition, the court of appeals

reviewed the methods EPA used to set emission limitations

for pollution sources in rural areas (Pet. App. la-8a). The

court approved EPA’s plan for controlling the ambient air

affected by four rural sources of air pollution in Ohio.? It

'The Clean Air Act is now 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg. See Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 e seq..

7Two of the four sources were power plants operated by petitioner.

See Pet. App. 2a, n.1.

3

also affirmed EPA's specific emission limitations developed

for those sources and the agency's modeling techniques (the

MAXT-24 model)’ for predicting the sources’ sulfur diox-

ide pollution, with one exception (Pet. App. 2a, 10a-13a,

17a-22a). That exception involved EPA's use in the approved

MAXT-24 model of what was termed the “Class A assump-

tion” or “Class A co-efficient” in determining pollution

dispersion under “least stable” wind conditions in rural

areas of complex terrain (Pet. App. 4a, 16a-17a).4 The

emission limitations for petitioner’s power plants, among

others, had been determined by employing the Class A

assumption in the MAXT-24 model (Pet. App. 72a-73a).

The court held that “{o]n this present record” the use of

the Class A assumption was “arbitrary and capricious”

(Pet. App. 16a). It noted that EPA’s justification for using

the Class A assumption was that no better solution had

been proposed. The court found that the record did not

show that EPA had considered adequately several studies

cited by industry petitioners that they claimed supported

the use of Class B stability coefficients. Therefore, the court

remanded for EPA to reconsider the question of the proper

coefficient to use in setting emission limitations under Class

A meteorological conditions, explicitly setting the limits of

the remand (Pet. App. 17a):

This is also referred to as the CRSTER model (see Pet. App. 15a).

‘Meteorological conditions are classified into six categories of stabil-

ity (from Class A to Class F), representing the rate at which emissions

from a source would disperse in the atmosphere under those meteoro-

logical conditions. The categories were based on the relative stability of

the weather conditions, Class A being the least stable and Class F being

the most stable. Under the Class A conditions, the “plume” of emissions

from a source reaches the ground the most rapidly and directly. See Pet.

App. 13a-l4a.

4

By pointing out [a] proposed solution, we do not man-

date its acceptance by United States EPA. Our ulti-

mate action on this score is simply to remand this issue

to United States EPA for further study. This might

result in the writing of a new record which supplies the

now missing support for the use of Class A coefficients

for the least stable wind condition in rural counties, or

it might result in United States EPA‘s adoption of use

of the Class B coefficients for the two least stable wind

conditions, or it might result in a new record which

supports a wholly new solution.

Petitioner did not immediately seek review of that decision

in this Court. Several other parties did, but not on the issue

presented in the instant petition. This Court denied their

petitions for certiorari. 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).

In response to the court of appeals’ remand order, EPA

published a notice in the Federal Register stating its prelim-

inary conclusions and soliciting public comment on its

reconsideration of the use of the Class A assumption for the

least stable meteorological conditions. 44 Fed. Reg. 7798

(1979). In that notice, the agency also stated that the effect

of the court of appeals’ decision was to stay the application

of the emission limitations which were based on the Class A

assumption pending its reconsideration.

The agency’s decision on remand was issued on June 19,

1980 (Pet. App. 28a-59a). EPA’s review showed that the use

of the Class A assumption for least stable meteorological

conditions was justified, and therefore was correctly used in

setting the emission limitations for the four sources in ques-

tion. In reaching its decision, the agency had reconsidered

the arguments previously submitted by the utilities, includ-

ing petitioner, and had reviewed field data not previously

considered during the initial rulemaking. In addition, the

agency considered the comments submitted in response to

its February 1979 notice and evaluated new alternatives and

5

further data, as suggested by the comments. However, EPA

concluded that the commenters had provided no technical

basis to support changing the agency’s use of the Class A

assumption, and that, in fact, the latest data reviewed indi-

cated further support of the Class A assumption (Pet. App.

59a).

In July and August 1980, the utilities concerned, includ-

ing petitioner, petitioned EPA for reconsideration of its

June 19, 1980 decision. They alleged they had new informa-

tion to support changing the emission limitations and

further criticized the agency’s previous decision. After

reviewing the comments submitted, the agency, on Novem-

ber 3, 1980, rejected the petitions for reconsideration (Pet.

App. 7la-9la). EPA found that the data presented by the

petitioners either was not new and had been addressed

before or was not relevant to the issue at hand (Pet. App.

76a-80a). In addition, the agency found that the petitioners’

renewed objections to its June 19, 1980 decision did not

warrant a revision in the original emission limitations (Pet.

App. 80a-90a). On the same day, EPA restarted the com-

pliance schedules and revised the attainment dates in the

Ohio state implementation plan for the sources in question,

noting that the application of the emission limitations had

been stayed pending its review of the Class A assumption

(Pet. App. 63a-70a).

Various parties again petitioned the court of appeals for

review of EPA’s decision. Petitioner herein, along with the

other utilities, raised extensive criticisms of the factual basis

for EPA’s decision to retain the use of the Class A assump-

tion. They also claimed that the agency’s reconsideration of

the issue was procedurally unsound because it had failed to

give a meaningful opportunity for notice and comment.

Finally, the utilities asserted that EPA had improperly

failed to repromulgate, pursuant to Section 306(d) of the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7606(d), the emission limitations

6

applicable to their power plants, which they believed had

been vacated in the court of appeals’ previous remand

order.

The court of appeals affirmed EPA’s decision (Pet. App.

la-8a). It noted that it had previously approved all aspects

of EPA’s implementation plan for Ohio, except its use of

the Class A assumption to determine pollution dispersion

under least stable wind conditions in rural areas. That

ruling, the court pointed out, was based on its view that the

administrative record presented in that appeal was inade-

quate to support the choice of the Class A assumption and,

therefore, the case was remanded for further consideration

of that issue. Pet. App. 4a-5a. Thus, the court ruled (Pet.

App. Sa):

[TJhe sole issue of practical significance before this

court at this time is the question as to whether or not

the EPA, since the remand, has properly carried out

this court’s mandate to undertake further study of the

basis for the use of Class A coefficients, and whether, if

so, the record now supports EPA's renewed determina-

tion that the Class A coefficients should continue to be

used for power plants in rural areas.

Rejecting what it termed “many newly stated arguments

from EPA’s opponents,” the court held “that we carefully

limited the remand to a single issue and that we should now

decide only that issue” (Pet. App. 6a). The court agreed with

EPA that full repromulgation proceedirgs under Section

307(d) of the Clean Air Act had not been required, since the

proceedings on remand had not constituted promulgation

or revision of an implementation plan (Pet. App. 6a n.2).

Applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review

in Section 307(d)(9)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

7607(d)\(9)(A), the court found that the agency’s reaffirma-

tion of the use of the Class A assumption was proper (Pet.

App. 6a-8a).

7

ARGUMENT

The only issue raised in the petition involves the format of

the 1978 decision: petitioner challenges the propriety of the

court of appeals’ procedure of remanding EPA’s promulga-

tion of an air pollution implementation plan for Ohio for

reconsideration simply of the one factual finding not sup-

ported by the administrative record. That decision was

correct, and does not conflict with any decision of this

Court or of any other court of appeals.5 Accordingly, and

particularly in light of EPA’s consideration of petitioner’s

objections on the remand, further review by this Court is

not warranted.

‘Although petitioner now contends (Pet. 6) that the question pre-

sented is “an important and unsettled question of administrative law,” it

neither sought this Court's review of that question in 1978, nor raised

the question in its second petition for review in the court of appeals.

Instead, petitioner merely assumed that the court of appeals had

vacated the emission limitation, and argued, based on that assumption,

that EPA should repromulgate the rule. The challenge to the 1978 order

raised here was first made in the petition seeking rehearing of the court

of appeals’ 1984 order — too late for that court to consider it. See

Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d

1285, 1295-1296 (8th Cir. 1977); Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384,

385-389 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152,

1158 (Sth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972). This Court does

not ordinarily decide questions that have not been properly raised for

consideration by the courts below. See, e.g. Youakim v. Miller, 425

U.S. 231, 234-235 (1976).

We do not here challenge petitioner’s claim (Pet. 2, 6 n.5) that this

Court now has jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s objections to the

1978 order. But cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,

378-379 (1965) (suggesting that issues presented only in first appeal

from agency order would be barred on review of second appeal).

Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that challenges alleging that the

reviewing court has overstepped the bounds of its authority in remand-

ing to the agency for further consideration should not be delayed.

“Clearly the effect of the [remand] order is immediate and irreparable,

and any review by this Court of the propriety of the order must be

immediate to be effective” (FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331 (1976)). This Court should accordingly reject

petitioner's attempt further to delay the implementation of the emission

limitations imposed on it.

1. Petitioner insists here, as i: did ir. the court of appeals,

that the court in 1978 found EPA’s emission limitation

invalid and therefore should have vacated and remanded

that rule for repromulgation (see Pet. 6, 7,9, 10). Petitioner

still seems unwilling to concede that the court below knew

and said precisely what it intended to do. In fact, the court

made the simple finding that EPA’s decision that the Class

A coefficient was the most accurate representation of the

dispersion of air pollution under certain meteorological

conditions was not supported “{oJn the present record,” and

should be given further consideration by the agency (see

pages 2-4, supra).* The question presented by the petition,

then, is equally simple — whether a court may properly

remand an agency’s determination on one issue for further

consideration without also vacating the overarching rule-

making.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim (Pet. 11-15), the court of

appeals’ remand was completely harmonious with this

Court’s view of the proper role of courts in the review of

agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and other statutes.” A review of this

6Petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 5 n.3) that the court of appeals’ mandate

in its 1978 decision was unclear is not believable. As petitioner notes, the

Sixth Circuit did, in a different case, Columbus & Southern Ohio

Electric Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910, 911 (1980), off-handedly state that

the emission limitations had been set aside. But that reference could not

have confused petitioner here, since it came well after EPA had under-

taken the reconsideration required by the remand. Furthermore, the

clarity of the 1978 remand order was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit itself

when, in its 1984 opinion here, it noted that its previous decision had

“carefully limited the remand to a single issue” (Pet. App. 6a). Thus, the

court’s reference in Columbus to the emission limitations was a mis-

taken one, which should have had no effect on petitioner here.

7Petitioner makes a curious attempt (Pet. 12 n.8) to show that the

APA and not the Clean Air Act governed the court of appeals’ review in

1978 of EPA's emission limitations. This claim is wrong. The court's

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from EPA's promulgation of the

1976 implementation plan derived from the Clean Air Amendments

9

Court’s decisions on which petitioner relies shows the

Court’s concern has always been to ensure that courts do

not encroach too far into the realm properly occupied by

the administrative agencies. Thus, the Court has turned

aside lower court attempts, when an administrative record

is inadequate to support an agency action, either to delve

into the record itself in order to supply an appropriate

explanation® or to conduct its own de novo factual proceed-

ings.? Likewise, the Court has prohibited lower courts from

of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1707. The 1977 amend-

ments to the Clean Air Act (Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305(a), 91 Stat. 772)

added Section 307(d)(9), which states that the court of appeals “may

reverse” any EPA action enumerated in Section 307(d)(1) which is

found to be “arbitrary and capricious.” The 1977 amendments were to

be effective immediately, pursuant to Section 406 of Pub. L. No. 95-95,

91 Stat. 795, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a) (91 Stat. 1405).

See League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Troundary, 598 F.2d 1164,

1172-1173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979). Thus, review of

EPA’s implementation plan in 1978 was governed by the Clean Air Act,

as the court of appeals correctly noted (Pet. App. 16a).

However, as petitioner notes, Congress intended that the Clean Air

Act’s standard of review should reflect the same rigorous standard

previously applied by the courts to review Clean Air Act regulations

under the APA. H-R. Conf. Rep. 95-564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 178

(1977). The legislative history does not address the change in language

from the APA’s direction that unlawful agency actions “shall” be “set

aside” to that in the Clean Air Act, which states that courts “may

reverse” unlawful EPA actions. While the Clean Air Act language

would seem more permissive, the courts have considered their duties

under that statute, in this respect at least, to be the same as under the

APA. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705

F.2d 506, 519-520, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684

F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,

391-392 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We see no reason to dispute this since, as

shown below, the court of appeals’ remand order was proper under the

APA standard.

*FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-

casting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).

%Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve-Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194 (1947).

10

dictating to agencies the manner in which remand proceed-

ings should be handled.'° The remand order of the court of

appeals here, then, was in keeping with this Court’s rulings.

The agency determination found unsupported by the record

was remanded for further proceedings, leaving EPA free to

determine how best to remedy the flaw in the record and

what actions to take once that flaw had been corrected. The

court of appeals’ order thus fully respected the agency’s

prerogatives. See note 17, infra.

In addition, in defining the courts’ proper role, this Court

has never imposed the sort of “all or nothing” review powers

that petitioner advocates. Rather, the Court decided in

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939), that

remand for further proceedings on distinct issues was

proper and “familiar appellate practice” (305 U.S. at 373).

Indeed, the Court found that review procedure particularly

appropriate in the review of agency action since its purpose

was “consonant with that of the administrative proceeding

itself, — to secure a just result with a minimum of technical

requirements” (ibid.). See also, Burlington Truck Lines,

Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 6-7) that the lower courts have

been confused and in conflict over whether partia! remand

for further proceedings is proper. In fact, quite the opposite

is true. The lower courts have followed Ford Motor Co.,

supra, in a remarkably consistent manner. Virtually every

circuit has recognized that it need not invalidate an other-

wise proper administrative action in its entirety because the

record fails adequately to support one or more findings

upon which the action is based, or because of procedural

errors. Indeed, the courts’ practice of remanding limited

issues for further consideration, or for correction of pro-

cedural errors, is most prevalent in the review of EPA

10 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S.

519 (1978); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S.

326 (1976).

regulations governing air and water pollution.'! Such judi-

cial restraint in this technologically complex area of regula-

tion is particularly warranted. The importance to the health

and safety of the public of the timely promulgation of such

regulations makes it impractical to require EPA to “start

from scratch” each time a court finds an error in the agen-

cy’s decision-making process, as petitioner advocates here.

In addition, the courts apply the same principle of review

authorized in Ford Motor Co., supra, in other regulatory

areas. !2

This established approach of the courts of appeals is not

in conflict with the dictates of Section 706(2) of the APA, as

petitioner insists (Pet. 11-12). Petitioner apparently believes

that that provision permits or requires the courts to “set

'' State of New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1980);

New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127,

1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478

F.2d 615, 649-650 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,

462 F.2d 846,850-851 (D.C. Cir. 1972); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,

504 F.2d 646, 665-666 (Ist Cir. 1974); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499

F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir.

1974); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979);

Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186(3d Cir. 1975); FMC Corp.

v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); Central Power & Light Co. v.

United States, 634 F.2d 137, 178 (Sth Cir. 1980); American Meat

Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); United States Steel

Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 576-577 (8th Cir. 1981); CPC Interna-

tional, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1050(8th Cir. 1975); Western Oil &

Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 812-813 (9th Cir. 1980).

'2Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1981) (OSHA

standards regulating employee exposure to inorganic arsenic); United

Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (OSHA

standards regulating employee exposure to lead); Rodway v. Depart-

ment of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (food stamp pro-

gram regulations); American Importers Ass'n v. CAB, 473 F.2d 168

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (CAB order approving international carrier’s agree-

ment limiting time freight may be held at an airport free of demurrage).

12

aside” only arbitrary and capricious “rules” (Pet. 12). In

fact, Section 706(2) is not so limited. It directs courts to set

aside arbitrary and capricious “action, findings and conclu-

sions.”!3 Indeed, the courts have recognized that their duties

under Section 706(2) of the APA coexist with their equit-

able discretion to fashion remand orders on discrete matters

for further proceedings. '¢

Thus, the format of the court of appeals’ 1978 remand

order is fully in compliance with this Court’s view of the

proper methods of judicial review of agency action. Despite

petitioner’s attempt selectively to paint a contrary picture, '*

it is also completely consistent with the views of other

\3There is no dispute here that the effect of the court of appeals’

decision was to set aside EPA’s reliance on the Class A assumption,

even though it did not explicitly so order (see Pet. App. 94a-95a). The

agency treated that reliance as reversed and gave the matter full-blown

reconsideration on remand. See pages 4-5, supra.

\4See Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, supra; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n Vv.

EPA, supra; Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, supra; South Terminal

Corp. v. EPA, supra.

\SAIl of the circuits referred to by petitioner (Pet. 7) obviously do not

condemn the type of remand order fashioned by the court of appeals

here, since they each have done the same in the appropriate circumstan-

ces. See page 11 & notes 11-12, supra. In addition, none of the cases

cited by petitioner stands for the proposition that partial remand of the

record for further consideration is prohibited. In some, the agency’s

actions were simply incurably wrong and had to be vacated for new

proceedings. California Cartage Company v. United States, 721 F.2d

1199 (9th Cir. 1983); Montana- Dakota Utilities Co. v. FERC, 631 F.2d

557 (8th Cir. 1980). In others, while the agency action was vacated in

full, the courts did not prohibit another solution. ASH v. CAB, 713

F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d

803 (3d Cir. 1982); Tabor v. Joint Board for Enrollment of Actuaries,

566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In EDF, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275

(D.C. Cir. 1981), the court upheld the agency’s action, and therefore did

not address the proper scope of remand. The court in Central Power &

Light Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 137 (Sth Cir. 1980), as noted above

(page 11 n.11, supra), fashioned the same sort of remand order as did

the court of appeals here.

13

circuits on the propriety of partial remand for further

consideration.

2. Even if petitioner were correct on the merits, interven-

ing events have long since rendered harmless any error in

the format of the 1978 remand order. Petitioner’s complaint

that the court of appeals should have ordered repromulga-

tion of the emission limitations, as well as reconsideration

of EPA’s reliance on the Class A assumption, presents a

distinction without a difference. EPA treated the applica-

tion of the emission limitations to petitioner as stayed by the

court of appeals during its reconsideration of the Class A

assumption (Pet. App. 64a; 44 Fed. Reg. 7798 (1979)). The

Class A assumption was given a full airing and detailed

study by the agency, and was found to be the proper coeffi-

cient for setting emission limitations. '® Hence, the emission

limitations were reinstated, and the compliance timetables

restarted (Pet. App. 63a-70a), based on a then valid and

fully supporting record. Since the only flaw in the record on

which the emission limitations were based was then cor-

rected without a change in the result, there was no practical

need to reconsider the emission limitations themselves. !7

Petitioner does not challenge EPA’s substantive decision

to reinstate the use of the Class A assumption. Rather, it

puts forward only one reason why it was necessary to

repromulgate the emission limitations despite this decision.

It claims (Pet. 5, 14) that when EPA reconsidered the Class

A assumption it used a “different modeling procedure” than

it had in the initial rulemaking. Petitioner speculates that if

EPA had repromulgated the emission limitations with this

‘See pages 4-5 supra; Pet. App. 28a-68a; 44 Fed. Reg. 7798 (1979).

'7As EPA itself recognized, had another assumption been determined

more appropriate than Class A, promulgation of new emission limita-

tions would have been required (Pet. App. 58a).

14

change, it would have resulted in less stringent limitations,

and a savings to petitioner of $29 million.

In fact, EPA did use a different computer model on

remand in implementing the Class A assumption—the

“MPTER” model. This model had the capability of calcu-

lating concentrations of pollution at specific designated

locations which the previous model could not. Therefore,

the MPTER model was used because it provided more

accurate comparisons between model calculations and

monitor data (Pet. App. 87a-88a). However, EPA specifi-

cally found that, except for the increased predictive accu-

racy of MPTER, the two models were equivalent in most

respects (Pet. App. 88a). To be absolutely sure that the new

model would resuli in no change in the emission limitations,

EPA “remodeled” its calculations for petitioner’s power

plant using the MPTER, and compared the pollution con-

centrations found under both models. It found the differen-

ces in the two insignificant (Pet. App. 89a-90a). Thus, peti-

tioner’s claim that the change in the model used to

implement the Class A assumption necessitated the repro-

mulgation of the emission limitations is contradicted by the

record.

In any event, the agency recognized the right of the

parties before it t© seek revision of the emission limitations.

When petitioner here asked for reconsideration of the agen-

cy’s reaffirmation of the Class A assumption, EPA treated

the motion as a petition to revise the previously promul-

gated limitation rule pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(e)

(Pet. App. 74a-75a). EPA then extensively reviewed the

matters raised in the petition for reconsideration, which

15

largely presented allegedly new data to challenge the predic-

tive accuracy of the Class A assumption. The agency deter-

mined that none of the matters raised warranted a change in

the emission limitations, either because the data were not

new or because they were not relevant to the Class A

assumption’s predictive accuracy (see page 5, supra; Pet.

App. 75a-91a); the court of appeals agreed (Pet. App. 8a).

Thus, the failure of the court of appeals to order the

formal repromulgation of the emission limitations, with all

the attendant procedural trappings, even if incorrect, would

not be a basis for reversal of the 1978 decision. Even if

repromulgation under Section 307(d) had been required,

EPA’s actions on remand would have rendered any proced-

ural error harmless under Section 307(d)(8) of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(8), as the court of appeals itself held

(Pet. App. 6a in.2).!8

'*Under that Section, courts may not invalidate rules for procedural

errors if the errors were not so serious that there is substantia! likelihood

the rule would have been significantly changed without them. The cour’

of appeals referred to subsection (d)(9), which addresses the standard of

judicial review of rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act and

permits reversal for procedural error only when consistent with subsec-

tion (d)(8).

16

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut, Il

Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNeEL

Janet L. STECKEL

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1984

ri

ea > = ea

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.